| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | ||||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | ||||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | ||||||
| Year | ||||||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 49.50 | 10.00 | |||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (3.40) | (11.70) | |||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 13.30 | 30.90 | |||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 77.80 | 11.00 | |||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | 19.40 | (8.40) | |||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | (4.60) | 3.90 | |||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 80.50 | 14.60 | |||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 8.10 | 18.90 | |||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (2.50) | (14.80) | |||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (48.70) | (26.40) | |||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 2.50 | 37.20 | |||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 129.30 | 23.60 | |||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | 46.80 | (7.40) | |||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 14.50 | 6.40 | |||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 102.50 | 18.20 | |||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.80 | 32.30 | |||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | 31.80 | (5.00) | |||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 38.40 | 21.40 | |||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 69.00 | 22.40 | |||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | (2.70) | 6.10 | |||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 93.70 | 31.60 | |||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 14.20 | 18.60 | |||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 4.60 | 5.10 | |||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 59.30 | 16.60 | |||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 84.60 | 31.70 | |||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (23.10) | (3.10) | |||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 35.60 | 30.50 | |||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 29.80 | 7.60 | |||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 38.90 | 1.10 | |||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 25.00 | 1.30 | |||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 57.40 | 37.60 | |||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 6.20 | 23.00 | |||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 34.90 | 33.40 | |||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 52.20 | 28.60 | |||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | (19.90) | 21.00 | |||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | 26.60 | (9.10) | |||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | 6.50 | (11.90) | |||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (3.80) | (22.10) | |||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 15.80 | 28.70 | |||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 4.30 | 10.90 | |||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 0.80 | 4.90 | |||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 24.10 | 15.80 | |||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 28.70 | 5.50 | |||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (31.80) | (37.00) | |||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 2.70 | 26.50 | |||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 21.40 | 15.10 | |||||
| 2011 | 4.60 | (4.70) | 2.10 | |||||
| 2012 | 14.40 | 16.80 | 16.00 | |||||
| 2013 | 18.20 | 32.70 | 32.40 | |||||
| 2014 | 8.30 | 27.00 | 13.70 | |||||
| 2015 | 6.40 | (12.50) | 1.40 | |||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2012 | 19.4% | 21.6% | 9.90 | |||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2012 | 751113.0% | 1826163.0% | 11196.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*
波克夏·哈撒韋公司2015年的淨資產為154億美元，公司A類和B類股票的每股賬面價值增長6.4%。在過去的51年時間裡（即現有管理層接手公司開始），公司股票的每股賬面價值從19美元增加至155501美元，年復合增長率為19.2%。Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
在我們接手波克夏的前幾十年，波克夏公司的賬面價值與企業內在商業價值大致相等，後者也是真正重要的東西。這兩個數據存在相似之處是因為我們的大多數資產部署在有價證券，我們需要定期重新評估市場的報價（如果出售股票會有更少的稅收）。按照華爾街的說法，我們的大部分資產是“按市價計算的”。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.
然而，到了1990年代早期，我們的重點已經轉向企業的完全所有權，即減少了資產負債表數據的相關性。因為適用於控制公司的會計準則不同於評估公司有價證券的準則，造成損失的賬面價值通常被記下來，但帶來盈利的卻未曾重估。
We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
我們已經有過這樣的經歷：我做了一些愚蠢的投資，但我為那些公司經濟信譽投入的資金在之後被註銷，此舉降低了波克夏的賬面價值。同時，我們也有一些成功的投資，其中一些是非常大的，但卻沒能提高公司資產的賬面價值。
Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.
隨著時間的推移，相較於我們認可的處理方式，這種不對稱的會計處理必然擴大了公司內在價值與賬面價值之間的差距。在今天，我們不斷增長但卻未記錄的盈利清楚的表明伯克希公司的內在價值遠遠超過其賬面價值，這就是為什麼我們將股票回購的價格上限提高到票面價值的120%。在這個水平線上，回購對於波克夏剩餘的股東而言，會快速提高每股的內在價值。
The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate marketvalue gain – tabulated on the facing page – materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.
我們擁有的企業價值增加卻未重估，解釋了為什麼波克夏公司列在首頁上的市場價值變動收益，超出了我們賬面價值變動收益。
* Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.
*在這封信中，所有收入都是稅前收入，除非另有指定。
The Year at Berkshire
波克夏這一年
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:
波克夏副董事長、我的伙伴查理·孟格，和我都希望每年波克夏的標準盈利能力增加。當然，實際的年收入有時會因為美國經濟的疲軟而下降，或者可能因為保險大災難。在一些年份標準盈利會比較少，另一些年份會比較多。去年是收穫頗豐的一年，以下為去年的亮點：
The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent
波克夏在2015年期間最重要的發展不是金融，雖然它帶來了更好的收益。在2014年表現欠佳後，我們的BNSF（美國伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路運輸公司）在去年大幅改善了對客戶的服務。而為了實現這一目的，我們在資本支出中拿出了58億美元，遠超美國鐵路歷史的紀錄，並且幾乎是我們年度折舊費用的三倍，但它花的真值！
BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.
以噸/英里的收入來計算，BNSF公司在2015年佔有了美國城際貨運17%的市場份額，無論是通過鐵路，卡車，航空運輸，水或管道。在這方面，我們是美國七大鐵路公司（其中兩家在加拿大）中最強大的，噸/英里的貨運量超出距離我們最近的競爭對手45%。因此，我們保持一流的服務不僅對我們的托運人的至關重要，而且對美國經濟的平穩運行至關重要。
For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion* (a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.
對於大多數美國鐵路公司，2015年是令人失望的一年，貨運總里程減少，利潤也在降低。但對於BNFS而言，在保持規模的前提下，稅前利潤達到了68億美元（2014年為6.06億美元）。馬特·羅斯和卡爾·艾斯，BNSF的經理，感謝你們。
BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance businesses – earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.
BNSF是“五大發動機”中最大的那個，除了它，還有波克夏海瑟崴能源公司（BHE；前身是MidAmerican能源公司）、IMC（以色列金屬加工工具供應商）、Lubrizol以及Marmon，這些公司是波克夏最大的五個非保險企業，在2015的收入達到131億美元，較2014年增加了6.5億美元。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003. Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
在這五個巨頭中，2003年我們只擁有BHE，當時獲利3.93億美元，後來我們相繼以全現金相繼購買了剩下4個公司中的3個，然而在收購BNSF時，70%的費用我們用現金支付，剩下的發行波克夏股票使盈利數值增長了6.1%，我們的目標不是簡單的增加收入，也要保證我們的股票每股價值增長。
Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.
明年，我將要著手“第六大發動機”的建設。新的小伙伴叫Precision Castparts Corp（PCC），我們在一個月前花費320億美元收購了它。PCC與波克夏模式完美的融合，將大大提高我們的標準化每股盈利水平。
Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.
在首席執行官馬克·多尼根多帶領下，PCC已經成為航空零部件的世界頂級供應商（供應當中大多數會是原裝設備，但是備件對於公司來說也很重要）。馬克的成就讓我想起了雅各布·哈帕茲（Jacob Harpaz）在IMC中展示的法寶，兩名男子變換著很普通的材料，卻用在各大廠商不平凡的產品中，每一個產品都是馬克手下的奇蹟。
PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.
經過多年的合同交付，PCC的產品大都是大型飛機中的關鍵部件，13個國家的162個工廠裡，有30466名各行各業員工為公司服務。馬克在構建自己的商業帝國時，做了很多收購，將來會有更多，我們期待著波克夏加入後他的舉措。
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers – they each handle about $9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.
個人致謝：收購PCC如果沒有Todd Combs 的投入和幫助是無法成功的，他在數年前將這家公司帶到了我的視野中，並且一直告訴我這個行業的竅門以及馬克的事情。儘管Todd和Ted Weschler的主要職責都是投資經理—他們每人為我們處理著約90億美元的業務—但他們都積極、巧妙地通過各種方式為波克夏增加價值。僱傭這兩位是我所做過的最好的決定之一。
With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 101⁄4 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 1⁄4.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by
經過對PCC的收購，波克夏將擁有世界財富500強中的10.25家（我們擁有的27%卡夫亨氏股份就是那1/4）。還剩下不到98%的美國企業巨頭沒有給我們打電話。接線員已經就位。（注：巴菲特在這裡開了個玩笑）。
Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million, six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.
我們的非保險業務公司在去年為我們創造了57億美元的收入，高於2014年的51億美元。在集團內部，我們有1家公司去年盈利超過7億美元，2家盈利在4億-7億美元之間，7家盈利在2.5億-4億美元之間，11家盈利在5000萬到1億美元之間。我們愛死他們了：這個系列的公司不管在數量上還是在盈利上都會隨著時間逐漸增長。
When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.
當你聽到有人談論美國搖搖欲墜的基礎設施建設，放心，他們談論的並不是波克夏。我們在去年投資了160億美元的資產、廠房和設備，86%都建設在美國。
I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.
我在早些時候告訴過你們BNSF在2015年的資本支出記錄。在每一年的末尾，我們的鐵路設施建設較1年或是更早之前都會有提升。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.
BHE有著相同的故事。這家公司投資了160億美元到可再生能源事業裡，並且現在擁有著國家7%的風能發電和6%的太陽能發電。事實上，我們的公用事業所擁有並且運作的4423兆瓦的風力發電是第二名的6倍。
We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.
還沒完。去年，BHE在巴黎氣候大會上，為支持未來可再生能源的發展做出了重大承諾。我們履行這些承諾有著重大的意義，不僅僅是為了環境也是為了波克夏的理念。
Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
波克夏龐大的保險業務在2015年完成了承保盈利連續13年增長。這些年裡，那些不屬於我們、但我們可以將其用於為波克夏的盈利投資的流動資金—從410億美元增長到了880億美元。雖然，我們的流動資金在收入和規模上並沒有反映在波克夏的盈利上，但浮存金產生了龐大的投資收益，因為它允許我們持有資產。
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.
同時，我們的承保盈利在13年里達到了總計260億美元，包含著2015年盈利的18億美元。毋庸置疑，波克夏最大的未登記的財富存在於保險業之中。我們用了48年時間來創建一個無法被替代的多維的經營方式。
While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.
在查理和我尋找新的收購對象的時候，我們的很多子公司都在進行補強收購。去年我們進行了29項補強，計劃總耗資為6.34億美元，購買價格從30萬美元到1.43億美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.
查理和我都鼓勵補強，如果他們定價合理。（大部分交易報出的價格顯然不合理。）這些收購都將資本配置在由我們的經理管理的符合我們現有商業模式的運營中。這意味著，工作沒有增加，但波克夏的盈利更多了，這種結合我們發現非常有吸引力。我們在未來會做更多的補強性交易。
Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of $4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.)
在去年我們的亨氏與Jorge Paulo Lemann ，Alex Behring和Bernardo Hees都通過與卡夫的合併使其規模增加了1倍還多。在這筆交易之前，我們花費了42.5億美元購買亨氏的53%股份。現在，我們擁有3.254億股卡夫亨氏股份（約27%），成本為98億美元。新公司每年有著270億美元的銷售額，可以為你提供亨氏番茄醬或者芥末，來搭配你的來自卡夫的奧斯卡梅耶熱狗。再加上一個可口可樂，你就將享受到我最喜歡的一頓飯了（我們會在每年的大會上帶上奧斯卡梅耶的熱狗車——帶上你的孩子一起來。）
Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.
儘管我們並沒有出售卡夫亨氏的股票，“GAAP”（一般公認會計原則）要求我們記錄下我們在這場合併上投資的68億美元的賬單。這就使得我們控股的卡夫亨氏在我們資產負債表上顯示出的價值高於我們的成本數十億以上，卻比市場價值要低，這樣的結果只有一個會計會喜愛。
Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.
波克夏還擁有著卡夫亨氏的優先股，每年支付我們7.2億美元，並且還有7.7億美元在我們資產負債表上。卡夫亨氏幾乎肯定會在六月以83.2億美元贖回優先股（最早的可選日期），這對於卡夫亨氏來說將會是一個好消息，但對於波克夏來說就是個壞消息了。
Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.
Jorge Paulo和他的同伴是再好不過的合夥人了。我們與他們分享併購的激情，構建和創立更大的企業來滿足基本的需求和慾望。我們走著不同的道路，但是追求著同一個目標。
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.
他們的方法一直以來都非常的成功，通過併購能夠提供減少不必要成本機會，然後迅速地完成工作。他們的行為極大的提升了生產力，這是在過去240年里美國經濟增長的最重要的因素。衡量生產力提升的標準是每小時輸出更多的需要的商品和服務，如果沒有，會經濟不可避免地停滯不前。在美國大部分公司裡，提升生產力是可能的，這一事實給Jorge Paulo和他的同伴提供了機會。
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)
在波克夏，我們也渴望效率並且厭惡官僚主義。為了實現我們的目標，我們遵循並強調避免膨脹，收購像PCC這樣的公司，一直由注意價格和高效的經理來進行。在收購之後，我們的角色就僅僅是創造一個環境，那些CEO和他們的志趣相投的最終繼任者能夠在其中最大化他們的管理效率和來自工作的愉悅。（這種不干涉風格，是我從Mungerism的話中知道的：“如果你不想讓自己生活在痛苦之中，就不要帶著改變別人行為方式的目的去結婚。”）
We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.
我們將繼續以極端分散——當然，幾乎聞所未聞——的方式來運營波克夏。但是我們也會尋找機會，作為一個融資夥伴來和Jorge Paulo合作，就像他的集團收購了Tim Horton's 一樣，或者作為股權融資夥伴，就像亨氏一樣。我們也會偶爾和他人合作，就像我們和Berkadia成功做過的那樣。
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.
然而，波克夏只會和合夥人做友好的收購。誠然，某些惡意收購是事出有因的：一些CEO忘記了他們在為哪些股東工作，同時其他的經理也是嚴重的不稱職。不論哪種情況，董事可能會無視問題所在或者只是簡單地不情願對需求做出改變。這時就需要新人了。我們會把這些“機會”留給其他人。在波克夏，我們只去歡迎我們的地方。
Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.
波克夏公司去年在它的“四大”投資——美國運通、 可口可樂、IBM 和富國都增加了所有者權益。我們購入了更多IBM和富國的股份（到2014年年末我們對IBM的股權從7.8 %增加到8.4%，對富國的股權從9.4%增加到9.8%）。在其他兩家公司，可口可樂公司和美國運通，股票回購也提高了我們所有權的百分比。我們在可口可樂公司的股權從9.2%增長到9.3%，對美國運通的股份從14.8%上升到15.6%。倘若你覺得這些看似小小的改變並不重要，我們可以做一個算術：波克夏在這四家公司的權益總和每增加一個百分點，獲得的年收益就會增加5億美元。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
這四個投資對象擁有優秀的業務，而且都由那些既有才華又維護股東利益的人員管理。它們帶來的有形資產的回報非常可觀甚至驚人。在波克夏，比起完全擁有一個一般的公司，我們更喜歡擁有優秀公司的某些實質部分，儘管它不受我們控制。正如擁有所有的水鑽都不如擁有希望之鑽的部分所有權。
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
如果以波克夏公司的年終控股來計算，我們在“四大公司”2015年的股權收入達47億美元。然而，在我們向你報告的收益中，我們只計算他們的分紅——去年約18億美元。但毫無疑問：我們沒有報告的這些公司近30億美元的收入和我們記錄下來的部分每一分都有同樣的價值。
The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.
