Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.
| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2006 | 21.4% | 10.4% | 11.0 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2006 | 361,156% | 6479% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Our gain in net worth during 2006 was $16.9 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 18.4%. Over the last 42 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $70,281, a rate of 21.4% compounded annually.*
2006年公司獲得169億美元的淨利潤，A股和B股的每股賬面價值同步增長了18.4%。現在的管理層接手公司之後，42年來每股賬面價值從19美元增長到70,281美元，年復合增長率為21.4%。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A.
*在年報中所有的數據，指的是A股，這是1996年以前所發行的股份，至於B股則僅擁有A股1/30的經濟利益。
We believe that $16.9 billion is a record for a one-year gain in net worth – more than has ever been booked by any American business, leaving aside boosts that have occurred because of mergers (e.g., AOL’s purchase of Time Warner). Of course, Exxon Mobil and other companies earn far more than Berkshire, but their earnings largely go to dividends and/or repurchases, rather than to building net worth.
除了像美國在線與時代華納那樣的合併，169億美元的淨利潤在美國商界中創下了一項新紀錄。儘管埃克森美孚和其他公司賺的錢比伯克夏公司多得多，但它們的大部分利潤都沒有留在公司裡，而是用於分紅或回購股票了。
All that said, a confession about our 2006 gain is in order. Our most important business, insurance, benefited from a large dose of luck: Mother Nature, bless her heart, went on vacation. After hammering us with hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 – storms that caused us to lose a bundle on super-cat insurance – she just vanished. Last year, the red ink from this activity turned black – very black.
坦率地說，2006年的盈利來得順順噹噹，因為我們最重要的保險業務在很大程度上靠的是運氣。感謝大自然的眷顧，這一年平安無事。2004年和2005年導致我們出現巨大虧損的颶風今年沒有出現，我們的巨災險從虧損變為盈利，而且盈利很多。
In addition, the great majority of our 73 businesses did outstandingly well in 2006. Let me focus for a moment on one of our largest operations, GEICO. What management accomplished there was simply extraordinary.
此外，2006年我們的73項生意大多經營出色，讓我們集中精力看一下最大的生意中的一項——政府僱員保險公司(GEICO)。
As I’ve told you before, Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, went to work at the company 45 years ago,
two months after turning 18. He became CEO in 1992, and from then on the company’s growth exploded.
In addition, Tony has delivered staggering productivity gains in recent years. Between yearend 2003 and
yearend 2006, the number of GEICO policies increased from 5.7 million to 8.1 million, a jump of 42%.
Yet during that same period, the company’s employees (measured on a fulltime-equivalent basis) fell 3.5%.
So productivity grew 47%. And GEICO didn’t start fat.
之前我曾經告訴過你們，在45年前，GEICO現任的CEO Tony Nicely加盟公司，那時他才18歲多一點。1992年他成為公司的CEO後，公司開始高速成長，近年來公司的效率在不斷提升，2003年到2006年，保單從570萬份增加到810萬份，增長了42%，同期公司全職僱員人數卻下降了3.5%，實際效率提高了47%，GEICO並沒有變得人員臃腫。
That remarkable gain has allowed GEICO to maintain its all-important position as a low-cost
producer, even though it has dramatically increased advertising expenditures. Last year GEICO spent $631
million on ads, up from $238 million in 2003 (and up from $31 million in 1995, when Berkshire took
control). Today, GEICO spends far more on ads than any of its competitors, even those much larger. We
will continue to raise the bar.
儘管去年大幅增加了廣告費用，GEICO還能繼續保持低成本的競爭優勢，這一點很重要，1995年我們收購GEICO時，廣告費是3,100萬美元，2003年是2.38億美元，去年是6.31億美元，GEICO的廣告費用遠遠超過所有的競爭對手，包括那些規模遠比它大的公司。我們會繼續增加這方面的開支。
Last year I told you that if you had a new son or grandson to be sure to name him Tony. But Don Keough, a Berkshire director, recently had a better idea. After reviewing GEICO’s performance in 2006, he wrote me, “Forget births. Tell the shareholders to immediately change the names of their present children to Tony or Antoinette.” Don signed his letter “Tony.”
去年我告訴大家，假如你有新生兒或新生孫子，務必取名叫Tony。但是，最近公司的董事Don Keough有更好的主意——在看了GEICO的表現後， 他寫信告訴我，“ 別再提新生兒的事了，告訴股東，馬上將他們的孩子改名叫Tony或叫Antoinette”，信的落款就是Tony。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie Munger – my partner and Berkshire’s vice chairman – and I run what has turned out to be
a big business, one with 217,000 employees and annual revenues approaching $100 billion. We certainly
didn’t plan it that way. Charlie began as a lawyer, and I thought of myself as a security analyst. Sitting in
those seats, we both grew skeptical about the ability of big entities of any type to function well. Size seems
to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug. In Churchill’s words: “We shape
our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Here’s a telling fact: Of the ten non-oil companies
having the largest market capitalization in 1965 – titans such as General Motors, Sears, DuPont and
Eastman Kodak – only one made the 2006 list.
我和副董事長查理·孟格目前管理著有21.7萬僱員、營業額達到1,000億美元的大生意，我們並非早就知道能發展到現在這樣的規模。查理早年是律師，我自認為是證券分析員，在那個年代，我們對大機構能否有效運作一直表示懷疑，逐漸變大的規模會使機構思考緩慢，拒絕變革。正如丘吉爾所說的那樣，“我們改變著世界，世界也在改變著我們。”事實如下：1965年按市值排名的十大非石油公司，如通用汽車、西爾斯百貨、杜邦和柯達等，在2006年的排名榜中僅存一家。
In fairness, we’ve seen plenty of successes as well, some truly outstanding. There are many giantcompany
managers whom I greatly admire; Ken Chenault of American Express, Jeff Immelt of G.E. and
Dick Kovacevich of Wells Fargo come quickly to mind. But I don’t think I could do the management job
they do. And I know I wouldn’t enjoy many of the duties that come with their positions – meetings,
speeches, foreign travel, the charity circuit and governmental relations. For me, Ronald Reagan had it
right: “It’s probably true that hard work never killed anyone – but why take the chance?”
公正而言，我們也看到許多成功企業甚至是十分傑出的企業，我很佩服許多大公司的經理人，像美國運通的ken Chenault、通用電器的Jeff Immelt、 富國銀行的Dick Kovacevich等。我認為自己無法勝任他們的管理工作，他們必鬚麵對的一系列會議、演講、國外旅行、慈善活動和政府公關等等。對我而言，羅納德·裡根說得很對：“儘管努力工作從來沒有累死人，但我為何要嘗試呢?”
So I’ve taken the easy route, just sitting back and working through great managers who run their
own shows. My only tasks are to cheer them on, sculpt and harden our corporate culture, and make major
capital-allocation decisions. Our managers have returned this trust by working hard and effectively.
我選擇了一條簡單的路，只是坐在那裡看經理們表演，鼓勵他們，捉摸和強化公司的文化，但投資由我決定。我們的經理們為信任奉獻回報，工作努力又高效。
For their performance over the last 42 years – and particularly for 2006 – Charlie and I thank
them.
查理和我感謝他們42年來的工作， 特別是2006年的表現。
Yardsticks
Charlie and I measure Berkshire’s progress and evaluate its intrinsic value in a number of ways.
No single criterion is effective in doing these jobs, and even an avalanche of statistics will not capture some
factors that are important. For example, it’s essential that we have managers much younger than I available
to succeed me. Berkshire has never been in better shape in this regard – but I can’t prove it to you with
numbers.
查理和我用多種方法評估伯克夏公司的進步和內在的價值，這種評估沒有單一的衡量標準，即使一系列統計數據也會抓不住要點。例如，我們需要年輕的經理人來接替我，但這方面我們公司一直沒有改善過，這件事至關重要，我卻無法用數據證明。
There are two statistics, however, that are of real importance. The first is the amount of
investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) that we own on a per-share basis. Arriving at this figure,
we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings.
Here’s the record since present management acquired control of Berkshire:
但有兩項統計指標很重要，第一項是用於投資的金額，包括現金和現金等有價物。表2和表3是目前的管理層接管伯克夏以後的紀錄，其中的數據不包括金融部分的投資，因為它們絕大多數被負債抵銷了。
| Year | Per-Share Investments* | |||
| 1965 | $4 | |||
| 1975 | 159 | |||
| 1985 | 2,407 | |||
| 1995 | 21,817 | |||
| 2006 | $80,636 | |||
| Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005 | 27.50% | |||
| Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005 | 12.60% | |||
*Net of minority interests
*扣除少數股東權益
In our early years we put most of our retained earnings and insurance float into investments in marketable securities. Because of this emphasis, and because the securities we purchased generally did well, our growth rate in investments was for a long time quite high.
早年，我們將大部分留存利潤和保險浮存金用於證券投資，我們投資的公司表現很出色，很長一段時間裡，我們投資的成長性很高。
In our early years we put most of our retained earnings and insurance float into investments in marketable securities. Because of this emphasis, and because the securities we purchased generally did well, our growth rate in investments was for a long time quite high.
早年，我們將大部分留存利潤和保險浮存金用於證券投資，我們投資的公司表現很出色，很長一段時間裡，我們投資的成長性很高。
Over the years, however, we have focused more and more on the acquisition of operating
businesses. Using our funds for these purchases has both slowed our growth in investments and accelerated
our gains in pre-tax earnings from non-insurance businesses, the second yardstick we use. Here’s how
those earnings have looked:
但近年來，我們越來越多地進行經營性業務的併購，這樣一來，我們的投資金額的增速放慢了，與此同時，非保險業務的盈利，也就是我們的第二項指標卻加速增長了。
| Year | Per-Share Investments* | |||
| 1965 | $4 | |||
| 1975 | 4 | |||
| 1985 | 52 | |||
| 1995 | 175 | |||
| 2005 | $3,625 | |||
| Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005 | 17.90% | |||
| Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005 | 31.70% | |||
*Excluding purchase-accounting adjustments and net of minority interests
*扣除購買法會計調整和少數股東權益
Last year we had a good increase in non-insurance earnings – 38%. Large gains from here on in,
though, will come only if we are able to make major, and sensible, acquisitions. That will not be easy. We
do, however, have one advantage: More and more, Berkshire has become “the buyer of choice” for
business owners and managers. Initially, we were viewed that way only in the U.S. (and more often than
not by private companies). We’ve long wanted, nonetheless, to extend Berkshire’s appeal beyond U.S.
borders. And last year, our globe-trotting finally got underway.
Acquisitions
併購案
We began 2006 by completing the three acquisitions pending at yearend 2005, spending about $6
billion for PacifiCorp, Business Wire and Applied Underwriters. All are performing very well.
