| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | ||||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | ||||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | ||||||
| Year | ||||||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 49.50 | 10.00 | |||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (3.40) | (11.70) | |||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 13.30 | 30.90 | |||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 77.80 | 11.00 | |||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | 19.40 | (8.40) | |||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | (4.60) | 3.90 | |||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 80.50 | 14.60 | |||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 8.10 | 18.90 | |||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (2.50) | (14.80) | |||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (48.70) | (26.40) | |||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 2.50 | 37.20 | |||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 129.30 | 23.60 | |||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | 46.80 | (7.40) | |||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 14.50 | 6.40 | |||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 102.50 | 18.20 | |||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.80 | 32.30 | |||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | 31.80 | (5.00) | |||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 38.40 | 21.40 | |||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 69.00 | 22.40 | |||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | (2.70) | 6.10 | |||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 93.70 | 31.60 | |||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 14.20 | 18.60 | |||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 4.60 | 5.10 | |||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 59.30 | 16.60 | |||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 84.60 | 31.70 | |||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (23.10) | (3.10) | |||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 35.60 | 30.50 | |||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 29.80 | 7.60 | |||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 38.90 | 1.10 | |||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 25.00 | 1.30 | |||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 57.40 | 37.60 | |||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 6.20 | 23.00 | |||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 34.90 | 33.40 | |||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 52.20 | 28.60 | |||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | (19.90) | 21.00 | |||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | 26.60 | (9.10) | |||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | 6.50 | (11.90) | |||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (3.80) | (22.10) | |||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 15.80 | 28.70 | |||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 4.30 | 10.90 | |||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 0.80 | 4.90 | |||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 24.10 | 15.80 | |||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 28.70 | 5.50 | |||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (31.80) | (37.00) | |||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 2.70 | 26.50 | |||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 21.40 | 15.10 | |||||
| 2011 | 4.60 | (4.70) | 2.10 | |||||
| 2012 | 14.40 | 16.80 | 16.00 | |||||
| 2013 | 18.20 | 32.70 | 32.40 | |||||
| 2014 | 8.30 | 27.00 | 13.70 | |||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2012 | 19.4% | 21.6% | 9.90 | |||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2012 | 751113.0% | 1826163.0% | 11196.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
A note to readers: Fifty years ago, today’s management took charge at Berkshire. For this Golden Anniversary, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger each wrote his views of what has happened at Berkshire during the past 50 years and what each expects during the next 50. Neither changed a word of his commentary after reading what the other had written. Warren’s thoughts begin on page 24 and Charlie’s on page 39. Shareholders, particularly new ones, may find it useful to read those letters before reading the report on 2014, which begins below.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.*
波克夏2014年的淨財富增加了183億美元，公司A類和B類股票的每股賬面價值增長8.3%。在過去50年中（即現有管理層接手公司開始），公司股票的每股賬面價值由19美元增長至146,186美元。年復合增長率為19.4%。Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2014 was $18.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 8.3%. Over the last 50 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.*
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
During our tenure, we have consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. We’ve done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that really counts: intrinsic business value.
在這半個世紀裡，我們持續不斷地將公司每股賬面價值與標普500的年度回報相比較。賬面價值雖然並不精準，但卻是行之有效的追踪工具，可以衡量對企業來說真正重要的東西——企業內在商業價值。
In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market.”
我們接手波克夏的前幾十年，賬面價值與內在價值之間的關聯性遠比現在要強，那時的確如此，因為波克夏當時大部分資產的價值都能持續反映出當時的市場價格，用華爾街的說法就是，大部分資產是“按市價計算的（marked to market）”。
Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.
今天，我們的重心已經發生重大變化，轉向擁有和運營大型商業資產。這其中不少企業的價值要遠遠超過他們基於成本計算的賬面價值。但是無論這些企業的價值增長到多高，其賬面價值從未向上修正過。結果就是，波克夏公司內在價值與賬面價值的差距實質上拉大。
With that in mind, we have added a new set of data – the historical record of Berkshire’s stock price – to the performance table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress, have their limitations in the short term. Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices and intrinsic value almost invariably converge. Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I believe that has been true at Berkshire: In our view, the increase in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1,826,163% gain in market price of the company’s shares.
考慮到這一點，我們在首頁增設了一項新數據——波克夏股價的歷史記錄。我想強調，市場價格在短期有局限性。月度或年度的股價波動通常不太穩定，並且無法反映公司內在價值的變化。如果將時間區間拉長，股價與內在價值最終會趨於接近。波克夏的副主席、我的伙伴
查理·孟格和我都相信，波克夏過去50年的每股內在價值基本上等同於公司股票的市場價值，同樣上漲了1,826,163%。
The Year at Berkshire
波克夏這一年
It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts, except one. Here are the important developments:
2014年波克夏在所有的主要指標上都表現尚佳，除了一項。以下是重要的發展情況：
● Our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of Berkshire’s largest non-insurance businesses – had a record $12.4 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2014, up $1.6 billion from 2013.* The companies in this sainted group are Berkshire Hathaway Energy (formerly MidAmerican Energy), BNSF, IMC (I’ve called it Iscar in the past), Lubrizol and Marmon.
● 我們的“五大發動機”——波克夏最大的五個非保險企業——在2014年的稅前淨利潤達到了創紀錄的124億美元，較2013年增加了16億美元，這些企業包括波克夏·哈撒韋能源公司（BHE；前身是MidAmerican能源公司）、伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路運輸公司（BNSF）、IMC、Lubrizol以及Marmon。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us a decade ago. Subsequently we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the ten-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
這五家企業中，只有BHE是我們在十年前買下的，這家公司當時的淨利是3.93億美元，隨後我們以全現金的方式拿下了另外三家公司，在併購第五家公司BNSF的時候，我們支付了70%的現金，剩下的通過增發6.1%的股票實現。換句話說，過去十年這五家公司每年給波克夏貢獻的120億美元的收益是通過稀釋少量股權實現的，這意味著我們實現了自己的目標，不僅增加了收益，還確保我們提高了每股價值。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve as well. The gain could reach $1 billion, in part because of bolt-on acquisitions by the group that have already closed or are under contract.
如果美國經濟今年持續改善，我們預計這五大發動機的盈利也將有所增加，增幅可能會達到10億美元，部分原因在於這些企業另外的併購活動已經完成或者按照合同在進行。
● Our bad news from 2014 comes from our group of five as well and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, BNSF disappointed many of its customers. These shippers depend on us, and service failures can badly hurt their businesses.
● 2014年有一個不好的消息也是來自五大企業，但與盈利無關。這一年BNSF令許多顧客失望。這些運貨商依賴我們，我們的服務出現問題可能會對他們的生意造成嚴重的傷害。
BNSF is, by far, Berkshire’s most important non-insurance subsidiary and, to improve its performance, we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly extraordinary amount, whether compared to revenues, earnings or depreciation charges.
到目前為止，BNSF是波克夏最重要的非保險行業的子公司，為了提升業績，我們將在2015年支出60億美元用於工廠和設備，這比其他鐵路公司一年花在這方面的費用高出將近50%，這的確是個巨大的數字，無論是與收入對比，還是與公司的淨利潤或者折舊費相比。
但是天氣原因（去年格外惡劣）依然會給鐵路帶來各種各樣的運營問題，我們的責任是盡一切可能將服務恢復到行業領先水平。這件事無法一夜之間達成，這需要增加系統運能，有時候會打斷正在進行中的鐵路營運。但是最近，我們巨額的支出已經開始顯現效果。最近三個月，BNSF的業績指標相較去年已經明顯改善。
● Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.1 billion last year, up from $4.7 billion in 2013. Here, as with our Powerhouse Five, we expect further gains in 2015. Within this group, we have two companies that last year earned between $400 million and $600 million, six that earned between $250 million and $400 million, and seven that earned between $100 million and $250 million. This collection of businesses will increase in both number and earnings. Our ambitions have no finish line.
● 我們許多中小型非保險行業公司去年掙了51億美元，2013年是47億美元。與五大發動機相同，我們認為這部分公司今年的收益也會增長。在這些公司中，有兩家公司去年淨利潤在4億美元到6億美元之間，6家在2.5億美元到4億美元之間，7家在1億美元到2.5億美元之間。這些企業的數量和收益都會增長，我們的雄心壯志沒有極限。
● Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2014 – that makes 12 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 12-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
● 波克夏爾體量巨大且在不斷增長的保險業務在2014年再次取得承保盈利，這是連續12年做到這一點，而且保險浮存金(Float)實現增長。在這12年間，我們的浮存金從410億美元增加到840億美元。儘管這並不能體現波克夏的規模和浮存資金，但是我們可以用這些資金來投資，並由此帶來了顯著的投資收益。
* Throughout this letter, as well as in the “Golden Anniversary” letters included later in this report, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $24 billion during the twelve-year period, including $2.7 billion earned in 2014. And all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
同時我們的承保盈利在過去12年累計達到240億美元，包括2014年的27億美元。所有的這些都始於我們在1967年以860萬美元的價格購入National Indemnity公司。
● While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year was particularly fruitful: We contracted for 31 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $7.8 billion in aggregate. The size of these transactions ranged from $400,000 to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition, Duracell, will not close until the second half of this year. It will then be placed under Marmon’s jurisdiction.
