| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (37.00) | 27.40 | ||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 26.50 | (6.70) | ||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 15.10 | (2.10) | ||||
| 2011 | 4.60 | 2.10 | 2.50 | ||||
| 2012 | 14.40 | 16.00 | (1.60) | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2012 | 19.7% | 9.4% | 10.30 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2012 | 586817.0% | 7433.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*
2012年，波克夏為股東實現了241億美元的回報。我們花了13億美元回購股票，因此公司淨值今年增長了228億。A級和B級股票的每股賬面價值增長了14.4%。過去的48年(即從現任的管理層接受以來)，每股賬面價值從19美元增長到了114,214美元，複合增長率19.7%。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.
去年波克夏有一些好消息，但我們還是先從壞消息說起吧。
●When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.
●1965年我運作的合夥公司接手波克夏以來，我從來沒有想過，一個回報241億美元的年份相對業績居然是低於平均水平的，請參見第一頁的業績比較。
But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.
但去年的業績的確低於平均水平。這是48年來第9次波克夏的業績落後於標普500指數的回報(計算包括的分紅和股價上升)。需要強調的是，另外的8次落後中，標普500指數增長都超過15%。我們在逆境里幹的要好一些。
To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of fiveyear wins will end.
迄今為止，我們從來沒有在按5年衡量的業績上落後於標普，已經實現了43連勝(記錄參見103頁)。但是標普指數過去4年連續取得正回報，並且超過了我們。如果2013年市場繼續實現超越，我們的5年期連勝記錄就要終結了。
One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value – for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy – at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.
有一件事情你可以確信：無論波克夏最終業績如何，我的合夥人查理·孟格，公司的副董事長，和我都不會改變業績標準。我們的工作就是以一個比標普指數更快的速度增加公司的內在價值——我們使用賬面價值作為其近似值。如果我們成功了，即使各年份的波動難以預測，波克夏的股價長期來看會超越標普指數。如果我們失敗了，我們沒有給投資者帶來任何價值，因為直接買一隻低費率的指數基金也可以獲得同樣的回報。
Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.
查理和我相信，波克夏的內在價值會持續以略高於標普指數的水平增長。我們的信心來源於公司優秀的業務，能幹的經理人團隊，以及以股東利益為導向的公司文化。我們的相對業績在市場向下或者表現平平的時候要好一些。在市場上漲強勁的年份，請預期我們將會暫時落後。
●The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.
2012年第二件令人失望的事情是我沒有能進行一筆大收購。我瞄準了一些大象，但最終空手而回。
Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.
不過今年年初我們運氣不錯。2月，我們達成協議購買一家全資擁有HJHeinz公司的控股公司50%股份。另外一半將會由以Jorge Paulo Lemann為首的少數投資者持有，他是巴西著名的商人和慈善家。
We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.
我們買不到比這更好的公司了。Jorge Paulo長期以來都是我的好朋友，並且是一位卓越的經理人。他為首的投資人團隊和波克夏將會各自出資約40億美元購買持股公司的普通股。波克夏還會另外投資80億美元購買分紅率9%的優先股。優先股兩個優勢大大增加了它的價值：首先它將會在特定時刻以顯著的溢價被回購，其次這些優先股還允許我們以像徵性的價格購買持股公司5%的普通股。
Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.
120億美元的總投資吸收了波克夏去年利潤的一大塊。但我們依然用有大量的現金，並在不斷地累積。所以，我們得繼續幹活;查理和我再次穿上遠征服，繼續獵象。
Now to some good news from 2012:
接下來是2012年的一些好消息：
● Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – our five most profitable non-insurance companies – were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “powerhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.
去年我告訴大家，BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、Marmon Group和MidAmerican Energy——我們盈利最好的5家非保險公司——2012年稅前利潤將會達到100億美元。它們確實做到了。儘管美國經濟增長微弱，全球多數經濟體都很疲軟，我們的“五駕馬車”總利潤101億美元，比2011年增加了約60億。
Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
5家公司裡，只有MidAmerican是波克夏8年前就擁有的，其稅前利潤3.93億。後來，我們以現金購買了另外5家中的3家。在收購第5家，也就是BNSF的時候，我們支付了70%的現金，剩下的部分增發股票，使得發行在外的股份增加了6.1%。最終結果是，5家公司為波克夏獻了97億美元但只產生了一點點攤薄。這與我們的目標一致，即不僅僅是實現增長，而是要實現每股價值的增長。
Unless the U.S. economy tanks – which we don’t expect – our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.
除非美國經濟出現危機——我們預期不太可能——我們的“五駕馬車”2013年將會貢獻更高的利潤。5位優秀的CEO們將負責這個事情。
● Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.
儘管我去年一筆大額收購都沒做成，但是我們各個分支的經理人比干的比我好多了。去年是我們“補強型”收購創紀錄的一年，我們花了23億美元，收購了26家融入我們現有業務的公司。這些交易沒有讓波克夏增發任何股票。
Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.
查理和我喜歡這樣的收購：通常它們是低風險的，不讓總部承受任何負擔，並且擴展了我們的經理人施展拳腳的空間。
● Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.
我們的保險業務去年業績喜人。不但為波克夏貢獻了730億美元的浮存金用於投資，還貢獻了16億美元的承保利潤，這是連續實現承保利潤的第10個年頭。這簡直就是一個怎麼吃掉了卻還在的蛋糕。
GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.
GEICO是保險業務裡的領頭羊，它繼續擴張著其市場份額而沒有犧牲其保單質量。從1995年我們收購GEICO以來，它在個人車險的市場份額從2.5%增長到了9.7%。保費收入從28億增長到了167億。未來還有巨大的增長空間等著它。
The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.
GEICO的卓越表現應歸功於Tony Nicely和他手下的27,000名員工。另外，我們還要感謝我們的Gecko。我們的“小蜥蜴②”一直堅守在崗位上，告訴大家如何到GEICO.com買更便宜的保險，風雨無阻。當我為大家祈福的時候，
When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.
我為GEICO祈禱兩次。
Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.
事實證明，Todd Combs和Ted Weschler，我們的新投資經理，非常聰明，而且正直誠信，除了作為組合管理人外，在許多方面都有益於波克夏，並且他們與公司文化相融。我們和兩位一起賺到了大獎。2012年，他們都以兩位數的優勢超過了標普500。這讓我相形見絀。
Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.
我們已經將他們各自管理的資金增加到了約50億(部分來自我們子公司的養老金)。Todd和Ted非常年輕，他們將會在查理和我離開後掌管波克夏巨額的投資組合。他們接手以後大家可以安心睡覺。
● Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.
波克夏年末的僱員總數創記錄地達到了288,462名(參加106頁的詳細信息)，比上年增加17,604名。我們總部的員工人數，依然維持在24名。暫時還沒有任何瘋狂的跡象。
Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo – all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.
●波克夏的四大投資——美國運通、可口可樂、IBM和富國銀行——都經歷了一個好年景。我們在4家公司的持股比例都有所增加。我們增持了富國銀行(現在的持股比例達8.7%，2011年末未7.6%)，和IBM(6.0%，之前為5.5%)。同時，可口可樂和美國運通的股票回購增加了我們的持股比例。我們在可口可樂的持股比例從8.8%增加到8.9%， 在美國運動的持股比例從13.0%增加到13.7%。
Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”
波克夏在這四家公司的持股比例未來還會增加。Mae West說的對：“好東西越多越精彩。”
The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.
這四家公司運營著非凡的業務，並且由聰明、為股東利益考慮的經理人掌舵。在波克夏，我們更願意擁有一家優秀公司非控制性但是足夠額度的權益，而不願意擁有一家業績平平的公司100%的權益。我們在資本配置上的靈活性，使我們具有一個巨大優勢，那就是可以限制下屬公司，保證它們只收購那些它們能夠運營好的業務。
Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.
以我們年末的份額計算，2012年我們在“四大”上獲得的利潤是39億。但在我們報告給你的財報上，我們只計算了我們獲得的分紅——大約11億。但是請不用懷疑：沒有進入財報的28億利潤和財報上記錄的具有同樣價值。
The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases – which enhance our share of future earnings – and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).
這四大企業利潤經常會被用來回購，這樣會提高我們未來的收益，當然也不排除企業用於他們已經發現的有優勢的項目。光陰荏苒，我們期望從這些投資公司賺取的更多的利潤。如果我們被證明是正確的，那麼分給波克夏的股息將增加，更重要的是，將實現我們的未實現資本收益（截至年底四大企業約有267億元）。
● There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capitalallocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan’s new country song, “Every Storm Runs Out of Rain.”
去年在做資本配置的決策時，苦惱於“不確定性”的CEO們一定非常糾結(雖然他們中的不少人所管理的公司盈利和現金都創紀錄的好)。在波克夏，我們完全沒有他們的擔心，相反2012年我們在工廠和設備上投資了98億美元，其中約88%投資在美國。這比2011年增加了19%，而2011年是我們之前投資的歷史高點。不管智者怎麼說，查理和我喜歡在值得的項目上大筆投資。我們注意到Gary Allan的新歌裡唱到，“風暴過後，又是一場大雨”。
We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.
我們依然腳踏實地，而且基本確定2013年又會是資本支出創紀錄的一年。在美國，機會到處都是。
************
A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).
給我的CEO夥伴們的一點想法：毫無疑問，未來永遠是充滿不確定性的，美國從1776年開始就一直面對各種不確定性。只不過有時候人們非常在意無以計數的、一直存在的各種不確定性，而另外一些時候，他們卻無視不確定性(通常是因為那段時間太平無事)。
American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)
美國公司前景光明。股票也一定會會表現良好，因為它們的命運是和公司的業績聯繫在一起的。週期性的困難在所難免，但是投資者和經理人處在一個由他們的喜好所影響的遊戲中。(道瓊斯工業指數在20世紀裡從66漲到了11,497，期間經歷了四次損失慘重的戰爭，一次大蕭條和多次的衰退，最終依然蹣跚上升了17,320%。而且不要忘了，投資者還收到了不少的分紅。
Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.
因為這個遊戲是如此的誘人，查理和我認為嘗試依據塔羅牌的排列，“專家”的預測，或者商業周期進進出出是一個巨大的錯誤。錯過這個遊戲的風險比呆在裡面要大得多。
My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day’s headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.
我自己的故事就是一個戲劇性的例子：1942年春天，美國當時痛苦地經歷著太平洋戰爭帶來的損失，而我購買了我的第一支股票。每天的新聞頭條都在訴說更多的困難。儘管如此，沒有人談論不確定性;每個美國人都堅信我們會挺過來。
The country’s success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.
我們的國家從那段痛苦到現在的成功讓人吃驚：通脹調整後，人均GDP從1941年到2012年間翻了4倍。在這期間，每個明天都充滿不確定性。然而，美國的命運一直都非常清晰：長盛不衰。
If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you. ************
如果你是一個CEO，因為短期因素的擔憂，擱置了一個巨大但利潤豐厚的投資項目，請打電話給波克夏。讓我們來緩解你的擔憂。
************
In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
總而言之，查理和我希望通過以下手段構築每股內在價值，(1)不斷提高我們分子公司的賺錢能力；(2)通過附加收購進一步增加他們的收益；(3)分享我們投資企業的成長；(4)當波克夏的股價大大低於內在價值時回購股票；(5)偶爾的大型收購。我們會儘量嘗試為你尋求最優方案，可能很少，如果有的話，也會發行新的波克夏的股票。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.
In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*
2012年，波克夏為股東實現了241億美元的回報。我們花了13億美元回購股票，因此公司淨值今年增長了228億。A級和B級股票的每股賬面價值增長了14.4%。過去的48年(即從現任的管理層接受以來)，每股賬面價值從19美元增長到了114,214美元，複合增長率19.7%。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.
去年波克夏有一些好消息，但我們還是先從壞消息說起吧。
●When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.
●1965年我運作的合夥公司接手波克夏以來，我從來沒有想過，一個回報241億美元的年份相對業績居然是低於平均水平的，請參見第一頁的業績比較。
But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.
但去年的業績的確低於平均水平。這是48年來第9次波克夏的業績落後於標普500指數的回報(計算包括的分紅和股價上升)。需要強調的是，另外的8次落後中，標普500指數增長都超過15%。我們在逆境里幹的要好一些。
To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of fiveyear wins will end.
迄今為止，我們從來沒有在按5年衡量的業績上落後於標普，已經實現了43連勝(記錄參見103頁)。但是標普指數過去4年連續取得正回報，並且超過了我們。如果2013年市場繼續實現超越，我們的5年期連勝記錄就要終結了。
One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value – for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy – at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.
有一件事情你可以確信：無論波克夏最終業績如何，我的合夥人查理·孟格，公司的副董事長，和我都不會改變業績標準。我們的工作就是以一個比標普指數更快的速度增加公司的內在價值——我們使用賬面價值作為其近似值。如果我們成功了，即使各年份的波動難以預測，波克夏的股價長期來看會超越標普指數。如果我們失敗了，我們沒有給投資者帶來任何價值，因為直接買一隻低費率的指數基金也可以獲得同樣的回報。
Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.
查理和我相信，波克夏的內在價值會持續以略高於標普指數的水平增長。我們的信心來源於公司優秀的業務，能幹的經理人團隊，以及以股東利益為導向的公司文化。我們的相對業績在市場向下或者表現平平的時候要好一些。在市場上漲強勁的年份，請預期我們將會暫時落後。
●The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.
2012年第二件令人失望的事情是我沒有能進行一筆大收購。我瞄準了一些大象，但最終空手而回。
Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.
