| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (37.00) | 27.40 | ||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 26.50 | (6.70) | ||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 15.10 | (2.10) | ||||
| 2011 | 4.60 | 2.10 | 2.50 | ||||
| 2012 | 14.40 | 16.00 | (1.60) | ||||
| 2013 | 18.20 | 32.40 | (14.20) | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2013 | 19.7% | 9.8% | 9.90 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2013 | 693.5% | 7433.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2013 was $34.2 billion. That gain was after our deducting $1.8 billion of charges – meaningless economically, as I will explain later – that arose from our purchase of the minority interests in Marmon and Iscar. After those charges, the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 18.2%. Over the last 49 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $134,973, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*
2013年，波克夏的淨值增長了342億美元。這是抵消了18億美元的賬面沖銷後的數據，賬面沖銷源於我們購買Marmon和Iscar的少數股權——這些沖銷沒有實質上的經濟意義，我後面會解釋。扣除上述攤銷費用後，波克夏的A級和B級股票每股賬面價值增長了18.2%。過去的49年(即從現任的管理層接手以來)，我們的每股賬面價值從19美元增長到134,973美元，複合增長率19.7%。(報告中的每股數據均指A級股票的數據。每股B級股票的數據是每股A級股票的1/1500。)
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
On the facing page, we show our long-standing performance measurement: The yearly change in Berkshire’s per-share book value versus the market performance of the S&P 500. What counts, of course, is pershare intrinsic value. But that’s a subjective figure, and book value is useful as a rough tracking indicator. (An extended discussion of intrinsic value is included in our Owner-Related Business Principles on pages 103 - 108. Those principles have been included in our reports for 30 years, and we urge new and prospective shareholders to read them.)
封面上是我們的業績衡量標準：每年波克夏每股賬面價值的變動和標普500指數的比較。當然真正有意義的是每股內在價值。但內資價值是一個主觀的數字，每股賬面價值則是內在價值一個有用的參考。(關於內在價值，更詳細的討論請參考我們的股東手冊103-108頁。30多年來，這些原則一直印在我們的股東手冊上，我們希望新加入的以及有興趣成為股東的投資者都閱讀這部分內容。)
As I’ve long told you, Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That’s why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount. We did not purchase shares during 2013, however, because the stock price did not descend to the 120% level. If it does, we will be aggressive.
我已經說過，波克夏的內在價值遠超賬面價值。並且兩者之間的差距近年來顯著擴大。這也是我們在2012年以賬面價值120%的價格回購公司股票的原因。在這個價位回購股票有利於繼續持有的股東，因為公司的每股內在價值超過了賬面價值一大截。2013年我們沒有回購股票，原因是股價一直沒有掉到賬面價值120%的價位。要不然我們會積極回購的。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I believe both Berkshire’s book value and intrinsic value will outperform the S&P in years when the market is down or moderately up. We expect to fall short, though, in years when the market is strong – as we did in 2013. We have underperformed in ten of our 49 years, with all but one of our shortfalls occurring when the S&P gain exceeded 15%.
公司的副董事長，我的合夥人，查理·孟格和我都相信，在市場下跌或者上漲緩慢的年份，波克夏的賬面價值和內在價值增速都會戰勝標普指數。在市場強勢上漲的年份——比如剛剛過去的2013年，我們一般會暫時落後。過去49年裡，我們曾有10年跑輸市場，其中只有一次標普指數上漲不到15%。
Over the stock market cycle between yearends 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.
2007-2013年這個週期裡，我們成功跑贏了標普指數。在未來的周期中，我們也一樣會跑贏市場。如果沒有做到這一點，我們將愧對於自己的工資。因為大家始終可以買一隻指數基金來獲得和標普500一樣的收益。
The Year at Berkshire
今年的波克夏
On the operating front, just about everything turned out well for us last year – in certain cases very well. Let me count the ways:
運營方面，過去的一年結果很不錯——某些方面甚至非常棒。請看下文：
● We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.
● 我們完成了兩項大型收購，花了180億美元完全買下NV Energy，以及亨氏(HJ Heinz)(HJ Heinz Company(NYSE:HNZ)，亨氏，紐交所上市公司，美國食品巨頭，總部位於匹茲堡。)的大筆股權。兩家公司和我們都非常契合，而且它們的生意都還會紅火一個世紀。
With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates – Bernardo Hees, Heinz’s new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman – are responsible for operations.
在亨氏的收購中，我們創造了一個未來波克夏可能還會使用的合作模式。具體來說，我們和3G Capital的投資者合作完成了收購。3G Capital是由我的朋友Jorge Paulo Lemann(豪爾赫·保羅·雷曼/Jorge Paulo Lemann，1939年生，巴西投資銀行家，2012年彭博富豪指數排名第37位，身價189億美元，巴西首富;曾涉足百威英博、漢堡王的投資，擁有私募股權投資基金3G Capital。)領導的一家公司。他的天才合夥人——Bernardo Hees，亨氏的新CEO，以及Alex Behring，公司的董事長，將會負責公司未來的運營。
Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred’s annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.
波克夏扮演的角色是財務合夥人。作為財務合夥人，我們花80億美元買下了亨氏分紅率9%的優先股，並且有權利將每年優先回報提高到12%。同時波克夏和3G分別出資42.5億美元各買下亨氏一半的普通股。
Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).
我們對亨氏的收購看起來和“私募股權”投資的交易非常相似，但是有著本質的不同：波克夏不打算賣出公司的任何股份。我們喜歡的是購買更多的股份，而且那很可能發生：3G的部分投資者將來會把他們的股份轉讓給我們，於是我們可以提高持股比例。另外，波克夏可以和3G協商，在未來某個合適的時間，在對雙方都有利的情況下，將我們的優先股轉換為普通股(以當時一個合理的估值)。
Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.
(去年)6月，我們的合作夥伴接手了亨氏，業績喜人。但是在波克夏的報表上，來自亨氏的利潤很小，這是由於收購和業務重組形成了13億美元的一次性攤銷。2014年的業績數字就會變得非常明顯。
With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 81⁄2 companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 4911⁄2 to go.
有了亨氏以後，世界500強公司裡，波克夏已經擁有了8.5家公司(忽略關聯關係將它們看作獨立的公司)。現在還剩491.5家等著我們。
NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada’s population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican’s last major acquisition.
NV Energy，由中美洲能源以56億美元買下，隸屬於我們的公共事業板塊，為內華達州88%的人口供電。這筆收購和我們現有的電力事業相輔相成，並且給我們在可再生能源的幾個大項目提供了許多機會。NV Energy不會是中美洲能源的最後一個大型收購。
●MidAmerican is one of our “Powerhouse Five” – a collection of large non-insurance businesses that, in aggregate, had a record $10.8 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2013, up $758 million from 2012. The other companies in this sainted group are BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol and Marmon.
●MidAmerican Energy(中美洲能源，愛荷華最大的能源公司，服務於愛荷華、伊利諾伊、南達科他、內布拉斯加等多個州的客戶。)是我們的“五駕馬車”之一——我們最大的5家非保險公司。2013年中美洲能源稅前利潤創紀錄地達到108億美元，而2012年僅有7.58億。其他的4架馬車分別是BNSF(伯靈頓北方聖特菲鐵路公司是世界最大的鐵路多式聯運公司，擁有5.2萬公里運營里程，營業範圍覆蓋美國西部、中西部28個州和加拿大2個州，主要進行聯合運輸、煤炭、工業品、農產品、汽車的運輸業務。目前，BNSF每年運送超過500萬個貨櫃量(相當於1000萬標準箱)，擁有火車機車超過5700輛，網絡覆蓋北美西海岸和墨西哥灣所有港口。)、Iscar(伊斯卡，公司是世界著名的金屬切削刀具及切削技術的供應商。總部設在以色列,是伊斯卡金屬切削集團(IMC)的領頭企業。)、 Lubrizol(路博潤，一家為交通、工業和消費產品生產提供化學製品的公司，2011年產值61億美元，總部位於俄亥俄州。)和Marmon(總部位於芝加哥的控股集團，擁有11個業務板塊，主要3個業務板塊是工業和金屬部件、自然資源和運輸、零售和終端技術。)
Of the five, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire nine years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and, for the remainder, issued shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $10.4 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the nine-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
5架馬車中，只有中美洲能源是9年前波克夏就已經擁有的，當時它稅前利潤3.93億。後來，我們相繼以現金收購了另外3家。收購第五家，也就是BNSF的時候，我們支付了70%的現金，剩餘部分通過增發股票支付，這樣我們增發了6.1%的股份。換句話說，現在5駕馬車每年貢獻給波克夏的104億利潤，而我們的股票這9年來卻只有輕微的稀釋。這與我們不單單追求增長，而是要追求每股價值的增長這一目標相符。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2014, we can expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve also – perhaps by $1 billion or so pre-tax.
如果2014年美國經濟繼續恢復，我們預計5駕馬車的利潤也會隨之增長——大致會增加10億美元左右。
●Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $4.7 billion pre-tax last year, up from $3.9 billion in 2012. Here, too, we expect further gains in 2014.
●非保險業務裡，我們其他小一些的公司稅前盈利從2012年的39億增長到今年的47億。預計2014年它們也會持續增長。
Berkshire’s extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 – that makes 11 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
● 2013年，波克夏最重要的保險業務再次實現了承保盈利——這是連續承保盈利的第11個年頭了，浮存金也還在繼續增加。11年來我們的浮存金——那些不屬於波克夏，但是我們可以投資並未波克夏賺取收益的錢，從410億增加到了770億。與此同時，我們累計實現了220億稅前承保利潤，其中2013年30億。而這一切，都起始於我們1967年以860萬美元收購了National Indemnity。
We now own a wide variety of exceptional insurance operations. Best known is GEICO, the car insurer Berkshire acquired in full at yearend 1995 (having for many years prior owned a partial interest). GEICO in 1996 ranked number seven among U.S. auto insurers. Now, GEICO is number two, having recently passed Allstate. The reasons for this amazing growth are simple: low prices and reliable service. You can do yourself a favor by calling 1-800-847-7536 or checking Geico.com to see if you, too, can cut your insurance costs. Buy some of Berkshire’s other products with the savings.
現在我們已經擁有多家卓越的保險公司。最為人所熟知的，GEICO, 由1955年波克夏完全收購的車險公司(在那之前很多年我們就持有它部分權益了)。1996年GEICO在美國車險企業裡排名第七。現在它排第二，剛剛超過了Allstate。它驚人增長的秘密其實非常簡單：便宜的價格和可靠的服務。大家應該打客服電話1-800-847-7536，或者登錄Geico.com，看看GEICO的產品是不是能幫你節省一些保險支出。省下來的錢可以買些其他波克夏的產品。
● While Charlie and I search for elephants, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year, we contracted for 25 of these, scheduled to cost $3.1 billion in aggregate. These transactions ranged from $1.9 million to $1.1 billion in size.
●查理和我一直在獵象，我們的公司也在不斷進行補強型收購。去年我們一共有25筆，總計31億美元的此類收購。這些收購從190萬到11億美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage these deals. They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. The result is no more work for us and more earnings for you. Many more of these bolt-on deals will be made in future years. In aggregate, they will be meaningful.
查理和我都支持這些收購。它們把資本用在了契合我們現有業務的地方，並且將由我們優秀的經理人團隊管理。結果就是，我們不用乾活，大家卻在賺錢。未來還會有更多類似的補強型收購。整體而言，它們帶來的意義非凡。
●Last year we invested $3.5 billion in the surest sort of bolt-on: the purchase of additional shares in two wonderful businesses that we already controlled. In one case – Marmon – our purchases brought us to the 100% ownership we had signed up for in 2008. In the other instance – Iscar – the Wertheimer family elected to exercise a put option it held, selling us the 20% of the business it retained when we bought control in 2006.
●去年我們投資了35億，用於確定無疑的補強型投資：購買了兩家我們已經擁有控制權公司的剩餘股權。第一個是Marmon，根據2008年的協議我們獲得了Marnon 100%的權益。另一個是Iscar，Wertheimer家族決定行使它的賣出權，將其持有公司的20%股份轉讓給我們。2006年我們已經獲得了公司的控制權。
These purchases added about $300 million pre-tax to our current earning power and also delivered us $800 million of cash. Meanwhile, the same nonsensical accounting rule that I described in last year’s letter required that we enter these purchases on our books at $1.8 billion less than we paid, a process that reduced Berkshire’s book value. (The charge was made to “capital in excess of par value”; figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion.
兩筆收購讓我們增加了3億的稅前利潤，帶來8億的現金流。但是去年的信中已經講過的，“虛幻”的會計準則要求我們以低於支付金額18億的價格對它入賬，於是減少了波克夏的賬面價值。(這項費用應該記在“超過賬面價值的資本”項目下;一個報表上沒有的項目)。大家應該明白，這條怪異的會計要求使得波克夏內在價值和賬面價值的差距增加了18億。
●Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America.
●2013年，波克夏所屬企業在廠房、設備上的資本開支達到110億，幾乎是折舊額的2倍。大約89%的錢投在了美國。我們也在國外投資，但是投資機會的主礦脈還是在美國。
In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They’ve earned it.
大多數股票經理人發現不可能超越標準普爾500指數的一年中，托德•庫姆斯（Todd Combs）和特德•韋施勒（Ted Weschler）都輕而易舉地做到了這一點。 現在每個人的投資組合都超過70億美元。 他們已經贏得。
I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add “by a lot.”) If such humiliating comparisons continue, I’ll have no choice but to cease talking about them.
我不得不坦白，他們的投資業績超過了我。(查理提醒我應該加上“超過了一大截”。)如果這種令人慚愧的對比繼續下去，我就只好閉口不提他倆了。
Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins.