我們2006年完成了2005年遺留下來的三宗併購，花了60億美元收購了PacifiCorp、Business Wire和Applied Underwriters，這些企業的表現都很好。
The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1¼-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cuttingtool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”
The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1¼-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cuttingtool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”
去年的亮點是收購以色列的ISCAR，該公司的主席Eitan Wertheimer和CEO Jacob harpaz成了我們的新同事。故事得從2005年10月25日說起，我收到Eitan一封一頁多一點的信，當時我根本不認識他。他在信中說，“我寫信向你推薦ISCAR”，接著，他進一步描述了在61個國家運作的切割工俱生意，“我們考慮到跨代傳承和大家族企業的所有權問題以及公司的未來，我們的結論是波克夏公司是我們理想的家園，我們相信，在變成你的投資組合的一部分後，ISCAR 會繼續興旺發達。”
Overall, Eitan’s letter made the quality of the company and the character of its management leap
off the page. It also made me want to learn more, and in November, Eitan, Jacob and ISCAR’s CFO,
Danny Goldman, came to Omaha. A few hours with them convinced me that if we were to make a deal, we
would be teaming up with extraordinarily talented managers who could be trusted to run the business after
a sale with all of the energy and dedication that they had exhibited previously. However, having never
bought a business based outside of the U.S. (though I had bought a number of foreign stocks), I needed to
get educated on some tax and jurisdictional matters. With that task completed, Berkshire purchased 80% of
ISCAR for $4 billion. The remaining 20% stays in the hands of the Wertheimer family, making it our
valued partner.
在Eitan的書信中，公司的經營質量和管理風格躍然紙上。2005年11月，Eitan、Jacob和財務總監Danny Goldman來到奧馬哈，經過幾個小時的溝通之後，我確信，如果成交，我們將擁有特別優秀的團隊，他們值得信賴，會像在收購前一樣充滿熱情地工作。但是，由於從來沒有收購境外公司的經歷(雖然我買過幾家外國公司的股票)，我需要熟悉外國的稅務和法律。最後，我們用40億美元買了ISCAR的80%股權，其餘20%留給Wertheimer家族，使家族成為我們更有價值的伙伴。
ISCAR’s products are small, consumable cutting tools that are used in conjunction with large and
expensive machine tools. It’s a business without magic except for that imparted by the people who run it.
But Eitan, Jacob and their associates are true managerial magicians who constantly develop tools that make
their customers’ machines more productive. The result: ISCAR makes money because it enables its
customers to make more money. There is no better recipe for continued success.
ISCAR的產品是小型的消耗型的切割工具，與大型、貴重的工具配套使用。ISCAR的生意沒什麼神秘，但Eitan、Jacob及其同僚都是管理天才，公司不斷開發新工具以提高客戶的生產效率，結果是，ISCAR因為幫客戶賺了更多的錢，自身也不斷盈利。對持續成功來說，這就是最好的秘訣。
In September, Charlie and I, along with five Berkshire associates, visited ISCAR in Israel. We –
and I mean every one of us – have never been more impressed with any operation. At ISCAR, as
throughout Israel, brains and energy are ubiquitous. Berkshire shareholders are lucky to have joined with
Eitan, Jacob, Danny and their talented associates.
2005年9月，我和查理及公司五位同事訪問了位於以色列的ISCAR公司。我們從未如此震撼過，在ISCAR以及以色列全國都充滿了生機和智慧。有Eitan、Jacob、Danny和他們聰明的同事加盟，我們的股東會很幸運。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A few months later, Berkshire again became “the buyer of choice” in a deal brought to us by my
friend, John Roach, of Fort Worth. John, many of you will remember, was Chairman of Justin Industries,
which we bought in 2000. At that time John was helping John Justin, who was terminally ill, find a
permanent home for his company. John Justin died soon after we bought Justin Industries, but it has since
been run exactly as we promised him it would be.
幾個月後，經我的朋友、Fort Wort的John Roach介紹，我們再次成為一宗交易的“首選買家”。你們可能記得，2000年我們購買的Justin Industries，John Justin就是這家公司的主席，當時Roach幫助重病中的John的公司尋找永久的歸宿。我們購買後不久，John Justin就去世了，經營方面我們按承諾嚴格地執行。
Visiting me in November, John Roach brought along Paul Andrews, Jr., owner of about 80% of
TTI, a Fort Worth distributor of electronic components. Over a 35-year period, Paul built TTI from
$112,000 of sales to $1.3 billion. He is a remarkable entrepreneur and operator.
2005年11月，John Roach帶著Paul Andrew二世來跟我會面。Paul擁有TTI 80%的股份，TTI是Fort Worth的電子元器件的分銷商，在過去的35年裡，Paul將TTI的銷售額從11.2萬美元增長到了13億美元，他是個傑出的企業家和經營行家。
Paul, 64, loves running his business. But not long ago he happened to witness how disruptive the
death of a founder can be both to a private company’s employees and the owner’s family. What starts out
as disruptive, furthermore, often evolves into destructive. About a year ago, therefore, Paul began to think
about selling TTI. His goal was to put his business in the hands of an owner he had carefully chosen, rather
than allowing a trust officer or lawyer to conduct an auction after his death.
Paul今年64歲，熱愛工作。但不久前，他碰巧見證了一個公司創始人的去世及其對公司僱員和業主家族的危害。這樣的事剛開始是破壞性的，進一步可能會毀滅企業。一年前，Paul開始考慮出售TTI，希望好好選擇買家，而不希望在他死後讓信託管理人或律師馬上拍賣他的產業。
Paul rejected the idea of a “strategic” buyer, knowing that in the pursuit of “synergies,” an owner
of that type would be apt to dismantle what he had so carefully built, a move that would uproot hundreds of
his associates (and perhaps wound TTI’s business in the process). He also ruled out a private equity firm,
which would very likely load the company with debt and then flip it as soon as possible.
Paul拒絕所謂的戰略投資者去追求所謂的協同效應，肢解他苦心經營的事業，甚至會將他的同事逐出公司，進一步傷害公司。他也拒絕私人股權投資公司，他們會盲目地使公司高額負債，然後儘快轉手。
That left Berkshire. Paul and I met on the morning of November 15th and made a deal before
lunch. Later he wrote me: “After our meeting, I am confident that Berkshire is the right owner for TTI . . .
I am proud of our past and excited about our future.” And so are Charlie and I.
因此，機會就輪到了伯克夏公司。Paul和我11月15日早上開始會談，未到中午就成交了，爾後他寫信給我：“與你會談，使我相信伯克夏才是TTI公司的歸宿，我對公司的過去感到驕傲，對未來感到興奮。”我和查理也有同感。
We also made some “tuck-in” acquisitions during 2006 at Fruit of the Loom (“Fruit”), MiTek, CTB, Shaw and Clayton. Fruit made the largest purchases. First, it bought Russell Corp., a leading producer of athletic apparel and uniforms for about $1.2 billion (including assumed debt) and in December it agreed to buy the intimate apparel business of VF Corp. Together, these acquisitions add about $2.2 billion to Fruit’s sales and bring with them about 23,000 employees.
2006年我們在Fruit、Mitek、CTB、Shaw和Clayton名下進行了一些整合併購，Fruit進行了一次最大的併購，它花12億美元買下運動服和製服領域的領先生產商Russell公司，12月份又購買了內衣生產商VF，這些併購增加了2.3萬名僱員和22億美元的銷售額。
Charlie and I love it when we can acquire businesses that can be placed under managers, such as John Holland at Fruit, who have already shown their stuff at Berkshire. MiTek, for example, has made 14 acquisitions since we purchased it in 2001, and Gene Toombs has delivered results from these deals far in excess of what he had predicted. In effect, we leverage the managerial talent already with us by these tuckin deals. We will make many more.
在Fruit公司，有像John Holland那樣能幹的經理，我和查理收購了一些業務，將其置於現有的經理旗下管理。自2001年我們收購Mitek以來，Mitek公司的Gene Toombs已連續進行了14宗併購，結果比他預測的更好。以上這些整合性併購，實際上是在巧用我們現有的管理才能，我們還會進行更多這樣的收購。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We continue, however, to need “elephants” in order for us to use Berkshire’s flood of incoming cash. Charlie and I must therefore ignore the pursuit of mice and focus our acquisition efforts on much bigger game.
為了好好利用像潮水一樣湧入的現金，我們需要“大象”級的收購對象，而放棄一些小“老鼠”項目，將精力專注於大項目。
Our exemplar is the older man who crashed his grocery cart into that of a much younger fellow while both were shopping. The elderly man explained apologetically that he had lost track of his wife and was preoccupied searching for her. His new acquaintance said that by coincidence his wife had also wandered off and suggested that it might be more efficient if they jointly looked for the two women. Agreeing, the older man asked his new companion what his wife looked like. “She’s a gorgeous blonde,” the fellow answered, “with a body that would cause a bishop to go through a stained glass window, and she’s wearing tight white shorts. How about yours?” The senior citizen wasted no words: “Forget her, we’ll look for yours.”
我們以下面的故事作比喻。在逛街時，一個中年男人的貨車撞上了一個年輕男子的貨車，中年男人連忙解釋道，原因是他的老婆走掉了，他正在全神貫注地找她。說來也巧，年輕男人的妻子也走散了，他建議不如兩人一起找老婆，效率會更高點。兩人同意一致行動後，中年男子向年輕人詢問：你的妻子長得什麼模樣。年輕人答道：“她是個漂亮的金發女郎，穿白色緊身短裙，身材迷人，很有可能使教父破窗而入撲過來。你的妻子又長得啥樣呢?”中年男子二話不說，“別提她了，我們一起找你的老婆吧。”
What we are looking for is described on page 25. If you have an acquisition candidate that fits, call me – day or night. And then watch me shatter a stained glass window.
我們要找的對像在第25頁上有描述，假如你有合適的對象，不管白天或晚上都可以打電話給我，然後看我是如何破窗而入的!
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Lumping their financial figures together impedes analysis. So we’ll look at them as four separate businesses, starting with the all– important insurance group.
讓我們來看一下伯克夏主要的四塊業務，但將四塊業務扯在一塊反而不易分析，因此我們將它們看成四塊獨立的業務，先從最重要的保險業務開始吧。
Insurance
保險事業
Next month marks the 40th anniversary of our entrance into the insurance business. It was on March 9, 1967, that Berkshire purchased National Indemnity and its companion company, National Fire & Marine, from Jack Ringwalt for $8.6 million.
下個月是我們進入保險行業40週年紀念日，1967年3月9日，我們花了860萬美元從Jack Ringwalt的手上買下National Indemnity保險和它的兄弟公司——國民火災和海事保險公司。
Jack was a long-time friend of mine and an excellent, but somewhat eccentric, businessman. For about ten minutes every year he would get the urge to sell his company. But those moods – perhaps brought on by a tiff with regulators or an unfavorable jury verdict – quickly vanished.