不過今年年初我們運氣不錯。2月，我們達成協議購買一家全資擁有HJHeinz公司的控股公司50%股份。另外一半將會由以Jorge Paulo Lemann為首的少數投資者持有，他是巴西著名的商人和慈善家。
We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.
我們買不到比這更好的公司了。Jorge Paulo長期以來都是我的好朋友，並且是一位卓越的經理人。他為首的投資人團隊和波克夏將會各自出資約40億美元購買持股公司的普通股。波克夏還會另外投資80億美元購買分紅率9%的優先股。優先股兩個優勢大大增加了它的價值：首先它將會在特定時刻以顯著的溢價被回購，其次這些優先股還允許我們以像徵性的價格購買持股公司5%的普通股。
Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.
120億美元的總投資吸收了波克夏去年利潤的一大塊。但我們依然用有大量的現金，並在不斷地累積。所以，我們得繼續幹活;查理和我再次穿上遠征服，繼續獵象。
Now to some good news from 2012:
接下來是2012年的一些好消息：
● Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – our five most profitable non-insurance companies – were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “powerhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.
去年我告訴大家，BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、Marmon Group和MidAmerican Energy——我們盈利最好的5家非保險公司——2012年稅前利潤將會達到100億美元。它們確實做到了。儘管美國經濟增長微弱，全球多數經濟體都很疲軟，我們的“五駕馬車”總利潤101億美元，比2011年增加了約60億。
Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
5家公司裡，只有MidAmerican是波克夏8年前就擁有的，其稅前利潤3.93億。後來，我們以現金購買了另外5家中的3家。在收購第5家，也就是BNSF的時候，我們支付了70%的現金，剩下的部分增發股票，使得發行在外的股份增加了6.1%。最終結果是，5家公司為波克夏獻了97億美元但只產生了一點點攤薄。這與我們的目標一致，即不僅僅是實現增長，而是要實現每股價值的增長。
Unless the U.S. economy tanks – which we don’t expect – our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.
除非美國經濟出現危機——我們預期不太可能——我們的“五駕馬車”2013年將會貢獻更高的利潤。5位優秀的CEO們將負責這個事情。
● Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.
儘管我去年一筆大額收購都沒做成，但是我們各個分支的經理人比干的比我好多了。去年是我們“補強型”收購創紀錄的一年，我們花了23億美元，收購了26家融入我們現有業務的公司。這些交易沒有讓波克夏增發任何股票。
Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.
查理和我喜歡這樣的收購：通常它們是低風險的，不讓總部承受任何負擔，並且擴展了我們的經理人施展拳腳的空間。
● Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.
我們的保險業務去年業績喜人。不但為波克夏貢獻了730億美元的浮存金用於投資，還貢獻了16億美元的承保利潤，這是連續實現承保利潤的第10個年頭。這簡直就是一個怎麼吃掉了卻還在的蛋糕。
GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.
GEICO是保險業務裡的領頭羊，它繼續擴張著其市場份額而沒有犧牲其保單質量。從1995年我們收購GEICO以來，它在個人車險的市場份額從2.5%增長到了9.7%。保費收入從28億增長到了167億。未來還有巨大的增長空間等著它。
The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.
GEICO的卓越表現應歸功於Tony Nicely和他手下的27,000名員工。另外，我們還要感謝我們的Gecko。我們的“小蜥蜴②”一直堅守在崗位上，告訴大家如何到GEICO.com買更便宜的保險，風雨無阻。當我為大家祈福的時候，
When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.
我為GEICO祈禱兩次。
Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.
事實證明，Todd Combs和Ted Weschler，我們的新投資經理，非常聰明，而且正直誠信，除了作為組合管理人外，在許多方面都有益於波克夏，並且他們與公司文化相融。我們和兩位一起賺到了大獎。2012年，他們都以兩位數的優勢超過了標普500。這讓我相形見絀。
Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.
我們已經將他們各自管理的資金增加到了約50億(部分來自我們子公司的養老金)。Todd和Ted非常年輕，他們將會在查理和我離開後掌管波克夏巨額的投資組合。他們接手以後大家可以安心睡覺。
● Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.
波克夏年末的僱員總數創記錄地達到了288,462名(參加106頁的詳細信息)，比上年增加17,604名。我們總部的員工人數，依然維持在24名。暫時還沒有任何瘋狂的跡象。
Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo – all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.
●波克夏的四大投資——美國運通、可口可樂、IBM和富國銀行——都經歷了一個好年景。我們在4家公司的持股比例都有所增加。我們增持了富國銀行(現在的持股比例達8.7%，2011年末未7.6%)，和IBM(6.0%，之前為5.5%)。同時，可口可樂和美國運通的股票回購增加了我們的持股比例。我們在可口可樂的持股比例從8.8%增加到8.9%， 在美國運動的持股比例從13.0%增加到13.7%。
Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”
波克夏在這四家公司的持股比例未來還會增加。Mae West說的對：“好東西越多越精彩。”
The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.
這四家公司運營著非凡的業務，並且由聰明、為股東利益考慮的經理人掌舵。在波克夏，我們更願意擁有一家優秀公司非控制性但是足夠額度的權益，而不願意擁有一家業績平平的公司100%的權益。我們在資本配置上的靈活性，使我們具有一個巨大優勢，那就是可以限制下屬公司，保證它們只收購那些它們能夠運營好的業務。
Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.
以我們年末的份額計算，2012年我們在“四大”上獲得的利潤是39億。但在我們報告給你的財報上，我們只計算了我們獲得的分紅——大約11億。但是請不用懷疑：沒有進入財報的28億利潤和財報上記錄的具有同樣價值。
The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases – which enhance our share of future earnings – and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).
這四大企業利潤經常會被用來回購，這樣會提高我們未來的收益，當然也不排除企業用於他們已經發現的有優勢的項目。光陰荏苒，我們期望從這些投資公司賺取的更多的利潤。如果我們被證明是正確的，那麼分給波克夏的股息將增加，更重要的是，將實現我們的未實現資本收益（截至年底四大企業約有267億元）。
● There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capitalallocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan’s new country song, “Every Storm Runs Out of Rain.”
去年在做資本配置的決策時，苦惱於“不確定性”的CEO們一定非常糾結(雖然他們中的不少人所管理的公司盈利和現金都創紀錄的好)。在波克夏，我們完全沒有他們的擔心，相反2012年我們在工廠和設備上投資了98億美元，其中約88%投資在美國。這比2011年增加了19%，而2011年是我們之前投資的歷史高點。不管智者怎麼說，查理和我喜歡在值得的項目上大筆投資。我們注意到Gary Allan的新歌裡唱到，“風暴過後，又是一場大雨”。
We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.
我們依然腳踏實地，而且基本確定2013年又會是資本支出創紀錄的一年。在美國，機會到處都是。
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A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).
給我的CEO夥伴們的一點想法：毫無疑問，未來永遠是充滿不確定性的，美國從1776年開始就一直面對各種不確定性。只不過有時候人們非常在意無以計數的、一直存在的各種不確定性，而另外一些時候，他們卻無視不確定性(通常是因為那段時間太平無事)。
American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)
美國公司前景光明。股票也一定會會表現良好，因為它們的命運是和公司的業績聯繫在一起的。週期性的困難在所難免，但是投資者和經理人處在一個由他們的喜好所影響的遊戲中。(道瓊斯工業指數在20世紀裡從66漲到了11,497，期間經歷了四次損失慘重的戰爭，一次大蕭條和多次的衰退，最終依然蹣跚上升了17,320%。而且不要忘了，投資者還收到了不少的分紅。
Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.
因為這個遊戲是如此的誘人，查理和我認為嘗試依據塔羅牌的排列，“專家”的預測，或者商業周期進進出出是一個巨大的錯誤。錯過這個遊戲的風險比呆在裡面要大得多。
My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day’s headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.
我自己的故事就是一個戲劇性的例子：1942年春天，美國當時痛苦地經歷著太平洋戰爭帶來的損失，而我購買了我的第一支股票。每天的新聞頭條都在訴說更多的困難。儘管如此，沒有人談論不確定性;每個美國人都堅信我們會挺過來。
The country’s success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.
我們的國家從那段痛苦到現在的成功讓人吃驚：通脹調整後，人均GDP從1941年到2012年間翻了4倍。在這期間，每個明天都充滿不確定性。然而，美國的命運一直都非常清晰：長盛不衰。
If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you. ************
如果你是一個CEO，因為短期因素的擔憂，擱置了一個巨大但利潤豐厚的投資項目，請打電話給波克夏。讓我們來緩解你的擔憂。
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In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
總而言之，查理和我希望通過以下手段構築每股內在價值，(1)不斷提高我們分子公司的賺錢能力；(2)通過附加收購進一步增加他們的收益；(3)分享我們投資企業的成長；(4)當波克夏的股價大大低於內在價值時回購股票；(5)偶爾的大型收購。我們會儘量嘗試為你尋求最優方案，可能很少，如果有的話，也會發行新的波克夏的股票。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.
這些方式具有堅實的基礎。一個世紀以後，BNSF和MidAmerican Energy依然會在美國經濟中扮演重要角色。保險業務就更不用說，依然對機構和個人具有重要意義——而且沒有公司比波克夏給這個領域投資帶來更多資源。當我們看到這些以及更多的優勢時，查理和我就非常喜歡你們公司的前景。
Intrinsic Business Value
內在商業價值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number
is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the
three elements – one of which was qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s
intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.
雖然查理和我不停談論內在價值，但我們無法告訴你波克夏的股票精確的內在價值(其他一些股票也很難)。在2010年的年報裡，我們提出了三個要素——其中一個是定性的——我們認為這是衡量波克夏內在價值的關鍵。相關分析完整復制在了104-105頁。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to $113,786, and our per-share pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments also increased 15.7% to $8,085.
這裡有兩個關鍵量化要素的最新數據：2012年，我們的每股投資增長了15.7%，達到113,786，我們除保險和投資外的每股稅前利潤也增長15.7%，達到8,085。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.
從1970年開始，我們的每股投資以每年19.4%的複合速度增長，我們的每股盈利增速則是20.8%。波克夏的估計過去42年的增速和我們兩個主要價值衡量指標的增速非常接近，這並非巧合。查理和我樂於看到這兩個方面都增長，但是我們的重點依然將是構築堅實的盈利能力。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
現在，讓我們了解公司四個主要業務板塊的運營情況。它們具有差別巨大的資產負債結構，以及全然不同的營收情形。因此把它們合併到一起將會影響分析。我們將分別討論各個業務，這也是查理和我看待它們的方式。
Insurance
保險業務
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
先來看保險業務，波克夏的核心業務，也是多年來驅動我們不斷擴展的引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collectnow, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains quite stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
財產保險公司現收取保險，事後進行理賠支付。在一些極端情況下，比如某些工傷保險，賠付可能發生在幾十年之後。這種現在收錢，將來賠付的模式讓我們持有大量的現金——我們把它稱作“浮存金”——但最終它會支付到別人手中。同時，我們可以使用這些浮存金為波克夏投資。雖然單筆的保單和索賠有進有出，但是我們持有的浮存金總額和保費收入維持一個穩定關係。所以，當我們的業務擴張時，我們的浮存金規模也擴張。我們增長的速度，參加下面的表格：
Year Float (in $ millions)
1970 $ 39
1980 237
1990 1,632
2000 27,871
2010 65,832
2012 73,125
Last year I told you that our float was likely to level off or even decline a bit in the future. Our insurance CEOs set out to prove me wrong and did, increasing float last year by $2.5 billion. I now expect a further increase in 2013. But further gains will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 2% in any year.
去年我告訴大家，我們的浮存金可能保持平穩，甚至有可能會在將來有所下降。但我們的保險公司CEO們最終證明我是錯的，他們去年讓我們增加了25億浮存金。我現在預期2013年還會有所增加。但是更多的增長會越發困難。好消息是，GEICO的浮存金基本上會保持增長。但是在Nationally Indemnity的再保險部門，我們有一些流失的保單，它們的浮存金會下降。如果我們未來確實出現了浮存金的下降，那它會是非常溫和的——每年不會超過2%。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That’s like your taking out a loan and having the bank pay you interest.
如果我們的保費收入超過了總成本和最終的賠付支出，我們會在利用浮存金投資獲得的投資收益之外錄得一個承保利潤。賺到這種利潤的時候，我們是在享受持有這些免費資金的好處——更好的是，我們還因為持有資金而賺到錢。這就好像你去銀行貸款，銀行還倒貼給你利息。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the eleven years ending in 2011. (Their financials for 2012 are not yet available.) There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry never ceases searching for new ones.
不幸的是，保險公司實現這個美好結果的強烈願望導致了激烈的競爭，競爭如此激烈以至於大多數年份，財產保險行業整體都在嚴重承保虧損中運行。這筆虧損，實質上就是整個行業為了獲得浮存金和支付的成本。舉個例子，State Farm，當前美國最大且管理良好的保險公司，截止到2011年前的11年裡有8年都錄得承保虧損(2012年的財務數據還沒有公佈)。保險行業有很多種虧錢的方式，而且這個行業從來不曾停止尋找新的虧錢方式。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for ten consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $18.6 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. If we do, our float will be better than free money.
