| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (37.00) | 27.40 | ||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 26.50 | (6.70) | ||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 15.10 | (2.10) | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2010 | 20.2% | 9.4% | 10.80 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2010 | 490409.0% | 6262.0% | |||||
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.*
2010年，A股和B股的每股賬面價值都增長了13%。也就是說，自從現任管理層接手公司之後，在過去46年中，每股賬面價值從19美元增長到95，453美元，年復合增長率為20.2% 。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.
2010年的亮點是公司收購了北伯林頓鐵路公司(Burlington Northern Santa Fe，以下簡稱“BNSF”)，該項收購比我預期的要好。現在表明，擁有這條鐵路將提高波克夏公司的“正常”盈利水平，稅前盈利將近提高了40%，稅後盈利提高超過30%。波克夏公司花費220億美元現金來收購該條鐵路。通過該次收購，我們的股份提高了6%。由於我們很快就補充了現金，該項交易的經濟效益證明非常好。
A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about $17 billion pre-tax and $12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.
當然，波克夏公司的副總裁(也是我的合夥人)，查理·孟格(Charlie Munger)，或者我本人，都無法準確定義“一個正常年份”的內涵。但是，為了估算公司當前的盈利能力，為了保險起見，我們假定“一個正常年份”不存在巨大災難，其一般的商業環境比2010年的商業環境要好，但卻不如2005年或2006年的商業環境。採用這些假設以及我在“投資”章節中所做的一些其他假設，本人估計公司目前所擁有資產的正常稅前盈利能力為170億美元，稅後盈利能力為120億美元，不包括資本損益。查理和我每天都在考慮如何增強公司的盈利能力。
Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.
我們倆都對於 BNSF公司的未來展望感到興奮，因為相較於他們的主要競爭對手公路運輸，鐵路有明顯的成本和環境優勢。去年，BNSF創造了一個記錄，每消耗1加侖柴油就可以將1噸貨物運送500英里，這比公路運輸還要多出三倍的燃料效率，意味著鐵路運輸在營運成本上擁有明顯重大的優勢。同時，我們的國家藉由鐵路運輸，因而減少溫室氣體排放及減少進口石油而獲得利益。當運輸由鐵路承攬時，整個社會也因此受益。
Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.
長期來看，在美國的貨運流通會增加，BNSF應該會得到它應得的收益。為了實現這成長，這條鐵路將需要大量投資，但沒有一個公司能在提供其所需資金上比波克夏更適合了。雖然經濟放緩，市場混亂，但我們開出的支票將得到償付。
Last year – in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy – we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending $6 billion on property and equipment. Of this amount, $5.4 billion – or 90% of the total – was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending – $8 billion – and spend all of the $2 billion increase in the United States.
去年，面對經濟，大家普遍悲觀的情緒氛圍下，波克夏花費了60億美元買進資產與設備，以展現了我們在股權投資的熱情。其中，54億美元或是說是約90％的部份是投資在美國境內。當然，未來我們的業務將擴充到國外，但未來投資的絕大部分將用在美國本土市場。在2011年，我們將投入創紀錄的80億美元用於股權投資，其中比去年多出來20億部分將全部投入美國市場，
Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.
金錢永遠追逐機會，而現在的美國充滿了機會。當前評論員經常談論“巨大的不確定性”。但是回頭想想，例如，1941年12月6日，1987年10月18日和2001年9月10日。不論今天的市場如何平淡，明天也總是無法確定。
Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.
不要讓現實嚇到你。在我一生中，政客和專家們總是不斷地指出美國面臨的種種可怕問題。但是我們的居民們現在的生活居然比我出生時還要好六倍。末日預言忽略了最重要的一個確定因素——人類仍然有充分的潛能，而且美國的制度促進此一潛能的發揮——儘管不斷地受到衰退甚至是內戰的干擾，但美國的制度仍然在超過兩個世紀的時間中創造了許多奇跡，依舊存活著且富有效率。
We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.
我們並不比美國建國時的祖先更加聰明，或者工作更加努力。但是看看四周，你會看到一個超越了任何殖民地居民夢想的世界。現在，如同在1776年，1861年，1932年和1941年一樣，美國的光輝未來就在前方。
Performance
公司績效
Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.
查理和我相信那些受託管理他人資金的管理者應該在開始管理時就建立績效目標。缺乏這樣的標準，管理層就有可能在射出績效之箭後，再將箭頭落地的地方描成靶心。
In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate
greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But,
if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could
have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.
但在波克夏，我們很久以前就告訴你們，我們的工作是增加每股的內在價值，且增速比同期S$P500指數的增幅(包含股息)還大。在一些年份中，我們成功了，而一些年份則沒有達到。但是，如果我們不能夠長期中達到這個目標，那麼我們就等於沒有為投資者做事，因為他們自己就可以藉由購買指數基金達到相同甚至更好的獲利結果。
The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.
當然，計算內在價值是一個挑戰。如果你分別問查理和我，你將得到兩個不同的答案。精確(計算內在價值)是不可能。
To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.
為了減少主觀因素，因此當我們評量績效時，我們使用了一個會低估內在價值的替代性指標：帳面價值。當然，我們的一些業務，其價值遠遠高於現有的帳面價值。（在這篇報告稍後的內容，我們將舉一些實例。）但由於這一溢價每年的變動都不大，用帳面價值來追蹤評量我們所做工作來說，是一個合理的指標。
The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier
years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of
capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for
better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.
第二頁的表格展示了我們過去46年與S&P指數相比的績效，在過去表現非常好，但現在僅是差強人意。我們想要強調，過去那種高速增長的年代，已經一去不復返了。我們現在擁有的巨額資本消除了獲得特別優秀績效的可能性。但是我們將努力取得優於平均水準的報酬，我們也認為如果投資者按照這一標準來衡量我們績效相當公平。
Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.
應該注意的是，每年的數字，既不能太過輕忽也不能太過看重。地球圍繞太陽轉動的速度，與投資理念或操作決策獲得報酬的時間並不同步。例如在GEICO，去年我們滿腔熱血地花費9億美元向投保人做廣告，這並不會帶來立即的效果。如果我們能夠更有效地花費這一數字的兩倍，我們也同樣會這樣做，儘管這樣對於短期績效會有更大的影響。在我們鐵路及公用事業營運上的許多大額投資也同樣著眼於長期受益。
Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.
應該注意的是，每年的數字，既不能太過輕忽也不能太過看重。地球圍繞太陽轉動的速度，與投資理念或操作決策獲得報酬的時間並不同步。例如在GEICO，去年我們滿腔熱血地花費9億美元向投保人做廣告，這並不會帶來立即的效果。如果我們能夠更有效地花費這一數字的兩倍，我們也同樣會這樣做，儘管這樣對於短期績效會有更大的影響。在我們鐵路及公用事業營運上的許多大額投資也同樣著眼於長期受益。
To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly
figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell
an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period,
however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative
advantage narrowed.
為了提供一些觀察長期績效的資訊，我們在另頁上按照五年的時間重新編排了第二頁上的年度資料。總的來說，共有42個五年期，它們會給你提供一個有趣的故事。在比較的基礎上，我們最好的年份在1980年代的早期結束了。但是市場的黃金時代，出現在隨後的17年中，儘管相對於市場而言，我們的優勢在縮小，但波克夏在這些年中達到持續地絕對報酬。
After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.
1999年之後，市場陷入停滯（或許你已經注意到了？）同時，相對於S&P的令人滿意的績效表現，波克夏只獲得了適當的絕對報酬。
Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.
展望未來，我們希望能夠有超越S&P幾個百分點的績效——儘管要達到這樣的結果顯然不是一件確定的事。如果我們成功達到，我們將在股票市場的較差年份獲得相對好的績效，在市場的較好年份則需忍受相對較差的績效。
Notes: The first two periods cover the five years beginning September 30 of the previous year. The third period covers 63 months beginning September 30, 1966 to December 31, 1971. All other periods involve calendar years.
The other notes on page 2 also apply to this table.
Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow
內在價值：現在與未來
Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.
雖然波克夏公司的內在價值無法精確計算，但是它(內在價值)三個關鍵支柱中的兩個是可以衡量的。當我們在估計波克夏的價值時，查理和我相當依賴這些測量工具。
The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.
第一個部份的價值，是我們的投資：股票、債券和約當現金。
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保險浮存金 - 在我們的保險營運暫時擁有的金錢，不屬於我們的 – 提供投資660億美元。只要保險承保部分損益兩平的話，這個浮存金是“沒有成本”的，這意味著我們收到的保費等於我們承擔的損失和費用。當然，承保的結果是變動的，總是不正常的利潤和虧損之間擺盪。雖然在我們的整個歷史當中，我們已經有相當程度的獲利，而我也希望在未來我們也能平均損益兩平或更好。 如果我們做到這一點，我們所有的投資 – 藉由這些浮存金和保留盈餘所提供的資金 - 可以被視為波克夏股東價值的一個元素。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.
波克夏的第二個價值組成是來自那些除了投資和保險承保的獲利。 這些收益來自我們的68家非保險的其他公司，逐項列在第106頁。 在波克夏早期，我們將重點放在投資方面。但是在過去的二十年裡，我們越來越多地強調了那些來自非保險業務發展的的盈餘部份，這種做法將繼續下去。
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.
下面的表格展現了這樣的轉變。第一個表格，我們呈現了自1970年以來每十年間每股投資的淨值成長，1970年之後三年，我們開始了保險業務。我們排除了那些投資適用於少數股東權益。
Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.
雖然在過去長達四十年間，我們每股投資的年複合成長是健康的19.9％，但當我們聚焦使用資金進行收購企業後，我們的增長率已大幅放緩。
The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.
這轉變的結果也顯示在接下來的表格，再一次以每股為基礎顯現出我們非保險業務的盈餘是如何增加，一樣排除那些少數股東權益的部份。
For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.
四十多年來，我們稅前的複合年度收益，非保險部份每股盈餘為 21.0％。 在同一期間，波克夏的股價每年以22.1％的速度成長。 長期來看，你可以預期我們的股價波動大致上與 Berkshire的投資和收益同步。 市場價格和內在價值往往遵循非常不同的路徑 - 有時需要相當長的期間 - 但最終他們會相符。
There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.
還有第三點，較主觀，這個用來計算內在價值的元素，可以是正面或負面的：它的成效與保留盈餘被運用後在未來的成效如何。就像其他許多企業一樣， 只要我們在未來十年內能保持損益兩平甚至超過我們所提供的資本，我們就可能持續維持盈餘。有些公司能將這些保留盈餘一元變成為五十美分，還有些公司可以讓它變成為兩美元。
This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.
After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.
1999年之後，市場陷入停滯（或許你已經注意到了？）同時，相對於S&P的令人滿意的績效表現，波克夏只獲得了適當的絕對報酬。
Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P – though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.
展望未來，我們希望能夠有超越S&P幾個百分點的績效——儘管要達到這樣的結果顯然不是一件確定的事。如果我們成功達到，我們將在股票市場的較差年份獲得相對好的績效，在市場的較好年份則需忍受相對較差的績效。
| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Five-Year Period | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965-1969 | 17.2 | 5 | 12.2 | ||||
| 1966-1970 | 14.7 | 3.9 | 10.8 | ||||
| 1967-1971 | 13.9 | 9.2 | 4.7 | ||||
| 1968-1972 | 16.8 | 7.5 | 9.3 | ||||
| 1969-1973 | 17.7 | 2 | 15.7 | ||||
| 1970-1974 | 15 | -2.4 | 17.4 | ||||
| 1971-1975 | 13.9 | 3.2 | 10.7 | ||||
| 1972-1976 | 20.8 | 4.9 | 15.9 | ||||
| 1973-1977 | 23.4 | -0.2 | 23.6 | ||||
| 1974-1978 | 24.4 | 4.3 | 20.1 | ||||
| 1975-1979 | 30.1 | 14.7 | 15.4 | ||||
| 1976-1980 | 33.4 | 13.9 | 19.5 | ||||
| 1977-1981 | 29 | 8.1 | 20.9 | ||||
| 1978-1982 | 29.9 | 14.1 | 15.8 | ||||
| 1979-1983 | 31.6 | 17.3 | 14.3 | ||||
| 1980-1984 | 27 | 14.8 | 12.2 | ||||
| 1981-1985 | 32.6 | 14.6 | 18 | ||||
| 1982-1986 | 31.5 | 19.8 | 11.7 | ||||
| 1983-1987 | 27.4 | 16.4 | 11 | ||||
| 1984-1988 | 25 | 15.2 | 9.8 | ||||
| 1985-1989 | 31.1 | 20.3 | 10.8 | ||||
| 1986-1990 | 22.9 | 13.1 | 9.8 | ||||
| 1987-1991 | 25.4 | 15.3 | 10.1 | ||||
| 1988-1992 | 25.6 | 15.8 | 9.8 | ||||
| 1989-1993 | 24.4 | 14.5 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1990-1994 | 18.6 | 8.7 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1991-1995 | 25.6 | 16.5 | 9.1 | ||||
| 1992-1996 | 24.2 | 15.2 | 9 | ||||
| 1993-1997 | 26.9 | 20.2 | 6.7 | ||||
| 1994-1998 | 33.7 | 24 | 9.7 | ||||
| 1995-1999 | 30.4 | 28.5 | 1.9 | ||||
| 1996-2000 | 22.9 | 18.3 | 4.6 | ||||
| 1997-2001 | 14.8 | 10.7 | 4.1 | ||||
| 1998-2002 | 10.4 | -0.6 | 11 | ||||
| 1999-2003 | 6 | -0.6 | 6.6 | ||||
| 2000-2004 | 8 | -2.3 | 10.3 | ||||
| 2001-2005 | 8 | 0.6 | 7.4 | ||||
| 2002-2006 | 13.1 | 6.2 | 6.9 | ||||
| 2003-2007 | 13.3 | 12.8 | 0.5 | ||||
| 2004-2008 | 6.9 | -2.2 | 9.1 | ||||
| 2005-2009 | 8.6 | 0.4 | 8.2 | ||||
| 2006-2010 | 10 | 2.3 | 7.7 | ||||
Notes: The first two periods cover the five years beginning September 30 of the previous year. The third period covers 63 months beginning September 30, 1966 to December 31, 1971. All other periods involve calendar years.