● 雖然我和查理·孟格不停的找尋併購機會，我們旗下的子公司也會經常自己做一些補強收購(bolt-on acquisition: 意指一項產品(或公司)收購交易很自然地符合收購方的現有業務範圍或公司戰略)。許多子公司去年做了大量的收購，成果是豐碩的：一共31起補強收購，總耗資78億美元。這些收購的規模從40萬美元至29億美元不等。不過諸如金霸王（Duracell）之類的大型收購，可能要等到今年下半年才會結束。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us aren’t.) They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these bolt-on deals in future years.
如果價格合理，我和查理都鼓勵子公司進行補強收購。因為這樣能夠有效地利用資金，對接我們的現有業務，將其納入我們專業經理人團隊的管理之下。這意味著我們不需要做太多額外的工作，就可以獲得更多盈利。未來幾年我們將會進行更多此類收購。
● Two years ago my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann, asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital group in the acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a no-brainer: I knew immediately that this partnership would work well from both a personal and financial standpoint. And it most definitely has.
● 兩年前，我的朋友Jorge Paulo Lemann問我，波克夏能否和他的3G資本集團聯合收購亨氏（Heinz）公司。我毫不猶豫地答應了：我明白這種合作無論從人事還是財務的角度來看都是一樁好買賣。事實也正是如此。
I’m not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under Alex Behring, Chairman, and Bernardo Hees, CEO, than would be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to extraordinarily high performance standards and are never satisfied, even when their results far exceed those of competitors.
我必須毫無愧色地承認，亨氏在其主席Alex Behring和CEO Bernardo的管理下表現的很好，我自己也做不到這麼出色。他們對自己表現要求始終很高，遠超同行，並且從不滿足。
We expect to partner with 3G in more activities. Sometimes our participation will only involve a financing role, as was the case in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King. Our favored arrangement, however, will usually be to link up as a permanent equity partner (who, in some cases, contributes to the financing of the deal as well). Whatever the structure, we feel good when working with Jorge Paulo.
我們希望與3G集團進行更多合作。有的時候我們的合作僅限於財務層面，就像此前Burger King收購Tim Hortons那樣。不過，我們更希望能夠建立一種永久性的股權合作關係。不管合作形式如何，我們與Jorge Paulo都合作得很愉快。
Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and Leucadia, and we may form new ones with them or with other partners. Our participation in any joint activities, whether as a financing or equity partner, will be limited to friendly transactions.
波克夏還和Mars及Leucadia擁有良好的合作關係，我們也希望同其他人合作。我們的所有聯合投資活動，無論是財務還是股權合作，都是建立在友好的基礎上。
● In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company’s owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now “car guys.”
● 去年十月，我們收購了Van Tuyl Automotive集團。該集團有78家汽車經銷商，運行得都很出色。我幾年前見過這家公司的老闆Larry Van Tuyl。他當時就決定，如果未來他想出售公司，波克夏將會是不二選擇。最近，我們的交易完成了，我們如今也成了“汽車人”。
Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.
Larry和他的父親Cecil花了62年打造了這家集團，他們的一貫策略是，把所有的當地經理都吸納為公司的合夥人。正是這種互惠互利的製度安排讓他們在競爭中成為贏家。Van Tuyl目前是美國第五大汽車集團，單店銷售數據極為搶眼。
In recent years, Jeff Rachor has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will continue. There are about 17,000 dealerships in the country, and ownership transfers always require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer. Berkshire’s job is to perform in a manner that will cause manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us. If we do this – and if we can buy dealerships at sensible prices – we will build a business that before long will be multiples the size of Van Tuyl’s $9 billion of sales.
這幾年來，Jeff Rachor一直和Larry並肩管理公司，這將確保好的製度安排得以延續。全美有17000家汽車經銷商，在轉手的時候，這些經銷商的所有權需要獲得汽車生產廠家的同意。波克夏要做的，就是讓汽車生產商樂於將車賣給我們。如果我們做到這一點，我們就能以合理的價格買到更多的汽車經銷權，就能在不久之後打造一個規模數倍於Van Tuyl現在90億美元銷售額的業務。
With the acquisition of Van Tuyl, Berkshire now owns 91⁄2 companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 were they independent (Heinz is the 1⁄2). That leaves 4901⁄2 fish in the sea. Our lines are out.
在收購了Van Tuyl後，波克夏如今擁有9.5家財富500強企業（那0.5個是亨氏）。池子裡還有490.5條大魚，我們的線已經放出去了。
● Our subsidiaries spent a record $15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over twice their depreciation charges. About 90% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we will always invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunities runs through America. The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I were born in the United States, and we are forever grateful for the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.
● 2014年，我們旗下的公司在廠房和設備上投資了創紀錄的150億美元，這是他們折舊費用的兩倍。這其中有90%的錢花在美國。儘管我們也經常在海外投資，但美國才是最大的淘金樂土。而且相比尚未開發的地方，已經被人們發掘的只是冰山一角。我和查理有幸出生在美國，我們永遠對此心懷感激。
● Berkshire’s yearend employees – including those at Heinz – totaled a record 340,499, up 9,754 from last year. The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters (where 25 people work). No sense going crazy
● 截至去年年底，波克夏的員工總數（包括亨氏）達到創紀錄的340499人，較前一年增加了9754人。增加的數字裡，並不包含總部的人（只有25人），對此我深感驕傲。
● Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at yearend 2013). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised our percentage ownership of each. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%, our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8% and our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by $50 million.
● 去年，波克夏在“四大”（美國運通、可口可樂、IBM和富國銀行）投資中的持股比例均有提高。我們購買了更多的IBM股票，持股比例從2013年的6.3%增加至7.8%。同時，可口可樂、美國運通和富國銀行均進行了股權回購，這也提升了我們的相對份額。我們在可口可樂的持股比例從9.1%提升至9.2%，在美國運通的持股比例從14.2%提升至14.8%，在富國銀行的持股比例從9.2%提升至9.4%。如果你覺得百分之零點幾算不了什麼，你可以簡單地做個算數題：如果將這四家公司合在一起，波克夏的持股比例每提高0.1%，每年的盈利就將淨增加5000萬美元。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
這四家公司業務出眾，管理團隊既有天賦，又注重股東利益。在波克夏，我們更希望擁有一家好公司的部分非控制性股權，而不是擁有一家二流公司100%的股權。寧選“碎玉”，不要“全瓦”。
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2014 earnings before discontinued operations amounted to $4.7 billion (compared to $3.3 billion only three years ago). In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.6 billion last year. (Again, three years ago the dividends were $862 million.) But make no mistake: The $3.1 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
2014年，按照股份計算，我們在“四大”的總盈利為（包含非持續性收入）47億美元（三年前為33億美元）。不過，我們向各位股東通報的利潤僅包含分紅，為16億美元（三年前為8.62億美元）。但你要明白，對波克夏而言，這31億美元沒有通報的利潤，每分錢都和那16億美元一樣值錢。
The earnings these investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. Their retained earnings also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time (though 2015 will be a tough year for the group, in part because of the strong dollar). If the expected gains materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the package of four, our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at yearend.)
這些被“四大”留存的收益，通常都用來回購了公司自己的股票。這讓波克夏不用花一分錢就可以提高持股比例，從而增加未來的盈利。這些留存收益還被用來投資新的商機，增加公司的競爭優勢。所有這些都讓我們相信，未來幾年“四大”的每股收益將會大幅增長（不過2015年將是艱難的一年，部分是因為強勢美元）。如果這些預期收益能夠實現，波克夏獲得的分紅將會增加，更重要的是，我們還有很多未實現的資本收益（就“四大”而言，截至去年年底，我們未實現的資本收益高達420億美元）。
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash.
我們願意進行大量被動的非控股型投資，這種靈活的資產配置策略，讓我們相比那些局限於進行控股型投資的公司具有很大優勢。我們的投資機會是他們的兩倍。
● I’ve mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps me as an investor and that my investment experience has made me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons that are applicable to the other. And some truths can only be fully learned through experience. (In Fred Schwed’s wonderful book, Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?, a Peter Arno cartoon depicts a puzzled Adam looking at an eager Eve, while a caption says, “There are certain things that cannot be adequately explained to a virgin either by words or pictures.” If you haven’t read Schwed’s book, buy a copy at our annual meeting. Its wisdom and humor are truly priceless.)
● 我以前曾提到，我經商的經驗對我的投資大有裨益，而投資經驗又讓我成為一個更優秀的商人。二者總是能相互補充和促進。唯有實踐才能出真知。（Fred Schwed的精彩著作“Where Are the Customers'Yachts 中，一幅Peter Arno 的漫畫描繪了一個困惑的亞當看著一個渴望的夏娃，而一個標題說：“有些東西不能用言語 或圖片“。如果你還沒有閱讀施韋德的書，在我們的年會上買一本，它的智慧和幽默是無價的。）
Among Arno’s “certain things,” I would include two separate skills, the evaluation of investments and the management of businesses. I therefore think it’s worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our two investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase two companies that, though smaller than we would normally acquire, have excellent economic characteristics. Combined, the two earn $100 million annually on about $125 million of net tangible assets.
