Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (37.00) | 27.40 | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2008 | 20.3% | 8.9% | 11.40 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2008 | 362319.0% | 4276.0% | |||||
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Our decrease in net worth during 2008 was $11.5 billion, which reduced the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 9.6%. Over the last 44 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,530, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*
2008年我們的市值縮水了115億美元。這讓我們兩種股票的每股賬面價值下滑了9.6%。在過去的44年中(也就是說，現任管理層繼任以來)，我們的第一類股票每股賬面價值從19美元上升到了70530美元，每年增長率為20.3%。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for A.
*在年報中所有的數據，指的是A股，至於B股則僅擁有A股1/30的經濟利益。
The table on the preceding page, recording both the 44-year performance of Berkshire’s book value and the S&P 500 index, shows that 2008 was the worst year for each. The period was devastating as well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and commodities. By yearend, investors of all stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
上頁表格（指的是收益表格，這里略去，見英文版——筆者註）記錄的波克夏股票賬面價值和標準普爾指數過去44年的表現顯示，2008年對兩者都是最壞的年景。對於公司、市政公債、地產和日用品，這段歲月同樣都是毀滅性的。年末時，各種類型的投資者都既困惑又遍體鱗傷，彷彿闖入了羽毛球比賽現場的小鳥。
As the year progressed, a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world’s great financial institutions was unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned non-functional. The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was young: “In God we trust; all others pay cash.”
這一年中，隨著時間推移，世界上很多大金融機構內部的致命問題暴露出來。這讓之前備受尊敬的信貸市場轉瞬變得機能紊亂。社會上的流行語變得像我年幼時在一家餐館牆壁上看到的標語：“我們只相信上帝，其餘人等請付現金。”
By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country. A freefall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before witnessed. The U.S. – and much of the world – became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.
到了第四季度時，信用危機伴以翻滾的房價和股市，製造出了席捲整個國家的讓人癱軟的恐懼。隨之而來的是整個商業活動的自由落體運動，而且是以我從未見過的加速度在下落。美國和世界的大部分地區都陷入了一種惡性循環。恐懼帶來商業萎縮，商業萎縮導致更大的恐懼。
This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly.
不斷上升的萎靡氣氛促使政府採取大動作。用撲克牌局的術語描述，財政部和美聯儲已經全押(allin)。如果說此前為經濟開出的藥都是論杯裝，那最近就是論桶。曾被認為是不可思議的用藥量當然必然帶來不受歡迎的副作用。儘管一個可能的後果是惡性通貨膨脹，但是大家還想當然認為用藥精確，毫無後顧之憂。更甚，主要行業都依賴於政府的支持，接下來市和州將會面對各種難以置信的請求。讓這些組織從公眾的乳頭上斷奶，將會是一項政治挑戰。他們才不願輕易離去。
Whatever the downsides may be, strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown. Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of our economy would have been cataclysmic. Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and the various Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.
要讓金融系統避免徹底崩潰，政府去年採取的強有力的緊急措施必不可少，無論可能出現怎樣的負面影響。一旦出現徹底崩潰，對我們經濟中的所有領域都將造成災難性的後果。如果是這樣，我們經濟的每個領域的結局就會是另一種局面。無論你是否喜歡，華爾街居民、主街居民和美國各種街道上的居民們都在同一條船上。
Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 211⁄2% prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges.
儘管身處壞消息之中，但不要忘記，我們的國家曾經面臨過遠比這糟糕的局面。僅僅在20世紀，我們就曾面對過兩次大戰(其中有一次我們似乎都要輸掉戰爭了);十多次的陣痛和衰退;1980年，惡性通貨膨脹曾導致高達21.5%的基本利率;還有1930年代的大蕭條，大蕭條期間的很多年中，失業率一直在15%到25%間徘徊。美國可從不缺挑戰。
Without fail, however, we’ve overcome them. In the face of those obstacles – and many others – the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497. Compare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which humans secured only tiny gains, if any, in how they lived. Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America’s best days lie ahead.
沒有失敗，只因為我們戰勝了失敗。面對著這麼多障礙——其他還有很多——美國人的實際生活水准在20世紀翻了七番，道瓊斯工業指數從66點上升到11497點。與之形成對比的是，在數十個世紀中，人類都只能依靠微薄所得(如果有的話)過活。儘管前進之路並不平坦，我們的經濟體系在過去運轉得相當不錯。沒有其他體系能像它那樣激發出人類的潛力，而且這套體系還會繼續如此運作。美國最好的日子還在前頭。
Take a look again at the 44-year table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44. But neither Charlie Munger, my partner in running Berkshire, nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance. (In our usual opinionated view, we don’t think anyone else can either.) We’re certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 – and, for that matter, probably well beyond – but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.
在過去44年中，75%的時間裡，標準普爾指數都代表著收穫。我猜，接下來44年中，大概有相同比例的年份也相當不錯。但無論是查理·孟格——我管理波克夏公司的搭檔——還是我，都不能提前預知哪些年景好，哪些年景壞。(我們固執的認為，也沒人能做出如此預知。)我們能確定，比如，2009年的經濟狀況將會慘不忍睹，但是這個結論也不能告訴我們股票市場會上漲還是下跌。
In good years and bad, Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
(1) maintaining Berkshire’s Gibraltar-like financial position, which features huge amounts of excess liquidity, near-term obligations that are modest, and dozens of sources of earnings and cash;
(2) widening the “moats” around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive advantages;
(3) acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
(4) expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who, over the years, have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
無論是好年景還是壞時辰，查理和我都簡單地緊盯四項目標：
1.維繫波克夏在金融上直布羅陀海峽般的位置。這意味著要有非常良好的資金流動性、適度的即將到期債務、數十個利潤與現金的源泉;
2.拓寬保護我們生意的“護城河”，這會讓我們的公司們具備長期競爭優勢;
3.收購和發展新的、各種各樣的利潤之源;
4.擴大和培養優秀的管理團隊，這個團隊要能持續為波克夏創造出非凡價值。
Berkshire in 2008
波克夏 在2008
Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as well. Our retailers were hit particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential construction. In aggregate, however, our manufacturing, service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them – particularly the larger ones – continue to strengthen their competitive positions. Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire’s two most important businesses – our insurance and utility groups – produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy. Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and have excellent prospects.
去年，波克夏生意中的大多數都受到下行經濟的顯著影響，在2009年還會如此。我們的零售業受到的打擊尤其嚴重，我們同民用建築相關的組織也是這樣。儘管如此，總體而言，我們的製造業、服務業和零售業產生了大量的現金流，它們中的大多數，尤其是那些較大的，繼續在鞏固自己的市場競爭優勢。更值得慶幸的是，波克夏的兩項最重要的生意：保險業務和公用事業業務，它們逆市增長，產生了大量利潤。這兩項生意在2008年都有傑出貢獻，它們的前景也都非常輝煌。
As predicted in last year’s report, the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008. Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year. This means that our $58.5 billion of insurance “float” – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit – cost us less than zero. In fact, we were paid $2.8 billion to hold our float during 2008. Charlie and I find this enjoyable.
正如去年年報中提到的，2007年我們保險業務實現的卓越的承保利潤在2008年不會再現。不過，保險集團還是連續第六年貢獻了承保收入。這意味著我們保險業的585億浮游額雖然不屬於我們，但是歸我們持有，並且在為我們的利益進行投資，我們卻什麼都不用付出。事實上，持有這筆浮游資金在2008年還給我們帶來了28億美元的收入。查理和我發現這買賣還真不錯。
Over time, most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes their economics far different from ours. Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses in some years. But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business, and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing. Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is an economic powerhouse.
大多數保險公司都經歷了嚴重的承保流失，這讓它們的經濟狀況遠不同於我們。當然，一些年之後，我們也會經歷承保流失。但我們擁有這個行業最優秀的經理們，多數情況下，他們都密切注意著那些特定的價值不菲的銷售地區。考慮到這些力量，我相信我們會持續賺得承保利潤，我們持有的浮游資金也不會消耗我們任何成本。保險業是波克夏生意的核心，是我們的經濟發電站。
Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains. Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the managers of this operation, have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry. I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.
查理和我對我們的公用事業生意同樣樂觀，去年已經有了盈利記錄，而且未來前景可觀。DaveSokol和GregAbel，我們的兩個管理人員，已經取得了在公用事業行業從未有過的成績。每當他們拿到新項目我都會歡喜雀躍。在這個資本密集的行業，每個項目投資都會很大。這讓波克夏有機會把大量資金投入到有不錯回報的行業。
Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities, and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy.
去年我們在資本分置上做得也不錯。波克夏總是同時購買生意和安定，我們又想賺錢又想低風險。市場的混亂讓我們在收購時順風順水。投資時，市場的悲觀是你的朋友，樂觀則是敵人。
In our insurance portfolios, we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets. These should add about $11⁄2 billion pre-tax to Berkshire’s annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well. We also closed on our Marmon acquisition (we own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years). Additionally, certain of our subsidiaries made “tuck-in” acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
在保險領域，我們做了三項在正常市場環境下無法完成的重大投資。這些投資會給波克夏帶來15億稅前年收入，同時提供資本收益的可能。我們也結束了對Marmon的併購舉動(我們現在擁有這家公司的64%股份，並且會在接下來的6年內持續購買它的其餘股份)。此外，特定的輔助收購會強化我們旗下公司的競爭優勢和盈利能力。
That’s the good news. But there’s another less pleasant reality: During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt. I will tell you more about these later. Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.
好消息到此為之。還有些不太讓人高興的事實：2008年我做了一些愚蠢的投資。我至少犯了一個重大錯誤，還有一些錯誤不那麼嚴重，但也造成了不良後果。稍後我會更詳細談及此事。此外，我還犯了一些疏忽大意的錯，當新情況出現時，我本應三思自己的想法、然後迅速採取行動，但我卻只知道咬著大拇指發楞。
Additionally, the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market. This does not bother Charlie and me. Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions. Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I likebuying quality merchandise when it is marked down.
此外，我們持續持有的債券與股票的市值隨著全體市場而遭受到巨大的下滑，但這並不困擾查理跟我。確實，假如有可用資金可以增加我們的部位，我們享受如此的股價下滑。很久以前，Ben Graham教我：「價格是你所支付的，價值則是你得到的」( Price is what you pay; Value is what you get )不管我們談論的是襪子還是股票，當他價格有顯著下降的時候，我還是喜歡買品質好的商品。
Yardsticks
Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend those totaled $122 billion (not counting the investments held by our finance and utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value). About $58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.
波克夏的價值主要來自兩塊領域。首先是我們的投資：股票、債券和視同庫存現金。到年底時，這部分資產價值為1220億美元(其中不包含由我們的金融部門和公用事業組織做出的投資，它們被算作第二部分價值)。其中有585億美元是由我們用保險業浮動資金投資貢獻的。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 67 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 96. We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates, and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.
波克夏的第二部分價值來源是除投資和保險之外的其他盈利渠道。這部分利潤由我們的67家非保險公司貢獻。我們把保險排除在外，是因為保險業的價值在於它的資金提供的投資收益，這我們已經歸類於第一部分了。
In 2008, our investments fell from $90,343 per share of Berkshire (after minority interest) to $77,793, a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of $4,093 per Berkshire share to $3,921 (again after minority interest).
2008年，波克夏的投資股從每股90343美元下跌到77793美元，這種下跌由整個市場的衰退引發，而不是由於市場對股票或債券的拋售。第二部分股票價值從稅前每股盈利4093美元下降到3921美元。
Both of these performances are unsatisfactory. Over time, we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire’s intrinsic value at an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for several decades. We like buying underpriced securities, but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.