除了投資賺錢以外，Todd和Ted還在諸多方面為大家創造了價值。他們帶來的價值只是小荷才露尖尖角：他們都流淌著波克夏的血。
● Berkshire’s yearend employment – counting Heinz – totaled a record 330,745, up 42,283 from last year. The increase, I must admit, included one person at our Omaha home office. (Don’t panic: The headquarters gang still fits comfortably on one floor.)
● 截至年底，波克夏的僱員總數，算上亨氏，再創紀錄達到了330,745人，比去年增加了42,283人。我得承認，增加的人裡包括一名在奧馬哈家庭辦公室裡上班的人。(別慌：一層樓還是足夠公司總部的傢伙們用了，不擠。)
● Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (increasing our ownership to 9.2% versus 8.7% at yearend 2012) and IBM (6.3% versus 6.0%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in CocaCola grew from 8.9% to 9.1% and our interest in American Express from 13.7% to 14.2%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our share of their equity raises Berkshire’s share of their annual earnings by $50 million.
● 去年波克夏在“四大”上的投資比例都上升了——美國運通、可口可樂、IBM和富國銀行。我們增持了富國銀行(從2012年底的8.7%增加到9.2%)和IBM(從6.0%到6.3%)。同時，可口可樂和美國運通的股票回購提高了我們的持股比例。我們在可口可樂的持股比例從8.9%提高到9.1%，美國運通的從13.7%提高到14.2%。如果大家覺得百分之零點幾的變動意思不大，那請大家這樣估算一下：我們在四大上的投資，每增加0.1%，波克夏每年的利潤就會增加5000萬。
The four companies possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business; it’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
四家公司都擁有良好的業務，並由聰明而且為股東著想的經理人掌管。在波克夏，我們情願擁有一家好公司非控制性但大比例的持股，也不願意100%擁有一家普普通通的公司;寧願擁有希望之星的一部分，也不願要一整顆人造鑽石，同樣的道理。
Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive – about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
以年末的持股比例計算，2013年四大歸屬於我們的利潤44億。但是在利潤表上，我們只報告了分紅——大約14億。但是別犯迷糊：沒有報告的30億利潤每一分都和賬上報告的一樣值錢。
The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that enhances our share of future earnings – as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, our unrealized capital gains will, too. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.)
4家公司留存的利潤經常被用於回購股票——這將增加未來我們所佔的利潤比例，或者投資於有利可圖的新業務。可以預期，我們在“四大”上的每股投資利潤都會不斷顯著增長。倘若事實的確如此，波克夏獲得的分紅也將隨之增加，更重要的是，我們的未實現資本收益也會增長。(截止年底，我們在“四大”上的未實現收益累計390億美元。)
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: “The advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.” Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash.
相比於那些局限於投資自身能夠運營的業務的公司，我們在投資上的靈活性——大額進行被動投資的意願，讓我們擁有更多優勢。伍迪·艾倫說過，“雙性戀的好處就是，週六晚上約會的概率可以提高一倍。”同樣，我們即投資可以自己運營的業務，又願意被動投資，於是我們源源不斷的現金找尋到合適投資機會的概率也提高了一倍。
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Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009年年末，在大衰退的陰影中，我們通過了買下BNSF的決定，波克夏歷史上最大的收購。當時我把這筆交易稱作是“完全下注於美國經濟的賭博”。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
當然這對我們來說也不是新鮮事了：從巴菲特合夥公司1965年買下波克夏以來，我們一直在下類似的賭注。以同樣充分的理由。查理和我一直認為“賭”美國長盛不衰，幾乎是一件只賺不賠的事。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America’s best days lie ahead.
過去的237年裡看空美國的人中誰獲益了?如果把我們國家現在的樣子和1776年作一個比較，大家一定不敢相信自己的眼睛。而且市場經濟的內在機制還會繼續發揮它的魔力，美國的好日子還在前頭。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
趁著順風，查理和我希望通過以下方式更進一步增加波克夏的每股內在價值：1、持續增強各個業務公司的盈利能力;2、繼續通過補強型收購來增加它們的利潤;3 、從我們投資的公司的增長中獲益;4、當波克夏的股價下跌到相對內在價值有很大折扣時回購公司股票;5、偶爾進行大型的收購。少數情況下，我們也可能通過增發波克夏的股票來最大化大家的收益。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals – and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire.
這些方式都有其堅實的基礎。一個世紀內，BNSF和中美洲能源還將繼續在我們的經濟中扮演重要角色。無論對於公司還是個人，保險業務也依然不可或缺，在這方面，波克夏投入的人力和資金超過其他任何公司。
Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
另外，我們依然會保持高度的財務穩健，維持至少200億的現金及等價物，並避免承擔大規模的短期債務。考慮到方方面面的優勢，查理和我非常看好公司的未來。我們感到非常幸運能夠將財富託付給公司管理。
Intrinsic Business Value
內在價值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109 - 110.
查理和我時常提到內在價值，但是我們很難告訴大家波克夏每股內在價值的準確數字(實際上，其他任何股票都不能)。2010年的年報中，我們提出了三個基本要素——其中一個是定性的，我們相信這些要素是衡量波克夏內在價值的關鍵指標。這些討論我們完整地收錄在109-110頁。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9,116 per share.
這裡是我們對兩個定量指標的更新：2013年，我們的每股投資增長了13.6%至129,253，另外我們的非保險非投資業務每股稅前利潤增長了12.8%至9,116。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings.
1970年來，我們的每股投資以每年19.3%的速度複合增長，同時我們的運營利潤數增速是20.6%。波克夏的股價43年來以一個類似的速度增長並非巧合。查理和我喜歡看到兩個部分都獲得增長，但是我們會更在意運營利潤。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
接下來，我們看一下公司四個主要板塊的業務情況。四個板塊都有完全不同的資產負債表和收入特性。所以我們把它們區別對待，這也是查理和我看待業務的方式(但是把它們在同一個體系中運作是非常重要並且具有優勢的)。假設我們位置互換，我們自己是沒到場的股東，而大家是作報告的管理層，那提供我們想要知道的信息就是以下匯報的目標。
Insurance
保險業
“Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.” — 1967 Annual Report
“在保險行業的投資是我們形成多元化利潤來源的重要一步。”— 1967年年報
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published.
我們先來看保險業務，1967年的年報發布以來不斷驅動波克夏前進和擴張的核心業務。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collectnow, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
財產保險公司先收取保費，事後進行理賠支付。在一些極端情況下，比如某些工傷保險，賠付可能發生在幾十年之後。這種現在收錢，將來賠付的模式讓我們持有大量的現金——我們
把它稱作“浮存金”——最終它會支付到別人手中。同時，我們可以使用這些浮存金為波克夏投資。雖然單筆的保單和索賠有進有出，但是我們持有的浮存金總額和保費收入維持一個穩定關係。所以，當我們的業務擴張時，我們的浮存金規模也擴張。我們增長的速度，參見下面的表格：
Year Float (in $ millions)
1970 $ 39
1980 237
1990 1,632
2000 27,871
2010 65,832
2013 77,240
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.)
獲取更多的浮存金越來越困難了。不過GEICO的浮存金繼續增長基本確定無疑。在National Indemnity的再保險業務部門，我們流失了一些保單，浮存金也相應下降。即便未來我們出現浮存金的下降，那也會是非常輕微的——每年最多不會超過3%。相較於我們的流動性規模，我們的保單特性保證我們不會受制於任何短期的流動性壓力。(在這方面，財險業務和某些形式的壽險業務有非常的區別。)
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我們的保費收入超過了總成本和最終的賠付支出，我們會在利用浮存金投資獲得的投資收益之外，錄得一個承保利潤。賺到這種利潤的時候，我們是在享受持有這些免費資金的好處——更好的是，我們還因為持有資金而賺到錢。這就好像你去銀行貸款，銀行還倒貼給你利息。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry – despite the float income all companies enjoy – will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.
不幸的是，保險公司實現這個美好結果的強烈願望導致了激烈的競爭，競爭如此慘烈以至於大多數年份，財產保險行業整體處在嚴重的承保虧損中運行。這筆承保虧損，實質上就是整個行業為了獲得浮存金而支付的成本。舉個例子，State Farm，當前美國最大且管理良好的保險公司，截止到2012年前的12年裡有9年都錄得承保虧損(依據我寫作本報告時所能獲得的最新一年的財務數據)。保險行業有很多種虧錢的方式，而且這個行業從來不曾停止尋找新的虧錢方式。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
正如前一部分提到的，我們已經連續11年錄得承保利潤，我們這一時期內的稅前承保利潤累計達220億美元。預計未來大部分年份中，我們依然會保持錄得承保利潤。實現承保利潤是我們保險公司管理層的每日工作，他們明白浮存金的價值，糟糕的承保虧損將會吞噬它的價值。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims – some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
那我們誘人的浮存金將會如何影響內在價值?當波克夏計算賬面價值的時候，所有的浮存金都作為負債被扣除了，就好像我們明天就要兌現債務，並且再也無法補充回來。但把浮存金當做一種嚴格意義上的負債是錯誤的，它實際上應該被看做一筆循環基金。2013年，我們平均每天賠付超過500多萬筆保單總計170億美元——這減少了浮存金。同時，我們每天都承接新保單從而增加浮存金。如果浮存金是無成本並且是長期存在的，我相信對波克夏來說確實如此，那這項負債的真實價值就遠比賬面負債小得多。
A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我們資產賬面上記錄的，對應保險公司的155億“商譽”部分地抵消了負債賬面價值的高估。實際上，這些商譽代表著我們為保險公司產生浮存金的能力所支付的價格。然而商譽的賬面成本，和它的真實價值毫無對應關係。比如說一家持續產生大額承保虧損的保險公司，其商譽應該為零，無論其歷史成本是多少。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸運的是，波克夏的情況不是那樣。查理和我相信，我們保險公司的真實商譽——我們願意為購買一家能產生類似質量的浮存金的保險公司所支付的價格——遠超過賬面上記錄的歷史成本。浮存金的價值是我們認為波克夏的內在價值明顯超過賬面價值的一個原因——一個重要原因。
************ Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
波克夏優越的經濟特性之所以存在，是因為我們有一群卓越的經理人經營我們拿手的業務，並且這些業務模式基礎強健並且難以復制。讓我將給大家介紹一些主要的公司。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some megacatastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
首先，浮存金規模排在第一的是波克夏再保險集團，由Ajit Jain領導。Ajit對其他人都不願意承保，或者沒有足夠資本進行承保的風險進行承保。他的公司集能力、速度、果斷，以及最重要的，保險專業智慧於一身。他從未讓波克夏暴露於與我們的資源不相稱的風險之下。實際上，我們比多數大保險公司在規避風險方面都更加謹慎。舉例來說，如果保險行業因某項巨災遭遇了2500億美元的虧損——這是歷史上所發生過最大規模虧損的3倍——波克夏當年整體上依然能夠實現盈利，因為它有如此多的利潤來源。我們一直會攥滿現金，等待巨災衝擊市場這樣的好機會。而其他的大保險公司和再保險公司則可能會出現大額的虧損，有些甚至將面臨破產。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit’s mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.
從1985年開始，Ajit已經創立了一個浮存金370億美元，實現巨額累計承保利潤的再保險公司，這是一項任何其他保險公司的CEO都難以望其項背成就。Ajit的大腦就想一個創意工廠，無時不刻搜尋著任何可以擴展他現有業務的機會。
One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully
去年6月一項新業務成行，Ajit組建了波克夏專業保險公司(“BHSI”)。這是我們首次進入商業保險領域，全國主要的保險經紀人和企業風險管理人都非常認可我們。這些專業人士明白，在財務穩健方面沒有任何其他保險公司可與波克夏相比，這保證了它們未來多年的任何合法索賠都會得到及時的全額賠付。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.
BHSI由Peter Eastwood領導，他是一名經驗豐富、受人尊敬的保險人。Peter組建的豪華團隊已經為許多世界500強企業提供了大量承保，當然也包括小一些的公司。BHSI將會成為波克夏的重要資產之一，一塊在未來幾年內貢獻數十億美元的財富。如果大家在年會上碰到Peter的話，向他致以波克夏式的問候。
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We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我們還有另外一駕再保險馬車，它屬於通用再保險，由Tad Montross掌管。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
最起碼地，一家優秀的保險公司必須遵守四項原則。它必須(1)理解所有可能導致保單形成損失的風險敞口;(2)保守地衡量風險敞口實際形成損失的概率以及可能的損失規模;(3)設定合理的保費，平均來看，要能在覆蓋潛在的損失成本和運營成本後實現承保利潤;(4)願意在收取不了合意的保費時放棄保單。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
很多保險公司順利通過前三條，但在第四條上不及格。它們無法在它們的競爭對手也爭搶的業務上回頭。古話說，“別人這麼幹，我也得這麼幹”，這在很多行業都造成了麻煩，但這在保險行業造成的麻煩尤其多。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad非常明了保險行業的四條軍規，他的業績證明了這一點。在他的領導下，通用再保險的巨額浮存金比免費的資金還要誘人，並且我們預計這種情況依然會繼續。我們尤其對通用再保險的國際人壽再保險業務充滿熱情，從1998年我們收購公司以來，這項業務持續增長並不斷盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
當初我們買下通用再保險時，公司問題纏身，許多評論員——甚至在短時間內包括我，都認為我自己犯下了巨大錯誤。不過事情過去很久了。現在，通用再保險是一塊珍寶。
最後，是GEICO，63年前讓我開始入行時投資的保險公司。GEICO由Tony Nicely掌管，他18歲就加入了公司，到2013年，已經服役52年。1993年Tony當上了CEO，公司從那一刻開始起飛。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.
1951年1月我第一次接觸到GEICO的時候就被公司無與倫比的成本優勢所震撼。這項優勢至今依舊保持並且是公司最最重要的資產。沒人喜歡買車險。但是幾乎每個人都喜歡開車。必不可少的車險成了大多數家庭的主要開支。便宜對他們來說非常重要——而只有低成本的保險公司能為他們提供這樣的車險。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.