正如前一部分提到的，我們已經連續10年錄得承保利潤，我們的這一時期內的稅前利潤累計186億美元。預計未來大部分年份中，我們依然會保持錄得承保利潤。如果確實如此，那我們的浮存金就比免費的資金更誘人。
So how does our attractive float affect the calculations of intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to look at float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe Berkshire’s will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
那我們誘人的浮存金將會如何影響內在價值的計算?當波克夏的計算賬面價值的時候，所有的浮存金都作為負債被扣除了，就好像我們明天就要兌現債務，並且再也無法補充回來。但是這是一種看待浮存金的錯誤觀念，它實際上應該被看做一筆循環基金。如果浮存金是無成本並且是長期存在的，我相信對波克夏來說確實如此，那這筆債務的真實價值就遠比賬面上的負債小得多。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the floatgenerating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我們資產賬面上記錄的，對應保險公司的155億“商譽”部分地抵消了負債賬面價值的高估。實際上，這些商譽代表著我們為保險公司產生浮存金的能力所支付的價格。然而商譽的賬面成本，和它的真實價值毫無對應關係。比如說一家產生持續大額承保虧損的保險公司，其商譽應該為零，無論其歷史成本是多少。
Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation producing float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸運的是，波克夏的情況不是那樣。查理和我相信，我們保險公司的真實商譽——我們願意為購買一家能產生類似質量的浮存金的保險公司所支付的價格——遠超過賬面上記錄的歷史成本。浮存金的價值是我們認為波克夏的內在價值明顯超過賬面價值的一個原因——一個重要原因。
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: There is very little “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue.
必須再強調一下，無成本的浮存金不應該成為對整個產險行業平均預期的結果：在保險行業裡像波克夏獲得的優質浮存金非常之少。2011年前的45年中，有37年整個行業的保費收入不能覆蓋賠付支出和成本費用。因此，整個行業的有形資產回報水平幾十年來一直低於美國其他行業的平均水平，這是一個悲傷但基本注定還會持續的情形。
A further unpleasant reality adds to the industry’s dim prospects: Insurance earnings are now benefitting from “legacy” bond portfolios that deliver much higher yields than will be available when funds are reinvested during the next few years – and perhaps for many years beyond that. Today’s bond portfolios are, in effect, wasting assets. Earnings of insurers will be hurt in a significant way as bonds mature and are rolled over.
另外一個讓行業的暗淡前景更加不利的事實：保險公司的利潤現在收益於之前“遺留”下的高收益債券，當資金未來年份重新進行投資時，不能再獲得如此高的收益率——也有可能還要過好些年。今天的債券市場實際上是減耗資產。保險公司的盈利在債券到期並重新配置時將會遭受重創。
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Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
波克夏優越的經濟特性之所以存在，是因為我們有一些卓越的經理人在運營著我們不同凡響的保險公司。讓我將給大家介紹一些主要的公司。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because it has so many streams of earnings. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
首先，浮存金規模排在第一的是波克夏海瑟崴再保險集團，由Ajit Jain領導。Ajit對其他人都不願意承保，或者沒有足夠資本進行承保的風險進行承保。他的公司集能力、速度、果斷，以及最重要的，保險專業智慧於一身。他從未讓波克夏暴露於與我們的資源不相稱的風險之下。實際上，我們比多數大保險公司在規避風險方面都更加謹慎。舉例來說，如果保險行業因某項巨災遭遇了2500億美元的虧損——這是歷史上所發生過最大規模虧損的3倍——波克夏當年整體上依然能夠實現盈利，因為它有如此多的利潤來源。其他的大保險公司和再保險公司則會出現大額的虧損，有些甚至將面臨破產。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $35 billion and a significant cumulative underwriting profit, a feat that no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. He has thus added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. If you meet Ajit at the annual meeting, bow deeply.
從1985年開始，Ajit已經創立了一個浮存金350億美元，實現巨額累計承保利潤的再保險公司，這是一項任何其他保險公司的CEO都難以望其項背成就。他也為波克夏貢獻了千百億的利潤。如果你在年會上遇到Ajit，請深深鞠躬表示敬意。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我們還有另外一駕再保險馬車，它屬於General Re，由Tad Montross掌管。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
最起碼的，一家優秀的保險公司必須遵守四項原則。它必須(1)理解所有可能導致保單形成損失的風險敞口;(2)保守地衡量風險敞口實際形成損失的概率以及可能的損失規模;(3)設定合理的保費，平均來看，要能在覆蓋潛在的損失成本和運營成本後實現承保利潤;(4)願意在收取不了合意的保費時放棄保單。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.
很多保險公司順利通過前三條，但在第四條上不及格。它們無法在它們的競爭對手也爭搶的業務上回頭。古話說，“別人這麼幹，我也得這麼幹”，這在很多行業都造成了麻煩，但這在保險行業造成的麻煩尤其多。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has achieved consistent and profitable growth since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad非常明了保險行業的四條軍規，他的業績證明了這一點。在他的領導下，General Re的巨額浮存金比無成本的資金還要誘人，並且我們預計這種情況依然會繼續。我們尤其對General Re的國際人壽再保險業務充滿熱情，從1998年我們收購公司以來，這項業務持續增長並不斷盈利。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 62 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 51 years of service in 2012.
最後，是GEICO，62年前讓我開始入行時投資的保險公司。GEICO由Tony Nicely掌管，他18歲就加入了公司，到2012年，已經服役51年。
I rub my eyes when I look at what Tony has accomplished. Last year, it should be noted, his record was considerably better than is indicated by GEICO’s GAAP underwriting profit of $680 million. Because of a change in accounting rules at the beginning of the year, we recorded a charge to GEICO’s underwriting earnings of $410 million. This item had nothing to do with 2012’s operating results, changing neither cash, revenues, expenses nor taxes. In effect, the writedown simply widened the already huge difference between GEICO’s intrinsic value and the value at which we carry it on our books.
Tony的成就讓我無法相信自己的眼睛。必須說明的是，他的業績遠不是去年GEICO按美國會計準則報告的6.8億美元承保利潤所能說明的。因為年初的會計準成調整，我們在GEICO的承保利潤中計入了4.1億的費用。這和GEICO 2012年的運營沒有任何關係，不改變現金、收入、成本和稅收項目。實際上，這項減記只是進一步加大了GEICO的內在價值和其賬面價值之間的差距。
GEICO earned its underwriting profit, moreover, despite the company suffering its largest single loss in history. The cause was Hurricane Sandy, which cost GEICO more than three times the loss it sustained from Katrina, the previous record-holder. We insured 46,906 vehicles that were destroyed or damaged in the storm, a staggering number reflecting GEICO’s leading market share in the New York metropolitan area.
儘管公司遭遇了歷史上最大的單筆損失，GEICO依然實現了承保利潤。虧損的原因是颶風桑迪，它給GEICO造成了三倍於卡特里娜的損失，後者是之前的記錄保持者。風暴中損毀的車輛中46,906輛是由GEICO承保的，這個巨大的數字，這也反映了GEICO在紐約地區市場份額的領先地位。
Last year GEICO enjoyed a meaningful increase in both the renewal rate for existing policyholders (“persistency”) and in the percentage of rate quotations that resulted in sales (“closures”). Big dollars ride on those two factors: A sustained gain in persistency of a bare one percentage point increases intrinsic value by more than $1 billion. GEICO’s gains in 2012 offer dramatic proof that when people check the company’s prices, they usually find they can save important sums. (Give us a try at 1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com. Be sure to mention that you are a shareholder; that fact will usually result in a discount.)
去年，GEICO在已有投保客戶的複單率(“粘度”)和詢價轉化為保單的比例(“轉化率”)上都有顯著的提升。這兩項數據意味著一大筆利潤：可持續地將客戶粘度提高一個百分點，意味著內在價值增加超過10億美元。2012年GEICO實現的提高證明，人們查詢公司的保單價格的話，通常可以發現購買GEICO的保險可以省下不少錢。(打個電話到1-800-847-7536或者到網站GEICO.com試一下。記得申明你是波克夏的股東，這通常能讓給你享受優惠價。)
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies have consistently delivered an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了我們的三家主要保險公司外，我們還有一些小保險公司，它們的大部分專注於保險行業的一些細分領域。整體上，這些公司一直為我們貢獻承保利潤。另外，正如表格數據顯示的那樣，它們也提供了大量浮存金。查理和我感謝這些公司和它們的經理人們。
Late in 2012, we enlarged this group by acquiring Guard Insurance, a Wilkes-Barre company that writes workers compensation insurance, primarily for smaller businesses. Guard’s annual premiums total about $300 million. The company has excellent prospects for growth in both its traditional business and new lines it has begun to offer.
2012下半年，我們收購Guard Insurance擴大了這個大家庭。它是一家威爾克斯-巴里的工傷保險公司，主要做一些小額的保單。Guard的年保費規模大約3億美元。這家公司在它的傳統業務和它即將提供的新業務上都有很大的發展潛力。
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | ||
| General Re | $304 | -$714 | $34,821 | $33,728 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 355 | 144 | 20,128 | 19,714 | ||
| GEICO | 688* | 576 | 11,578 | 11,169 | ||
| Other Primary | 286 | 242 | 6,598 | 5,960 | ||
| Total | $1,625 | $248 | $73,125 | $70,571 | ||
*After a $410 million charge against earnings arising from an industry-wide accounting change
*由於行業會計準則調整，減少了4.1億美元承保利潤。
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world. It was our lucky day when, in March 1967, Jack Ringwalt sold us his two property-casualty insurers for $8.6 million.
在所有大型保險公司中，我認為波克夏的保險公司是全球最好的。我們非常有幸在1967年3月以860萬美元收購了Jack Ringwalt賣給我們的兩家財產保險公司。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受管制的、資本密集型業務
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
這個版塊主要有兩家公司，BNSF(伯靈頓北方聖特菲鐵路公司④)和MidAmercian Energy(中美洲能源)，它們有一些重要共同特點區別於我們其他的公司。所以，我們在這裡把它們單獨歸為一類進行討論，並在美國會計報表中單獨列示它們的合併資產負債表和營收表。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each business has earning power that even under terrible conditions amply covers its interest requirements. In last year’s tepid economy, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.6x. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as deeply flawed.) At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: the company’s recession-resistant earnings, which result from our exclusively offering an essential service, and its great diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.
它們的一個重要特徵是，兩家公司都有巨額的長期受管制的資產投資，這些資產部分由大額長期賬務支持，波克夏並不承擔相關的債務責任。它們實際上並不需要我們的信用支持，因為它們具備良好的盈利能力，即使在惡劣的環境下也能覆蓋它們的債務利息。比如在去年疲軟的經濟中，BNSF的利息覆蓋倍數是9.6倍。(我們隊覆蓋倍數的定義是稅前利潤/利息，而不是EBITDA(息稅前利潤)/利息，一項我們認為被普遍使用的錯誤指標。) 在中美洲能源，另外有兩個因素保證它在各種情形下還本付息的能力：公司抗週期的盈利特性，這源於公司壟斷性地提供一項必須服務，以及它多元化的盈利來源，這保護它不會由於某個監管部門的措施而遭受致命衝擊。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我們的兩家公司都在驅動著美國經濟：
●BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact making BNSF the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.
BNSF承擔了全國15%(以噸-英里衡量)的城際間貨運量，包括公路、鐵路、水路、航空以及管道運輸。BNSF的噸-英里運量超過其他任何公司，這個事實意味著BNSF是全國經濟循環系統最重要的大動脈。
BNSF also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
BNSF還以一種非常節約能源和環境友好的方式在運輸著貨物，它運輸一頓貨物500英里只需一加侖柴油。卡車實現同樣的運力大約要使用4倍的能源。
●MidAmerican’s electric utilities serve regulated retail customers in ten states. Only one utility holding company serves more states. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: first, from a standing start nine years ago, we now account for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity. Second, when we complete three projects now under construction, we will own about 14% of U.S. solar-generation capacity.
●中美洲能源的電力設施為10個州的零售客戶服務。只有一家公用事業持股公司為多個州服務。另外，我們是再生能源方面的領導者：第一，9年前開始涉足，到目前為止我們佔全國風力發電量的6%。第二，在建的三個項目完成後，我們將佔有全美太陽能發電量的14%。
Projects like these require huge capital investments. Upon completion, indeed, our renewables portfolio will have cost $13 billion. We relish making such commitments if they promise reasonable returns – and on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
類似的項目需要巨額的資本投資。到項目建成為止，我們的再生能源項目將耗資130億美元。我們進行這樣的投資是因為我們認為它可以提供合意的回報——在這方面，我們給予了未來的監管策略極大的信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. And it is in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a manner that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我們的信心來源於過往的經驗，也來源於社會在交通和能源方面會一直需要大量投資的認識。政府為了自己的利益將會合理對待資本提供者，以保證有持續的資金來滿足必須的公共項目。從我們自身的利益出發，我們願意去爭取監管者和它們所代表的人民的認可和批准。
Our managers must think today of what the country will need far down the road. Energy and transportation projects can take many years to come to fruition; a growing country simply can’t afford to get behind the curve.
我們的經理人必須在今天就考慮我們的國家明天會需要什麼。能源和交通項目需要很多年才能見到效益;但一個增長的經濟體不能後知後覺。
We have been doing our part to make sure that doesn’t happen. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting on our laurels: BNSF will spend about $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, roughly double its depreciation charge and more than any railroad has spent in a single year.