兩類股票的表現都不讓人滿意。如果我們希望以一個可接受的速率增加波克夏的固定資產價值，我們需要在每個領域內都逆市增長。當然，我們會始終聚焦在能帶來利潤的領域，正好像我們數十年來一直做的那樣。我們喜歡購買那些被低估的安全資產，但是我們更喜歡購買那些價格公道的公司。
Now, let’s take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
現在讓我們看看波克夏的四塊主要部分。每一領域的贏收平衡和收入計算方法都迥然不同。因此，把它們合併到一起，如標準的金融報告所做的那樣，只會妨礙我們的分析。因此我們把它們分成四個獨立部分，查理和我正是如此想的。
Regulated Utility Business
受規範的公用事業
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide
variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose
3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which
serves 723,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving
about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines,
which carry about 9% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
波克夏擁有中美能源控股84.7%的股份。中美能源旗下有多家公用事業組織。它們中最大的包括：1.Yorkshire Electricity and NorthernElectric，它有380萬用戶，是英國第三大電力公司;2.中美能源，它服務著72.3萬電力用戶，主要集中在愛荷華;3. PacificPowerandRockyMountainPower，服務著西部六州的170萬電力用戶;4.Kern Riverand NorthernNaturalpipelines，通過它運輸的天然氣占美國用量的9%。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my long-time friend, Walter Scott. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Nine years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
我們在中美能源控股的合夥人包括兩位了不起的管理者Dave Sokol和Greg Abel，以及我的老友Walter Scott。每個合夥人擁有多少投票權並不重要。因為只有我們達成一致時才會做出重大決定。同Dave、Greg和Walter的九年合作讓我深信，我們再找不到比他們更好的搭檔了。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Last year was a terrible year for home sales, and 2009 looks no better. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
有些讓人掃興的是，中美能源還擁有全美第二大房地產經紀公司HomeServicesofAmerica。這家公司有21個地方品牌和16000個代理商。去年是房地產銷售的恐怖之年，2009年也好不到哪兒去。不過，我們會在合理價格水平上，繼續收購一些優質經紀公司。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
這裡是一些中美公司營運的關鍵數字：
| Earnings (in $ millions) | |||||
| 2008 | 2007 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $399 | $337 | |||
| Iowa utility | 425 | 412 | |||
| Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006) | 703 | 692 | |||
| Pipelines | 595 | 473 | |||
| Home Services | (45) | 42 | |||
| Other (Net) | 186 | 130 | |||
| Earnings before corporate interest and tax | 2,203 | 2,086 | |||
| Constellation Energy* | 1,092 | – | |||
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (332) | (312) | |||
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt . | (111) | (108) | |||
| Income Tax | (1,002) | (477) | |||
| Net Earnings | $1,850 | $1,189 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire** | $1,704 | $1,114 | |||
| Debt Owed to Others | 19,145 | 19,002 | |||
| Debt Owed to Berkshire | 1,087 | 821 | |||
*Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million.
**Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $72 in 2008 and $70 in 2007.
MidAmerican’s record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding. Here’s some backup for that claim.
中美能源在電力供應和天然氣管道輸送方面的表現非常傑出。
Our two pipelines, Kern River and Northern Natural, were both acquired in 2002. A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction. Among the 44 rated, Kern River came in 9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39th. There was work to do.
我們的兩大管線，Kern River與Northern Natural，都是在2002年取得的。有一家名叫Mastio的公司定期在替管線服務作顧客滿意度的排名；當我們買下Kern River時，他是在44條管線當中排名第九，而當時的Northern Natural的排名是第三十九名。有許多工作可作。( There was work to do，應意指還有很多進步空間之意 )
In Mastio’s 2009 report, Kern River ranked 1st and Northern Natural 3rd. Charlie and I couldn’t be more proud of this performance. It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.
在 Mastio 2009年的報告中，Kern River已經是排名第一，而 Northern Natural則是排名第三，查理跟我對這樣的績效感到相當自豪。會達到這樣的成就，是因為每一個參與營運的人對自己做下對新企業文化的承諾，並且傳遞這個承諾。
Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive. In 1995, MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa. By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency, the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.
我們在電力公用事業的成就也是相當令人印象深刻的。1995年，中美公司變成在愛荷華州的主要電力提供者。藉由明智的計畫與追求效率的熱誠，從我們買下他之後，這家公司便保持電力價格不調整的政策，並且直到2013年都保證不變。
MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind. Since our purchase, MidAmerican’s wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.
與此同時，中美公司維持這樣的低價政策使得愛荷華州風力發電佔總供電量的比例達到全美第一。從我們購買之後，中美公司風力發電的設施從0%成長到佔總供電量的20%。
Similarly, when we purchased PacifiCorp in 2006, we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts. It’s now 794, with more coming. (Arriving at PacifiCorp, we found “wind” of a different sort: The company had 98 committees that met frequently. Now there are 28. Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.)
同樣的，當我們在2006年買下太平洋企業( PacifiCorp )時，我們積極的擴充風力發電，當時風力發電只有3千3百萬瓦，到現在已經達到7億9千4百萬瓦，而且還在繼續擴充。( 當我們取得太平洋企業時，我們發現不同種類的「風」 (編按：指空談之意)：這家公司當時有98個委員會一天到晚都在開。現在只剩下28個。而在這期間，我們減少了2%的人力，產生並傳遞了更多更多的電力出去 )
In 2008 alone, MidAmerican spent $1.8 billion on wind generation at our two operations, and today the company is number one in the nation among regulated utilities in ownership of wind capacity. By the way, compare that $1.8 billion to the $1.1 billion of pre-tax earnings of PacifiCorp (shown in the table as “Western”) and Iowa. In our utility business, we spend all we earn, and then some, in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas. Indeed, MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early 2000. Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve. In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested. It’s a great partnership for all concerned.
僅僅2008年，中美公司在兩個營運部門花了18億在風力發電上，到今天公司是全國風力發電股份有限公司中最大的。順道一提，可以比較一下18億與在愛荷華州的太平洋企業稅前盈餘11億( 在表中的右邊欄 )。在我們的公用事業裡，我們花掉我們全部賺的，某些是為了滿足我們所服務地區之需求。的確，中美公司自2000年初波克夏入主後便沒有發放股利，這些盈餘反而拿來再投資，發展那些我們客戶所需求與渴望的公用事業系統。在交換上，我們被允許在我們投資的巨大金額中，獲得合理的回報；對大家而言，這是相當棒的夥伴關係。
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Our long-avowed goal is to be the “buyer of choice” for businesses – particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker).
在商業上，我們長期以來的公開目標就是成為“最佳買家”，尤其是對那些由家族創立和擁有的生意。想擁有這個稱號，就必須配得上這個稱號。這意味著我們必須堅守承諾：避免槓桿收購;給予經理人極大的自主權;和被收購公司同甘共苦，好壞共度(儘管我們更喜歡公司越來越好)。
Our record matches our rhetoric. Most buyers competing against us, however, follow a different path. For them, acquisitions are “merchandise.” Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these operators are contemplating “exit strategies.” We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
過去的歷史表明我們言行一致。同我們競爭的大多數買家都不走我們這條路。對他們而言，收購就像買賣蘿蔔白菜，合約墨跡未乾，收購者已經在考慮“退出策略”，尋找下家。因此，當我們碰到那些真正關心自己生意未來的出售者時，我們擁有壓倒性優勢。
Some years back our competitors were known as “leveraged-buyout operators.” But LBO became a bad name. So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change their moniker. What they did not change, though, were the essential ingredients of their previous operations, including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.
退後幾年，我們的競爭者被稱為“槓桿收購者”(LBO)。但是槓桿收購後來聲名狼藉。因此，收購者要給自己換個馬甲。但是他們的所作所為全都未變，比如他們深愛的收費制度和對資金槓桿的熱愛。
Their new label became “private equity,” a name that turns the facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing. A number of these acquirees, purchased only two to three years ago, are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling below 70¢ on the dollar, and the public debt has taken a far greater beating. The privateequity firms, it should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need. Instead, they’re keeping their remaining funds very private.
它們的新馬甲是“私募股權基金”(PE)。這個稱號頗具顛倒事實的誤導性。這些公司購買的商業組織總是得到一個不變的結局，同PE進入之前相比，股權投資在它們資本結構中的構成比例急劇下降。一些才被收購了兩三年的公司，發現自己被PE加給它們的債務推到命懸一線的境地。今天，銀行債券大都在以低於票面價值七折的價格出售。政府公債價格更低。儘管如此，應注意的是，PE公司並沒有對它們的監護公司注入它們急需的股權投資，相反的是在於他們讓他們的基金持續私有化。
In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses. Here, Berkshire hopes to be the “buyer of choice” of regulators. It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
在高度管制的公用事業領域內沒什麼大的家族企業。因此，波克夏希望成為監管者眼中的“最佳買家”。當收購計劃提出時，是監管者而不是出售股權的股東在判斷買家品性如何。
There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators. They can – and do – call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.
在監管者面前隱藏你的歷史表現毫無作用。他們能——而且也會——讓他們在各州的合作機構調查你之前的商業軌跡，包括你是否願意提供足夠的資本入股。
When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in 2005, regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities. We passed this examination, just as we expect to pass future ones.
中美能源在2005年意欲收購PacifiCorp時，六個州的監管機構迅速檢查了我們在愛荷華州的紀錄。他們還仔細核查了我們的財務計劃和資本能力。我們通過了檢驗。我們希望我們能一如既往地通過未來的各種檢驗。
There are two reasons for our confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner. They don’t know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future – and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.
我們如此自信的原因有兩點。首先，DaveSokol和GregAbel會始終以一流的水準來管理交由他們管理的生意。他們根本不知道如何把事情做差。其次，我們希望在未來我們能購買更多管制下的公用事業機構，我們知道，明天是否受監管機構的歡迎，取決於今天我們如何表現。
Insurance
保險業
Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire’s growth since we first entered the business in 1967. This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry. During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14.0% for the Fortune 500. Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back. Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days. Why do I love them? Let me count the ways.
打從1967年我們進入以來，保險業就一直在推動波克夏公司的增長。這個讓人欣喜的結果並不是由該行業的普遍繁榮帶來的。截至2007年年底，過去25年時間內，按市值計算，保險業的投資回報增長率是8.5%，財富500強是14%。很明顯，我們在保險業的CEO們並不佔天時地利。但這些經理的表現卻遠超出查理和我早先的預計。我愛死他們了。
At GEICO, Tony Nicely – now in his 48th year at the company after joining it when he was 18 – continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting. When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2.0% of the auto insurance market, a level at which the company had long been stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up from 7.2% in 2007.
TonyNicely18歲時加入GEICO，如今已在公司度過48年。當他在1993年成為公司CEO時，GEICO在車險領域僅有2%的市場份額，公司很長時間以來一直徘徊在這個市場份額上下。現在我們的市場份額已經從2007年的7.2%上升到了7.7%。
The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire purchased control, GEICO was number seven. Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.
開拓新生意帶來的收穫和對已有生意的再創新，讓GEICO在車險保險公司中佔據了第三的市場位置。1995年波克夏購得公司控制權時，它的市場位置是第七。如今我們牢牢佔據探花位置。
GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But virtually everyone likes to drive. So, sensibly, drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost, and efficiency is Tony’s specialty. Five years ago the number of policies per employee was 299. In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity.
GEICO增長的原因是它能為機動車駕駛者省錢。沒人喜歡購買車險，但是基本上人人都喜歡開車。因此，駕車者喜歡尋找保險費用最低但服務一流的保險公司。高效是低成本的關鍵，而高效正是Tony的專長。五年前，每個僱員能獲得299張保單。2008年，這個數字是439張。生產力極大提高。
As we view GEICO’s current opportunities, Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp. Juicy targets are everywhere. First, and most important, our new business in auto insurance is now exploding. Americans are focused on saving money as never before, and they are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a monthly record – by a wide margin – for growth in policyholders. That record will last exactly 28 days: As we go to press, it’s clear February’s gain will be even better.
當我們檢視GEICO目前的機會，Tony跟我感覺就像在天體營裡的兩隻飢餓蚊子。到處都是美味多汁的目標。首先，也是最重要的，汽車保險的新事業正在爆發性的成長。美國人以前從來沒有把重點放在省錢上，而他們現在成群結隊的來GEICO。2009年一月，由於投保人數的增加，我們創下了單月最大的獲利，這紀錄將只持續28天：因為當我們在印本文的時候，二月的獲利很明顯地比一月更好。
Beyond this, we are gaining ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base. And, finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos, a big market that offers real promise.