我很看重兩個獨立的能力：對投資估值的能力，以及管理業務的能力。所以，我認為我們的兩個投資經理Todd Combs和Ted Weschler，每人至少應該管理我們旗下的一項業務。幾個月前，他們的機會來了。我們收購了兩家公司，雖然規模不大，但業務數據很漂亮。兩家公司合計淨資產為1.25億美元，但每年盈利1億美元。
我讓Todd和Ted各挑一家公司去擔任總裁。這樣的安排可以為我省下一些工作量，更重要的是，這個崗位將讓他們成為更加出色的投資者（也就是說，他們已經非常優秀了）。
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Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009年末，伴隨著市場大衰退的陰影，我們決定收購BNSF，這是波克夏歷史上最大手筆的收購。當時我將這筆交易稱為“對於美國經濟未來的最大押注”。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us. We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too: Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
在1965年Buffett Partnership Ltd收購併控股波克夏之後，這種押注就屢見不鮮。查理和我總是對美國經濟繁榮前景“打賭”，儘管這種繁榮幾乎是板上釘釘的事。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 238 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. In my lifetime alone, real per-capita U.S. output has sextupled. My parents could not have dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see. Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly about America’s problems, I’ve never seen one who wishes to emigrate (though I can think of a few for whom I would happily buy a one-way ticket).
事實上，在美國238年的歷史上，那些看空的人誰最終受益了？如果將現在的美國和1776年的美國相比，你肯定也無法相信自己的眼睛。在我所經歷的年代中，美國的人均產出已經翻了六倍。我的父母輩在1930年代時做夢也無法想像到我會經歷什麼。雖然許多人指責美國有這樣那樣的問題，但是我從沒有見過誰希望從美國移民出去。（如果有人願意那麼做的話，我願意出錢給他們買一張離開的單程票。）
The dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Gains won’t come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner; they never have. And we will regularly grumble about our government. But, most assuredly, America’s best days lie ahead.
美國金融市場的勃勃生機將繼續延續下去。獲取利潤從來不會是一件一帆風順的事情。有時候我們會對我們的政府有所抱怨，但是幾乎可以肯定的是，美國的未來會更加光明。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
為了完成這個目標，查理和我希望以下面的方式增加波克夏的內在價值：1）不斷改善子公司基本的盈利能力；2）通過收購的方式提高子公司的盈利水平；3）採取投融方式；4）在公司價值被低估的時候回購股票；5）偶爾進行一次大規模的收購。偶爾情況下，我們也會出於對股東的考慮增發一些股票。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
這些措施將會鞏固公司的實力和地位，BNSF和波克夏在未來一個世紀裡將依然對美國經濟起到至關重要的作用。保險行業對個人和企業來說必不可少，家庭產業和汽車產業也會繼續與日常生活息息相關。查理和我都相信，未來的世界將會由波克夏來定制，我們對此感到幸運並將不辱使命。
Intrinsic Business Value
內在價值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 123-124.
查理和我已經多次討論過商業內在價值，我們不可能告訴你一個確切的數字(事實上，其他公司也不可能做到)。在我們2010年年度報告中，我們曾經指出過三個關鍵因素，其中一個對於波克夏的內在價值起到決定性意義。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2014 our per-share investments increased 8.4% to $140,123, and our earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 19% to $10,847 per share.
以下是其中兩個關鍵因素的最新情況：2014年我們的每股投資增長了8.4%，達到了140123美元。我們在保險和投資之外的業務收益增長了19%，達到了每股10847美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 44 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main focus is to build operating earnings. That’s why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings stock for operating businesses last year and to contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.
自從1970年以來，我們的每股投資年化增長率達到了19%，盈利增長則為20.6%。這樣的表現確保了波克夏股價過去44年來取得類似的增速。查理和我希望能夠做到面面俱到，但我們首要目標還是增加營收。也正因此，去年我們欣然用所持的Phillips 66及Graham Holdings公司股權交換了其資產，併計劃在2015年對寶潔旗下的金霸王如法炮製。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
下面，讓我們來看看波克夏的四項主要業務。每一項的資產負債表和營收特點都與其他業務明顯不同。所以我們將其當作四項獨立業務來呈現，我和查理對此已有共識（儘管將它們放在同一個籃子裡有顯著且持久的優勢）。如果你我位置對換，你是做報告的經理而我們是未到場的股東，我們想要獲知的信息正是我們如今要為你提供的。（當然位置對換只是假設而已！）
Insurance
保險
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.
首先是保險業務，這是公司的核心業務。自從1967年以來，保險業務一直是公司業績增長的關鍵引擎。當時我們以860萬美元的價格收購了National Indemnity 和National Fire & Marine。這筆收購對於公司的意義十分深遠，雖然其過程十分簡單。
Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.
我的朋友——兩家公司實際控股股東Jack Ringwalt來到我的辦公室表示希望出售公司，15分鐘後，我們就達成了一致。Jack的公司並沒有接受外部公司的審計，我也沒有對此做出任何要求。這是因為1）Jack是一個誠實的人；2）如果收購過程過於繁瑣的話，他可能就會放棄交易了。
On pages 128-129, we reproduce the 11⁄2-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.
收購合約就這樣完成了，雙方都沒有請律師到場。這筆交易是波克夏最成功的一筆交易，至今為止National Indemnity的GAAP淨值達到1110億美元，超過了全球其他所有保險公司的總和。
One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
公司介入財產意外險的一個重要原因是其獨特的金融特性。保險公司可以先收取保費，然後支付賠償金。在極端情況下，比如工傷賠償，保險公司支付過程可能會持續數十年之久。這種先收錢後賠錢的模式可以讓保險公司擁有大量的現金，也就是所謂的浮存金。公司可以利用浮存金進行投資並獲取收益。儘管個人保單處於不斷變化的狀態，但是整體浮存金規模通常都會和保費保持相對穩定的比例。因此長期來看，我們的業務和浮存金都持續增長。以下是1970-2014年公司浮存金增長情況：
Year Float (in $ millions)
1970 $ 39
1980 237
1990 1,632
2000 27,871
2010 65,832
2014 83,921
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in Berkshire’s economic fortress.
對於公司而言，浮存金進一步增長是個艱鉅任務。不過從好的方面來看，GEICO和我們新的保險業務都會保持理想的增長速度。National Indemnity的再保險業務保單大幅減少導致浮存金在下降。但是即便我們的浮存金出現下滑，其速率也會十分平緩，每年下滑不會超過3%。保險業務的特性決定了我們擁有的現金資源肯定可以滿足短期的償付需求。這個優勢是波克夏長盛不衰的關鍵。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我們的保費收入超過了費用和最終償付金的總額，我們將獲得承保利潤。這增加了我們的保險浮存金產生的投資收入。當這種利潤產生時，比使用這筆意外之財更棒的是，持有這些錢能帶來額外收益。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.
不幸的是，所有保險公司都想實現這一令人愉悅的目標。這產生了激烈的競爭，其激烈程度常常讓整個財產保險行業以巨額損失的代價進行運營。這個損失實際上就是保險行業為持有浮存金支付的成本。儘管保險公司享受著浮存金帶來的好處，但競爭幾乎保證了保險公司的收入會繼續慘淡。和美國其他行業的公司相比，保險公司在有形淨資產上獲得的回報較低。
美國長期的低利率讓浮存金獲得的利息收入有所減少，因此加劇了行業的利潤下滑問題。
As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for twelve consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. That message is given at least lip service by all insurers; at Berkshire it is a religion.
正如在報告第一部分所說的那樣，波克夏現在已經連續12年在承保盈利的狀況下運營。這段期間內，我們的稅前利潤達到240億美元。展望未來，我相信我們將在許多年內繼續在盈利的情況下承銷保單。這是我們保險經理每日都要關注的事。這些經理知道浮存金是有價值的，但是不佳的承銷結果可能會抵消掉浮存金帶來的收益。雖然所有的保險公司都會提這一點，但波克夏把這一點奉為圭臬。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $22.7 billion to more than six million claimants in 2014 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float.
那麼，我們的浮存金是如何影響內在價值的？當我們計算波克夏賬面價值時，浮存金的總額被作為負債減掉，就好像我們明天就要將其全部支付，而無法補充。不過，將浮存金嚴格視作負債是錯誤的。它應該被看作一種循環基金。每天，我們支付舊的索賠和相關費用——2014年，我們向600萬索賠人支付了227億美元——這減少了我們的浮存金。但同時，我們每天獲得新的業務，收取保費，增加浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities are treated as equals, however, under GAAP.
如果我們的循環浮存金沒有成本並且可以長期持久，那該負債的真正價值會顯著低於會計上認定的價值。永遠擁有1美元——因為新業務會替代舊的索賠——和擁有明天就將失去的1美元是兩件完全不同的事。然而，在GAAP下，這兩種類型的負債被認為是相同的。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
155億美元的“商譽”資產是對這被誇大負債的一種抵消。這些商譽資產在我們購買保險公司時產生，這增加了賬面價值。這種商譽體現了我們為保險公司獲得浮存金能力支付的價格。然而，商譽並沒有實際的價值。舉例來說，如果一個保險公司維持高額的、長期的承保損失，任何賬面上的商譽資產都應被視作是毫無價值的，無論原始成本是多少。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Under present accounting rules (with which we agree) this excess value will never be entered on our books. But I can assure you that it’s real. That’s one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸運的是，波克夏並不是這樣。查理和我相信，我們保險公司的商譽存在真正的經濟價值，且遠超其歷史價值。當我們收購類似的保險公司時，我們會很樂意為它們的浮存金支付費用。在目前的會計製度下，這種價值永遠不會進入賬面價值。但我可以保證這是真的。這就是我們相信波克夏內在商業價值遠高於其賬面價值的一大原因。
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Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
波克夏吸引人的保險經濟模式之所以存在，都是因為我們擁有傑出的經理。他們以嚴格的操作運營難以復制的商業模式。讓我來向你們介紹幾個主要的業務部門。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先，浮存金規模最大的是由Ajit Jain管理的Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group。Ajit為別人沒有意願或能力承擔的風險投保。他的操作結合了能力、速度和果斷。更重要的是，他的思維方式在保險界獨一無二。然而，他從沒將波克夏暴露在不適合我們資源的風險之中。
Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, if not facing insolvency
事實上，我們在規避風險上遠比其他大型保險公司要謹慎。舉例來說，如果保險行業因天災而遭受2500億美元的損失——這一損失大約為保險業經歷過最大損失的三倍——波克夏作為整體依然將在該年度獲得高額利潤，因其業務線非常廣泛。我們依然將擁有充足的現金，並將在波動的市場中尋找大的機會。而其他的主要保險公司，或是再保險公司將損失慘重，甚至面臨破產。
Ajit’s underwriting skills are unmatched. His mind, moreover, is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. Last year I told you about his formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly welcomed by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. Previously, we had written only a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.