我們的投資對象保留的收入通常用於回購自己的股票——這是一項增加波克夏未來收益的比重，而不需要我們付出一分錢的舉動。這些公司留存的收益也用來創造生意機會，通常最後都會發現是有利的。所有這些讓我們相信，這四個投資對象每股的收益總體上將隨著時間的推移而大幅增長。如果確實有收益，給波克夏的股息就會增加，因此，我們未來的資本收益也會增加。
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.
相比僅限於收購他們會運作的公司，我們在資本配置上的靈活性——具體來說，我們被動地在非控制企業上大額投資的意願——給了我們很大的優勢。伍迪·艾倫曾說，雙性戀的優勢在於它讓你周六晚上找到約會的機會加倍。以相似的方式——當然，並不完全一樣的方式——既願意運作企業，又願意被動投資的胃口加倍了波克夏為其無盡井噴的現金找到明智的使用方式的機率。除此之外，擁有巨額的有價證券組合給我們提供了存在重大收購時可以利用的資金儲備。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.
今年是個選舉年，候選人們不會停止討論我們國家的問題（當然，這些問題只有他們能解決）。這種消極宣傳的結果是，很多美國人現在認為他們的孩子不能像他們那樣生活得好。
That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
這種觀點大錯特錯：今天在美國出生的嬰兒是歷史上最幸運的孩子。
American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.
美國人現在的人均GDP為56000美元。就像我去年提到的——實質上是我出生的那年，1930年人均GDP的驚人的六倍，這遠遠超出了我的父母和他們同時代的人最瘋狂的夢想。今天的美國公民不是本質上比以前更聰明，也不是比1930的人更加努力工作。而是工作得更加有效率從而產出更高。這種強力的趨勢會確切地延續下去：美國的經濟魔力保持良好和活力。
Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.
一些評論家哀嘆我們現在每年2%的實際GDP增長——是的，我們都希望看到更高的增長率。但是讓我們用過分悲觀的2%的數字做一下簡單的數學計算。我們會看到，增長帶來了驚人的收益。
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net
migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive.
But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita.
(Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.)
In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation.
Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians
need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.
Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few – transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.
確實，今天的孩子大部分都不錯。我所有中產階級的鄰居都定期享受比約翰·D·洛克菲勒在我出生時更好的生活水平。他無與倫比的財富買不到我們現在擁有的，無論是什麼領域——僅舉幾個——交通、娛樂、通信或醫療服務。洛克菲勒當然有權力和名聲，不過他不能活得像我的鄰居現在一樣好。
Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.
儘管由下一代分享的餡餅會比今天的大得多，它將被如何劃分仍將被激烈爭議。就像是現在這樣，在勞動力和退休人員之間，健康和體弱者之間，繼承者和霍雷肖·阿爾杰之間，投資者與工人之間，特別是那些市場都十分看重的人才和同樣努力的缺乏市場技能的美國人之間會為了更多的產品和服務而奮鬥。這種衝突永遠在我們身邊——並將永遠繼續。國會將會是戰場，金錢和選票將是武器。遊說將是保持增長的產業。
The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)
然而，好消息是即使是“落敗”那一方的成員也將幾乎肯定可以享受——正如他們應該的那樣——將來比他們在過去所擁有的遠遠更多的商品和服務。他們增加的獎金的質量會也顯著改善。在生產人們想要的商品上，沒有什麼能競爭的過市場系統，在提供人們還不知道他們需要的商品上更是如此。我的父母年輕的時候，無法想像一台電視機，我在我50多歲的時候，也不曾認為我需要一台個人電腦。這兩種產品，當人們看見他們能做什麼之後，迅速徹底改變了他們的生活。我現在一周花十個小時在網上打橋牌。而且，當我寫這封信時，“搜索”功能對於我來說是十分寶貴的。不過我還沒準備好使用Tinder（一款手機交友APP）。
For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.
240年來，和美國打賭一直是一個可怕的錯誤，而且現在仍然不是開始的時候。美國的商務與創新的金鵝將繼續下更多和更大的蛋。美國對社會保障的承諾將兌現，也許會更慷慨。而且，是的，美國的孩子們的生活將遠比他們的父輩要好。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
考慮到這種有利的形勢，波克夏（要肯定的是，其他許多企業也一樣）幾乎肯定會蓬勃發展。那些查理和我的繼任經理們將根據以下我們簡單的藍圖，增加波克夏的每股股票的內在價值：
1．不斷改善我們眾多附屬公司的基本盈利能力；
2．通過補強併購進一步增加他們的收益；
3．從增長的投資中獲益；
4．在相對於內在價值而言具有有意義的折扣時回購波克夏股票；
5．偶爾進行大型收購。管理部門也會通過少量發行波克夏的股份（如果有的話），盡量使你的收益最大化。
Intrinsic Business Value
企業內在價值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.
儘管查理和我經常談論企業內在價值，我們還是無法告訴你們波克夏公司股票的確切價值（而且，事實上，對任何股票都是如此）。但是我們可以做一個合理的估計。我們在2010年的年度報告中提出了三個因素，我們相信其中一個定性的因素是我們對波克夏公司的內在價值進行估計的關鍵。關於這個問題的討論會在113-114頁進行完整的再現。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses – including insurance underwriting income – increased 2.1% to $12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax.
在這裡對兩個定量的因素進行更新：2015年我們的每股現金和投資增加8.3%，至159794美元（包括我們擁有的卡夫亨氏股份在市場的價值），而且我們從許多生意中賺錢— —包括保險承銷收入——每股收益增加2.1%至每股12304美元。在第二個因素中，我們從我們持有的投資中剔除股息和利息，因為他們會產生重複計算的值。在計算我們的收入時，我們扣除所有的企業開銷、利息、折舊費、攤銷和少數股東權益，但不扣除所得稅。也就是說，我們計算的是稅前收入。
I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.
我在上面的段落中使用斜體，是因為我們第一次加入保險承銷業務收入。當我們最初介紹波克夏公司兩個支柱性定量因素的估值時，之所以沒有計算在內，是因為我們保險業務的結果深受災難覆蓋範圍的影響。如果沒有颶風和地震，我們會獲得豐厚的利潤。但是一場大災難就會產生虧損。為了保守的闡述我們的商業收入，我們一貫假定保險業務會盈虧平衡，從而在第二個因素的年度計算中忽略保險業務所有的收入和損失。
Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed $1,118 per share to the $12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.
今天，我們的保險業務很可能更穩定，因為相比於十幾二十年前，我們讓大型災難變得不那麼重要，極大地拓展了作為我們主要收入來源的業務線。參照這部分的第二段，去年，保險承銷收入在我們每股12304美元的收益中貢獻了1118美元。在過去的十年中，保險承銷收入平均每年達到每股1434美元，而且我們預計在之後的大部分年份中都會贏利。但是你應該認識到，保險承銷業務在任何一年都有可能無利可圖或是大賺。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings.
自1970年以來，我們的每股投資以18.9%的年均增長率增長，收入（包括在第一年和最後一年的保險承銷業務收入）的增長率達到23.7%。波克夏公司的股票價格在接下來的45年，增長速度與我們兩種因素測量的值非常相似並不是巧合。查理和我喜歡通過這兩個領域去理解收益，但是我們的主要目標是建立關於營業利潤可複制的模型。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)
現在，讓我們用我們的操作方法去檢查4個主要部門。與其他部門相比，它們每個都有截然不同的資產負債表和收入特點。我和查理會視他們為四個獨立的業務（儘管把他們放在同一屋簷下有重要和持久的經濟優勢）。我們的目的是為您提供我們在你們的位置上會希望獲取的信息，就像你們是報表經理而我們是缺席股東。（別激動，我們並沒有考慮和你們互換職務）。
Insurance
保險
Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.
先看看保險業，自從我們在1967年以860萬美元的價格，收購了國家賠償和它的姊妹公司國家火災與海事保險公司以來，這個行業的財產-意外險（P/C）分支就是推動我們擴張的動力所在，今天，從淨市值來算，國家賠償是世界上最大的財產-意外險保險公司。不僅如此，它的內在價值遠超我們在書中表達的那些。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我們喜歡P/C行業的原因是因為它的經濟特點：P/C行業的承保人先收取擔保費，而後才會支付索賠。在一些極端的例子中，比如某一位工人的事故補償金，支付期限甚至可以長達好幾十年。這種“現在收取，隨後支付”的模式讓P/C公司擁有一大筆現金，我們稱之為浮存金，這些錢最終都會進入別人的口袋。但同時，這些承保人可以用這些浮存金來為自己謀利益。雖然個人的保險單和補償金來來回回，但整個承保機構的公開流通股票總額卻保持在一個與擔保費總量相關的相對穩定的水平。因此，隨著我們公司的業務增長，我們的公開流通股票也在增長。我們的增長之路，如下面的圖表所示：
Year Float (in millions)
1970 $ 39
1980 237
1990 1,632
2000 27,871
2010 65,832
2015 87,722
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised.
想要在浮存金上獲取更多收益比較困難。一方面，GEICO和許多像我們這樣的專業操作公司都已經在高速增長。國家賠償保險公司的再保險業務與大多數因為浮存金快速下滑而即將不再投保的合同相關。如果我們在浮存金正遭受下降的時候及時操作，這將會變得十分緩慢（外界看來速度不會超過每年增長3%）。但是我們保險合同的自然屬性就是這樣，讓我們不可能承受對於資金的快速的或者短期的需求，因為這些浮存金對於我們的現金資源來說十分重要。這個結構是人為設計的，也是波克夏經濟堡壘中最重要的一個成分。這個結構永遠不會被放棄。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我們的擔保費超過了我們所有花費和最終損失的總和，那麼我們將會簽署一個承保盈利，而這些將會增加我們的產品產生的投資收入。當這樣的利潤被賺取之後，我們就會盡情地享受這種免費得到的資金，當然，最好的結果是，我們能夠因為這筆資金再賺些錢。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.
不幸的是，這種希望所有承保人都實現這種美好結果的期望引發了了業界緊張的競爭局勢。如此劇烈的需求導致它時常引發P/C行業作為一個整體去操作一個非常嚴重的承保損失。這種損失，實際上，是產業為了維持其發行市場而支付的。有競爭力、有活力的市場總是能夠保證保險產業在相較於其他美國行業時，總還是能夠維持乏味的歷史記錄，在有形資產淨值上賺取低於正常水平的回報，儘管這些發行資金所獲得的收益是行業所有公司都在共享的。這段整個世界現在都在應對的很長的低利率期實際上確認了一點，在浮存金所能獲取的收益在未來幾年將會持續減少，因此惡化了承保人所面對的收益問題。當產業成果在未來十年下滑到比過去幾十年還低時，這是一個投資的好機會，尤其對於那些對於再保險十分專業的公司來說，更是如此。
As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
就像這份報告此前提及的一樣，波克夏公司到目前為止，已經連續13年保障著承諾利潤，我們這個階段的稅前收入總計262億美元。那並不是一個偶然，嚴格的風險評估是我們全部的保險經理們的日常關注焦點，他們知道什麼時候的股票浮動是有價值的，盈利也可能因為太低的承諾利潤而血本無歸。所有的承保人都能給出那樣的空頭承諾。在波克夏公司這是一個傳統，類似舊約全書的的風格。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
那麼我們的股票浮動是如何影響我們的固有市值的呢？當波克夏公司計算賬面價值的時候，我們的全部浮存金就像債務一樣被扣除，就像我們明天必須支付但是不能補充它。但是把浮存金全部等同於債務又是不正確的，它可以被視作一個周轉金。每天我們都需要支付一些日常開支和債務，這些支付行為減少了浮存金，2015年的245億美元里面就有超過600萬美金是用來支付債務的。就像每一天，我們開發新的業務，那也會很快產生新業務的債權，可增加浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
如果浮存金是成本低廉和持續性的，就像我們相信的那樣，那麼這項負債的真實價值將會大大低於會計們所計算出來的負債價值。擁有一美元，實際上永遠不會離開這個世界——因為總會有新的業務來代替它，這就完全不同於擁有一美元——然而明天就會消失。然而，這兩種不同形式的負債，卻在通用會計準則中被視為等量。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
能部分抵消了的這一被誇大的負債是價值155億美元的“商譽”資產。我們在保險公司購買保險時產生，這能夠增加賬面價值。在很大程度上，這種商譽代表了我們為保險公司獲得的浮存金能力所支付的價格。然而，對商譽進行的花費和它的真實價值之間沒有聯繫。例如，如果一個保險公司維持長期的、高金額的損失，那麼任何書面的商譽資產承諾都應該被視為毫無價值，不論其原始成本究竟是多少。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸運的是，波克夏並不是這樣。查利和我相信，我們保險公司的“商譽”是真正地有經濟價值的，而且還會遠遠地超過它的歷史價值。如果我們能夠擁有這樣的公司，我們將會愉快地去支付他們的浮存金。事實上，幾乎所有的155億美元——我們在保險業務中由商業信譽所帶來的，2000年的時候已經在我們的書上提到過。然而隨後，我們有了三倍的浮動。現在，它的價值是一個原因——一個為什麼我們相信波克夏的內在商業價值大大超過其賬面價值的巨大的原因。
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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
波克夏有吸引力的保險經濟模式之所以存在，是因為我們有一些優秀的的管理者，他們正以一種嚴格的態度去運行著一種極難復制的商業模式。讓我來向你們介紹一些主要部門
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先，浮存金額度最高的是由Ajit Jain管理的波克夏海瑟崴再保險公司。Ajit敢於對一些其他人根本沒有什麼興趣或者沒有資本接受的保險進行投保。他進行投保是總是集能力、速度、決斷力和智慧於一身。更重要的是，在保險界，他總是有一些與眾不同的想法。但是，他不會讓波克夏置身於資源不合適的危機當中。
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
事實上，波克夏在規避風險上的方法比絕大部分保險公司要保守。例如，如果保險公司將在一場特大災難中損失2500億美元，這將是保險業迄今為止最大賠償的三倍，那麼波克夏作為一個整體，他們將在這一年度要獲得更多的收益，因為該公司的業務範圍十分廣。我們也要準備充裕的現金以求在波動巨大的市場上找到有前景的業務機會。與此同時，一些主要的保險公司和再保險公司將會面臨赤字問題，甚至瀕臨破產。
1986年的那個週六，Ajit走進了波克夏的辦公室，那時的他甚至沒有一點保險業方面的經驗。儘管如此，保險公司的主管Mike Goldberg還是讓他管理再保險業務。在這種鼓勵和推動下，Ajit在保險界嶄露頭角，並且很快大放異彩，為波克夏公司獲得了巨額的收入。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我們還有另外一個保險業的巨頭——通用再保險公司，該公司由Tad Montross管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
本質上，一個運行穩定的保險公司需要遵守四大規則，它包括：（1）、理解一切會讓保單發生損失的風險；（2）、對可能發生的風險進行謹慎評估並預計可能發生的損失；（3）、設置保費。就一般而言，保費需要稍高於可能發生的損失和運營需要的總和；（4）、懂得在無法獲得合適保費的時候放手。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
許多保險公司都能夠遵守前三條規則，卻忽略了第四條。他們無法捨棄競爭對手都去積極爭取的業務。但是老話說：“別人都在做，我們也要去做”，很多行業都存在這個問題，但是這個問題在保險行業尤為突出。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad卻能夠做到這四條，他的業績表現就體現了這些。在他的領導下，通用再保險公司的巨額浮存金的表現一直好於零成本，我們預計這種情況將繼續。我們對通用再保險公司的國際人壽再保險業務十分滿意。從我們1998年收購此公司以來，它就一直保持穩定、持續的盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
不過在購買通用再保險公司不久後，它也出現了一些問題。這讓一些評論家——包括我自己都相信我犯了一個很大的錯誤。不過這一天已經過去了，通用再保險公司依舊是一個寶貝。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him, his every action has made great sense.