1951年1月，當我第一次被介紹給GEICO時，與業內巨人所付出的代價相比，公司享有巨大的成本優勢。 今天的運營效率持續下去，是一項重要的資產。 沒有人喜歡購買汽車保險，但幾乎每個人都喜歡開車。保險是大多數家庭的主要支出。 所以省錢對他們很重要 - 只有低成本的保險才能實現這些。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling
GEICO的成本優勢是其市場份額年年上升的原因。它的低成本優勢是其它競爭對手難以逾越的、持久的護城河。我們的小蜥蜴(GEICO.com主頁上，客服的卡通形像是一隻“小蜥蜴”http://www.geico.com/)一直在宣傳GEICO如何為大家省錢。最近公司進行了新一輪的運營成本削減，它的傳說還將繼續。
In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn’t already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That’s “goodwill,” and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO’s business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.
1995年，我們買下GEICO剩餘的一半股份時，比可辨淨認資產多花了14億。這被記作“商譽”，並且在財報上的數值一直不變。但是隨著GEICO的業務增長，它的真實商譽也不斷增長。我認為這個數值現在接近200億。
************
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers
除了我們的三家主要保險公司外，我們還有一些小保險公司，它們的大部分專注於保險行業的一些細分領域。整體上，這些公司一直為我們貢獻承保利潤。另外，正如表格數據顯示的那樣，它們也提供了大量浮存金。查理和我感謝這些公司和它們的經理人們。
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 | ||
| General Re | $1,294 | $304 | $37,231 | $34,821 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 283 | 355 | 20,013 | 20,128 | ||
| GEICO | 1,127 | 688 | 12,566 | 11,578 | ||
| Other Primary | 385 | 286 | 7,430 | 6,598 | ||
| Total | $3,089 | $1,625 | $77,240 | $73,125 | ||
Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.
簡單的說，保險賣的是對未來的承諾。“顧客”現在付錢，保險公司承諾未來某些事件發生的情況下付錢。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay – even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives – is all-important.
有時候，承諾在未來幾十年都有效。(比如大家20來歲時買的壽險。)因此，保險公司的賠付能力和賠付意願非常的重要，哪怕賠款的需要剛好趕上經濟危機。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world’s largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally longlived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however – one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor – would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.
波克夏的信譽是無人能比的，最近幾年的事實更加證明了一點，一些全球最大、最富經驗的保險公司正在試圖擺脫它們巨額的長壽風險，尤其涉及到石棉的保單。它們希望將這些負債轉移給再保險公司。但是如果選擇了錯誤的再保險公司——那些將會陷入財務困境或者運營不良的再保險公司，對原保險公司來說意味著將賠付責任轉回自己腳下的風險。
Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd’s in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.)
毫無例外，所有尋求幫助的大保險公司都會聯繫波克夏。實際上，2007年Lloyd's將上千筆1993年前的確定將會索賠的保單出售給了我們，同期的保單裡還有不確定數量但是絕對是大額的索賠未來基本一定會賠付，這是創紀錄的一筆交易。(對，我們會接收幾十年前的保單並對1993前發生的事件承保。)
Berkshire’s ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd’s transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer’s promise would have given Lloyd’s the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd’s claims said it best: “Names [the original insurers at Lloyd’s] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
波克夏因為Lloyd's的交易最終的賠付額今天還不得而知。但是可以確定的是，波克夏一定會賠付上限為150億內的一切有效索賠。沒有任何其他保險公司的承諾能給予Lloyd's波克夏所提供的安心。公司的CEO拿著Lloyd's的保單說：“某某(Lloyd's的原承保人)希望晚上能安心睡覺，我們想我們已經給他送去了世界上最好的床墊。”
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Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
波克夏優秀的經理人團隊，良好的財務穩健性，還有多元化的業務，構成了它在保險行業獨一無二的護城河。這樣的構成是波克夏股東們的巨大財富，並且隨著時間推移，它會變得越發值錢。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受管制的、資本密集型業務
“Though there are many regulatory restraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.” — 1999 Annual Report
“雖然公用事業充滿管制，我們還是有機會進行一些投資。一旦我們決定投資，一定是大手筆。”
——1999年年報
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
這個版塊主要有兩家公司，BNSF(伯靈頓北方聖特菲鐵路公司)和MidAmercian Energy(中美洲能源)，它們有一些重要共同特點區別於我們其他的公司。所以，我們在這裡把它們單獨歸為一類進行討論，並在GAAP會計報表中單獨列示它們的合併資產負債表和營收表。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
它們的一個重要特徵是，兩家公司都有巨額的長期受管制的資產投資，這些資產部分由大額長期賬務支持，波克夏並不承擔相關的債務責任。它們實際上並不需要我們的信用支持，因為它們具備良好的盈利能力，即使在惡劣的環境下也能覆蓋它們的債務利息。比如在去年疲軟的經濟中，BNSF的利息覆蓋倍數是9:1。(我們對覆蓋倍數的定義應該是稅前利潤/利息，而不是EBITDA(息稅折舊攤銷前利潤)/利息，一項我們認為被普遍使用的錯誤指標。)
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies exclusively offering an essential service. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Now, with the acquisition of NV Energy, MidAmerican’s earnings base has further broadened. This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire’s ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.
在中美洲能源，有兩個因素確保它在各種情形下都具有還本付息的能力。第一個因素與其他公用事業企業相同：抗週期的盈利能力，這源於公司壟斷地提供社會必需的服務。第二個因素則只有少數公用事業公司才具備：多元化的利潤來源，這保護我們不會因為監管部門的某一項措施而遭受重創。收購了NV Energy以後，中美洲能源的利潤來源進一步擴大了。同時，由於波克夏的股東背景，中美洲能源和它的分支機構可以以顯著低於同行的利率借債。這種優勢即有利於我們也有利於我們的顧客。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我們的兩家公司都在驅動著美國經濟：
●BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system. Its hold on the number-one position strengthened in 2013.
●BNSF承擔了全國15%(以噸-英里衡量)的城際間貨運量，包括公路、鐵路、水路、航空以及管道運輸。BNSF的噸-英里運量超過其他任何公司，這個事實意味著BNSF是全國經濟循環系統最重要的大動脈。2013年它依然保持著其龍頭地位。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
和其他鐵路公司一樣，BNSF還以一種非常節約能源和環境友好的方式在運輸著貨物，它運輸一頓貨物500英里只需一加侖柴油。卡車實現同樣的運力大約要使用4倍的能源。
●MidAmerican’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: From a standing start nine years ago, MidAmerican now accounts for 7% of the country’s wind generation capacity, with more on the way. Our share in solar – most of which is still in construction – is even larger.
●中美洲能源的電力設施為11個州的零售客戶服務。沒有任何公用事業公司服務範圍比我們更廣。另外，我們是再生能源方面的領導者： 9年前開始涉足，到目前我們已經佔全國風力發電量的7%，未來還會更多。我們在太陽能上的份額——雖然大部分還在建設當中，甚至更高。
MidAmerican can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. Here’s a little known fact: Last year MidAmerican retained more dollars of earnings – by far – than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this as an important advantage – one almost certain to exist five, ten and twenty years from now.
中美洲能源之所以能進行上述投資是因為它留存了所有利潤。事實上：去年中美洲能源迄今為止累計留存的利潤超過美國任何其他電力公司。我們和監管部門都把這看作一項重要的優勢——一項還會持續5年、10年、20年的優勢。
When our current projects are completed, MidAmerican’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns. And, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
等我們的在建項目完工後，中美洲能源的可再生能源投資將達到150億。只要這些投資的預期回報合理，我們都喜歡這樣的投資。在這方面，我們給予了未來的監管極大的信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is meanwhile in our selfinterest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我們的信心來源於過往的經驗，也來源於社會在交通和能源方面會一直需要大量投資的認識。政府為了自己的利益將會合理對待資本提供者，以保證有持續的資金來滿足必須的公共項目。從我們自身的利益出發，我們願意去爭取監管者和它們所代表的人民的認可和批准。
Tangible proof of our dedication to that duty was delivered last year in a poll of customer satisfaction covering 52 holding companies and their 101 operating electric utilities. Our MidAmerican group ranked number one, with 95.3% of respondents giving us a “very satisfied” vote and not a single customer rating us “dissatisfied.” The bottom score in the survey, incidentally, was a dismal 34.5%.
去年一份消費者對52家控股公司和它們的101家電力公司滿意度調查的結果，是我們投資於未來這一決心的有力證明。我們的中美洲能源排名第一，95.3%的被調查者表示“非常滿意”，並且沒有一個被調查者表示“不滿意”。調查中墊底的公司，僅有34.5%的滿意度。
All three of our companies were ranked far lower by this measure before they were acquired by MidAmerican. The extraordinary customer satisfaction we have achieved is of great importance as we expand: Regulators in states we hope to enter are glad to see us, knowing we will be responsible operators.
我們現有的三家公司在被中美洲能源收購以前的調查中排名遠低於現在。優異的消費者滿意度在我們擴張的時候發揮著重要作用：我們希望進入地區的監管部門願意看到我們的到來，因為他們知道我們是負責任的公司。
Our railroad has been diligent as well in anticipating the needs of its customers. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting: BNSF spent $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, double its depreciation charge and a single-year record for any railroad. And, we will spend considerably more in 2014. Like Noah, who foresaw early on the need for dependable transportation, we know it’s our job to plan ahead.
預見到消費者的需求增長，我們的鐵路板塊也在兢兢業業的工作。你聽說的任何關於我們國家基礎設施建設的怨言，都不適用於BNSF和鐵路行業。美國的鐵路系統從未有過今天這樣良好的狀態，這是行業巨額投資的成果。當然我們也沒閒著：2013年BHSF在鐵路上投資了40億，是折舊額的兩倍，也是有史以來最高的單年投資額。我們可能在2014年投資更多。就好像預見到未來交通需求的諾亞一樣，我們明白必須未雨綢繆。
Leading our two capital-intensive companies are Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, and the team of Matt Rose and Carl Ice at BNSF. The three are extraordinary managers who have my gratitude and deserve yours as well. Here are the key figures for their businesses:
領導我們兩家重資本公司的是中美洲能源的Greg Abel，還有BNSF的Matt Rose和Carl Ice團隊。他們三人都是卓越的經理人，應該受到我和大家的感謝。
| MidAmerican (89.8% owned) | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||||
| 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | |||||
| U.K. Utilities | $362 | $429 | $469 | ||||
| Iowa utility | 230 | 236 | 279 | ||||
| Western utilities | 982 | 737 | 771 | ||||
| Pipelines | 385 | 383 | 388 | ||||
| Home Services | 139 | 82 | 39 | ||||
| Other (Net) | 4 | 91 | 36 | ||||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 2,102 | 1,958 | 1,982 | ||||
| Interest | 296 | 314 | 336 | ||||
| Income Taxes | 170 | 172 | 315 | ||||
| Net Earnings | $1,636 | $1,472 | $1,331 | ||||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire | $1,470 | $1,204 | $1,204 | ||||
| BNSF | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||||
| 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | |||||
| Revenues | $22,014 | $20,835 | $19,548 | ||||
| Operating earnings | 15,357 | 14,835 | 14,247 | ||||
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 6,657 | 6,000 | 5,301 | ||||
| Interest (Net) | 729 | 623 | 560 | ||||
| Income taxes | 2,135 | 2,005 | 1,769 | ||||
| Net earnings | $3,793 | $3,372 | $2,972 | ||||
Ron Peltier continues to build HomeServices, MidAmerican’s real estate brokerage subsidiary. Last year his operation made four acquisitions, the most significant being Fox & Roach, a Philadelphia-based company that is the largest single-market realtor in the country.
Ron Peltire在繼續打造HomeServices，中美洲能源的房地產經濟業務。去年他進行了四次收購，最主要的是對Fox & Roach的收購，一家總部位於費城、全國最大的地區性經紀公司。
HomeServices 現在有22,114名經紀人(各地區的名單見112頁)，比2012年增加38%。
HomeServices now has 22,114 agents (listed by geography on page 112), up 38% from 2012. HomeServices also owns 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which are in the process of rebranding their franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices. If you haven’t yet, many of you will soon be seeing our name on “for sale” signs.
HomeServices還擁有Prudential and Real Living 67%的特許經營權業務，它正在更名為Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices。大家很快就會在“待售”的房屋廣告上看到我們的名字。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造、服務和零售業務
“See that store,” Warren says, pointing at Nebraska Furniture Mart. “That’s a really good business.” “Why don’t you buy it?” I said.
“It’s privately held,” Warren said.
“Oh,” I said.
“I might buy it anyway,” Warren said. “Someday.”