Ajit的承銷能力無人能及。他的大腦是一個創意工廠。他一直在尋找新的業務加入目前的組合中。去年，我向你們介紹了他建立的Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance （BHSI）。這將我們帶入了商業保險領域，並使我們立即受到了美國主要保險經紀和公司風險經理的歡迎。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both international business and new lines of insurance. We repeat last year’s prediction that BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years.
BHSI現在由Peter Eastwood領導。他是一個富有經驗的承銷人，在保險行業受人尊重。在2014年，Peter擴大了他富有才華的部門，進軍國際業務，擴大了保險業務條線。我們重申去年的預計，BHSI將會成為波克夏的重要資產，將在未來數年產生數十億的業務。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross
我們還有另一個強大的再保險公司Gerneral Re，該公司由Tad Montross管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
本質上，一個穩健的保險公司需要遵守四大規則：它必須（1）理解所有會讓保單發生損失的風險；（2）謹慎的評估風險發生的可能性以及其可能造成的損失；（3）設定保費。平均而言，保費需要高於可能發生的損失以及運營費用的總和；（4）願意在無法獲得合適保費的情況下放手。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
許多保險公司都遵守前三條規則，卻忽視了第四條。他們無法拒絕競爭對手正在積極爭取的業務。老話說：“別人在做，我們就必須做。”這個問題在許多行業都有所體現，但在保險行業尤為突出。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵守了這四條戒律，而這體現在了他的成果上。在他的管理下，General Re的巨額浮存金一直在產生額外收益，我們預計這種情況將大體繼續。我們尤其熱衷於General Re的國際人壽再保險業務。自我們1998年收購該公司以來，該業務就一直穩定增長且保持盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
在我們購買General Re後不久，它受到了一些問題的困擾。這讓不少評論員——包括我自己——一度相信我犯了一個巨大的錯誤。但這已經過去很久了。General Re現在是一塊寶石。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 64 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in 2014. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony.
最後，還有GEICO。GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，他18歲就加入公司，到2014年已經為公司服務了53年。Tony在1993年成為公司CEO，之後該公司表現亮眼。沒有比Tony更好的經理了。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
當我1951年第一次聽說GEICO的時候，我被該公司相對於其他保險巨頭巨大的成本優勢震驚了。當時我就明白，GEICO將獲得成功，因為它值得成功。沒人喜歡買車險，但幾乎所有人都愛開車。因為開車而需要的保險是許多家庭的一筆大支出，而儲蓄對家庭來說很重要——只有低成本的保險公司才能提供這些。事實上，至少40%在讀這封信的人可以通過投保GEICO省錢。所以，暫停閱讀，登錄GEICO.Com或者撥打800-368-2734。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality – he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.
GEICO的成本優勢是讓該公司持續擴大市場份額的主要原因（1995年波克夏·哈撒韋公司剛剛收購GEICO的時候，它的市場份額是2.5%，而2014年我們的市場份額達到了10.8%）。GEICO的低成本成為了一道競爭對手無法逾越的壕溝。我們的小壁虎（gecko；GEICO的廣告形像是一隻操著倫敦口音的綠色壁虎）不知疲倦地告訴美國人GEICO如何為他們省錢。我不得不說，小壁虎有一種讓人產生好感的品質，即他工作不需要報酬。不同於任何一個人類發言人，他從不被自己的名譽沖昏頭腦，也從不提醒我們他幹得多麼出色。我喜歡這個小傢伙。
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade, they have earned $2.95 billion from underwriting while growing their float from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了擁有三個主要的保險公司外，我們還有一些其他的小公司，他們大部分都還在保險業的角落辛勤地耕耘。總體而言，這些公司成長非常好，穩定地創造著承保利潤。在過去十年中，他們從承保業務賺得了29.5億美元收入，同時浮存金從17億美元增長到了86億美元。查理和我都非常珍惜這些公司和他們的經理人。
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2014 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013 | ||
| General Re | $606 | $1,294 | $42,454 | $37,231 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 277 | 283 | 19,280 | 20,013 | ||
| GEICO | 1,159 | 1,127 | 13,569 | 12,566 | ||
| Other Primary | 626 | 385 | 8,618 | 7,430 | ||
| Total | $2,668 | $3,089 | $83,921 | $77,240 | ||
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Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.
簡單來說，保險業是銷售承諾。“顧客”現在付錢，保險公司承諾，如果未來某件客戶不希望發生的事情發生了，就向客戶付錢。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by people in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives, is all-important.
有時候這些承諾可能幾十年都不會兌現（比如一位客戶在20多歲買了一份人壽保險）。因此，保險公司履行承諾的意願和能力都很重要，即便是在付款期遇上經濟危機。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world’s largest and most sophisticated P/C insurers, who wished to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” these liabilities – most of them potential losses from asbestos claims – to a reinsurer. They needed the right one, though: If a reinsurer fails to pay a loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it. Choosing a reinsurer, therefore, that down the road proves to be financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its lap.
波克夏·哈撒韋公司在履行承諾方面無人可比，這一點在近幾年已經被世界上各個最大最資深的財產保險公司認可。這些公司都希望從規模巨大、時間超長的負債中擺脫出來。也就是說，這些保險公司希望將這些負債“割讓”給再保險公司，由於大多數負債都是因索賠出現的損失，因此他們需要一個好的再保險公司：如果一個再保險公司不能履約，原先的保險公司就會有風險。因此，如果一個再保險公司陷入資金困難，將對那些負債累累的保險公司構成很大威脅。
Last year, our premier position in reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying a $3 billion single premium. I believe that the policy’s size has only been exceeded by our 2007 transaction with Lloyd’s, in which the premium was $7.1 billion.
去年，我們簽下一個保費高達30億美元的保單，這奠定了我們的行業領先地位。我相信這個保單只遜於我們自己在2007年拿下的Lloyd's保單，其保費高達71億美元。
In fact, I know of only eight P/C policies in history that had a single premium exceeding $1 billion. And, yes, all eight were written by Berkshire. Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial payments 50 years or more from now. When major insurers have needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will be made, Berkshire has been the party – the only party – to call.
事實上，據我所知歷史上只有8個財險和意外險保單的單筆保費超過10億美元。沒錯，全部都是波克夏·哈撒韋公司出具的。其中有些合約要求我們50年甚至更久之後賠付。當保險公司需要這種類型的賠付承諾時，波克夏·哈撒韋是唯一能夠兌現的公司。
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Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
波克夏·哈撒韋公司偉大的經理人、卓越的金融能力、以及許多獨特的商業模式在保險業中形成了門檻。這些優勢是波克夏·哈撒韋公司的巨大財富，長遠來看，會為股東們創造更大的利益。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受監管的資產密集型業務
We have two major operations, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我們主要有兩家公司， 美國伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路運輸公司（BNSF）和波克夏·哈撒韋能源公司（BHE），他們擁有共同的特點，而這些特點又有別於我們的其他業務。所以，我們把他們的各項統計數據從我們GAAP的負債表和收益表中分離出來，在這封信中單獨來談。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
這兩家公司的一大共同點是對長期受監管資產進行大量投資。這些資產部分由大規模長期債務支撐，但不由波克夏·哈撒韋公司擔保。這些資產並不需要我們的信貸支持，因為即使在經濟狀況惡化時，它們的盈利能力也遠超其利率負擔。比如，去年BNSF的利息償付倍數是8比1。（我們對利息償付率的定義是稅前收益/利息，而不是稅息折舊及攤銷前利潤/利息，儘管後者常用，但我們覺得有嚴重的紕漏。）
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Recently, we have further broadened that base through our $3 billion (Canadian) acquisition of AltaLink, an electric transmission system serving 85% of Alberta’s population. This multitude of profit streams, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, has enabled BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
對於BHE而言，有兩個因素保證公司能在所有情況下償付債務支出。第一個對於所有公共事業項目很常見：抗衰退收益，這來自於這些公司提供的獨家服務。第二個只有少數幾個公共事業項目享有，即多樣化的收入來源，這讓我們免於因任何單一監管機構而遭受損失。最近，我們擴大了這一基礎。我們用30億美元收購了AltaLink，主營電力轉換系統，為加拿大亞伯達省（Alberta）85%的人口提供服務。通過多樣化收入來源，加上母公司的內在優勢，BHE及其公共事業部門大幅度降低了負債。這種模式讓我們的公司和客戶受益。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，這兩家子公司都在為美國經濟提供重要動力：
● BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.