最後，是GEICO。托尼·萊斯利現在管理著政府員工保險公司，他18歲就進入了公司，截止到2014年，他已經為公司服務了53年。1993年，托尼成為了公司的CEO，從那以後，該公司飛速發展。世界上再也沒有比托尼更好的經理了。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
1951年2月，我第一次聽說GEICO，我被該公司相比於其他保險巨頭的巨大成本優勢給震驚到了。當時我就知道了這個公司一定會大獲成功。
No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
沒有人喜歡買車險，但是幾乎每個人都喜歡開車。對許多家庭而言，給車投的保險是一個家庭的巨大開銷。儲蓄對家庭而言是很重要的——只有低成本的保險公司才會提供這種業務。所以，至少40%的人在閱讀了這篇文章後可以在政府員工保險公司的保險業務上省下錢。所以，快停止閱讀，登錄geico.com或者撥打800-368-2734。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross.
GEICO’s的成本優勢是它能夠持續擴大市場份額的主要原因（1995年波克夏公司收購它的時候，它的市場份額只有2.5%，而在2015年市場份額達到了11.4%）。政府員工保險公司的低成本成為了其他競爭無法超越的鴻溝。
All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)
我們的吉祥物“gecko”不怕疲倦地告訴美國人政府員工保險公司怎樣幫助他們去省錢。我喜歡聽到這個小傢伙傳達的信息：“只要15分鐘就能夠幫你省15%或者更多的汽車保險。”（不過總會有那麼幾個愛發牢騷的人。我的一個朋友就和我說過，一些能夠說話的動物，除了談到過保險再也不會討論其他的問題。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned $4 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from $943 million to $9.9 billion.
我們除了擁有這三個主要的保險公司，還有一些其他的小公司，他們中的大部分都在保險界中勤勤懇懇地干著自己應該做的事情。大體來說，這些公司發展非常好，穩定地盈著利。在過去的十年裡，他們從保險業務中獲得了29.5億美元的利潤，同時浮存金從17億美元增長到86億美元。查理和我都很看重這些公司和他們的領導者。
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.
不到三年前，我們成立了波克夏特殊保險公司（“BHSI”），我們也讓它加入了這個隊伍中。我們第一個決定就是讓Peter Eastwood去管理這個公司。這是一個全壘打的舉措：波克夏特殊保險公司的年度保費量已經達到10億美元，而且在Peter的領導下，它有望成為保險業的領頭羊之一。
Here’s a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:
這是一些決策所帶來的增值收益和浮存金的概括：
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2015 | 2014 | 2015 | 2014 | ||
| General Re | $421 | $606 | $44,108 | $42,454 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 132 | 277 | 18,560 | 19,280 | ||
| GEICO | 460 | 1,159 | 15,148 | 13,569 | ||
| Other Primary | 824 | 626 | 9,906 | 8,618 | ||
| Total | $1,837 | $2,668 | $87,722 | $83,921 | ||
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
波克夏優秀的經理人、出色的金融能力和許多獨特的商業模式在保險業中建立了巨大的鴻溝，讓它在保險界別具一格。各種力量的集合為伯克萊爾的股東們帶來了巨大的資產，而且這份資產還會隨著時間不斷增值。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受監管的資本密集型業務
We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings.
我們的主要業務有兩塊：BNSF and BHE，它們存在共同的優點，而他們的這些特質又和我們其他的業務不一樣。所以我們把他們的各項統計數據從我們GAAP準則下的資產負債表和收益表中分離出來，在這封信中單獨來談。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/ interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
它們的一個主要的共同特點就是對長期的、受監管的資產進行大量投資。這些資產部分由大規模長期債務支撐，但是不是波克夏擔保。這些資產不需要我們進行信貸支持，因為即使經濟情況不好，它們的盈利也能彌補他們的利率負債。例如，去年，在鐵路經濟不景氣的情況下，BNSF的利息保障比率超過了8：1（我們對於利息保障比率的定義是稅前收益/利息，而不是稅息折舊及攤銷前利潤/利息，儘管後者才經常被人使用，但是我們認為這種方法存在很大的問題）。
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
與此同時，在對於BHE，有兩個因素能夠保證公司在任何情況下都能夠支付債務支出。第一個在很多的公共事業項目中十分常見：抗衰退收益，這些來自於這些公司提供的獨家額外服務。第二個只有我們其他幾個少數的公共事業項目所享有，即收入來源多樣化，這樣可以讓我們免於因為一個單一監管機構而遭受損失。我們獲得的大部分收益，很多是由於強大的母體公司所擁有的巨大優勢帶來了一些補充，這樣就讓BHE和它的一些有用的分公司降低了他們的債務成本。這些讓我們和我們的的顧客獲得了很大的收益。
All told, BHE and BNSF invested $11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to key components of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
眾所周知，去年BHE和BNSF這兩家公司花費了116億美元在修建和裝備上，對美國的城市內部結構做出了重要的貢獻。只要它們能夠承諾合理的收益回報，那麼我們很願意做這樣的投資。不過前提就是，我們對未來的規劃有絕對的信心。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我們的這種自信心，不僅來自於我們自身過去的經驗，而且來自於我們對社會清晰的認識——社會永遠都會需要這種對於交通和能源的巨大投資。確保資金穩定流入一些重要的項目，對政府部門很有利。同時，做這些項目的投資對我們而言也是十分有利的，它可以讓我們贏得政府及人民的信任。
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is 10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低廉的價格是讓這些支持者們高興的重要原因。在愛荷華州，BHE的平均零售價是5分/千瓦時，Alliant，該週的另一個主要的有用能源，均價是9.3美分。這裡有一些來自附近州的可進行比較的價格數據：內布拉斯加州9美分、密蘇爾州9.3美分、伊利諾斯州9.7美分、明尼蘇達州9.7美分。國家的平均價格大概是10.4美分。我們的底價為我們工薪階層的顧客增加了一些額外的收益。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.
對於BNSF而言，它的價格很難和一些主要的鐵路公司去進行比較，因為他們在運輸貨物和運輸里程上和其他公司存在著巨大的差異。然而，為了提供未加工的措施，去年我們的收益低於3美分每噸每公里，然而其他四個主要的美國鐵路客戶的電子運輸費用至少比我們高40%，從4.2美分到5.3美分不等。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that figure to 58% in 2017.)
BHE和BNSF公司已經成為美國能源友好型產業的領頭羊。在風力發電產業上，沒有哪個州能夠超過愛荷華州，去年我們生產的風電相當於我們鐵路顧客所用電量的47%。（新增的風電項目將會讓這個指數在2017年達到58%）。
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.
BNSF，和其他一等鐵路公司一樣，僅僅用一加侖的柴油可以讓一噸的貨物移動500米。這比卡車的能源利用率高了4倍！而且，更重要的是，鐵路運輸減少了高速公路的擁堵情況和嚴重堵車所帶來的巨大開銷。
Here are the key figures for BHE and BNSF:
這裡是BHE和BNSF的一些主要數據：
| MidAmerican (89.8% owned) | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | |||
| U.K. Utilities | $460 | $527 | $362 | ||
| Iowa utility | 314 | 298 | 230 | ||
| Nevada utilities | 586 | 549 | (58) | ||
| PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah) | 1,026 | 1,010 | 982 | ||
| Gas Pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River) | 401 | 379 | 385 | ||
| Canadian transmission utility | 170 | 16 | — | ||
| Renewable projects | 175 | 194 | 50 | ||
| HomeServices | 191 | 139 | 139 | ||
| Other (Net) | 27 | 26 | 12 | ||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 3,350 | 3,138 | 2,102 | ||
| Interest | 499 | 427 | 296 | ||
| Income Taxes | 481 | 616 | 170 | ||
| Net Earnings | $2,370 | $2,095 | $1,636 | ||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire | $2,132 | $1,882 | $1,470 | ||
| BNSF | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | |||
| Revenues | $21,967 | $23,239 | $22,014 | ||
| Operating earnings | 14,264 | 16,237 | 15,357 | ||
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 7,703 | 7,002 | 6,657 | ||
| Interest (Net) | 928 | 833 | 729 | ||
| Income taxes | 2,527 | 2,300 | 2,135 | ||
| Net earnings | $4,248 | $3,869 | $3,793 | ||
I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.
我目前希望在2016年BHE能增加稅後收益，但是BNSF收入在降低。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業和零售業
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我們要詳細地談談波克夏的這部分業務狀況。讓我們來看一看該業務部門的資產負債表和損益表。
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/15 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $6,807 | Notes payable | $2,135 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 8,886 | Other current liabilities | 10,565 | |||||
| Inventory | 11,916 | Total current liabilities | 12,700 | |||||
| Other current assets | 970 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 28,579 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 30,289 | Deferred taxes | 3649 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 15,161 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,767 | |||||
| Other assets | 4,445 | Non-controlling interests | 521 | |||||
| $78,474 | Berkshire equity | 56,837 | ||||||
| $78,474 | ||||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | |||||
| Revenues | $107,825 | $97,689 | $93,472 | ||||
| Operating expenses | 100607 | 90788 | 87208 | ||||
| Interest expense (net) | 103 | 109 | 104 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 7115 | 6792 | 6160 | ||||
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2432 | 2324 | 2283 | ||||
| Net income | $4,683 | $4,468 | $3,877 | ||||
* Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products results.
*已經重申了不包含馬蒙集團租賃業務的2013年收入，現在這部分業務收支已計入了金融和金融產品部門。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我們根據一般會計公認原則得出的收支信息在第38頁。相比之下，上表中的營業支出不是根據一般會計公認原則計算的，因為它沒有包括某些收購記賬項目（主要是一些無形資產的攤銷）。我們這樣做是因為查理和我認為經過這樣調整後的數字比一般公用會計原則數據更能精確反映表中所有業務的實際收支情況。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they could not differ more.
我不會一一解釋每一個調整細節，其中有些調整很微小，也很難解釋。但是專業投資者應該能理解無形資產的特殊性質。有些無形資產會隨時間減值，而有些則完全不會。比如拿軟件來舉例，軟件資產就有切切實實的攤銷費用。相反地，針對其他一些無形資產形成的費用，比如按照收購會計核算原則而產生的對諸如客戶關係之類的無形資產進行的攤銷，就明顯不能反映其真實資產狀況。公認會計原則對這兩種費用不加以區分，在計算利潤時把這二者都計入了支出。然而從投資者的視角來看，這兩種費用完全不一樣。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.
第38頁中會計公認原則數據顯示，該部門有11億美元的攤銷費用被作為費用入賬。我們可以說其中只有“20%”是實際發生的費用，其它全不是。因為我們進行了大量收購活動，所以這個曾經不存在的“非實際”費用如今變得十分龐大。隨著我們進行更多的收購，非實際攤銷費用也肯定會進一步增加。
The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)
第55頁列示了按一般會計公認原則計算的無形資產現時狀況報表。我們現在有68億美元的可攤銷無形資產，其中41億美元將在未來5年內攤銷。當然，最終這些“資產”都會攤銷殆盡。一旦全部攤銷完，就算實際利潤沒有什麼變化，報表反映的利潤卻會增加。（這是我給我的繼任者的一份禮物。）
I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?
我建議你最好忽視一部分按一般會計公認原則計算的攤銷費用。但這麼做會讓我害怕，因為我知道現在企業管理者告訴股東忽視一些費用項目幾乎已成了常態。其中最常見的一個例子就是“股份補償。”這個費用項目名稱中有“補償”兩個字，如果補償不算費用的話，那還有什麼能算費用？如果收入計算不包括真實費用和經常性費用，那還有什麼費用能包括進去？
Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring “earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.
華爾街分析師也經常這樣做，用這些管理層提供的忽視“補償”的費用去做分析。也許是這些分析師不太懂，或者他們怕與管理層關係搞壞。又或者他們就是玩世不恭，認為其他人都這麼做，為什麼自己不順應潮流呢。不管原因是什麼，這些分析師向投資者傳遞這些誤導性信息是有罪的。
Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.
折舊費是一項更複雜的費用，但幾乎總是真實的實際費用。毫無疑問波克夏也有折舊費。我希望我們能在保持業務競爭力的同時盡可能減少折舊費支出，我花了51年才想出來該怎麼做。誠然，我們的鐵路業務的折舊費支出下降速度比鐵路業務正常運轉所需資本支出的下降速度慢得多，這也導致了會計一般公認原則下收入賬面數據比實際高。（這個現像在整個鐵路行業都存在。）如果有CEO和投資銀行家用未折舊前的數據向你推銷，例如未計利息、稅項、折舊及攤銷前的利潤，那麼他十有八九就在故意忽悠你。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.
當然了，我們公佈的收益報告還是要遵循一般公認會計準則。要了解真實準確信息，你一定要記得把我們報告中的大多數攤銷費用加回到利潤額上去，然後還要減去一些以反映柏林頓北方聖塔菲公司少計的折舊費。
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Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
讓我們回到我們的製造業、服務業零售業業務，這些業務涉及的公司的產品從棒棒糖到噴氣式飛機等什麼都有。其中有些公司經濟狀況十分好，其無抵押有形資產淨值收益率能達到稅後25%至100%。其他一些公司則可以達到12%~20%的良好收益水平。
A few, however – these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation – have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.
但也有少數幾家公司收益水平相當糟糕，這是我在做資本配置工作中犯的一些嚴重錯誤。這些錯誤大部分都是由於我在評估這家公司或其所屬行業的經濟動態時出的差錯，現在我的這些錯誤讓我們付出了代價。有時候我在評估現任經理和未來經理候選人的忠誠度和工作能力時出錯還會更多；真的，沒騙你。如果我們幸運的話，這種情況只會在我們極小部分的業務中發生。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.
如果把這個部門中的公司視為一個單一的主體，那麼其業績是相當傑出的。它們在2015年擁有平均256億美元的淨有形淨資產，其中包括大量過剩現金和少量負債，並在此基礎上獲得了18.4%的稅後有形資產淨值收益率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts enter the fold.
當然了，為一家經營經濟狀況很好的公司支付過高收購價格一定是一項糟糕的投資。我們已經為我們的大多數公司所擁有的淨有形資產支付了大量的溢價，其成本反映在我們數額龐大的商譽和其它無形資產項目上。但總的來說，我們這樣部署資本的方式為我們帶來了很好的資本回報。等到2016年內我們對金霸王公司和Precision Castparts的收購完成後，我們還會看到更多的資本回報增長。
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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 88-91.
我們在該業務部門擁有太多公司，所以我不能一一對它們全都評價一番。而且，這些公司現有的和潛在的競爭對手都可以讀到這份報告，如果他們對我們的數據有太多了解，那這只會對我們的公司不利。因此，對於那些在評估波克夏時不具有規模重要性的業務，我們只按照規定進行披露。不過，在第88至91頁你可以找到我們很多業務的詳細數據。
Finance and Financial Products
金融和金融產品業務
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that’s paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire’s enduring advantages.
我們的三項租賃業務是由CORT（家具）、XTRA（半拖掛車）和馬蒙（主要業務包括油罐車、冷藏車、聯運式罐式集裝箱和吊車）三家公司構成。這三家公司都是行業領導者，在美國經濟走強之際都取得了很大的收益增長。我們在這三家公司擁有設備上的投資比他們的任何一個競爭者都要多，這讓我們獲得了回報。發揮自身長處是波克夏經久不衰的優勢之一。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased it in 2003.