— Supermoney by Adam Smith (1972)
“看那間超市”，沃倫指著內布拉斯加家具超市說，“那真是個好公司。”
“那你為什麼不買下它?”我說。
“它是家私有企業”沃倫說。
“哦”，我說。
“我一定會買下它的”，沃倫說，“總有一天”。
——Supermoney，作者Adam Smith (1972)
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我們在這部分的業務種類繁多。我們將通過一個合併的資產負債表和營收表來了解整個部門。
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/12 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $6,625 | Notes payable | $1,615 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 7,749 | Other current liabilities | 8,965 | |||||
| Inventory | 9,945 | Total current liabilities | 10,580 | |||||
| Other current assets | 716 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 25,035 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 25,617 | Deferred taxes | 5184 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 19,389 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,405 | |||||
| Other assets | 4,274 | Non-controlling interests | 456 | |||||
| $74,315 | Berkshire equity | 53,690 | ||||||
| $74,315 | ||||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | |||||
| Revenues | $95292 | $83,255 | $72,406 | ||||
| Operating expenses | 88414 | 76978 | 67239 | ||||
| Interest expense (net) | 135 | 146 | 130 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 6742 | 6131 | 5037 | ||||
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2512 | 2432 | 1998 | ||||
| Net income | $4230 | $3,699 | $3,039 | ||||
Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
符合美國通用會計準則(GAAP)的收入和支出數據列示在29頁。上表中的運營成本剔除了一些併購會計項目，是不符合GAAP準則的(主要是某些無形資產的攤銷)。我們列示這些數據是因為查理和我認為調整後的數字比GAAP下顯示的數字更準確地反映了整塊業務真實的成本和利潤。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不打算逐一解釋所有的調整——有些是細微並且晦澀的——但是認真的投資者必須要理解不同無形資產之間的本質區別：一些無形資產的價值隨時間消耗殆盡，但是另外一些的價值從不耗減。比如說軟件，其攤銷額是真是的成本支出。但對於某些無形資產，例如對客戶關係，購買法會計準則下的攤銷則顯然不是真實的成本。GAAP會計準則並不對這兩者進行區分。儘管從投資者的角度看，它們完全不同，但在會計上計算利潤是它們都會被記作成本。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在29頁列示的GAAP會計準則的數據下，該部門6.48億美元的攤銷費用被計入了成本。我們大致認為其中的20%是“真實”的——這也是我們上面的表格包括的部分——其他的則不是。這種差別因為我們做了非常多的收購而變得影響巨大。我們未來進行的收購越多，這樣的差別還會越來越大。
Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and – alas – it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.
當對應的資產沒攤銷完之後，相應的賬面成本也就沒有了。但這通常需要15年，哎，我的繼承人才能享受到攤銷完之後報表上增加的利潤了。
Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.
我們報告的折舊，才是真正的成本支出。對其他任何公司來說也是這樣。當華爾街人士用EBITDA作為估值指標時，捂緊你的錢包。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
當然我們公開的財報依然會遵循GAAP會計準則。但是請認清現實，記得把我們報告的攤銷加回來。
************
The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.
這個版塊的公司銷售的產品從棒棒糖到噴氣式飛機，無所不包。有些公司有非常好的經濟特性，它們無槓桿條件下的稅後有形資產回報率從25%到100%多。其他一些產品的回報率介於12%-20%。但也有少數公司回報率很糟糕，這是我們在資產配置上所犯下的嚴重錯誤。我並沒有受到誤導：我只是錯誤地估計了公司或者其所在行業的經濟形勢。
Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
幸運的是我們犯得錯誤一般是小型的收購。我們的大型收購都運行的很好，有些甚至非常好。但以上不會是我犯得最後一個錯誤。並非事事都如我所料。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.
把整個板塊看作一個公司的話，這家公司業務非常優秀。2013年它們運作250億的淨資產，大量的現金和極低的槓桿，實現了16.7%的稅後收益。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
當然，如果出價過高，買入一些具有良好經濟特性的公司也可能成為一筆糟糕的投資。我們大多數的收購裡都支付了遠超有形淨資產的溢價，這些成本反映在財報巨額的無形資產數據中。不過總體來說，我們收穫了與投資額相稱的回報。而且，這些公司的內在價值，遠超它們的賬面價值。需要說明的是，在保險板塊和受管制的行業板塊，內在價值和賬面價值之間的差距更加巨大。那裡才是真正的大贏家所在之處。
************
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, both current and potential competitors read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if they knew our numbers. So, in some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 80-84.
這個版塊內的公司太多，我們不能一一道來。而且它們現有和潛在的競爭對手都能看到這份報告。公開某些公司的數據將會對它們不利。所以，對波克夏來說，規模不是非常大的公司我們僅按要求披露信息。不過，在80-84的內容裡，大家可以找到更多詳細內容。
I can’t resist, however, giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart’s expansion into Texas. I’m not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire – it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire’s $225 billion equity base. But I’ve now worked 30 years with the marvelous Blumkin family, and I’m excited about the remarkable store – truly Texas-sized – it is building at The Colony, in the northern part of the Dallas metropolitan area.
我還是忍不住要像大家匯報一下內布拉斯加家具超市在德克薩斯擴張的最新進展。我把它拿出來說，是因為它對波克夏來說不僅僅是新開了一家店那麼簡單，雖然相比波克夏2250億的資產規模來說這微不足道。我和Blumkin家族合作30多年了，我為這家新店而興奮，一家真正德克薩斯式的超市，它開在達拉斯市區北面的The Colony。
When the store is completed next year, NFM will have – under one roof, and on a 433-acre site – 1.8 million square feet of retail and supporting warehouse space. View the project’s progress at www.nfm.com/texas. NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (in Omaha and Kansas City, Kansas), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away. If you live anywhere near Dallas, come check us out.
明年NFM建成以後，它將會在433英畝的地基上擁有180萬平方英尺的零售和倉儲空間。可以在www.nfm.com/texa 查詢項目的進展情況。NFM已經擁有全國銷售額最大的兩家店鋪了(分別位於奧馬哈和堪薩斯市)，兩家的年銷售額分別達到4.5億左右。我預計德克薩斯的新店將會刷新上述紀錄。如果大家住在達拉斯附近，歡迎大家來看看。
I think back to August 30, 1983 – my birthday – when I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 11⁄4-page purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. (It’s reproduced on pages 114 - 115.) Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company’s financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was what, and her word was good enough for me.
回想起1983年8月30日，那天剛好是我的生日，我拿著自己起草的1頁半不到的收購意向書(114-115頁有復印版)去見B夫人(Rose Blumkin)。B夫人在沒有改動一個字，在沒有投資銀行家和律師在場的情況下接受我的收購協議(這是專業人士覺得在天堂才會發生的事)。雖然公司的財務報告並沒有經過審計，我也毫不擔心。B夫人告訴我實際情況，她的話對我來說足夠了。
Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 – definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM’s financial statements from 1946 on pages 116 - 117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 – no zeros omitted – of cash the company then possessed, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son, Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.
那時候B夫人89歲了，後來一直工作到103——絕對是我們風格的女強人。大家看一看116-117頁上NFM從1946年以來的財務報告。NFM現在所有的一切都從當初72,264美元淨資產、50美元的現金，以及B夫人、她的兒子Louie、孫子Ron和Irv難以置信的天才衍化而來。
The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At Mrs. B’s request, the family always sang God Bless America at its gatherings.
故事裡最秒的地方是，B夫人從來沒上過學。而且她從俄國移民到美國時甚至連英文都不會說。但是她熱愛這個接納它的國家：家庭聚會時他們經常應B夫人的要求合唱上帝保佑美國。
Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B’s incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B’s lessons, they need none from me.
有抱負的經理人應該好好學習讓B夫人成功的那些樸素卻稀有的品質。每年都有超過40所大學的學生們來拜訪我，我以帶領他們參觀FM作為開場。如果他們吸收了B夫人的經驗，他們不需要向我學任何東西。
Finance and Financial Products
金融和金融產品
“Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.” — 2003 Annual Report
“Clayton的貸款規模不用幾年就會達到50億美元，它們信用質量良好，將會產生巨額利潤。”
——2003年年報
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%- owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
這是我們最小的業務版塊，包括兩家租賃公司，XTRA(拖車租賃)和CORT(家具租賃)，以及Clayton Home，國內領先的預置房生產商和金融租賃商。除了這些100%擁有的子公司外，我們還有其他一些金融資產以及Berkadia Commerical Mortgage公司50%的權益。
Clayton is placed in this section because it owns and services 326,569 mortgages, totaling $13.6 billion. In recent years, as manufactured home sales plummeted, a high percentage of Clayton’s earnings came from this mortgage business.
Clayton被歸入這個版塊，是因為它有326,569筆抵押貸款，合計136億美元。近幾年，由於預置房銷量的下跌，公司大部分的盈利都來自於抵押貸款業務。
In 2013, however, the sale of new homes began to pick up and earnings from both manufacturing and retailing are again becoming significant. Clayton remains America’s number one homebuilder: Its 2013 output of 29,547 homes accounted for about 4.7% of all single-family residences built in the country. Kevin Clayton, Clayton’s CEO, has done a magnificent job of guiding the company through the severe housing depression. Now, his job – definitely more fun these days – includes the prospect of another earnings gain in 2014.
但是2013年，新房的銷售開始回升，製造和零售兩部分的利潤恢復。Clayton依然是美國最大的房屋建築商：2013年它建造了29,457套房屋，佔全國新建住宅總數的4.7%。公司的CEO，Kevin Clayton成功領導公司度過了房地產市場的衰退。現在他的工作——一定比之前輕鬆多了——就是在2014年實現盈利。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. And Jeff Pederson and Bill Franz will keep them on top. We are backing their plans through purchases of equipment that enlarge their rental potential.
CORT和XTRA也是各自行業中的佼佼者。Jeff Pederson和BillFranz依然會維持它們的領先地位。我們支持他們購置設備擴大租賃規模的計劃。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
下面是這個版塊的稅前收入：
| 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | ||
| (in millions) | ||||
| Berkadia | $80 | $35 | $25 | |
| Clayton | 416 | 255 | 154 | |
| CORT | 40 | 42 | 29 | |
| XTRA | 125 | 106 | 126 | |
| Net financial income* | 324 | 410 | 440 | |
| $985 | $848 | $774 | ||
* Excludes capital gains or losses
*不包括資本利得或損失
Investments
股票
“Our stock portfolio . . . was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value [cost] . . . it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost.”
— 1974 Annual Report
“我們的股票投資……大約比他們的賬面價值(投資成本)要低1700萬美元……但我們相信，幾年以後，整個組合的價值將會遠超投資成本。”
——1974年年報
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
下面列出了我們市值前15的股票投資：
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules.
**Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.
波克夏有一項重要的股票投資沒有列在表上：在2021年以前的任何時候，我們都可以以50億美元購買美國銀行7億股股票。截至年底，這些股票價值109億。我們傾向於在購買權到期前行權購買。大家應該了解，美國銀行的投資是我們的第五大股票投資，並且我們非常看好。
In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we’ve done well in these. But not always.
除了股票以外，我們也會大額投資債券。通常我們業績都不錯。但也並非時時如此。
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn’t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.
大家應該沒有聽說過Energy Future Holdings這家公司。請相信你們是幸運的;我寧願自己也沒聽過這家公司。它是2007年為槓桿收購一家德克薩斯的電力公司而成立的。權益投資者提供80億美元同時藉入大量債務實現收購。債務中的大約20億由波克夏提供，我沒有諮詢查理的情況下做了這個決定。這真是個巨大的錯誤。
Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I’ll call Charlie.
儘管天然氣價格大幅上漲，EFH還是注定要在2014年申請破產。去年我們以2.59億賣出了我們的債權。持有債權期間，我們收到了8.37億現金利息。所以我們稅前一共虧了8.73億。下次我一定會先問問查理。
A few of our subsidiaries – primarily electric and gas utilities – use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of mediumterm float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.
我們的一些公司——主要是電力和天然氣公司——在經營中會使用衍生工具。除此之外，我們近年來都沒有投資衍生品，原有的頭寸也逐步到期。已經到期的衍生品給我們帶來了數十億美元的利潤，和中期浮存金一樣。雖然不是百分之百確定，我們預計資產負債表上剩下的衍生品同樣會給我們帶來利潤。
Some Thoughts About Investing
關於投資的一些思考
Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.