Jack是我的老友，除了有時行為顯得有些古怪之外，他是個傑出的商人，有時他會衝動，想把公司賣掉，這些情緒可能是由於與監管者或司法裁定的不愉快引起的。但他賣公司的念頭往往馬上就會打消。
In the mid-1960s, I asked investment banker Charlie Heider, a mutual friend of mine and Jack’s, to alert me the next time Jack was “in heat.” When Charlie’s call came, I sped to meet Jack. We made a deal in a few minutes, with me waiving an audit, “due diligence” or anything else that would give Jack an opportunity to reconsider. We just shook hands, and that was that.
20世紀60年代中期，我告訴投資銀行家Charlie Heider——他是我和Jack共同的朋友——Jack一有衝動，馬上就告訴我。當Charlie打電話通知我時，我火速會見Jack，我們馬上就成交了。我省略了諸如審計、盡職調查等會讓他有機會重新考慮的事項，以免Jack反悔。我們握手成交，大功告成，經過就是這樣。
When we were due to close the purchase at Charlie’s office, Jack was late. Finally arriving, he explained that he had been driving around looking for a parking meter with some unexpired time. That was a magic moment for me. I knew then that Jack was going to be my kind of manager.
在Jack的辦公室裡完成交易時，Jack遲到了一會兒，他解釋說是在尋找那種上一輛車剛離開而咪錶還餘有時間的車位，對我而言，這是美妙的時光。那時我就明白Jack是我所喜歡的那種類型的經理人。
When Berkshire purchased Jack’s two insurers, they had “float” of $17 million. We’ve regularly offered a long explanation of float in earlier reports, which you can read on our website. Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest.
伯克夏買下了Jack的保險公司，它有1,700萬美元浮存金。在早期的報告裡，我們詳細解釋了浮存金，大家可以在我們公司的網站上查閱。簡而言之，浮存金是我們持有但不是我們所有的資金，我們可用於投資。
At the end of 2006, our float had grown to $50.9 billion, and we have since written a huge retroactive reinsurance contract with Equitas – which I will describe in the next section – that boosts float by another $7 billion. Much of the gain we’ve made has come through our acquisition of other insurers, but we’ve also had outstanding internal growth, particularly at Ajit Jain’s amazing reinsurance operation. Naturally, I had no notion in 1967 that our float would develop as it has. There’s much to be said for just putting one foot in front of the other every day.
2006年年底，浮存金高達509億美元，我們和Equitas簽署了可追溯再保險大額合同(在後面會詳細論述)，該合同貢獻了70億美元浮存金，我們大部分收益來自於收購其他的保險公司，但我們的內部增長也很突出，特別是Ajit Jain管理的再保險部門。實際上，在1967年，我全然沒有預料到會出現這樣的局面，雖然是一步一個腳印走到現在，但還是有很多可說的。
The float from retroactive reinsurance contracts, of which we have many, automatically drifts down over time. Therefore, it will be difficult for us to increase float in the future unless we make new acquisitions in the insurance field. Whatever its size, however, the all-important cost of Berkshire’s float over time is likely to be significantly below that of the industry, perhaps even falling to less than zero. Note the words “over time.” There will be bad years periodically. You can be sure of that.
來自可追溯再保險的浮存金雖然有許多，但隨著時間會自行下降，所以，除非我們再進行保險行業的新併購，不然的話，將來增加浮存金會很困難。不管規模如何，長期來看，最重要的是我們浮存金成本應該顯著低於行業成本，甚至低於零。請注意我的用詞，“長期來看”表明我們會周期性地遇上壞年份，在這一點上，你要堅信不移。
In 2006, though, everything went right in insurance – really right. Our managers – Tony Nicely (GEICO), Ajit Jain (B-H Reinsurance), Joe Brandon and Tad Montross (General Re), Don Wurster (National Indemnity Primary), Tom Nerney (U.S. Liability), Tim Kenesey (Medical Protective), Rod Eldred (Homestate Companies and Cypress), Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies (Applied Underwriters), John Kizer (Central States) and Don Towle (Kansas Bankers Surety) – simply shot the lights out. When I recite their names, I feel as if I’m at Cooperstown, reading from the Hall of Fame roster. Of course, the overall insurance industry also had a terrific year in 2006. But our managers delivered results generally superior to those of their competitors.
2006年，保險行業運作不是良好，而是非常之好。GFICO的Tony Nicely， BH 再保險的Ajit，通用再保險的Joe Brandon 和Tad Montross，National Indemnity Primary的Don Wurster US liability的Tom Nernty，Medical Protective的Tim Kenesey.，Homestate Companies and cypress的Rod Eldred，Applied Underwriters的Sid Ference和Steve Menzies，Central States的John Kiser和Kamsas Bankers Surety 的Don Towle——simple shot the lights out。當我歷數他們的名字的時候，我彷佛置身於Cooperstown的名人堂，誦讀名人堂的名冊。當然，2006年整個保險行業形勢非常好，但我們的經理仍優於同業中的競爭對手。
Below is the tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance. Enjoy the view, because you won’t soon see another like it.
表4是保險行業各部門的保單和浮存金，你不會有第二次這樣的機會。養養眼吧!
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2006 | 2005 | 2006 | 2005 | ||
| General Re | $526 | (334) | $22,827 | $22,920 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 1,658 | (1,069) | 16,860 | 16,233 | ||
| GEICO | 1,314 | 1221 | 7,171 | 6,692 | ||
| Other Primary* | 340** | 235 | * | 4,029 | 3,442 | |
| Total | $3,838 | $53 | $50,887 | $49,287 | ||
* Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.
** Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.
* 從2005年6月30日開始，包括MedPro
** 從2006年5月19日開始，包含Applied Underwriters
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In 2007, our results from the bread-and-butter lines of insurance will deteriorate, though I think they will remain satisfactory. The big unknown is super-cat insurance. Were the terrible hurricane seasons of 2004-05 aberrations? Or were they our planet’s first warning that the climate of the 21st Century will differ materially from what we’ve seen in the past? If the answer to the second question is yes, 2006 will soon be perceived as a misleading period of calm preceding a series of devastating storms. These could rock the insurance industry. It’s naïve to think of Katrina as anything close to a worst-case event.
2007年我們保險業務的業績可能會變差，儘管我主觀認為會仍然令人滿意。最大的不確定是巨災險，2004年-2005年的颶風難道是脫離常軌了嗎?還是對我們地球的第一次警告?21世紀的氣候會與過去大不相同?假如答案是第二個的話，那麼，2006年可能是暴風驟雨來臨前的片刻寧靜，讓我們產生了錯覺。這很危險，會動搖整個行業的基石。假如你認為Katrina颶風已是最壞的災害，那就太天真了。
Neither Ajit Jain, who manages our super-cat operation, nor I know what lies ahead. We do know that it would be a huge mistake to bet that evolving atmospheric changes are benign in their implications for insurers.
管理巨災險的Ajit Jain和我都不知道來未來會是什麼樣子，但我們知道，假如認為氣候的演變對保險公司的影響很小的話，我們就會犯大錯誤。
Don’t think, however, that we have lost our taste for risk. We remain prepared to lose $6 billion in a single event, if we have been paid appropriately for assuming that risk. We are not willing, though, to take on even very small exposures at prices that don’t reflect our evaluation of loss probabilities. Appropriate prices don’t guarantee profits in any given year, but inappropriate prices most certainly guarantee eventual losses. Rates have recently fallen because a flood of capital has entered the super-cat field. We have therefore sharply reduced our wind exposures. Our behavior here parallels that which we employ in financial markets: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.
不要認為我們對風險失去了感覺，假如保費合理的話，我們做好了一次賠償60億美元的準備。我們不願意承接風險與收益不對稱的保單，價格合理不一定盈利，但價格不合理，最終一定會虧損。由於大量資金湧入巨災險領域，價格一路下跌，我們大幅削減了颶風保險。我們在保險領域的行為與金融市場的行為是一致的——別人貪婪時，我們恐懼;別人恐懼時，我們貪婪。
Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance
勞合社，Equitas再保險公司以及可追溯再保險
Last year – we are getting now to Equitas – Berkshire agreed to enter into a huge retroactive reinsurance contract, a policy that protects an insurer against losses that have already happened, but whose cost is not yet known. I’ll give you details of the agreement shortly. But let’s first take a journey through insurance history, following the route that led to our deal.
去年，伯克夏同意進入可追溯再保險領域，向勞合社下屬的再保險公司Equitas提供保險，保障原來的承保人免予索賠，現在我們已經在這麼做，稍後我會告訴你協議的細節。首先讓我們來回顧一下保險歷史，一直回顧到我們是如何成交的。
Our tale begins around 1688, when Edward Lloyd opened a small coffee house in London. Though no Starbucks, his shop was destined to achieve worldwide fame because of the commercial activities of its clientele – shipowners, merchants and venturesome British capitalists. As these parties sipped Edward’s brew, they began to write contracts transferring the risk of a disaster at sea from the owners of ships and their cargo to the capitalists, who wagered that a given voyage would be completed without incident. These capitalists eventually became known as “underwriters at Lloyd’s.”
這個故事要從1688年開始，Edward Lloyd在倫敦開了家咖啡館，雖然當時沒有星巴克，由於他的客戶——船東、商人和英國的風險資本家——的商業活動，他的咖啡館注定會名揚海外。當他們一邊喝著咖啡、一邊開始簽署合同時，船東和貨主將海上的風險轉嫁到風險資本家的身上，而風險資本家則押注海上航行會順利。這些資本家最終成為勞合社的承保人。
Though many people believe Lloyd’s to be an insurance company, that is not the case. It is instead a place where many member-insurers transact business, just as they did centuries ago.
雖然不少人認為勞合社是保險公司，實際上它並不是，就像幾個世紀前一樣，它是許多保險人進行交易的地方。
Over time, the underwriters solicited passive investors to join in syndicates. Additionally, the business broadened beyond marine risks into every imaginable form of insurance, including exotic coverages that spread the fame of Lloyd’s far and wide. The underwriters left the coffee house, found grander quarters and formalized some rules of association. And those persons who passively backed the underwriters became known as “names.”
一段時間後，這群承保人說服被動投資者加入保險互助社，業務也從海事保險擴展到許多領域，境外業務使勞合社的名聲傳播到海外。之後這些承保人離開了咖啡館，找了一個更大的地方，把互助社的條款規範化。這些被動投資人變成後來的承保人。
Eventually, the names came to include many thousands of people from around the world, who joined expecting to pick up some extra change without effort or serious risk. True, prospective names were always solemnly told that they would have unlimited and everlasting liability for the consequences of their syndicate’s underwriting – “down to the last cufflink,” as the quaint description went. But that warning came to be viewed as perfunctory. Three hundred years of retained cufflinks acted as a powerful sedative to the names poised to sign up.