Kevin Clayton旗下Clayton Homes公司再次取得了行業領先業績，成為美國第二大活動房屋製造商。去年該公司賣出了34，397套房屋，佔全美活動房屋銷售量的45%。2003年我們買下Clayton時，它的市場佔有率只有14%
Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing $150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton’s homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton’s remaining sales are made to 1,395 independent retailers.
活動房屋讓美國低收入人群實現了買房夢，Clayton賣出的46%的房屋都是通過我們的331家自營商店銷售的，其它大部分銷量是通過1395家獨立零售商賣掉的。
Key to Clayton’s operation is its $12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only the homes of our competitors.
Clayton盈利的關鍵是其所擁有的128億美元的按揭貸款。其中35%貸款來源於活動房屋，37%來源於零售業務，大部分餘額來源於獨立零售商，其中有些會賣我們的房屋，還有一些只賣我們競爭對手的房屋。
Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire’s backing, however, Clayton steadfastly financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.
從借方角度講，Clayton是所有出借方中最可靠最長久的。有了波克夏的支持，Clayton能在2008年至2009年淨金融危機期間穩定源源不斷地向房屋購買者提供按揭貸款。在那段期間，Clayton確實也用其寶貴的資金向那些沒有賣Clayton房屋的經銷商提供了按揭貸款支持。那段時間我們為高盛集團和通用電氣公司提供的資金支持佔據了各大媒體頭條；波克夏在背後默默向Clayton注入的資金讓許多美國普通人擁有了自己的房子，同時也讓許多非Clayton房屋經銷商活了下來。
Our retail outlets, employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of alternative sources for financing – most of it coming from local banks – and always secure acknowledgments from customers that this information has been received and read. (The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on page 119.)
我們在Clayton房屋零售店都用了簡單明了的宣傳語，不斷提醒消費者他們可以選擇多種消費渠道，我們向消費者建議最多的就是讓他們去當地銀行申請貸款。同時我們從消費者也得到了他們確實收到了我們的提醒的反饋。
Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008, which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and (2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to unwitting institutions around the world.
按揭貸款對於借方和整個社會都有極大好處。毫無疑問，導致2008年金融危機進而引發經濟衰退的元兇之一就是不顧後果的濫放按揭貸款行為。危機發生之前，一個腐朽的按揭貸款模式往往是這樣：（1）比方說加尼福利亞州的一家金融機構放了許多貸款（2）然後這家機構迅速把這些貸款賣給一家比方說是在紐約的投資銀行或商業銀行，這家銀行會把積累許多貸款，把這些貸款抵押作為抵押貸款證券的抵押物（3）隨後又把這些證券賣給世界各地不知情的機構或個人。
As if these sins weren’t sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings. (When Wall Street gets “innovative,” watch out!) While that was going on, I described this “doubling-up” practice as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security being offered.
似乎上述的惡行還不足以引發壞結果，一些異想天開的投資銀行有時還在此基礎上炮製出第二層融資產品，這些產品的價值主要依賴於那些初次發行債券的垃圾部分。（如果華爾街聲稱他們發明了什麼新產品，你可要當心！）上述這種情況就好像是要求投資者讀幾萬頁麻木無聊的散文，然後再評估要買的這支證券。
Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to understand. (It’s also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more complex structures. But rate them they did.)
上述的貸款發放人和粉飾證券的銀行真的都不要臉，他們的眼裡只有錢。許多貸款屋主都指望著這筆貸款，而貸款發放人心裡卻打著另外的算盤。當然了風險最大的信貸產品會產生最大的收益。狡猾的華爾街銷售員們依靠向顧客推銷他們不懂的產品就能年入百萬（同樣地，為什麼分級機構能夠對比他們更複雜的機構進行評級呢？然而他們就這樣做了）。
Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, “The one major weakness that I’ve seen in the implementation was this decision by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages.” Today, some legislators and commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.
Barney Frank可能是2008金融危機期間最懂金融的國會議員了。最近他在評價2010年《多德弗蘭克法案》時說，“我發現在該法案在執行過程中有一個巨大缺點，那就是監管者沒有把風險自留強加給所有住房抵押貸款。”今天，一些立法者和評論家還在建議要讓貸款發放方承擔1%至5%的風險自留，以保障貸款發放方、貸款人和擔保人的利益一致。
At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a price – a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of $157 million.
在Clayton，我們有100%的風險自留。我們每發放一筆貸款，就會一直持有它（除了少數有政府擔保的貸款）。我們如果放貸不慎，那麼我們自己承擔代價。這筆代價著實不小，比我們的房屋原始銷售利潤都要多。去年我們取消了8，444筆活動房屋按揭貸款的抵押品贖回權，為此我們共計損失了1.57億美元。
The average loan we made in 2015 was only $59,942, small potatoes for traditional mortgage lenders, but a daunting commitment for our many lower-income borrowers. Our buyer acquires a decent home – take a look at the home we will have on display at our annual meeting – requiring monthly principal-and-interest payments that average $522.
我們在2015年發放的貸款平均每筆是59，942美元，對於傳統放貸者來說數額很小，但對於許多低收入貸款人來說意義非凡，他們能依靠這筆貸款獲得一棟體面的房子，平均每月只需支付552美元的本息。看看我們在年會是那個展示的房子照片吧，多漂亮。
Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get overextended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people earning multiples of our typical borrower’s income.
當然了，有些貸款人可能會失業，會離婚或者是去世。也有人會遭遇其它經濟問題。遇到這種情況我們會損失錢，我們的貸款人會失去首付款。即便如此，但是我們的FICO評分、我們的貸款人的收入和他們在經濟危機期間的償還貸款情況都要比其它同類按揭貸款要好，而那一類按揭貸款的貸款人的收入往往是我們的貸款人的收入的好幾倍。
The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we’ve done well with our mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with shortterm fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which bears fixed rates. (Incidentally, we would have enjoyed similar margins had we simply bought long-term bonds and financed the position in some short-term manner.)
貸款人對於擁有一個家的強烈的渴望是我們持續經營房屋按揭貸款業務的主要原因之一。同時我們可以浮息債券和短期固息債券為這些按揭貸款融資。最終我們在近年來極低的短期利率和按揭貸款收入之間操作範圍越來越大，這就會催生固定利率。（有時候我們僅僅只購買長期債券然後以短期方式進行融資，那麼我們也能得到類似的結果）
Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however, we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least $20 billion in cash-equivalents that earn short-term rates. More often, our short-term investments are in the $40 billion to $60 billion range. If we have, say, $60 billion invested at 1⁄4% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms, Berkshire is – and always will be – heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.
一般情況下，短期借入並以固定利率長期借出，是風險較高的行為，然而我們旗下克萊頓房產公司（Clayton）的營運模式卻正是如此。過去幾年來，幾家以此模式運作的金融巨頭紛紛不堪重負、關門大吉。而我們波克夏公司採取自然抵消策略，我們現金等價物的業務額始終維持在200億美元以上，以此賺取短期利率。更多情況下，我們的短期投資額介於400億至600億美元之間。假如我們將600億美元用於投資少於25%的股票，那麼短期利率將會急劇上漲，我們便可以從中獲利，這與我們投資在克萊頓的130億美元抵押貸款組合相比，前者的賺頭遠大於後者所需承擔的較高融資成本。在銀行業務中，波克夏將保持一貫的資產高度敏感性，並會因此從上升的利率中獲得收益。
Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.
現在我來談談令我引以為傲的一項業務，此業務需要謹慎守法地運作。當年的經濟大蕭條導致抵押貸款放貸商、服務商、包裝商受到了極為嚴苛的監管，還遭受了巨額罰款。
The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and internal controls. At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were $38,200 and our refunds to customers $704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year, 95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.
這些監管顯然波及到了克萊頓，其抵押貸款業務頻頻遭到檢查，檢查內容包括貸款發放、服務、匯集、宣傳推廣、法令遵循、內部管控等環節。至於聯邦政府方面，我們要接受聯邦貿易委員會、住房與城市發展部、消費者金融保護局等政府部門的監管。不勝枚舉的各種州立法律也制約著我們。在過去2年裡，聯邦政府及來自25個州的相關機構常常造訪克萊頓，以65種五花八門的理由調查其抵押貸款業務。調查結果如何？這段時間裡我們總共被罰了3.82萬美元，退還給顧客704678美元。此外，在過去的一年裡，儘管我們不得不取消2.64%的活動房屋抵押品贖回權，但95.4%的借款者已接近年終還款期限，還清貸款後，他們的房產就不再背負抵押債務了。
************
Marmon’s rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the company’s purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.
美聯集團（Marmon）的汽車零件業務擴張迅速，截至去年年底，已擁有13.322萬個單位的零部件，自去年9月30日向通用電氣公司購入25085台汽車後，其業務量便實現了顯著增長。倘若將我們的各項業務比作一列火車，那麼奧馬哈市就是引擎，最後一節車廂位於緬因州的波特蘭市。
At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each year. Though “tank cars” sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product; chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that car.
截至去年年底，我們97%的軌道車已租出，其中15-17%的車輛需每年重新續租。儘管這些鐵路油罐車聽上去像是滿載原油的貨輪，但實際上只有7%的車輛用於運載原油，我們承運的主要是化工產品以及精煉石油。當列車從你面前徐徐駛過，請仔細尋找我們油罐車上的UTLX或者Procor標誌。當你看到那個標誌時，請挺起你的胸膛，作為股東，你也是那輛車的主人之一。
Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:
下圖為此部分業務的收益概況：
| 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | ||
| (in millions) | ||||
| Berkadia (our 50% share) . | $74 | $122 | $80 | |
| Clayton | 706 | 558 | 416 | |
| CORT | 55 | 36 | 40 | |
| Marmon–Containers and Cranes | 192 | 238 | 226 | |
| Marmon – Railcars | 546 | 442 | 353 | |
| XTRA | 172 | 147 | 125 | |
| Net financial income* | 341 | 296 | 324 | |
| $2,086 | $1,839 | $1,564 | ||
Investments
投資
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the “equity” method.
下圖為截至去年年底，我們投資的普通股中市場價值最大的15家公司。卡夫亨氏公司（Kraft Heinz）並未列入排名，因為我們實際上擁有公司控制權，根據“權益法”，我們對其盈虧需承擔責任。
| 12/31/15 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 15.6 | $1,287 | $10,545 | ||
| 46,577,138 | AT&T | 0.8 | 1,283 | 1,603 | ||
| 7,463,157 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 6.6 | 1,202 | 1,367 | ||
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.3 | 1,299 | 17,184 | ||
| 18,513,482 | DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. | 8.8 | 843 | 1,291 | ||
| 22,164,450 | Deere & Company | 7 | 1,773 | 1,690 | ||
| 11,390,582 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 2.7 | 654 | 2,053 | ||
| 81,033,450 | International Business Machines Corp. | 8.4 | 13,791 | 11,152 | ||
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation . | 12.6 | 248 | 2,475 | ||
| 55,384,926 | Phillips 66 | 10.5 | 4,357 | 4,530 | ||
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,683 | ||
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,701 | 1,896 | ||
| 101,859,335 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.8 | 3,239 | 4,346 | ||
| 63,507,544 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2 | 3,593 | 3,893 | ||
| 500,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.8 | 12,730 | 27,180 | ||
| Others | 10,276 | 16,450 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | 58,612 | 112,338 | ||||
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of writeups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
* 此為我們的實際買入價，且為課稅基礎；在某些情況下，一般公認會計原則中的“支出”科目不盡相同，在運用該原則時，賬面價值依據需要而相應提高或降低。
** 不包括波克夏子公司名下養老基金所持有的股票。
*** 此金額依買賣合同約定。
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $11.8 billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5 billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly
表格中並未體現波克夏大量持股的另一家公司：在2021年9月之前，我們能夠以50億美元的價格隨時買下美國銀行的7億支股票。截至去年年底，這些股票價值118億美元。我們打算在約定到期日前再購入這些股票，如果我們樂意的話，還可以將佔6%份額的這50億美元美國銀行股票用於優先投資這筆交易。同時，各位必須認識到，實際上，美國銀行是我們持有普通股數額第四大的公司，而且我們十分看重這家公司。
Productivity and Prosperity
生產力與成功
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
早些時候，我曾向各位匯報過，我們卡夫亨氏的合夥人是如何杜絕效率低下的現象，並因此提升了每小時的工作產量。此類生產力的進步是美國自1776年建國以來，生活水平大幅改善的秘訣。不幸的是，這“秘訣”知道的人還真不多：只有極少數美國人能真正悟出生產力與成功之間的關聯性。要知道究竟關聯在何處，先來看看美國最經典的實例——農業，再來通過波克夏的3個特殊投資領域進行驗證。
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
1900年，美國有2800萬勞動力。其中高達四成，即1100萬人口，在農業領域進行勞作。當時的主要農作物與現在一樣，是玉米。約9千萬英畝的農田用於種植玉米，每英畝產量為30蒲式耳（1蒲式耳=35.238升），每年總產量為27億蒲式耳。
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
後來，人們發明了拖拉機以及其他各式各樣的農業工具，使農業生產力有了革命性的進步，種植、收割、灌溉、施肥、選種等流程的效率皆大大提升。如今，美國約8500萬英畝的農田用於種植玉米。雖然面積並未增加，然而產量卻翻了好幾番，每英畝產量超過150蒲式耳，每年總產量為130-140億蒲式耳。其他農作物的產量也不相上下。
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.
美國人不僅僅在產量上有了突破，更掀起了一場勞動力的變革，農業勞動力大幅減少。如今僅剩3百萬人口在田間勞作，僅佔1.58億總勞動力的2%。由此可見，農業技術的進步解放了成千上萬的美國人，讓他們得以將時間和才智投入到其他領域，人力資源的再分配使如今的美國人得以享受琳瑯滿目的商品和服務，如果不是生產力的提高，人們的生活只能停留在男耕女織時代。
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
回顧過去的115年曆史，我們意識到，農業發明是多麼的偉大、多麼的有益，不僅僅減輕了農民的負擔，更推動了整個社會的進步。如果我們當年不幸扼殺了生產力的進步空間，就不會有現在的美國。（幸好馬兒們不會投票，否則它們要抗議了。）然而，在柴米油鹽層面，跟那些失業的農場工人們大談科技的美好無異於對牛彈琴，由於機器幹起活來更利索，因此，工人們無用武之地，只好下崗。之後我們會進一步討論生產力發展導致的失業問題。
For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.
現在，我們來談談波克夏子公司效率提升產生重大變化的3個實例。這類勵志故事在美國商界已經是老生常談了。
In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
1947年，二戰剛結束那會兒，美國共有4400萬勞動力。約135萬工人供職於鐵路行業。當年由一級鐵路承載的每噸英里運輸量總計6550億。
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.
到了2014年，一級鐵路每噸英里運載1.85兆貨物，增幅達182%，而僱員人數僅為18.7萬，相比1947年減少了86%。（包括部分乘務工作人員，但大部分被裁的是貨運工作人員。）鑑於這一革命性的生產力發展，扣除物價上漲因素後，每噸英里的貨運成本自1947年來降低了55%，按當下物價計算，每年為托運方節省了約900億美元的開支。
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.)
再來看另一組令人震驚的數據：假如，今天的運輸業發展停留在1947年的水平，我們需要300多萬的鐵路工人來負荷如今的運輸量。（當然，如此多的人工成本將大大增加運輸費用，運輸行業也很難發展到今天這般規模。）
Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.