● BNSF承擔了15%的城市間運輸量（按噸公里計算），無論是公路、鐵路、水路、航空或是管道。我們比以前的運輸量更大，這讓BNSF成為美國經濟循環中最為重要的一部分。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
像所有其他鐵路運輸一樣，BNSF也提供高效環保的貨物運輸，一加侖柴油能將一噸貨物運輸500英里。卡車完成同樣的任務要消耗4倍的能源。
● BHE’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are a leader in renewables: From a standing start ten years ago, BHE now accounts for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity and 7% of its solar generation capacity. Beyond these businesses, BHE owns two large pipelines that deliver 8% of our country’s natural gas consumption; the recentlypurchased electric transmission operation in Canada; and major electric businesses in the U.K. and Philippines. And the beat goes on: We will continue to buy and build utility operations throughout the world for decades to come.
● BHE的公共事業項目在11個州為零售客戶提供服務。沒有別的公共事業公司比它服務範圍更廣。此外，我們在再生能源方面也是領先的：從十年前開始，BHE提供了美國6%的風能發電量和7%的太陽能發電量。除此之外，BHE還擁有兩條管道，輸送占美國消費量8%的天然氣，還擁有最近收購的加拿大電力轉換公司，以及在英國和菲律賓的大型電力公司。我們還將在未來數十年收購和建造更多的公共事業項目。
BHE can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. In fact, last year the company retained more dollars of earnings – by far – than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this 100% retention policy as an important advantage – one almost certain to distinguish BHE from other utilities for many years to come.
BHE之所以能做這些投資，是因為它能留存全部收益。事實上，目前來看，去年BHE留存的收益比美國其他任何一家電力公司都要多。我們和監管部門都認為這種100%留存收益政策（retention policy）具有很大優勢。這也將讓BHE未來數年內在行業中獨領風騷。
When BHE completes certain renewables projects that are underway, the company’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. In addition, we have conventional projects in the works that will also cost many billions. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
當BHE完成這些目前在建的公共事業項目時，公司整個再生能源資產組合將花費150億美元。同時，我們還有其他傳統項目，也要花費數十億美元。只要他們能帶來合理回報，我們樂於做出這些投入。而且，我對未來的政府監管措施非常有信心。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我們的信心既來自於我們過去的經驗，又來自於我們相信社會對交通和能源有永久的投資需求。確保資金穩定流入重要項目符合政府自身利益。同時，做這些項目投資對我們也是有利的，它讓我們贏得了政府以及它所代表的人民的信任。
Last year we fully met this objective at BHE, just as we have in every year of our ownership. Our rates remain low, our customer satisfaction is high and our record for employee safety is among the best in the industry.
一如往常，去年BHE完全達到了該目標，我們的費率一直很低，我們的客戶滿意度很高，我們的員工保障也是行業內最好的。
The story at BNSF, however – as I noted earlier – was not good in 2014, a year in which the railroad disappointed many of its customers. This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures that BNSF has made in recent years, with those having far exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal competitor.
BNSF方面的情況，就像我之前提過的一樣，2014年表現的並不好，這一年的鐵路行業令很多顧客失望，儘管BNSF近幾年的資本支出創了紀錄新高，遠超其主要競爭對手——聯合太平洋鐵路公司（Union Pacific）。
The two railroads are of roughly equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably more freight (measured either by carloads or ton-miles). But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific’s last year, and we lost market share as a result. Moreover, U.P.’s earnings beat ours by a record amount. Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.
兩家鐵路公司的收入規模基本相等，但我們的貨運量更大。不過去年我們的服務還是出現了比Union Pacific更多的問題，結果就是我們失去了部分市場份額。而且Union Pacific去年比我們盈利高出的規模創下了歷史記錄。顯然，我們還有很多工作要做。
We are wasting no time: As I also mentioned earlier, we will spend $6 billion in 2015 on improving our railroad’s operation. That will amount to about 26% of estimated revenues (a calculation that serves as the industry’s yardstick). Outlays of this magnitude are largely unheard of among railroads. For us, this percentage compares to our average of 18% in 2009-2013 and to U.P.’s projection for the near future of 16-17%. Our huge investments will soon lead to a system with greater capacity and much better service. Improved profits should follow.
但我們也沒有浪費時間：就像我早先提到的，我們將在2015年支出60億美元以改善我們的鐵路運營。這筆錢預計將占到今年收入的26%。這麼大規模的支出在整個鐵路行業內都很罕見。我們2009-2013年平均支出佔比是18%，而Union Pacific對未來的計劃是16~17%。我們大規模的投資將很快帶來更大的運力和更好的服務，盈利也會很快改善。
Here are the key figures for Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF:
下面是波克夏·哈撒韋能源公司(BHE)和伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路運輸公司(BNSF)的一些主要財務數據：
| MidAmerican (89.8% owned) | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||||
| 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | |||||
| U.K. Utilities | $527 | $362 | $429 | ||||
| Iowa utility | 298 | 230 | 236 | ||||
| Nevada utilities | 549 | — | — | ||||
| Pipelines | 1,010 | 982 | 737 | ||||
| Gas Pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River) | 379 | 385 | 383 | ||||
| PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah) . | 139 | 139 | 82 | ||||
| Other (Net) | 236 | 4 | 91 | ||||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 3,138 | 2,102 | 1,958 | ||||
| Interest | 427 | 296 | 314 | ||||
| Income Taxes | 616 | 170 | 172 | ||||
| Net Earnings | $2,095 | $1,636 | $1,472 | ||||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire | $1,882 | $1,470 | $1,323 | ||||
| BNSF | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||||
| 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | |||||
| Revenues | $23,239 | $22,014 | $20,835 | ||||
| Operating earnings | 16,237 | 15,357 | 14,835 | ||||
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 7,002 | 6,657 | 6,000 | ||||
| Interest (Net) | 833 | 729 | 623 | ||||
| Income taxes | 2,300 | 2,135 | 2,005 | ||||
| Net earnings | $3,869 | $3,793 | $3,372 | ||||
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業，服務業和零售業情況
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏這部分的經營我將盡可能全面地敘述，首先讓我們看一下這些部門的財務摘要：
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/14 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $5,765 | Notes payable | $965 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 8,264 | Other current liabilities | 9,734 | |||||
| Inventory | 10,236 | Total current liabilities | 10,699 | |||||
| Other current assets | 1117 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 25,382 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 28,107 | Deferred taxes | 3801 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 13,806 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,269 | |||||
| Other assets | 3,793 | Non-controlling interests | 492 | |||||
| $71,088 | Berkshire equity | 51,827 | ||||||
| $71,088 | ||||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2014 | 2013* | 2012* | |||||
| Revenues | $97,689 | $93,472 | $83,255 | ||||
| Operating expenses | 90788 | 87208 | 76978 | ||||
| Interest expense (net) | 109 | 104 | 146 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 6792 | 6160 | 6131 | ||||
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2324 | 2283 | 2432 | ||||
| Net income | $4,468 | $3,877 | $3,699 | ||||
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 49. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我們的收入和支出數據符合公認會計準則（GAAP）。但是上面的運營費用則是非公認會計準則的（non-GAAP），並且不包含一些採購會計項目（主要是一些無形資產的攤銷）。我們用此方法呈現這些數據是因為我和查理都認為，這些調整過的數字可以更準確地反映真實支出和利潤情況。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. The concept of making charges against other intangibles, such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arises through purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不會一一解釋所有的調整，因為其中一些變化微小且不易解釋，但是一些嚴肅的投資者應該理解不同無形資產的性質。一些無形資產的價值會隨著時間的推移而損耗殆盡，而另外一些的價值卻完全不會出現損失。例如軟件，其攤銷費用就是實實在在的費用。而其它一些無形資產是不應被“攤銷”的，比如客戶關係。如果通過採購會計規則計算顯然不能反映真實情況。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once nonexistent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在報告49頁的GAAP合規數據中，有11.5億美元的攤銷費用作為支出項被扣除。我們認為其中只有20%是“真實的”，“不真實”部分的費用曾經在波克夏是不存在的，但是隨著我們不斷收購公司，這些費用變得越來越大，之後也應該會延續這樣的趨勢。
The GAAP-compliant table on page 67 gives you the current status of our intangible assets. We now have $7.4 billion left to amortize, of which $4.1 billion will be charged over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of non-real costs becomes entirely charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat.
在報告67頁的GAAP合規表格中給出了目前我們的無形資產。我們目前還有74億美元的無形資產有待攤銷，其中41億美元將在未來五年中攤銷完畢。當然，最終所有非真實成本將全部被沖銷。到時財報上的盈利將增長，儘管真實的盈利可能是持平的。
Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize, are different: Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real cost. That’s true, moreover, at most other companies. When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph test.
但我們想強調，折舊費是不同的：我們上報的每一分折舊費用都是真實成本。這一點也適用於其他大部分公司。如果公司CEO把EBITDA（未計利息、稅項、折舊及攤銷前利潤）作為估值指南來兜售，他們多半是在說謊。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
我們的公開收入報告仍將遵照GAAP準則。但為了貼近現實，你要記得把我們上報的大部分攤銷費用加回來。
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To get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, they sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates.
回到我們製造業、服務和零售業的眾多業務上，我們出售的產品涵蓋面甚廣，從棒棒糖到飛機不等。以未加槓桿的有型資產淨額計算，其中一些行業的業務受益於良好的經濟形勢，實現的稅後利潤高達25%至逾100%。其他一些行業的利潤在12%至20%間。不過，有幾家公司的回報非常差，這是我在資本配置時犯下的一些嚴重錯誤。我並未被誤導，只是在評估公司和產業的經濟動態時犯了錯誤。
Fortunately, my blunders normally involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
幸運的是，我一般情況下只在相對較小的收購決定上犯錯。我們的大宗收購案表現普遍不錯，個別案例則是非常不錯。但我在購買公司或股票時依然會犯錯，並非所有事情都按計劃運轉。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using little leverage, earned 18.7% after-tax on that capital.