最後，世界各地成千上萬名承保人被吸引過來，他們希望抓住不需太努力或太冒險的機會，獲取額外的回報。儘管潛在的承保人被嚴肅地告之：他們要為互助社的承保承擔永久和無限的責任，甚至可能會賠至最後一個鈕扣(最後一分錢)。但警告被視為例行公事，因為三百年沒有徹底賠光的歷史，對準備簽約的承保人而言似乎是種安慰。
Then came asbestos. When its prospective costs were added to the tidal wave of environmental and product claims that surfaced in the 1980s, Lloyd’s began to implode. Policies written decades earlier – and largely forgotten about – were developing huge losses. No one could intelligently estimate their total, but it was certain to be many tens of billions of dollars. The specter of unending and unlimited losses terrified existing names and scared away prospects. Many names opted for bankruptcy; some even chose suicide.
但在上世紀80年代爆發了石棉索賠事件，有關環境和產品方面的索賠加上潛在的損失蜂擁而來，勞合社亂得像炸開了鍋，許多幾十年前簽下的甚至被遺忘的保單給公司造成了巨額虧損，沒有人能精確地估計結果，但肯定要賠幾百億美元。沒完沒了的損失嚇壞了現有的承保人，也嚇跑了很多潛在的承保人。不少承保人破了產，甚至有些人自殺了。
From these shambles, there came a desperate effort to resuscitate Lloyd’s. In 1996, the powers that be at the institution allotted £11.1 billion to a new company, Equitas, and made it responsible for paying all claims on policies written before 1993. In effect, this plan pooled the misery of the many syndicates in trouble. Of course, the money allotted could prove to be insufficient – and if that happened, the names remained liable for the shortfall.
在此動盪不安的時刻，勞合社仍然在竭盡全力恢復元氣。1996年，勞合社的高層調撥了111億美元設立了Equitas公司，專門負責1993年前的索賠案件，把所有遭遇困難的互助社的不幸集中在一起處理。當然，調撥的資金可能不夠——如果真是這樣，承保人要承擔不足的部分。
But the new plan, by concentrating all of the liabilities in one place, had the advantage of eliminating much of the costly intramural squabbling that went on among syndicates. Moreover, the pooling allowed claims evaluation, negotiation and litigation to be handled more intelligently than had been the case previously. Equitas embraced Ben Franklin’s thinking: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall hang separately.”
由於新計劃將所有承保負債集中在一起，有助於減少勞合社內部的摩擦，同時也使索賠的評估、談判和訴訟進行得比以前更為明智和順利。Equitas再保險公司印證了富蘭克林的思想：“現在我們必須至死絞合在一起，否則注定會被分別絞死。”
From the start, many people predicted Equitas would eventually fail. But as Ajit and I reviewed the facts in the spring of 2006 – 13 years after the last exposed policy had been written and after the payment of £11.3 billion in claims – we concluded that the patient was likely to survive. And so we decided to offer a huge reinsurance policy to Equitas.
一開始，不少人預計Equitas會失敗，但Ajit和我審閱了它到2006年春天的情況，這時它已經賠付了113億美元，最後的保單也生效了13年。我們的結論是，Equitas可能存活下去，所以，我們決定與Equitas簽定巨額再保險合同。
Because plenty of imponderables continue to exist, Berkshire could not provide Equitas, and its 27,972 names, unlimited protection. But we said – and I’m simplifying – that if Equitas would give us $7.12 billion in cash and securities (this is the float I spoke about), we would pay all of its future claims and expenses up to $13.9 billion. That amount was $5.7 billion above what Equitas had recently guessed its ultimate liabilities to be. Thus the names received a huge – and almost certainly sufficient – amount of future protection against unpleasant surprises. Indeed the protection is so large that Equitas plans a cash payment to its thousands of names, an event few of them had ever dreamed possible.
由於太多不可估量的索賠會隨之而來，伯克夏無法向Equitas和它的27,972名承保人提供無限制的保證。但簡而言之，假如Equitas付給我們71.2億美元現金或證券，我們賠付的上限是139億美元，比Equitas最近估計的最終賠付責任高出57億美元。這樣的結果是原來的承保得到了足夠的保護，Equitas計劃將現金歸還給承保人，是這些人連做夢都沒有想到的。
And how will Berkshire fare? That depends on how much “known” claims will end up costing us, how many yet-to-be-presented claims will surface and what they will cost, how soon claim payments will be made and how much we earn on the cash we receive before it must be paid out. Ajit and I think the odds are in our favor. And should we be wrong, Berkshire can handle it.
那麼，波克夏怎麼賺錢呢?這依賴於幾個方面：第一，已知的索賠有多少;第二，有多少未知的索賠將會出現以及要賠付多少，索賠多久才能處理完畢;第三，我們收到的現金，在必須賠付前，我們能賺多少。Ajit和我認為我們的勝算很高，即使錯了，我們也應付得來。
Scott Moser, the CEO of Equitas, summarized the transaction neatly: “Names wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
Equitas的CEO Scott Moser總結道：“承保人早就想晚上安心睡覺了，我想我們剛好買了世界上最好的床墊。”
* * * * * * * * * * *
Warning: It’s time to eat your broccoli – I am now going to talk about accounting matters. I owe this to those Berkshire shareholders who love reading about debits and credits. I hope both of you find this discussion helpful. All others can skip this section; there will be no quiz.
提示：吃零食稍作休息的時間到了，我現在在討論會計問題，對喜歡閱讀資產負債表的股東來說，我欠了他們很多，希望下面討論對他們有所幫助。其他人可以跳過這部分，我們後面沒有考試。
Berkshire has done many retroactive transactions – in both number and amount a multiple of such policies entered into by any other insurer. We are the reinsurer of choice for these coverages because the obligations that are transferred to us – for example, lifetime indemnity and medical payments to be made to injured workers – may not be fully satisfied for 50 years or more. No other company can offer the certainty that Berkshire can, in terms of guaranteeing the full and fair settlement of these obligations. This fact is important to the original insurer, policyholders and regulators.
波克夏簽署了許多可追溯保單，數量和金額是其他保險公司的幾倍，這些責任涵蓋受傷工人的終身理賠和醫療賠償，要進行這些理賠，可能50年時間都不夠，我們是承擔這些理賠責任的首選再保險公司，其他公司都不能像我們這樣確保公正、全額的給予賠付。這些事實對第一承保人、投保人和監管機構是很重要的。
The accounting procedure for retroactive transactions is neither well known nor intuitive. The best way for shareholders to understand it, therefore, is for us to simply lay out the debits and credits. Charlie and I would like to see this done more often. We sometimes encounter accounting footnotes about important transactions that leave us baffled, and we go away suspicious that the reporting company wished it that way. (For example, try comprehending transactions “described” in the old 10-Ks of Enron, even after you know how the movie ended.)
然而，追溯保險的會計原理既不是眾人皆知的，也不是簡單易懂的。為了讓股東們明白，最好的方法是將它列為資產負債表，查理和我很喜歡閱讀會計報表，會計報表的註腳有時會讓我們難以理解，我們懷疑那些公司根本就沒打算讓你讀懂(例如：即使已經知道安然公司的結果，也難以理解老式的10-KS表格里安然公司對交易的描述)。
So let us summarize our accounting for the Equitas transaction. The major debits will be to Cash and Investments, Reinsurance Recoverable, and Deferred Charges for Reinsurance Assumed (“DCRA”). The major credit will be to Reserve for Losses and Loss Adjustment Expense. No profit or loss will be recorded at the inception of the transaction, but underwriting losses will thereafter be incurred annually as the DCRA asset is amortized downward. The amount of the annual amortization charge will be primarily determined by how our end-of-the-year estimates as to the timing and amount of future loss payments compare to the estimates made at the beginning of the year. Eventually, when the last claim has been paid, the DCRA account will be reduced to zero. That day is 50 years or more away.
讓我們來總結一下Equitas交易中的會計處理，主要的借方科目是現金及投資、可轉回再保險責任、承保的再保險遞延支出(DCRA)，主要的貸方科目是損失準備及損失調整費用。在交易設立時是不會有盈利或損失產生，但隨著DCRA的攤銷，每年都會產生承保損失，攤銷的金額大小是由我們在年終時對未來損失發生的時間和金額的估計數與年初時的同樣估計數相比較來決定的。最終，當最後一筆賠付完成，DCRA賬戶金額就變成零。這一天要到50多年以後。
What’s important to remember is that retroactive insurance contracts always produce underwriting losses for us. Whether these losses are worth experiencing depends on whether the cash we have received produces investment income that exceeds the losses. Recently our DCRA charges have annually delivered $300 million or so of underwriting losses, which have been more than offset by the income we have realized through use of the cash we received as a premium. Absent new retroactive contracts, the amount of the annual charge would normally decline over time. After the Equitas transaction, however, the annual DCRA cost will initially increase to about $450 million a year. This means that our other insurance operations must generate at least that much underwriting gain for our overall float to be cost-free. That amount is quite a hurdle but one that I believe we will clear in many, if not most, years.
最重要的是要記住，追溯保險合同總是會給我們帶來承保損失，值不值得承擔這些損失，取決於我們收到的現金能否產生超過這些損失的投資收益。最近我們DCRA的攤銷費用每年大約帶來3億美元左右的承保損失，這個數目超過了我們運用收到的保費所能產生的收益。在沒有新的追溯承保合同的情況下，每年攤銷的費用會隨著時間的流逝不斷降低，但經過Equitas的交易後，每年的DCRA攤銷會增加到4、5億美元。這就意味著我們其他的保險業務必須至少產生這個數目的承包利潤，才能保證我們總體的保險浮存資金是沒有成本的。這個數量確實是個不小的障礙，但這個障礙在很多年份裡，如果不能說是大多數年份裡是可以克服的。
Aren’t you glad that I promised you there would be no quiz?
你們現在是不是很高興我答應過你們沒有小測驗啊?
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造、服務及零售
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏這部分的業務涵蓋廣泛。我們先來看看這一塊業務的一個簡要的資產負載和盈利情況。
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $1,543 | Notes payable | $1,468 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 3,793 | Other current liabilities | 6,635 | |||||
| Inventory | 5,257 | Total current liabilities | 8,103 | |||||
| Other current assets | 363 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 10,956 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 13,314 | Deferred taxes | 540 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 8,934 | Term debt and other liabilities | 3,104 | |||||
| Other assets | 1,168 | Equity | 22,715 | |||||
| $34,372 | $34,372 | |||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | |||||
| Revenues | $52,660 | $46,896 | $44,142 | ||||
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of $823 in 2006,$699 in 2005 and $676 in 2004) | |||||||
| 49002 | 44190 | 41,604 | |||||
| Interest expense (net) | 132 | 83 | 57 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 3526* | 2623* | 2,481* | ||||
| Income taxes | 1395 | 977 | 941 | ||||
| Net income | 2131 | 1646 | $1,540 | ||||
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
*不包括購買法(一種企業購併時的賬務處理辦法)會計調整。
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 25% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.8%.