The other notes on page 2 also apply to this table.
Intrinsic Value – Today and Tomorrow
內在價值：現在與未來
Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.
雖然波克夏公司的內在價值無法精確計算，但是它(內在價值)三個關鍵支柱中的兩個是可以衡量的。當我們在估計波克夏的價值時，查理和我相當依賴這些測量工具。
The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.
第一個部份的價值，是我們的投資：股票、債券和約當現金。
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保險浮存金 - 在我們的保險營運暫時擁有的金錢，不屬於我們的 – 提供投資660億美元。只要保險承保部分損益兩平的話，這個浮存金是“沒有成本”的，這意味著我們收到的保費等於我們承擔的損失和費用。當然，承保的結果是變動的，總是不正常的利潤和虧損之間擺盪。雖然在我們的整個歷史當中，我們已經有相當程度的獲利，而我也希望在未來我們也能平均損益兩平或更好。 如果我們做到這一點，我們所有的投資 – 藉由這些浮存金和保留盈餘所提供的資金 - 可以被視為波克夏股東價值的一個元素。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.
波克夏的第二個價值組成是來自那些除了投資和保險承保的獲利。 這些收益來自我們的68家非保險的其他公司，逐項列在第106頁。 在波克夏早期，我們將重點放在投資方面。但是在過去的二十年裡，我們越來越多地強調了那些來自非保險業務發展的的盈餘部份，這種做法將繼續下去。
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.
下面的表格展現了這樣的轉變。第一個表格，我們呈現了自1970年以來每十年間每股投資的淨值成長，1970年之後三年，我們開始了保險業務。我們排除了那些投資適用於少數股東權益。
| Per-Share Investments Investments | Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share | ||||||
| Year | Years | ||||||
| 1970 | $66 | ||||||
| 1980 | 754 | 1970-1980 | 27.50% | ||||
| 1990 | 7,798 | 1980-1990 | 26.30% | ||||
| 2000 | 50,229 | 1990-2000 | 20.50% | ||||
| 2010 | 94,730 | 2000-2010 | 6.60% | ||||
Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.
雖然在過去長達四十年間，我們每股投資的年複合成長是健康的19.9％，但當我們聚焦使用資金進行收購企業後，我們的增長率已大幅放緩。
The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.
這轉變的結果也顯示在接下來的表格，再一次以每股為基礎顯現出我們非保險業務的盈餘是如何增加，一樣排除那些少數股東權益的部份。
| Per-Share Investments Investments | Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share | ||||||
| Year | Years | ||||||
| 1970 | $3 | ||||||
| 1980 | 19.01 | 1970-1980 | 20.80% | ||||
| 1990 | 103 | 1980-1990 | 18.40% | ||||
| 2000 | 919 | 1990-2000 | 24.50% | ||||
| 2010 | 5926.4 | 2000-2010 | 20.50% | ||||
For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.
四十多年來，我們稅前的複合年度收益，非保險部份每股盈餘為 21.0％。 在同一期間，波克夏的股價每年以22.1％的速度成長。 長期來看，你可以預期我們的股價波動大致上與 Berkshire的投資和收益同步。 市場價格和內在價值往往遵循非常不同的路徑 - 有時需要相當長的期間 - 但最終他們會相符。
There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.
還有第三點，較主觀，這個用來計算內在價值的元素，可以是正面或負面的：它的成效與保留盈餘被運用後在未來的成效如何。就像其他許多企業一樣， 只要我們在未來十年內能保持損益兩平甚至超過我們所提供的資本，我們就可能持續維持盈餘。有些公司能將這些保留盈餘一元變成為五十美分，還有些公司可以讓它變成為兩美元。
This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.
為了達到能合理估計公司內在價值，對我們來說，”有了錢，他們將會做什麼”的這個因素必須總是跟”我們現在擁有什麼”'來一起進行評估，這是因為當管理階層將外部投資者獲得的盈餘再投資，外部投資者總是只能眼巴巴地等待。如果CEO可以被預料能將這工作做好，公司當前的價值將被增加，有前景值得被投資；如果CEO的聰明才智或動機被人質疑，那麼今天的價值必須要打折扣。這差別的結果是巨大的。當時一美元價值在60年代末期的Sears Roebucks(sears百貨)的或Montgomery Ward(實體商店)的CEO們的手上，其命運遠遠不同於這一美元託付給Sam Walton(walt-mart百貨)。
************
Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.
查理和我希望我們非保險事業的每股盈餘能持續在一個適合的比率增加。 但是，當事業數目越來越大，工作也變得越困難。 我們從目前的企業跟更多重大的收購來增加績效。 我們的獵象槍已經再次上膛﹐我扣動扳機的手指正在發癢。
Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.
我們有的幾個重要優勢，能部分抵銷我們錨的尺寸(譯者按：優勢能降低規模的問題)。 首先，我們擁有真正的技術管理幹部，他們對自己的企業與波克夏有一個特殊的承諾。 我們的許多 CEO們富裕，工作只是因為他們喜歡做而已。 他們都是志願者，而不是僱傭兵。 因為沒有人能提供他們樂在其中的的工作，他們不能被挖走。
At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.
在波克夏，管理者將專注在開展自己的業務：他們不會受到總部會議的指揮，沒有融資的困擾，也沒有華爾街騷擾。 他們只是收到我每2年一次的來信（這是轉載 104-105頁），當他們有需求的時候才打電話給我。而他們的需求並不相同：有經理人，去年一整年我都沒跟他說到話，同時另一個是幾乎天天與我交談。 我們信任的是人而不是過程。“僱人越好，管理越少”這樣的規範適合他們也適合我。
Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.
波克夏的CEO們有許多形式。 有的MBA畢業生，有的根本沒有讀完大學。 有些使用預算，並按照書本上的方法，有些則是憑直覺做事。 我們的團隊就像由全明星所組成的一個棒球隊，每個人都有很大不同的打擊風格。在我們的打線陣容上，是很少需要調整改變的。
Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.
我們的第二個優勢涉及我們企業盈餘的分配上。在滿足那些企業營運所需資金後，我們還有非常大量的資金剩下。 大多數公司局限於靠行業運作所得資金的再投資。然而，在資本分配的世界裡，這樣往往限制了他們，在寬廣的世界裡這是既小且相當低階的方法。一些機會的取得競賽現在都趨於激烈了。賣方佔上風，就像一個女孩，如果她是在許多男生的派對裡唯一參加的女性依樣。 這種不平衡的狀況將對女孩是很棒的，但對男孩來說是很糟糕的。
At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle – and frequently we can’t – we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.
在波克夏裡，當我們佈局資金時並不會面臨體制上的限制。 對於了解未來可能的收購案，查理和我的能力是有限的。 如果我們清楚這個關卡—通常我們不能—我們就有能力去對各種他人主導的收購案去比較各種機會。
When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation – so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.
當我在1965年掌控了波克夏時，我並沒有利用這個優勢。 波克夏當時只是紡織廠，它在過去十年損失大量的金錢。我做的最愚蠢的事是，追隨”機會”，以改善和擴大現有的紡織業務，而且多年來我一直這麼做。 然後，在最後的一陣輝煌時期後，我退出了，且買了另一紡織公司。 Aaaaaaargh！ 最後我從我的第六感甦醒過來，開始主導進入保險業，然後再進展到其他行業。
There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.
甚至有一個補充這個大有前途的優勢：除了評估我們的企業對其他股東的吸引力，我們也可以藉由企業在可出售有價證券可行機會來衡量，相對來說大部分的管理階層不會這麼做。通常，企業的價格高的離譜反而可以從投資於股票或債券獲利。在這樣的時刻，我們等待買入證券的時機。
Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.
我們的彈性，迄今展現大部分我們在資產配置部分的進展。例如我們能夠從喜思糖果(See’s Candies)或美國商業新聞(Business Wire)賺到錢（兩個我們最好的企業，但也是兩個提供僅能有限再投資機會的公司），並用它(資金)作為賭注的一部分，我們拿來購買了BNSF。
Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.
我們的最後一個優勢是，滲透在波克夏內、難以複製的文化。經營企業，以文化為標竿。
To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.
首先，代表你的想法跟行為的執行長就像是業主一樣。他們接受代幣式的補償：無選擇權，無特別股票，並且幾乎沒有現金。我們沒有為他們提供董事及高級職員責任保險，這幾乎每一個大型上市公司都該有給的。如果他們搞砸了你的錢，他們將失去他們的金錢。 在我的持股外，執行長及其家族擁有波克夏股份價值超過 30億美元。因此，我們的執行長對於關注波克夏的行動和結果展現濃厚的興趣。你們和我很幸運有他們當管家。
This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.
有同樣的業主導向想法的經理人也普遍存在我們之中。在許多情況下，這些人原本早就擁有這些企業，也找了波克夏作為其收購者。他們帶著業主心態來找我們，我們提供了一個能鼓勵他們繼續保留它(該企業)的環境。擁有這些愛他們企業的經理人們是不小的優勢。
Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.
文化會潛移默化。 溫斯頓丘吉爾曾經說過，”你形塑你的房子，然後它們形塑你”。 這樣的智慧也適用於企業。官僚的程序招致更多的官僚主義，帝王般的企業宮殿促使專橫的行為。（就像推一個搖籃那樣，'當你坐在汽車後座且汽車都不動的時候，你就會知道你不再是CEO了。）在波克夏的”世界總部”，每年的租金是27萬212美元。此外，你叫得出來的這些家庭辦公室投資家具，藝術品，可樂機，午餐室，高科技設備 - 總計30萬1363美元。 只要查理和我把你的錢當作是我們自己的，波克夏的經理們就盡可能要謹慎使用它。
Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.
我們的補償方案，我們的年會，甚至我們的年度報告都著眼在加強波克夏文化的設計上，並使其能夠將不同偏好的管理者們排除跟驅逐在外。 這種文化的每年日益強大，並會在查理跟我離開後繼續保持下去。
We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.
我們需要將我剛剛描述的所有的優勢都做好。你可以指望我們的經理們將能夠提供。但在競爭的收購環境這部份上，是查理和我來決定最終的資本分配。你將看到我們盡最大的努力。
GEICO
GEICO公司
Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.
現在讓我告訴你一個故事，這將有助於您了解一個企業的內在價值可以遠遠超過其帳面價值。 關於這個故事也讓我有機會重溫一些美好的回憶。
Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.
60年前的最後一個月，GEICO走進我的生命之中，而這也徹底改變了我的一生。當時我還是哥倫比亞大學的一名研究生，是被我的恩師班、葛拉漢推薦過去的。
One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.
有一天，我在圖書館裏翻閱《美國名人錄》時發現班（Ben）是政府雇員保險公司（現在的GEICO）的董事長。當時我對保險業一無所知，同時也沒有聽說過這家公司。後來圖書管理員給我看了一些關於保險公司的匯編材料，才讓我對GEICO有了初步的了解，之後我決定拜訪下這家位於華盛頓的公司。
Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.
但是當我到達公司總部的時候，門卻是緊閉著的。之後我開始不厭其煩地敲門，一個看門人把我帶到了當時公司裏唯一的一個人面前——洛裏默•戴維森（Lorimer Davidson）。
That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)
這是我的幸運時刻。在接下來的四個小時，戴維森十分詳細地把保險業和GEICO給我講解了一遍，這是我們美好友誼的開始。此後不久，我從哥倫比亞大學順利畢業，並成為在奧馬哈市（Omaha）的一名股票推銷員。當然，GEICO是我的首選推薦，使我在一開始就擁有了數十家客戶。GEICO也提升了了我的淨資產，因為和戴維森會面的不久之後，我所投資的9800美元也實現了75%的盈利率。(即使如此，我也感到是過度分散。)
Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened – with the stock falling by more than 95% – Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)
後來，戴維成為 GEICO公司的CEO，同時將GEICO推向做夢也想不到的高度，而在他退休幾年後，70年代中期，GEICO便陷入危機。 當這事發生了-股票下跌超過95％ - 波克夏從市場上買了大約三分之一的股份，這些年因為GEICO自己買回自己的股份而來提高到50％的部位。這一半生意對波克夏來說成本是4600萬美元。 (儘管我們部位有其規模，但我們對其有控制權但並不干涉營運。）
We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95,
to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with
Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)
1996年初，波克夏準備收購GEICO剩餘50%的股份，這讓95歲的戴維森大為高興，當時還專門為此製作了一個錄影帶來告訴大家他有多高興，他心愛的GEICO公司將永久跟波克夏相伴下去。（他還開玩笑地做了總結，'下一次，華倫，請預約'。）
A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.