若從單一公司實體來看，這一集團內的公司都是優秀企業。儘管他們持有大量超額現金，且幾乎沒有舉債，但他們2014年平均有形資產淨額達到240億美元，稅後掙得18.7%的利潤。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in both the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
當然，如果是在價格過高的時候買入，良好經濟形勢下所做的交易可能是一筆不佳投資。我們為大部分業務的有形資產淨額支付了大量溢價，這筆開支在我們公佈的數據中有所反映。不過我們為此投入的資本獲得了可觀的回報。而且，這些業務的內在價值總體來說超出了它們的賬面價值，這部分溢價相當不錯，而且很可能會擴大。即便如此，保險業和受監管行業的內在價值和賬面價值差距還是很大。而這才產生了真正的大贏家。
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We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97-100.
在這個集團，我們有太多公司想要一一評論。而且他們目前與潛在的競爭對手都會讀這份報告。在一些業務上，如果其他人知道了某些數字，我們可能失去競爭優勢。因此對於那些對波克夏·哈撒韋估值沒有實質性影響的業務，我們就不披露那些非必要數據了。不過你可以在97-100頁上找到我們業務運營的大量細節。
Finance and Financial Products
金融和理財產品
This year we include in this section Marmon’s very sizable leasing operations, whose wares are railcars, containers and cranes. We have also restated the previous two years to reflect that change. Why have we made it? At one time there was a large minority ownership at Marmon, and I felt it was more understandable to include all of the company’s operations in one place. Today we own virtually 100% of Marmon, which makes me think you will gain more insight into our various businesses if we include Marmon’s leasing operations under this heading. (The figures for the many dozens of Marmon’s other businesses remain in the previous section.)
今年這一領域包括了Marmon規模可觀的租賃業務，其業務包括有軌車、集裝箱和起重機租賃。我們還重述了過去兩年的狀況以反映該調整。我們為何這麼做？我們一度擁有Marmon控股旗下大量的少數股權，因此我認為把公司的所有業務都放在一起更易理解。但如今我們實際上已擁有Marmon 100%的股權，因此我認為，把Marmon的租賃業務包含在這一章節裡，能讓你對我們不同業務有更多洞見。
Our other leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture) and XTRA (semi-trailers). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. Both companies have invested more money in new equipment than have many of their competitors, and that’s paying off.
我們其他的租賃業務是由CORT（家具）和XTRA（半掛車）進行的。這些公司都是行業先鋒，且隨著美國經濟走強，他們的收入已大幅增加。這兩家公司在新設備上投入的資金比他們許多競爭者都多，而這正帶來回報。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the largest home builder in America. Last year, Clayton sold 30,871 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. When we purchased Clayton in 2003 for $1.7 billion, its share was 14%.
Kevin Clayton再次帶領全美最大的住房建築商Clayton Homes取得了行業領先的成績。去年，Clayton售出了30871套房，約占美國人購買預製房總數的45%。當我們在2003年以17億美元價格買入Clayton時，其市場份額僅為14%。
Key to Clayton’s earnings is the company’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, when funding for the industry dried up, Clayton was able to keep lending because of Berkshire’s backing. In fact, we continued during that period to finance our competitors’ retail sales as well as our own.
Clayton收入的關鍵在於該公司擁有的130億美元按揭貸款投資組合。在2008年和2009年金融危機時期，當房地產融資枯竭時，Clayton有能力維持放貸是因為有波克夏·哈撒韋的支持。事實上，在金融危機時期，我們為自己的公司提供資金的同時，還在持續為競爭對手的零售銷售提供資金。
Many of Clayton’s borrowers have low incomes and mediocre FICO scores. But thanks to the company’s sensible lending practices, its portfolio performed well during the recession, meaning a very high percentage of our borrowers kept their homes. Our blue-collar borrowers, in many cases, proved much better credit risks than their higher-income brethren.
Clayton的許多藉款人都是低收入者，信用一般。但因公司明智的放貸操作，其投資組合在經濟衰退時期也表現良好，這也意味著我們的借款人中，相當高比例的人都保住了自己的房子。在許多情況下，我們藍領借款人的信譽被證明要遠好於高收入者。
At Marmon’s railroad-car operation, lease rates have improved substantially over the past few years. The nature of this business, however, is that only 20% or so of our leases expire annually. Consequently, improved pricing only gradually works its way into our revenue stream. The trend, though, is strong. Our 105,000-car fleet consists largely of tank cars, but only 8% of those transport crude oil.
在Marmon的有軌電車業務中，租賃利率在過去幾年裡顯著改善。但該業務的性質是，我們每年僅有20%左右的租賃合同到期。因此，定價上漲只會在我們的收入上逐步反映出來。不過這是個強勁的趨勢。我們總計10.5萬輛車的車隊包含大量的油罐車，但只有8%用於運輸原油。
One further fact about our rail operation is important for you to know: Unlike many other lessors, we manufacture our own tank cars, about 6,000 of them in a good year. We do not book any profit when we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed on our books at a “bargain” price. The difference between that figure and a “retail” price is only slowly reflected in our earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we enjoy over the 30-year life of the car. Because of that fact as well as others, Marmon’s rail fleet is worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is carried on our books.
還有一件重要的事情你們需要知道：不像許多其他租賃商，我們自己生產油罐車，每年約生產6000輛。我們把油罐車從生產線轉移至租賃線，不會計提任何利潤。因此從財務報表上看，我們的車隊價格低廉。該數字與“零售”價格的差距只會通過每年小額的折舊費用，慢慢反映在我們的收益中。因為上述及其他原因，Marmon車隊的價值遠高於財報上的50億美元這個數字。
Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:
| 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | ||
| (in millions) | ||||
| Berkadia (our 50% share) . | $122 | $80 | $35 | |
| Clayton | 558 | 416 | 255 | |
| CORT | 36 | 40 | 42 | |
| Marmon–Containers and Cranes | 238 | 226 | 246 | |
| Marmon – Railcars | 442 | 353 | 299 | |
| XTRA | 147 | 125 | 106 | |
| Net financial income* | 296 | 324 | 410 | |
| $1,839 | $1,564 | $1,393 | ||
Investments
投資
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
以下是截至去年年末，波克夏投資的市值最大的15只普通股。
| 12/31/14 | ||||||
| Shares** | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 14.8 | $1,287 | $14,106 | ||
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.2 | 1,299 | 16,888 | ||
| 18,513,482 | DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. | 8.6 | 843 | 1,402 | ||
| 15,430,586 | Deere & Company | 4.5 | 1,253 | 1,365 | ||
| 24,617,939 | DIRECTV | 4.9 | 1,454 | 2,134 | ||
| 13,062,594 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 3 | 750 | 2,532 | ||
| 76,971,817 | International Business Machines Corp. | 7.8 | 13,157 | 12,349 | ||
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation . | 12.1 | 248 | 2,364 | ||
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.8 | 2,990 | 4,023 | ||
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,683*** | ||
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,721 | 2,032 | ||
| 96,890,665 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.4 | 3,033 | 4,355 | ||
| 43,387,980 | USG Corporation | 30 | 836 | 1,214 | ||
| 67,707,544 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2.1 | 3,798 | 5,815 | ||
| 483,470,853 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.4 | 11,871 | 26,504 | ||
| Others | 10,180 | 15,704 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | 55,056 | 117,470 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
**Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
***Held under contract of sale for this amount.
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly
波克夏還有一個主要的股權投資並未計入上表：我們在2021年9月以前任何時間都可以以50億美元的價格買入7億股美國銀行的股票。在去年年末，這些股票市值是125億美元。我們可能會在期權到期日之前才行權。同時，我們的投資者必須意識到，美國銀行實質上是我們的第四大股權投資，並且是我們極為重視的一項投資。
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Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor, I’m embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.
細心的讀者將注意到，Tesco去年年末還在上面這個列表裡，但現在已經不在了。我很慚愧，一個細心的投資者應該更早賣掉Tesco的股票。我們在Tesco股票上太拖拉，這是個巨大的錯誤。
At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.
到2012年年末，我們持有4.15億股Tesco。Tesco在當時和今天都是英國最大的食品零售商，它在其他國家也做的不錯。我們這項投資的成本是23億美元，其市值和成本接近。
In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)
2013年，我遺憾的發現Tesco當時的管理層賣掉了1.14億股自己持有的公司股票，賺了4300萬美元。我的Tesco股票賣得太慢，造成很大的潛在損失。
During 2014, Tesco’s problems worsened by the month. The company’s market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.
2014年，Tesco的問題不斷加劇。公司股價下跌、利潤率下滑，財務問題顯現。在商業世界裡，壞消息總是連環出現：你在廚房裡看到一隻蟑螂；隨著時間流逝，你就會看到這只蟑螂的親戚。
We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire’s net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper
我們去年全年賣光了Tesco的股票。我們稅後的損失是4.44億美元，約為波克夏淨值的0.2%。過去50年，我們只有一次投資損失超過我們淨值的2%；此外還有兩次投資損失超過波克夏淨值的1%。這三筆投資都發生在1974-1975年，當時我們將那些股票賤賣，以買入其他更便宜的股票。
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Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind. During the 1964-2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to 2,059, which, with reinvested dividends, generated the overall return of 11,196% shown on page 2. Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now takes $1 to buy what could be bought for 13¢ in 1965 (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).