這一組業務涵蓋廣泛，從賣棒棒糖到活動房屋，去年平均有形淨資產取得了令人滿意的25%的回報。值得注意的是，這個回報是只用了很小的財務槓桿取得的。很顯然，我們擁有了一些出色的生意。不過，這些生意都是我們以賬面淨資產的很大的溢價買回來的，這一點反映在我們資產負債表的商譽一項中。按持有成本算，這也使我們的回報降到了10.8%。
Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
下面是這一組公司中一些值得注意的事情。
Bob Shaw, a remarkable entrepreneur who from a standing start built Shaw Industries into the country’s largest carpet producer, elected last year, at age 75, to retire. To succeed him, Bob recommended Vance Bell, a 31-year veteran at Shaw, and Bob, as usual, made the right call. Weakness in housing has caused the carpet business to slow. Shaw, however, remains a powerhouse and a major contributor to Berkshire’s earnings.
Bob Shaw是一位傑出的企業家，他草創了Shaw Industries，並把它變成全國最大的地毯製造商。Bob Shaw去年75歲了，決定退休。他推薦Vance Bell，一個31歲的公司老員工，來接替他。像以往一樣，Bob又做了一個正確的決定。房屋市場的低迷使得地毯行業放緩，但Show仍是波克夏的掙錢機器及主要的利潤來源。
MiTek, a manufacturer of connectors for roof trusses at the time we purchased it in 2001, is developing into a mini-conglomerate. At the rate it is growing, in fact, “mini” may soon be inappropriate. In purchasing MiTek for $420 million, we lent the company $200 million at 9% and bought $198 million of stock, priced at $10,000 per share. Additionally, 55 employees bought 2,200 shares for $22 million. Each employee paid exactly the same price that we did, in most cases borrowing money to do so.
MiTek在2001年我們收購時是一個屋頂槽連接裝置的生產商，現在已經發展成為一個小型的綜合企業了。事實上，按照它的發展速度，再說它是“小型”很快就會不合適了。我們這項收購花了4.2億，以9%利息借給公司2個億，並買了1.98億的公司股票，價格是1萬美元一股，公司55個員工買了2200股，共花了2200萬，和我們購買的價格是一樣的，大部分都是藉錢買的。
And are they ever glad they did! Five years later, MiTek’s sales have tripled and the stock is valued at $71,699 per share. Despite its making 14 acquisitions, at a cost of $291 million, MiTek has paid off its debt to Berkshire and holds $35 million of cash. We celebrated the fifth anniversary of our purchase with a party in July. I told the group that it would be embarrassing if MiTek’s stock price soared beyond that of Berkshire “A” shares. Don’t be surprised, however, if that happens (though Charlie and I will try to make our shares a moving target).
而且他們都樂於這麼做了，五年後，MiTek的銷售收入增長了三倍，股票價格已經達到了71699一股，儘管過去MiTek花了2.91億共做了14次的收購，但它還是付清了向波克夏的借款，並手持3500萬的現金，我們在收購五週年的時候舉行了一個PARTY,我告訴大家，如果MiTek的股價哪一天超過了波克夏A股的價格，那真讓人感到慚愧。如果有一天是這樣了，大家也別覺得驚訝(儘管我和查理會盡力使波克夏的股價成為一個變動的目標)
Not all of our businesses are destined to increase profits. When an industry’s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline. Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance. (As a wise friend told me long ago, “If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.”) And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry, a trend that has caused the profits of our Buffalo News to decline. The skid will almost certainly continue.
並不是我們所有的業務都注定會盈利增長的，當一個行業的內在盈利能力惡化時，傑出的管理層能延緩下跌的速度，但最終惡化的基本因素會超過管理者的傑出能力。(就像一個聰明的朋友很早就告訴過我：如果你想成為一個有聲望的商人，一定要進入到一個好的行業。)現在報紙行業的狀況正在不斷地惡化，這已經導致了《水牛城新聞》的利潤下降了，而且這種下降的趨勢還肯定會繼續下去。
When Charlie and I were young, the newspaper business was as easy a way to make huge returns as existed in America. As one not-too-bright publisher famously said, “I owe my fortune to two great American institutions: monopoly and nepotism.” No paper in a one-paper city, however bad the product or however inept the management, could avoid gushing profits.
在我和查理年輕的時候,報紙是當時美國容易賺大錢的生意之一。就像當時一個不是很聰明的出版商說的著名的話:我的財富歸功於美國的兩項製度,壟斷和家族繼承。在一個只有一份報紙的城市,不管辦的多糟,也不管管理層多麼笨,賺錢擋都擋不住。
The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century, newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.
這個行業有著讓人吃驚的回報是很容易解釋的。在20世紀的大部分時間裡,報紙是美國公眾主要的信息來源。不管是體育、財經還是政治方面,報紙佔據了絕對優勢。同樣重要的是,報紙還是你找工作或者了解超市日用品價格的最方便的辦法。
The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest.
大部分的家庭都覺得每天都需要一份報紙,但可理解的是,他們都不原意花錢買兩份報紙。廣告商喜歡發行量大的報紙,讀者傾向於要更多廣告和新聞的報紙。發行量決定了報紙行業的法則:適者生存。
Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually – and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly – and often in a disapproving way – reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm . . .)
所以,在一個大城市裡如果有兩家甚至更多的報紙時(一個世紀以前這是普遍的現象),那個能在競爭中脫穎而出的往往是最後唯一的贏家。當競爭消失後,報紙在發行和廣告兩個方面的定價能力都沒有製約了。一般情況下,廣告商和讀者每年都要面臨提價,利潤也就滾滾而來了。對報紙的所有者來說,這簡直就是賺錢的天堂。(有趣的是報紙雖然經常以一種並不被認同的方式報導比如汽車或鋼鐵行業的盈利,但他們卻從來沒有讓讀者明白到報紙本身是非常賺錢的。嘿嘿…)
As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was changing, writing that “the media businesses . . . will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties, moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses.
早在1991年致股東的信中,我就指出,這種報紙世外桃源般的狀況正在改變,我寫到“媒體行業….會遠遠不如我、整個行業或出資人等幾年前所想的那樣”。很多出版商對我當時及之後的幾次警告很不高興。報紙資產在繼續作為不會受到破壞的賺錢機器而銷售。事實上,很多聰明的報紙管理人員,雖然每天在編輯或分析著世界上發生的事情,但對他們眼皮底下發生的事情卻視而不見或漠不關心。
Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.
現在呢,幾乎所有的報商都意識到他們在爭奪眼球的戰鬥中不斷地敗下陣來。簡單說吧,如果有線電視、衛星廣播以及互聯網在報紙之前就產生了的話,我們所了解的報紙行業也許根本不會存在。
In Berkshire’s world, Stan Lipsey does a terrific job running the Buffalo News, and I am enormously proud of its editor, Margaret Sullivan. The News’ penetration of its market is the highest among that of this country’s large newspapers. We also do better financially than most metropolitan newspapers, even though Buffalo’s population and business trends are not good. Nevertheless, this operation faces unrelenting pressures that will cause profit margins to slide.
在波克夏,Stan Lipsey在管理《水牛城新聞》方面做了卓越的工作,我對主編Margart Sullivan 也深感自豪。《新聞》報的市場滲透率也在全國的大報紙中最好。我們的財務狀況比各大都市報紙要好,儘管水牛城的人口和經濟走向並不好。雖然這樣,我們(報業)的經營還是面臨著無情的壓力,利潤率也會下滑。
True, we have the leading online news operation in Buffalo, and it will continue to attract more viewers and ads. However, the economic potential of a newspaper internet site – given the many alternative sources of information and entertainment that are free and only a click away – is at best a small fraction of that existing in the past for a print newspaper facing no competition.
的確,我們在水牛城有最好的在線新聞業務,會不斷吸引瀏覽和廣告。但是由於存在眾多免費的信息和娛樂來源,只需點擊一下而已,這種報紙網站的盈利潛力和過去那種沒有競爭的報紙相比,充其量只是其一小部分而已。
For a local resident, ownership of a city’s paper, like ownership of a sports team, still produces instant prominence. With it typically comes power and influence. These are ruboffs that appeal to many people with money. Beyond that, civic-minded, wealthy individuals may feel that local ownership will serve their community well. That’s why Peter Kiewit bought the Omaha paper more than 40 years ago.
對於一個當地人來說,擁有一個城市的報紙,就像擁有一個運動隊一樣能讓你馬上出名。隨之而來的就是權力和影響力。這對有錢人來說極具吸引力。此外,熱心公益的、富有的人會覺得又本地人擁有(報紙)能更好的服務社區。那就是為什麼Peter Kiewit在40 多年前買下奧馬哈報的原因。
We are likely therefore to see non-economic individual buyers of newspapers emerge, just as we have seen such buyers acquire major sports franchises. Aspiring press lords should be careful, however: There’s no rule that says a newspaper’s revenues can’t fall below its expenses and that losses can’t mushroom. Fixed costs are high in the newspaper business, and that’s bad news when unit volume heads south. As the importance of newspapers diminishes, moreover, the “psychic” value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.
我們可能會看到一些不是很追求盈利的人來買報紙,就像我們已經看到的買運動隊的人一樣。但這些熱心的媒體大亨們要小心了,沒有哪條鐵律說報紙的收入一定不會降到其費用以下,虧損不會冒出來。報紙經營的固定費用是很高的,一旦單位發行量下降可就糟了。當報紙的重要性不斷下降,擁有一家報紙帶來的“心理”價值也會逐漸消退,而擁有一個運動隊的“心理”價值還有一席之地。
Unless we face an irreversible cash drain, we will stick with the News, just as we’ve said that we would. (Read economic principle 11, on page 76.) Charlie and I love newspapers – we each read five a day – and believe that a free and energetic press is a key ingredient for maintaining a great democracy. We hope that some combination of print and online will ward off economic doomsday for newspapers, and we will work hard in Buffalo to develop a sustainable business model. I think we will be successful. But the days of lush profits from our newspaper are over.
除非我們面臨現金流的枯竭而又無法逆轉,我們會一直堅持持有《新聞報》,就像以前我們曾說過的那樣。查理和我都很喜歡報紙,我們每人每天都要讀五份報紙,我們也相信一個自由、活躍的出版物是維持一個偉大民主制度的重要組成部分。我們希望印刷和在線方式結合起來能阻止報紙無法賺錢的宿命,我們也會努力經營以圖實現一個可以持續經營下去的模式。我想我們會成功的。但那種經營報紙就可賺取大把錢的日子已經一去不復返了。
A much improved situation is emerging at NetJets, which sells and manages fractionally-owned aircraft. This company has never had a problem growing: Revenues from flight operations have increased 596% since our purchase in 1998. But profits had been erratic.