除此之外，在產品線上我們找到新的領域範圍。去年，我們的機車保險增加了23.4%，幫助我們的市佔率從大約6%提升到超過7%。我們的休旅車與四輪傳動車業務儘管很小，但也快速的成長。最後，我們最近開始承保商用汽車，一個相當有前途的大市場。
GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans. Go to GEICO.com or call 1-800-847-7536
and see if we can save you money as well.
GEICO如今位數以百萬計的美國人省錢。去GEICO.com網站看看或者撥打 1-800-847-7536這支電話，看看是否我們也能同樣的幫你省下不少錢。
General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re’s culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
我們最大的國際再保險公司Gen-eralRe2008年也表現不凡。一段時間之前，這家公司還存在非常嚴重的問題(我們在1998年購買它時，我對問題毫無察覺)。2001年，JoeBrandon在TadMontross的輔助下成為公司CEO時，公司的情形還在進一步惡化。公司正承受著承保額下降、現金儲備減少以及與此同時的支出帶來的損失。Joe和Tad上任之後，這些問題都很成功地被解決了。今天GeneralRe已經重新煥發青春。去年春天Joe退休，Tad接替他成為CEO。查理和我對Joe扶正公司航向的工作感激不盡，同時我們也相信，Tad正是Gen-eralRe所需的那個正確的領導者。
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, “It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.” That’s no worry for General Re clients.
再保險是門長線生意，一個保險承諾有時會延續50年甚至更久。過去的一年讓承保人再次認識到一個至關重要的原則：承諾並不重要，重要的是承諾由誰做出。這正是GeneralRe勝出的地方：它是惟一一家有AAA級公司作為背後支撐的再保險公司。本•富蘭克林說過一句話：“空麻袋立不直，空心承諾靠不住。”GeneralRe的客戶無需擔心這點。
Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division, headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only 31 employees. This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world, hard to characterize but easy to admire.
我們在保險業的第三大機構是AjitJain的再保險公司。它的總部位於Stamford，僅有31名僱員。它可能是世界上最值得稱道的公司之一，難以描述難以定義，但絕對值得表揚。
From year to year, Ajit’s business is never the same. It features very large transactions, incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads. When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured, Ajit is almost certain to be called.
每一年Ajit的生意都花樣翻新。它的特徵是大買賣、讓人難以置信的執行速度和願意承保那些讓競爭對手苦惱到撓頭不已的單子。每當有一項保險存在巨大的非同一般的風險時，人們總會想到去找Ajit。
Ajit came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly, I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing: I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course, I knew the answer before writing. There isn’t anyone like Ajit.
Ajit在1986年加入波克夏。用不了多久，我就意識到自己得到了一個非比尋常的天才人物。因此我寫了一封信給他在新德里的父母，問他們是否還有另外一個這樣的孩子在家待著。當然，寫信之前我就知道答案會是什麼。世界上根本不可能有第二個Ajit。
Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the “big three,” regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost. We aggregate their results below under “Other Primary.” For space reasons, we don’t discuss these insurers individually. But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.
我們那些稍小些的保險機構也都以自己的方式表現傑出，像我們提到的三巨頭一樣。它們以微小的成本為我們提供了寶貴的浮動資金。我們將它們歸類於“其他”類。為了避免冗長，我們不再詳細個別討論。但請相信，查理和我對它們的貢獻都欣賞不已。
Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance. But, overall, I expect us to average an underwriting profit. If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.
有張組成我們保險凳子四隻腳的紀錄在這。此承保的獲利表示，由此四個部份提供波克夏的資金，在去年是不用任何成本的，跟2007年的情況一樣。這兩年的承保收益率都遠高於此產業達到的水準。當然，我們偶爾會遇到保險業相當糟糕的年份，但是總的來說，我預期我們承保的獲利部分將達到一個平均水準。假如如此，我們將會有大規模的免費資金來面對不確定的未來。
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2008 | 2007 | 2008 | 2007 | ||
| General Re | $342 | $555 | $21,074 | $23,009 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 1,324 | 1,427 | 24,221 | 23,692 | ||
| GEICO | 916 | 1,113 | 8,454 | 7,768 | ||
| Other Primary | 210 | 279 | 4,739 | 4,229 | ||
| Total | $2,792 | $3,374 | $58,448 | $58,698 | ||
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業和零售業公司
波克夏在這一部分的營運也是相當全面的。讓我們來看一下整個集團的資產負債表和損益表摘要：
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $2,497 | Notes payable | $2,212 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 5,047 | Other current liabilities | 8,087 | |||||
| Inventory | 7,500 | Total current liabilities | 10,299 | |||||
| Other current assets | 752 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 15,796 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 16,515 | Deferred taxes | 2786 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 16,338 | Term debt and other liabilities | 6,033 | |||||
| Other assets | 1,248 | Equity | 30,779 | |||||
| $49,897 | $49,897 | |||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | |||||
| Revenues | $66,099 | $59,100 | $52,660 | ||||
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,280 in 2008, $955 in 2007 and $823 in 2006) | |||||||
| 61937 | 55026 | 49002 | |||||
| Interest expense (net) | 139 | 127 | 132 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 4023 | 3947 | 3526 | ||||
| Income taxes | 1740 | 1594 | 1395 | ||||
| Net income | 2283 | 2353 | 2131 | ||||
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned an impressive 17.9% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 8.1%.
這是個五花八門的組合，出售從棒棒糖到家用電器的各種商品。它們在去年取得了令人印象深刻的17.9%的市值增長。值得注意的是，這些公司只用了很小的資金槓桿就收到瞭如此回報。顯然我們擁有一些不可思議的生意。我們購買了很多這樣的實際價值在市值之上的公司。這些購買讓我們的賬面資產價值下降了8.1%。
Though the full-year result was satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year’s fourth quarter. Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains strong earning power even under today’s conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company. Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year, partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions. In contrast, many competitors were treading water (or sinking).
儘管全年表現可圈可點，但是該組合中很多公司的收入在去年第四季度時像踩了急剎車。2009年的前景看上去更糟。儘管如此，在今天這種惡劣環境下，這組公司仍然具備強勁的賺錢能力，會繼續為母公司提供可觀的現金流。總之，去年這些公司的市場競爭優勢都得到了強化，部分原因是資本上的優勢讓我們得以進行能帶來增值的收購。與之形成對比的是，很多競爭對手或者在忙著對付危機的洪水，或者正在沉沒其中。
The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar’s late-November purchase of Tungaloy, a leading Japanese producer of small tools. Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment – and appreciation! – at the accomplishments of Iscar’s management. To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing. Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown. Iscar’s growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations – which were high – and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.
最值得注意的一件併購是依斯卡(Iscar)在去年十一月收購Tungaloy的股權，這是家小型工具的日本領導生產廠商。查理跟我帶著驚訝與讚賞的眼光看著Iscar的管理階層完成這個任務。當我們在收購公司時，能留下像Eitan Wertheimer、 Jacob Harpaz 或Danny Goldman這樣的管理者是一種幸運，能全留下就像贏得三冠王一樣。自從我們收購Iscar之後，他的成長總是超過我們的預期很多，而Tungaloy的併購將會把Iscar的績效表現帶向另一個境界。
MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in 2002. At that time, we paid $140 million for the company. Last year its pre-tax earnings were $89 million. Vic Mancinelli, its CEO, followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival. He focuses on blocking and tackling, day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course. Ten years from now, Vic will be running a much larger operation and, more important, will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.
MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon 與 CTB也在去年期間完成一件或多件的收購。CTB是家專門生產各式農業設備的公司，在我們2002年入主後他已經收購了六家小公司。在那時我們支付了一億四千萬。去年的稅前盈餘是8900萬。Vic Mancinelli，這家公司的執行長，在我們入主前就已經依著類似波克夏的營運準則經營很久了。他專注在處理公司的營運問題上面，日復一日的把小事情做對，並且從不偏離此道。從現在到未來十年，Vic將會經營更多大規模的營運，更重要的是，將從投資的資金中賺取更棒的報酬。
Finance and Financial Products
金融和金融產品
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.
我會在這裡稍顯冗長地論述下ClaytonHomes的抵押貸款操作。這樣做是因為，Clayton最近的經驗可能會對關於房地產和抵押貸款的公共政策爭論有些幫助。
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry’s 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.
Clayton是住宅建築行業最大的公司，去年建造了27499套住房，這佔了整個81889套住房市場的34%。2009年我們的市場份額會進一步增加，部分原因是該行業的其他公司正身陷絕境。站在行業角度，自1998年達到售出372843套的高峰之後，整個行業的住房銷售數量都在穩步下降。
At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving “borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
當時，該行業中多數銷售行為都很糟糕。我曾描述這段時期為，“不該當債主的人把錢借給了不該欠債的人”。
To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. (“That certainly looks like a $2,000 cat to me” says the salesman who will receive a $3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”) and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
首先，本很重要的分期付款的首次付款經常被忽略。有時候大家弄虛作假(“我看他們家的貓值2000美元”，銷售人員說。貸款被批准後，他會得到一個能賺3000美元的購房委託)。貸款者同意簽署根本不可能償還的每月分期付款協議，因為他們沒什麼可失去的。最後的抵押貸款債券被打包，然後由華爾街出售給毫不懷疑的投資者。這套愚蠢的做法必然收穫惡果，事實上也正如此。
Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.
必須強調的是，Clayton在那一時期貸出款項時要理性得多。事實上，沒有一個購買了Clayton抵押貸款債券的投資者損失過一毛錢的本金和利息。但是Clayton只是個例外，整個行業都處在垂死狀態。這種掙扎狀況一直持續到了今天
This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on “house-price appreciation” to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again: “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
1997-2000年的蕭條應該被視為更大範圍內的常規住房市場的煤礦瓦斯預警。但是投資者、政府和評級機構從住房建築行業的衰退中沒得到任何啟發。相反，令人大惑不解的是，同樣的錯誤在2004-2007年在常規住房中得到重複：借貸者愉悅地把錢借給根本還不起的人;貸款者也毫不猶豫簽署了分期付款協議。雙方都希望“房地產價值上漲”來為這項根本不可能實現的安排買單。《飄》中女主人公郝思嘉說得好：“車到山前自有路，明天再考慮也不遲。”如今我們經濟的各方面都品嚐到了這種行為的苦果。
Clayton’s 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated “sub-prime.” Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.
不過，克萊頓有198,888位借款人，在全球房市崩潰都還是能繼續正常的支付貸款，使我們沒有任何預期的損失。這原因並不是因為這些借款人依FICO分數顯示其信用頗佳所造成的( FICO是一種信用風險的衡量標準 )。他們FICO的中位數是只有644，國家的中位數標準是在723，而且有約35%是低於620，這個部分總被稱為「次級貸款」 ( sub-prime )。許多一般住宅的抵押貸款嚴重的問題更常發生在那些以FICO評分信用評價良好的借款人身上。
Yet at yearend, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton’s foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.
到08年底，我們放款的違約率是3.6%，只比2004年跟2006年的2.9%高一些。(除了放款之外，我們也從不同的財務機構買入了大量不同類型的投資組合)。克萊頓在2008年的回贖權取消比例只有3%，2006年跟2004年則分別是3. 8%跟5. 3%。
金融和金融產品
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.
我會在這裡稍顯冗長地論述下ClaytonHomes的抵押貸款操作。這樣做是因為，Clayton最近的經驗可能會對關於房地產和抵押貸款的公共政策爭論有些幫助。
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry’s 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.