— The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
最聰明的投資，是把它當做生意一樣看待。
——《聰明的投資者》，作者班傑明·葛拉漢
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
引本·班傑明·葛拉漢的話作為本章開頭非常恰當，因為我對投資的理解很多都歸功於本。後面我會講一些本的事情，我還會講到股票投資。但是讓我先講兩個很早以前非股票投資的投資的例子吧。雖然兩筆投資對我個人財富的影響並不大，但它們卻具有啟發意義。
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
事情發生在內布拉斯加。1973到1981年間，中西部農場價格瘋漲，原因是對通貨膨脹的預期和一些小型農村銀行寬鬆的貸款政策。後來泡沫破滅了，價格下跌了50%多，這摧毀了借債的農場主和他們的債權人。那次泡沫中愛荷華和內布拉斯加倒閉的銀行數量是剛過去的大蕭條中倒閉的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986年，我買下了奧馬哈北部，距FDIC 50英里的400英畝農場。花了28萬美元，比幾年前銀行貸給農場主買地的金額小的多。我對經營農場一竅不通。但是我兒子喜歡農場，我從他那裡了解到玉米和大豆的產量，還有對應的運營成本。根據這些估計，我計算出農場的正常回報大約10%。我還考慮到，產量會逐步提高，並且作物的價格也會上漲。兩個預期後來都被證明是對的。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我並不需要特別的知識來判斷投資不會沒有底部，同時可能有可觀的上升空間。糟糕的產量和價格當然偶爾會令人失望。但這又怎麼樣呢?同樣也會有些好的異常的年份，並且我不用迫於壓力出售資產。現在，28年過去了，農場的利潤翻了三倍，價值是我們當初投資額的五倍。我依然對農場一竅不通，而且最近才第二次去到那片農場。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993年，我做了另外一小筆投資。當我還是Salomon的CEO的時候，老闆Larry Silverstein告訴我紐約大學旁邊Resolution Trust 集團的一塊零售物業打算出售。同樣，當時泡沫破裂——RTC被迫拆分出售資產，那些遭殃的儲蓄機構當初樂觀的貸款政策導致了現在的愚蠢行為。
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
這裡的分析同樣簡單。和農場的情況類似，該物業當時無槓桿的收益率是10%。但是考慮到RTC糟糕的管理，空置的店鋪出租以後收入還會增加。更重要的是，它的最大租客——約佔20%左右的出租面積，僅僅支付每平方尺5美元的租金，而其他租客的平均租金是70美元。它的租約將在9年內到期，到時盈利必然可以大幅上升。物業的位置也是非常理想的：紐約大學絕不會搬走。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
包括Larry和我的朋友Fred Rose的團隊買下了這個物業。Fred是一位經驗豐富，高水準的房地產投資者，而且他的家族將會管理這個物業。他們接手了。舊的租約到期後，利潤翻了三倍。年租金回報現在達到了當初投資額的35%。另外，我們最初的按揭貸款在1996年和1999年兩次進行了重置，這讓我們獲得了相當於初始投資額150%的特別租金回報。我至今還沒去看過這塊物業。
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
農場和紐大物業的收入未來幾十年還會繼續增加。雖然他們的收入不會突然激增，但兩筆投資都是我和我的孩子、孫子可以一輩子持有的穩固並且令人滿意的投資。
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我講這兩個故事是為了闡明投資的基本道理：
● You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
● 獲取滿意的投資回報不需要成為專家。當然如果大家本身不是專家，那就要認識到自己的能力圈，並遵從一個合理的規律。保持簡單，不要揠苗助長。當有人承諾讓你賺筆快錢時，立即答复“不行”。
● Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
● 關注你說考慮投資的資產未來的產出。如果大家覺得難以估計一項資產的未來盈利，那就忘了它，放棄它。沒有人能估計所有的投資回報。無所不知也是不需要的;大家只需要理解自己的行為就可以。
● If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
● 如果大家關注的是資產未來可能被接手的價格，那麼這就是投機。投機沒有什麼不好。但是我知道我不能總是投機正確，我也懷疑那些聲稱自己可以持續投機成功的人。置硬幣時第一輪有一半人會贏;但是這些人如果繼續不斷玩下去都不會有贏家。另外，一項資產近來持續升值絕不是一個買入的理由。
● With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
● 在兩筆投資上，我都只考慮資產的產出，而不是它們每天的估值。最後的贏家是把精力用在球場上的人，而不是緊盯著計分板的人。如果大家週末不看股價的時候可以放輕鬆，那麼試著工作日的時候也這樣做。
● Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
● 總結宏觀形式，聽信別人的宏觀或者市場都是浪費時間。實際上，這甚至是危險的，它會模糊大家對真正重要的事實的看法。(每當我聽到電視評論員流利地分析著市場的下一步走勢，我就會想起Mickey Mantle(米奇·查理斯·曼托(1931年10月20日-1995年8月13日)是1974年被選入名人堂的美國職棒球員。他生涯18個球季都效力於紐約洋基隊，贏得3座美聯MVP以及入選16次明星賽。曼托參加過12次世界大賽並擁有7枚世界大賽冠軍戒指。1995年曼托因肝癌去世，享年63歲。)犀利的評論“你不坐到直播間裡去都不知道原來棒球比賽這麼簡單”。)
● My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
● 我的兩筆投資分別在1986年和1993年做出。接下來經濟、利率、或者股市在下一年——1987和1994年——會如何發展對兩筆投資都沒有影響。我已經不記得當時的報紙頭條和專家的意見。但是莊稼依舊在內布拉斯加生長，學生們一樣到紐大上課。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
我的兩筆投資和股票投資有一個重要的區別。股票每分鐘都有報價，但是我至今也沒有見過農場和紐大物業的市場報價。
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
瘋狂波動的股價本該成為股票投資者的一項巨大優勢——對其中部分投資者來說是這樣。畢竟如果有一個喜怒無常的人每天給我報價，買入或者賣出農場——並且價格在短期內隨著他的心情忽上忽下，那我不就可以從它瘋狂的行動中賺錢嗎?如果他的報價低的可笑，而我又有些閒錢，那我就會買入農場。如果他的報價高的要命，那我就把自己的賣給他然後去種地。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
股票投資者，經常讓其他同伴善變的，並且通常不理性的行為所影響。因為有太多關於市場、經濟、利率和股價走勢的評論，一些投資者認為應該聽聽專家的建議——更糟糕的是，認為應該根據他們的建議買賣。
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
那些擁有一片農場或者一項房產時可以安靜持有幾十年的人，經常因為置身於源源不斷的股價波動中和評論員們“別光坐著，你得做點什麼”的鼓動而變得頭腦發熱。對這些投資者來說，流動性從一項絕對的優勢變成了詛咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
“閃電暴跌”或者其他一些市場的極端波動不會傷害投資者，就好像一個飄忽不定、愛說大話的鄰居不會影響我的農場投資。本來漲漲跌跌的市場對那些真正的投資者來說是好事，如果他有現金在價格跌破價值時購入的話。恐懼的頂點是投資的好朋友;一路上漲的市場才是投資的敵人。
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
在剛剛過去的2008年金融危機中，我從沒想過要賣掉農場或者紐大的物業，即便一段嚴重的衰退即將到來。如果我擁有一項長期前景不錯的業務100%的權益，光是考慮賣掉它的想法都非常愚蠢。那我為什麼要考慮賣掉那些優秀業務的小比例持股?確實，它們中一些會令人失望，但是作為整體而言它匯報會非常不錯。真的有人相信美國無與倫比的物質資本和人力資本將會毀於一旦嗎?
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When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
查理和我買股票的時候，我們把它都當作獲得部分權益的投資看待，我們的分析和買下整個公司的分析類似的。首先我們要考慮是否能夠估計公司未來5年，或者更長時間內的盈利。如果答案是可以，那我們就會在對應估計區間下限的價格上買入股票。如果我們不具備估計未來盈利的能力——經常是這樣——那我們就去考慮其他投資。合作54年來，我們從來沒有因為宏觀或者政治環境的因素，或者因為其他人的看法放棄過有吸引力的投資。實際上，這些都不是我們做投資決策時會考慮的因素。
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
認清自己“能力圈”的半徑，並且呆在能力圈裡面非常重要。即便做到了，有時候我們還是會犯錯誤，無論買股票還是收購公司。但是這樣不會帶來災難，就像一個持續上漲的牛市誘導大家根據價格走勢買股票，或者因為需要有所行動的慾望買股票那樣。
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
對多數的投資者而言，研究公司的前景並非生活的重點。於是，他們可能認為自己並不具備足夠的知識來理解公司和預測未來的盈利能力。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
我有一個好消息告訴這些非專業人士：一般投資者並不需要那些技能。總體而言，美國公司長期以來都表現很好，並且還會欣欣向榮(當然一定會有起起伏伏)。20世紀的一百年裡，道瓊斯指數從66點漲到了11,497點，分紅不斷提高。21世紀一樣會有巨額的回報。非專業投資者的目標不應該是挑出優勝企業——他和他的“幫手”都做不到，而是應該配置一個誇行業的組合，整體而言其回報必定不錯。一個低費率的標普500指數基金就可以實現這個目標。
That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
以上就是非專業投資者所需的“做什麼”。“何時做”也同樣重要。主要的風險是，膽小投資者的或者投資新手可能剛好在市場劇烈波動前入場，並且在出現浮虧時幻想破滅。(記住巴頓·比格斯(巴頓·比格斯，在美國整個投資界的聲譽和影響力幾乎可與索羅斯、朱利安等一班金融大鱷匹敵。多次被《機構投資者》雜誌評選為“美國第一投資策略師”，著有《對沖基金風雲錄》)的話：“牛市就像性愛一樣，在結束之前達到高潮。”)解決時間問題的辦法是，在一個較長的時間內逐步買入，並且無論利空滿天還是股價新高都不賣出。遵守這些規則，“盲投”並且保持多元組合和低費率的投資者一定會獲得滿意的回報。實際上，認識到自身不足的簡單投資者長期將會戰勝那些哪怕只是忽略了一個弱點的專業投資者。
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
如果“投資者”市場時常買賣他們的農場，產量和莊稼的價格都不會增加。唯一的結果就是農場所有者的最終收益由於諮詢和交易費用顯著下降。
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
無論是機構還是個人，都會被賺取諮詢和交易費的中介結構不斷慫恿，不停地交易。對投資者來說，這些費用總和非常巨大，它吞噬了利潤。所以，忽略那些建議吧，保持最低的交易成本，並且像持有農場那樣持有股票。
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.
我的錢將會投到指數基金裡，因此我還得再為此說兩句：我在這裡所建議的和已經寫在遺囑中的內容是一致的。遺贈將會把現金配置到為我妻子設立的信託當中。(我必須使用現金進行個人遺贈，因為我所持有的全部波克夏股票將在我去世後的十年內會分配給一些慈善組織。)我對信託公司的要求非常簡單：持有10%的現金購買短期政府債券，另外90%配置在低費率的標普500指數基金上。(個人推薦先鋒集團的基金。)我相信遵守這個策略，信託的長期業績常會戰勝大多數的聘請了高費率管理人的投資者——無論是養老金、機構還是個人。
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And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
現在回過頭來說說班傑明·葛拉漢。我大多數的投資分析都是從本寫的《智慧型股票投資人
》當中學到的。1949年我買到這本書，從此我的投資生涯完全改變。
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
在閱讀本的書以前，我在投資的世界四處遊蕩，嘗試每一種投資方法。很多我讀到的方式曾吸引我：我試著自己畫圖，用市場標記預測股價走勢。也曾坐在交易大廳裡盯著交易帶，聽評論員的評論。這些都很有趣，但是我始終被找不到歸宿的感覺困擾。
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.
而本的理論完全不同，它邏輯清晰，容易理解(不用任何希臘語或者復雜的公式)。對我而言，最重要的觀點在新版本的第8章和第20章。(1949年的原版章節劃分和後來不同)。正是這些觀點指導著我今天的投資決策。
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
這本書還有另外一些有意思的事：後來的版本里有一則附錄，描述了一項讓本大賺一筆的不具名投資。本1948年寫第一版的時候進行了這項投資——擁抱自己吧——這家神秘的公司就是GEICO。如果不是本在GEICO還是萌芽時期就認識到它的優越特性，我和本的財富經歷都會大不相同。
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
1949年版的書還推薦了一家鐵路公司，每股17美元而淨利潤10美元。(我敬佩本的原因之一是他敢使用當時並未驗證的例子，如果未來並不如他所言他可能會被嘲笑。)如此低的估值部分是由於當時的會計準則要求鐵路公司將其下屬公司的留存利潤從報告的利潤中剔除。
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
被推薦的股票就是北太平洋鐵路公司，它主要的下屬公司是芝加哥、柏林頓和昆西鐵路。這些鐵路現在成為了BNSF的主要部分，BNSF由波克夏全資擁有。當我讀到那本書時，北太平洋鐵路公司市值4000萬美元。現在，它的繼承者(當然增加了很多資產)每4天就能賺4000萬。
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
我已經不記得買《聰明的投資者》第一版花了多少錢。不管是多少，它都證明了本的格言：價格是你付的數字，價值才真正是你所得到的。在我所有的投資當中，買本的書應該是最划算的一筆(不包括我的兩次結婚證)。
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Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.
地方和國家的財政問題在加劇，很大程度上是由於政府承諾了它們支付不起的養老金。公民和政府官員通常低估了承諾和和支付能力之間的衝突導致的財務困境。不幸的是，養老金的計算至今對大多數美國人來說都是一個迷。
Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.
養老金的投資策略也是造成上述問題的原因之一。1975年，我寫了一份備忘錄給時任華盛頓郵報董事長的Katharine Graham，當中講到了養老金和投資策略的重要性。這份備忘錄被抄錄在118-136頁。
During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
接下來的數十年，大家於將會讀到很多關於公共養老金計劃的消息——壞消息。我希望我的備忘錄有助於大家理解立即採取補救措施的必要性。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
(以下是波克夏年會的時間、地點安排等，翻譯再補。)
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and – yes – saves us money.
波克夏公司2013年度股東大會召開時間是2014年5月4號，星期六，地點是在Century Link中心。年會將由我們天才的總導演Carrie Sova負責。我們波克夏公司總部整個團隊都會全力支持她；我們這幫人自己獨立操辦股東年會，比專業活動策劃者做得更好，當然，也更省錢。
CenturyLink’s doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me: I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
早上7點開始入場，7點半我們將舉行我們公司的第3屆報紙投擲國際挑戰賽。投擲目標將設在一個克雷頓公司製造的移動房屋（Clayton Home）的門廊,從投擲線起到門口的精確距離為35英尺。我所以少年時代做報童時，曾經投擲過50萬份報紙，所以我自認為自己投擲報紙的功夫非常好。來向我挑戰吧：任何人只要把報紙投擲得比我離門口更近，我就會給他買一個Dilly Bar雪糕。比賽用的報紙有36至42頁厚,你必須自己折疊(不准橡皮筋捆綁)。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8:30，波克夏最新製作的年會電影開始放映。一個小時後，9:30，我們將開始進行提問回答，並將一直持續到下午3:30為止(中間短暫休息在CenturyLink中心的攤位上有午餐供應)。問答環節結束之後，短暫休息一下，我和芒格在3:15將正式召集大家召開年度股東大會。如果你要在年會當天的提問回答期間離開會場的話，請在查理·孟格講話的時候離開。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We’ll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,062 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 32 seconds), 12,792 pounds of See’s candy, 11,162 Quikut knives (21 knives per minute) and 6,344 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie’s picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don’t let me down.
當然，離開會場的最好理由是去購物。為了幫助各位更好地進行購物，與股東年會會場相鄰的194,300平方英尺的大廳裡，我們擺滿了波克夏下屬公司生產的各種商品。 2012年年會期間各位股東做得很棒，很多產品的銷售都創下歷史新高。在去年年會召開的9個小時裡，我們銷售了1062雙Justin靴子（每32秒賣出1雙靴子），12,792磅喜詩巧克力，11,162把Quikut小刀(每分鐘銷售21把)，6,344雙Wells Lamont手套，這可總是熱門商品。今年，我和查理將要比賽銷售瓶裝番茄醬。自然，有查理頭像的瓶裝番茄醬將會大幅打折促銷。但是，如果你捧場的話，有我頭像的瓶裝番茄醬還會賣得比他多。這對我很重要，千萬不要讓我丟面子。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your tickets for the meeting. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates.