1995年，當時的伯林頓北方公司與聖塔菲公司合併，成立了我們的柏林頓北方聖塔菲公司。1996年，是這家新合併公司第一個完整營運的年份，4.5萬名員工完成了4.11億噸英里的運貨量。2015年，這一數據達到了7.02億噸英里（增幅達71%），而僱員人數為4.7萬（僅增加4%）。生產力的提升不但惠及運輸公司，也惠及托運方。同時，柏林頓北方聖塔菲公司的生產安全性也得到了提升：1996年上報的因工受傷人數為2.04人/每20萬人工時數，而今下降了超過50%，僅為0.95人/每20萬人工時數。
A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine – except for the consumer.
一個多世紀以前，汽車就被發明出來，在它周圍形成了一個保證汽車和司機的行業。 最初，這項業務是通過傳統的保險機構 - 火災保險類處理。 這種以代理為中心的方法包括高佣金和其他承保費用，大約消耗了40美分的美元。 那麼強大的地方機構當時就坐在駕駛座上，因為他們代表了多家保險公司，並且在委員會談判時可以與另一家公司對抗。 卡特爾式的定價盛行，除了消費者之外，所有的參與者都做得很好。
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
然後，一些美國人的聰明才智開始發揮作用：來自伊利諾斯州Merna的一位農民G. J. Mecherle提出了一個專屬銷售團隊的想法，該團隊只銷售一家公司的保險產品。 他的寶貝被命名州立農業保險公司。 該公司削減佣金和開支 - 允許較低價格的舉動 - 並很快成為一個強大的力量。 幾十年來，國家農場一直是汽車和房主保險的失控量領先者。 以直銷模式運營的Allstate也是亞軍。 包括State Farm和Allstate在內的承保費用約為25％。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
在二十世紀三十年代初，另一個競爭者聯合服務汽車協會（“USAA”）是一家相互合作的公司，正在為直接到顧客的基礎上為軍官寫汽車保險。 這種營銷創新是從軍人必須購買保險的需求出發的，這些保險在他們從基地移動到基地的過程中會留在他們身邊。 對於那些希望永久居民持續更新的地方保險公司來說，這是一件不太感興趣的事情。
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State
Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian
Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model
beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government
Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
美國農業部的直接分配方法，比起State Farm和Allstate，成本更低，因此交易成本更高。 這使美國航空公司的員工利奧和莉蓮·古德溫夢想著擴大超越軍官的直接分配模式的目標市場。 1936年，以10萬美元的資本開始，他們成立了政府僱員保險公司（後來把這口子壓縮到GEICO）。
Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did $22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
他們的羽翼未豐在1937年創下了23.8萬美元的汽車保險業務，這是它的第一個全年。 去年，GEICO完成了226億美元，是USAA的兩倍多。 （儘管早起的鳥兒得了蟲子，第二隻老鼠得到了奶酪。）2015年，GEICO的承保費用是14.7％的保費，USAA是唯一一家達到較低比例的大公司。 （GEICO與USAA完全一樣高效，但在促進增長的廣告上花費更多。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
憑藉GEICO低成本的價格優勢，幾年前公司從Allstate手中奪得汽車保險第二名，這並不奇怪。 GEICO也在國營農場上佔有一席之地，儘管它在數量上仍然遙遙領先。 2030年8月30日 - 我的100歲生日 - 我計劃宣布GEICO已經佔據了榜首。 在你的日曆標記。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO約有34,000名員工為1400萬保單持有人提供服務。 我只能猜測，在這個機構體系下，需要為相似數量的保單持有人提供服務。 但是，我相信這個數字至少是6萬，這是保險公司直接就業所需要的人員和支持機構所需人員的組合。
In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
在電力這塊公共事業領域， 波克夏海瑟崴能源（BHE）的運營模式正在改變。以已有的經驗來看，效率並非地方電力企業生存的必要條件。事實上，從財政角度來看，“隨便”一些的運營方式可能恰到好處。
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
這種經驗是由於公共事業往往是某種產品的唯一供應商，並能夠基於投入的資本，設定一個確保盈利的定價。業內有這樣一個笑話，說公共事業是唯一比裝修老闆辦公室更掙錢的行當。許多公共事業公司的執行總裁也確實是按著這個套路操作的。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
但現在，這一切都改變了。享有美國聯邦政府補貼的風能和太陽能發電有益於我們的長遠利益，這已經成為瞭如今的社會共識。聯邦政府通過稅款抵免來落實這一政策，以支持特定地域內可再生能源價格的競爭力。這些針對可再生能源的稅收抵免（或其他支持政策），最終可能會侵蝕現有的公共事業公司，尤其是那些運行成本較高的公司。長期以來，哪怕BHE公司並不需要依靠這一點確保收入，但公司一直都非常注重效益，而這種對效益的重視讓BHE在如今的市場變得越發具有競爭力。更重要的是，這種競爭力在未來還會發揮更大的作用。
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatthours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
1999年，BHE公司獲得了愛荷華州的公共事業代理權。而1998年時，該公共事業僱傭著3700名員工，電能產量只能達到1900萬兆瓦/時。現在，在BHE的管理下，只需3500名員工，就可以達到2900兆瓦/時的產能。效益的巨大飛躍，讓我們在這16年來的運營中費率從來沒有增長過，而同期工業成本費率上漲了44%。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
我們在愛荷華州的公共事業公司的安全記錄也非常出挑。2015年，員工的事故率只有0.79%，比我們接手前那家公司7%的記錄優秀了太多。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006年，BHE收購了俄勒岡州和猶他州的電力企業美國太平洋公司（PacifiCorp）。收購前一年，太平洋公司僱傭員工為6750人，產能效率為5260萬兆瓦時。而去年，我們只用5700名員工就達到了5630萬兆瓦時的產能效率。安全係數的提升也非常顯著，2015年的事故率從2005年的3.4%下降到了0.85%。安全方面，BHE可以在行業排到前十。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership
這些傑出的表現都可以解釋，為什麼BHE希望收購某個地區的公共事業企業時，當地的監管機構會表現出如此大的歡迎。監管者們知道，我們的公司會帶來高效、安全又可靠的生產操作，同時也會為各種有意義的項目帶來無數的資金。（雖然BHE隸屬波克夏，但從未向我們支付過股息。BHE對投資的熱情在全美投資者所有的公共事業中都屬絕無僅有。）
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The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我剛剛詳細解釋的生產能力的提升，以及其他方面的成就，都為社會帶來了驚人的利益。這就是為什麼我們的全體公民享受到的不僅僅是產品和服務。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
出於這一點來看，這裡頭其實有一些抵消交易。首先，近年來的生產率提升讓富人們收穫頗豐。其次，生產力提升也常常會帶來劇變：如果創新或新的效率顛覆了已有世界，不管是資本家還是勞動者，都將付出巨大的代價。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
資本家們（不論是私人擁有者還是組團的公眾股東）都不需要我們的同情，他們可以顧好自己。正確的決定為投資者帶去了大量的回報，那錯誤的決定帶來巨大的損失也無可避免。此外，那些廣泛地分散投資又靜觀其變的投資者們一定會成功：在美國，成功的投資回報往往高於失敗帶來的損失。（20世紀，道瓊斯工業平均指數從66點飆升至11497點，所有的零部件企業始終享受著增長的分紅。）
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
但工齡較長的工人所面臨的問題卻與他們截然不同。當創新與市場體系相互作用，提升生產效率，許多工人會因此失去價值，他們的能力會變得過時。或許有些人能在別的地方找到體面的就業機會，但其他人卻別無選擇。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
當低成本競爭將鞋業生產的中心轉向亞洲，我們曾經繁榮的德克斯特（Dexter）鞋業倒閉了，緬因州小鎮1600名員工因此失業。許多人已經過了可以再學習另一門營生的年紀。我們失去了幾乎所有的投資，但這是我們能夠承受得起的，許多員工失去的是根本無可替代的生計。同樣的場景也出現在我們原來的新英格蘭紡織廠“慢性死亡”的過程中。這家紡織廠垂死掙扎了整整20年，許多新貝德福德廠的老員工就是活生生的例子——他們只會說葡萄牙語，有的能說一點點英語，幾乎不會其他語言，他們沒有第二個選擇。
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
上述這些例子的解決方法不在於限製或禁止提高生產力。如果我們堅持1100萬人口不應該失去農業上的工作，那麼美國人將永遠享受不到如今這樣優渥的生活。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
問題的解決方案在於，為那些願意繼續工作、但其才能卻因為市場原因貶值的人提供多樣而廣泛的保護網絡。（我個人非常贊成改革擴大勞動所得稅減免制度，為那些願意工作的人們提供最大的保障。）美國的大多數人享受著不斷增長的繁榮，這不應當成為不幸的小部分承受貧困的理由。
Important Risks
重要的風險
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
和所有的上市公司一樣，美國證券交易委員會要求我們每年都要在公開文件中登記自己的“風險因素”。然而，我並不記得閱讀公開文件中的“風險”因素對於我評估業務有多大幫助。這並不是因為這些風險認定不真實，而是通常真正的風險因素是我們沒有認知到的。除此之外，公開文件中的風險因素也不是為了評估而提供的：1）真實發生威脅事故的概率；2）如果發生事故，將付出多大的成本；3）可能造成損失的時機有哪些。50年後才可能浮現出來的問題可能會成為社會問題，但這並不屬於如今的投資者們需要考慮的問題。
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.
波克夏涉足的行業領域比我知道的其他任何公司都要多。我們的所有工作都擁有一些不同的問題和可能。列舉容易評估難：我、查理還有我們其他的執行總裁計算各種可能帶來的時機、成本和可能性的方式有很大的區別。
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view, for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
我可以舉一些例子。我們從一個最顯而易見的威脅開始吧：BNSF相較於其他鐵路，未來十年很可能將失去大量的煤炭業務。而未來的某個時刻（雖然在我看來這不會太遠了），無人自駕車可能會讓政府僱員保險公司（Geico）的保單數量大規模萎縮。當然，這些趨勢也會影響到我們的汽車經銷商。印刷報紙的發行量還將繼續下降，這是我們在收購時就非常清楚的事情。目前，可再生能源對我們的公共事業企業起到了幫助作用，但如果電力存儲的能力得到實質提升，那麼情況又將大有不同。在線零售已經威脅到了我們的零售企業的經營模式和消費品牌。這些都還只是我們面對的負面可能性的一小部分——但即便對商業新聞再漫不經心的人，也早已意識到了這些負面因素。
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
然而，這些問題都不會對波克夏的長遠發展起到什麼關鍵性的影響。1965年我們剛接手公司時，一句話就能概括當時的風險：“我們所有的資本都投到了北方的紡織公司裡頭，但紡織業注定將持續受損，直至消亡。”然而，這種發展趨勢，並沒有成為公司的喪鐘。我們只是適應了它，未來也是如此。
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
每天，波克夏的經理人都在思考，他們該如何與這個變換不息的世界抗爭。正如我和查理每天都在孜孜不倦地關注著，哪些領域值得我們源源不斷地投入資金。在這一方面，我們比那些只涉足一個行業的公司更有優勢——畢竟他們的選擇更為有限。我一直堅信波克夏擁有足夠的金錢、能力和文化，來突破上文提到的、或者其他的種種逆境，並形成愈發強大的盈利能力。
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.
然而，波克夏有一個非常明確存在又非常持久的危險，讓我和查理也感到束手無策。這也是我們的國民所面臨的主要威脅：那就是入侵者口中針對美國“成功的”網絡、生物、核能和化學襲擊。這是波克夏與全美所有企業共同面臨的危機。
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government – and luck! – for this result.
對任何給定的年份而言，這種大規模殺傷襲擊的概率都非常小。上一次《華盛頓郵報》頭條報導美國投擲原子彈的新聞，已經是70多年前了。之後多年，我們常常與毀滅性的打擊擦肩而過。對於這個結果，我們得感謝於我們的政府，當然，還有運氣。
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
然而，短期內的小概率事件放到長遠中看，就會變成必然。（如果某一年發生某一事件的概率為三十分之一，那放眼一個世紀，該事件至少發生一次的概率就會是96.6%。）更壞的消息是，總有個人或組織、甚至可能是國家，希望對我們的國家製造巨大的傷害。而他們達成這種目的的能力正在呈指數增長。可見，“創新”也有其陰暗面。
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
美國的公司和投資者無法擺脫這種風險。如果大規模破壞事件在美國發生，那麼所有股票的投資都會瀕臨毀滅。
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
沒有人知道“後一天”會是什麼樣子。然而，在我看來，1949年愛因斯坦的這句評價如今依然恰當：“我不知道第三次世界大戰會是怎樣，但是第四次世界大戰時，人們手中的武器將是木棒和石塊！”
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I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
我之所以會寫這篇文章，是因為今年的年度會議上，我們討論了關於氣候變化的代理提案。贊助商希望我們能提交一份報告，具體闡述氣候變化可能會對我們的保險業務帶來怎樣的威脅，以及我們將如何應對這些挑戰。
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.
在我看來，氣候變化很可能為我們的星球帶來一個嚴峻的問題。我之所以說“很可能”，而不說“一定”會帶來這個問題，是因為我沒有相應的科學能力做出這個判斷，並且我至今記得大多數“專家”們對千年蟲問題的可怕預言。不過，如果所有人都認為這一結果大有可能，而即便立刻採取行動，能夠成功制止危機到來的可能也非常小的話，不管是我還是誰，再要求100%確鑿的證據來證明傷害即將到來，那也是非常愚蠢的。
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.
這個問題與針對上帝是否存在的帕斯卡賭注有驚人的相似之處。帕斯卡曾經提出，如果有很小的可能上帝真實存在，那麼以上帝確實存在的標準行事就是有意義的——因為這麼做的回報可能是無限的，但不這麼做卻要冒著很痛苦的風險。同樣，哪怕只有1%的可能這個星球真的面臨一場巨大災難，時機延誤就意味著再無回寰的餘地，那現在的無為就是真正的魯莽。這可以叫做諾亞方舟法則：如果方舟對於生存可能是必不可少的，那麼不論現在的天空有多麼晴朗，應當立即開始建築方舟。
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
代理提案的讚助商會認為氣候變化將波克夏帶來巨大威脅也是可以理解的，因為我們是一家巨大的保險公司，覆蓋了各種類型的風險。他們或許會擔心，氣候變化會使財產損失大幅上升。事實上，如果我們要為未來10-20年寫下固定價格的保單，那麼這種擔憂是非常有必要的。但是，保單通常以一年為期來寫，每年都會針對新暴露的問題重新定價。損失增加的可能性能夠被及時轉化到增長的保費中。
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about $30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase to about $1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
1951年，我剛開始對政府僱員保險公司（Geico）產生熱情。該公司年均單個保單的損失為30美元。想像一下，如果我那會兒預測2015年損失成本將達到每單約1000美元，你會作何反應？你會問，如此暴漲的損失賠償會不會造成災難性的打擊啊？好吧，答案是否定的。
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing $600 million of business annually rather than one doing $23 billion.