Clayton是住宅建築行業最大的公司，去年建造了27499套住房，這佔了整個81889套住房市場的34%。2009年我們的市場份額會進一步增加，部分原因是該行業的其他公司正身陷絕境。站在行業角度，自1998年達到售出372843套的高峰之後，整個行業的住房銷售數量都在穩步下降。
At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving “borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
當時，該行業中多數銷售行為都很糟糕。我曾描述這段時期為，“不該當債主的人把錢借給了不該欠債的人”。
To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. (“That certainly looks like a $2,000 cat to me” says the salesman who will receive a $3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”) and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
首先，本很重要的分期付款的首次付款經常被忽略。有時候大家弄虛作假(“我看他們家的貓值2000美元”，銷售人員說。貸款被批准後，他會得到一個能賺3000美元的購房委託)。貸款者同意簽署根本不可能償還的每月分期付款協議，因為他們沒什麼可失去的。最後的抵押貸款債券被打包，然後由華爾街出售給毫不懷疑的投資者。這套愚蠢的做法必然收穫惡果，事實上也正如此。
Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.
必須強調的是，Clayton在那一時期貸出款項時要理性得多。事實上，沒有一個購買了Clayton抵押貸款債券的投資者損失過一毛錢的本金和利息。但是Clayton只是個例外，整個行業都處在垂死狀態。這種掙扎狀況一直持續到了今天
This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on “house-price appreciation” to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again: “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
1997-2000年的蕭條應該被視為更大範圍內的常規住房市場的煤礦瓦斯預警。但是投資者、政府和評級機構從住房建築行業的衰退中沒得到任何啟發。相反，令人大惑不解的是，同樣的錯誤在2004-2007年在常規住房中得到重複：借貸者愉悅地把錢借給根本還不起的人;貸款者也毫不猶豫簽署了分期付款協議。雙方都希望“房地產價值上漲”來為這項根本不可能實現的安排買單。《飄》中女主人公郝思嘉說得好：“車到山前自有路，明天再考慮也不遲。”如今我們經濟的各方面都品嚐到了這種行為的苦果。
Clayton’s 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated “sub-prime.” Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.
不過，克萊頓有198,888位借款人，在全球房市崩潰都還是能繼續正常的支付貸款，使我們沒有任何預期的損失。這原因並不是因為這些借款人依FICO分數顯示其信用頗佳所造成的( FICO是一種信用風險的衡量標準 )。他們FICO的中位數是只有644，國家的中位數標準是在723，而且有約35%是低於620，這個部分總被稱為「次級貸款」 ( sub-prime )。許多一般住宅的抵押貸款嚴重的問題更常發生在那些以FICO評分信用評價良好的借款人身上。
Yet at yearend, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton’s foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.
到08年底，我們放款的違約率是3.6%，只比2004年跟2006年的2.9%高一些。(除了放款之外，我們也從不同的財務機構買入了大量不同類型的投資組合)。克萊頓在2008年的回贖權取消比例只有3%，2006年跟2004年則分別是3. 8%跟5. 3%。
Why are our borrowers – characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores – performing so well? The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual – not hoped-for – income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home prices.
為什麼我們的貸款者表現得這麼好?——他們收入平平，也談不上信用等級多麼好。答案非常簡單。我們的貸款者僅僅是量力貸款，他們會看一下貸款協議，看其是否在他們實際收入(而不是期望收入)的承受範圍內。他們貸款時就想好瞭如何償還，不管房價怎樣變化。
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing. They did not sign up for “teaser” rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.
同樣重要的還有我們的貸款者沒有做什麼。他們沒有指望依靠再次借貸來償還貸款。他們沒有簽訂同自己的收入脫節的利率苛刻的貸款合同。他們也不會假定，當他們無法償還貸款時，可以通過出售房屋，賺一大筆，來還掉錢。
Of course, a number of our borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits. The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job, but death, divorce and medical expenses all cause problems. If unemployment rates rise – as they surely will in 2009 – more of Clayton’s borrowers will have troubles, and we will have larger, though still manageable, losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.
當然，我們的貸款者中也有不少人未來會陷入困境。如果不幸降臨，他們並沒有太多儲蓄以讓自己安然無恙。讓他們毀約或喪失抵押贖回權的主要原因，是失業、死亡、離婚和重病也都會引發問題。如果失業率上升——在2009年這是肯定的，更多的貸款者會陷入麻煩。我們也會有更大的、但還是可控的損失。但我們的問題同房價走勢關係不大。
Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage (so-called “upside-down” loans). Rather, foreclosures take place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay. Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment – derived from savings and not from other borrowing – seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage. Instead, they walk when they can’t make the monthly payments.
關於目前房地產危機的評論往往忽略掉一個關鍵事實，那就是大多數違約並不是因為房屋價值低於抵押貸款價值，而是因為貸款者還不起他們答應償還的每月分期付款。那些通過借貸而不是節衣縮食來支付首付的業主，很少是因為物業價值在今天低於抵押貸款價值而毀約。相反，當他們付不起月供時，他們就會甩手不干了。
Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.
住自己的房子是好事兒。我的家庭和我在我們現在的房子裡住了50年，而且還會一直住下去。但是購買房屋的首要動機應該是家的喜悅和居住其中，而不是指望它盈利。房屋的購買也應該同購房者的收入水平相吻合。
The present housing debacle should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future. Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower’s income. That income should be carefully verified.
目前的房地產崩盤應當會讓房屋買家、貸款提供商、經紀商和政府學到一些簡單的教訓，而這將確保房市將來的穩定。買房的時候，借款人應當實打實地預付至少10%的首期，月供也要在藉款人收入可以輕鬆負擔的範圍之內。借款人的收入情況要仔細核實。
Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.
居者有其屋是個很美好的目標，但不應該是我們國家的首要目標。讓購房者待在自己的房子里而不毀約才應該是努力的方向。
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Clayton’s lending operation, though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers, is nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis. Funders that have access to any sort of government guarantee – banks with FDIC-insured deposits, large entities with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve, and others who are using imaginative methods (or lobbying skills) to come under the government’s umbrella – have money costs that are minimal. Conversely, highly-rated companies, such as Berkshire, are experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury rates, are at record levels. Moreover, funds are abundant for the government-guaranteed borrower but often scarce for others, no matter how creditworthy they may be.
克萊頓的貸款業務，儘管沒有因為這些借款者的表現而產生損失，然而也受到了一點信用危機的威脅。這些資助者輕易得到政府的保證—FDIC存款保證的銀行、大量的商業本票，現由FED擔保，以及其他用各種想得到方法或遊說技巧去要求躲在政府的保護傘之下，以取得最小成本的資金。相反的，像波克夏這樣評價較好的公司，相對於國庫券利率，正在面對歷史天價的借貸成本。然而，不管他們信用狀況如何，那些由政府保證借款的資金相當充沛，但對於其他則相當匱乏。
This unprecedented “spread” in the cost of money makes it unprofitable for any lender who doesn’t enjoy government-guaranteed funds to go up against those with a favored status. Government is determining the “haves” and “have-nots.” That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank holding companies, not a course feasible for Berkshire.
與那些政府受優惠保證的業者相比，這史無前例的資金氾濫將造成所有沒有享受到政府保證的放款業者無利可圖。政府正在決定誰有錢、誰沒錢，這也是為什麼許多公司趕著轉型銀行控股公司，這對波克夏來說並不是一個可行的方法。
Though Berkshire’s credit is pristine – we are one of only seven AAA corporations in the country – our cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing. At the moment, it is much better to be a financial cripple with a government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.
儘管波克夏的信用是相當良好的 — 我們是這個國家僅剩七家AAA級企業之一 — 但我們的借款成本現在已經遠高於那些資產負債表不良但卻有政府作靠山的競爭者。這時做為一個有政府保證的財務跛腳比當個直布羅陀般的巨人而沒人當靠山好太多了。
Today’s extreme conditions may soon end. At worst, we believe we will find at least a partial solution that will allow us to continue much of Clayton’s lending. Clayton’s earnings, however, will surely suffer if we are forced to compete for long against government-favored lenders.
今天這樣極端的情況將很快的結束。最糟的情況，我們相信我們將至少找到部分的解決方案能使得我們繼續克萊頓的放款業務。不過，如果我們面對來自有政府偏好之放款業者長期的競爭，克萊頓的獲利將確定會受到損害。
| (in $ millions) | ||||
| Pre-Tax Earnings | ||||
| 2008 | 2007 | |||
| Net investment income | $330 | $272 | ||
| Life and annuity operation | 23 | (60) | ||
| Leasing operations | 87 | 111 | ||
| Manufactured housing finance (Clayton) | 206 | 526 | ||
| Other* | 141 | 157 | ||
| Income before investment and derivatives gains or losses . | 787 | 1,006 | ||
*Includes $92 million in 2008 and $85 million in 2007 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.
Tax-Exempt Bond Insurance
免稅債券保險
Early in 2008, we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company (“BHAC”) as an insurer of the tax-exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local entities. BHAC insures these securities for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the public (primary transactions) and later, when the bonds are already owned by investors (secondary transactions).
在2008年初，我們成立波克夏保險公司(Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company，“BHAC”)，專門為政府、城市或地方團體發行的免稅債券提供保險。BHAC擔保這些發行者的債券在被投資人擁有(次級市場)的情況下，也都能在那時或稍後將他們的債券賣給大眾(初級市場)。
By yearend 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had
all fallen into big trouble. The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West: “I was Snow White,
but I drifted.”
2007年年底，再這個行業大約一半的主要公司遭遇到大的麻煩。他們問題的起因，就像Mae West曾說的︰「曾經我是個白雪公主，不過如今我已不再清白。」
The monolines (as the bond insurers are called) initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were
low-risk. But over the years competition for this business intensified, and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of
stagnating or declining earnings, the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions. Some of these
involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations. When housing prices plummeted, the monoline
industry quickly became a basket case.
早些年，波克夏在三家最大家的保證保險公司的報告上，提出對所有承保免稅債券的保險公司提出一個假設。這些公司都將面臨生存威脅的問題( 儘管他們說不會 )。我們會以1.5的利率去接管大約8220億的債券。如果我們的提議被接受了，我們將被要求支付給擁有債券的這些投資者所有損失，有一些個案甚至可長達40年。我們可不是做無聊的提議：因為這會讓波克夏陷入巨大的風險之中，所以我們提得晚了些。
The monolines summarily rejected our offer, in some cases appending an insult or two. In the end,
though, the turndowns proved to be very good news for us, because it became apparent that I had severely
underpriced our offer.
這些公司立刻拒絕我們的提議，一些公司還加了一兩句羞辱。儘管到後來，這些拒絕被證明對我們來說是好消息，因為很明顯地，我可以很大大調低我們的提議價格。
Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the secondary market. And here’s the punch
line: About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already insured, largely by the three aforementioned
monolines. In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do
so.
We wrote this “second-to-pay” insurance for rates averaging 3.3%. That’s right; we have been paid far
more for becoming the second to pay than the 1.5% we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay. In one
extreme case, we actually agreed to be fourth to pay, nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium
charged by the monoline that remains first to pay. In other words, three other monolines have to first go broke
before we need to write a check.
我們承保這些二手貸( second-to-pay )保險的利率平均是3.3%。這是對的，我們過去支付變成二手貸的部份，遠高於早期支付一手貸的 1.5%。一些極端的例子，在各家保險公司維持一手貸時，我們同意過四手貸，仍然接受了三次約1%風險貼水，換句話說，要其他三家保證保險公司先破產，我們才需要付款。( 編按：類似二胎貸款，用較低的利息水準借款取得較低的抵押權順位 )
Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital.
This, of course, directly helps us, since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at least in the near term,
any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail. In addition to our book of
secondary business, we have also written $3.7 billion of primary business for a premium of $96 million. In
primary business, of course, we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other
monoline. Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs. This explains why many sophisticated
investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another
monoline. BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference, but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to
bondholders.
在承保的背後，我們有多樣的資金來源遠超過其他保證保險公司。也因此必然地，我們的保證遠比其他家業者來得有價值。這也解釋為什麼儘管他們在其他家保證保險公司已經有投保，許多有經驗的投資者還是要透過我們購買二手貸的保險。BHAC變成不只是大家偏好的保險業者，也是在許多情形下，債券持有人唯一願意接受的承保業者。
Nevertheless, we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure
thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us. The reason is simple, though I have never seen even
a passing reference to it by any financial analyst, rating agency or monoline CEO.
The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have
historically been few. But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds.
Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn’t exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds remained uninsured
A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured, but otherwise similar bonds, the only question being how different. To understand why, let’s go back to 1975 when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time its bonds – virtually all uninsured – were heavily held by the city’s wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions. These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city’s fiscal problems. So before long, concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution. Without one, it was apparent to all that New York’s citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
在承保的免稅債券範圍裡，有不同程度的未保險免稅債券之損失經驗是確定的，但是在其他相似的債券裡，唯一的問題是如何變得不同。為了知道為什麼，讓我們回到紐約城市瀕臨破產的1975年，那時候的債券，幾乎全部沒有保險，被那些與銀行或其他機構一樣有錢的人大量的持有著。這些地方的債券持有者深深的渴望能解決城市的財政問題，在經過冗長、讓步與合作，在這選區的主席產生了一個解決的方案，若沒有這個方案，所有的紐約市民與企業將會在他們持有的債券上經歷大規模且嚴重的財物損失。
Now, imagine that all of the city’s bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire. Would similar belttightening, tax increases, labor concessions, etc. have been forthcoming? Of course not. At a minimum, Berkshire would have been asked to “share” in the required sacrifices. And, considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.
現在，讓我們想像一下，所有的市政債券都被波克夏承保的情況。類似的勒緊褲帶、增稅與勞工的讓步行為等，將會隨之而來嗎？在最低的標準下當然不會發生，波克夏將在必要的犧牲下被要求做出分攤。考慮一下我們的深口袋，這必要的貢獻將無疑地是相當大的。
Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year’s report will be a huge contributor to these woes. Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend 2008. The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.
地方政府將在未來面對比過去還要更艱難的財政困境。我去年曾說過的退休金負債將是巨大災難的促成因素。當在08年底時檢查他們基金目前的狀況，許多城市與州級政府一定會感到非常的恐懼。資產與目前負債實際精算的評估之間的缺口是相當大到難以置信的。
When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop “solutions” less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents. Losses in the tax-exempt arena, when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers. If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow. What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?
在面對大量的稅收不足，持有有保險債券的大眾比那些持有未保險債券的地方銀行或居民而言，有比較不贊成發展解決方案的傾向。若他們成功的話，在免稅部分所造成的損失，可能也會與承保業者有高度相關。如果少部分的大眾帶著他們的債權人一起離開，則其他人跟隨他們腳步的可能性將會變多，市長或城市委員會會選擇在主要增稅上增加當地居民的痛苦，還是增加確定的債券承保業者的痛苦呢？
Insuring tax-exempts, therefore, has the look today of a dangerous business – one with similarities, in fact, to the insuring of natural catastrophes. In both cases, a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits. We will try, therefore, to proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.
因此，承保免稅債券，在今天看起來是相當危險的生意，事實上有一樣東西很像，就是承保天然災害。一連串沒有損失的年份，一次毀滅性的經驗就足以摧毀早年的所有獲利。因此我們將繼續試試看，小心的經營這項生意，避免經常性的包含其他保證保險公司的各級債券。
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The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance. “Back-tested” models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error. Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action. (If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
謬論的典型包含將過去沒有承保的債券損失經驗投射到看起來類似(欺騙性地近似，deceptively similar），但卻是在其他財務領域有承保債券的範圍裡。( 編按：意思應指把不同東西拿來一起比較是一種錯誤，而人們常不自覺犯了這種錯誤 )許多種類的回測模型，都會受到這種類型的錯誤所影響。然而，他們卻經常被金融市場用來當作未來的行動指南。(假如主要查看過去的財務資料就可以告訴你未來會怎麼樣，那麼財星400大應該會都是圖書館員。)
Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen, rating agencies and investors. These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible. They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses. They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn’t afford. In short, universe “past” and universe “current” had very different characteristics. But lenders, government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.
的確，抵押貸款相關證券的損失令人目瞪口呆，大到一個相當大的境界，因為銷售人員、信評機構與投資人使用錯誤、以歷史資料為基礎的模型。這些人以房價溫和上漲、房屋投機性買賣被忽略的這些期間為基礎，去查看這些時間的損失經驗，之後便以這些經驗設計出一套對未來損失評價的標準。他們開心的忽略了一個事實：房價最近的突然暴衝上漲，貸款業務惡化以及許多買主購買了他們負擔不起的房子。簡單的說，過去與現在是相當不同的情況，但是放款者、政府與媒體卻不願認清這個最重要的事實。
Investors should be skeptical of history-based models. Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta, gamma, sigma and the like, these models tend to look impressive. Too often, though, investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols. Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.
投資人應該要懷疑以過去歷史為基礎的模型。使用一些只有圈內人才懂的名詞，像是beta、gamma、sigma之類的，所建造出來的這些模型，看起來是相當吸引人的；然而投資人太常忘了檢查這些符號背後的假設。我們的忠告：當心公式底下的陷阱。
****************
A final post-script on BHAC: Who, you may wonder, runs this operation? While I help set policy, all of the heavy lifting is done by Ajit and his crew. Sure, they were already generating $24 billion of float along with hundreds of millions of underwriting profit annually. But how busy can that keep a 31-person group? Charlie and I decided it was high time for them to start doing a full day’s work.
最後有關BHAC的部份，你想知道是誰在經營這公司嗎？我幫忙設立政策，其他所有重大的事都是由Ajit及他的團隊完成的。當然，我們已經在每年數以百仟萬計的承保獲利中，產生了2400萬的浮存金。但是為什麼這麼忙，還是可以只維持31人在運作就行了？查理跟我認為，當他們決定做某事的時候，就會立刻去做。( 編按：意指他們立即貫徹的執行力。 )
Investments
投資
Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.
因為會計準則的關係，我們今年將我們龐大的普通股持股部份分為兩大類。下表是第一類，在我們的資產負債表上條列出年底市值超過五億美元以上的投資案。
| 12/31/08 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost * | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 13.1 | $1,287 | $2,812 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 9,054 | ||
| 84,896,273 | Conoco Phillips | 5.7 | 7,008 | 4,398 | ||
| 30,009,591 | Johnson & Johnson | 1.1 | 1,847 | 1,795 | ||
| 130,272,500 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 8.9 | 4,330 | 3,498 | ||
| 3,947,554 | POSCO | 5.2 | 768 | 1,191 | ||
| 91,941,010 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 3.1 | 643 | 5,684 | ||
| 22,111,966 | Sanofi-Aventis | 1.7 | 1,827 | 1,404 | ||
| 11,262,000 | Swiss Re | 3.2 | 773 | 530 | ||
| 227,307,000 | Tesco | 2.9 | 1,326 | 1,193 | ||
| 75,145,426 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.3 | 2,337 | 1,879 | ||
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 0.5 | 942 | 1,118 | ||
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | 18.4 | 11 | 674 | ||
| 304,392,068 | Wells Fargo & Company | 7.2 | 6,702 | 8,973 | ||
| Others | 6,035 | 4,870 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks | 37,135 | 49,073 | ||||
In addition, we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value” – our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.
此外，我們還持有穆迪(moody’s)和柏靈頓北聖大非鐵路(Belington Northern Santa Fe )的股票，在公允價值中列出,購買成本加上購買後獲取的收益,減去應支付的稅收(如果這些收益以分紅的形式付給我們)。對一家公司的投資達到其股份的20%時,這種會計處理是必須的。
We purchased 15% of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody’s, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.
我們在一些年前購買了15%的穆迪股份，之後就沒再買了。然而，在2008年末，穆迪買回自己的股份，這些買回減資使得我們的持股上升到超過20%。柏靈頓北聖大非也有買回自家股份，但是我們持股超過20%主要是因為我們持續在買進它的股票。
Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at “equity accounting” values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.
除非會計規則改變，否則你都將會在我們的資產負債表上的「權益計算價值」( equity accounting )看到這些持股，也就是他們的市價。你也會看到我們投資他們產生的持股獲利(含少部分的稅)持續的包含在我們每季與每年的盈餘中。
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and
maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of
ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in
energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in
the future than the current $40-$50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise,
moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.
此前我曾經提到過，去年我犯了一個嚴重的投資錯誤(可能還有很多，只是這個被發現了而已)。查理或者其他人都跟此事無關。在油價和天然氣價格接近最高點時，我購買了大量的康菲石油公司股票。我沒能預計到2008年下半年能源價格的戲劇性下跌。我仍然認為未來石油價格會比現在的40-50美元高得多。但是到目前為止我錯得離譜。即使石油價格回升，我選擇購買的時機也讓波克夏消耗了數十億美元。
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
我還犯了一些目前已經可見的錯誤。這些錯誤不那麼大，但不幸的是，它們也不小。2008年，我用兩億四千四百萬美元買了兩家愛爾蘭銀行的股票，當時那股價看上去便宜得很。年底時這些股票的價值已經低到不能再低：2700萬美元，我們損失了89%的錢。那之後，那兩隻股票的價格還在一路下跌。網球比賽的觀眾會稱這種行為為“非受迫性失誤”。
On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged – to you, the rating agencies and myself – to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
去年的投資也有積極的一面。我們購買了145億Wrigley、高盛和GE的固定收益證券。我們非常喜歡這些投資。它們自身的良好成長性讓這些投資再滿意不過。作為對我們投資的額外回報，我們還獲得了可以繼續增股這三家公司的機會。為了做出這三項重大收購，我不得不出售了我們持有的一些其他資產，儘管我很願意繼續持有它們(主要是強生公司和康菲石油公司的資產)。但是我曾發誓——對投資者和我自己——要讓波克夏公司高效運轉，而不是僅僅持有大量現金。我們不能指望靠陌生人的恩惠去盡明天的義務。如果被迫選擇，我不會為了更多利潤犧牲哪怕一晚的睡眠。
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
投資界已經從擔心定價過低的風險發展到了擔心定價過高的風險。這種轉變可真不小，鐘擺已經從一個極端搖擺到了另一個極端。僅僅數年前，我們仍會覺得以下行為不可思議——人們對信用級別良好的市政公債或者公司債券不聞不問，卻熱衷於零風險的政府短期債券，儘管它的收益幾乎為零。未來人們撰寫這十年的金融史時，肯定會提到上世紀90年代的互聯網泡沫和本世紀初的房地產泡沫。但2008年底的美國國債泡沫可能也會被認為幾乎與前幾次泡沫一樣非同尋常。
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable – in fact, almost smug – in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
如果很長一段時間內一直執著於現金等價物(指極容易和很快可轉換成現金的資產，持有這種資產如同持有現金)或者長期政府債券投資，其後果一定相當恐怖。當然，隨著金融局面的進一步動盪，持有這些資產的投資者會越發自我感覺良好，甚至到自鳴得意的地步。當他們聽到所有評論都在說“現金為王”時，他們越發感覺自己決策英明。儘管這些為王的現金不能帶來任何收益，而且隨著時間推移購買力在不斷下降。
Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
投資的目的不是為了讓人夸你有多棒。事實上，讚揚經常是增長的敵人。因為它束縛你的思維，讓你的大腦開放性下降，不會對早先形成的結論進行反思。謹防那些讓人溢美的投資舉措;偉大的舉動通常都會讓人覺得枯燥無聊。
Derivatives
衍生性金融商品
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent $244 million for shares of two Irish banks that appeared cheap to me. At yearend we wrote these holdings down to market: $27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
我還犯了一些目前已經可見的錯誤。這些錯誤不那麼大，但不幸的是，它們也不小。2008年，我用兩億四千四百萬美元買了兩家愛爾蘭銀行的股票，當時那股價看上去便宜得很。年底時這些股票的價值已經低到不能再低：2700萬美元，我們損失了89%的錢。那之後，那兩隻股票的價格還在一路下跌。網球比賽的觀眾會稱這種行為為“非受迫性失誤”。
On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged – to you, the rating agencies and myself – to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
去年的投資也有積極的一面。我們購買了145億Wrigley、高盛和GE的固定收益證券。我們非常喜歡這些投資。它們自身的良好成長性讓這些投資再滿意不過。作為對我們投資的額外回報，我們還獲得了可以繼續增股這三家公司的機會。為了做出這三項重大收購，我不得不出售了我們持有的一些其他資產，儘管我很願意繼續持有它們(主要是強生公司和康菲石油公司的資產)。但是我曾發誓——對投資者和我自己——要讓波克夏公司高效運轉，而不是僅僅持有大量現金。我們不能指望靠陌生人的恩惠去盡明天的義務。如果被迫選擇，我不會為了更多利潤犧牲哪怕一晚的睡眠。
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
投資界已經從擔心定價過低的風險發展到了擔心定價過高的風險。這種轉變可真不小，鐘擺已經從一個極端搖擺到了另一個極端。僅僅數年前，我們仍會覺得以下行為不可思議——人們對信用級別良好的市政公債或者公司債券不聞不問，卻熱衷於零風險的政府短期債券，儘管它的收益幾乎為零。未來人們撰寫這十年的金融史時，肯定會提到上世紀90年代的互聯網泡沫和本世紀初的房地產泡沫。但2008年底的美國國債泡沫可能也會被認為幾乎與前幾次泡沫一樣非同尋常。
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable – in fact, almost smug – in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
如果很長一段時間內一直執著於現金等價物(指極容易和很快可轉換成現金的資產，持有這種資產如同持有現金)或者長期政府債券投資，其後果一定相當恐怖。當然，隨著金融局面的進一步動盪，持有這些資產的投資者會越發自我感覺良好，甚至到自鳴得意的地步。當他們聽到所有評論都在說“現金為王”時，他們越發感覺自己決策英明。儘管這些為王的現金不能帶來任何收益，而且隨著時間推移購買力在不斷下降。
Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
投資的目的不是為了讓人夸你有多棒。事實上，讚揚經常是增長的敵人。因為它束縛你的思維，讓你的大腦開放性下降，不會對早先形成的結論進行反思。謹防那些讓人溢美的投資舉措;偉大的舉動通常都會讓人覺得枯燥無聊。
Derivatives
衍生性金融商品
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.