我們的跑鞋公司Brooks，將會再次為波克夏股東年會推出一款特製紀念版跑鞋，僅在年會上供應。買好這款跑鞋，第二天就穿上，參加我們的“波克夏5公里”長跑活動，時間是周日早上8點，從CenturyLink中心開始起跑。參賽的所有細節詳見參會指南（the Visitor’s Guide），你將會收到你的股東年會入場憑證的同時會收到這本指南。參加長跑的人將會發現自己身邊跑的人群中有很多是波克夏公司的公司經理人、董事、員工。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO將設一個展台，有來自全美最優秀的保險顧問為您服務，他們隨時準備為您提供汽車保險詢價。在大多數情況下，GEICO將會給您一個股東特別折扣(通常是8%)。我們開展業務的51個行政區域中有44個都批准了這個特別優惠。 (額外提示：這個折扣不可以與其他優惠累加使用，比如給予特定群體的優惠)。把你現有保險的詳細情況帶過來，看看我們能否幫你多省點錢。我相信，我們至少可以幫助你們中一半人省下更多的保險費。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index that I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You’ll enjoy it.
你一定要到Bookworm書店的展區看看，這家書店將會提供超過35種的圖書和DVD，有幾本是最新出版的。其中一本新書是Max Olson編輯的致波克夏股東的信，從1965年開始至今。這本書包括一個索引，我覺得特別有用，按照人名、公司、主題分別註明頁碼。我還要推薦我兒子霍華德寫的新書《Forty Chances》。你一定會喜歡這本書的。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft sure to set your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果您是一個會花大錢的大款,或者是你很希望成為這樣一個大款，請在周六中午到下午五點參觀位於奧馬哈機場東側的Signature航空館。那裡將會展出我們下屬的NetJets公司的私人專機編隊，肯定會讓您心跳加速。坐著大巴來，坐著私人飛機回。享受一下生活。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
隨同附上的股東大會資料中有個附件，告訴您如何獲取參加股東的憑證，憑此才能參加股東年會和其它活動。在伯克希爾股東大會召開的周末，航空公司有時會提高機票價格。如果你從很遠的地方過來，可以比較一下飛到肯薩斯與奧馬哈的價格。飛到肯薩斯，再開車到奧馬哈，只需要2個半小時左右，也許這樣可以幫你省掉一大筆錢，尤其是你本來就打算在奧馬哈租車的話。省下來的錢，一定要在會場上購物花掉噢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did $40.2 million of business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.
內布拉斯加家具商場(Nebraska Furniture Mart，NFM)位於72街上，在Dodge街和Pacific街之間，佔地77英畝，在這裡我們將會再次舉辦“波克夏週末專場”特惠促銷活動。 2013年，這家商場在年會期間銷售收入為4020萬美元，打破了以前的歷史最高記錄，增長了12%。同時也在星期六創下了820萬美元的最高單日銷售記錄，賣出了接近100萬張床墊。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 29th and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
要得到波克夏股東的特別優惠，你必須在4月29日週二到5月5日週一之間購買，並出示參加股東年會的憑證。這次特惠促銷包括了幾個非常著名的超級大牌廠家的產品，一般情況下它們嚴禁打折銷售，但考慮到這是一個我們股東的周末特別活動，所以特別破例一次，只為參加股東大會人士提供優惠折扣。我們特別感謝他們的支持。 NFM在周一至週六早上十點到晚上九點營業，週日是早上十點到晚上六點營業。週六下午五點半到晚上八點，NFM將會舉行野餐會，邀請所有參會人士加入。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在Borsheims珠寶店，我們將會再次召開兩場股東專場優惠活動。第一個活動將是一場雞尾酒會，在5月2日週五下午6點到晚上9點舉行。第二個活動是一個大型聚會，在5月5日週日早上九點到下午四點舉行。週六，我們將會一直營業到下午六點。最近幾年，我們在股東年會期間三天的銷售額就遠遠超過整個12月份的銷售額，而12月份通常是珠寶店生意最好的一個月。
About 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.
在星期天下午1點15分，我本人將會親自在Borsheims擔任售貨員。不管你選擇什麼商品，都可以向我要求一個“瘋狂巴菲特”特別優惠價格。隨著我變得越來越老，我給的價格也越來越荒謬可笑。所以請大家快來占我的便宜吧
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整個週末Borsheims珠寶商店都會人群非常擁擠。因此為了你的方便考慮，股東優惠價格將會從4月28日週一一直持續5月10日週六。在此期間，請出示你的股票年會入場憑證或券商出具的持股證明，以證明你本人是波克夏公司的股東。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
在Borsheims外面的商場裡，美國兩屆象棋比賽冠軍Patrick Wolff將會蒙上雙眼，接受所有人的挑戰，當然挑戰者們不用蒙眼，而且他是一個人一次同時和6個人進行對奕。就在附近，著名的達拉斯魔術師Norman Beck將進行精彩表演。另外，我們將邀請兩位世界級橋牌頂尖高手Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，在周日下午與我們的股東們進行比賽。千萬別和他們倆賭錢。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans – and especially me – proud with her performance at the Olympics.
我的朋友邢延華(Ariel Hsing)將會再次出現在Borsheim外面的商場裡，接受乒乓球，去年他在奧運會乒乓球比賽場面的表現讓所有美國人尤其是我本人感到驕傲。
I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women’s Champion. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我第一次遇見刑延華，她只有9歲，但是那時我跟他打乒乓球一分都拿不到。現在她已經是普林斯頓大學的大一新生，也是美國女子乒乓球比賽冠軍。如果你不介意讓自己感到難堪，就來和她打上一盤，檢驗一下你的球技如何。比賽將在下午一點鐘開始。我和比爾·蓋茲帶頭挑戰，我們要努力讓她手下留情。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and for Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
5月4日，週六，Gorat's餐廳和Piccolo’s餐廳將會再次僅對波克夏公司股東開放。 Gorat's餐廳會從下午1點營業到晚上10點，Piccolo’s餐廳將會從下午4點營業到晚上10點。這兩家都是我特別喜歡的餐廳，週日晚上我會在兩家餐廳都吃上一頓。請記住，要在Gorat's訂餐，請在5月1日(但不要提前)撥打電話402-551-3733。要在Piccolo’s訂餐，電話是402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s餐廳，要顯得你有品位，就得要上一大杯根啤作為甜點，要小杯的不是男人。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
今年我們將再次邀請同樣的三位財經記者引領年會問答環節，他們通過電子郵件收集股東提交給他們的問題，向我和孟格進行提問。這三位記者和他們的電子郵件地址分別是：財富雜誌記者CarolLoomis：cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC記者BeckyQuick：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；紐約時報記者(AndrewRossSorkin：arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每一個記者將會從郵件收集到的眾多問題中進行篩選，選出6個他（她）認為最有趣和最重要的問題來現場提問。他們告訴我，如果你的問題符合以下條件：十分簡潔，不是最後一刻才提交，問題和波克夏相關，每封電子郵件提出的問題不超過兩個，那麼符合以上條件的問題被選中的機會最大。（在你的郵件中，請告訴記者，如果你提出的問題被他們選中，您是否希望提到你的名字。）
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb.
2012年我們邀請了一個由三名追踪波克夏公司的分析師組成的提問團隊。今年的保險行業分析專家將是Barclays公司的JayGelb 。負責提問與我們非保險業務相關的問題將是來自Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfa rb的Jonathan Brandt。
And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position). The three analysts will bring their own Berkshirespecific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
我們希望能夠再次在分析師團隊中加入一位公認看空波克夏公司的分析師。我們希望那些看空並做空波克夏股票的分析師來信申請（請附上你的做空持倉證明）。這三位分析師將會各自提出他們自已對關於波克夏的問題，分析師、記者和聽眾將會交替提問。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial information late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, but rather treat all shareholders the same. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that further educate our owners about their investment.
我和查理認為，所有股東都應該有渠道能夠在同一時間知悉波克夏公司的最新信息，而且應該有足夠的時間分析這些信息，這也是我們為什麼總是努力安排在周五股市收盤之後或者周六一早才公佈公司財務信息的原因，這也是我們為什麼選擇在周六召開股東年會的原因。我們不會與大型機構投資者或分析師進行一對一交流。我們的希望是，記者們和分析師們將會提出一些好的問題，能夠讓我們的股東們更加充分了解自己所投資的公司。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
我和查理事先不知道任何在會上提出的問題有關的東西。我們知道，記者和分析師會選擇一些難以回答的問題，而這正是我們所希望的。總的來說，我們希望至少能夠回答54個問題，三個記者和三個分析師每個人提問6個問題，現場聽眾提問18個問題。如果還有一些剩餘的時間，我們將會回答現場聽眾更多的問題。聽眾提問者將會在8點15分進行抽籤決定，15個提問用的話筒分別放置在會場不同的區域和主要的分會場。
************
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我經常稱讚我們經理人的成就。他們是名副其實的全明星團隊，他們如同自己的家族擁有公司一樣經營著公司。我認為我們經理人那樣為股東著想的理念在大型的公眾持股公司中也能找到。他們中的大多數財務自由;他們在業務上的“全壘打”成就感和他們的薪酬同樣重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 23,000-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
同樣重要的，還有24位和我一同在總部辦公室工作的男女同事。這個團隊非常高效地處理大量和SEC和其他監管機構的要求，提交23000頁的聯邦稅收、地方稅收和國外稅收文件，回復不計其數的股東和媒體的問詢，製作年報，籌備全國最大的股東年會，配合媒體的工作等等，這個單子還有很長很長。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他們充滿熱情地處理上述事務，效率驚人，讓我的生活變得簡單而愉快。他們的努力不僅僅是服務於波克夏：去年他們聯繫了40所大學(從200個申請者中挑選而出)派送學生到奧馬哈和我進行問答互動的活動。他們還處理各種我接到的邀請，安排行程，甚至給我買漢堡和法式炸薯條(當然是塗滿番茄醬的)當午餐。沒有任何CEO有比這更好的團隊;我每天都是跳著舞去上班的。
In closing, I think it’s become appropriate to ignore our “no pictures” policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn’t make it; otherwise you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire’s headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.
最後，我覺得應該無視我們年報“無圖片”的傳統，讓大家看看我們舉世矚目的辦公室團隊。下面是我們聖誕節晚餐的一張照片。有兩個人缺席;不然你就可以看到波克夏總部的全家福了。他們真的是創造奇蹟的員工。
Next year’s letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
明年的信將會回顧波克夏過去的50年，並且憧憬一下下一個50年。記得5月3日到奧馬哈來享受投資界的伍德斯托克音樂節。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2014
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2014年2月28日
*不包括資本利得或損失
Investments
股票
“Our stock portfolio . . . was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value [cost] . . . it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost.”
— 1974 Annual Report
“我們的股票投資……大約比他們的賬面價值(投資成本)要低1700萬美元……但我們相信，幾年以後，整個組合的價值將會遠超投資成本。”
——1974年年報
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
下面列出了我們市值前15的股票投資：
| Shares ** | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost * | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 14.2 | $1,287 | $13,756 | ||
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.1 | 1,299 | 16,524 | ||
| 22,999,600 | DIRECTV | 4.2 | 1,017 | 1,536 | ||
| 41,129,643 | Exxon Mobil Corp. | 0.9 | 3,737 | 4,162 | ||
| 13,062,594 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 2.8 | 750 | 2,315 | ||
| 68,121,984 | International Business Machines Corp. | 6.3 | 11,681 | 12,778 | ||
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation . | 11.5 | 248 | 1,936 | ||
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.2 | 2,990 | 4,415 | ||
| 20,668,118 | Phillips 66 . | 3.4 | 660 | 1,594 | ||
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,272 | ||
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,747 | 2,354 | ||
| 301,046,076 | Tesco plc | 3.7 | 1,699 | 1,666 | ||
| 96,117,069 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.3 | 3,002 | 3,883 | ||
| 56,805,984 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.8 | 2,976 | 4,470 | ||
| 483,470,853 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.2 | 11,871 | 21,950 | ||
| Others | 11,281 | 19,894 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | 56,581 | 117,505 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules.
**Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.
波克夏有一項重要的股票投資沒有列在表上：在2021年以前的任何時候，我們都可以以50億美元購買美國銀行7億股股票。截至年底，這些股票價值109億。我們傾向於在購買權到期前行權購買。大家應該了解，美國銀行的投資是我們的第五大股票投資，並且我們非常看好。
In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we’ve done well in these. But not always.
除了股票以外，我們也會大額投資債券。通常我們業績都不錯。但也並非時時如此。
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn’t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.
大家應該沒有聽說過Energy Future Holdings這家公司。請相信你們是幸運的;我寧願自己也沒聽過這家公司。它是2007年為槓桿收購一家德克薩斯的電力公司而成立的。權益投資者提供80億美元同時藉入大量債務實現收購。債務中的大約20億由波克夏提供，我沒有諮詢查理的情況下做了這個決定。這真是個巨大的錯誤。
Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I’ll call Charlie.
儘管天然氣價格大幅上漲，EFH還是注定要在2014年申請破產。去年我們以2.59億賣出了我們的債權。持有債權期間，我們收到了8.37億現金利息。所以我們稅前一共虧了8.73億。下次我一定會先問問查理。
A few of our subsidiaries – primarily electric and gas utilities – use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of mediumterm float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.
我們的一些公司——主要是電力和天然氣公司——在經營中會使用衍生工具。除此之外，我們近年來都沒有投資衍生品，原有的頭寸也逐步到期。已經到期的衍生品給我們帶來了數十億美元的利潤，和中期浮存金一樣。雖然不是百分之百確定，我們預計資產負債表上剩下的衍生品同樣會給我們帶來利潤。
Some Thoughts About Investing
關於投資的一些思考
Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.