過去幾年中，通貨膨脹導致了汽車維修和其他人身事故費用的激增。但這些增加的費用都及時反映到了增加的保費中。因此，與設想不同，在損失成本上升的過程中，保險公司的價值反而增加了。如果損失的成本一直維持不變，那現在波克夏旗下一家汽車保險公司的年均業務額將是6億美元，永遠無法達到如今230億美元的龐大規模。
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weatherrelated events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely – though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
到目前為止，氣候變化並沒有帶來更加頻繁或損失更大的颶風或其他保險覆蓋的氣候事件。因此，最近幾年美國的超級巨災保險在持續下降，這也是我們放棄這一塊業務的原因。如果超級巨災變得更加頻繁或損失更加慘重，那波克夏旗下的保險公司只會將這一塊業務做得更大，也更有利可圖。
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
作為公民，氣候變化讓你輾轉反側是在情理之中，如果你的房子地勢比較低，想要搬家也是人之常情。但單單作為一個大型保險公司的股東，氣候變化不應該是你擔心的事情。
The Annual Meeting
股東大會
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
我和查理終於決定和21世紀保持步調一致了。今年的年會將在全世界進行完整的網絡直播。如果想查看我們這次年度會議的內容，可以在北京時間5月1日上午10:00登錄以下網址：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。前半小時，雅虎網絡直播會播放對管理人員、董事和一些股民的採訪，我和查理將在9:30開始回答大家的問題。
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
這一安排主要有兩個目的。首先，這可能適當分流一些參會人流。去年的記錄是有超過40000人參與我們的年度會議，這已經超過了我們的承受能力。不僅是世紀鏈接中心（CenturyLink Center）的主會場人滿為患，毗鄰的奧馬哈希爾頓酒店兩個大型的會議室也很快擠滿了人。不包括Airbnb增長的業務量，當時所有的大酒店都被搶訂一空。預算有限的人們則通過Airbnb（一家民宿網站）訂房。
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t look that impressive when we were at our best.)
第二個讓我們開始嘗試網絡直播的原因更重要一些。查理今年92歲，我也85歲了。如果我們和你是做一些小企業業務合作，你大概會時不時就想看看我們倆是不是已經迷迷糊糊昏昏欲睡了。而股民們則不用跑到希爾頓酒店監督我們表現得如何。（還請你們在評論的時候寬容一些：請接受我們哪怕在最好的狀態下也沒有太大吸引力的事實。）
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry – and want to stay that way.
觀眾也可以藉此觀察一下我們之所以如此長壽的飲食習慣。會議期間，我和查理大概要喝上好多可樂、吃掉好多時思（See's）軟糖和花生糖，都夠得上一個NFL前鋒一周的攝入量了。很久以前，我倆就發現了一個基本的事實：你要真的餓了，沒什麼比得上胡蘿蔔和花椰菜的——你還想一直這麼保持下去。
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
準備現場參加會議的股東們，當天早上7:00，世紀鏈接中心一開門就可以來了，逛個街購個物甚麼的。今年的年會還是由嘉麗·索瓦（Carrie Sova）負責。上個月她剛剛生下來第二個孩子，但這沒有耽擱正事兒。嘉麗鎮定、機智又非常專業，可以為大家呈現出最好的內容。來自全國的波克夏的員工們，以及我們辦公室所有的工作人員也都為這次年會提供了積極的幫助，他們將共同為各位帶來一個有趣充實的周末。
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed – so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
去年我們延長了CenturyLink的營業時間，這也讓我們的銷量直線上漲，所以我們今年還會繼續延續新的營業時間。今年的4月29日（星期五），您可以從中午一直逛到下午5點，週六您可以從早晨7點一直逛到下午4點半。
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
週六早晨，我們將進行第五屆國際報紙投遞挑戰賽。目標地點仍是克雷頓之家（Clayton home）的門廊，投擲線據目標大概35英尺左右。當我還是個青年時，我曾經非常勤勞地做過送報紙的工作，我送了大概50萬份報紙，所以我覺得自己很擅長這個遊戲。向我挑戰吧！讓我難堪吧！打倒我吧！報紙大概有36到42頁，你必須自己折疊它們（不許用橡皮筋）。
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged most accurate – four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set – will compete against me at 7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything home.
比賽將在早晨7點15分開始，參賽者將參加初賽，將有8名投擲手在7點45分與我展開最終對決。這8名投擲手有4名由參賽者中選出，4名是以往的選手。年輕的新選手只要晉級就會獲得獎勵，而老選手必須要打敗我才能贏回點兒東西。
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for $78,900, fully installed on land you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his order book.
不要忘了順便去看看克雷頓之家，您可以花7.8萬買下它，我們可以將它“嫁接”到您指定的地點。在過去的幾年中，我們在年會上做成了很多買賣，Kevin Clayton的手上會隨時拿著訂貨單的。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
早晨8點半將會上映一部新的波克夏電影。一個小時後會有問答環節（有午餐休息時間，CenturyLink中會提供午餐），問答環節將持續到下午3點半。在短暫的休息後，查理與我將會在3點45分召開年度會議。業務環節大概會持續半小時，為了安全起見那些想要來個“最後一分鐘購物”的人可以跳過這個環節。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
您將會在一個19.43萬平方英尺的大廳購物，它就在會場旁邊，波克夏旗下的數十家子公司的產品將在這裡出售。向那些為自己產品站台的波克夏經理們問好吧。記得看看伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路公司（BNSF）為了向波克夏致敬而設立的鐵路佈局圖，您和您的孩子一定會為它著迷。
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000 pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
今年我們還有一個非常特別的新展覽——世界上最特別的飛機發動機的等比例模型。模型的絕大多數零件都是由Precision Castparts公司製造的。真的發動機有2萬磅重，直徑10英尺，長22英尺。我們展覽的這個被從中間切開的模型可以讓您更好的了解Precision Castparts公司為您的飛機提供的零件。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我們經營的Brooks跑鞋今年也會出售會議紀念款。買一雙之後參加我們週日早晨8點的第四屆“波克夏5公里”活動吧。起跑點設在CenturyLink，您可以在和參會入場券一起寄過去的參會指南中看到更多相關的詳細信息。參加這個比賽您就會發現自己在和一堆波克夏的經理、管理人員、董事和合作夥伴共同前行。（不過查理和我要多睡會兒，我們吃了太多的軟糖和花生脆）。這項活動的參賽者正在逐年增多，也幫我們創下了另一個記錄。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on our other products.
購物區的GEICO展位是由來自我們公司分佈在全國各地的頂尖顧問組成的。別忘了在展位下停下讓他們給你個優惠。他們會給你個股東折扣（通常8%左右）。這個折扣價在我們運行的44個展位中都通行。（補充一點：折扣不能和其他折扣同時使用，比如您屬於其他享受折扣的群體。）帶上您本來就有的折扣券再看看我們的價錢，您就會發現真的可以省好多錢。用省下的錢買我們的其他產品吧！
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
記得去Bookworm看看。我們將會在那裡展出35本書和一些DVD，其中有一些是新版本。Andy Kilpatrick將介紹他關於波克夏最新的全方位報導，並且很願意簽名。本書有1304頁並重9.8磅重。（我對於這本書的簡介：“沒有缺陷”）同時看看Peter Bevelin的新書。Peter是長期駐守在波克夏的非常敏銳的觀察員。
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the thenpublisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price remains $20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for sale at the meeting.
我們也將推出一個新的，20頁的波克夏的50週年紀念版本。我們曾在去年的會展上賣出了12000本。那之後，Carrie和我發現了一些新的資料，我們認為它們非常吸引人的，例如一些非常私人的信件，比如Grover Cleveland寄給Edward Butler的信，Edward Butler是他的朋友，之後成了《水牛城日報》的發行人。原版中已有的內容沒有任何刪除或改動，價格仍是20美元。Charlie和我將共同簽100本，它們將隨機地放置在準備好地5000本當中，在展會上售賣。
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water, an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best managerial duo – both in what they accomplished and how they did it – that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll never need a second exemplar.
我的朋友Phil Beuth曾寫過Limping on Water，一部關於他自己在資本城市過信息生活的自傳體編年史。他還寫了不少關於他的領導Tom Murphy和Dan Burke的事。不論是從已經取得的成就看還是從取得成就的過程看，這兩位都是頂尖的管理者，Charlie和我也都是見證者。你的人生能取得怎樣的成就，很大程度上取決於你崇拜和學習的對象。Tom Murphy就是一個不二人選。
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules, a book that will debut at the annual meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd. and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
最後，由Jeremy Miller寫的《巴菲特基本法則》也將在這次年會上閃亮登場。Miller先生已經對巴菲特合夥公司做了出色的研究和調查，並且詳細的解釋了波克夏是如何從最初的BPL發展至今的。如果你著迷於理論與實踐，你會喜歡這本書的。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
這份報告的附件材料可以告訴您如何獲得年會及其他活動的入場券。機票有時會在波克夏週舉行前提價。如果您從很遠的地方來，您可以選擇飛到堪薩斯城或者奧馬哈，之後開2.5小時的車過來。堪薩斯城和奧馬哈比起來，堪薩斯開車過來更便宜。這樣大概可以幫您省1000多美元。把剩下的錢花在我們的產品上吧！
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store did a record $44,239,493 of business. If you repeat that figure to a retailer, he is not going to believe you. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store – the highest-volume home furnishings store in the United States except for our new Dallas store – is about $9 million.)
在位於72街的佔地72英畝的內布拉斯加家具店（NFM）中，我們將再次舉行“波克夏週末”折扣價活動。在去年的年會周裡，這個家具店創下了約4424萬美元營業額。如果你和任何的零售商說這個數字，他們都不會相信。（NFM在奧馬哈的店鋪平時一周的銷售額大概900萬美元，奧馬哈的銷售情況還是除了我們在達拉斯的新店之外最好的。）
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
您在NFM獲得波克夏的折扣優惠，在4月26日（週二）至5月2日（週一）有效，別忘了一起帶著您的參會憑證。一些平常絕對沒有折扣活動的公司這次也會參加特價活動，本著股東周末的特別精神，我們讓他們破了例。我們非常感謝他們的配合。在“波克夏週末”NFM將在工作日從上午10點營業至晚上9點，週六將從上午10點營業至晚上9點半，週日從上午10點營業至晚上8點。週六晚5點半至8點半，NFM將舉辦野餐活動，我們邀請您也一同參加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
在Borsheims，我們還將舉行兩個只有股東可以參加的活動。第一個是4月29日（週五）下午6點到9點的酒會。最主要的聯歡晚會將在5月1日（週日）舉行早上9點至下午4點舉行。週六Borsheims將營業至下午6點。去年的這個週五到週日，我們的商店在營業時間每15分鐘就會開張銷售單。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
週末期間波仙珠寶（Borsheims）將迎來大量客流。因此，為了您的方便，股東價格優惠期間定於4月25日星期一到5月7日星期六。在此期間，請您出示自己的參會憑據，或出示能顯示您持有我們股票的經紀聲明（brokerage statement），以便確定您的股東身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to have Ajit and Charlie there also.
星期天，來自達拉斯的傑出魔術師Norman Beck將會在波仙珠寶外面的商場進行令人眼花繚亂的表演。在商場上層，我們邀請到了世界頂級橋牌專家Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，股東可在星期天下午和他們切磋牌藝。我會加入牌局，並希望能把阿基特和查理也請過來。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing星期天也會來到商場，接受乒乓球的挑戰。我第一次見Ariel時她才9歲，即便那會兒我也一分都贏不了她。她在2012年就已經代表美國出征過奧運會，現在是普林斯頓大學的大三學生。如果您不介意輸球的尷尬的話，可以和她切磋一下球技，活動下午1點開始。比爾·蓋茨和我會率先登場，試著削減她的銳氣。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before). As for my other favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
5月1日星期天這一天，Gorat's餐館將會為波克夏股東獨家開放，營業時間為下午1點到晚上10點。請於4月1日（請勿提前）撥打402-551-3733預定Gorat's餐廳座位。而另一家我最喜歡的餐廳，Piccolo's，我很遺憾地宣布它關門了。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their email addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我們將再次邀請同樣的三位財經記者引導大會期間的問答環節，他們會向我和查理提出股東通過電子郵件發送的問題。三名記者和他們的郵件分別是：傑出的商業記者Carol Loomis，她的郵箱是loomisbrk@gmail.com；來自CNBC的Becky Quick，郵箱是BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；《紐約時報》的Andrew Ross Sorkin，郵箱是arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位記者會從收到的問題中，選出他/要她認為最有意思最重要的6個問題。幾位記者告訴我，為了增加您的問題被選中的機率，您的問題要簡潔，避免在最後一刻才發送出去，要和波克夏相關，並且一封郵件裡問題數量不要超過兩個。（在郵件裡請向記者說明，如果您的問題被選中您是否希望透露自己的名字）。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
三名關注波克夏的分析師會提出另外一組問題。今年的保險業專家是來自野村證券的Cliff Gallant。與我們非保險業務相關的問題，將會由來自Ruane， Cunniff & Goldfarb公司的Jonathan Brandt和晨星公司（Morningstar）的Gregg Warren提出。我們希望分析師和記者提出的問題有助於增進股東們對自己投資的了解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us.
查理和我對於將要回答的問題並沒有什麼線索。有些問題會很刁鑽，這是肯定的，我們歡迎這樣的問題。一個問句裡包含多個問題是不允許的，我們想要讓盡可能多的人有機會向我們提問。
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
我們預計總共會收到至少54個問題，其中分析師和記者每人可以問6個問題，聽眾可以提出18個問題。（去年我們總共回答了64個問題）。聽眾的問題將通過11次抽籤的方式選出來，抽籤時間為年度會議當天早上的8點15分。在大會場館和主要分會場一共安置有11個麥克風，每個麥克風將會進行一次抽籤。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
在我談論讓股東增加知識的同時，我也要提請大家注意，查理和我相信所有的股東都應該能夠同時接收到波克夏發布的新信息；而且如果條件允許的話，股東應該在進行交易前用充足的時間消化和分析這些信息。正是出於這個原因，我們盡量在周五晚間或週六早間發布財經數據，年度大會也總是在周六舉辦。我們並不採用某種通常的做法，也就是和大型機構投資者或分析師進行一對一的交談，而對其他股東不管不顧。有些股東能力有限，卻把他們積蓄中的大部分交託於我們打理，這種股東是我們最為重視的。
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我常常誇讚公司的操作經理們（Operating managers）所取得的成就，他們受之無愧。他們都是全明星級別的經理，辦起業務來就好像這些資產是他們家庭僅有的財產一樣謹慎。我還相信我們的經理以股東為重的心態，是所有大型上市公司裡最強的。我們公司的經理大多數並不需要為錢而工作。對他們來說，在商業打出“全壘打”所帶來的愉悅和獲得的收益同樣重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal income tax return – that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! – oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
在我們公司總部辦公室工作的24名男女僱員也同樣重要。他們高效地處理證券交易委員會和其它管理機構的要求，填寫了30400頁聯邦所得稅申報表——比前一年多了6000多頁！還要監管3530項州稅申報表，回應無數的股東和媒體問詢，做出年度報告，準備美國最大規模的年會，協調董事會的活動，對這封信進行事實審核——這份任務列表還可以寫很長。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
他們愉快地處理了所有這些商業任務，而且效率驚人，讓我的生活變得輕鬆愉悅。他們還努力處理一些並非和波克夏嚴格相關的活動：比如，去年有40所大學（從200所申請大學挑選出來的）派了學生到奧馬哈和我進行一天的問答活動，這項活動是由他們處理的。他們還處理我收到的各種請求，安排我的旅程，甚至午餐時還幫我買漢堡和炸薯條（當然裹滿了亨氏番茄醬）。沒有哪個CEO比我更舒服了；我真的感覺每天工作像跳踢踏舞一般開心。事實上，我的工作每年都會變得更有趣。
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by $16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25 next year.