我們完成自己的角色以防止不利情況發生。大家可能聽到過我們國家阻礙基礎設施建設的言論，但對BNSF和多數的鐵路來說都不是這樣。美國的鐵路系統正處於一個不能更好的狀態，這是行業巨大投資的結果，但我們沒有滿足於現狀：BNSF將會在2013年支出40億美元，大約是其折舊額的2倍，並且超過任何鐵路公司歷史上的單年投資額。
In Matt Rose, at BNSF, and Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, we have two outstanding CEOs. They are extraordinary managers who have developed businesses that serve both their customers and owners well. Each has my gratitude and each deserves yours. Here are the key figures for their businesses:
BNSF的Matt Rose，中美洲能源的Greg Abel，是我們兩位優秀的CEO。他們是傑出的經理人，創立了為客戶提供良好服務，為股東創造良好回報的公司。我非常感謝他們，他們也應該得到大家的感謝。下面是他們公司的主要業務數據。
| MidAmerican | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2012 | 2011 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $429 | $469 | |||
| Iowa utility | 236 | 279 | |||
| Western utilities | 737 | 771 | |||
| Pipelines | 383 | 388 | |||
| Home Services | 82 | 39 | |||
| Other (Net) | 91 | 36 | |||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,958 | 1,982 | |||
| Interest | 314 | 336 | |||
| Income Taxes | 172 | 315 | |||
| Net Earnings | $1,472 | $1,331 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire | $1,204 | $1,204 | |||
| BNSF | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2012 | 2011 | ||||
| Revenues | 20,835 | 19,548 | |||
| Operating earnings | 14,835 | 14,247 | |||
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 6,000 | 5,301 | |||
| Interest (Net) | 623 | 560 | |||
| Income taxes | 2,005 | 1,769 | |||
| Net earnings | 3,372 | 2,972 | |||
Sharp-eyed readers will notice an incongruity in the MidAmerican earnings tabulation. What in the world is HomeServices, a real estate brokerage operation, doing in a section entitled “Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses?”
眼尖的讀者可能已經註意到中美洲能源的利潤表格中的怪異。住房服務公司(HomeSevices of America Inc.)是怎麼回事?這樣一家公司怎麼會被劃分到“受管制的，資本密集的業務”中?
Well, its ownership came with MidAmerican when we bought control of that company in 2000. At that time, I focused on MidAmerican’s utility operations and barely noticed HomeServices, which then owned only a few real estate brokerage companies.
實際上，2000年我們獲得中美洲能源控制權的時候，它的就在公司中。那時我主要關注公司的公用業務，沒有關注到住房服務公司，它包括幾家房地產經紀公司。
Since then, however, the company has regularly added residential brokers – three in 2012 – and now has about 16,000 agents in a string of major U.S. cities. (Our real estate brokerage companies are listed on page 107.) In 2012, our agents participated in $42 billion of home sales, up 33% from 2011.
然而，從那時起，住房服務公司就不斷地增加地產經紀公司——2012年增加了3家——現在在美國主要的大城市擁有大約16,000名代理人。(我們的房地產經紀公司列示在107頁)。2012年，我們的代理人參與的房屋銷售額達420億美元，比2011年增長33%。
Additionally, HomeServices last year purchased 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which together license 544 brokerage companies throughout the country and receive a small royalty on their sales. We have an arrangement to purchase the balance of those operations within five years. In the coming years, we will gradually rebrand both our franchisees and the franchise firms we own as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices.
另外，房屋服務公司去年購買了Prudential and Real Living 67%的特許權業務，它在全國一共有544家經紀公司加盟，並它們的在銷售額中收取少量的特許費。我們計劃5年內收購剩餘的份額。今年，我們將逐步把連鎖加盟商和特許權公司的品牌統一為波克夏住房服務。
Ron Peltier has done an outstanding job in managing HomeServices during a depressed period. Now, as the housing market continues to strengthen, we expect earnings to rise significantly.
即便在蕭條時期，Ron Peltier在管理住房服務公司上依然工作出色。現在，房地產市場持續恢復，我們期望利潤未來會有顯著的提升。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造、服務和零售業務
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我們在這部分的業務種類繁多。我們將通過一個合併的資產負債表和營收表來了解整個部門。
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/12 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $5,338 | Notes payable | $1,454 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 7,382 | Other current liabilities | 8,527 | |||||
| Inventory | 9,675 | Total current liabilities | 9,981 | |||||
| Other current assets | 734 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 23,129 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 26,017 | Deferred taxes | 4907 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 18,871 | Term debt and other liabilities | 5,826 | |||||
| Other assets | 3,416 | Non-controlling interests | 2,062 | |||||
| $71,433 | Berkshire equity | 48,657 | ||||||
| $71,433 | ||||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2012 | 2011* | 2010 | |||||
| Revenues | $83,255 | $72,406 | $66,610 | ||||
| Operating expenses | |||||||
| 76978 | 67239 | 62225 | |||||
| Interest expense (net) | 146 | 130 | 111 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 6131 | 5037 | 4274 | ||||
| Income taxes | 2432 | 1998 | 1812 | ||||
| Net income | $3699 | $3039 | $2462 | ||||
*Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.
*2012年9月16起包括Lubrizol的利潤
Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP. In particular, they exclude some purchase-accounting items, primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets. We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the real expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table.
符合美國會計準則(GAAP)的收入和支出數據列示在29頁。上表中的運營成本是不符合GAAP準則的。尤其是它剔除了一些購買法下的項目，主要是某些無形資產的攤銷。我們列示這些數據是因為查理和我認為這樣的調整更準確地反映了整塊業務真實的成本和利潤。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are small and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others never lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real expenses. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when calculating earnings – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不打算逐一解釋所有的調整——有些是細微並且晦澀的——但是認真的投資者必須要理解不同無形資產之間的本質區別：一些無形資產的價值隨時間消耗殆盡，但是另外一些的價值從不耗減。比如軟件，攤銷費用是真實的成本。然而一些無形資產，比如客戶關係，按購買法的會計準則必須攤銷，但是它並非真實的成本。GAAP並不區分這兩種攤銷。兩種攤銷費用都在計算利潤時計入成本——儘管從投資者的角度看，它們是如此不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $600 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real” – and indeed that is the portion we have included in the table above – and the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made.
在29頁列示的美國會計準則的數據下，該部門6億美元的攤銷費用被計入了成本。我們大致認為其中的20%是“真實”的——這也是我們上面的表格包括的部分——其他的則不是。這種差別因為我們做了非常多的收購而變得影響巨大。
“Non-real” amortization expense also looms large at some of our major investees. IBM has made many small acquisitions in recent years and now regularly reports “adjusted operating earnings,” a non-GAAP figure that excludes certain purchase-accounting adjustments. Analysts focus on this number, as they should.
“非真實”的攤銷費用還對我們一些主要的投資對象產生影響。IBM近幾年進行了許多小筆的收購，並且定期地報告“調整後的營業利潤”，一個剔除了某些購買法調整的非GAAP數據。分析師一般關注這個數據，他們也的確應該如此。
A “non-real” amortization charge at Wells Fargo, however, is not highlighted by the company and never, to my knowledge, has been noted in analyst reports. The earnings that Wells Fargo reports are heavily burdened by an “amortization of core deposits” charge, the implication being that these deposits are disappearing at a fairly rapid clip. Yet core deposits regularly increase. The charge last year was about $1.5 billion. In no sense, except GAAP accounting, is this whopping charge an expense.
富國銀行沒有強調它的一項“非真實”攤銷費用，據我所知，也沒有被分析師所注意到。富國銀行報告的盈利深受一項“核心存款的攤銷”費用所累，這似乎意味著這些存款在迅速的消失。但是實際情形卻是存款在不斷增長。去年這項攤銷是15億。除了在美國會計準則下，這項異常巨大的攤銷在哪裡都不具有實際意思。
And that ends today’s accounting lecture. Why is no one shouting “More, more?”
今天的會計課到此結束。為什麼沒有人大聲要求“再多講一點，再講一點?”
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The crowd of companies in this section sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation.
這個版塊的公司銷售的產品從棒棒糖到噴氣式飛機，無所不包。有些公司有非常好的經濟特性，它們無槓桿條件下的稅後有形資產回報率從25%到100%多。其他一些產品的回報率介於12%-20%。但也有少數公司回報率很糟糕，這是我們在資產配置上所犯下的嚴重錯誤。
More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the compelling logic of his position, I have sometimes reverted to my old habit of bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible. Fortunately, my mistakes have usually occurred when I made smaller purchases. Our large acquisitions have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well.
50多年前，查理就告訴我，以合理的價格買入一家優秀的公司比以一個便宜的價格買入一家平庸的公司划算。儘管這個道理背後的邏輯非常清楚，我還是時不時地犯廉價收購的毛病，其結果有些難以接受，有些則極其糟糕。幸運的是，我只在進行小筆收購的時候犯毛病。我們的大筆收購通常結果都不錯，有部分可不僅僅是不錯。
Viewed as a single entity, therefore, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employ $22.6 billion of net tangible assets and, on that base, earned 16.3% after-tax.
把這個版塊看做一個整體的話，這些公司們的業績非常不錯。他們運作著226億美元的有形淨資產，並獲得了16.3%的稅後回報率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the price paid is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for intangible assets. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulatedindustry segments is far greater. It is there that the huge winners reside.
當然，如果出價過高，買入一些具有良好經濟特性的公司也可能成為一筆糟糕的投資。我們大多數的收購裡都支付了遠超有形淨資產的溢價，這些成本反映在財報巨額的無形資產數據中。不過總體來說，我們收穫了與投資額相稱的回報。而且，這些公司的內在價值，遠超它們的賬面價值。需要說明的是，在保險板塊和受管制的行業板塊，內在價值和賬面價值之間的差距更加巨大。那裡才是真正的大贏家所在之處。
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Marmon provides an example of a clear and substantial gap existing between book value and intrinsic value. Let me explain the odd origin of this differential.
Marmon公司是一個解釋內在價值和賬面價值差別的極好例子。現在讓我來告訴大家這個詭異的差別源於何處。
Last year I told you that we had purchased additional shares in Marmon, raising our ownership to 80% (up from the 64% we acquired in 2008). I also told you that GAAP accounting required us to immediately record the 2011 purchase on our books at far less than what we paid. I’ve now had a year to think about this weird accounting rule, but I’ve yet to find an explanation that makes any sense – nor can Charlie or Marc Hamburg, our CFO, come up with one. My confusion increases when I am told that if we hadn’t already owned 64%, the 16% we purchased in 2011 would have been entered on our books at our cost.
去年，我告訴大家，我們增持了Marmon的股票，持股比例升至了80%(從2008年我們收購時的64%)。我還告訴大家，根據美國會計準則，我們必須以遠低於我們實際支付價格的成本記錄這筆交易。我花了一整年的時間來思考這條怪異的會計準則，但是沒有找到任何合理解釋——查理和Marc Hamburg，我們的CFO，也想不出來。當我得知，如果我們之前沒有擁有64%的權益，那我們2011年新購買的16%就可以以實際購買成本入賬時，我更加糊塗了。
In 2012 (and in early 2013, retroactive to yearend 2012) we acquired an additional 10% of Marmon and the same bizarre accounting treatment was required. The $700 million write-off we immediately incurred had no effect on earnings but did reduce book value and, therefore, 2012’s gain in net worth.
2012年(實際發生在2013年初，但追溯調整至2012)，我們又購買了Marmon額外的10%股份，同樣奇怪的會計要求又出現了。立即減記的7億美元沒有影響我們的利潤，但是降低了我們的賬面價值，因此也降低了2012年公司的淨資產值。
The cost of our recent 10% purchase implies a $12.6 billion value for the 90% of Marmon we now own. Our balance-sheet carrying value for the 90%, however, is $8 billion. Charlie and I believe our current purchase represents excellent value. If we are correct, our Marmon holding is worth at least $4.6 billion more than its carrying value.
最近10%的收購價格意味著我們持有Marmon另外的90%股份價值126億美元。但我們賬面記錄的價值僅有80億。查理和我認為最近的收購價格代表了真實的價值。如果我們是對的，那我們持有Marmon的實際價值至少比賬面價值高46億美元。
Marmon is a diverse enterprise, comprised of about 150 companies operating in a wide variety of industries. Its largest business involves the ownership of tank cars that are leased to a variety of shippers, such as oil and chemical companies. Marmon conducts this business through two subsidiaries, Union Tank Car in the U.S. and Procor in Canada.
Marmon是一家多元化的公司，有150多家各個行業的子公司。它最大的業務是持有並租賃油罐車給各種貨運公司，比如油運和化工產品運輸公司。
Union Tank Car has been around a long time, having been owned by the Standard Oil Trust until that empire was broken up in 1911. Look for its UTLX logo on tank cars when you watch trains roll by. As a Berkshire shareholder, you own the cars with that insignia. When you spot a UTLX car, puff out your chest a bit and enjoy the same satisfaction that John D. Rockefeller undoubtedly experienced as he viewed his fleet a century ago.
Marmon的業務主用由美國的Union Tank Car和加拿大的Procor兩家子公司運營。Union Tank Car歷史悠久，1911年Standard Oil Trust帝國倒閉之前一直由其擁有。有火車經過的時候留意看UTLX的標誌。作為波克夏的股東，大家擁有打著這個商標的油罐車。當大家看到UTLX的車時，請挺起胸膛，並享受一個世紀前約翰·洛克菲勒看到自己的車隊所享受到那種滿足感。
Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars having a net book value of $4 billion. A new car, it should be noted, costs upwards of $100,000. Union Tank Car is also a major manufacturer of tank cars – some of them to be sold but most to be owned by it and leased out. Today, its order book extends well into 2014.
鐵路公司並不擁有油罐車，它們屬於貨運商或者出租公司。去年年底，Union Tank Car和Procor一共擁有97,000輛油罐車，賬面價值40億美元。強調一下，一輛新車成本約10萬美元。Union Tank Car還是一家主要的油罐車製造商——一部分出售但大部分自己持有並出租。現在，它的訂單已經排到2014年了。
At both BNSF and Marmon, we are benefitting from the resurgence of U.S. oil production. In fact, our railroad is now transporting about 500,000 barrels of oil daily, roughly 10% of the total produced in the “lower 48” (i.e. not counting Alaska and offshore). All indications are that BNSF’s oil shipments will grow substantially in coming years.