衍生產品很危險。它們讓我們金融系統中的槓桿率和風險都增加不少。它們讓投資者們難以理解和分析我們的大商業銀行和投資銀行。它們讓房利美和房地美常年陷入巨大的虛假陳述中。房地美和房利美是如此讓人困惑，以至於它們在政府中的監管機構——聯邦住房企業監管辦公室的100多名職員除了監督這兩家公司之外什麼都不用做，即使如此還完全不得要領，徹底迷失在它們複雜的衍生產品名目中。
Indeed, recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs (or former CEOs) at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives. Include Charlie and me in this hapless group: When Berkshire purchased General Re in 1998, we knew we could not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives contracts, made with 884 counterparties (many of which we had never heard of). So we decided to close up shop. Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400 million in losses to largely complete the task. Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: “I liked you better before I got to know you so well.”
實際上，最近的一些事件揭示出，那些供職於主要金融機構的CEO或者前CEO們，也沒有能力去管理一個擁有如此復雜和龐大的衍生產品的生意。查理和我也在這個倒霉鬼名單中。當波克夏在1998年收購GeneralRe時，我們知道我們搞不定它同884個交易商達成的23218份衍生產品合約(其中很多交易商和衍生產品我們聽都沒聽過)。因此我們決定不做這生意。儘管當我們選擇退出時，我們不用承受任何壓力，市場也很溫和，大致完成這項任務仍用了我們五年時間，讓我們蒙受了超過4億美元的損失。離別之際，我們對這門生意的感覺正如一句鄉村民謠歌詞所唱：“在我了解你之前，我還更喜歡你些。”
Improved “transparency” – a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks – won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).
更高的“透明度”——政治家、評論員和金融監管機構最喜歡用這個良方來避免將來出現嚴重問題——對衍生產品導致的問題也無能為力。我沒聽說有哪種報告機制能夠大體不差地描述和衡量龐大復雜的衍生產品投資組合的風險。審計人員無法審計這些合約，監管機構也無法進行監管。當我讀到使用這類衍生工具的公司10-K年報中“事項披露”部分時，我只知道自己最後對這些公司的投資組合狀況一無所知(然後還得吃幾片阿司匹林緩解頭痛) 。
For a case study on regulatory effectiveness, let’s look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress, which retained control over them, dictating what they could and could not do. To aid its oversight, Congress created OFHEO in 1992, admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves. With that move, Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
在一些管理有效的個案研究中，讓我們更確實的看一下房地美及房利美的例子。這些巨大的機構是由控制他們的美國國會所創立，並且指示他們哪些能做、哪些不能做。為了協助監督，國會在1992年創立了OFHEO，用來提醒並確定這兩個巨獸能自我控制。在這些措施下，房利美與房地美在指派人力資源運用上，變成我所認知，受規範程度最高的企業。
On June 15, 2003, OFHEO (whose annual reports are available on the Internet) sent its 2002 report to Congress – specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other than Messrs. Sarbanes and Oxley. The report’s 127 pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line: “Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence.” The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired. No mention of their departures was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as it always did, that “Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
2003年6月15日，OFHEO( 它每年的年報可以在網上找到 )寄發它2002年的年報給美國國會，特別是參眾議院的四個主席、副主席，在之中的就是沙賓法案（Sarbanes-Oxley）的主角由參議院銀行委員會主席薩班斯（Paul Sarbanes）和眾議院金融服務委員會（Committee on Financial Services）主席奧克斯利（Mike Oxley）。在127頁的報告中包含自我祝賀語：「慶祝卓越的十年。」這封信函跟報導被傳達之前九天，房地美的CEO跟CFO才羞愧的辭職下台，COO才剛被炒魷魚。沒有任何的改革在信中被提及，即使報告的最後，也總是這樣寫著：「所有的企業財務都相當健全且管理良好」。
In truth, both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time. Finally, in 2006, OFHEO issued a 340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that, more or less, blamed the fiasco on every party but – you guessed it – Congress and OFHEO.
事實上，所有的企業都從事大量的會計欺騙一段時間了。最後，在2006年，OFHEO發表340頁嚴厲的記述著房利美的荒唐罪惡，多多少少指責在每個部份的徹底失敗，但是，你猜怎麼著？就是沒有美國國會與OFHEO。(編按：台美都一樣，千錯萬錯都別人的錯，都不是自己的錯。)
The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions, a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire’s 2002 report. On April 3, 2008, Tim Geithner, then the able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a rescue: “The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.” This is Fedspeak for “We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.” In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.
貝爾斯登( Bear Stearns )的倒塌突顯出衍生性金融商品有關交易對手的問題，我第一次在波克夏2002年的年報中有提及，這是個定時炸彈。2008年四月三日，Tim Geithner，當時紐約聯邦準備銀行的能幹主席，解釋為什麼救援是必要的：「貝爾斯登衍生性金融商品的交易對手，他們在適當位置上放置了大量保護他們自身財務風險的金融部位，若突然被發現不能再有效運作的話將在市場上觸發更大的混亂。貝爾斯登的對手償付擔保品且企圖在已經非常脆弱的市場上收回這些部位，將導致市場加速衰退。」這個關於「我們必須按部就班的避免不可預測的金融危機連鎖反應」的聯準會演講方式( fedspeak )，在我看來，聯準會這麼做是對的。
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means credit problems can’t accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in 1995.
一般股票或債券交易，只要交易方有現金或其他證券，幾天內就可以完成交易。因此交易對手風險很快的就消失了，也就是說信用問題並不會累積。這快速的結算過程就是維持市場健全的關鍵。實際上，這也是為什麼在1995年時，NYSE與NASDAQ要將結算期間從五天改為三天的原因之一。
Derivatives contracts, in contrast, often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims against each other. “Paper” assets and liabilities – often hard to quantify – become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.
相反的，衍生性金融商品契約，由於交易對手在彼此之間建立的巨大的宣告要求後，常常可以好幾年不結清，甚至是十幾年。儘管這些帳目好幾年都不會生效，但經常是很難量化的帳面資產與負債卻變成財務報表中重要的部份。此外，在巨大的財務機構下，互相信賴的網路逐漸脆弱。應收與應付濃縮成少數幾個有高槓桿傾向的經紀商在處理。參與者想要躲開麻煩就像一些人想要避免性病一樣：這不只是牽涉到跟你睡的是誰，而且還牽涉到他們跟誰睡。
Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood – I won’t mention names – are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I’m sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won’t do; it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required.
繼續我們的比喻，大家都睡在一起，對大型的衍生性金融商品經紀商來說居然是有效的，因為他們假設如果遇到問題時政府一定會伸出援手。換句話說，只要有公司有些能感染整個全體的問題出現 — 我不想是提哪些公司 — 就可以確定一定會變成全國關心的事( 這樣的結果，我很難過的說，是真的 ) 。令人惱怒的是，這些有野心的CEO，把公司堆在財務槓桿上、交易大量且不能理解的衍生性金融商品，現在開始上演「企業生存第一法則」：謙虛單純地訴說以自己的無能將不會這麼做；都是一時難以控制自己而把事情搞砸了。
Considering the ruin I’ve pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault.
思考一下我所描繪的崩潰，你會納悶為什麼除了營運目的需要的中美公司與少部分Gen Re留下的契約外，波克夏要成為251個衍生性金融商品的交易方呢？這個答案很簡單：我相信我們所擁有的每個契約在開始的時候都定價錯誤，有些則是戲劇性如此( 編按：故意定錯 )。我買下這些部位並且用我一貫的信念與負責任的態度同時監控他們，我相信任何大型財務機構的執行長都必須如同風險長(Chief Risk Officer，CRO)一樣。假如我們在衍生性金融商品上損失金錢，那將會是我的錯。
Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid – our derivatives “float,” so to speak – totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.
我們衍生性金融商品的交易要求我們的對手必須在契約簽訂時就先付錢給我們。因此波克夏總是握有現金，讓我們可以假設不會遇到交易對手的風險。年底時，我們收這些款項一共81億，會讓我們要支付的損失減少，這可以說成是我們的衍生性金融商品浮存金。這浮存金跟保險浮存金很像：如果我們能在這種交易下達到損益兩平，那麼我們將能夠免費的使用這些資金很長一段時間。儘管這完全不是件確定的事，但我們還是預期我們會做得比損益兩平還要好，而且我們獲得大量的投資收入對基金而言就像幫蛋糕上糖衣一樣( frosting on the cake )( 編按：意應指很簡單，但只有一點點 )
Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).
當市場不利於我們的時候，只有很小比例的買方部位需要附上擔保品的。甚至像去年第四季那樣混亂的情況下，我們只需要提供小於我們證券組合1%的比例作為擔保。( 當我們提出存在第三交易方的擔保品時，這些存入的證券同時也固定了它的投資獲利 )在我們2002年的年報中，我們提出警告，說這被創造出來的擔保是致命的威脅，在去年的許多財務機構中，我們就看到活生生的例子。( 就此而言，若沒有中美能源控股公司( MidAmerican )抵達相救，美國星座能源集團( Constellation Energy )已經進入了破產的倒數計時階段。
Our contracts fall into four major categories. With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them in excruciating detail.
我們的這些契約分成四個主要類型。帶著對那些沒有被眾多金融工具迷惑的人的抱歉，我會盡力解釋這些契約的細節部份。
• We have added modestly to the “equity put” portfolio I described in last year’s report. Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20. We must make a payment to our counterparty at maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of the contract. Neither party can elect to settle early; it’s only the price on the final day that counts.
• 在去年的報告裡，我所說的賣權部位，我們在08年有適度的增加了些。其中的一些契約是15年到期，剩下的是20年才到期。如果這些賣權到期時，其所連結的參考指數低於當初契約所約定的，我們就必須要支付一筆款項給我們的交易對手。沒有任何一個部份可以提早確定，因為只有最後一天的價格才有價值。
To illustrate, we might sell a $1 billion 15-year put contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at, say, 1300. If the index is at 1170 – down 10% – on the day of maturity, we would pay $100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe nothing. For us to lose $1 billion, the index would have to go to zero. In the meantime, the sale of the put would have delivered us a premium – perhaps $100 million to $150 million – that we would be free to invest as we wish.