— The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
最聰明的投資，是把它當做生意一樣看待。
——《聰明的投資者》，作者班傑明·葛拉漢
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
引本·班傑明·葛拉漢的話作為本章開頭非常恰當，因為我對投資的理解很多都歸功於本。後面我會講一些本的事情，我還會講到股票投資。但是讓我先講兩個很早以前非股票投資的投資的例子吧。雖然兩筆投資對我個人財富的影響並不大，但它們卻具有啟發意義。
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
事情發生在內布拉斯加。1973到1981年間，中西部農場價格瘋漲，原因是對通貨膨脹的預期和一些小型農村銀行寬鬆的貸款政策。後來泡沫破滅了，價格下跌了50%多，這摧毀了借債的農場主和他們的債權人。那次泡沫中愛荷華和內布拉斯加倒閉的銀行數量是剛過去的大蕭條中倒閉的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986年，我買下了奧馬哈北部，距FDIC 50英里的400英畝農場。花了28萬美元，比幾年前銀行貸給農場主買地的金額小的多。我對經營農場一竅不通。但是我兒子喜歡農場，我從他那裡了解到玉米和大豆的產量，還有對應的運營成本。根據這些估計，我計算出農場的正常回報大約10%。我還考慮到，產量會逐步提高，並且作物的價格也會上漲。兩個預期後來都被證明是對的。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我並不需要特別的知識來判斷投資不會沒有底部，同時可能有可觀的上升空間。糟糕的產量和價格當然偶爾會令人失望。但這又怎麼樣呢?同樣也會有些好的異常的年份，並且我不用迫於壓力出售資產。現在，28年過去了，農場的利潤翻了三倍，價值是我們當初投資額的五倍。我依然對農場一竅不通，而且最近才第二次去到那片農場。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped – this one involving commercial real estate – and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993年，我做了另外一小筆投資。當我還是Salomon的CEO的時候，老闆Larry Silverstein告訴我紐約大學旁邊Resolution Trust 集團的一塊零售物業打算出售。同樣，當時泡沫破裂——RTC被迫拆分出售資產，那些遭殃的儲蓄機構當初樂觀的貸款政策導致了現在的愚蠢行為。
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant – who occupied around 20% of the project’s space – was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
這裡的分析同樣簡單。和農場的情況類似，該物業當時無槓桿的收益率是10%。但是考慮到RTC糟糕的管理，空置的店鋪出租以後收入還會增加。更重要的是，它的最大租客——約佔20%左右的出租面積，僅僅支付每平方尺5美元的租金，而其他租客的平均租金是70美元。它的租約將在9年內到期，到時盈利必然可以大幅上升。物業的位置也是非常理想的：紐約大學絕不會搬走。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
包括Larry和我的朋友Fred Rose的團隊買下了這個物業。Fred是一位經驗豐富，高水準的房地產投資者，而且他的家族將會管理這個物業。他們接手了。舊的租約到期後，利潤翻了三倍。年租金回報現在達到了當初投資額的35%。另外，我們最初的按揭貸款在1996年和1999年兩次進行了重置，這讓我們獲得了相當於初始投資額150%的特別租金回報。我至今還沒去看過這塊物業。
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
農場和紐大物業的收入未來幾十年還會繼續增加。雖然他們的收入不會突然激增，但兩筆投資都是我和我的孩子、孫子可以一輩子持有的穩固並且令人滿意的投資。
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我講這兩個故事是為了闡明投資的基本道理：
● You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
● 獲取滿意的投資回報不需要成為專家。當然如果大家本身不是專家，那就要認識到自己的能力圈，並遵從一個合理的規律。保持簡單，不要揠苗助長。當有人承諾讓你賺筆快錢時，立即答复“不行”。
● Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
● 關注你說考慮投資的資產未來的產出。如果大家覺得難以估計一項資產的未來盈利，那就忘了它，放棄它。沒有人能估計所有的投資回報。無所不知也是不需要的;大家只需要理解自己的行為就可以。
● If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
● 如果大家關注的是資產未來可能被接手的價格，那麼這就是投機。投機沒有什麼不好。但是我知道我不能總是投機正確，我也懷疑那些聲稱自己可以持續投機成功的人。置硬幣時第一輪有一半人會贏;但是這些人如果繼續不斷玩下去都不會有贏家。另外，一項資產近來持續升值絕不是一個買入的理由。
● With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
● 在兩筆投資上，我都只考慮資產的產出，而不是它們每天的估值。最後的贏家是把精力用在球場上的人，而不是緊盯著計分板的人。如果大家週末不看股價的時候可以放輕鬆，那麼試著工作日的時候也這樣做。
● Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
● 總結宏觀形式，聽信別人的宏觀或者市場都是浪費時間。實際上，這甚至是危險的，它會模糊大家對真正重要的事實的看法。(每當我聽到電視評論員流利地分析著市場的下一步走勢，我就會想起Mickey Mantle(米奇·查理斯·曼托(1931年10月20日-1995年8月13日)是1974年被選入名人堂的美國職棒球員。他生涯18個球季都效力於紐約洋基隊，贏得3座美聯MVP以及入選16次明星賽。曼托參加過12次世界大賽並擁有7枚世界大賽冠軍戒指。1995年曼托因肝癌去世，享年63歲。)犀利的評論“你不坐到直播間裡去都不知道原來棒球比賽這麼簡單”。)
● My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following – 1987 and 1994 – was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
● 我的兩筆投資分別在1986年和1993年做出。接下來經濟、利率、或者股市在下一年——1987和1994年——會如何發展對兩筆投資都沒有影響。我已經不記得當時的報紙頭條和專家的意見。但是莊稼依舊在內布拉斯加生長，學生們一樣到紐大上課。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
我的兩筆投資和股票投資有一個重要的區別。股票每分鐘都有報價，但是我至今也沒有見過農場和紐大物業的市場報價。
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings – and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his – and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state – how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
瘋狂波動的股價本該成為股票投資者的一項巨大優勢——對其中部分投資者來說是這樣。畢竟如果有一個喜怒無常的人每天給我報價，買入或者賣出農場——並且價格在短期內隨著他的心情忽上忽下，那我不就可以從它瘋狂的行動中賺錢嗎?如果他的報價低的可笑，而我又有些閒錢，那我就會買入農場。如果他的報價高的要命，那我就把自己的賣給他然後去種地。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits – and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
股票投資者，經常讓其他同伴善變的，並且通常不理性的行為所影響。因為有太多關於市場、經濟、利率和股價走勢的評論，一些投資者認為應該聽聽專家的建議——更糟糕的是，認為應該根據他們的建議買賣。
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
那些擁有一片農場或者一項房產時可以安靜持有幾十年的人，經常因為置身於源源不斷的股價波動中和評論員們“別光坐著，你得做點什麼”的鼓動而變得頭腦發熱。對這些投資者來說，流動性從一項絕對的優勢變成了詛咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
“閃電暴跌”或者其他一些市場的極端波動不會傷害投資者，就好像一個飄忽不定、愛說大話的鄰居不會影響我的農場投資。本來漲漲跌跌的市場對那些真正的投資者來說是好事，如果他有現金在價格跌破價值時購入的話。恐懼的頂點是投資的好朋友;一路上漲的市場才是投資的敵人。
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
在剛剛過去的2008年金融危機中，我從沒想過要賣掉農場或者紐大的物業，即便一段嚴重的衰退即將到來。如果我擁有一項長期前景不錯的業務100%的權益，光是考慮賣掉它的想法都非常愚蠢。那我為什麼要考慮賣掉那些優秀業務的小比例持股?確實，它們中一些會令人失望，但是作為整體而言它匯報會非常不錯。真的有人相信美國無與倫比的物質資本和人力資本將會毀於一旦嗎?
************
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
查理和我買股票的時候，我們把它都當作獲得部分權益的投資看待，我們的分析和買下整個公司的分析類似的。首先我們要考慮是否能夠估計公司未來5年，或者更長時間內的盈利。如果答案是可以，那我們就會在對應估計區間下限的價格上買入股票。如果我們不具備估計未來盈利的能力——經常是這樣——那我們就去考慮其他投資。合作54年來，我們從來沒有因為宏觀或者政治環境的因素，或者因為其他人的看法放棄過有吸引力的投資。實際上，這些都不是我們做投資決策時會考慮的因素。
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
認清自己“能力圈”的半徑，並且呆在能力圈裡面非常重要。即便做到了，有時候我們還是會犯錯誤，無論買股票還是收購公司。但是這樣不會帶來災難，就像一個持續上漲的牛市誘導大家根據價格走勢買股票，或者因為需要有所行動的慾望買股票那樣。
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
對多數的投資者而言，研究公司的前景並非生活的重點。於是，他們可能認為自己並不具備足夠的知識來理解公司和預測未來的盈利能力。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
我有一個好消息告訴這些非專業人士：一般投資者並不需要那些技能。總體而言，美國公司長期以來都表現很好，並且還會欣欣向榮(當然一定會有起起伏伏)。20世紀的一百年裡，道瓊斯指數從66點漲到了11,497點，分紅不斷提高。21世紀一樣會有巨額的回報。非專業投資者的目標不應該是挑出優勝企業——他和他的“幫手”都做不到，而是應該配置一個誇行業的組合，整體而言其回報必定不錯。一個低費率的標普500指數基金就可以實現這個目標。
That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better longterm results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
以上就是非專業投資者所需的“做什麼”。“何時做”也同樣重要。主要的風險是，膽小投資者的或者投資新手可能剛好在市場劇烈波動前入場，並且在出現浮虧時幻想破滅。(記住巴頓·比格斯(巴頓·比格斯，在美國整個投資界的聲譽和影響力幾乎可與索羅斯、朱利安等一班金融大鱷匹敵。多次被《機構投資者》雜誌評選為“美國第一投資策略師”，著有《對沖基金風雲錄》)的話：“牛市就像性愛一樣，在結束之前達到高潮。”)解決時間問題的辦法是，在一個較長的時間內逐步買入，並且無論利空滿天還是股價新高都不賣出。遵守這些規則，“盲投”並且保持多元組合和低費率的投資者一定會獲得滿意的回報。實際上，認識到自身不足的簡單投資者長期將會戰勝那些哪怕只是忽略了一個弱點的專業投資者。
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
如果“投資者”市場時常買賣他們的農場，產量和莊稼的價格都不會增加。唯一的結果就是農場所有者的最終收益由於諮詢和交易費用顯著下降。
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
無論是機構還是個人，都會被賺取諮詢和交易費的中介結構不斷慫恿，不停地交易。對投資者來說，這些費用總和非常巨大，它吞噬了利潤。所以，忽略那些建議吧，保持最低的交易成本，並且像持有農場那樣持有股票。
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors – whether pension funds, institutions or individuals – who employ high-fee managers.
我的錢將會投到指數基金裡，因此我還得再為此說兩句：我在這裡所建議的和已經寫在遺囑中的內容是一致的。遺贈將會把現金配置到為我妻子設立的信託當中。(我必須使用現金進行個人遺贈，因為我所持有的全部波克夏股票將在我去世後的十年內會分配給一些慈善組織。)我對信託公司的要求非常簡單：持有10%的現金購買短期政府債券，另外90%配置在低費率的標普500指數基金上。(個人推薦先鋒集團的基金。)我相信遵守這個策略，信託的長期業績常會戰勝大多數的聘請了高費率管理人的投資者——無論是養老金、機構還是個人。
************
And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
現在回過頭來說說班傑明·葛拉漢。我大多數的投資分析都是從本寫的《智慧型股票投資人
》當中學到的。1949年我買到這本書，從此我的投資生涯完全改變。
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
在閱讀本的書以前，我在投資的世界四處遊蕩，嘗試每一種投資方法。很多我讀到的方式曾吸引我：我試著自己畫圖，用市場標記預測股價走勢。也曾坐在交易大廳裡盯著交易帶，聽評論員的評論。這些都很有趣，但是我始終被找不到歸宿的感覺困擾。
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.
而本的理論完全不同，它邏輯清晰，容易理解(不用任何希臘語或者復雜的公式)。對我而言，最重要的觀點在新版本的第8章和第20章。(1949年的原版章節劃分和後來不同)。正是這些觀點指導著我今天的投資決策。
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and – brace yourself – the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
這本書還有另外一些有意思的事：後來的版本里有一則附錄，描述了一項讓本大賺一筆的不具名投資。本1948年寫第一版的時候進行了這項投資——擁抱自己吧——這家神秘的公司就是GEICO。如果不是本在GEICO還是萌芽時期就認識到它的優越特性，我和本的財富經歷都會大不相同。
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
1949年版的書還推薦了一家鐵路公司，每股17美元而淨利潤10美元。(我敬佩本的原因之一是他敢使用當時並未驗證的例子，如果未來並不如他所言他可能會被嘲笑。)如此低的估值部分是由於當時的會計準則要求鐵路公司將其下屬公司的留存利潤從報告的利潤中剔除。
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
被推薦的股票就是北太平洋鐵路公司，它主要的下屬公司是芝加哥、柏林頓和昆西鐵路。這些鐵路現在成為了BNSF的主要部分，BNSF由波克夏全資擁有。當我讀到那本書時，北太平洋鐵路公司市值4000萬美元。現在，它的繼承者(當然增加了很多資產)每4天就能賺4000萬。
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
我已經不記得買《聰明的投資者》第一版花了多少錢。不管是多少，它都證明了本的格言：價格是你付的數字，價值才真正是你所得到的。在我所有的投資當中，買本的書應該是最划算的一筆(不包括我的兩次結婚證)。
************
Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.