BNSF和Marmon都受益於與美國原油生產的重新擴張。我們的鐵路現在每天運輸50萬桶原油，大約是“下48州”(不包括阿拉斯加和離岸州)總產量的10%。種種跡象表明，BNSF今年的原油運輸量將會顯著增長。
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Space precludes us from going into detail about the many other businesses in this segment. Companyspecific information about the 2012 operations of some of the larger units appears on pages 76 to 79.
篇幅所限，我們不能在這裡一一討論許多其他公司的細節。2012年各個主要公司的詳細情況參見76至79頁。
Finance and Financial Products
金融和金融產品
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%- owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
這是我們最小的業務版塊，包括兩家租賃公司，XTRA(拖車租賃)和CORT(家具租賃)，以及Clayton Home，國內領先的預置房生產商和金融租賃商。除了這些100%擁有的子公司外，我們還有其他一些金融資產以及Berkadia Commerical Mortgage公司50%的權益。
We include Clayton in this sector because it owns and services 332,000 mortgages, totaling $13.7 billion. In large part, these loans have been made to lower and middle-income families. Nevertheless, the loans have performed well throughout the housing collapse, thereby validating our conviction that a reasonable down payment and a sensible payments-to-income ratio will ward off outsized foreclosure losses, even during stressful times.
我們把Clayton歸入到這個版塊，是因為它擁有332,000筆抵押貸款，合計137億美元。這些貸款中的大部分貸給了中低收入家庭。然而這些貸款在房地產市場崩盤中表現良好，這進一步增強了我們的認識，即合理的首付比例和合理的月供收入比可以有效防範抵押跌價損失，即便在市場蕭條時也有效。
Clayton also produced 25,872 manufactured homes last year, up 13.5% from 2011. That output accounted for about 4.8% of all single-family residences built in the country, a share that makes Clayton America’s number one homebuilder.
Clayton去年還生產了25,872套預置房，比2011年上升13.5%。這佔全國全國獨棟住宅建設量的4.8%，其份額為全美第一。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. Our expenditures for new rental equipment at XTRA totaled $256 million in 2012, more than double its depreciation expense. While competitors fret about today’s uncertainties, XTRA is preparing for tomorrow.
CORT和XTRA也是各自行業中的佼佼者。2012年XTRA在新租賃設備上的投資是2.56億美元，是其折舊額的兩倍。當競爭對手們在擔憂今天的不確定性時，XTRA已經在為明天做準備。Berkadia依然保持良好的業績。
Berkadia continues to do well. Our partners at Leucadia do most of the work in this venture, an arrangement that Charlie and I happily embrace.
我們在卡地亞的伙伴們在這項業務上投入很多，這是查理和我喜聞樂見的情形。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
下面是這個版塊的稅前收入概述：
| 2012 | 2011 | ||
| (in millions) | |||
| Berkadia | $35 | $25 | |
| Clayton | 255 | 154 | |
| CORT | 42 | 29 | |
| XTRA | 106 | 126 | |
| Net financial income* | 410 | 440 | |
| $848 | $774 | ||
*不包括資本利得或損失
Investments
投資
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面是我們年末持有的，市值超過10億美元的股票投資。
| 12/31/12 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 13.7 | $1,287 | $8,715 | ||
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.9 | 1,299 | 14,500 | ||
| 24,123,911 | Conoco Phillips | 2 | 1,219 | 1,399 | ||
| 22,999,600 | DIRECTV | 3.8 | 1,057 | 1,154 | ||
| 68,115,484 | International Business Machines Corp. | 6 | 11,680 | 13,048 | ||
| 28,415,250 | Moody’s Corporation . | 12.7 | 287 | 1,430 | ||
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.3 | 2,990 | 3,599 | ||
| 20,668,118 | Phillips 66 . | 3.3 | 660 | 1,097 | ||
| 3,947,555 | POSCO | 5.1 | 768 | 1,295 | ||
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 3,563 | ||
| 25,848,838 | Sanofi | 2 | 2,073 | 2,438 | ||
| 415,510,889 | Tesco plc | 5.2 | 2,350 | 2,268 | ||
| 78,060,769 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.2 | 2,401 | 2,493 | ||
| 54,823,433 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.6 | 2,837 | 3,741 | ||
| 456,170,061 | Wells Fargo & Company | 8.7 | 10,906 | 15,592 | ||
| Others | 7,646 | 11,330 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | 49,796 | 87,662 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required
*此處為實際投資成本，等於計稅基礎，GAAP準則下的成本在某些情況下因減記和增計而不同。
One point about the composition of this list deserves mention. In Berkshire’s past annual reports, every stock itemized in this space has been bought by me, in the sense that I made the decision to buy it for Berkshire. But starting with this list, any investment made by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler – or a combined purchase by them – that meets the dollar threshold for the list ($1 billion this year) will be included. Above is the first such stock, DIRECTV, which both Todd and Ted hold in their portfolios and whose combined holdings at the end of 2012 were valued at the $1.15 billion shown.
關於上面的投資組合，有一點需要說明。在波克夏以前的年報中，上面的每隻股票都是我買的，我為波克夏做出了買入的決定。但是今年以後的組合中，由Todd Combs或者Ted Weschlerg投資購買的，或者兩人聯合購買的，滿足列示要求的(今年是10億美元)都會被列入上表。DIRECTV就是第一支這樣的股票，Todd和Ted在他們的投資組合中都持有它，2012年末市值合計11.5美元。
Todd and Ted also manage the pension funds of certain Berkshire subsidiaries, while others, for regulatory reasons, are managed by outside advisers. We do not include holdings of the pension funds in our annual report tabulations, though their portfolios often overlap Berkshire’s.
Todd和Ted還管理著一些波克夏子公司的養老金，另外一些由於監管的原因由外部的投資公司管理。我們的年報表格里不包括養老金賬戶的持股，雖然它們的組合有許多與波克夏的組合相重疊。
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We continue to wind down the part of our derivatives portfolio that involved the assumption by Berkshire of insurance-like risks. (Our electric and gas utility businesses, however, will continue to use derivatives for operational purposes.) New commitments would require us to post collateral and, with minor exceptions, we are unwilling to do that. Markets can behave in extraordinary ways, and we have no interest in exposing Berkshire to some out-of-the-blue event in the financial world that might require our posting mountains of cash on a moment’s notice.
我們將繼續削減與波克夏保險風險相關的衍生品投資組合。(我們的電力和天然氣公用業務還會繼續進行運營所需的衍生品投資。)除了少數的例外，新的合約將會要求我們提供抵押，我們不情願做抵押。市場有可能會走極端，但我們無意於將波克夏暴露在任何金融市場的意外情況之中，這可能片刻之間就吞噬掉波克夏堆積如山的現金。
Charlie and I believe in operating with many redundant layers of liquidity, and we avoid any sort of obligation that could drain our cash in a material way. That reduces our returns in 99 years out of 100. But we will survive in the 100th while many others fail. And we will sleep well in all 100.
查理和我崇尚維持多重的流動性保障，避免任何會耗光我們現金的運營策略。這種策略在100年中的99年裡將降低我們的回報率。但是這可以在別人都倒下的時候，保護我們安然度過第100年的危機。於是100年裡我們都可以安心睡覺。
The derivatives we have sold that provide credit protection for corporate bonds will all expire in the next year. It’s now almost certain that our profit from these contracts will approximate $1 billion pre-tax. We also received very substantial sums upfront on these derivatives, and the “float” attributable to them has averaged about $2 billion over their five-year lives. All told, these derivatives have provided a more-than-satisfactory result, especially considering the fact that we were guaranteeing corporate credits – mostly of the high-yield variety – throughout the financial panic and subsequent recession.
我們出售的為企業債在提供信用保障的衍生品明年將會到期。基本可以確定我們將會在這些合約上實現10億美元的稅前收入。我們還獲得了大筆的預收款，這些合約5年的存續期裡貢獻的“浮存金”平均大於20億美元。如前所述，這些衍生品提供了遠超合意的回報，尤其考慮到，我們承保的是企業債券——大部分是高收益品種——並且安然度過了金融危機和之後的衰退期。
In our other major derivatives commitment, we sold long-term puts on four leading stock indices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts were initiated between 2004 and 2008 and even under the worst of circumstances have only minor collateral requirements. In 2010 we unwound about 10% of our exposure at a profit of $222 million. The remaining contracts expire between 2018 and 2026. Only the index value at expiration date counts; our counterparties have no right to early termination.
在其他主要的衍生品合約裡，我們曾賣出了四個主要股票指數的長期的看跌期權——美國、英國、歐洲和日本。這些合約是2004年至2008年期間簽訂的，即使在市場最糟糕的時候，也僅有小額的抵押要求。2010年，我們解除了10%的風險敞口，賺得2.22億美元。剩餘的合約將會在2018年至2026年之間到期。只有期末的指數才能用於結算，我們的交易對手不能提前行權。
Berkshire received premiums of $4.2 billion when we wrote the contracts that remain outstanding. If all of these contracts had come due at yearend 2011, we would have had to pay $6.2 billion; the corresponding figure at yearend 2012 was $3.9 billion. With this large drop in immediate settlement liability, we reduced our GAAP liability at yearend 2012 to $7.5 billion from $8.5 billion at the end of 2011. Though it’s no sure thing, Charlie and I believe it likely that the final liability will be considerably less than the amount we currently carry on our books. In the meantime, we can invest the $4.2 billion of float derived from these contracts as we see fit.
波克夏簽訂以上還未到期的合約時時，收到了42億美元的保費。如果所有合約都在2011年到期，我們當時需要賠付62億美元，2012年這個數字是39億美元。由於結算負債的大幅下降，我們的GAAP負債從2011年的85億下降到2012年的75億。雖然最終結果還不確定，但是查理和我相信，最終的負債將會比我們現有的賬面負債還低。另外，我們可以自由運用這些合約產生的42億美元，投資於我們喜歡的標的。
We Buy Some Newspapers . . . Newspapers?
我們買了一些報業公司……報業?
During the past fifteen months, we acquired 28 daily newspapers at a cost of $344 million. This may puzzle you for two reasons. First, I have long told you in these letters and at our annual meetings that the circulation, advertising and profits of the newspaper industry overall are certain to decline. That prediction still holds. Second, the properties we purchased fell far short of meeting our oft-stated size requirements for acquisitions.
過去的15個月裡，我們以3.44億美元收購了28家日報。有兩個原因可能讓你非常疑惑。第一，我一直在致股東的信和年會裡向大家說，報紙行業的總體發行量、廣告和利潤下降沒有懸念。這個預測依然有效。第二，我們買下的資產完全達不到我們要求的收購規模標準。
We can address the second point easily. Charlie and I love newspapers and, if their economics make sense, will buy them even when they fall far short of the size threshold we would require for the purchase of, say, a widget company. Addressing the first point requires me to provide a more elaborate explanation, including some history.
第二點可能比較容易解釋。查理和我喜歡報紙，如果它們的經濟情況合意，我們會買下它們，哪怕它們的規模根本達不到我們的收購標準，比如一些袖珍型公司。解釋第一點需要多費一些唇舌，還需要一些故事。
News, to put it simply, is what people don’t know that they want to know. And people will seek their news – what’s important to them – from whatever sources provide the best combination of immediacy, ease of access, reliability, comprehensiveness and low cost. The relative importance of these factors varies with the nature of the news and the person wanting it.
新聞，簡單的說，就是人們不知道但卻又想知道的事情。考慮及時性、方便性、可靠性、全面性和成本，人們會從實現最佳組合的渠道搜尋他們想要的新聞——對他們來說重要的新聞。這些因素的重要程度隨新聞的特性和受眾的需求而不同。
Before television and the Internet, newspapers were the primary source for an incredible variety of news, a fact that made them indispensable to a very high percentage of the population. Whether your interests were international, national, local, sports or financial quotations, your newspaper usually was first to tell you the latest information. Indeed, your paper contained so much you wanted to learn that you received your money’s worth, even if only a small number of its pages spoke to your specific interests. Better yet, advertisers typically paid almost all of the product’s cost, and readers rode their coattails.
在沒有電視和互聯網以前，報紙是各種新聞的最主要信息渠道，這一事實讓其成為大部分人不可或缺的產品。無論你關注國際、國內、地方時間，還是體育、財經新聞，大家訂閱的報紙通常是最快的信息來源。哪怕整份報紙裡只有幾頁滿足大家的興趣愛好，報紙裡所包含的信息還是讓你的訂閱物超所值。更好的是，廣告商通常支付了幾乎全部的刊印成本，讀者只需搭個順風車。
Additionally, the ads themselves delivered information of vital interest to hordes of readers, in effect providing even more “news.” Editors would cringe at the thought, but for many readers learning what jobs or apartments were available, what supermarkets were carrying which weekend specials, or what movies were showing where and when was far more important than the views expressed on the editorial page.
不僅如此，廣告本身也提供了很多信息給有興趣的讀者，實際上相當於提供了更多“新聞”。編輯們在思想和觀點上絞盡腦汁，但是對很多讀者來說，招聘信息，哪裡有房屋出租，哪個超市週末打折，或者哪部電影何時在哪裡上映，比主要文章裡的觀點要有意義的多。
In turn, the local paper was indispensable to advertisers. If Sears or Safeway built stores in Omaha, they required a “megaphone” to tell the city’s residents why their stores should be visited today. Indeed, big department stores and grocers vied to outshout their competition with multi-page spreads, knowing that the goods they advertised would fly off the shelves. With no other megaphone remotely comparable to that of the newspaper, ads sold themselves.