在過去的60年中，GEICO發生了很多事，但是其核心目標——為美國人節省花在購買汽車保險上的錢—一直沒有改變。（試試我們在1-800-847-7536 或www.GEICO.com。）換句話說，獲得保單持有人的業務都是值得的生意。而圍繞這個目標，GEICO已經成為美國的第三大汽車保險公司，擁有8.8%的市佔率。
When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.
公司現任CEO托尼•萊斯利（Tony Nicely）1993年上任時，該比例為2%，當時這一數據已經維持了十多年。但是在托尼的帶領下，GEICO變成一家不一樣的公司，找到了既能保持承保率的成長，又能降低成本的方法。
Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.
讓我量化Tony的成就。1996年，我們以23億美元的價格購買了GEICO公司50%的股票，這筆投資隨後變成了46億美元，收益率達到了100%。而當時GEICO的有形資產凈值也達到了19億美元。
The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.
而這其中還隱含了27億美元的無形價值（經過我們的測算，GEICO公司的商譽完全有這麼高）。商譽代表要保人跟GEICO做生意的經濟價值。1995年，公司客戶一共支付了28億美元的保費，而有有97%的客戶是會每年付保費給公司的。(2.7/2.8)如果按照行業標準，這個數字比例相當高，但是GEICO不是一般的保險公司，因為公司的運營成本較低，保單持續盈利能力強，顧客忠誠度也很高。
Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.
今天，雖然公司的保費收入是143億美元並持續成長，但是我們帳面給出的信譽值只有14億美元，這個數值將不會因為GEICO價值增加而改變的(會計原則是，經濟價值衰退時所寫下的信譽的帳面價值，在經濟價值提升時並不調升)。如果是以1996年開始，97%的保費量為基準，GEICO的信譽真正的價值大約140億美元。而這個價值可能從現在開始的十年甚至二十年，都會是這麼高。GEICO在2011年有一個強勁的開始，是一個能不斷提供(譯者按：現金)的禮物。
One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personallines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.
此外，在Tony的帶領下，GEICO公司已經成為全美最大的個人保險機構，主要是賣給我們車險客戶一些房產險保單。在這些生意中，我們代表那些不屬於我們的保險公司的對手，由他們承擔風險，我們只負責簽下客戶。在這樣的營運代理下，去年公司一共賣出769898份新的個人保險合同，較前年增長了34%。這樣對我們最明顯的幫助就在於佣金收入，同樣重要的是，也幫助我們強化跟保戶的關係，協助我們留住客戶。我欠了Tony跟Davy很大的人情。
1996年初，波克夏準備收購GEICO剩餘50%的股份，這讓95歲的戴維森大為高興，當時還專門為此製作了一個錄影帶來告訴大家他有多高興，他心愛的GEICO公司將永久跟波克夏相伴下去。（他還開玩笑地做了總結，'下一次，華倫，請預約'。）
A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.
在過去的60年中，GEICO發生了很多事，但是其核心目標——為美國人節省花在購買汽車保險上的錢—一直沒有改變。（試試我們在1-800-847-7536 或www.GEICO.com。）換句話說，獲得保單持有人的業務都是值得的生意。而圍繞這個目標，GEICO已經成為美國的第三大汽車保險公司，擁有8.8%的市佔率。
When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.
公司現任CEO托尼•萊斯利（Tony Nicely）1993年上任時，該比例為2%，當時這一數據已經維持了十多年。但是在托尼的帶領下，GEICO變成一家不一樣的公司，找到了既能保持承保率的成長，又能降低成本的方法。
Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.
讓我量化Tony的成就。1996年，我們以23億美元的價格購買了GEICO公司50%的股票，這筆投資隨後變成了46億美元，收益率達到了100%。而當時GEICO的有形資產凈值也達到了19億美元。
The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.
而這其中還隱含了27億美元的無形價值（經過我們的測算，GEICO公司的商譽完全有這麼高）。商譽代表要保人跟GEICO做生意的經濟價值。1995年，公司客戶一共支付了28億美元的保費，而有有97%的客戶是會每年付保費給公司的。(2.7/2.8)如果按照行業標準，這個數字比例相當高，但是GEICO不是一般的保險公司，因為公司的運營成本較低，保單持續盈利能力強，顧客忠誠度也很高。
Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.
今天，雖然公司的保費收入是143億美元並持續成長，但是我們帳面給出的信譽值只有14億美元，這個數值將不會因為GEICO價值增加而改變的(會計原則是，經濟價值衰退時所寫下的信譽的帳面價值，在經濟價值提升時並不調升)。如果是以1996年開始，97%的保費量為基準，GEICO的信譽真正的價值大約140億美元。而這個價值可能從現在開始的十年甚至二十年，都會是這麼高。GEICO在2011年有一個強勁的開始，是一個能不斷提供(譯者按：現金)的禮物。
One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personallines insurance agencies, which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.
此外，在Tony的帶領下，GEICO公司已經成為全美最大的個人保險機構，主要是賣給我們車險客戶一些房產險保單。在這些生意中，我們代表那些不屬於我們的保險公司的對手，由他們承擔風險，我們只負責簽下客戶。在這樣的營運代理下，去年公司一共賣出769898份新的個人保險合同，較前年增長了34%。這樣對我們最明顯的幫助就在於佣金收入，同樣重要的是，也幫助我們強化跟保戶的關係，協助我們留住客戶。我欠了Tony跟Davy很大的人情。
I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).
(而且現在想想，我也欠那個看門的一個人情。)
************
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and
income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them
as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
現在，讓我們來看看波克夏的四個主要部門。每個資產負債表和損益表的特點都有很大的不同，若將他們混為一談將會阻礙分析。因此，我們將以四個獨立企業來呈現，讓大家看看查理和我是怎麼檢視他們的。
We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
我們首先來看看保險業務，波克夏的核心業務和以及推動我們擴張多年的發動機。
Insurance
保險
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:
財產保險公司通常預收保險費，後付賠償金。在個別情況下，比如有些工人的意外事故索賠，賠償金的支付可能拖延十年之久。這種先收錢後賠錢的模式讓我們持有大量流動資金，這些最終會轉向他人的錢，我們稱之為”存浮金”。我們可以為了公司的利益把這些存浮金用於投資。盡管投保和索賠不斷，但是我們持有流動資金的數額保持穩定。因此，我們的存浮金隨著業務增長而增加。大家可以看一下底下的表格就會知道我們是如何成長的：
| Yearend | Float (in $ millions) | |
| 1970 | $39 | |
| 1980 | 237 | |
| 1990 | 1,632 | |
| 2000 | 27,871 | |
| 2010 | 65,832 | |
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.
如果我們收取的保費超過支出和賠償金，我們就獲得了保險利潤，再加上我們的存浮金帶來的投資收入。當這些利潤產生，我們也樂於運用這些免費的資金，這些尚未支付的資金。實際上多年來激烈的競爭已讓財產保險業承受了巨大的保險損失。這些損失就是保險業持有浮存金的代價。比如說，全美最大的保險公司State Farm，公司管理有方，卻在過去十年裏有七年時間承受保險損失。在此期間，該公司的虧損金額超過了200億美元。
At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will benefit just as we would if some party deposited $66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.
在波克夏，我們連續八年獲得保險利潤，在此期間的盈利總計達到170億美元。我相信保險業務在未來的幾年裏 - 但肯定不是每年 - 還能繼續獲得利潤。如果我們做到了，那麼我們的浮存金將比零成本還要便宜划算。就像是有企業向我們支付費用讓我們持有660億元，然後我們還會從中投資獲利。
Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.
讓我再次強調，取得零成本的存浮金在整個產險業中並不是一個預期的結果。在大多數年份，行業保費收入並不足以支付索賠與支出。 因此，整個行業的有形資產報酬率已經有幾十年遠遠低於美國企業的平均報酬率，這麼糟糕的績效幾乎肯定會繼續下去。波克夏傑出經濟的存在只是因為我們有一些了不起的經理執行一些不尋常的業務。 我們已經告訴你有關GEICO的故事，我們還有其他兩個非常大的保險公司，同時還有一群規模較小，但每個在自己領域上都是明星的保險公司。
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First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.
************
First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.
首先是波克夏再保險集團，是由阿吉特(Ajit Jain)在管理。 阿吉特承擔了沒人願意或資本承擔的風險。 他的經營結合能力，速度，果斷，最重要的是，更重要的是擁有保險業獨具一格的思維方式。然而，他從未讓波克夏承擔不合時宜的風險。我們比起該行業的其他公司來說的確更為保守。過去一年裏，阿吉特大幅提升了人壽保險業務，帶來了20億美元的保費，今後幾十年這種情形還將繼續上演。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.
1985年以來，阿吉特為保險業務帶來了300億美元的存浮金和巨大的保險利潤，這個壯舉，沒有任何其他保險公司的CEO能與之匹配。透過他的成就，他已經為波克夏公司增添了數十億美元的資產。即使克利普頓石把阿吉特彈開。(譯者按：應為表示阿吉特的能力相當強之意)
************
We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我們還擁有通用再保險公司，由泰德蒙特羅斯（Tad Montross）負責。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
說到底，一個健全的保險業務經營需要四條準則：（1）了解所有的風險都能造成損失;（2）保守評價任何暴露風險實際造成損失的可能性及可能的成本;（3）在平均上能確保利潤的保費金額的設定，包括未來的損失成本和運營費用在內（四）如果不能獲得合理的保費就放棄這項業務的意志。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.
許多保險公司通過了前三條準則的考驗，卻在第四條碰了壁。華爾街的急功近利，機構和經紀人帶來的壓力，或者是雄心勃勃的CEO不肯讓業務規模縮水，導致許多保險公司以低價承攬業務。”其他人在做，所以我們也要做”讓任何生意陷入麻煩，但是這麼做最保險。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.
泰德蒙特羅斯恪守四條準則，並且讓他展現在結果上。通用再保險公司在他的領導下擁有巨額存浮金，平均來說，我們預計該公司依然能保持下去。
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Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the
insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the
float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
最後，我們擁有許多小保險公司，大多數公司有專屬經營範圍。總的來說，他們的獲利是相當醫致的，就像下表所呈現的那樣，提供給我們了大量的存浮金。我和查理非常看重這些企業和他們的經理人。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
下面是我們產險及壽險業務的四個部分：
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world
印象中，在所有的大型保險公司裡，波克夏是我認為世界上最好的保險公司。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業和零售業
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏在這一部分的營運也是相當全面的。讓我們來看一下整個集團的資產負債表和損益表摘要：
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
最後，我們擁有許多小保險公司，大多數公司有專屬經營範圍。總的來說，他們的獲利是相當醫致的，就像下表所呈現的那樣，提供給我們了大量的存浮金。我和查理非常看重這些企業和他們的經理人。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
下面是我們產險及壽險業務的四個部分：
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2010 | 2009 | 2010 | 2009 | ||
| General Re | $452 | $477 | $20,049 | $21,014 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 176 | 250 | 30,370 | 27,753 | ||
| GEICO | 1,117 | 649 | 10,272 | 9,613 | ||
| Other Primary | 268 | 84 | 5,141 | 5,061 | ||
| Total | $2,013 | $1,460 | $65,832 | $63,441 | ||
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world
印象中，在所有的大型保險公司裡，波克夏是我認為世界上最好的保險公司。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業和零售業
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏在這一部分的營運也是相當全面的。讓我們來看一下整個集團的資產負債表和損益表摘要：
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $2,673 | Notes payable | $1,805 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 5,396 | Other current liabilities | 8,169 | |||||
| Inventory | 7,101 | Total current liabilities | 9,974 | |||||
| Other current assets | 550 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 15,720 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 16,976 | Deferred taxes | 3001 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 15,421 | Term debt and other liabilities | 6,621 | |||||
| Other assets | 3,029 | Equity | 31,550 | |||||
| $51,146 | $51,146 | |||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | |||||
| Revenues | $66,610 | $61,665 | $66,099 | ||||
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,362 in 2010, $1,422in 2009and $ 1280 in 2008) | |||||||
| 62225 | 59509 | 61937 | |||||
| Interest expense (net) | 111 | 98 | 139 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 4274* | 2058* | 4023* | ||||
| Income taxes | 1812 | 945 | 1740 | ||||
| Net income | $2462 | $1113 | $2283 | ||||
This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses
enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to
more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor
returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about
because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of
the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes
my eyesight has been poor
這個大雜燴集團，從棒棒糖到噴射機都有賣，一些了不起的部份，以沒有運用槓桿的平均有形淨值來說，從售後25%到超過100%的都有。在其他部份也有12-20%的報酬率。 不幸的是，有少數是因為我在資金配置上犯下了嚴重錯誤而有很差的報酬。這錯誤來自我誤判了我所併購企業的競爭力或是該產業在未來營運上的競爭力。我做這些併購決定時，總試圖看到未來十年或二十年後，但有時候我的視力也是很差的。
Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.