地方和國家的財政問題在加劇，很大程度上是由於政府承諾了它們支付不起的養老金。公民和政府官員通常低估了承諾和和支付能力之間的衝突導致的財務困境。不幸的是，養老金的計算至今對大多數美國人來說都是一個迷。
Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.
養老金的投資策略也是造成上述問題的原因之一。1975年，我寫了一份備忘錄給時任華盛頓郵報董事長的Katharine Graham，當中講到了養老金和投資策略的重要性。這份備忘錄被抄錄在118-136頁。
During the next decade, you will read a lot of news – bad news – about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
接下來的數十年，大家於將會讀到很多關於公共養老金計劃的消息——壞消息。我希望我的備忘錄有助於大家理解立即採取補救措施的必要性。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
(以下是波克夏年會的時間、地點安排等，翻譯再補。)
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and – yes – saves us money.
波克夏公司2013年度股東大會召開時間是2014年5月4號，星期六，地點是在Century Link中心。年會將由我們天才的總導演Carrie Sova負責。我們波克夏公司總部整個團隊都會全力支持她；我們這幫人自己獨立操辦股東年會，比專業活動策劃者做得更好，當然，也更省錢。
CenturyLink’s doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me: I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
早上7點開始入場，7點半我們將舉行我們公司的第3屆報紙投擲國際挑戰賽。投擲目標將設在一個克雷頓公司製造的移動房屋（Clayton Home）的門廊,從投擲線起到門口的精確距離為35英尺。我所以少年時代做報童時，曾經投擲過50萬份報紙，所以我自認為自己投擲報紙的功夫非常好。來向我挑戰吧：任何人只要把報紙投擲得比我離門口更近，我就會給他買一個Dilly Bar雪糕。比賽用的報紙有36至42頁厚,你必須自己折疊(不准橡皮筋捆綁)。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8:30，波克夏最新製作的年會電影開始放映。一個小時後，9:30，我們將開始進行提問回答，並將一直持續到下午3:30為止(中間短暫休息在CenturyLink中心的攤位上有午餐供應)。問答環節結束之後，短暫休息一下，我和芒格在3:15將正式召集大家召開年度股東大會。如果你要在年會當天的提問回答期間離開會場的話，請在查理·孟格講話的時候離開。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We’ll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,062 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 32 seconds), 12,792 pounds of See’s candy, 11,162 Quikut knives (21 knives per minute) and 6,344 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie’s picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don’t let me down.
當然，離開會場的最好理由是去購物。為了幫助各位更好地進行購物，與股東年會會場相鄰的194,300平方英尺的大廳裡，我們擺滿了波克夏下屬公司生產的各種商品。 2012年年會期間各位股東做得很棒，很多產品的銷售都創下歷史新高。在去年年會召開的9個小時裡，我們銷售了1062雙Justin靴子（每32秒賣出1雙靴子），12,792磅喜詩巧克力，11,162把Quikut小刀(每分鐘銷售21把)，6,344雙Wells Lamont手套，這可總是熱門商品。今年，我和查理將要比賽銷售瓶裝番茄醬。自然，有查理頭像的瓶裝番茄醬將會大幅打折促銷。但是，如果你捧場的話，有我頭像的瓶裝番茄醬還會賣得比他多。這對我很重要，千萬不要讓我丟面子。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your tickets for the meeting. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates.
我們的跑鞋公司Brooks，將會再次為波克夏股東年會推出一款特製紀念版跑鞋，僅在年會上供應。買好這款跑鞋，第二天就穿上，參加我們的“波克夏5公里”長跑活動，時間是周日早上8點，從CenturyLink中心開始起跑。參賽的所有細節詳見參會指南（the Visitor’s Guide），你將會收到你的股東年會入場憑證的同時會收到這本指南。參加長跑的人將會發現自己身邊跑的人群中有很多是波克夏公司的公司經理人、董事、員工。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO將設一個展台，有來自全美最優秀的保險顧問為您服務，他們隨時準備為您提供汽車保險詢價。在大多數情況下，GEICO將會給您一個股東特別折扣(通常是8%)。我們開展業務的51個行政區域中有44個都批准了這個特別優惠。 (額外提示：這個折扣不可以與其他優惠累加使用，比如給予特定群體的優惠)。把你現有保險的詳細情況帶過來，看看我們能否幫你多省點錢。我相信，我們至少可以幫助你們中一半人省下更多的保險費。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index that I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You’ll enjoy it.
你一定要到Bookworm書店的展區看看，這家書店將會提供超過35種的圖書和DVD，有幾本是最新出版的。其中一本新書是Max Olson編輯的致波克夏股東的信，從1965年開始至今。這本書包括一個索引，我覺得特別有用，按照人名、公司、主題分別註明頁碼。我還要推薦我兒子霍華德寫的新書《Forty Chances》。你一定會喜歡這本書的。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft sure to set your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果您是一個會花大錢的大款,或者是你很希望成為這樣一個大款，請在周六中午到下午五點參觀位於奧馬哈機場東側的Signature航空館。那裡將會展出我們下屬的NetJets公司的私人專機編隊，肯定會讓您心跳加速。坐著大巴來，坐著私人飛機回。享受一下生活。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
隨同附上的股東大會資料中有個附件，告訴您如何獲取參加股東的憑證，憑此才能參加股東年會和其它活動。在伯克希爾股東大會召開的周末，航空公司有時會提高機票價格。如果你從很遠的地方過來，可以比較一下飛到肯薩斯與奧馬哈的價格。飛到肯薩斯，再開車到奧馬哈，只需要2個半小時左右，也許這樣可以幫你省掉一大筆錢，尤其是你本來就打算在奧馬哈租車的話。省下來的錢，一定要在會場上購物花掉噢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did $40.2 million of business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.
內布拉斯加家具商場(Nebraska Furniture Mart，NFM)位於72街上，在Dodge街和Pacific街之間，佔地77英畝，在這裡我們將會再次舉辦“波克夏週末專場”特惠促銷活動。 2013年，這家商場在年會期間銷售收入為4020萬美元，打破了以前的歷史最高記錄，增長了12%。同時也在星期六創下了820萬美元的最高單日銷售記錄，賣出了接近100萬張床墊。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 29th and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
要得到波克夏股東的特別優惠，你必須在4月29日週二到5月5日週一之間購買，並出示參加股東年會的憑證。這次特惠促銷包括了幾個非常著名的超級大牌廠家的產品，一般情況下它們嚴禁打折銷售，但考慮到這是一個我們股東的周末特別活動，所以特別破例一次，只為參加股東大會人士提供優惠折扣。我們特別感謝他們的支持。 NFM在周一至週六早上十點到晚上九點營業，週日是早上十點到晚上六點營業。週六下午五點半到晚上八點，NFM將會舉行野餐會，邀請所有參會人士加入。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在Borsheims珠寶店，我們將會再次召開兩場股東專場優惠活動。第一個活動將是一場雞尾酒會，在5月2日週五下午6點到晚上9點舉行。第二個活動是一個大型聚會，在5月5日週日早上九點到下午四點舉行。週六，我們將會一直營業到下午六點。最近幾年，我們在股東年會期間三天的銷售額就遠遠超過整個12月份的銷售額，而12月份通常是珠寶店生意最好的一個月。
About 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.
在星期天下午1點15分，我本人將會親自在Borsheims擔任售貨員。不管你選擇什麼商品，都可以向我要求一個“瘋狂巴菲特”特別優惠價格。隨著我變得越來越老，我給的價格也越來越荒謬可笑。所以請大家快來占我的便宜吧
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整個週末Borsheims珠寶商店都會人群非常擁擠。因此為了你的方便考慮，股東優惠價格將會從4月28日週一一直持續5月10日週六。在此期間，請出示你的股票年會入場憑證或券商出具的持股證明，以證明你本人是波克夏公司的股東。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
在Borsheims外面的商場裡，美國兩屆象棋比賽冠軍Patrick Wolff將會蒙上雙眼，接受所有人的挑戰，當然挑戰者們不用蒙眼，而且他是一個人一次同時和6個人進行對奕。就在附近，著名的達拉斯魔術師Norman Beck將進行精彩表演。另外，我們將邀請兩位世界級橋牌頂尖高手Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，在周日下午與我們的股東們進行比賽。千萬別和他們倆賭錢。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans – and especially me – proud with her performance at the Olympics.
我的朋友邢延華(Ariel Hsing)將會再次出現在Borsheim外面的商場裡，接受乒乓球，去年他在奧運會乒乓球比賽場面的表現讓所有美國人尤其是我本人感到驕傲。
I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women’s Champion. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我第一次遇見刑延華，她只有9歲，但是那時我跟他打乒乓球一分都拿不到。現在她已經是普林斯頓大學的大一新生，也是美國女子乒乓球比賽冠軍。如果你不介意讓自己感到難堪，就來和她打上一盤，檢驗一下你的球技如何。比賽將在下午一點鐘開始。我和比爾·蓋茲帶頭挑戰，我們要努力讓她手下留情。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and for Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
5月4日，週六，Gorat's餐廳和Piccolo’s餐廳將會再次僅對波克夏公司股東開放。 Gorat's餐廳會從下午1點營業到晚上10點，Piccolo’s餐廳將會從下午4點營業到晚上10點。這兩家都是我特別喜歡的餐廳，週日晚上我會在兩家餐廳都吃上一頓。請記住，要在Gorat's訂餐，請在5月1日(但不要提前)撥打電話402-551-3733。要在Piccolo’s訂餐，電話是402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s餐廳，要顯得你有品位，就得要上一大杯根啤作為甜點，要小杯的不是男人。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
今年我們將再次邀請同樣的三位財經記者引領年會問答環節，他們通過電子郵件收集股東提交給他們的問題，向我和孟格進行提問。這三位記者和他們的電子郵件地址分別是：財富雜誌記者CarolLoomis：cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC記者BeckyQuick：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；紐約時報記者(AndrewRossSorkin：arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每一個記者將會從郵件收集到的眾多問題中進行篩選，選出6個他（她）認為最有趣和最重要的問題來現場提問。他們告訴我，如果你的問題符合以下條件：十分簡潔，不是最後一刻才提交，問題和波克夏相關，每封電子郵件提出的問題不超過兩個，那麼符合以上條件的問題被選中的機會最大。（在你的郵件中，請告訴記者，如果你提出的問題被他們選中，您是否希望提到你的名字。）
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb.
2012年我們邀請了一個由三名追踪波克夏公司的分析師組成的提問團隊。今年的保險行業分析專家將是Barclays公司的JayGelb 。負責提問與我們非保險業務相關的問題將是來自Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfa rb的Jonathan Brandt。
And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position). The three analysts will bring their own Berkshirespecific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
我們希望能夠再次在分析師團隊中加入一位公認看空波克夏公司的分析師。我們希望那些看空並做空波克夏股票的分析師來信申請（請附上你的做空持倉證明）。這三位分析師將會各自提出他們自已對關於波克夏的問題，分析師、記者和聽眾將會交替提問。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial information late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, but rather treat all shareholders the same. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that further educate our owners about their investment.
我和查理認為，所有股東都應該有渠道能夠在同一時間知悉波克夏公司的最新信息，而且應該有足夠的時間分析這些信息，這也是我們為什麼總是努力安排在周五股市收盤之後或者周六一早才公佈公司財務信息的原因，這也是我們為什麼選擇在周六召開股東年會的原因。我們不會與大型機構投資者或分析師進行一對一交流。我們的希望是，記者們和分析師們將會提出一些好的問題，能夠讓我們的股東們更加充分了解自己所投資的公司。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
我和查理事先不知道任何在會上提出的問題有關的東西。我們知道，記者和分析師會選擇一些難以回答的問題，而這正是我們所希望的。總的來說，我們希望至少能夠回答54個問題，三個記者和三個分析師每個人提問6個問題，現場聽眾提問18個問題。如果還有一些剩餘的時間，我們將會回答現場聽眾更多的問題。聽眾提問者將會在8點15分進行抽籤決定，15個提問用的話筒分別放置在會場不同的區域和主要的分會場。
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly AllStars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
我經常稱讚我們經理人的成就。他們是名副其實的全明星團隊，他們如同自己的家族擁有公司一樣經營著公司。我認為我們經理人那樣為股東著想的理念在大型的公眾持股公司中也能找到。他們中的大多數財務自由;他們在業務上的“全壘打”成就感和他們的薪酬同樣重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 23,000-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
同樣重要的，還有24位和我一同在總部辦公室工作的男女同事。這個團隊非常高效地處理大量和SEC和其他監管機構的要求，提交23000頁的聯邦稅收、地方稅收和國外稅收文件，回復不計其數的股東和媒體的問詢，製作年報，籌備全國最大的股東年會，配合媒體的工作等等，這個單子還有很長很長。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他們充滿熱情地處理上述事務，效率驚人，讓我的生活變得簡單而愉快。他們的努力不僅僅是服務於波克夏：去年他們聯繫了40所大學(從200個申請者中挑選而出)派送學生到奧馬哈和我進行問答互動的活動。他們還處理各種我接到的邀請，安排行程，甚至給我買漢堡和法式炸薯條(當然是塗滿番茄醬的)當午餐。沒有任何CEO有比這更好的團隊;我每天都是跳著舞去上班的。
In closing, I think it’s become appropriate to ignore our “no pictures” policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn’t make it; otherwise you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire’s headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.
最後，我覺得應該無視我們年報“無圖片”的傳統，讓大家看看我們舉世矚目的辦公室團隊。下面是我們聖誕節晚餐的一張照片。有兩個人缺席;不然你就可以看到波克夏總部的全家福了。他們真的是創造奇蹟的員工。
Next year’s letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
明年的信將會回顧波克夏過去的50年，並且憧憬一下下一個50年。記得5月3日到奧馬哈來享受投資界的伍德斯托克音樂節。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2014
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2014年2月28日