反過來說，報紙對於打廣告的公司來說也是不可或缺的。如果希爾斯或者西夫韋在奧馬哈開了新店，它們需要一個“大喇叭”來告訴城裡的居民為何今天應該去光顧它們的商店。實際上，大型百貨商店、珠寶店爭相在報紙上連夜打廣告，因為它們知道廣告促銷的產品立馬就會被搶購一空。再沒其他宣傳方式比得上報紙了，廣告自身就是廣告。
As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, its profits were certain to be extraordinary; whether it was managed well or poorly made little difference. (As one Southern publisher famously confessed, “I owe my exalted position in life to two great American institutions – nepotism and monopoly.”)
只要是當地唯一的一份報紙，它一定利潤可觀;經營水平的好壞沒有太大影響。(正如一家南部的出版社坦言，“我一生優越的地位全部歸功於美國的兩項製度——裙帶關係和壟斷。”)
Over the years, almost all cities became one-newspaper towns (or harbored two competing papers that joined forces to operate as a single economic unit). This contraction was inevitable because most people wished to read and pay for only one paper. When competition existed, the paper that gained a significant lead in circulation almost automatically received the most ads. That left ads drawing readers and readers drawing ads. This symbiotic process spelled doom for the weaker paper and became known as “survival of the fattest.”
近些年裡，絕大部分城市都只剩下了一份報紙(或者兩家競爭的報紙合併如同一個經濟利益體)。這種減縮不可避免，大部分人只願意訂閱和閱讀一份報紙。當競爭存在的時候，發行量領先的報紙基本會自動獲得大部分的廣告。於是廣告吸引讀者，讀者吸引廣告。共生的過程淘汰弱勢的報紙，即所謂的“胖者生存”。
Now the world has changed. Stock market quotes and the details of national sports events are old news long before the presses begin to roll. The Internet offers extensive information about both available jobs and homes. Television bombards viewers with political, national and international news. In one area of interest after another, newspapers have therefore lost their “primacy.” And, as their audiences have fallen, so has advertising. (Revenues from “help wanted” classified ads – long a huge source of income for newspapers – have plunged more than 90% in the past 12 years.)
現在情況變了,股價信息和全國體育節目的信息在報紙開始印刷的時候已經成了舊聞。互聯網提供了大量招聘和租房信息。電視機隨時播放政治、國內和國際新聞。報紙在一個接一個地丟失它的陣地。受眾減少以後，廣告也隨之下降。(招聘類廣告收入——曾經報紙的重要收入——在過去的12年裡下降超過90%。)
Newspapers continue to reign supreme, however, in the delivery of local news. If you want to know what’s going on in your town – whether the news is about the mayor or taxes or high school football – there is no substitute for a local newspaper that is doing its job. A reader’s eyes may glaze over after they take in a couple of paragraphs about Canadian tariffs or political developments in Pakistan; a story about the reader himself or his neighbors will be read to the end. Wherever there is a pervasive sense of community, a paper that serves the special informational needs of that community will remain indispensable to a significant portion of its residents.
但無論如何，報紙在傳遞地方新聞方面，依然維持著霸主地位。如果大家想知道自己的社區發生了什麼——無論是市長的八卦，稅收，或者高中橄欖球隊的新聞——沒有任何東西能取代報紙。讀者看到加拿大稅局的照片，或者讀到巴基斯坦的政局發展會犯困;但是一條與讀者或者他的鄰居有關的新聞，會被從頭到尾認真閱讀。只要社區觀念普遍存在，滿足特定新聞需求的報紙就會對社區內的大部分居民不可或缺。
Even a valuable product, however, can self-destruct from a faulty business strategy. And that process has been underway during the past decade at almost all papers of size. Publishers – including Berkshire in Buffalo – have offered their paper free on the Internet while charging meaningful sums for the physical specimen. How could this lead to anything other than a sharp and steady drop in sales of the printed product? Falling circulation, moreover, makes a paper less essential to advertisers. Under these conditions, the “virtuous circle” of the past reverses.
即便一個有價值的產品，也會因錯誤的商業模式而自毀。過去幾十年，大大小小的報紙都在這件事件上犯錯誤。出版者——包括波克夏的巴法羅——都曾在互聯網上免費提供它們的報紙，同時卻對紙質報紙收費。這怎麼能不導致紙質報紙發行量的大幅下降呢?下跌的發行量，進一步降低了它對廣告方的意義。於是“惡性循環”不斷重複。
The Wall Street Journal went to a pay model early. But the main exemplar for local newspapers is the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, published by Walter Hussman, Jr. Walter also adopted a pay format early, and over the past decade his paper has retained its circulation far better than any other large paper in the country. Despite Walter’s powerful example, it’s only been in the last year or so that other papers, including Berkshire’s, have explored pay arrangements. Whatever works best – and the answer is not yet clear – will be copied widely.
華爾街日報早很早就開始嘗試收費模式。地方性報紙的範例則是Arkansas Democrat-Gazette， 由Walter Hussman出版，Jr. Walter也很早開始嘗試收費模式，過去的幾十年裡，它的發行量維持的比國內其他報紙都要好。除了Walter外，其他報紙，包括波克夏的報紙，直到最近幾年才嘗試付費模式。效果最好的模式——現在還不確定——將會被廣泛複製。
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Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable information to tightly-bound communities and having a sensible Internet strategy will remain viable for a long time. We do not believe that success will come from cutting either the news content or frequency of publication. Indeed, skimpy news coverage will almost certainly lead to skimpy readership. And the less-than-daily publication that is now being tried in some large towns or cities – while it may improve profits in the short term – seems certain to diminish the papers’ relevance over time. Our goal is to keep our papers loaded with content of interest to our readers and to be paid appropriately by those who find us useful, whether the product they view is in their hands or on the Internet.
查理和我認為報紙在一個聯繫緊密的社區中提供了全面和可靠的信息，如果採取恰當的互聯網策略，將會在很長時間內保持活力。我們不認為削減內容和發行頻率會帶來成功。實際上，狹窄的覆蓋範圍會導致狹窄的客戶群。而低於一天的發行頻率在一些較大的城鎮和城市也被嘗試過了——雖然短期內可能提高利潤——但是長期來看會減少報紙的曝光頻率。我們的目標是讓報紙充滿讀者感興趣的內容，並且讓覺得它有用的人支付合理的費用，無論是紙質的還是網絡版。
Our confidence is buttressed by the availability of Terry Kroeger’s outstanding management group at the Omaha World-Herald, a team that has the ability to oversee a large group of papers. The individual papers, however, will be independent in their news coverage and editorial opinions. (I voted for Obama; of our 12 dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate, 10 opted for Romney.)
我們的信心來源於Terry Kroeger在奧馬哈先驅報的卓越管理，他的團隊有能力管理更多的報紙。各份報紙則會在新聞採編上保持獨立。(我投票支持奧巴馬;但我們的12份日報調查的總統候選人中，有10份選擇羅姆尼。)
Our newspapers are certainly not insulated from the forces that have been driving revenues downward. Still, the six small dailies we owned throughout 2012 had unchanged revenues for the year, a result far superior to that experienced by big-city dailies. Moreover, the two large papers we operated throughout the year – The Buffalo News and the Omaha World-Herald – held their revenue loss to 3%, which was also an above-average outcome. Among newspapers in America’s 50 largest metropolitan areas, our Buffalo and Omaha papers rank near the top in circulation penetration of their home territories.
我們的報紙當然也逃脫不了導致收入下滑的壓力。但到目前為止，我們擁有的6份小型日報2012年的收入沒有下降，這是比其他大城市日報要好的成績。另外，我們的兩份大型報紙——巴法羅新聞報和奧馬哈先驅報——收入下滑維持在3%，也優於平均水平。在全美50個大城市圈，我們的巴法羅和奧馬哈報紙在當地的滲透率名列前茅。
This popularity is no accident: Credit the editors of those papers – Margaret Sullivan at the News and Mike Reilly at the World-Herald — for delivering information that has made their publications indispensable to community-interested readers. (Margaret, I regret to say, recently left us to join The New York Times, whose job offers are tough to turn down. That paper made a great hire, and we wish her the best.)
兩份報紙的流行並非意外：應歸功於報紙的編輯們——布法羅的Margaret Sullivan和世界先驅報的Mike Reilly——他們傳遞了讓關注社區的讀者不可或缺的信息。(非常遺憾，Margaret最近離開我們加入了紐約時報，但她的成績不可磨滅。紐約時報挖了一個好牆角，我們祝她一切順利。)
Berkshire’s cash earnings from its papers will almost certainly trend downward over time. Even a sensible Internet strategy will not be able to prevent modest erosion. At our cost, however, I believe these papers will meet or exceed our economic test for acquisitions. Results to date support that belief.
波克夏在報紙上的現金收入將會不斷下降。即便互聯網策略得當也不能阻止溫和的侵蝕。至於我們的投資，我們相信這些報紙將會達到或者超過我們的收購回報標準。至今為止的數據都證明了我們的想法。
Charlie and I, however, still operate under economic principle 11 (detailed on page 99) and will not continue the operation of any business doomed to unending losses. One daily paper that we acquired in a bulk purchase from Media General was significantly unprofitable under that company’s ownership. After analyzing the paper’s results, we saw no remedy for the losses and reluctantly shut it down. All of our remaining dailies, however, should be profitable for a long time to come. (They are listed on page 108.) At appropriate prices – and that means at a very low multiple of current earnings – we will purchase more papers of the type we like.
查理和我始終堅持11條經濟原則(參見99頁)，我們不會持續運營扭虧無望的業務。我們收購Media General 時包括了一家在其管理下盈利一塌糊塗的日報，我們對其進行了分析，找不出解決辦法，雖不情願，但最後還是將其關閉。而我們其他的日報，則在未來很長一段時間內都會保持盈利。(它們被列示在108頁)。如果價格合理——這意味著當前盈利非常低的估值倍數——我們還會購買一些類似的報紙。
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A milestone in Berkshire’s newspaper operations occurred at yearend when Stan Lipsey retired as publisher of The Buffalo News. It’s no exaggeration for me to say that the News might now be extinct were it not for Stan.
波克夏報紙業務的一個重要事件是年末巴法羅新聞報的Stan Lipsey退休了。毫不誇張地說，如果不是Stan，巴法羅不會有現在的成績。
Charlie and I acquired the News in April 1977. It was an evening paper, dominant on weekdays but lacking a Sunday edition. Throughout the country, the circulation trend was toward morning papers. Moreover, Sunday was becoming ever more critical to the profitability of metropolitan dailies. Without a Sunday paper, the News was destined to lose out to its morning competitor, which had a fat and entrenched Sunday product.
查理和我1977年4月收購了巴法羅。當時它是一份晚報，主打工作日而沒有周日版。全國上下，發行量都朝著晨報集中。而且週日版對於都市日報的盈利來說越來越重要。沒有周日版，巴法羅幾乎注定要輸給它的晨報競爭對手，它們擁有加厚的、根深蒂固的周日版。
We therefore began to print a Sunday edition late in 1977. And then all hell broke loose. Our competitor sued us, and District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. authored a harsh ruling that crippled the introduction of our paper. His ruling was later reversed – after 17 long months – in a 3-0 sharp rebuke by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we lost circulation, hemorrhaged money and stood in constant danger of going out of business.
於是我們在1977年晚些時候開始刊印週日版。但是噩夢開始了。競爭對手起訴我們，地區法官Charle Brieant宣布了重創我們的判決。他的判決後來在第二輪的上訴中以3-0的徹底反對被否定了——但已經是17個月之後。在上訴期間，我們損失了發行量，大出血，並且隨時面臨著停業的危險。
Enter Stan Lipsey, a friend of mine from the 1960s, who, with his wife, had sold Berkshire a small Omaha weekly. I found Stan to be an extraordinary newspaperman, knowledgeable about every aspect of circulation, production, sales and editorial. (He was a key person in gaining that small weekly a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.) So when I was in big trouble at the News, I asked Stan to leave his comfortable way of life in Omaha to take over in Buffalo.
那時Stan Lipse，60年代就他已經是我的好朋友，和他的妻子一起賣給了波克夏一家小型奧馬哈週報。我發現Stan是一位一流的報業人士，對發行量、產品、銷售和編輯各個方面瞭如指掌。(他是讓那份小周報榮獲1973年普利策獎的關鍵人物)。所以當我在巴法羅焦頭爛額的時候，我邀請Stan離開他舒適的生活，接手巴法羅。
He never hesitated. Along with Murray Light, our editor, Stan persevered through four years of very dark days until the News won the competitive struggle in 1982. Ever since, despite a difficult Buffalo economy, the performance of the News has been exceptional. As both a friend and as a manager, Stan is simply the best.
他沒有猶豫。和Murray Light，我們的主編一起，Stan在艱難的時光中堅持奮鬥了4年，直到巴法羅1982年在競爭中勝出。從那時起，即便在巴法羅的經濟糟糕的時候，我們的報紙業績都表現良好。無論作為朋友還是經理人，Stan都是最棒的。
Dividends
股息
A number of Berkshire shareholders – including some of my good friends – would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.
部分波克夏的股東——包括我一些最好的朋友——可能都希望波克夏進行現金分紅。讓他們疑惑的是，我們從大多數波克夏擁有的子公司那裡收到很多分紅，卻從來不向大家分紅。我們有必要來了解一下什麼時候分紅對股東有意義，什麼時候沒有。
A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business – projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.