NetJets,銷售和管理被分散持有的飛機,其經營狀況已經得到了改善。這個公司不存在增長的問題,飛行運營收入從1998年公司創立以來增長了598%,但盈利卻不穩定。
Our move to Europe, which began in 1996, was particularly expensive. After five years of operation there, we had acquired only 80 customers. And by mid-year 2006 our cumulative pretax loss had risen to $212 million. But European demand has now exploded, with a net of 589 customers having been added in 2005-2006. Under Mark Booth’s brilliant leadership, NetJets is now operating profitably in Europe, and we expect the positive trend to continue.
我們在歐洲始於1996年的運營尤其昂貴,運作5年後才取得了80個客戶。到2006年中期,我們錄得2.12億的稅前損失。但現在歐洲的需求出現爆發性的增長,2005到2006年,我們就有了589個客戶。在Mark Booth的卓越領導下,NetJets現在在歐洲已經盈利,我們期望這個好的趨勢能繼續下去。
Our U.S. operation also had a good year in 2006, which led to worldwide pre-tax earnings of $143 million at NetJets last year. We made this profit even though we suffered a loss of $19 million in the first quarter.
NetJets去年在美國的業務也不錯,導致全球範圍內的稅前盈利達到1.43億,即使在去年一季度的時候我們還虧損1900萬。
Credit Rich Santulli, along with Mark, for this turnaround. Rich, like many of our managers, has no financial need to work. But you’d never know it. He’s absolutely tireless – monitoring operations, making sales, and traveling the globe to constantly widen the already-enormous lead that NetJets enjoys over its competitors. Today, the value of the fleet we manage is far greater than that managed by our three largest competitors combined.
這個業績的取得要歸功於Rich Stantulli和Mark。就像我們波克夏的很多管理人員一樣,Rich在財務上是不需要工作的,但你可不知道,他可是從來都不知道累的——監督公司的運營，積極地銷售，不停的在全世界到處跑,不斷地將我們與競爭對手比已經有的很大的優勢繼續擴大。今天我們管理的這個機隊的價值已經超過了我們主要的三個競爭對手之和。
There’s a reason NetJets is the runaway leader: It offers the ultimate in safety and service. At Berkshire, and at a number of our subsidiaries, NetJets aircraft are an indispensable business tool. I also have a contract for personal use with NetJets and so do members of my family and most Berkshire directors. (None of us, I should add, gets a discount.) Once you’ve flown NetJets, returning to commercial flights is like going back to holding hands.
NetJets是競爭中的領先者，原因之一就是它提供最安全的飛行和最好的服務。在波克夏和一些下屬企業,NetJets的飛機是不可缺少的工具。我自己和我的家人及波克夏的大部分董事都和NetJets簽有私人使用飛行服務的合同(我要指出,我們任何一個人都沒有享有折扣)。一旦你用過了NetJets的飛行服務,再回到普通的商業飛行,就好像回到被人捆著的狀態。
Regulated Utility Business
受監管的公用事業
Berkshire has an 86.6% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
波克夏在MidAmerican Energy Holdings有86.6%的權益(完全攤薄),MidAmerican Energy Holdings在許多公用事業領域有投資。其中最大的是:1,約克郡電力和北方電力,在英國是第三大的電力供應商,有370萬客戶; 2,中美洲能源,主要在俄亥俄州營運,有70.6萬客戶;3,太平洋電力和Rocky Mountain電力,主要在西部6個州,有170萬客戶;4,Kern River and Northern天然氣管道公司,輸送了美國消費市場8%的天然氣。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Six years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
和我們共同擁有MidAmerican 的合作夥伴是Walter Scott,還有MidAmerican 的兩個傑出的管理層,Dave Sokol和Greg Abel。每一方擁有多少投票權並不重要,我們只在大家一致認為管理者非常明智的時候才會做重大決策。六年來和Dave,Greg和Walter一起工作,進一步強化了我最開始的想法,他們是波克夏難得的合作夥伴。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 20,300 agents. Despite HomeServices’ purchase of two operations last year, the company’s overall volume fell 9% to $58 billion, and profits fell 50%.
有點顯得不和諧的是,MidAmerican還持有全美第二大的不動產經紀公司,美國家庭服務公司。這個公司有20個地方的品牌和20300個房產經紀。儘管去年又買入了兩個公司,公司的全年營業額下降了19%,達到580億,利潤下降了50%。
The slowdown in residential real estate activity stems in part from the weakened lending practices of recent years. The “optional” contracts and “teaser” rates that have been popular have allowed borrowers to make payments in the early years of their mortgages that fall far short of covering normal interest costs. Naturally, there are few defaults when virtually nothing is required of a borrower. As a cynic has said, “A rolling loan gathers no loss.” But payments not made add to principal, and borrowers who can’t afford normal monthly payments early on are hit later with above-normal monthly obligations. This is the Scarlett O’Hara scenario: “I’ll think about that tomorrow.” For many home owners, “tomorrow” has now arrived. Consequently there is a huge overhang of offerings in several of HomeServices’ markets.
住宅房地產市場的冷卻部分原因是因為最近幾年借貸活動的減少。曾經流行的帶“選擇權”的合約及開玩笑般的利率使借款人在按揭的頭幾年付的款還遠遠不能支付正常的利息。像這樣對借款人幾乎沒什麼壓力,自然也就很少有違約的事情發生。就像一句譏諷的話，“循環信貸是不會導致損失的”(還不起的利息又記為新的本金,譯註)但這樣的話就會加大按揭的本金部分,那些早期不能承擔正常月供的借款人,就會被後來的超過正常月供的債務壓垮。這就是Scarlett O'Hara 描述過的場景,“我明天再考慮這個問題吧”,對很多買房人來說,明天終於來了。其結果就是在家庭服務公司所在的幾個市場,到處都充斥著要賣出的房子。
Nevertheless, we will be seeking to purchase additional brokerage operations. A decade from now, HomeServices will almost certainly be much larger.
不管怎麼樣,我們會不斷地繼續買入經紀中介業務,十幾年後,家庭服務公司會比現在大得多。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
這裡是一些MidAmerican 的關鍵的經營數字
| Earnings (in $ millions) | |||||
| 2006 | 2005 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $338 | $308 | |||
| Iowa utility | 348 | 288 | |||
| Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006) | 356 | N/A | |||
| Pipelines | 376 | 309 | |||
| Home Services | 74 | 148 | |||
| Other (Net) | 226 | 115 | |||
| Earnings before corporate interest and tax | 1,718 | 1,168 | |||
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (261) | (200) | |||
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt . | (134) | (157) | |||
| Income Tax | (407) | (248) | |||
| Net Earnings | $916 | $563 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire* | $885 | $523 | |||
| Debt Owed to Others | 16,946 | 10,296 | |||
| Debt Owed to Berkshire | 1,055 | 1,289 | |||
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $87 in 2006 and $102 in 2005.
* 包括了波克夏賺得利息收入(扣除了相關的所得稅),2005 年時$102, 06 年是$87
Finance and Financial Products
金融行業及金融產品
You will be happy to hear – and I’m even happier – that this will be my last discussion of the losses at Gen Re’s derivative operation. When we started to wind this business down early in 2002, we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. Now we have 197. Our cumulative pre-tax loss from this operation totals $409 million, but only $5 million occurred in 2006. Charlie says that if we had properly classified the $409 million on our 2001 balance sheet, it would have been labeled “Good Until Reached For.” In any event, a Shakespearean thought – slightly modified – seems appropriate for the tombstone of this derivative business: “All’s well that ends.”
我最後一次討論有關Gen Re 的衍生品業務虧損,你們一定很高興聽到我這麼說,我就更高興了。我們2002年開始清理這項業務時,有23218個合約在手,現在只剩下197個了。我們這項業務的累積稅前虧損達到可4.09億,不過在2006年只有500萬。查理說如果我們把這4.09億在我們2001年的負債表上重新歸類的話,應該標註為“只要不處理就是好的”。不管什麼情況下,莎士比亞的名句——稍微改動了一點,“好的都已經結束了”作為衍生品行業的墓碑是很合適的。
We’ve also wound up our investment in Value Capital. So earnings or losses from these two lines of business are making their final appearance in the table that annually appears in this section.
還清理了我們在價值資本公司的投資。因此這兩項業務的盈虧是最後一次出現在這裡了。
Clayton Homes remains an anomaly in the manufactured-housing industry, which last year recorded its lowest unit sales since 1962. Indeed, the industry’s volume last year was only about one-third that of 1999. Outside of Clayton, I doubt if the industry, overall, made any money in 2006.
Clayton Homes仍然是移動房屋領域的特例,它去年錄得1962年來的最低銷售記錄.的確整個行業去年的銷售只有99 年的三分之一. 我懷疑整個行業06 年總體來說是不是能盈利。
Yet Clayton earned $513 million pre-tax and paid Berkshire an additional $86 million as a fee for our obtaining the funds to finance Clayton’s $10 billion portfolio of installment receivables. Berkshire’s financial strength has clearly been of huge help to Clayton. But the driving force behind the company’s success is Kevin Clayton. Kevin knows the business forward and backward, is a rational decision-maker and a joy to work with. Because of acquisitions, Clayton now employs 14,787 people, compared to 6,661 at the time of our purchase.
但Clayton仍然實現了5.13億的稅前盈利,而且由於他們從波克夏獲得資金為他們10個億的分期付款導致的應收帳款提供融資,還支付了8600萬的費用給波克夏。波克夏的財政優勢對Clayton顯然幫助很大。但公司成功的決定因素是Kevin Clayton,公司現在已經僱傭了14787個員工,我們在買下公司時只有6661個員工。
We have two leasing operations: CORT (furniture), run by Paul Arnold, and XTRA (truck trailers), run by Bill Franz. CORT’s earnings improved significantly last year, and XTRA’s remained at the high level attained in 2005. We continue to look for tuck-in acquisitions to be run by Paul or Bill, and also are open to ideas for new leasing opportunities.