在這個部份的大多數公司去年都在改善他們的盈餘，並創下四個紀錄，讓我們來看看第一個破紀錄的公司。
• TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI’s exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.
•TTI，我們的電子元器件通路商，已銷售額超過於之前的紀錄(2008)達21％，和稅前盈利也超出其先前的紀錄58％。 其銷售獲利跨越三大洲，北美佔16％，歐洲佔26％，亞洲佔50％。TTI販賣數以千計的元件都是微不足道的，許多都賣不到一美元。由保羅(Paul Andrews)以及他的, TTI這麼優異的魔術表現，是由其CEO保羅安德魯(Paul Andrews)，以及他的團隊所打造出來的。
• Forest River, our RV and boat manufacturer, had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There’s no need; Pete Liegl, the company’s CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.
•Forest River,，我們的房車和船生產商，銷量記錄近20億美元，盈利紀錄也是一樣好。 Forest River一共有82個工廠，我還沒有訪問一個（或因為我都在家辦公）。其實沒有必要，因為公司CEO Pete Liegl，把公司經營得非常好。來年度盛會看看他的產品吧。 更好的是，買一個。
• CTB, our farm-equipment company, again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company’s CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid $140 million for CTB in 2002. It has since paid us dividends of $160 million and eliminated $40 million of debt. Last year it earned $106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were $189,365; now they are $405,878.
•CTB，我們的農場設備公司，再次刷新盈利的紀錄。 我在2008年的年度報告中有提到該公司的CEO，Vic Mancinelli。 他表現得更好了。波克夏在2002年以1.4億美元買下CTB。 它後來迄今支付我們達1.6億美元股息並減少了4000萬美元的債務。去年，它稅前總共賺了1.06億美元。 生產率的提高了這一成長的大部分。 我們買下CTB當時，每名員工的銷售額為18萬9365美元，而今他們是40萬5878美元。
• Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.
•你相信鞋子(譯者按：賣鞋能做到這種程度)嗎？ 以Born聞名的H. H. Brown公司，由吉姆(Jim Issler)負責營運，創下新的銷售和盈利紀錄（得益於在我們的年度盛會上賣出1110雙鞋子）。 吉姆出色地適應了主要的產業改變。我應該提到過他的工作，被一個名叫Frank Rooney監督著；Rooney是一個89歲的優秀商人，若是跟他在高爾夫球場上打賭時，他還是一個危險的傢伙哩。
A huge story in this sector’s year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can’t overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol’s achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.
在這個部份裡，逐年改善的NetJets，背後有一個巨大的故事。 我不能誇大Dave Sokol在這家公司達到成就的的重要性與廣度和重要性，這是家分時所有權噴氣飛機產業的領導廠商。 NetJets的業務一直是成功的，在2010年其市佔率領先最接近競爭對手達五倍之多。我們壓倒性的領先來自於擁有一個包含飛行員，機械師和服務人員的夢幻團隊。 這些人在2010年再度表現得非常好，不論是在客戶滿意度，或是在我們定期的調查項目內，都達到新高標準。
Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire’s credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater
儘管 NetJets不論在客戶滿意度以及財務表現上，都是輕而易舉的大贏家，但在1998年收購時，卻是一個失敗的情況。在11年到2009年的11年間，該公司報告的整體除稅前虧損為1.57億美元，這個數字遠遠低於NetJets的借貸成本，這資金是大部分是來自免費使用波克夏的信用。 NetJets營運獨立的情況下，多年來其損失都是數以百萬計算的。
We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire’s guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to $38 million in 2010), NetJets earned $207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave’s quick restructuring of management and the company’s rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire’s only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.
我們現在向NetJets公司收取適當的費用做為波克夏提供保證的代價。儘管有這麼一個費用（在2010年來到3800萬美元），NetJets在2010年的稅前收入為2.07億美元，2009年是9.18億美元。大衛索科爾（Dave Sokol）很快的對其管理層進行重組，並對公司的採購和支出政策作了合理規劃，終結了資金的大失血，自從以後，NetJets才走上了騰飛之路。快速的轉型，管理和公司的合理化，其採購和支出政策已經結束失血現金，轉身將波克夏唯一關心的主要業務問題，變成了一個穩定獲利的營運。
Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets’ industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that’s equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.
同時，在安全度及服務上，大衛讓NetJets持續保有領先業界的聲譽。在許多重要的部份，我們的培訓和業務標準，是大大高於美國聯邦航空局的要求。維持頂級的標準是正確該做的事情，但我也有一個自私的理由支持這一政策。我和家人已經乘坐該公司的飛機飛行了5000小時（相當於每七個月就要在天上待一天的時間），將來還要再飛上數千小時。我們從來沒要求什麼特殊待遇，並且隨機使用超過一百架飛機及300位機組人員，不論是飛機或是機組人員，我們總是知道我們是與私人航空領域中訓練最精良的機師們共同翺翔於藍天。
The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon, a collection of 130 businesses. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.
在製造業、服務業及零售部分，Marmon，一個集合130個企業的事業體，是我們最大的收入來源。在不久我們將藉由向普利茲克家族購買17%股權的計畫執行，提高我們的股權到80%。這筆費用將大約為 15億美元。 然後，我們將購買餘下的普利茲克在2013年或2014年控股，日期讓普利茲克家族來決定。 法蘭克普塔克(Frank Ptak)把Marmon經營得非常好，我們期待擁有100％的所有權。
Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier’s McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company’s dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.
Marmon之外，另外兩個最賺錢的部分是伊斯卡(Iscar)和麥克林(Mcline)。(對他們而言)去年都是優秀的一年。2010年，在格雷迪羅希爾(Grady Rosier)手上的麥克林切入葡萄酒及烈酒批發業務，為麥克林批發經營食品，香煙，糖果和雜物等320億業務的同時增補了產品。在併購主要經營在喬治亞州和北卡羅萊納州的Empire Distributors這家公司中，，我們跟大衛卡恩(David Kahn合作)，他是公司的全方位CEO。 大衛也藉由我們在地域上擴展業務。到年底，他已經完成他的第一次收購，位於在田納西州的Horizon Wine and Spirits。
At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar’s main competitors.
2010年，依斯卡的獲利增長了159％，而我們在2011可能會超過之前衰退前的水準。 銷售改善遍及全球，尤其是在亞洲。如此優越的績效由Eitan Wertheimer，Jacob Harpaz和Danny Goldman所建立，遠遠優於伊斯卡的主要競爭對手。
All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned $362 million pre-tax in 2010 compared to $1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.
所有這些都是好消息。 但是我們關於的居家建材方面的業務繼續掙扎著。Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick保持其競爭地位，但他們的獲利水準遠遠低於前幾年。總合來說，2010年這些業務稅前收入為3.62億美元，而在2006年是13億元，僱員則下降到了9400人左右。
A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently: (1) At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months; (2) At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for $50 million; (3) Johns Manville is building a $55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year; and (4) Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America. These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.
房市將會在一年之內開始復甦，它肯定會在某個時候發生。 因此：（1）在MiTek，過去11個月我們已經完成，或致力於五個補強性收購(bolt-on acquisition，譯者按：增加股權的動作)；（2）在Acme方面，我們才剛以5000萬美元收購了在阿拉巴馬州磁磚製造的領導廠商；（3 ）Johns Manville正在俄亥俄州建造花費5500萬美元建造一個屋頂舖面製造廠，將在明年完成；（四）Shaw將在2011年針對他位於在美國的工廠與設備斥資2億美元。這些企業進入衰退期時表現強勁，並將衰退結束後更加強大。 在Berkshire，我們的投資期是永遠的。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受規範的、資本密集型企業
We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我們有兩個非常大的企業，BNSF公司和中美能源，他們具有一些重要的共同特性足以跟我們齊下的許多企業做區隔。 因此，我讓他們在這封信中分為同一類，並且將他們的財務統計部份從我們的GAAP資產負債表與損益表中獨立出來。
A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF’s car loadings far off peak levels, the company’s interest coverage was 6:1.
這兩家公司的一個主要特點是在相當長的規範資產中巨額投資，而這麼大量的長期債務的資金來源，波克夏並沒有為其背書。 我們的信用保證並不需要：因為即使在非常不利的經營環境下，他們都能充分的達成利息支付的要求，顯示這兩家公司都有相當強的獲利能力。例如，在2010經濟衰退期間，BNSF的負載量遠低於尖峰水準，該公司的利息覆蓋率(譯者按：利息保障倍數)為 6:1。
Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.
兩家公司都被相當重的監管，且都有一個必須在廠房設並作出重大投資的需求，並且永無止盡。 雙方還需要提供高效率，顧客滿意的服務，來贏得監督者的尊重。 報酬率上，他們也都需要一個保證，一個被允許在未來投資上能取得合理利潤的保證。
Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country’s future. Rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.
剛才我解釋說明的是，對於我們國家的未來，鐵路有多麼的重要。 若以每公里多少頓來計算，鐵路運送美國城市間42％的貨運，而BNSF的貨運量大約佔整個產業的28%，超過其他任何一條鐵路。稍微一點數學計算就會告訴你，BNSF負責美國城市間運輸超過 11％。由於人口向西部遷移，我們的市佔率可能會一點一點增長。
All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy’s circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society’s needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I’m confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.
這些加起來是一個巨大的責任。 我們是美國經濟循環系統一個主要且必要的部分，必須不斷在這2萬3000英哩軌道上連同附屬橋樑、隧道、發動機與車輛上保持和改善。在開展這項工作，我們必須預見到社會的需要，而不是僅僅作出反應。為了履行我們的社會責任，我們定期花費將遠遠超過我們的折舊，這個花費數額在2011年超過 20億美元。 我確信我們將在這龐大的增輛投資上獲得相應的回報。智慧的規範和聰明的投資是一枚硬幣的兩面。
At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up everincreasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.
在中美能源，我們參與了類似的“社會契約”。 我們預計不斷增加的資金來滿足未來客戶的需求。 如果能夠同時兼顧可靠性和高效性，我知道我們會獲得公正的投資回報。
MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.
中美能源在美國共供應 240萬客戶電力，是愛荷華州，懷俄明州和猶他州最大的電力供應商，也是其他州重要的供應商。 我們的管線運輸美國8％的天然氣。 顯然，許多以百萬計的美國人每天都依賴我們。
MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire’s interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.
中美能源公司為它的所有者（波克夏佔了89.8％的股權）和它的客戶交出了優異的表現。 不久後，中美能源公司在2002年購買北方天然氣公司時，該公司的業績被該領域的領導權威評比為最後一名，43名中的第43名。在最近發表的報告，北方天然氣排名第二。 榜首則是我們的另一家公司拿下，kern River。
In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.
在其電力業務中，中美能源有一個可供匹敵的記錄。自從1999年我們購買了之後， 愛荷華州的費率就沒有增加過。在同一期間，在國內其他主要的電力公司漲價超過70%，目前已經遠遠超過我們的費率。在某些大城市地區中，兩家電力公司比鄰，我們的客戶電費遠遠低於他們的鄰居。 據我所知，如果在城市裡，這類的房子位於我們的服務範圍內，將可以賣更高的價格。
MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.
中美能源在2011年年底，將擁有 2909兆瓦的風力發電電能，超過國內任何其他受規範的電力公司。中美能源已投資與正在投入風力發電的總投資金額是驚人的54億美元。因為中美能源可以維持其盈餘，所以我們可以進行這樣的投資，不像其他公用事業，通常支付掉大部分所賺取的金錢。
As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:
現在你可以這麼說，我深感驕傲BNSF在Matt Rose的領導下以及中美能源在David Sokol and Greg Abel的領導下，對我們的社會有所貢獻與成就。 同時我也感到自豪跟感謝他們為波克夏股東所做的。下面是相關的表格：
| MidAmerican | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2010 | 2009 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $333 | $248 | |||
| Iowa utility | 279 | 285 | |||
| Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006) | 783 | 788 | |||
| Pipelines | 378 | 457 | |||
| Home Services | 42 | 43 | |||
| Other (Net) | 47 | 25 | |||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,862 | 1,846 | |||
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (323) | (318) | |||
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt . | (30) | (58) | |||
| Income Tax | (271) | (313) | |||
| Net Earnings | $1,238 | $1,157 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire* | $1,131 | $1,071 | |||
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $19 in 2010 and $38 in 2009.
BNSF
| Earnings (in $ millions) | |||||
| 2010 | 2009 | ||||
| Revenues | 16,850 | 14,016 | |||
| Operating earnings | 4,495 | 3,254 | |||
| Interest (Net) | 507 | 613 | |||
| Pre-Tax earnings | 3,988 | 2,641 | |||
| Net earnings | 2,459 | 1,72 | |||
Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融產品
This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.