舉例來說，我們可能在S&P500指數在1300點時賣了一筆10億的15年期賣權。假如到期時，指數跌了10%變成只剩1170點，那麼我們將支付1億元。假設那時超過1300點，我們便一毛沒欠。對我們而言，要損失到10億，那麼指數得跌到零才行。在這期間，賣權的銷售會帶給我們額外的權利金，也許是1億到1.5億，我們想投資就可以自由投資。
Our put contracts total $37.1 billion (at current exchange rates) and are spread among four major indices: the S&P 500 in the U.S., the FTSE 100 in the U.K., the Euro Stoxx 50 in Europe, and the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on September 9, 2019 and our last on January 24, 2028. We have received premiums of $4.9 billion, money we have invested. We, meanwhile, have paid nothing, since all expiration dates are far in the future. Nonetheless, we have used BlackScholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of $10 billion, an amount that will change on every reporting date. The two financial items – this estimated loss of $10 billion minus the $4.9 billion in premiums we have received – means that we have so far reported a mark-to-market loss of $5.1 billion from these contracts.
我們的賣權契約總共有371億美元(以目前的匯率計算)，分散在四個主要指數上：美國的S&P500指數、英國的富時100指數，歐洲的歐盟50及在日本的日經225指數。我們第一個契約到期日是在2019年的9月9日，最後一個契約的到期日是在2028年的1月24日。我們收了49億美元，這些錢我們會拿去投資。所有的到期日都還那麼遠，所以在這期間，我們不必支付任何款項。然而，我們有使用布雷克-休斯(Black-Scholes，俗稱B-S模型)的評價方法來記錄100億的年底負債，這數字在每年的統計報告日都會改變。這兩個財務數字，100億的預估損失減去我們收到的權利金49億，亦即到目前為止，這些契約每日結算的損失金額達到51億美元。
We endorse mark-to-market accounting. I will explain later, however, why I believe the BlackScholes formula, even though it is the standard for establishing the dollar liability for options, produces strange results when the long-term variety are being valued.
我們認同每日結算。雖然B-S公式是建立選擇權美元負債的標準，但在面對長期波動率評價時卻會產生奇怪的結果，不過我稍後會解釋為什麼我相信B-S公式。
One point about our contracts that is sometimes not understood: For us to lose the full $37.1 billion we have at risk, all stocks in all four indices would have to go to zero on their various termination dates. If, however – as an example – all indices fell 25% from their value at the inception of each contract, and foreign-exchange rates remained as they are today, we would owe about $9 billion, payable between 2019 and 2028. Between the inception of the contract and those dates, we would have held the $4.9 billion premium and earned investment income on it.
關於我們的契約有一點是難理解的：對我們來說在風險上要損失全部的371億元，必須四個指數的所有股票在不同的到期日時都要歸零才可能。舉例來說，如果所有指數在每個合約剛發行時就跌掉了25%的市值，且當時的匯率跟今天一樣，那麼我們將積欠約90億美元，在2019到2028之間要支付的數字。而在這期間，我們將持有49億的權利金，並運用這些錢獲得投資收益。
• The second category we described in last year’s report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay when credit losses occur at companies that are included in various high-yield indices. Our standard contract covers a five-year period and involves 100 companies. We modestly expanded our position last year in this category. But, of course, the contracts on the books at the end of 2007 moved one year closer to their maturity. Overall, our contracts now have an average life of 21⁄3 years, with the first expiration due to occur on September 20, 2009 and the last on December 20, 2013.
• 第二個在去年報告說到的類型是關於衍生性金融商品，當那些在包含多樣化高收益指數裡的公司發生信用損失時，要求我們必須支付的衍生性金融商品。我們的標準契約包含了五年期間且涉及了一百家公司。我們在去年適度地增加了這個分類的部位，當然，這些在2007年底的契約離他們的到期日更接近了一年。大體上我們的契約現在平均壽命有2又1/3年，第一個到期日發生在2009年9月20日，而最後一個是發生在2013年12月20日。
By yearend we had received premiums of $3.4 billion on these contracts and paid losses of $542 million. Using mark-to-market principles, we also set up a liability for future losses that at yearend totaled $3.0 billion. Thus we had to that point recorded a loss of about $100 million, derived from our $3.5 billion total in paid and estimated future losses minus the $3.4 billion of premiums we received. In our quarterly reports, however, the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of $327 million in the second quarter of 2008 to a loss of $693 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.
在年底我們收這些契約共34億的權利金，然後支付了5.42億的損失。使用每日結算的原則，我們也在年底認列了30億未來損失在負債項目上。因此，我們必須在這點上列上大約1億的損失，這1億適從估計未來的總可能損失35億，減去我們已經收取的保證金34億而來。不過，列在我們季報上的獲利或損失的金額浮動範圍非常大，在08年的第二季是3.27億的帳面獲利，到了第四季就變成是6.93億的帳面損失。
Surprisingly, we made payments on these contracts of only $97 million last year, far below the estimate I used when I decided to enter into them. This year, however, losses have accelerated sharply with the mushrooming of large bankruptcies. In last year’s letter, I told you I expected these contracts to show a profit at expiration. Now, with the recession deepening at a rapid rate, the possibility of an eventual loss has increased. Whatever the result, I will keep you posted.
意外的，去年我們在這些契約上只支付了9千700萬美元，遠低於我當初決定要做這些交易所預估的數字。不過伴隨著今年大的破產事件迅速的增加，這些損失也會明顯的加速。在去年的信中，我告訴你們我預期這些契約在到期時會產生一些利潤。現在，隨著經濟衰退快速加重，最後會產生損失的可能性也跟著增加，但不論結果如何，我會持續向大家通報的。
• In 2008 we began to write “credit default swaps” on individual companies. This is simply credit insurance, similar to what we write in BHAC, except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations rather than of tax-exempt issuers.
• 2008年起，我們開始承作個別公司的信用違約交換契約(credit default swaps，CDS)的業務，這是單純的信用保險，很像我們在BHAC所做的業務，只不過我們承擔的企業信用風險比免稅債券承保業者來得大就是。
If, say, the XYZ company goes bankrupt, and we have written a $100 million contract, we are obligated to pay an amount that reflects the shrinkage in value of a comparable amount of XYZ’s debt. (If, for example, the company’s bonds are selling for 30 after default, we would owe $70 million.) For the typical contract, we receive quarterly payments for five years, after which our insurance expires.
這麼說好了，假如XYZ公司破產，而我們承保了1億的契約，我們有責任要支付一筆款項，這筆款項要能反映XYZ負債價值的減損上(就是說，如果一家公司的公司債在違約後只被賣了三千萬美元，我們就欠交易對手七千萬美元)。典型的此類契約，在五年期的到期日前，我們每季收取權利金。
At yearend we had written $4 billion of contracts covering 42 corporations, for which we receive annual premiums of $93 million. This is the only derivatives business we write that has any counterparty risk; the party that buys the contract from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe us over the five years. We are unlikely to expand this business to any extent because most buyers of this protection now insist that the seller post collateral, and we will not enter into such an arrangement.
在年底我們承保了40億此類契約，涵蓋了42家公司，每年可收取9300萬的權利金。這是唯一我們承作衍生性金融商品業務有交易對手風險的；合約的買方必須在五年期間都要能保持每季付得出來這些權利金給我們。我們不太可能把這個生意做大，因為在目前的保護制度下，大多數買方都堅持賣方要提供擔保品，而我們不考慮這樣的情況。
• At the request of our customers, we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are similar to those written at BHAC, but that are structured as derivatives. The only meaningful difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.
• 在買主的要求下，我們承做了一些免稅債券保險契約，就像BHAC做的類似，只是這個結構是衍生性金融商品。兩類契約最大的不同之處在於衍生性金融商品要求每日結算，而BHAC承做的契約是以標準會計應計原則計算。
But this difference can produce some strange results. The bonds covered – in effect, insured – by these derivatives are largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about them. At yearend, however, mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC, and used the accrual accounting required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small profit for the year. The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting result. In the short term, however, the variance in reported profits can be substantial.
但這個不同就能產生很奇妙的結果。被這些衍生性金融商品包裝的債券( 對此類債券而言，效果上是一種保險 )主要是州立債券，我們覺得這商品很好。不過到年底，每日結算的制度要求我們認列這些衍生性金融商品共6.31億的損失。儘管我們在BHAC用同樣的價格承保同樣條件的債券，在保險公司被要求的應計會計準則使用下，我們再去年還有一些小的獲利出現。對我們來說，使用這兩種方法去計算我們所承保的債券，最後都將產生同樣的會計結果，但是在短期，帳面獲利的變動會是非常大的。
We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as they are to mark-to-market accounting, will produce wild swings in the earnings we report. The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. Indeed, the “downs” can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms. I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.
我們在之前說過，由於我們的衍生性金融商品合約是每日結算的，所以會在我們的帳面盈餘上產生大的波動，但不論往上或往下波動都不會困擾查理跟我。向下波動可以讓我們有機會在更有利的位置增加我們的部位。我希望關於我們這些交易的解釋會讓你跟我們有同樣的想法。
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The Black-Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance, and we use it when
valuing our equity put options for financial statement purposes. Key inputs to the calculation include a contract’s
maturity and strike price, as well as the analyst’s expectations for volatility, interest rates and dividends.
在金融財務方面，B-S公式幾乎已經達到聖經的地位，而為了財務報表上的目的，我們在評價選擇權賣權部分會使用它。在計算上的關鍵數字包含契約的到期日與履約價，以及分析師對波動率、利率與股利的預期。
If the formula is applied to extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results. In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well. But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.
不過這個公式應用到時間週期的延展，它會產生很荒謬的結果。公正的說，布雷克與休斯幾乎是一定知道這一點。但是他們虔誠的跟隨著也許忽略了他們兩人的警告，而這警告就在他們第一次發表這公式的附件上。
It’s often useful in testing a theory to push it to extremes. So let’s postulate that we sell a 100- year $1 billion put option on the S&P 500 at a strike price of 903 (the index’s level on 12/31/08). Using the implied volatility assumption for long-dated contracts that we do, and combining that with appropriate interest and dividend assumptions, we would find the “proper” Black-Scholes premium for this contract to be $2.5 million.
要測試一個理論，就把它推向極端，總是有用的。所以讓我們假設一下，如果我們賣出S&P500一百年到期，10億的賣權部位，履約價是903( 這是2008年12月31日當天的收盤價 )，把隱含波動率的假設套用在我們長天期的契約上，結合恰當的利率與股利假設，B-S模型計算讓我們可以找出這樣的契約適當的權利金是250萬美元。
To judge the rationality of that premium, we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a century from now at less than today. Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its present value (at only 2% inflation it will be worth roughly 14¢). So that will be a factor pushing the stated value of the index higher. Far more important, however, is that one hundred years of retained earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the companies in the index. In the 20th Century, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175-fold, mainly because of this retained-earnings factor.
為了評論這權利金的合理性，我們需要評估從現在到一百年後S&P的價值有多少。可以確定的是，到時候美元會比現在多一點點價值(在只有2%的通貨膨脹下大概價值14￠)。如此一來這會是把指數的初始值推得更高的一個因素。不過更重要的，一百年的保留盈餘將會大大增加在指數裡的這些公司的價值。在20世紀中，道瓊工業指數平均上升了約175倍，主要是因為這些保留盈餘的緣故。
Considering everything, I believe the probability of a decline in the index over a one-hundred-year period to be far less than 1%. But let’s use that figure and also assume that the most likely decline – should one occur – is 50%. Under these assumptions, the mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be $5 million ($1 billion X 1% X 50%).
在考慮各方面的情況，我相信在這百年期間，指數下滑的機率遠小於1%。但是讓我們使用這個數字，也是最常見的下跌、應該會發生的一個假設：50%的下跌。在這些假設下，我們契約精確的預期損失應該是500萬美元。( 10億 X 1% X 50% )
But if we had received our theoretical premium of $2.5 million up front, we would have only had to invest it at 0.7% compounded annually to cover this loss expectancy. Everything earned above that would have been profit. Would you like to borrow money for 100 years at a 0.7% rate?