我們有兩項租賃業務,CORT(家具租賃),由Paul Arnold 經營,XTRA(貨車拖頭租賃),由Bill Franz 經營。CORT 的盈利去年大幅改善了,XTRA 的盈利也保持在05 年的高水平。我們繼續尋找大手筆的收購,交給Paul 和Bill 來經營。我們也歡迎有新的租賃業務推薦給我們。
Here’s a breakdown of earnings in this sector:
金融行業及金融產品盈利明細
| (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Pre-Tax Earnings | Interest-bearing Liabilities | |||||||
| 2005 | 2005 | 2006 | 2005 | |||||
| Trading – Ordinary Income | $274 | $200 | $600 | $1,061 | ||||
| Gen Re Securities | (5) | (104) | 1,204* | 2617* | ||||
| Life and annuity operation | 29 | 11 | 2,459 | 2,461 | ||||
| Value Capital | 6 | (33) | N.A. | N.A. | ||||
| Leasing operations | 182 | 173 | 261 | 370 | ||||
| Manufactured housing finance (Clayton) | 513 | 416 | 10,498 | 9,299 | ||||
| Other | 158 | 159 | N.A. | N.A. | ||||
| Income before capital gains | 1,157 | 822 | ||||||
| Trading – Capital Gains | 938 | (234) | ||||||
| Total | $2,095 | $588 | ||||||
*包括所有負債
Investments
投資
We show below our common stock investments. With two exceptions, those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2006 are itemized. We don’t itemize the two securities referred to, which have a market value of $1.9 billion, because we continue to buy them. I could, of course, tell you their names. But then I would have to kill you.
下面是我們股市投資的明細。那些在2006年底市值超過7億的都列出來了,除了兩個例外。我們沒有列出兩個證券的名稱,這兩個證券我們持有的市值為19億,因為我們不斷地在買入。當然我也可以告訴你它們的名字,但然後我就要殺你滅口。
| 12/31/06 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 12.6 | $1,287 | $9,198 | ||
| 36,417,400 | Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. | 4.7 | 1,761 | 1,792 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 9,650 | ||
| 17,938,100 | Conoco Phillips | 1.1 | 1,066 | 1,291 | ||
| 21,334,900 | Johnson & Johnson | 0.7 | 1,250 | 1,409 | ||
| 6,708,760 | M&T Bank Corporation | 6.1 | 103 | 820 | ||
| 48,000,000 | Moodyís Corporation | 17.2 | 499 | 3,315 | ||
| 2,338,961,000 | PetroChina“H” shares (or equivalents) | 1.3 | 488 | 3,313 | ||
| 3,486,006 | POSCO | 4 | 572 | 1,158 | ||
| 100,000,000 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 3.2 | 940 | 6,427 | ||
| 229,707,000 | Tesco | 2.9 | 1,340 | 1,820 | ||
| 31,033,800 | US Bancorp | 1.8 | 969 | 1,123 | ||
| 17,072,192 | USG Corp | 19 | 536 | 936 | ||
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 0.5 | 942 | 921 | ||
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | 18 | 11 | 1,288 | ||
| 218,169,300 | Wells Fargo & Company | 6.5 | 3,697 | 7,758 | ||
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance | 16 | 369 | 999 | ||
| Others | 5,866 | 8,315 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks | $22,995 | $61,533 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
* 這是我們實際的購買成本和納稅基準,會計準則的成本會與之在一些方面有差異,那是因為估值的增值和減值的要求造成的?
We are delighted by the 2006 business performance of virtually all of our investees. Last year, we told you that our expectation was that these companies, in aggregate, would increase their earnings by 6% to 8% annually, a rate that would double their earnings every ten years or so. In 2006 American Express,Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo, our largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 18%, 9%, 8% and 11%. These are stellar results, and we thank their CEOs.
我們對06 年我們所投資股票的公司業績表現非常高興。去年,我曾說過我們的期望是這些公司總體的業績能年均增長6%-8%,這個速度能使他們的業績10年翻一倍。在06年,美國運通、可口可樂、寶潔和富國銀行,這些是我們最大的持股,他們的盈利分別增長了18%、9%、8%、11%。這是很傑出的結果,讓我們謝謝這些公司的CEO們。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
We’ve come close to eliminating our direct foreign-exchange position, from which we realized about $186 million in pre-tax profits in 2006 (earnings that were included in the Finance and Financial Products table shown earlier). That brought our total gain since inception of this position in 2002 to $2.2 billion. Here’s a breakdown by currency:
我們已經接近清除我們所有的外匯直接持倉。在2006年這一項大概實現了1.86億的稅前利潤。(前面的金融及金融產品利潤表裡已經包含了這一部分)這使得我們2002 年以來我們在持有外匯這一項的收益達到22 億,下面是各個幣種的明細。
| Total Gain (Loss) in Millions | ||||||
| Australian dollar $247.1 | Mexican peso $106.1 | |||||
| British pound 287.2 | New Zealand dollar 102.6 | |||||
| Canadian dollar 398.3 | Singapore dollar (2.6) | |||||
| Chinese yuan (12.7) | South Korean won 261.3 | |||||
| Euro 839.2 | Swiss franc 9.6 | |||||
| Hong Kong dollar (2.5) | Taiwan dollar (45.3) | |||||
| Japanese yen 1.9 | Miscellaneous options 22.9 | |||||
We’ve made large indirect currency profits as well, though I’ve never tallied the precise amount. For example, in 2002-2003 we spent about $82 million buying – of all things – Enron bonds, some of which were denominated in Euros. Already we’ve received distributions of $179 million from these bonds, and our remaining stake is worth $173 million. That means our overall gain is $270 million, part of which came from the appreciation of the Euro that took place after our bond purchase.
我們還有很大的非直接的外匯收益,當然我從沒有給出過準確的數字。例如我們02 至03年花了8200 萬買了安然公司的債券,部分債券是以歐元標價的?我們已經從這些債券分得了1.79 億的收益,餘下的權益還值1.73 億。也就是說我們總的獲益是2.7 億,部分是來自我們購買後歐元的升值。
When we first began making foreign exchange purchases, interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and most foreign countries favored a direct currency position. But that spread turned negative in 2005. We therefore looked for other ways to gain foreign-currency exposure, such as the ownership of foreign equities or of U.S. stocks with major earnings abroad. The currency factor, we should emphasize, is not dominant in our selection of equities, but is merely one of many considerations.
我們剛開始買外匯的時候,美元和其他外彙的利息差是有利於直接持有外彙的。但在2005 年,這個利息差變成負的了。因此我們要尋找其他方式來持有外匯資產,比如購買外國的股票或者那些有海外利潤的美國股票。我要強調的是,匯率因素不是我們選擇股票的主要因素,只是其中一個考慮的因素。
As our U.S. trade problems worsen, the probability that the dollar will weaken over time continues to be high. I fervently believe in real trade – the more the better for both us and the world. We had about $1.44 trillion of this honest-to-God trade in 2006. But the U.S. also had $.76 trillion of pseudo-trade last year – imports for which we exchanged no goods or services. (Ponder, for a moment, how commentators would describe the situation if our imports were $.76 trillion – a full 6% of GDP – and we had no exports.) Making these purchases that weren’t reciprocated by sales, the U.S. necessarily transferred ownership of its assets or IOUs to the rest of the world. Like a very wealthy but self-indulgent family, we peeled off a bit of what we owned in order to consume more than we produced.
隨著美國的貿易收支惡化,美元隨著時間的推移逐漸貶值的可能性很高。我絕對相信越多的真實貿易對我們和全世界度有好處。在06 年我們有1.44 萬億的貿易額，希望這個數據是真實的。但美國也有0.76 萬億的非貿易額,也就是說我們進口了0.76 萬億的東西,卻沒有提供相應的物品或服務。(好好想一會,評論家們會怎樣認為我們進口了0.76 萬億的東西——佔了美國GDP 的6%,而又沒有相應的出口)在買這些東西時沒有對應的賣出,意味著美國人要把他們持有的財產轉給、或者就是欠著整個世界。就像一個富有的而又揮霍的家庭,一點點變賣資產來消費自己並沒有創造的財富。
The U.S. can do a lot of this because we are an extraordinarily rich country that has behaved responsibly in the past. The world is therefore willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.
美國可以做很多事(來變賣資產),因為我們非常富有,過去也非常講信譽。全世界都願意接受我們的債券,股票,還有生意。我們還有大把的存貨可以用。
These transfers will have consequences, however. Already the prediction I made last year about one fall-out from our spending binge has come true: The “investment income” account of our country – positive in every previous year since 1915 – turned negative in 2006. Foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card. And, like everyone who gets in hock, the U.S. will now experience “reverse compounding” as we pay ever-increasing amounts of interest on interest.
然而,這種換手是要承擔後果的。我去年曾就我們這種亂花錢預言了一個後果,現在變成了現實:那就是我們國家的投資性帳戶在1915 年以來都是正的,06 年已經變成了負的。外國人在美國的投資收入要超過美國人在海外的投資收入。實際就像我們花完了銀行帳戶上的錢,現在開始用信用卡了。現在我們美國就像任何一個借債消費的人一樣,正在經歷一種不斷增長的為利息而付利息的反向的複利效應。
I want to emphasize that even though our course is unwise, Americans will live better ten or twenty years from now than they do today. Per-capita wealth will increase. But our citizens will also be forced every year to ship a significant portion of their current production abroad merely to service the cost of our huge debtor position. It won’t be pleasant to work part of each day to pay for the over-consumption of your ancestors. I believe that at some point in the future U.S. workers and voters will find this annual “tribute” so onerous that there will be a severe political backlash. How that will play out in markets is impossible to predict – but to expect a “soft landing” seems like wishful thinking.
我想強調一點,儘管我們這樣做是不明智的,但美國人在未來的十到二十年裡還是會比現在境況要好。人均財富還是會增加。但我們的國民要被逼每年付出所創造財富的很大部分來償付債務的費用。每天工作一段時間只是為了償付我們上一輩人的過度消費總不是一件開心的事。我相信未來的某一天,勞動者和選民們會發現這種額外的支付是如此的繁重,有可能會引起政治上的爭執。這些會怎麼影響市場是無法預測的,但期望軟著陸恐怕是一廂情願。
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I should mention that all of the direct currency profits we have realized have come from forward contracts, which are derivatives, and that we have entered into other types of derivatives contracts as well. That may seem odd, since you know of our expensive experience in unwinding the derivatives book at Gen Re and also have heard me talk of the systemic problems that could result from the enormous growth in the use of derivatives. Why, you may wonder, are we fooling around with such potentially toxic material?
我應該提到,我們所有的直接的外匯收益都是通過期權合同,也就是衍生品實現的,而且我們還持有其他類型的衍生品合同。這好像很奇怪,大家都知道我們清理Gen Re 衍生品遭受的慘重損失,也聽到過我講過的大量使用衍生品可能導致的系統性風險。你會奇怪我們幹嘛還在這些“毒藥”上折騰呢。
The answer is that derivatives, just like stocks and bonds, are sometimes wildly mispriced. For many years, accordingly, we have selectively written derivative contracts – few in number but sometimes for large dollar amounts. We currently have 62 contracts outstanding. I manage them personally, and they are free of counterparty credit risk. So far, these derivative contracts have worked out well for us, producing pre-tax profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (above and beyond the gains I’ve itemized from forward foreign-exchange contracts). Though we will experience losses from time to time, we are likely to continue to earn – overall – significant profits from mispriced derivatives.