一家盈利的公司，可以有許多方法配置它的盈利(當然這些方法是相斥的)。公司的經理層應該首先檢查公司主業繼續投資的可能性——提高效率的項目，區域擴張，擴張或改進生產線，或者其他加深與競爭對手之間護城河的投資。
I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.
我要求子公司的經理人們永無止境地專注於加深護城河的機會，他們也的確找到很多行之有效的辦法。但有時候我們的經理人也犯錯。錯誤的原因通常是因為他們先找到了他們想要的答案，然後在反過來尋找支持它們的理由。顯然這樣的程序是錯誤的;這也是讓錯誤無比危險的原因。
Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.
你們的董事長也犯過同樣的錯誤。在波克夏1986年的年年報裡，我詳述了我們20年來在原有的紡織業務上的努力和投資最終如何竹籃打水一場空。我希望公司最後能成功，導致了一些列糟糕的決定。(我甚至一度曾想購買另一家新英格蘭的紡織廠。)但是夢想成真只在迪士尼的童話故事裡存在，現實畢竟是現實。
Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolton acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.
雖然過去犯過如此錯誤，但我們可用資金的首要配置選擇依然是它能否被現有業務有效利用。2012年我們創紀錄的121億固定資產投資和補強型收購證明，在波克夏，有一大片肥沃的土地可以投資。而且我們具備顯著優勢：我們運營著如此眾多的業務，所能享受的投資領域要比大多數公司多得多。在決定投資什麼的時候，我們可以直接澆灌鮮花，同時避開雜草。
Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?
即使在利用過了波克夏現有業務的諸多投資機會以後，波克夏依然不斷產生富餘的現金。我們的下一步，則是尋找與現有業務無關的收購機會。我們的標準也很簡單：查理和我是否認為我們可以通過交易讓股東在每股資產上變得更加富有?
I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.
在收購上我已經犯了很多錯誤，而且還會接著犯錯。不過總體來說，我們的記錄還算讓人滿意，也就是說我們把資金用於收購，比起把資金用來回購或者分紅，我們的股東變得更加富有了。
But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.
不過借用標準的免責申明，歷史記錄不能保證未來的收益。對波克夏來說尤其是這樣：波克夏當前的規模，比起多年以前的小規模來說，通過收購帶來顯著的受益越來越難。
Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.
不過一筆巨額的收購還是可以實質性地提高我們的每股價值。BNSF就是一個不錯的例子：它現在比賬面價值要值錢的多。如果我們把用來收購的錢用來分紅或者回購，我們的情況要比現在糟糕。雖然像BNSF這樣的大傢伙不多，但是海裡還是有鯨魚的。
The third use of funds – repurchases – is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.
資金的第三種利用方式——回購——在公司股票以明顯低於保守估計的內在價值的折扣出售時具有意義。實際上，有紀律的股票回購是合理利用資金的最安全方法：以80美分或者更低的價格購買1美元很難出錯。去年的年報裡我們解釋了回購的規則，如果機會來了，我們會大筆回購股票。我們之前說不會以超過賬面價值110%的價格回購股票，但是事實證明那不切實際。因此，我們在12月一大筆股票以賬面價值的116%出售時，我們把價格上限提到了120%。
But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.
不要忘了：在回購決策裡，價格是最重要的。如果回購價格高於內在價值那就是在毀滅價值。董事們和我都認為，繼續以低於賬面價值120%的價格回購股票對股東是有利的。
And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.
最後我們來到分紅。這裡我們需要一些假設並且要做些計算。這些數字需要一些功夫才能理解，但是這對於理解應該和不應該分紅的原因很重要。所以請耐心聽我講。
We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth – $240,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.
我們假設你和我各自擁有一家價值200萬美元的公司的一半。公司每年的利潤率是12%——24萬美元——並且可以合理預期新增投資也能獲得12%的回報率。另外，外部投資者願意以淨資產125%的價格收購我們的公司。於是，我們各自資產的價格是125萬美元。
You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the onethird payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).
你可能希望公司每年把利潤的三分之一用來分配，剩餘三分之二繼續投資。你覺得這個方案即滿足了當前收入的要求，又能實現資本增值。所以你建議我們分配8萬美元現金，剩餘16萬用於增加公司未來的利潤。第一年，你會收到4萬美元的分紅，之後利潤會增長，三分之一的分紅比例繼續持續，你收到的分紅也會增長。於是，分紅和股票價值會以每年8%的速度增長(12%的回報率減去4%的分紅比例)。
After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after – with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.
10年以後，我們的公司會價值4,317,850美元(期初的2百萬按8%的複合增長率計算)，同時你下一年收到的分紅也會增長到86,357美元。我們兩人各自的股票價值2,698,656(我們各自一半淨資產的125%)。我們之後還會更快樂——分紅和股價依然每年增長8%。
There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.
但還有另外一種方式可以讓我們更加快樂。那就是我們留存所有的利潤，同時每年賣出手中3.2%的股票。因為股票可以以淨資產125%的價格賣出，所以這種方法第一年也能獲得4萬美元的現金，賣出獲得的資金也會不斷增長。我們暫且把這種方法叫做“賣出法”。
Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.
在“賣出法”的情形下，10年以後公司的淨資產值會增長到6,211,686(期初的2百萬按12%的複合增長率計算)。但是因為我們每年賣出股票，持股比例會下降，10年以後，我們每人擁有公司36.12%的股票。即便如此，你所持的股票對應的淨資產為2,243,540美元。另外別忘了，每一美元的淨資產值可以以1.25美元賣出。因此，剩餘的股票市值2,804,425美元，大約比分紅的情形下高4%。
Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! – you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.
同時，你每年賣出股票獲得的現金要比分紅獲得的現金情形下高4%。哇!——你不但每年有更有錢花，最後還有更多的財產。
當然，上述的計算假設平均每年12%的淨資產回報率，而且股東能以賬面價值的125%賣出股票。這一點上，標普500回報率明顯超過12%，並且股價遠超淨資產的125%。這兩條假設對於波克夏來說似乎都是適當的，當然這無法保證。
Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history – admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated – the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.
考慮到樂觀的情形，上面的假設條件被超過的可能性也是存在的。如果事實如此，那麼賣出法就更具優勢。根據波克夏的歷史——必須說明這無法繼續重複——賣出策略比分紅策略給股東帶來了多得多的財富。
Aside from the favorable math, there are two further – and important – arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them – perhaps even most of them – are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.
除了計算上的優勢以外，還有兩個原因——也非常重要——支持賣出策略。第一，分紅策略強制對所有股東進行同樣比例的分紅。比如說，分紅比例是40%，那些希望分紅比例是30%，50%的股東受到損害。我們60萬股東的分紅偏好各不相同。或許可以有把握地說，他們中的許多人——或許是絕大部分——偏好儲蓄模式，因此傾向於不分紅。
The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)
相反，賣出策略則讓股東可以自由決定現金和資本增值的比例。一位股東可以選擇兌現60%的利潤，另一位可以選擇兌現20%或者不兌現。當然，分紅策略下的股東可以用分紅把股票買回來，但是他這樣做會遇到困難：既要交稅，又要支付25%的溢價才能把股票買回來。(記住，公開市場以賬面價值的125%交易股票。)
The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior – usually far inferior – to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.
分紅策略的第二個壞處同樣嚴重：分紅策略的稅收負擔劣於——通常嚴重劣於——賣出策略。分紅策略下，每年股東收到所有的現金分紅都要交稅，而賣出策略只需為現金收入中的利得部分交稅。
Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 41⁄4% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.
讓我們以我自己的例子來解釋股東如何逐步減持股票，同時實現投資的增值，並結束這數學練習吧——我可以聽到你們好像牙醫的鑽頭被拿開了一樣的開心的歡呼。過去的7年裡，我每年減持自己持有的4.25%波克夏股票。經過減持，我一開始的712,497,000股B股股票(經過拆股調整)減少到了528,525,623股。很顯然我的持股比例顯著的減少了。
Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 41⁄2% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).
但我在公司的投資實際上增加了：我現在持有的股票的賬面價值明顯高於7年前。(具體數字是2005年的282億比2012年402億。)換句話說，我現在波克夏的持股比例雖然降低了，但是在投在波克夏進行增值的錢更多了。我在波克夏股票的內在價值和公司的盈利能力也比2005年大大增強。隨著時間推移，我預計上述增長還會繼續——儘管是以一種不規則的方式——雖然我現在每年減持手少4.5%的股票(增加的減持份額是由於我增加了對某些基金會的終身承諾)。
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Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.
總而言之，分紅策略必須一致保持清晰、穩定並且理性。反复無常的策略會把股東弄糊塗，也會排斥潛在的投資者。Phil Fisher 54年前在他的《普通股和不普通的利潤》一書的第7章非常經典地解釋了這件事情，對認真的投資者而言，這本書在經典書目上僅次於《聰明的投資者》以及1940年版的《證券分析》。Phil說你可以成功地運營一家賣漢堡的餐館，或者一家以中國菜為主打的餐館，但是你不可能不停地轉換還同時留住兩類顧客。
Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.
大多數公司奉行穩定的分紅策略，一般逐步增加分紅，削減分紅通常是非常不情願的。我們的“四大”投資組合就遵循類似的、可理解的模式。有時候，它們還非常積極地回購股票。
We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.
我們拍手稱讚它們現行的策略，並希望它們繼續保持。我們喜歡增加分紅，我們也喜歡以合理的價格回購股票。
At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.
當然在波克夏，我們一直採取了另外一條不同的分紅策略，我們深知這樣做的合理性，我們也希望上述的段落能幫助大家理解這一策略。只要我們認為關於賬面價值增長和市場價格的假設依然合理，我們就會一直堅持上述策略。如果將來某項因素變化導致了實質性的改變，我們將會重新審視我們的策略。
The Annual Meeting
股東大會
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 4th at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova will be in charge. (Though that’s a new name, it’s the same wonderful Carrie as last year; she got married in June to a very lucky guy.) All of our headquarters group pitches in to help her; the whole affair is a homemade production, and I couldn’t be more proud of those who put it together.
年會將在5月4號，星期六開始，地點在世紀互聯中心。Carrie sova 總負責。（雖然看起來是個新名字，其實仍是去年那個優秀的carrie。她剛剛嫁給一個幸運的男士）所有我們總部的團隊都會協助她，整個活動都是我們公司自己操辦，我為所有參與其中的員工由衷的感到驕傲
The doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our second International Newspaper Tossing
Challenge. The target will be the porch of a Clayton Home, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. Last year I
successfully fought off all challengers. But now Berkshire has acquired a large number of newspapers and with
them came much tossing talent (or so the throwers claim). Come see whether their talent matches their talk. Better
yet, join in. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands).
我們將在早上7點開門,7點半我們將開展我們的第二屆國際報紙投遞挑戰賽。目標將在克雷頓之家（Clayton Home）的門廊,精確來說從投擲線算起有35英尺。去年我成功的打敗了所有的挑戰者。但是如今波克夏已經收購了一大批報業公司，與之同來的有很多的報紙投遞高手(當然投遞索賠也是) 。來看看他們的才能是否有他們說的那麼好。最好你也加入進來。這些報紙有36至42頁,你必須自己把他們折起來。(不准用橡皮筋)
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer
period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie
and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so
while Charlie is talking.
早上8點半，一部新的波克夏電影會上映。一個小時以後,我們將開始問答階段，這將會持續到下午3點半(其間會有在CenturyLink的看臺休息吃午飯)。在短暫的休息之後，查理與我將會在3點45分召開年度會議。如果你決定在白天的提問時間離開,請在查理說話的時候溜走：）
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall
that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and
most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,090 pairs of Justin boots, (that’s a pair every
30 seconds), 10,010 pounds of See’s candy, 12,879 Quikut knives (24 knives per minute) and 5,784 pairs of Wells
Lamont gloves, always a hot item. But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness
simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.
最好的退出理由當然是購物。毗鄰會議區，一個占地達19萬4300平方英尺的大堂裏會放滿波克夏旗下數十家企業的產品，我們就這樣幫你購物的。去年,在你購物的時候，大多數地點都創下了銷售新紀錄。在9小時內我們賣出了1090雙Justin靴子(算起來30秒賣出一雙) ，10010磅的詩喜糖果，12879把Quikut小刀(每分鐘售出24把刀) 與5784雙Wells Lamont手套(那一直賣得很好)。但你可以做的更好。記住，那些說金錢不能買幸福的人甚至還沒有在我們的年會上買過東西。
Last year, Brooks, our running shoe company, exhibited for the first time and ran up sales of $150,000.
Brooks is on fire: Its volume in 2012 grew 34%, and that was on top of a similar 34% gain in 2011. The company’s
management expects another jump of 23% in 2013. We will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at
the meeting.
去年，Brooks，我們的跑鞋公司，在第一次展覽時就獲得了15萬美元的銷售。Brooks現在火了，其銷售額在2012年增長了34%，緊跟在其2011年約34%的增長之後。公司的管理層預計2013年銷售額還能再提升23%。我們將再次有一款特殊的紀念性跑鞋在年會上供應。
On Sunday at 8 a.m., we will initiate the “Berkshire 5K,” a race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for
participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your credentials for the meeting. We
will have plenty of categories for competition, including one for the media. (It will be fun to report on their
performance.) Regretfully, I will forego running; someone has to man the starting gun.
周日早上8點，我們開啟了“波克夏5公里”活動，一場從Century Link開始的跑步比賽，參賽的所有細節會可見於來賓手冊。你在收到你的會議邀請函同時會收到這本手冊。我們將會有各類比賽，包括一個對於媒體的比賽。(當他們報導自己的表現時一定會很有趣)。遺憾的是，我會錯過這項跑步比賽，因為某人不得不去打響發令槍。
I should warn you that we have a lot of home-grown talent. Ted Weschler has run the marathon in 3:01.