這一點，我們最小的部門，包括兩個租賃公司，XTRA（拖車）和CORT（家具）和克萊頓(Clayton Homes)，國內組合屋領導製造商和融資廠商。
Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to $35 million from $17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of $3 million in 2009 to $18 million of profit in 2010.
儘管基礎較差，我們增加了我們的租賃業務也改善了去年的績效。XTRA將其設備利用率由2009年的63％提高到2010年的75％，從而將稅前盈利由2009年的1700萬美元提高到2010年的3500萬美元。去年CORT的業務發展也藉由搭便車的方式而大大加強其業務。這種結合方式讓CORT從2009年稅前虧損300萬美元到2010年已有1800萬美元的利潤。
At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry’s total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.
在克萊頓，我們生產了23343戶的組合房屋，約佔1998年組合屋總數50046戶的47％。去年一共有372843戶組合屋被生產出來。（所以我們有8%的市佔率）在任何的情況下，去年這樣的銷售數字都是很不錯的，但我在2009年所評論的融資問題，將持續加劇。解釋：我國政府的房貸政策，是透過聯邦住房管理局、房地美和房利美同意所提供的貸款，這樣的政策有利於現場建造的住所，而對擁有價格競爭優勢的組合屋不利。
We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country’s home-loan practices. Let’s take a look.
我們比其他公司提供更多融資給組合屋的買家。因此我們的經驗應該能給這些準備徹底改革我國房貸政策的政黨們一些啟發。讓我們來看看。
Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.
克萊頓一開始擁有200804個抵押貸款契約。（它也有購買一些抵押貸款投資組合。）這些契約當中，我們的借款人平均FICO評分為648分，然後有47％是在640分或以下。你的銀行家會告訴你，這樣的分數，這些人應該普遍都是信用有問題的。
Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here’s our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:
不過，在這樣的壓力條件下，我們的投資組合表現良好。下面是我們過去五年的在這些契約上的損失經驗：
Year Net Losses as a Percentage of Average Loans
2006 .............................. 1.53%
2007 .............................. 1.27%
2008 .............................. 1.17%
2009 .............................. 1.86%
2010 .............................. 1.72%
Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.
Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.
我們的借款人當他們失去工作、健康亮起紅燈或是離婚等問題出現時才陷入麻煩。這些問題嚴重打擊他們。但是他們想要留住自己的家，而一般來說他們的貸款額度多寡是跟他們的工作收入有關。此外，我們持續持有這些原始的抵押貸款，意味著我們並沒有將其證券化或是轉售給他人。這使他們得聚精會神。
If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.
如果在全國各地的購房者都表現得像我們的買家，美國就不會出現像之前的金融危機。我們的做法很簡單，只是要得到一個有價值的首期付款和搭配每月固定一個合理的比例的收入來支付。 這項政策使克萊頓保有償付能力，而且也幫助購屋者保有自己的家。
Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.
擁有一個家對大多數美國人來說是有意義的，特別是在現在較低的價格及可商量的利率。在考量所有事情後，雖然我可以用租房子省下來的錢去購買股票，但我這輩子做過第三個最好投資就是我買了房子我的家。（另外兩個最好的投資是結婚對戒。）我位了這棟房子付了3萬1500美元，但我的家人和我得到了52年來很多美好的回憶。
But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.
但是如果買家的眼光比他的錢包還大，如果貸款人 - 通常有政府擔保所保護的 - 促進買家的幻想，那麼房子也可以是一場噩夢。我國社會的目標不應該把一般家庭送入他們夢幻中的家園，而是把他們安置在他們負擔的起的房子裡。
Investments
投資
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面我們秀出我們普通股的投資，在年底的市值已經超過十億美元。
| 12/31/10 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 12.6 | $1,287 | $6,507 | ||
| 225,000,000 | BYD Company, Ltd. | 9.9 | 232 | 1,182 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 13,154 | ||
| 29,109,637 | Conoco Phillips | 2 | 2,028 | 1,982 | ||
| 45,022,563 | Johnson & Johnson | 1.6 | 2,749 | 2,785 | ||
| 97,214,584 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 5.6 | 3,207 | 3,063 | ||
| 19,259,600 | Munich Re | 10.5 | 2,896 | 2,924 | ||
| 3,947,555 | POSCO | 4.6 | 768 | 1,706 | ||
| 72,391,036 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 2.6 | 464 | 4,657 | ||
| 25,848,838 | Sanofi-Aventis | 2 | 2,060 | 1,656 | ||
| 242,163,773 | Tesco plc | 3 | 1,414 | 1,608 | ||
| 78,060,769 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.1 | 2,401 | 2,105 | ||
| 39,037,142 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.1 | 1,893 | 2,105 | ||
| 358,936,125 | Wells Fargo & Company | 6.8 | 8,015 | 11,123 | ||
| Others | 3,020 | 4,956 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks | 33,733 | 61,513 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience – and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century – undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.
在我們公佈的盈餘報告中，我們只反映出我們投資的公司所支付的股息部份。不過我們這些投資公司的未分配盈餘超過20億美元。這些保留盈餘是重要的。根據我們的經驗 – 針對這一問題超過過去一世紀投資者的經驗 – 儘管在一個極不規律的市場行為中，未分配利潤既不是相符也不會超過市場收益。（實際上，有時甚至是負相關。正如2009年一位投資者這麼說：'這比離婚還糟糕。我已經失去了一半的身家 – 但我的老婆還在。）今後，我們希望我們的市場收益，最終至少等於我們的投資公司的保留盈餘。
************
In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).
在早先我們評估波克夏的正常盈利能力時，關於未來的投資收益部分我們進行了三次調整。（但不包括任何我剛剛說的未分配盈餘因素）。
The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these – our Swiss Re note – was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others – our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks – are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.
第一次調整是被斷然否定的。去年，我們討論了在我們盈餘報告裡貢獻大量資金的五個大型固定收益投資。其中之一 - 我們的瑞士再保險公司短天期債券 – 已在2011年初期被贖回，另外兩個 - 我們的高盛和通用電氣的優先股 - 有可能在年底前消失。通用電氣公司是有權要求在十月贖回我們持有的優先股，並已經表示打算這樣做。高盛有權在30天前要求贖回我們所持有的優先股，但不幸的是，很久以前放行高盛的美國聯邦儲備局一直阻礙著（祝福吧！）。
All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so – in aggregate about $1.4 billion – but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That’s the bad news.
這三個公司要求贖回都必須支付給我們費用 - 總計約為 14億美元 – 不過所有的贖回動作我都不喜歡。 因為當這件事發生，我們的盈利能力將會大大降低。這是壞消息。
There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held $38 billion of cash equivalents that have been earning a pittance throughout 2010. At some point, however, better rates will return. They will add at least $500 million – and perhaps much more – to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of “normal” earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book
有兩種可能的抵消方式。截至2010年底，我們賺取微薄利潤累積至380億美元的約當現金。不過在某些時點利率會更好一些。他們將為我們的投資收益增加至少5億美元 - 或許更多。那種增加貨幣市場收益率的部分不太可能很快到來。不過，對於我們來說，估算'正常'的盈利能力中把增加的利率部分考慮進去也是很適當的。此外我們也相當幸運，甚至能在高利率到來之前，找到一個善用我們現金儲備的機會，以獲得像樣的報酬率。這天對我來說不能來得太早：伊索寓言有云，有一個妹在敞篷車裡，比電話簿裡有五個妹好太多了。(譯者按：一鳥在手勝過百鳥在林)
In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don’t fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)
此外，我們目前普通股部分的股息幾乎肯定會增加。最大的收益可能是來自於富國銀行。美國聯邦儲備委員會，關於高盛事件上我們的朋友(譯者按：因為前文Fed一直阻止高盛贖回特別股，故巴菲特稱Fed為朋友)，在過去兩年已凍結主要大型銀行的股息水準，無論是強弱。
At some point, probably soon, the Fed’s restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
雖然富國銀行在經濟衰退最嚴重的時候持續繁榮發展，且目前享有巨大的資金實力和盈利能力，但也因此被迫維持一個人為的低配息。 (我們不是責怪美聯儲：由於種種原因，在危機期間與造成的後果考量，一個全面的凍結是有其意義的。)
Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us $88 million in 1995, the year after we finished purchasing the stock. Every year since, Coke has increased its dividend. In 2011, we will almost certainly receive $376 million from Coke, up $24 million from last year. Within ten years, I would expect that $376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.
可能很快的，美聯儲的這項限制在某個時點將被解除。富國銀行就可以恢復合理的股利政策，這是股東應得的。同時，我們希望光靠股息每年增加數百個數百萬美元。我們的其他公司也可能增加他們的股息。1995年，我們完成收購可口可樂後的那年，可口可樂我們支付8800萬美元。之後的每一年，可口可樂都增加配息。2011年，我們幾乎肯定會從從可口可樂獲得 3.76億美元，同去年增加2400萬美元。我預計十年內這3.76億美元可以再增加一倍。到這期間結束時，看到我們持有可口可樂年收益的部份超過我們所付出投資金額的100％，我也不會感到驚訝。時間是卓越公司的朋友。
Overall, I believe our “normal” investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.
總的來說，雖然我剛說明的贖回部份會降低我們2011年的投資收益，也許2012年也會，但我相信我們的'正常'的投資收益將至少相當於我們在2010年實現的部份。
************
Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 – an age Charlie and
I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire – his call was a surprise.
去年夏天，婁辛普森(Lou Simpson)告訴我，他希望退休。由於 Lou僅僅只有74歲 – 一個查理和我認為在波克夏當實習生剛剛好的年紀 - 他的要求是一個驚喜(譯者按：令我訝異)。
Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been
invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only
because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?
Lou在1979年加入GEICO公司擔任投資經理，他的表現，對公司而言一直是無法衡量的(無價的)。在2004年的年報中，我詳細閱讀他在投資股票上的紀錄，然後只因為他的績效使我的臉色難看，所以我就直接忽略了。誰需要呢？(譯者按：意思應該是只有一次績效不好，所以巴菲特並不在意)
Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.
Lou從來就不會宣傳自己的才能。但我會：很簡單，Lou是投資大師之一。我們會想念他。
************
Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren’t around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.
四年前，我告訴你們，我們需要添加一個或更多的年輕投資管理者，以確保查理，婁和我都不在時候可以繼續經營下去。當時我們有多個傑出的候選人可以立即勝任我CEO的職位（如我們現在要做的），但我們在投資領域並沒有人選。
It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of – and sensitivity to – risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.
去辨認很多投資經理人最近優秀的紀錄是簡單的。但是過去的成績固然重要，卻還不足以用來評斷未來的績效。 這些記錄如何被達到是至關重要的，因為這是攸關經理人對風險的了解程度和敏感度。（太多學者採用β值來衡量是絕對行不通的。）關於風險的標準，我們正在尋找擁有某項技能的人，但這項技能難以評估：有能力預見別人觀察不到的經濟前景與後果的人。 最後，我們希望這個人認為波克夏工作是遠遠不僅僅只是一般的工作而已。
When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with
Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have
arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by
undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have
received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their
limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started
another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past
losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.
當查理和我遇見了泰德康姆斯(Todd Combs)，我們知道他符合我們的要求。泰德跟婁一樣的支薪條件，將獲得支付薪金，另外以他相對於S&P500的操作績效為基礎給予獎金。對於延遲跟推展部份我們都已經安排到位，以防止拉鋸的績效得到不當的支付。對沖基金存在的世界出現了一些可怕的行為，當獲利在上升時，這些合夥人獲得巨大的派息，但當壞的結果發生，他們帶著金錢離開，而他們的有限合夥人則將稍早的獲利吐回去。有時，這些相同的普通合夥人很快在隨後就又募集了一個基金，使他們可以立即參加今後的利潤，而不必克服過去的虧損。 把錢交給這些經理人的投資者應該被標記為容易受騙的人，而不是合作夥伴。
As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire’s holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as “long-short,” “macro,” “international equities.” At Berkshire our only style box is “smart.”)
只要我是CEO，我將繼續管理絕大多數波克夏的持股，包含債券和股票。 泰德最初將管理資金1-3億美元左右，這金額將每年調整一次。 他的重點將是股票，但他並不限於這種形式的投資。 （基金顧問喜歡要求操作風格，如'多空策略'，'宏觀策略'，'國際股票等'。在波克夏我們唯一的操作風格是”聰明點”。）
Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.
長期來看，如果我們能找得到合適的人，我們可能添加一個或兩個投資經理人。如果我們做到這一點，我們可能每位經理人80％的績效獎酬都仰賴他的投資組合和20%來自其他經理人的。 我們希望有一個獎酬制度，不只根據個人的成功來支付，也要能促進合作，而非競爭。
When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted – but not to have a vote – on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.