我們的投資業績一直不錯，這搭了大環境的順風車。1964-2014期間，標普500指數從84點漲到2059點。如果計算複利，標普500產生的總體回報是11,196%。同期，美元的購買力下跌了87%。
There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as “the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future.”
對於投資者而言，美元和美股表現的差異，傳遞出一個非常重要的信息。我們2011年年報中提到，投資就是把現在的購買力轉移給別人，同時合理預期未來獲得更多的購買力（扣除名義收益徵稅後）。
The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities – Treasuries, for example – whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century.
過去50年的經驗顯示，將錢投資在一系列分散的美國公司裡比購買與美元相關的債券更為安全。再之前的50年裡（包括大蕭條和兩次世界大戰），這一經驗也適用。投資者要記住歷史。在某些意義上來說，這條經驗也適用於下個世紀。
Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term, however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments – far riskier investments – than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray.
相對於現金而言，股票波動性總是更大。但長期來看，以貨幣為基礎的投資工具，要比一個分散的股票投資組合風險高得多。當然，後者所需的管理費和手續費不能太高。在商學院裡，很少有人教授這一觀點。商學院多半將波動性和風險劃等號。雖然這種書生氣的假設讓教學更容易，但這是錯的：波動性和風險不是一回事。一些流行的公式，將學生和投資者領入歧途。
It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors – say, investment banks – whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits.
當然，短期持有股票（比如一天、一周或者一年），相對於持有現金相關的投資風險要高得多。這對於一些投資者而言是很重要的。比如，資產價格下降可能威脅到投行的生存，因為價格大跌可能迫使他們賣出證券，進一步打壓市場。此外，任何對資金有短期需求的投資者都應該保留適當的錢在國債和銀行存款裡。
For the great majority of investors, however, who can – and should – invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time, will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities.
大部分投資者都可以、也應該把投資時限設置為數十年，短期的價格變動是不重要的。他們應該關注長期購買力的增加。對於這些投資者，在一段較長的時間裡，購買一個分散的多樣化投資組合，比持有美元債券要安全的多。
If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in “safe” Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).
相反，如果投資者害怕價格波動，錯誤的把它視為某種風險，他反而可能會做一些高風險的事。你們回憶一下，六年前有權威人士警告股價會下跌，建議你投資“安全”的國債或者銀行存單。如果你真的聽了這些勸告，那麼現在只有微薄的回報，很難愉快的退休了。（標普500指數當時低於700點，現在約為2100點。）如果他們不擔心毫無意義的價格波動，當時買了一些低成本的指數基金，現在的回報能保證有不錯的生活。因為這些基金不但股息在增加，本身的價格也在上漲（當然這其中也有很多起伏）。
Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior, make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator – and definitely not Charlie nor I – can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.
投資者本身的行為可能會讓持有股票變成某種高風險行為，許多人都有這個問題。積極的交易，試圖“抓準”市場的波動，不充分的多元投資，向基金經理和顧問支付不必要且高昂的費用，用借來的錢做投資，這些行為都可能會摧毀你的豐厚回報。如果你一直持有的話就不會有這些風險。投資者不應該用借來的錢投資，因為市場中任何時候都有可能發生意想不到的事情。沒有哪個經濟學家、顧問、電視評論員——當然包括我和查理——能告訴你高風險事件什麼時候發生。所謂的預測家能填滿你的耳朵，但是永遠不能填滿你的錢包。
The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to “the little guy.” Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool’s game.
以上列出的“投資原罪”並不只是說給那些“小傢伙們”聽的。大型機構投資者群體，通常也會跑輸簡單的指數基金投資者。其中一個重要的原因就是費用：許多機構投資者向諮詢機構支付巨額的費用，而這些機構推薦了費用高昂的經理。這是一場愚蠢者的遊戲。
There are a few investment managers, of course, who are very good – though in the short run, it’s difficult to determine whether a great record is due to luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far better at generating high fees than they are at generating high returns. In truth, their core competence is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their siren songs, investors – large and small – should instead read Jack Bogle’s The Little Book of Common Sense Investing.
當然，也有一些投資經理非常優秀，但從短期看難以辨別是運氣還是天才。許多投資顧問索取高額費用的本領遠遠高於提供高額回報，事實上他們的核心競爭力是銷售能力。不管是大投資者還是小投資者，與其聽他們的花言巧語，不如讀一讀Jack Bogle寫的《The Little Book of Common Sense Investing》這本書。
Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for investment failure, using a quote from Shakespeare: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”
幾十年前，格雷厄姆在反省投資失敗的教訓時，引用了一句莎士比亞名言：“親愛的布魯圖斯，錯誤不在星星，而在我們自己。”
The Annual Meeting
股東大會
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 2nd at the CenturyLink Center. Last year’s attendance of 39,000 set a record, and we expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our Golden Anniversary. Be there when the doors open at 7 a.m.
本屆大會將於5月2日（週六）在CenturyLink中心召開。去年有3.9萬人出席會議，創下歷史記錄。我們預計來參加本次50週年慶典的人數將再創新高。會議中心將在當天上午7點開門。
Berkshire’s talented Carrie Sova will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked her to take charge of the meeting – a huge undertaking, requiring a multitude of skills – and she jumped at the chance. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in the hundreds who work with her. She is aided by our entire home office crew who enjoy pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
波克夏的才女Carrie Sova將再次負責安排大會安排。六年前24歲的Carrie作為秘書加入了我們公司。四年前我邀請她負責年會，這是一個艱鉅的任務，需要高超的技能，她接受了挑戰。Carrie鎮定機智，善於啟發同事表現出最好的一面。她得到了我們總部辦公室所有工作人員的幫助，會讓我們所有股東享受一個充實和有趣的周末。
And, yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our products while they’re here. In fact, this year we will substantially increase the hours available for purchases, opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st, from noon to 5 p.m. as well as the usual 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie’s face and do some serious shopping.
沒錯，我們還會向出席大會的股東出售我們的產品。事實上今年我們還會延長採購時間。CenturyLink中心從5月1日週五中午12點到下午5點開放，在會議日上午7點到下午4點開放。你們多買一點東西，查理會很高興的。
Get up early on Saturday morning. At 6:20 a.m., Norman and Jake, two Texas longhorns each weighing about a ton, will proceed down 10th Street to the CenturyLink. Aboard them will be a couple of our Justin Boot executives, who do double duty as cowboys. Following the steers will be four horses pulling a Wells Fargo stagecoach. Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles. Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our reputation as America’s all-purpose transportation company.
週六早上6:20， Norman和Jake這兩頭體重為一噸的得克薩斯長角牛，將穿越CenturyLink中心門前的第十大街，牛背上坐著兩位兼職牛仔的Justin Boot公司高管。後面是一輛由四匹馬拉著的富國銀行馬車。波克夏哈撒韋公司已經有了飛機、火車和汽車。把馬車牛車加入我們的組合，我們就是一家大而全的交通公司了。
At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, we will have our fourth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target again will be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I tossed about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). I’ll present a special prize to the 12-or-under contestant who makes the best toss. Deb Bosanek will be the judge.
週六上午7:30，我們將舉辦第四屆國際扔報紙挑戰賽，按照傳統，投遞目標仍是35英尺之外的一個克萊頓之家（Clayton Home）門廊。我記得我少年時做報童，曾經投遞過50萬份報紙。所以我認為自己水平相當高。挑戰我吧！嘲笑我吧！打敗我吧！我會為打敗我的人買一份Dilly Bar酒。報紙有36到42頁，你必須先把它們折好（不准用橡皮筋）。我還會為那些12歲或者小於12歲優勝參賽者設特別獎。Deb Bosanek將擔任裁判。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so.
8:30會放映一部關於波克夏公司的新電影。一小時後，我們將開始問答環節，一直持續到下午3:30結束。中午將在CenturyLink中心午餐。下午在短暫的退場之後，查理和我將在下午3:45召開年會，會議時間通常持續一個半小時。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. If you don’t get your shopping done on Friday, slip out while Charlie’s talking on Saturday and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad layout also. Even though I’m 84, it still excites me.
購物採購區設在194300平方英尺的會議大廳各處，有數十種波克夏公司的產品供購買。如果你們週五沒有買夠，那麼可以在查理講話的時候溜出去買，盡情享受我們的特價商品吧。別忘了BNSF的鐵路模型，儘管我已經84歲了，但它仍讓我激動。
Last year you did your part as a shopper, and most of our businesses racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period on Saturday, we sold 1,385 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 23 seconds), 13,440 pounds of See’s candy, 7,276 pairs of Wells Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup. Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will be available this year. (Buy both!) Now that we are open for business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every precinct.
去年的銷售創下了記錄。在周六9小時內，我們售出了1385雙Justin boots皮靴（23秒一雙），13440磅See's糖果，7276雙Well Lamont工作手套，1萬瓶亨氏番茄醬。亨氏有一個新的芥末產品，我推薦你今年芥末和番茄醬都買。由於今年周五就開賣，我預計銷售將再創紀錄。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our third annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your credentials for the meeting. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.)
我們的跑鞋公司Brooks，將提供一款紀念版跑鞋。你可以穿著它參加第二天早上8:00舉行的第三屆“波克夏哈撒韋5公里”比賽。全部細節在會議指南中都有，你將有機會與波克夏公司的經理、董事和合作夥伴一起參加跑步比賽。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money.