2015年，波克夏的收入增加了160億美元。 然而仔細看，在面對頁上的兩張照片。 最重要的是去年的報告，並在我們的聖誕午餐中展示了整個波克夏家庭辦公室的工作人員。 下面這張照片是今年的聖誕照片，描繪了同樣的25位同樣定位的人。 2015年，沒有人加入我們，沒有人離開。 很可能你會在明年看到同樣的照片。
Can you imagine another very large company – we employ 361,270 people worldwide – enjoying that kind of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people – and they have stayed with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about “restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
2015年，沒有人加入，也沒有人離開。你能想像還有哪家超大型公司的總部——我們在全球有361270名僱員——能有這樣的僱員穩定性嗎？波克夏僱傭了許多傑出的人，他們堅守在我們公司。此外，我們只僱傭我們真正需要的人。這就是你從來沒聽說過波克夏要進行“重構”的原因。
On April 30th, come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – and meet my gang. They are the best.
4月30日，來奧馬哈——這裡是資本主義的搖籃——和我的這些小伙伴碰面吧。他們是最棒的。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 2016
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2016年2月27日
美國農業部的直接分配方法，比起State Farm和Allstate，成本更低，因此交易成本更高。 這使美國航空公司的員工利奧和莉蓮·古德溫夢想著擴大超越軍官的直接分配模式的目標市場。 1936年，以10萬美元的資本開始，他們成立了政府僱員保險公司（後來把這口子壓縮到GEICO）。
Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did $22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
他們的羽翼未豐在1937年創下了23.8萬美元的汽車保險業務，這是它的第一個全年。 去年，GEICO完成了226億美元，是USAA的兩倍多。 （儘管早起的鳥兒得了蟲子，第二隻老鼠得到了奶酪。）2015年，GEICO的承保費用是14.7％的保費，USAA是唯一一家達到較低比例的大公司。 （GEICO與USAA完全一樣高效，但在促進增長的廣告上花費更多。）
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
憑藉GEICO低成本的價格優勢，幾年前公司從Allstate手中奪得汽車保險第二名，這並不奇怪。 GEICO也在國營農場上佔有一席之地，儘管它在數量上仍然遙遙領先。 2030年8月30日 - 我的100歲生日 - 我計劃宣布GEICO已經佔據了榜首。 在你的日曆標記。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO約有34,000名員工為1400萬保單持有人提供服務。 我只能猜測，在這個機構體系下，需要為相似數量的保單持有人提供服務。 但是，我相信這個數字至少是6萬，這是保險公司直接就業所需要的人員和支持機構所需人員的組合。
In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
在電力這塊公共事業領域， 波克夏海瑟崴能源（BHE）的運營模式正在改變。以已有的經驗來看，效率並非地方電力企業生存的必要條件。事實上，從財政角度來看，“隨便”一些的運營方式可能恰到好處。
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
這種經驗是由於公共事業往往是某種產品的唯一供應商，並能夠基於投入的資本，設定一個確保盈利的定價。業內有這樣一個笑話，說公共事業是唯一比裝修老闆辦公室更掙錢的行當。許多公共事業公司的執行總裁也確實是按著這個套路操作的。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
但現在，這一切都改變了。享有美國聯邦政府補貼的風能和太陽能發電有益於我們的長遠利益，這已經成為瞭如今的社會共識。聯邦政府通過稅款抵免來落實這一政策，以支持特定地域內可再生能源價格的競爭力。這些針對可再生能源的稅收抵免（或其他支持政策），最終可能會侵蝕現有的公共事業公司，尤其是那些運行成本較高的公司。長期以來，哪怕BHE公司並不需要依靠這一點確保收入，但公司一直都非常注重效益，而這種對效益的重視讓BHE在如今的市場變得越發具有競爭力。更重要的是，這種競爭力在未來還會發揮更大的作用。
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatthours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
1999年，BHE公司獲得了愛荷華州的公共事業代理權。而1998年時，該公共事業僱傭著3700名員工，電能產量只能達到1900萬兆瓦/時。現在，在BHE的管理下，只需3500名員工，就可以達到2900兆瓦/時的產能。效益的巨大飛躍，讓我們在這16年來的運營中費率從來沒有增長過，而同期工業成本費率上漲了44%。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
我們在愛荷華州的公共事業公司的安全記錄也非常出挑。2015年，員工的事故率只有0.79%，比我們接手前那家公司7%的記錄優秀了太多。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006年，BHE收購了俄勒岡州和猶他州的電力企業美國太平洋公司（PacifiCorp）。收購前一年，太平洋公司僱傭員工為6750人，產能效率為5260萬兆瓦時。而去年，我們只用5700名員工就達到了5630萬兆瓦時的產能效率。安全係數的提升也非常顯著，2015年的事故率從2005年的3.4%下降到了0.85%。安全方面，BHE可以在行業排到前十。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership
這些傑出的表現都可以解釋，為什麼BHE希望收購某個地區的公共事業企業時，當地的監管機構會表現出如此大的歡迎。監管者們知道，我們的公司會帶來高效、安全又可靠的生產操作，同時也會為各種有意義的項目帶來無數的資金。（雖然BHE隸屬波克夏，但從未向我們支付過股息。BHE對投資的熱情在全美投資者所有的公共事業中都屬絕無僅有。）
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The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America – have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我剛剛詳細解釋的生產能力的提升，以及其他方面的成就，都為社會帶來了驚人的利益。這就是為什麼我們的全體公民享受到的不僅僅是產品和服務。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
出於這一點來看，這裡頭其實有一些抵消交易。首先，近年來的生產率提升讓富人們收穫頗豐。其次，生產力提升也常常會帶來劇變：如果創新或新的效率顛覆了已有世界，不管是資本家還是勞動者，都將付出巨大的代價。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
資本家們（不論是私人擁有者還是組團的公眾股東）都不需要我們的同情，他們可以顧好自己。正確的決定為投資者帶去了大量的回報，那錯誤的決定帶來巨大的損失也無可避免。此外，那些廣泛地分散投資又靜觀其變的投資者們一定會成功：在美國，成功的投資回報往往高於失敗帶來的損失。（20世紀，道瓊斯工業平均指數從66點飆升至11497點，所有的零部件企業始終享受著增長的分紅。）
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
但工齡較長的工人所面臨的問題卻與他們截然不同。當創新與市場體系相互作用，提升生產效率，許多工人會因此失去價值，他們的能力會變得過時。或許有些人能在別的地方找到體面的就業機會，但其他人卻別無選擇。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
當低成本競爭將鞋業生產的中心轉向亞洲，我們曾經繁榮的德克斯特（Dexter）鞋業倒閉了，緬因州小鎮1600名員工因此失業。許多人已經過了可以再學習另一門營生的年紀。我們失去了幾乎所有的投資，但這是我們能夠承受得起的，許多員工失去的是根本無可替代的生計。同樣的場景也出現在我們原來的新英格蘭紡織廠“慢性死亡”的過程中。這家紡織廠垂死掙扎了整整20年，許多新貝德福德廠的老員工就是活生生的例子——他們只會說葡萄牙語，有的能說一點點英語，幾乎不會其他語言，他們沒有第二個選擇。
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
上述這些例子的解決方法不在於限製或禁止提高生產力。如果我們堅持1100萬人口不應該失去農業上的工作，那麼美國人將永遠享受不到如今這樣優渥的生活。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
問題的解決方案在於，為那些願意繼續工作、但其才能卻因為市場原因貶值的人提供多樣而廣泛的保護網絡。（我個人非常贊成改革擴大勞動所得稅減免制度，為那些願意工作的人們提供最大的保障。）美國的大多數人享受著不斷增長的繁榮，這不應當成為不幸的小部分承受貧困的理由。
Important Risks
重要的風險
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
和所有的上市公司一樣，美國證券交易委員會要求我們每年都要在公開文件中登記自己的“風險因素”。然而，我並不記得閱讀公開文件中的“風險”因素對於我評估業務有多大幫助。這並不是因為這些風險認定不真實，而是通常真正的風險因素是我們沒有認知到的。除此之外，公開文件中的風險因素也不是為了評估而提供的：1）真實發生威脅事故的概率；2）如果發生事故，將付出多大的成本；3）可能造成損失的時機有哪些。50年後才可能浮現出來的問題可能會成為社會問題，但這並不屬於如今的投資者們需要考慮的問題。
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.
波克夏涉足的行業領域比我知道的其他任何公司都要多。我們的所有工作都擁有一些不同的問題和可能。列舉容易評估難：我、查理還有我們其他的執行總裁計算各種可能帶來的時機、成本和可能性的方式有很大的區別。
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view, for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
我可以舉一些例子。我們從一個最顯而易見的威脅開始吧：BNSF相較於其他鐵路，未來十年很可能將失去大量的煤炭業務。而未來的某個時刻（雖然在我看來這不會太遠了），無人自駕車可能會讓政府僱員保險公司（Geico）的保單數量大規模萎縮。當然，這些趨勢也會影響到我們的汽車經銷商。印刷報紙的發行量還將繼續下降，這是我們在收購時就非常清楚的事情。目前，可再生能源對我們的公共事業企業起到了幫助作用，但如果電力存儲的能力得到實質提升，那麼情況又將大有不同。在線零售已經威脅到了我們的零售企業的經營模式和消費品牌。這些都還只是我們面對的負面可能性的一小部分——但即便對商業新聞再漫不經心的人，也早已意識到了這些負面因素。
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
然而，這些問題都不會對波克夏的長遠發展起到什麼關鍵性的影響。1965年我們剛接手公司時，一句話就能概括當時的風險：“我們所有的資本都投到了北方的紡織公司裡頭，但紡織業注定將持續受損，直至消亡。”然而，這種發展趨勢，並沒有成為公司的喪鐘。我們只是適應了它，未來也是如此。
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
每天，波克夏的經理人都在思考，他們該如何與這個變換不息的世界抗爭。正如我和查理每天都在孜孜不倦地關注著，哪些領域值得我們源源不斷地投入資金。在這一方面，我們比那些只涉足一個行業的公司更有優勢——畢竟他們的選擇更為有限。我一直堅信波克夏擁有足夠的金錢、能力和文化，來突破上文提到的、或者其他的種種逆境，並形成愈發強大的盈利能力。
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.
然而，波克夏有一個非常明確存在又非常持久的危險，讓我和查理也感到束手無策。這也是我們的國民所面臨的主要威脅：那就是入侵者口中針對美國“成功的”網絡、生物、核能和化學襲擊。這是波克夏與全美所有企業共同面臨的危機。
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government – and luck! – for this result.
對任何給定的年份而言，這種大規模殺傷襲擊的概率都非常小。上一次《華盛頓郵報》頭條報導美國投擲原子彈的新聞，已經是70多年前了。之後多年，我們常常與毀滅性的打擊擦肩而過。對於這個結果，我們得感謝於我們的政府，當然，還有運氣。
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
然而，短期內的小概率事件放到長遠中看，就會變成必然。（如果某一年發生某一事件的概率為三十分之一，那放眼一個世紀，該事件至少發生一次的概率就會是96.6%。）更壞的消息是，總有個人或組織、甚至可能是國家，希望對我們的國家製造巨大的傷害。而他們達成這種目的的能力正在呈指數增長。可見，“創新”也有其陰暗面。
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
美國的公司和投資者無法擺脫這種風險。如果大規模破壞事件在美國發生，那麼所有股票的投資都會瀕臨毀滅。
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
沒有人知道“後一天”會是什麼樣子。然而，在我看來，1949年愛因斯坦的這句評價如今依然恰當：“我不知道第三次世界大戰會是怎樣，但是第四次世界大戰時，人們手中的武器將是木棒和石塊！”
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I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
我之所以會寫這篇文章，是因為今年的年度會議上，我們討論了關於氣候變化的代理提案。贊助商希望我們能提交一份報告，具體闡述氣候變化可能會對我們的保險業務帶來怎樣的威脅，以及我們將如何應對這些挑戰。
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.
在我看來，氣候變化很可能為我們的星球帶來一個嚴峻的問題。我之所以說“很可能”，而不說“一定”會帶來這個問題，是因為我沒有相應的科學能力做出這個判斷，並且我至今記得大多數“專家”們對千年蟲問題的可怕預言。不過，如果所有人都認為這一結果大有可能，而即便立刻採取行動，能夠成功制止危機到來的可能也非常小的話，不管是我還是誰，再要求100%確鑿的證據來證明傷害即將到來，那也是非常愚蠢的。
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.
這個問題與針對上帝是否存在的帕斯卡賭注有驚人的相似之處。帕斯卡曾經提出，如果有很小的可能上帝真實存在，那麼以上帝確實存在的標準行事就是有意義的——因為這麼做的回報可能是無限的，但不這麼做卻要冒著很痛苦的風險。同樣，哪怕只有1%的可能這個星球真的面臨一場巨大災難，時機延誤就意味著再無回寰的餘地，那現在的無為就是真正的魯莽。這可以叫做諾亞方舟法則：如果方舟對於生存可能是必不可少的，那麼不論現在的天空有多麼晴朗，應當立即開始建築方舟。
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
代理提案的讚助商會認為氣候變化將波克夏帶來巨大威脅也是可以理解的，因為我們是一家巨大的保險公司，覆蓋了各種類型的風險。他們或許會擔心，氣候變化會使財產損失大幅上升。事實上，如果我們要為未來10-20年寫下固定價格的保單，那麼這種擔憂是非常有必要的。但是，保單通常以一年為期來寫，每年都會針對新暴露的問題重新定價。損失增加的可能性能夠被及時轉化到增長的保費中。
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about $30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase to about $1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
1951年，我剛開始對政府僱員保險公司（Geico）產生熱情。該公司年均單個保單的損失為30美元。想像一下，如果我那會兒預測2015年損失成本將達到每單約1000美元，你會作何反應？你會問，如此暴漲的損失賠償會不會造成災難性的打擊啊？好吧，答案是否定的。
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing $600 million of business annually rather than one doing $23 billion.
過去幾年中，通貨膨脹導致了汽車維修和其他人身事故費用的激增。但這些增加的費用都及時反映到了增加的保費中。因此，與設想不同，在損失成本上升的過程中，保險公司的價值反而增加了。如果損失的成本一直維持不變，那現在波克夏旗下一家汽車保險公司的年均業務額將是6億美元，永遠無法達到如今230億美元的龐大規模。
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weatherrelated events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely – though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
到目前為止，氣候變化並沒有帶來更加頻繁或損失更大的颶風或其他保險覆蓋的氣候事件。因此，最近幾年美國的超級巨災保險在持續下降，這也是我們放棄這一塊業務的原因。如果超級巨災變得更加頻繁或損失更加慘重，那波克夏旗下的保險公司只會將這一塊業務做得更大，也更有利可圖。
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
作為公民，氣候變化讓你輾轉反側是在情理之中，如果你的房子地勢比較低，想要搬家也是人之常情。但單單作為一個大型保險公司的股東，氣候變化不應該是你擔心的事情。
The Annual Meeting
股東大會
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
我和查理終於決定和21世紀保持步調一致了。今年的年會將在全世界進行完整的網絡直播。如果想查看我們這次年度會議的內容，可以在北京時間5月1日上午10:00登錄以下網址：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。前半小時，雅虎網絡直播會播放對管理人員、董事和一些股民的採訪，我和查理將在9:30開始回答大家的問題。
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
這一安排主要有兩個目的。首先，這可能適當分流一些參會人流。去年的記錄是有超過40000人參與我們的年度會議，這已經超過了我們的承受能力。不僅是世紀鏈接中心（CenturyLink Center）的主會場人滿為患，毗鄰的奧馬哈希爾頓酒店兩個大型的會議室也很快擠滿了人。不包括Airbnb增長的業務量，當時所有的大酒店都被搶訂一空。預算有限的人們則通過Airbnb（一家民宿網站）訂房。
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t look that impressive when we were at our best.)