當查理和我都不在時，我們的投資經理人(們)將為整個投資組合負起全責，然後由CEO和董事會來規範設置。因為好的投資者會對企業併購帶來了有益的觀點，因此在可能的併購案上，我們希望他們能被諮商 – 而不只是投一票而已。最後，當然還是由董事會作出任何重大併購決定。
One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd’s joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was “little-known” and expressed puzzlement that we didn’t seek a “big-name.” I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Ajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops – that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)
註：當我們發出關於泰德加入我們的新聞稿時，一些評論者指出，他”鮮為人知”，並對我們沒有尋求”大牌”表示困惑。 我不知道他們當中的多少人知道1979年時的婁(Lou)，1985年的阿吉特(Ajit)，或者，1959年的查理。我們的目標是要找到一個 2歲的Secretariat，而不是一個 10歲的Seabiscuit。 （哎呀 – 從一個80歲的CEO說出口，這可能不是最聰明的比喻呀。）(譯者按：Secretariat是電影奔騰人生(2010)的動物主角「秘書」，故事是改編1973年神駒三冠王的故事；而Seabiscuit是電影奔騰年代(2003)的電影主角「海餅乾」，故事是改編1938經濟大蕭條的一個賽馬傳奇)
Derivatives
衍生性金融商品
Two years ago, in the 2008 Annual Report, I told you that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operations at our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the few left over at Gen Re). Today, the comparable number is 203, a figure reflecting both a few additions to our portfolio and the unwinding or expiration of some contracts.
兩年前，在2008的年報中，我告訴你們，波克夏身為251個衍生金融商品合約的交易方（除了那些用於我們附屬公司的營運上之外的部份，如中美能源，與少部分在Gen Re裡面的）。到今天，這個數目為203個，這個數字既反映了一些我們投資組合增加的部份以及一些合約的平倉或到期。
Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging us in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks that others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk. That’s important.
我們續存的部位，所有由我本人親自負責，主要可以分為兩類。我們認為這兩個分類都是被視為類似保險的活動，我們收到保費來承擔別人不希望發生的可能風險。事實上，在這些衍生性金融交易中，跟我們保險業務中使用的思維流程是相同的。你們也應該明白，當我們開始執行合約時，就先得到支付，因此沒有對手風險。 這很重要。
Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.
我們的第一類衍生金融性商品包括在2004-2008年簽的契約，如果有一些包含高收益指數的債券違約時，需要由我們支付。在過去五年來，除了少數例外，我們這些合約承擔了一百家企業的風險。
In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float.
總的來說，這些合約讓我們收到保費34億元。當我在2007年年報首次針對這些契約向你們說明時，我說，我預計這些合約將帶給我們“承保利潤”，意思是我們的損失將小於我們收到的保險費。 此外，我說我們將因為使用這些浮存金而受益。
Subsequently, as you know too well, we encountered both a financial panic and a severe recession. A number of the companies in the high-yield indices failed, which required us to pay losses of $2.5 billion. Today, however, our exposure is largely behind us because most of our higher-risk contracts have expired. Consequently, it appears almost certain that we will earn an underwriting profit as we originally anticipated. In addition, we have had the use of interest-free float that averaged about $2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago.
隨後，就像你們清楚了解的，我們遭遇了金融恐慌和嚴重的衰退。一些在高收益指數編列內的公司違約，就造成我們支付25億美元的損失。然而到今天，曝險的部份已經遠離我們，因為大部分高風險的合約已經過期。因此，看來幾乎可以肯定，我們將獲得那些承保利潤，一如我們原先的預期。此外，在這些合約存續期間，我們動用過這些平均約200億美元的免息浮存金。 總之，我們收取的保險費溢價了，而且在三年前商業環境很糟糕的時候，也保護了我們。
Our other large derivatives position – whose contracts go by the name of “equity puts” – involves insurance we wrote for parties wishing to protect themselves against a possible decline in equity prices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts are tied to various equity indices, such as the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the FTSE 100 in the U.K. In the 2004-2008 period, we received $4.8 billion of premiums for 47 of these contracts, most of which ran for 15 years. On these contracts, only the price of the indices on the termination date counts: No payments can be required before then.
我們的其他大型衍生性商品部位 – 這些被稱為”權益賣權”的合約 - 涉及一個保險，與我們的對手方希望自己企業在美國、英國、歐洲或日本的公司股價能免受可能下降的風險。這些合約都是連結各種股票指數，如在美國的S＆P 500指數、在英國的FTSE 100等。在2004-2008年期間，我們在47個這樣的合約中收取48億美元保費，其中大部分是15年的契約。在這些合約中，只有在合約終止日的股價指數才被拿來計算：在此之前不可要求付款。
As a first step in updating you about these contracts, I can report that late in 2010, at the instigation of our counterparty, we unwound eight contracts, all of them due between 2021 and 2028. We had originally received $647 million in premiums for these contracts, and the unwinding required us to pay $425 million. Consequently, we realized a gain of $222 million and also had the interest-free and unrestricted use of that $647 million for about three years.
更新大家對這些合約資訊的第一步，就是我可以向你們報告，2010年年底，在我們交易對手的要求下，我們有八個合約平倉，他們的存續期間都介於2021年和2028年之間。我們原本收到的保費收入為 6.47億美元，這些合約和平倉需要我們付出4.25億美元。 因此，我們實現了2.22億美元的收益，還得到6.47億美元三年左右的免息及無限制使用。
Those 2010 transactions left us with 39 equity put contracts remaining on our books at yearend. On these, at their initiation, we received premiums of $4.2 billion.
這些交易後使我們在2010年年底的帳上剩下39個權益賣權契約。 而這些契約的最初，我們收到的保費達42億美元。
The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 – and foreign exchange rates are unchanged – we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount “settlement value.”
這些合約的未來當然是不確定的。但這裡有一個角度可以觀察他們。如果有關指數地價格在合約期滿與在2010年12月31日是相同的，- 且匯率不變 - 我們將在2018到2026年的到期期間內欠下38美元。你可以稱這個數額為「結算價值」。
On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at $6.7 billion. In other words, if the prices of the relevant indices remain unchanged from that date, we will record a $2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of $6.7 billion and the settlement value of $3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that, of course, is far from a sure thing.
但是在我們今年年底資產負債表，我們將這些剩下的權益賣權列舉了為負債共67億美元。 換句話說，如果有關指數的價格保持不變，那到期時，我們將記錄一個29億美元的獲利，就是負債67億與結算價38億之間的差額。我相信，從現在到結算期間，股價將很可能增加，而且我們的負債將大大的減少。如果是這樣的話，我們的獲利將會更好。 但是，當然，這件事離確定還很遠。
What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of $4.2 billion for an average of about 10 more years. (Neither this float nor that arising from the high-yield contracts is included in the insurance float figure of $66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.
可以肯定的是，我們每年將有42億美元的存浮金可供使用，可以用十幾年。 （在保險存浮金中，不含此存浮金也不包含高收益契約增加的存浮金部分的數字為 660億美元。）由於金錢是用來交換的，這些資金的一部份被認為有助於購買 BNSF的。
As I have told you before, almost all of our derivatives contracts are free of any obligation to post collateral – a fact that cut the premiums we could otherwise have charged. But that fact also left us feeling comfortable during the financial crisis, allowing us in those days to commit to some advantageous purchases. Foregoing some additional derivatives premiums proved to be well worth it.
正如我之前告訴你的，幾乎所有我們被當作是抵押品的衍生性金融商品合約都是零成本的 - 事實上這些被減少的保費我們都可以用其他方式去收費。也因為這樣讓我們安然的度過金融危機，也讓我們在那些日子能夠去做一些更有利的併購。 上述這些額外的衍生性金融商品的風險貼水被證明是相當值得的。
On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don’t
報告和誤報： 哪些數字在財報中算數？
Earlier in this letter, I pointed out some numbers that Charlie and I find useful in valuing Berkshire and measuring its progress.
在此封信的前頭，我指出了一些數字，這些數字是評估波克夏及其運作中，查理，我認為最有用。
Let’s focus here on a number we omitted, but which many in the media feature above all others: net income. Important though that number may be at most companies, it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire. Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could – quite legally – cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.
讓我們聚焦在一個我們省略的數字，但在媒體上都會相當關注的數字：純益(netincome)。這個數字雖然對大多數公司來說相當重要，但它對波克夏而言，幾乎沒有任何意義。不論我們的企業如何營運，查理跟我都可以很合法的在任何特定時間做出任何我們想要的純益數字。
We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a $10 billion increase in unrealized gains in a given year and concurrently had $1 billion of realized losses. Our net income – which would count only the loss – would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved.
我們可以這麼有彈性是因為投資的已實現損益會計入純益中，而未實現損益（在大多數情況下都是損失）卻被排除在外。例如，假設波克夏在某一年增加了100億美元的未實現收益，並同時有已實現損失10億美元。我們的純益 - 只計算損失的純益 - 將被報告為小於我們的營運收入。如果我們同時在前一年又有實現收益時，媒體標題可能會宣布我們的獲利下降了X％，但事實上我們的業務可能是大大的改善。
If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for “game playing” with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.
如果我們真的認為純益重要，我們可以定期讓它變成只是已實現收益，因為我們有大量的未實現收益可以提取。請放心，，查理和我從來沒有賣了這些證券，因為出售的結果將會很快的反應在我們的純益報告上。我們都深深厭惡玩”數字遊戲”，這種做法在90年待的美國公司相當猖獗，，但至今仍然存在，只是它發生的不那麼頻繁，比起過去已經沒那麼明目張膽。
Operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing. Ignore our net income figure, however. Regulations require that we report it to you. But if you find reporters focusing on it, that will speak more to their performance than ours.
儘管有一些缺點，但一般來說營運收益是了解我們企業正在做什麼的合理指南。但可以忽略我們的純益數字。反正法規也會要求我們提供報告給你。但是，如果您發現記者關注它，這將更多地講他們的績效多於我們的。(譯者按：記者總講太多有的沒的)
Both realized and unrealized gains and losses are fully reflected in the calculation of our book value. Pay attention to the changes in that metric and to the course of our operating earnings, and you will be on the right track.
已實現及未實現損益完全反映在我們的帳面價值計算。注意該指標的變化，以及我們的營運收益部分，你會在正確的軌道上。
************
As a p.s., I can’t resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had a termination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay $6.4 billion to our counterparties at that date. Security prices then generally rose in the next quarter, a move that brought the corresponding figure down to $5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from $8.9 billion to $9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.
作為一個 PS，我無法抗拒的指出淨利是有多麼善變。假如將我們的權益賣權到期日訂在2010年的6月30日，我們將被要求在該日期支付給我們的對手交易方64億美元。然後證券價格在下一季普遍上漲，此舉帶來的相應數字在9月30日則下降至58億美元。然而，我們用來評估這些契約的Black - Scholes公式，要求我們在此期間將我們資產負債表的負債部份從89億美元增加到96億美元，這一變化後，影響稅收預付費用，減少了我們本季4.55億美元的純益。
Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.
查理跟我都認為對於長天期的選擇權來說，Black – Scholes模型會出現相當不適當的評價。在兩年前的年報中我們舉了一個荒唐的例子。更切實地，我們直接把錢用在我們的權益賣權契約上以實踐我們所說的。藉由這樣做，我們可以保守的說，我們的對手或是他們的顧客採用Black - Scholes計算出來的估價是錯誤的。
We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation – almost all leading business schools teach it – and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use BlackScholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.
不過我們繼續使用該公式在我們的財務報表裡。Black – Scholes模型是被接受的選擇權評價標準 - 幾乎所有的著名商學院都有教 –我們不得不按它計算，否則會受到指責，還會給審計帶來難以解決的問題。此外，如果我們這麼做的話(譯者按：如果我們不使用這個公式的話)，我們將造成我們的審計人員難以逾越的問題：因為我們的交易對手也採用此公式，如果雙方的評估方法相差太大，審計就無法證明他們與我們評估的精確度。
Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure – anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.
審計和監管者借助於該定價公式的部分原因是它能提供精確的數字。查理和我無法支持這個論點。我們相信，我們合約裡的真正負債部分要遠遠低於Black – Scholes所計算出來的，但我們無法拿出一個確切的數字 – 一個比GEICO、BNSF或者波克夏本身所代表的價值還要精確。對此，我們並不擔心，因為近似的正確好過精確的錯誤。
John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it “anomalies.” (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)
John Kenneth Galbraith曾悄悄地觀察到，他們在研究院學到的觀點能用一輩子。大學的財金系通常表現都差不多。上世紀七、八十年代，幾乎所有人都固執地堅持效率市場理論，輕蔑地稱駁倒這一理論的有力事實為「反常現象」。 （我總是喜歡這種類型的解釋：「地平說學會」（The Flat Earth Society）可能認為輪船環遊地球令人討厭、不合邏輯且不正常。）
Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.
我們需要重新審視大學教師將Black - Scholes作為披露真相的現行方法來教授，也要重新審視大學教師詳述期權訂價的傾向。即使沒有絲毫評價期權的能力，你一樣可以成為非常成功的投資者。學生應該學習的是，是如何評價一個企業。這就是投資的全部。
Life and Debt
生活與債務
The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.
賽車的基本原則是，首先得要完成它，你必須首先好好跑完。 這一格言同樣適用於波克夏的企業以及指導我們的每個行動。
Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade – and some relearned in 2008 – any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.