但是我們在最前面接受我們的理論權利金是250萬美元，為了打平這損失的預期，我們的投資在每年只有0.7%的複合成長而已。所以可以獲利的工具都比這來得有利潤，你願意為了一個0.7%的獲利率而去借錢借100年嗎？
Let’s look at my example from a worst-case standpoint. Remember that 99% of the time we would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct. But even in the worst case among the remaining 1% of possibilities – that is, one assuming a total loss of $1 billion – our borrowing cost would come to only 6.2%. Clearly, either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is inappropriate.
讓我們從最壞的打算來看我的例子。如果我的假設是正確的，那麼99%的時間我們不需要付一毛錢。但是即使是只有1%的情況會面對最糟情況，假設這損失達十億，那麼我們借貸的成本就來到6.2%。很明顯的，不是我的假設太瘋狂，就是這公式是不適當的。
The ridiculous premium that Black-Scholes dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past period of days, months or years. This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probabilityweighted range of values of American business 100 years from now. (Imagine, if you will, getting a quote every day on a farm from a manic-depressive neighbor and then using the volatility calculated from these changing quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that predicts a probability-weighted range of values for the farm a century from now.)
造成B-S模型在我極端的例子中出現荒繆的權利金的原因，是因為公式裡包含了波動率。而事實上，波動率是由過去一段時間，年、月、日間有多少股票被週轉而決定出來的。這度量跟一百年後美國企業的價值會在哪個權重範圍的估算一點關係也沒有。( 想像一下，如果你可以從一個有躁鬱症的鄰居那每天得到一個農場的報價，然後把這些變動的報價計算出來的波動率當作是你公式裡的一個重要變數，用來預測從現在開始一百年的農場價值會落在哪個權重範圍 )
Though historical volatility is a useful – but far from foolproof – concept in valuing short-term options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the option lengthens. In my opinion, the valuations that the BlackScholes formula now place on our long-term put options overstate our liability, though the overstatement will diminish as the contracts approach maturity.
雖然歷史波動率在評價短期選擇權是個有用的概念，但完全不防呆。當選擇權的存續期間越長，它的效用就會快速的降低。在我看來，用B-S公式套用在我們長期的賣權部位做出來的評價，誇大了我們的負債，但這誇大將隨著我們契約越接近到期日而逐漸減少。
Even so, we will continue to use Black-Scholes when we are estimating our financial-statement liability for long-term equity puts. The formula represents conventional wisdom and any substitute that I might offer would engender extreme skepticism. That would be perfectly understandable: CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric financial instruments have seldom erred on the side of conservatism. That club of optimists is one that Charlie and I have no desire to join.
即使如此，當我們評估長期賣權作為在財務報表上的負債項目時，我們也會繼續使用B-S模型來評估。這公式象徵著普遍的智慧，而任何我能想到的替代方案都會產生極端的懷疑。( 編按：因為大家都這麼用，所以不用它會被質疑 XD )這是完全可以理解的：一個必須在複雜財務工具下捏造他們公司價值的執行長，很少會在保守的那端犯錯。樂觀者俱樂部是一個查理跟我都沒興趣加入的地方。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 2nd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
我們今年的年會將在5月2日星期六舉行。像往常一樣，哈奎斯特中心的大門會在早上七點準時敞開。八點半時會放映一部新的波克夏影片。九點半時我們會直接進入問答環節。這個環節會持續到下午三點(中間有個午餐)。短暫休息之後，查理和我會在三點一刻召開年會。如果你決定在這天的問答環節離開，那麼請在查理講話時離場。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I lock the exits.)
最好的離席原因，那當然是去購物囉！我們會在靠近會場的19萬平方英尺大廳擺滿我們波克夏子公司的商品以協助大家方便購物。去年來參加會議的3萬1000人做得很好，幾乎每個攤位都創了銷售紀錄。但是你們可以做得更好！(如果必要的話，我會去鎖門！)
This year Clayton will showcase its new i-house that includes Shaw flooring, Johns Manville insulation
and MiTek fasteners. This innovative “green” home, featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving
products, is truly a home of the future. Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about $1 per day
when the home is sited in an area like Omaha. After purchasing the i-house, you should next consider the Forest
River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby. Make your neighbors jealous.
今年克萊頓將展示新的i-house，包含Shaw的地板，Johns Manville的隔間，MiTek的扣件。這是創新的綠建築，使用太陽能面板及大量的省電產品，著實是未來世界的房子。估計這樣的房子若建在奧馬哈這樣的地方，一天的電能與熱能花費只要一美元。在你們買下i-house之後，接下來你應該考慮一下在隔壁攤Forest River的休旅車和浮船，會讓你的鄰居羨慕死。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO會有從全國各地來的一些頂尖保險顧問在攤位駐守，他們都準備好滿足你的車險需求。在一般狀況下GEICO會給你們股東特別折扣(通常是8%)。這個特別優惠是由我們經營的50區當中的45區所同意的。(補充一點：如果你們也符合另一個集團的波克夏股東，不能再拿一次折扣)把你現有的保險明細帶來，看看我們能為你省多少錢。我想至少到5成，我相信我們能做到。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take along – with no fear of a strip search – the Ginsu knives that you’ve purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.
星期六當天，在奧瑪哈機場，我們照例會有一排NetJets的飛機讓您審閱用。到Qwest會場的NetJets攤位可以學到如何賞機。坐巴士來奧瑪哈，坐在你新買的飛機裡離開。可以順便帶著你在Quikut展場買的Ginsu剪刀，不用怕被搜身。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.
接下來，如果你還有閒錢，參觀一下Bookworm，在那裏有賣30本書和DVD，對於那些對知識渴望超過他們行李的人，我們也有提供寄送服務。
Finally, we will have three fascinating cars on the exhibition floor, including one from the past and one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our subsidiary, TTI, will bring his 1935 Duesenberg, a car that once belonged to Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr., parent and grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase. The future will be represented by a new plug-in electric car developed by BYD, an amazing Chinese company in which we have a 10% interest.
最後，我們在展示廳有三輛迷人的車款，包含從過去到未來的。Paul Andrews，我們子公司TII的執行長，將帶來它1935年的Duesenberg車款，這部車曾屬於Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr.,，以及我們新夥伴在Wrigley購買這車的父母跟祖父母的。未來款則是由比亞迪開發的插電電動車，我們擁有10%的股權，這是家驚人的公司。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
這份報告內附的股東會資料有個附件，告訴如何取得你要參加股東會跟其他活動所需的入場券。機加酒跟租車，我們跟美國運通有簽約(800-799-6634)，給你們特別的服務。Carol Pederson是負責這些事情的窗口，她每年都為我們做得很好，我很感謝她。房間會很難訂，但是交給Carol你就會訂得到。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM twelve years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to a record $33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend, we also set a single day record of $7.2 million. Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.
在Nebraska Furniture Mart，一個77英畝場地，位在Dodge和Pacific中間的72街上，我們會再次舉辦「波克夏週末」折扣活動。這個特別的活動是12年前在NFM開始的，這個”週末”的銷量從1997年的530萬元成長到2008年的3330萬元。在這個周末的星期六，我們也創下一天720萬的紀錄，可以問問任何零售商他想不想要這樣的銷量。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 30th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a western cookout to which you are all invited.
要獲得波克夏的折扣，你必須在4月30日星期四到5月4號星期一之間購買，還要秀出你的股東會資料。這個特賣期間甚至會包含一些幾乎不打折的精品在內，但是為了我們股東周末活動的精神，特別為你們破例。我們感謝他們的合作。NFM營業時間週一到週六是從早上10點到晚上9點，周日則是從早上10點到下午6點。今年的周六從下午5點半到8點，NFM為所有被邀請的你們準備了西式野餐。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在Borsheims，我們會再次舉辦兩個只有股東才能參加的活動。第一個是在5月1日星期五從下午6點到10點的雞尾酒會；第二個，也就是主宴會，將在5月3號星期日從早上9點到下午4點舉行，星期六我們會開到下午6點。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整個週末Borsheims將會相當的擁擠。因此，為了給大家方便，股東價從4月27日星期一到5月9號星期日都適用。在那期間，請秀出你的股東會資料或是秀出你持有波克夏股票的交割單以證明你是波克夏股東。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
星期天，在Borsheims的外面，再次蟬聯美國棋王的Patrick Wolff將矇住眼，接受競爭對手的挑戰—六組眼睛都張得大大的挑戰者們。在附近還有Norman Beck，一個來自達拉斯的傑出魔術師，將變魔術給大家瞧瞧。另外，在星期天的下午，我們還有Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，這兩位世界級的橋牌專家跟大家一起打橋牌。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 975 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,448 including 702 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please don’t embarrass me by ordering foie gras. Remember: To come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
另外在5月3日星期天當天，Gorats將再次只為波克夏的股東開門營業，而且會從下午4點供餐到晚上10點。去年他們在股東會的那個星期天為240個席位提供了975份晚餐。那三天包含美食家所喜愛的主菜丁骨牛排702份，一共賣出2,448份晚餐。請記得，如果當天要來Gorat’s，你一定得訂位。從4月1日起，可以打402-551-3733預約訂位唷。(但是不可以在之前打)。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from outside the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
為了來自北美以外地區的股東，我們將再一次的從星期六下午4點開始接待。每年我們股東會都吸引許多來自世界各地的人，查理和我想要確定我們能親自迎接自遠方來的朋友。去年我們和超過700位來自各國的朋友一起享受股東會的樂趣。任何從美加以外地區來的股東都會領取到一份特別的股東會憑證及使用說明。
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This year we will be making important changes in how we handle the meeting’s question periods. In recent years, we have received only a handful of questions directly related to Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically none. So we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire’s businesses.
今年股東會關於我們回答問題期間，我們做了重大的改變。在近幾年，我們只接受少數跟波克夏與旗下企業直接相關的問題。事實上去年都沒有。所以我們回到波克夏本身的討論上。
In a related problem, there has been a mad rush when the doors open at 7 a.m., led by people who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for questioners. This is not desirable from a safety standpoint, nor do we believe that sprinting ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose questions. (At age 78, I’ve concluded that speed afoot is a ridiculously overrated talent.) Again, a new procedure is desirable.
在相關問題上，當7點開始時就讓發問者從12支麥克風發問會相當混亂，也會很趕。從安全的考量來看，這並不是令人滿意的結果，我們也不相信這設定的短時間內會是大家決定問問題的關鍵因素。( 在七十八歲的年齡，我認為能快步走是太高估了。 )再一次，新的流程是令人嚮往的。( 編按：意應指慢慢改改看，試試看新方法怎麼樣。 )
In our first change, several financial journalists from organizations representing newspapers, magazines and television will participate in the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
我們第一個改變，讓許多來新聞、雜誌與電視的財經記者參加Q&A時間，讓股東把問題email給他們，然後由他們向查理跟我發問。記者跟他們的email是財星的 Carol Loomis，cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC的Becky Quick， BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and 紐約時報的Andrew Ross Sorkin，arsorkin@nytimes.com。 從這些寄信中，每個記者選12個左右他們覺得最有趣且最重要的問題來提問。(在信中，如果你想要你的名字在問題中被提到，請告訴這些記者)。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
查理跟我不會知道關於這些問題的任何線索。我們知道這些記者會挑一些難的問題，而我們也喜歡這樣。
In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. At least half the questions – those selected by the panel from your submissions – are therefore certain to be Berkshire-related. We will meanwhile continue to get some good – and perhaps entertaining – questions from the audience as well.
第二個改變是，每個希望發問的股東，每支麥克風在八點十五分時，都會抽籤。在股東會時，我會代替那些為抽中股東發言的記者發問。至少有一半的問題是從你們提交的名單中選出來的，這樣可以確定他們會跟波克夏有關。在這期間我們將會持續從觀眾獲得好的，也許是有趣的問題。
So join us at our Woodstock for Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format. Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.
嗯，加入我們這個資本家年度搖滾盛會吧！讓我們知道你有多喜歡這新的安排。查理跟我都期待能看到你們。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 2009
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2009年2月27日