第二個讓我們開始嘗試網絡直播的原因更重要一些。查理今年92歲，我也85歲了。如果我們和你是做一些小企業業務合作，你大概會時不時就想看看我們倆是不是已經迷迷糊糊昏昏欲睡了。而股民們則不用跑到希爾頓酒店監督我們表現得如何。（還請你們在評論的時候寬容一些：請接受我們哪怕在最好的狀態下也沒有太大吸引力的事實。）
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry – and want to stay that way.
觀眾也可以藉此觀察一下我們之所以如此長壽的飲食習慣。會議期間，我和查理大概要喝上好多可樂、吃掉好多時思（See's）軟糖和花生糖，都夠得上一個NFL前鋒一周的攝入量了。很久以前，我倆就發現了一個基本的事實：你要真的餓了，沒什麼比得上胡蘿蔔和花椰菜的——你還想一直這麼保持下去。
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
準備現場參加會議的股東們，當天早上7:00，世紀鏈接中心一開門就可以來了，逛個街購個物甚麼的。今年的年會還是由嘉麗·索瓦（Carrie Sova）負責。上個月她剛剛生下來第二個孩子，但這沒有耽擱正事兒。嘉麗鎮定、機智又非常專業，可以為大家呈現出最好的內容。來自全國的波克夏的員工們，以及我們辦公室所有的工作人員也都為這次年會提供了積極的幫助，他們將共同為各位帶來一個有趣充實的周末。
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed – so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
去年我們延長了CenturyLink的營業時間，這也讓我們的銷量直線上漲，所以我們今年還會繼續延續新的營業時間。今年的4月29日（星期五），您可以從中午一直逛到下午5點，週六您可以從早晨7點一直逛到下午4點半。
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
週六早晨，我們將進行第五屆國際報紙投遞挑戰賽。目標地點仍是克雷頓之家（Clayton home）的門廊，投擲線據目標大概35英尺左右。當我還是個青年時，我曾經非常勤勞地做過送報紙的工作，我送了大概50萬份報紙，所以我覺得自己很擅長這個遊戲。向我挑戰吧！讓我難堪吧！打倒我吧！報紙大概有36到42頁，你必須自己折疊它們（不許用橡皮筋）。
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged most accurate – four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set – will compete against me at 7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything home.
比賽將在早晨7點15分開始，參賽者將參加初賽，將有8名投擲手在7點45分與我展開最終對決。這8名投擲手有4名由參賽者中選出，4名是以往的選手。年輕的新選手只要晉級就會獲得獎勵，而老選手必須要打敗我才能贏回點兒東西。
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for $78,900, fully installed on land you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his order book.
不要忘了順便去看看克雷頓之家，您可以花7.8萬買下它，我們可以將它“嫁接”到您指定的地點。在過去的幾年中，我們在年會上做成了很多買賣，Kevin Clayton的手上會隨時拿著訂貨單的。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
早晨8點半將會上映一部新的波克夏電影。一個小時後會有問答環節（有午餐休息時間，CenturyLink中會提供午餐），問答環節將持續到下午3點半。在短暫的休息後，查理與我將會在3點45分召開年度會議。業務環節大概會持續半小時，為了安全起見那些想要來個“最後一分鐘購物”的人可以跳過這個環節。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
您將會在一個19.43萬平方英尺的大廳購物，它就在會場旁邊，波克夏旗下的數十家子公司的產品將在這裡出售。向那些為自己產品站台的波克夏經理們問好吧。記得看看伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路公司（BNSF）為了向波克夏致敬而設立的鐵路佈局圖，您和您的孩子一定會為它著迷。
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000 pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
今年我們還有一個非常特別的新展覽——世界上最特別的飛機發動機的等比例模型。模型的絕大多數零件都是由Precision Castparts公司製造的。真的發動機有2萬磅重，直徑10英尺，長22英尺。我們展覽的這個被從中間切開的模型可以讓您更好的了解Precision Castparts公司為您的飛機提供的零件。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我們經營的Brooks跑鞋今年也會出售會議紀念款。買一雙之後參加我們週日早晨8點的第四屆“波克夏5公里”活動吧。起跑點設在CenturyLink，您可以在和參會入場券一起寄過去的參會指南中看到更多相關的詳細信息。參加這個比賽您就會發現自己在和一堆波克夏的經理、管理人員、董事和合作夥伴共同前行。（不過查理和我要多睡會兒，我們吃了太多的軟糖和花生脆）。這項活動的參賽者正在逐年增多，也幫我們創下了另一個記錄。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on our other products.
購物區的GEICO展位是由來自我們公司分佈在全國各地的頂尖顧問組成的。別忘了在展位下停下讓他們給你個優惠。他們會給你個股東折扣（通常8%左右）。這個折扣價在我們運行的44個展位中都通行。（補充一點：折扣不能和其他折扣同時使用，比如您屬於其他享受折扣的群體。）帶上您本來就有的折扣券再看看我們的價錢，您就會發現真的可以省好多錢。用省下的錢買我們的其他產品吧！
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
記得去Bookworm看看。我們將會在那裡展出35本書和一些DVD，其中有一些是新版本。Andy Kilpatrick將介紹他關於波克夏最新的全方位報導，並且很願意簽名。本書有1304頁並重9.8磅重。（我對於這本書的簡介：“沒有缺陷”）同時看看Peter Bevelin的新書。Peter是長期駐守在波克夏的非常敏銳的觀察員。
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the thenpublisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price remains $20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for sale at the meeting.
我們也將推出一個新的，20頁的波克夏的50週年紀念版本。我們曾在去年的會展上賣出了12000本。那之後，Carrie和我發現了一些新的資料，我們認為它們非常吸引人的，例如一些非常私人的信件，比如Grover Cleveland寄給Edward Butler的信，Edward Butler是他的朋友，之後成了《水牛城日報》的發行人。原版中已有的內容沒有任何刪除或改動，價格仍是20美元。Charlie和我將共同簽100本，它們將隨機地放置在準備好地5000本當中，在展會上售賣。
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water, an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best managerial duo – both in what they accomplished and how they did it – that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll never need a second exemplar.
我的朋友Phil Beuth曾寫過Limping on Water，一部關於他自己在資本城市過信息生活的自傳體編年史。他還寫了不少關於他的領導Tom Murphy和Dan Burke的事。不論是從已經取得的成就看還是從取得成就的過程看，這兩位都是頂尖的管理者，Charlie和我也都是見證者。你的人生能取得怎樣的成就，很大程度上取決於你崇拜和學習的對象。Tom Murphy就是一個不二人選。
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules, a book that will debut at the annual meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd. and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
最後，由Jeremy Miller寫的《巴菲特基本法則》也將在這次年會上閃亮登場。Miller先生已經對巴菲特合夥公司做了出色的研究和調查，並且詳細的解釋了波克夏是如何從最初的BPL發展至今的。如果你著迷於理論與實踐，你會喜歡這本書的。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
這份報告的附件材料可以告訴您如何獲得年會及其他活動的入場券。機票有時會在波克夏週舉行前提價。如果您從很遠的地方來，您可以選擇飛到堪薩斯城或者奧馬哈，之後開2.5小時的車過來。堪薩斯城和奧馬哈比起來，堪薩斯開車過來更便宜。這樣大概可以幫您省1000多美元。把剩下的錢花在我們的產品上吧！
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store did a record $44,239,493 of business. If you repeat that figure to a retailer, he is not going to believe you. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store – the highest-volume home furnishings store in the United States except for our new Dallas store – is about $9 million.)
在位於72街的佔地72英畝的內布拉斯加家具店（NFM）中，我們將再次舉行“波克夏週末”折扣價活動。在去年的年會周裡，這個家具店創下了約4424萬美元營業額。如果你和任何的零售商說這個數字，他們都不會相信。（NFM在奧馬哈的店鋪平時一周的銷售額大概900萬美元，奧馬哈的銷售情況還是除了我們在達拉斯的新店之外最好的。）
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
您在NFM獲得波克夏的折扣優惠，在4月26日（週二）至5月2日（週一）有效，別忘了一起帶著您的參會憑證。一些平常絕對沒有折扣活動的公司這次也會參加特價活動，本著股東周末的特別精神，我們讓他們破了例。我們非常感謝他們的配合。在“波克夏週末”NFM將在工作日從上午10點營業至晚上9點，週六將從上午10點營業至晚上9點半，週日從上午10點營業至晚上8點。週六晚5點半至8點半，NFM將舉辦野餐活動，我們邀請您也一同參加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
在Borsheims，我們還將舉行兩個只有股東可以參加的活動。第一個是4月29日（週五）下午6點到9點的酒會。最主要的聯歡晚會將在5月1日（週日）舉行早上9點至下午4點舉行。週六Borsheims將營業至下午6點。去年的這個週五到週日，我們的商店在營業時間每15分鐘就會開張銷售單。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
週末期間波仙珠寶（Borsheims）將迎來大量客流。因此，為了您的方便，股東價格優惠期間定於4月25日星期一到5月7日星期六。在此期間，請您出示自己的參會憑據，或出示能顯示您持有我們股票的經紀聲明（brokerage statement），以便確定您的股東身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to have Ajit and Charlie there also.
星期天，來自達拉斯的傑出魔術師Norman Beck將會在波仙珠寶外面的商場進行令人眼花繚亂的表演。在商場上層，我們邀請到了世界頂級橋牌專家Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，股東可在星期天下午和他們切磋牌藝。我會加入牌局，並希望能把阿基特和查理也請過來。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing星期天也會來到商場，接受乒乓球的挑戰。我第一次見Ariel時她才9歲，即便那會兒我也一分都贏不了她。她在2012年就已經代表美國出征過奧運會，現在是普林斯頓大學的大三學生。如果您不介意輸球的尷尬的話，可以和她切磋一下球技，活動下午1點開始。比爾·蓋茨和我會率先登場，試著削減她的銳氣。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before). As for my other favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
5月1日星期天這一天，Gorat's餐館將會為波克夏股東獨家開放，營業時間為下午1點到晚上10點。請於4月1日（請勿提前）撥打402-551-3733預定Gorat's餐廳座位。而另一家我最喜歡的餐廳，Piccolo's，我很遺憾地宣布它關門了。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their email addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我們將再次邀請同樣的三位財經記者引導大會期間的問答環節，他們會向我和查理提出股東通過電子郵件發送的問題。三名記者和他們的郵件分別是：傑出的商業記者Carol Loomis，她的郵箱是loomisbrk@gmail.com；來自CNBC的Becky Quick，郵箱是BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；《紐約時報》的Andrew Ross Sorkin，郵箱是arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位記者會從收到的問題中，選出他/要她認為最有意思最重要的6個問題。幾位記者告訴我，為了增加您的問題被選中的機率，您的問題要簡潔，避免在最後一刻才發送出去，要和波克夏相關，並且一封郵件裡問題數量不要超過兩個。（在郵件裡請向記者說明，如果您的問題被選中您是否希望透露自己的名字）。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
三名關注波克夏的分析師會提出另外一組問題。今年的保險業專家是來自野村證券的Cliff Gallant。與我們非保險業務相關的問題，將會由來自Ruane， Cunniff & Goldfarb公司的Jonathan Brandt和晨星公司（Morningstar）的Gregg Warren提出。我們希望分析師和記者提出的問題有助於增進股東們對自己投資的了解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us.
查理和我對於將要回答的問題並沒有什麼線索。有些問題會很刁鑽，這是肯定的，我們歡迎這樣的問題。一個問句裡包含多個問題是不允許的，我們想要讓盡可能多的人有機會向我們提問。
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
我們預計總共會收到至少54個問題，其中分析師和記者每人可以問6個問題，聽眾可以提出18個問題。（去年我們總共回答了64個問題）。聽眾的問題將通過11次抽籤的方式選出來，抽籤時間為年度會議當天早上的8點15分。在大會場館和主要分會場一共安置有11個麥克風，每個麥克風將會進行一次抽籤。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
在我談論讓股東增加知識的同時，我也要提請大家注意，查理和我相信所有的股東都應該能夠同時接收到波克夏發布的新信息；而且如果條件允許的話，股東應該在進行交易前用充足的時間消化和分析這些信息。正是出於這個原因，我們盡量在周五晚間或週六早間發布財經數據，年度大會也總是在周六舉辦。我們並不採用某種通常的做法，也就是和大型機構投資者或分析師進行一對一的交談，而對其他股東不管不顧。有些股東能力有限，卻把他們積蓄中的大部分交託於我們打理，這種股東是我們最為重視的。
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我常常誇讚公司的操作經理們（Operating managers）所取得的成就，他們受之無愧。他們都是全明星級別的經理，辦起業務來就好像這些資產是他們家庭僅有的財產一樣謹慎。我還相信我們的經理以股東為重的心態，是所有大型上市公司裡最強的。我們公司的經理大多數並不需要為錢而工作。對他們來說，在商業打出“全壘打”所帶來的愉悅和獲得的收益同樣重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal income tax return – that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! – oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
在我們公司總部辦公室工作的24名男女僱員也同樣重要。他們高效地處理證券交易委員會和其它管理機構的要求，填寫了30400頁聯邦所得稅申報表——比前一年多了6000多頁！還要監管3530項州稅申報表，回應無數的股東和媒體問詢，做出年度報告，準備美國最大規模的年會，協調董事會的活動，對這封信進行事實審核——這份任務列表還可以寫很長。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
他們愉快地處理了所有這些商業任務，而且效率驚人，讓我的生活變得輕鬆愉悅。他們還努力處理一些並非和波克夏嚴格相關的活動：比如，去年有40所大學（從200所申請大學挑選出來的）派了學生到奧馬哈和我進行一天的問答活動，這項活動是由他們處理的。他們還處理我收到的各種請求，安排我的旅程，甚至午餐時還幫我買漢堡和炸薯條（當然裹滿了亨氏番茄醬）。沒有哪個CEO比我更舒服了；我真的感覺每天工作像跳踢踏舞一般開心。事實上，我的工作每年都會變得更有趣。
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by $16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25 next year.
2015年，波克夏的收入增加了160億美元。 然而仔細看，在面對頁上的兩張照片。 最重要的是去年的報告，並在我們的聖誕午餐中展示了整個波克夏家庭辦公室的工作人員。 下面這張照片是今年的聖誕照片，描繪了同樣的25位同樣定位的人。 2015年，沒有人加入我們，沒有人離開。 很可能你會在明年看到同樣的照片。
Can you imagine another very large company – we employ 361,270 people worldwide – enjoying that kind of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people – and they have stayed with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about “restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
2015年，沒有人加入，也沒有人離開。你能想像還有哪家超大型公司的總部——我們在全球有361270名僱員——能有這樣的僱員穩定性嗎？波克夏僱傭了許多傑出的人，他們堅守在我們公司。此外，我們只僱傭我們真正需要的人。這就是你從來沒聽說過波克夏要進行“重構”的原因。
On April 30th, come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – and meet my gang. They are the best.
4月30日，來奧馬哈——這裡是資本主義的搖籃——和我的這些小伙伴碰面吧。他們是最棒的。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 2016
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2016年2月27日