毫無疑問，有些人透過借錢投資已經變得非常豐富。然而，這也一直是變得一貧如洗的方法。 當槓桿作用，它放大您的收益。你的配偶會認為你很聰明，和你的鄰居會羨慕。 但是槓桿會上癮。 一旦享受過他的美好，很少有人能撤退到更為保守的做法。就像我們在小學三年級學到的 – 有些人在2008年又再學一次 - 任何的正數，不論這個數字多麼大到令人印象深刻，只要乘上零就一次蒸發。歷史告訴我們，既使是僱用非常聰明的人，用槓桿也可能常常帶來很多零。
Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.
當然對企業來說，槓桿也可能致命的。 許多負債累累的公司認為債務到期時可以靠繼續融資解決，這種假定通常是有效的。但是一旦企業本身特定的問題或者全球信用出現危機，到期債務就必須如約清償，屆時只有現金才能完成這項工作。
Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.
這些借款人將學到，信用就像氧氣。當他相當豐富時，它的存在就被忽視。但當他消失時，這一切又變得相當重要。即使短暫的信貸危機也可能使企業崩潰，事實上，2008年9月一夜之間席卷多個經濟部門的信貸危機使整個美國陷入癱瘓狀態。
Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s wellbeing. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.
查理跟我對於任何可能給波克夏帶來絲毫威脅的活動沒有興趣。（我們倆加起來已經167歲，「從頭再來」可不在我們的水桶名單內。）我們永遠謹記一個事實：你們，也就是我們的合夥人，往往將將積蓄的很大一部分信託給我們。此外，一些重要的慈善活動也依賴於我們的審慎決定。最後，許多因事故造成傷殘的受害人依賴於我們從現在開始十幾年的保險服務。如果為了追求額外的一點利潤而使這麼多人面臨風險，那將是不負責任的。
A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.
一點點個人的歷史可以部分解釋我們的金融冒險主義的極端厭惡。直到他三十五歲查理才遇到我，儘管我在他長大100碼內的地方已經住了52年，還就讀了奧馬哈內的公立高中，我的父親，妻子，孩子和兩個孫子都是那裡畢業的。然而查理和我一樣，也都在當年那個在我祖父雜貨店裡工作過，雖然我們的受僱期間相距約五年。我祖父的名字是恩斯特，也許沒有一個人更貼切地命名。 沒有人為恩斯特工作，即使一個受到經驗形塑的股票男孩。
On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found – along with $1,000 of cash – when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.
再接下來的頁面你可以看到在1939年恩斯特致函給他最小的兒子，我的叔叔弗雷德。類似的信件他其他四個孩子也有。我仍然保有他寄給我姨媽愛麗絲的信，隨著1000美元的現金一起，因為在1970年時我是她的遺產執行人，我打開了她的保管箱被我發現。
Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his $1,000 solution a bit further and have pledged that we will hold at least $10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least $20 billion on hand so that we can both withstand unprecedented insurance losses (our largest to date having been about $3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil
恩斯特從未上過商業學校 - 事實上，他從來沒有讀完高中 - 但他理解流動性是為保證生存的條件之重要性。 在波克夏，我們已採取了他1,000元解決方案的這個想法，並承諾我們將至少持有100億美元的現金，不包括在我們受管制的公用事業和鐵路業務。由於這一承諾，我們通常保持至少200億美元在手，使我們都能承受得了前所未有的保險損失（我們迄今最大的金額是來自卡翠那颶風帶來約30億美元的損失，保險業最昂貴的災難），並且在金融風暴時期也能迅速抓住收購或投資機會。
We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.
我們的現金主要以美國國庫券形式存在，而避免持有利率略高幾個基點的其他短期證券。我們在之前長期堅持的觀點：商業債券和貨幣市場基金的脆弱性，在2008年9月便明顯顯露出來。我們同意投資作家雷迪沃的觀察，'更多的錢已經失去了深遠的產量比在點槍'。在波克夏，我們不依賴銀行，我們不會訂立需要要求抵押品的合約，除了那些與我們的流動性資產相比微小的數額。
Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about $1 billion per month. Our net worth has thus increased from $48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.
此外，波克夏過去40年來從未分紅或回購股票，相反的，我們將所有的盈利都用於強化業務，現在月度盈利已超過10億美元。在這40年中，我們的凈資產從4800萬美元增長至1570億美元，幾十年下來我們的內在價值增加的非常多，沒有任何其他美國公司像我們這樣重視財務實力。
By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.
因為對槓桿的謹慎，我們的報酬率略受影響。 但是有流動性現金讓我們能睡得安穩。此外，在偶爾爆發的經濟危機中，其他公司都為生存而掙扎，而我們則裝備好充沛資金和精神準備去發動攻勢。這也是為什麼2008年雷曼兄弟破產後市場一片恐慌，而我們得以在25天內投資了156億美元。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.
本屆年會將於 4月30日星期六召開。從我們總公司來的嘉莉凱澤Carrie Kizer將成為掌門人，她今年的主題是飛機，火車和汽車。 這使NetJets，BNSF公司和比亞迪有機會秀一下。
As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)
同往常一樣，奎斯特中心的大門會在早上七點準時敞開。八點半放映一部新的波克夏影片。九點半直接進入問答時間並持續到下午三點半(中間在奎斯特用午餐)。在一個短暫的休息後，我和查理將在三點四十五分做會議總結。如果你決定在問答時間離開，請在查理講話的時候走(但要快，他講話很簡短)。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,053 pairs of Justin boots, 12,416 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Dairy Queen Blizzards® and 8,800 Quikut knives (that’s 16 knives per minute). But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t learned where to shop.
離開會議去做的最佳活動當然是購物。我們將在19萬四千三百坪米的相鄰大廳裡擺滿各種波克夏相關商品。去年大家買東西都很努力，大多銷售額破了紀錄。 在九個小時內，我們賣1053雙賈斯汀靴，12416鎊的喜思糖果，8000盒冰雪皇后乳品和8800支 Quikut knives（這是每分鐘 16支）。 但是你們可以做的更好。 記住：任何人說誰的錢不能買到幸福，那是因為他們根本沒有學會在哪裡購物。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO將設一個攤位，有來自全國的優秀顧問為您服務，竭誠為您提供汽車保險建議。 GEICO將給您一個股東折扣(通常是8%)。我們開展業務的51個區域中的44個都允許了這個特別優惠。 (額外提示：這個折扣可以累積在其他優惠上)把你現在的保險拿來，看看能否再省點錢。我相信你們中至少50%我們可以做到。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can’t read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
一定要光顧書蟲書吧。它提供60餘種書和DVD，其中包含《可憐查理編年史(Poor Charlie's Almanac)》的中文版，這是我合夥人的故事，很受歡迎。所以如果你不能閱讀中文？ 只要購買一個拷貝，把它周圍，它會讓你看起來文雅和博學。 。如果您需要將買的書郵寄回去的話，旁邊就有郵遞服務。
If you are a big spender – or merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.
如果您是一位購物狂——或者只是喜歡到處看看，可以在周六中午到下午五點光顧奧瑪哈機場東側的伊里亞特飛機(Elliott Aviation)。 NetJet公司的飛機艦隊將讓您心跳加速。讓你坐公車來，搭私人飛機離開。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
有一個隨信附件告訴您如何獲取參會憑證，來參加會議和其它活動。至於航班、酒店和汽車租賃，我們仍將與美國運通(800-799-6634)合作，為您提供專門的服務。凱若-佩德森(Carol Pedersen)將一如既往為我們處理相關事務，我知道這很繁雜，在此對她表示感謝。酒店房間可能很難找，但是通過凱若應該能訂到。
Airlines have often jacked up prices – sometimes dramatically so – for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 21⁄2 hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.
航空公司往往抬高價格，有時甚至會大幅調高週末到波克夏的部份。如果你來自相當遙遠，可以比較一下飛往堪薩斯城與奧馬哈的成本。大約是兩個半小時，特別是你本來就不打算在奧馬哈租一輛車，這可能可以為你節省大量資金。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that – as far as I know – exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anyplace. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
內布拉斯加家具商場(NFM)位於72街上，道奇和太平洋之間，佔地77英畝，在這裡我們將再次召開“波克夏週末”特價促銷。去年年會時，該商店也做出3330萬美元的業績。據我所知，這超過了任何一家零售店一個星期的總和。有要得到波克夏折扣，你必須在四月二十六日週二到五月二日週一之間光臨並出示參會證。本季特價包括了幾個大牌產品，這幾個牌子通常是沒有任何折扣的，但由於是股東周末，所以有例外。我們感謝他們的支持。 NFM在周一至週六早十點到晚九點開放，週日是早上十點到晚上六點。週六下午五點半到晚八點，NFM都舉行燒烤晚會，邀請所有與會者。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st , from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men’s shirts at J.C. Penney’s 63 years ago. I’ve told Susan Jacques, Borsheims’ CEO, that I’m still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.
在Borsheim's，我們將再次召開兩場股東專屬的活動。首先將是一個雞尾酒招待會，在四月二十九日週五下午六點到晚上九點。然後是一個大型聚會，在五月依日週日早上九點到下午四點。週六，我們將開放到下午六點。週日則到下午一點左右，我會在在Borsheims帶著微笑跟擦亮的皮鞋，就像我在63年前的JC Penney賣男士襯衫一樣般的，賣珠寶首飾。我告訴蘇珊雅克(Susan Jacques)，Borsheims的CEO，我還是個炙手可熱的推銷員。 但我看到懷疑她的眼睛。 所以叫你的妻子或戀人(大概是同一人)要向我多買點東西，少砍點價，讓我看起來不錯。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire shareholder.
週末我們將在Borsheim's迎來大批顧客。為了您的方便，股東優惠將從四月二十五日週一持續到五月七日週六。在此期間，請出示您的參會卡或者股東證明來享受優惠。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
週日，在Borsheim's外面的大廳，兩屆美國國際象棋冠軍帕特里克-沃夫(Patrick Wolff)將以一敵六，盲棋應戰挑戰者。著名的達拉斯魔術師貝克(Norman Beck)將進行精彩表演。此外，我們將有Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg，兩個世界頂尖的橋樑專家，在週日下午提供給我們的股東發揮橋藝。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and – still being a growing boy – I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.
高瑞特餐館(Gorat's)跟皮科洛(Piccolo's)將再次於五月依日週日開放給波克夏股東專屬，高瑞特是從下午一點開始而皮科洛是從下午四點，兩家都一直開到晚上十點。這兩家餐廳都是我的最愛，也都在持續成長，我計劃在週日傍晚兩個餐廳都要去。記住，要在高瑞特訂餐，請在四月一日撥打電話402-551-3733(但不要提前)，皮科洛電話是402-342-9038。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
今年我們將同樣由這三位財經記者主持問答時間，他們將通過電子郵件收集股東的問題，並對我和查理進行提問。這三位記者和他們的電子郵件是：財富雜誌的Carol Loomis, e-mail：cloomis@fortunemail.com，CNBC記者Becky Quick，BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, 紐約時報記者Andrew Ross Sorkin， arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
從提交的問題中，每位記者將選擇十幾個他認為最有趣最重要的問題。希望你們的郵件盡量簡潔明了，並且不超過兩個問題。 (並註明是否介意透露姓名。)
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the
journalists will pick some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it.
我和查理事先都不知道問題。記者們會挑選一些有挑戰性的，這正是我們所喜歡的。
We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those
shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the
journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our
standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting
discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.
我們將在周六八點十五分通過十三支麥克風抽籤選出問題。在會議上，我將輪流回答記者提的問題和抽中的問題。我們希望至少回答60個問題，從我們的角度來看，多多益善。我們的目標，就是我們希望每年都透過這些信件和我們會議的討論，讓你更了解你自己所擁有的企業。
************
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
基於好的理由，我經常歌頌我們的經營管理者的成就。 但同樣重要的，是在企業辦公室跟我一起工作的是20名男女（通通都在一層樓裡，我們也打算這樣繼續下去！）。
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097- page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
這個團隊有效地處理了SEC的許多事務和其他監管機關的要求，歸檔處理了14097頁聯邦所得稅納稅申報表以及本國與外國收益率，回應了無數股東和傳媒的查詢，產出年度報告，準備為全國最大的年度會議上，協調董事會的活動 – 還有很多不勝枚舉的例子。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.
他們處理所有這些業務，令人難以置信的有效率，使我的生活輕鬆和快樂。 他們的努力也顯現在波克夏相關的活動上：他們處理 48所大學（選自200名申請人）到底誰本學期能將學生送到奧馬哈與我相處一天，同時也處理各種我收到的請求，安排我的行程，甚至午餐幫我帶漢堡，。 有沒有CEO可以(像我)這麼好了。
This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30th and tell them so.
對辦公室的組員我有最深切的感謝，這也是你們應得的。四月三十日來我們的資本主義伍德斯托克節吧，並這麼告訴他們。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 26, 2011
華倫巴菲特
董事長
2011年2月26日
Memo
February 26, 2011
華倫巴菲特
董事長
2011年2月26日
Memo
To: Berkshire Hathaway Managers (“The All-Stars”)
TO: 波克夏經理人們 (我的全明星隊員)
cc: Berkshire Directors
複本：波克夏執行長
From: Warren E. Buffett
來自：華倫巴菲特
Date: July 26, 2010
日期：2010年七月二十六日
This is my biennial letter to reemphasize Berkshire’s top priority and to get your help on succession planning (yours, not mine!).