全美最頂級的保險顧問將出現在GEICO展台區。我們的股東通常能享受到8%的優惠。有一點需要注意的是，折扣不能疊加，如果你本身就屬於某個能享受某種優惠的團體的話，你可以帶上自己的保單到現場來，這真的能為你省很多錢。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Last year, many shareholders purchased Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for the meeting. We also expect to be selling an inexpensive book commemorating our fifty years. It’s currently a work in process, but I expect it to contain a wide variety of historical material, including documents from the 19th Century.
記得看Bookworm的展台，這裡會有35種書籍和DVD，其中不少新書。去年許多股東買了Max Olson整理的從1965年開始的巴菲特股東信合集，今年他將推出更新版。另外，我們還會推出一本物美價廉的紀念我們50週年的書。我們還在進行各種歷史整理工作，包括某些來自19世紀的文件材料。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
附件中的材料包括了幫助你參加本次會議和其他活動需要準備的各種資料和許可文件。屆時飛機票可能會因為人多漲價。如果你從很遠的地方來，你可以比較到堪薩斯城和到奧馬哈的機票。堪薩斯到奧馬哈的車程約為2個半小時，如果你打算租車的話，買到堪薩斯的機票可以省下一大筆錢，估計約為1000美元。把錢省下來到我們這裡花。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did a record $40,481,817 of business. (An average week for NFM’s Omaha store is about $9 million.)
在72大街Dodge和Pacific之間的Nebraska Furniture Mart百貨公司，屆時會有一場“波克夏週末”打折大會。去年在會議的那一周，該店銷售額創下了4048.1817萬美元的記錄。（平常該店一周銷售額約為900萬美元。）
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 28th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
為了獲得波克夏在內布拉斯加州家具市場（NFM）的折扣，你需要在4月28日週二至5月4日週一期間（含這兩天）購物，同時必須出示你出席股東大會的證件。這段時間的特殊折扣甚至適用於多家知名製造商的產品。他們通常不打折銷售，但為了我們的股東周末，他們破例給予折扣。我們感激他們的合作。NFM的營業時間是周一至週五上午10點至晚9點，週六上午10點到晚9點30分，週日上午10點至晚8點。週六下午5點30分至晚8點，NFM會舉辦一場野餐會，會邀請各位股東參加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded our sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
我們會在Borsheims珠寶店再次舉行兩場股東專屬的活動。第一場是5月1日週五晚6點至9點的雞尾酒招待會。第二場是5月3日週日早9點至下午4點的大型售賣活動。週六我們還會開到晚6點。近幾年，我們這種活動的三日銷量超過了每年12月全月銷量，而12月往往是珠寶商銷售業績最好的月份。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
屆時整個週末，Borsheims會人潮洶湧。因此，為便於你安排，我們將股東優惠價的時段設定為4月27日週一至5月9日週六。在此期間，請出示出席會議的證件或代理委託書證明你是波克夏的股東。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
週日，在Borsheims外面的購物中心，來自達拉斯的優秀魔術師Norman Beck會為觀眾表演。此外，我們會邀請兩位世界頂級橋牌大師Bob Hamman與Sharon Osberg當天下午與股東們玩橋牌。千萬別和他們玩牌賭錢。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a sophomore at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing週日當天也會去購物中心，和大家打乒乓球。我認識Ariel時她只有9歲，那時我打乒乓球連一個球都贏不了她。現在她已經在普林斯頓大學念大二，代表美國參加過2012年的奧運會。如果你不介意在她這樣的奧運選手面前班門弄斧，想和她切磋下球技，那天下午1點就可以開始了。比爾·蓋茨和我都會上場和她較量一番。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before); for Piccolo’s, call 402-346-2865. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one
週日（5月3日），Gorat's與Piccolo's兩家餐館會再次向波克夏的股東開放。他們都會開到當晚10點，Gorat's當天下午1點開門，Piccolo's當天下午4點開門。這兩家餐館都是我的最愛，週日晚上兩家我都會光顧。請記住，4月1日起預訂Gorat's請撥打402-551-3733（4月1日以前不是這個號碼），Piccolo's的訂餐電話是402-346-2865。在Piccolo's可以點特大號的根汁汽水加冰淇淋球作為飯後甜點。小姑娘才點小份呢。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, who retired last year after sixty years at Fortune, but remains the expert on business and financial matters, and who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我們會再次邀請同樣三位財經記者主持會議的問答環節，他們會向查理和我提出股東用電郵發來的問題。這三位記者及其電郵地址分別是：為《財富》雜誌效力60年於去年離休的Carol Loomis，郵箱為：cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC的記者Becky Quick，郵箱為：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；和《紐約時報》的記者Andrew Ross Sorkin，郵箱為：arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
三位記者每人會在那些提交的問題中選擇六個他/她認為最有趣又最重要的提問。記者們告訴我，如果你不是在最後一刻才提交問題，每封郵件提問未超過兩個，而且問題既簡潔又和波克夏相關，就最有可能被選中。（你可以在郵件中告訴三位記者，如果問題被選中，你是否希望他們公開自己的名字。）
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
我們還會邀請由三名研究波克夏的分析師組成的分析師團隊。今年保險業的專家將是Dowling & Partners的Gary Ransom。保險業以外的問題將來自Ruane, Cunniff& Goldfarb的Jonathan Brandt、晨星公司的Gregg Warren。我們希望分析師與記者提的問題能讓我們的股東更了解他們的投資。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 62 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
對那些將被問到的問題，查理和我都不會得到任何線索。當然，有些問題會很難回答，可那正是我們樂意的方式。我們希望他們能問至少54個問題，每位分析師和記者都將提6個問題，剩餘的18個將由觀眾來提。去年我們總共回答了62個問題。提問的觀眾會由11次抽籤選出。抽籤在年會當天上午8點15分開始。主分會場將佈置11個麥克風，每個麥克風區域將有一次抽籤機會。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.
既然談及了股東想要知道的問題答案，那麼我來提醒一下，查理和我相信，所有的股東都應當在同一時間接收到波克夏發布的新消息，也應當擁有足夠的時間來對其進行分析。那正是我們試圖在周五晚間或週六早間發佈公司相關數據的原因，也正因此，我們的年度股東大會也選擇在周六召開。我們不與大型機構投資者或分析師進行一對一的談話，我們對待他們與對待所有股東都是一樣的。
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We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy yourselves. This year, because we expect record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of hotel rooms. To deal with that possible problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to have a wide array of accommodations to offer. Airbnb’s services may be especially helpful to shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive. Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.
在開會時，我們將得到數以千計奧馬哈居民和生意人的幫助，他們希望各位在這裡度過一段開心的時光。今年，由於預計出席會議的人數將創歷史新高，我們擔心會出現酒店房間不足的情況。為了解決這個問題，Airbnb（住宿服務網站）為此付出了特別努力，向我們提供了會議期間與會者所能選擇的酒店房間清單。Airbnb的服務給予了希望在奧馬哈鎮短暫停留一晚的股東極大幫助。去年股東大會期間，有一些酒店就要求住宿的客人最少支付三晚的房間費用，那相當昂貴。對於預算緊張的參會股東來說，應當提前在Airbnb網站上查看住宿信息。
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers also to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我經常讚揚我們的運營管理人員所做出的工作成績。他們是真正的全明星，他們像對待自家唯一擁有的資產那般對待自己的工作。我相信，我們的管理人員也是以股東為導向的。
多數管理人員在工作上並非是為了追求金錢。他們喜歡在工作中贏得“全壘打”，對他們來說，工作的樂趣幾乎就等於他們獲得的薪水。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 24,100-page Federal income tax return and oversees the filing of 3,400 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
然而，同樣重要的還有那些與我並肩作戰的24位總部辦公室員工。這個團隊有效地處理了SEC與其他監管機構提出的大量要求，填寫了多達24100頁的聯邦所得稅申報表，審查了3400項州稅收申報，回答了無數股東和媒體的問題和質詢，發佈公司年度報表，準備全美最大規模的上市公司年度股東大會，與董事會進行協調——這樣的例子數不勝數。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他們幹勁十足且異常高效地解決了所有這些問題，我的生活因此輕鬆愉快。他們的努力已經不局限於跟波克夏嚴格相關的活動：去年他們組織來自40所高校（從200所候選學校中篩選出）的學生代表來奧馬哈，跟我進行了一天問答。他們還處理我收到的各種邀請，安排我的行程，甚至幫我買漢堡和（蘸著亨氏番茄醬的）薯條作午餐。沒有哪個CEO能有更好體驗了；我真的每天都想跳著踢踏舞去上班。
Last year, for the annual report, we dropped our 48-year-old “no pictures” policy – who says I’m not flexible? – and ran a photo of our remarkable home-office crew that was taken at our Christmas lunch. I didn’t warn the gang of the public exposure they were to receive, so they didn’t have on their Sunday best. This year was a different story: On the facing page you will see what our group looks like when they think someone will be noticing. However they dress, their performance is mind-boggling.
去年年度報告中，我們摒棄了延續48年的“沒有照片”政策，發布了一張總部員工聖誕節共進午餐的照片——誰說我不知變通來著？當時我沒有提醒他們這張照片會對外公開，所以他們未著盛裝。今年就不同了：你將在報告首頁看到我們總部團隊正式對外時的樣子。不管他們穿著如何，他們的工作表現都令人驚嘆。
Come meet them on May 2nd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
就在5月2日，來跟他們會面，並享受我們的投資者狂歡派對吧。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 27, 2015
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2015年2月27日
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