Jim Weber, Brooks’ dynamic CEO, is another speedster with a 3:31 best. Todd Combs specializes in the triathlon,
but has been clocked at 22 minutes in the 5K.
我得給你們提個醒，我們有很多土生土長的人才。Ted Weschler的馬拉松紀錄為3小時1分鐘。Jim Weber，Brooks跑鞋公司的CEO，另一位體力充沛的跑步健將，有著3小時31分的記錄。Todd Combs 的專長是鐵人三項全能，但他在5公里項目上有著22分鐘的記錄。
That, however, is just the beginning: Our directors are also fleet of foot (that is, some of our directors are).
Steve Burke has run an amazing 2:39 Boston marathon. (It’s a family thing; his wife, Gretchen, finished the New
York marathon in 3:25.) Charlotte Guyman’s best is 3:37, and Sue Decker crossed the tape in New York in 3:36.
Charlie did not return his questionnaire.
然而，這僅僅是開始：我們的管理者也是跑步健將（或者說，我們這些管理者中的一些也是）。Steve Burke在波士頓馬拉松賽的成績是2小時39分。（這是他們家特色：他的妻子，Gretchen，在3小時25分內完成了紐約馬拉松賽）。Charlotte Guyman的最好成績是3小時37分，Sue Decker在紐約跑了3小時36分。至於查理，他沒有回復我給他的問卷。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the
country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%).
This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The
discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your
existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO將會在購物區設個攤，由其在全國各地的頂級顧問們負責。插一句，在多數情況下，GEICO會給你一個股東優惠（通常為8%）。在我們運營的51個地區中有44個區可以享受這個特別的優惠。（加一點：這個優惠不可以與其他優惠同時享有，假如你已經享受到另一個優惠，比如給予某些特殊群體的）。帶上你現存保險的細節，我們來看看是否能幫你省錢。你們當中有至少一半以上的人，我相信我們能夠幫到。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones.
Carol Loomis, who has been invaluable to me in editing this letter since 1977, has recently authored Tap Dancing to
Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything. She and I have cosigned 500 copies, available exclusively at the
meeting.
你一定要去Bookworm店裏走走。它會帶來35種書籍及DVD產品，包括一些新書。Carol Loomis，自1977年來就在幫我修改這封信，對我提供了無價之寶的幫助，最近寫了《踏著踢踏舞去工作：沃倫巴菲特和他的一切》(Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffet on Practically Everything)。她和我已經一起簽了500本書，只有在會場專賣。
The Outsiders, by William Thorndike, Jr., is an outstanding book about CEOs who excelled at capital
allocation. It has an insightful chapter on our director, Tom Murphy, overall the best business manager I’ve ever
met. I also recommend The Clash of the Cultures by Jack Bogle and Laura Rittenhouse’s Investing Between the
Lines. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
《外界》The Outsiders，由William Thorndike,Jr.撰寫，是一本傑出的好書，是關於CEO如何在資本配置方面達到出色業績。Tom Murphy，是我所見到過的最好的商業管理者，在這本書中寫了有洞察力的一章。我也推薦Jack Bogle的《文化的衝撞》The Clash of the Cultures與Laura Rittenhouse的《從字裏行間間挖掘投資機會》（Investing Between Lines）。如果你需要運輸你買的書，附近就有一家能提供物流服務。
The Omaha World-Herald will again have a booth, offering a few books it has recently published. Redblooded
Husker fans – is there any Nebraskan who isn’t one? – will surely want to purchase Unbeatable. It tells the
story of Nebraska football during 1993-97, a golden era in which Tom Osborne’s teams went 60-3.
Omaha World-Herald將會再設一個攤，提供其最近出版的幾本書。活躍的Huskers粉絲，（哪一個內布拉斯加州人不是他的粉絲呢），將會想買一本《不可戰勝》（Unbeatable）。它講述了內布拉斯加州橄欖球在1993-97的故事，那個黃金時代裏Tom Osborne的隊伍贏得了60勝3負的戰績。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Aviation on the east side of the Omaha
airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your
pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果你很能燒錢，或有打算這樣做，週六中午至下午5點來奧馬哈機場東面的Signature Aviation。在那裏我們會有一隊NetJets飛機供你來爽一把。你可以坐巴士來，開私人飛機走，活著不就要享受一下嘛。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the
credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices
for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus
Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that you can save significant money,
particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
代理投票材料的附件中有報告，可以告訴你如何獲得進入會場與其他活動的邀請函。這周到波克夏航線價格已經大大上漲。如果你從遠方來，可以比較飛去坎薩斯城與直飛奧馬哈的成本。這兩個城市之間的車程在2個半小時，你也許可以省不少錢，尤其如果你打算在奧馬哈租車的話。和我們一起省錢吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will
again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $35.9 million of business during its
annual meeting sale, an all-time record that makes other retailers turn green. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you
must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 30th and Monday, May 6th inclusive, and also present your
meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers
that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made
an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through
Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic
to which you are all invited.
在 Dodge路與Pacific路之間的 72號大街，有著77英畝的土地，上面坐落著內布拉斯加州傢俱市場，我們在那兒會再次舉辦“波克夏週末”的打折活動。去年這家店在會議期間的銷售額達3590萬美元，是一項劃時代的記錄，幫助其他零售商盈利。為了獲得波克夏的折扣，你必須在4月30日週二至5月6日週一之間（包含這兩天）的這段時間購物，同時也必須出示你的邀請函。這段時間的特殊折扣甚至適用於好幾家知名生產商的產品，通常是不給打折銷售的，但出於股東週末的考慮，給予你一個例外。我們感激他們的合作。內布拉斯加州傢俱市場的營業時間是週一至週六早上10點至晚上9點，周日是早10點至晚6點。今年的星期六，從晚上5點半到8點，傢俱市場會舉辦一個野餐會，你們都會被邀請的。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from
6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 3rd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 5th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of
December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在波克夏，我們會再次開展兩個股東獨有的活動。第一個是雞尾酒招待會，從5月3日週五晚上6點至9點。第二個是大型慶祝活動（main gala），5月5日周日早上9點至下午4點。在週六，我們會開到晚上6點。最近幾年，我們三天的銷售額已經超過了12月的所有銷售額，通常是jeweler的最好月份。
Around 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Last year my sales totaled $1.5 million.
This year I won’t quit until I hit $2 million. Because I need to leave well before sundown, I will be desperate to do
business. Come take advantage of me. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” price.
周日下午1點，我會在Borsheims開始我的慈善午餐拍賣會。去年我的銷售額累計到150萬美元。今年我會堅持到200萬美元。因為我需要在日落前好好的離開，我會拼命努力的。來占我便宜好了。為“瘋狂的沃倫”開個價吧。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore,
shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 29th through Saturday, May 11th. During that period, please
identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you
are a Berkshire holder.
整個週末我們在Borsheims有巨大的人群。為你的方便考慮，股東優惠價從4月29日週一至5月11日週六都可以。在此期間，請出示你的參會邀請函或證券單據來證明你是波克夏的股東。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will
take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable
magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two
of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play
them for money
在周日，Borsheims外面的大廳，蒙住眼睛的 Patrick Wolff，兩次美國象棋冠軍，會帶著所有的來賓，讓他們大開眼界，在六個人的群體。Norman Beck，一位來自達拉斯的魔術師，會震撼觀眾。此外，我們會邀請Bob Hamman與Sharon Osberg，兩位世界頂級橋牌大師，在周日下午與我們的股東玩橋牌。不過別和他們玩牌賭錢。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5th. Both
will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are
my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call
402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer
float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one. (I once saw Bill Gates polish off two of the giant variety after a
full-course dinner; that’s when I knew he would make a great director.)
5月5日周日Gorat家與 Piccolo家兩家餐館會再次向波克夏的股東開放。他們會服務到晚上10點，Gorat家下午1點開門，Piccolo家4點開門。這兩家餐館都是我的最愛，周日晚上兩家我都會去光顧。記住，要在Gorat家預定，4月1日起撥打402-551-3733，Piccolo家電話是402-342-9038。在Piccolo家可以點一個“大屋頂啤酒霜淇淋”作為飯後甜點。只有修女才會點小的。我曾經看到比爾蓋茨在一頓晚飯後幹掉大屋頂，那時我認識到他會成為一個偉大的管理者的。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting,
asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail
addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC,
at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我們再次會有三位相同的經濟記者主持會議的問答環節，他們會向查理和我提出股東通過電子郵件發來的問題。他們及他們的電子郵箱位址是：Carol Loomis，財富雜誌，cloomis@fortunemail.com；Becky Quick， CNBC，BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com,和Andrew Ross Sorkin，紐約時報，arsorkin@nytimes.com
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting
and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it
concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in
any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your
question is selected.)
那些被提交的問題中，每一個記者將會選擇六個他（她）認為最有趣和重要的進行提問。他們過去的選擇已經告訴我那些簡潔，提交時間較早，和波克夏相關的問題（請記住，每封電子郵件最好不要提出超過兩個問題）最有可能被選中（在您的郵件中，請告訴記者如果問題被選中，您希不希望自己的名字被公開）。
Last year we had a second panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. All were insurance specialists,
and shareholders subsequently indicated they wanted a little more variety. Therefore, this year we will have one
insurance analyst, Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb will join the
analyst panel to ask questions that deal with our non-insurance operations.
去年我們邀請了一個由三名研究波克夏的分析師組成的分析師團隊，但是由於他們三人都是保險業的專家，所以很多股東在會後表示希望今年的分析師團隊能夠更加多元化一些。因此，今年我們將只邀請一名保險行業的專家：來自野村證券的Cliff Gallant。除了他以外，來自Ruane,Cunniff & Goldfarb的JonathanBrandt將會被邀請到今年的分析師團隊對非保險業務進行提問。
Finally – to spice things up – we would like to add to the panel a credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably
one who is short the stock. Not yet having a bear identified, we would like to hear from applicants. The only
requirement is that you be an investment professional and negative on Berkshire. The three analysts will bring their
own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
最後，為了讓整個提問過程變得更為給力，我們希望能夠有一位看空波克夏的分析師加入到分析師團隊中，如果是已經開始在做空波克夏的那就更理想了。儘管此前從來沒有過對波克夏的前景看空的論調，我們仍然希望能找到這樣的分析師。對這位分析師唯一的要求是你是一位投資專家並且看空波克夏。三位分析師將會提出他們自身對於波克夏的疑問，同時，記者和其他參會者也將會交替對他們發問。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously
and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market
close on a Friday and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional
investors or analysts. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that will further educate
shareholders about their investment.
我和查理相信所有的股東都能在同時獲得波克夏的資訊，並且擁有充足的時間去分析它們，而這也是為什麼我們在週五收盤之後公佈去年的年度報告，並在週六舉行年度股東大會的原因。我們不會一個一個去告知大型的機構投資者或者分析師。我們希望記者和分析師所提出的問題能夠幫助波克夏的股東進一步理解他們對波克夏的投資。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists
and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54
questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra
time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take
place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 11 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
我和查理將不會獲知那些即將被問及的問題的細節。我們也知道記者和分析師將會提出很有水準的問題（有些甚至會讓我們難堪），可是那正是我們所希望看到的。總的來說，我們希望能被問到至少54個問題，其中每個分析師和記者將提出6個，剩餘的18個將由其他股東大會參與者提出。如果有多餘的時間，我們允許與會者提出更多的問題。那些有權提出問題的其他與會者將會被選擇並在早上八點一刻通過十一個佈置在主會場和分會場的麥克風宣佈。
************
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars,
who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be
as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial
need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我時常對旗下運營經理所取得的成就進行褒獎是有充足理由的：他們都是這一行的精英，並且把他們所經營的生意當成他們家族唯一的資產一樣來對待。我確信他們擁有和大多數大型公眾公司相同的“以股東為導向”的信念。他們中的大多數人已經實現了財務自由，對他們而言，享受運營好一家公司的樂趣並不低於支票簿上的數字所能夠帶來的快樂。
Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on
one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
當然，另外23名與我在公司辦公室共事的員工（我們都在一層樓層辦公，這是一個我們一直在維持的工作傳統）
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 21,500-page
Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries,
gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and
the list goes on and on.
也是同樣出色和重要的。 這個團隊高效率地去應對證券交易委員會和其他監管機構繁雜的監管要求，發佈了21,500頁的聯邦，州立以及海外營業稅返還，回復數不清的股東及媒體要求，製作公司的年度報告，準備公司一年一度最大規模的股東年會，協調董事會的活動並且年復一年日復一日地重複著上述繁雜的工作任務。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy
and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 48 universities
(selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of
requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do
feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他們以一種歡欣的態度和令人難以置信的效率去處理上述一切事宜，從而讓我的生活變得輕鬆和快樂。他們還將精力花在與波克夏的業務非直接相關的事務中：去年他們接待了48個學校的代表（他們是從200多個申請學校中選拔出來的）——他們來到奧馬哈參加和我的問答日活動。除此之外，他們還著手處理一切我所收到的請求，安排我的行程，甚至給我訂購午餐吃的漢堡。作為一個CEO，還能要求有更多嗎？我感覺每一天自己都是開心到跳著踢踏舞去上班的。
This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as
well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 4th and chime in.
企業的職員和我們的運營經理，請接受我最真摯的感謝，你們配的上這些稱讚。5月4號，請來奧馬哈——資本的搖籃——並且為我助陣。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 2013
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2013年3月1日