這是兩年一度，為了再次強調波克夏的首要任務，而且要繼續下去需要你們的幫助(而不是我的)而寫的信。
The priority is that all of us continue to zealously guard Berkshire’s reputation. We can’t be perfect but we can try to be. As I’ve said in these memos for more than 25 years: “We can afford to lose money – even a lot of money. But we can’t afford to lose reputation – even a shred of reputation.” We must continue to measure every act against not only what is legal but also what we would be happy to have written about on the front page of a national newspaper in an article written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter.
重點是，我們所有人都要有熱誠，將繼續守護著波克夏的信譽。我們不能完美，但是我們可以試著完美。正如我所說的這些話，這些備忘已經超過二十五年了，”我們賠得起錢，即使是很多錢，但我們賠不起信譽，即使是一點點信譽”。我們必須繼續衡量我們的每一個舉動，這些舉動不只是要合法的，也要是我們樂於被那些不友善、但聰明的記者刊登在全國性報紙上的頭條新聞。
Sometimes your associates will say “Everybody else is doing it.” This rationale is almost always a bad one if it is the main justification for a business action. It is totally unacceptable when evaluating a moral decision. Whenever somebody offers that phrase as a rationale, in effect they are saying that they can’t come up with a good reason. If anyone gives this explanation, tell them to try using it with a reporter or a judge and see how far it gets them.
有時候你的同事會說：”其他人都在做”。如果他的主要理由是因為業務行為需要的話，這理由通常是不好的。當作為道德上考量，這是完全不能被接受的。每當有人提出這麼一句話作為理由，實際上他們是在說，他們拿不出一個很好的理由。如果有人給出一個這樣的解釋，那麼叫他們去跟法官跟記者說吧，看看這理由離說服他們有多遠。
If you see anything whose propriety or legality causes you to hesitate, be sure to give me a call. However, it’s very likely that if a given course of action evokes such hesitation, it’s too close to the line and should be abandoned. There’s plenty of money to be made in the center of the court. If it’s questionable whether some action is close to the line, just assume it is outside and forget it.
如果你看到任何事在正當性與合法性讓你有疑慮的，請務必打電話給我。然而，如果採取某些行動會造成之後有類似這樣的疑慮，它可能太接近那個道德底線而你應該放棄這樣做。在法院裡面總是有很多錢。如果某些行為是相當接近底限的，那麼它應該是有問題的，只要假設那些錢都在別處外了，然後忘了他。
As a corollary, let me know promptly if there’s any significant bad news. I can handle bad news but I don’t like to deal with it after it has festered for awhile. A reluctance to face up immediately to bad news is what turned a problem at Salomon from one that could have easily been disposed of into one that almost caused the demise of a firm with 8,000 employees.
總之，如果有什麼重大的壞消息，請及時讓我知道。我能夠應付壞消息，但是我不喜歡在他腐爛一段時間後才處理它。不願立刻面對壞消息的後果就像所羅門證券，一家擁有八千名員工的公司差點讓一個很簡單處理的問題搞倒。
Somebody is doing something today at Berkshire that you and I would be unhappy about if we knew of it. That’s inevitable: We now employ more than 250,000 people and the chances of that number getting through the day without any bad behavior occurring is nil. But we can have a huge effect in minimizing such activities by jumping on anything immediately when there is the slightest odor of impropriety. Your attitude on such matters, expressed by behavior as well as words, will be the most important factor in how the culture of your business develops. Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.
今天如果讓我知道有人在波克夏這麼做，查理跟我都會很不高興。這是不可避免的：現在我們僱用了超過二十五萬員工，日子久了沒有壞行為的機率幾乎是不可能沒有。但我們可以藉由對稍有不當的氣氛與情況時便馬上處理的方式，將這樣的問題最小化，並達到最好的效果。你的態度跟表現出來的行為是否言行一致，是你的企業發展中，最重要的因素。企業文化，是比制度規範更重要，決定了你的組織行為。
In other respects, talk to me about what is going on as little or as much as you wish. Each of you does a first-class job of running your operation with your own individual style and you don’t need me to help. The only items you need to clear with me are any changes in post-retirement benefits and any unusually large capital expenditures or acquisitions.
在其他方面，或多或少跟我說一下你們希望怎麼做就好。你們每一個都在用自己的風格去經營自己的企業，做第一流的工作，並不需要我的協助。唯一需要跟我弄清楚的，就是退休後的紅利計算改變，以及任何大筆不尋常的資本支出跟收購。
************
I need your help in respect to the question of succession. I’m not looking for any of you to retire and I hope you all live to 100. (In Charlie’s case, 110.) But just in case you don’t, please send me a letter (at home if you wish) giving your recommendation as who should take over tomorrow if you should become incapacitated overnight. These letters will be seen by no one but me unless I’m no longer CEO, in which case my successor will need the information. Please summarize the strengths and weaknesses of your primary candidate as well as any possible alternates you may wish to include. Most of you have participated in this exercise in the past and others have offered your ideas verbally. However, it’s important to me to get a periodic update, and now that we have added so many businesses, I need to have your thoughts in writing rather than trying to carry them around in my memory. Of course, there are a few operations that are run by two or more of you – such as the Blumkins, the Merschmans, the pair at Applied Underwriters, etc. – and in these cases, just forget about this item. Your note can be short, informal, handwritten, etc. Just mark it “Personal for Warren.”
cc: Berkshire Directors
複本：波克夏執行長
From: Warren E. Buffett
來自：華倫巴菲特
Date: July 26, 2010
日期：2010年七月二十六日
This is my biennial letter to reemphasize Berkshire’s top priority and to get your help on succession planning (yours, not mine!).
這是兩年一度，為了再次強調波克夏的首要任務，而且要繼續下去需要你們的幫助(而不是我的)而寫的信。
The priority is that all of us continue to zealously guard Berkshire’s reputation. We can’t be perfect but we can try to be. As I’ve said in these memos for more than 25 years: “We can afford to lose money – even a lot of money. But we can’t afford to lose reputation – even a shred of reputation.” We must continue to measure every act against not only what is legal but also what we would be happy to have written about on the front page of a national newspaper in an article written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter.
重點是，我們所有人都要有熱誠，將繼續守護著波克夏的信譽。我們不能完美，但是我們可以試著完美。正如我所說的這些話，這些備忘已經超過二十五年了，”我們賠得起錢，即使是很多錢，但我們賠不起信譽，即使是一點點信譽”。我們必須繼續衡量我們的每一個舉動，這些舉動不只是要合法的，也要是我們樂於被那些不友善、但聰明的記者刊登在全國性報紙上的頭條新聞。
Sometimes your associates will say “Everybody else is doing it.” This rationale is almost always a bad one if it is the main justification for a business action. It is totally unacceptable when evaluating a moral decision. Whenever somebody offers that phrase as a rationale, in effect they are saying that they can’t come up with a good reason. If anyone gives this explanation, tell them to try using it with a reporter or a judge and see how far it gets them.
有時候你的同事會說：”其他人都在做”。如果他的主要理由是因為業務行為需要的話，這理由通常是不好的。當作為道德上考量，這是完全不能被接受的。每當有人提出這麼一句話作為理由，實際上他們是在說，他們拿不出一個很好的理由。如果有人給出一個這樣的解釋，那麼叫他們去跟法官跟記者說吧，看看這理由離說服他們有多遠。
If you see anything whose propriety or legality causes you to hesitate, be sure to give me a call. However, it’s very likely that if a given course of action evokes such hesitation, it’s too close to the line and should be abandoned. There’s plenty of money to be made in the center of the court. If it’s questionable whether some action is close to the line, just assume it is outside and forget it.
如果你看到任何事在正當性與合法性讓你有疑慮的，請務必打電話給我。然而，如果採取某些行動會造成之後有類似這樣的疑慮，它可能太接近那個道德底線而你應該放棄這樣做。在法院裡面總是有很多錢。如果某些行為是相當接近底限的，那麼它應該是有問題的，只要假設那些錢都在別處外了，然後忘了他。
As a corollary, let me know promptly if there’s any significant bad news. I can handle bad news but I don’t like to deal with it after it has festered for awhile. A reluctance to face up immediately to bad news is what turned a problem at Salomon from one that could have easily been disposed of into one that almost caused the demise of a firm with 8,000 employees.
總之，如果有什麼重大的壞消息，請及時讓我知道。我能夠應付壞消息，但是我不喜歡在他腐爛一段時間後才處理它。不願立刻面對壞消息的後果就像所羅門證券，一家擁有八千名員工的公司差點讓一個很簡單處理的問題搞倒。
Somebody is doing something today at Berkshire that you and I would be unhappy about if we knew of it. That’s inevitable: We now employ more than 250,000 people and the chances of that number getting through the day without any bad behavior occurring is nil. But we can have a huge effect in minimizing such activities by jumping on anything immediately when there is the slightest odor of impropriety. Your attitude on such matters, expressed by behavior as well as words, will be the most important factor in how the culture of your business develops. Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.
今天如果讓我知道有人在波克夏這麼做，查理跟我都會很不高興。這是不可避免的：現在我們僱用了超過二十五萬員工，日子久了沒有壞行為的機率幾乎是不可能沒有。但我們可以藉由對稍有不當的氣氛與情況時便馬上處理的方式，將這樣的問題最小化，並達到最好的效果。你的態度跟表現出來的行為是否言行一致，是你的企業發展中，最重要的因素。企業文化，是比制度規範更重要，決定了你的組織行為。
In other respects, talk to me about what is going on as little or as much as you wish. Each of you does a first-class job of running your operation with your own individual style and you don’t need me to help. The only items you need to clear with me are any changes in post-retirement benefits and any unusually large capital expenditures or acquisitions.
在其他方面，或多或少跟我說一下你們希望怎麼做就好。你們每一個都在用自己的風格去經營自己的企業，做第一流的工作，並不需要我的協助。唯一需要跟我弄清楚的，就是退休後的紅利計算改變，以及任何大筆不尋常的資本支出跟收購。
************
I need your help in respect to the question of succession. I’m not looking for any of you to retire and I hope you all live to 100. (In Charlie’s case, 110.) But just in case you don’t, please send me a letter (at home if you wish) giving your recommendation as who should take over tomorrow if you should become incapacitated overnight. These letters will be seen by no one but me unless I’m no longer CEO, in which case my successor will need the information. Please summarize the strengths and weaknesses of your primary candidate as well as any possible alternates you may wish to include. Most of you have participated in this exercise in the past and others have offered your ideas verbally. However, it’s important to me to get a periodic update, and now that we have added so many businesses, I need to have your thoughts in writing rather than trying to carry them around in my memory. Of course, there are a few operations that are run by two or more of you – such as the Blumkins, the Merschmans, the pair at Applied Underwriters, etc. – and in these cases, just forget about this item. Your note can be short, informal, handwritten, etc. Just mark it “Personal for Warren.”
關於繼任的問題，我需要你們的幫忙。我還沒找到任何人可以接替你們，我希望你們都能活到一百歲。(查理的話要活到110歲)。但是為了預防萬一，請寄封信給我。(如果你願意的話在家寫也可以)，推薦一個假如你離開人世的話隔天馬上就可以繼任你的人選。除非我不在是CEO，否則這些信將不會被其他人看見，我的繼任者也需要這些資訊。請對你主要候選人及任何候補人選，簡要說明他們的長處與缺點，你們當中大部份過去都參予過這個工作，也有一些在口頭上提供了你們的想法。不過對我來說，重要的是要定期更新這些資訊，現在我們又增加了許企業，我需要你們將你們的想法變成書面形式，而不是只在我的記憶裡而已。當然，也是有一些公司是由兩個或更多人來領導營運的，例如Applied Underwriters的the Blumkins和the Merschmans，在這樣的情況下，請忘記這項任務。你提供的資料可以是短的，不正式的，手寫的，都可以，只要註明”限華倫專屬 ”即可。
Thanks for your help on all of this. And thanks for the way you run your businesses. You make my job easy.
這一切都感謝您們的協助。並感謝你們用自己的方式經營自己的企業。你們使我的工作變得簡單。
WEB/db
WEB(華倫巴菲特的縮寫)
P.S. Another minor request: Please turn down all proposals for me to speak, make contributions, intercede with the Gates Foundation, etc. Sometimes these requests for you to act as intermediary will be accompanied by “It can’t hurt to ask.” It will be easier for both of us if you just say “no.” As an added favor, don’t suggest that they instead write or call me. Multiply 76 businesses by the periodic “I think he’ll be interested in this one” and you can understand why it is better to say no firmly and immediately.
PS.另外有一個小請求：請回絕任何請求、或來自蓋茲基金會的說情等。有時候這些請求對你來說只是一個舉手之勞，覺得幫忙問問也沒關係，但如果你直接說不的話，這對我們來說會更加容易。另外，也不要建議他們改用寫信或是打電話給我。定期的以”我認為誰可能會對這家企業有興趣”的方式來審視76家企業，你就會了解為什麼堅決且立即說「不」是比較好的方式。