答案是,衍生品就像股票或債券一樣也會被很離譜的錯誤的定價了。多年來,我們根據這些(錯誤的定價)有選擇的接受一些衍生品合同,次數不多,但金額有時很大。我們現在還有62個這樣的合約在手,我自己親自處理這些合同。而且這些合約對手不存在信用風險。到目前為止,這些衍生品合同運轉的不錯,創造了數億的稅前利潤(超過了我上面列出的外匯期權合約產生的利潤)。當然我們有時候也會遭受損失,但我們還會繼續做下去,從那些錯誤定價的衍生品合約中賺取豐厚的利潤。
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I have told you that Berkshire has three outstanding candidates to replace me as CEO and that the Board knows exactly who should take over if I should die tonight. Each of the three is much younger than I. The directors believe it’s important that my successor have the prospect of a long tenure.
我告訴過你們波克夏有三位候選人可以接替我CEO 的位置,董事會也確切的知道如果我今晚過世由誰來接替我。這三個人每個都比我年輕,董事們知道我的繼任者有個比較長的任期的重要性。
Frankly, we are not as well-prepared on the investment side of our business. There’s a history here: At one time, Charlie was my potential replacement for investing, and more recently Lou Simpson has filled that slot. Lou is a top-notch investor with an outstanding long-term record of managing GEICO’s equity portfolio. But he is only six years younger than I. If I were to die soon, he would fill in magnificently for a short period. For the long-term, though, we need a different answer.
坦率的說,我們在管理投資事務的人選上準備的還不充分。這裡有歷史的原因,曾經有一段時間,查理是我投資事務的備選接替者,後來,Lou Simpson 取代了查理的位子。Lou 是一位頂尖的投資者,其管理的GEICO 公司的股權組合長期以來有傑出的回報。但他只比我年輕6歲,如果我不久過世,他會接替我一段短的時間,長期而言,我們需要更好的方案。
At our October board meeting, we discussed that subject fully. And we emerged with a plan, which I will carry out with the help of Charlie and Lou.
在十月份的董事會上,我們全面地討論了這個問題。現在我們有了一個計劃,我會在查理和Lou 的幫助下實施這個計劃。
Under this plan, I intend to hire a younger man or woman with the potential to manage a very large portfolio, who we hope will succeed me as Berkshire’s chief investment officer when the need for someone to do that arises. As part of the selection process, we may in fact take on several candidates.
按照這個計劃,我傾向於挑選一個年輕的人,他或她有能力管理一個龐大的投資組合。我們希望由這個人在有需要的時候來接替我出任波克夏的首席投資官。作為甄選計劃的一部分,我們可能會考察好幾個人選。
Picking the right person(s) will not be an easy task. It’s not hard, of course, to find smart people, among them individuals who have impressive investment records. But there is far more to successful longterm investing than brains and performance that has recently been good.
選擇合適的人可不是一件容易的事。在那些有著出色投資業績的人中選出精明的人是非常難的。但長期成功的投資業績要比聰明和近期好的投資表現要重要的多。
Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.
長期而言,市場會發生一些重大的、甚至是荒謬的事。一個大的錯誤可以抹掉一大串的長期成功。因此我們需要一個具有天生的基因能分辨和避免這樣的錯誤的人,包括那些我們以前沒有打過交道的人。各種投資策略中潛伏的一些特定的風險是不可能由今天各個金融機構普遍採用的投資模式來發現的。
Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.
性情也是重要的。獨立思考、情緒穩定以及對人和投資機構的各種行為方式有敏銳的了解對長期投資成功是至關重要的。我看到很多非常聰明的人缺乏這些素質。
Finally, we have a special problem to consider: our ability to keep the person we hire. Being able to list Berkshire on a resume would materially enhance the marketability of an investment manager. We will need, therefore, to be sure we can retain our choice, even though he or she could leave and make much more money elsewhere.
最後,我們還要考慮一個很特別的問題:我們怎麼樣留住我們請來的人。能夠把在波克夏工作過加在簡歷裡面能大大增強一個投資經理在市場上的緊俏性。我們需要保證我們能留住我們選擇的人,即使別處他或她能賺更多的錢(也不會離開)。
There are surely people who fit what we need, but they may be hard to identify. In 1979, Jack Byrne and I felt we had found such a person in Lou Simpson. We then made an arrangement with him whereby he would be paid well for sustained overperformance. Under this deal, he has earned large amounts. Lou, however, could have left us long ago to manage far greater sums on more advantageous terms. If money alone had been the object, that’s exactly what he would have done. But Lou never considered such a move. We need to find a younger person or two made of the same stuff.
肯定有人符合我們的要求,但找出這個人可不容易。在1979 年,Jack Byrne 和我確信我們找到了這樣的人,Lou Simpson。我們隨即和他達成協議,如果他取得了持續的好的回報,他個人也會得到很好的報酬。然而,Lou其實很久以前就可以離開我們以更優厚的條件去管理更大的資金。如果僅僅是以錢作為目標的話,他早就會那麼做了。我們需要找到一、兩個這樣的、更年輕的人。
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The good news: At 76, I feel terrific and, according to all measurable indicators, am in excellent health. It’s amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow.
好消息是:以76 歲的年紀,我感覺好極了,而且以各種可衡量的指標來看,我也非常健康。我很驚奇,櫻桃味的可樂和漢堡包能讓人這麼健康。
Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board
波克夏董事會的一些變化
The composition of our board will change in two ways this spring. One change will involve the Chace family, which has been connected to Berkshire and its predecessor companies for more than a century. In 1929, the first Malcolm G. Chace played an important role in merging four New England textile operations into Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates. That company merged with Hathaway Manufacturing in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway, and Malcolm G. Chace, Jr. became its chairman.
我們波克夏董事會在今年春天會有兩方面的變化。其中一個涉及到Chace 家族,Chace家族和波克夏及其前身有著超過一個世紀的聯繫。在1929 年,第一代的Malcolm G Chace在將四個新英格蘭的紡織廠轉變成波克夏精紡協會的過程中起了重要的作用。後來波克夏精紡協會與哈撒維製造與1955 年合併,Malcolm G Chace 擔任了合併公司的主席。
Early in 1965, Malcolm arranged for Buffett Partnership Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire shares and welcomed us as the new controlling shareholder of the company. Malcolm continued as nonexecutive chairman until 1969. He was both a wonderful gentleman and helpful partner.
1965 年初的時候,Malcolm 安排了巴菲特合夥人公司購買了一大塊波克夏的股票,並歡迎我們成為新的控股股東。Malcolm 繼續擔任非執行主席直到1969 年,他是一位極好的紳士和一位對我們有幫助的合作者。
That description also fits his son, Malcolm “Kim” Chace, who succeeded his father on Berkshire’s board in 1992. But last year Kim, now actively and successfully running a community bank that he founded in 1996, suggested that we find a younger person to replace him on our board. We have done so, and Kim will step down as a director at the annual meeting. I owe much to the Chaces and wish to thank Kim for his many years of service to Berkshire.
這種描述同樣可以用在他兒子,Malcolm Kim Chace 的身上。Kim1992 年繼承了他父親在波克夏董事會的職位。但去年,Kim 由於積極和成功的經營了一家社區銀行,建議我們找一位年輕的人取代他在董事會的位子。我們會這麼做,今年年會的時候,Kim 會議董事的身份辭職。我欠了Chace 家族許多,感謝Kim 在波克夏董事會多年的服務。
In selecting a new director, we were guided by our long-standing criteria, which are that board members be owner-oriented, business-savvy, interested and truly independent. I say “truly” because many directors who are now deemed independent by various authorities and observers are far from that, relying heavily as they do on directors’ fees to maintain their standard of living. These payments, which come in many forms, often range between $150,000 and $250,000 annually, compensation that may approach or even exceed all other income of the “independent” director. And – surprise, surprise – director compensation has soared in recent years, pushed up by recommendations from corporate America’s favorite consultant, Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo. (The name may be phony, but the action it conveys is not.)
在選擇新的董事時,我們遵循我們長期以來就有的標準。這個標準就是董事必須是以股東利益為導向、懂經營、有興趣而又真正獨立。我說“真正”是因為現在很多董事監管部門和旁觀者認為他是獨立的,而實際上遠不是獨立,這些董事是靠董事酬金來維持他們的生活的。這些酬金,以各種方式出現,大概在每年15 到25 萬之間。這些報酬往往超過這些“獨立”董事們其他的收入。而且,奇怪,實在是奇怪, 這幾年在美國最受歡迎的公司顧問的推動下,董事酬金急速上漲。
Charlie and I believe our four criteria are essential if directors are to do their job – which, by law, is to faithfully represent owners. Yet these criteria are usually ignored. Instead, consultants and CEOs seeking board candidates will often say, “We’re looking for a woman,” or “a Hispanic,” or “someone from abroad,” or what have you. It sometimes sounds as if the mission is to stock Noah’s ark. Over the years I’ve been queried many times about potential directors and have yet to hear anyone ask, “Does he think like an intelligent owner?”
查理和我認為這四項標準對於董事做好工作是基本的要求。按照法律,董事是代表股東利益的。但這些標準卻經常被忽視了。公司顧問和CEO 們在選擇董事時經常說“我們要找個女的”或者“西班牙裔的”或者“從海外回來的”或者你想要的什麼。有時候聽起來找董事好像是往諾亞方舟上儲存東西一樣。多年來我被問到很多次關於選董事的事情,就是沒聽到有人問“他會像一個精明的股東那樣考慮問題嗎?”
The questions I instead get would sound ridiculous to someone seeking candidates for, say, a football team, or an arbitration panel or a military command. In those cases, the selectors would look for people who had the specific talents and attitudes that were required for a specialized job. At Berkshire, we are in the specialized activity of running a business well, and therefore we seek business judgment.
我提出的問題如果是用來選擇足球運動員、陪審團、或者軍事指揮官就顯得荒謬了。那些情況下是要選擇對於特定的工作選擇有特定才能和天賦的人。在波克夏,我們的特定工作是怎麼把生意做好,所以我們看重的是商業判斷(能力)。
That’s exactly what we’ve found in Susan Decker, CFO of Yahoo!, who will join our board at the annual meeting. We are lucky to have her: She scores very high on our four criteria and additionally, at 44, is young – an attribute, as you may have noticed, that your Chairman has long lacked. We will seek more young directors in the future, but never by slighting the four qualities that we insist upon.
那就是我們在雅虎的CEO Susan Decke 身上所找到的。她會在今年年會的時候加入我們的董事會。我們很幸運的能請到她,她按照我們的標準可以打很高的分,而且她還只有44歲,非常年輕——你們應該注意到，你們的董事局主席很久以來就缺少這個特點了。我們會在將來邀請更多的年輕人加入我們的董事會,但從不會動搖我們一直堅持的四條標準。
This and That
這些和那些
Berkshire will pay about $4.4 billion in federal income tax on its 2006 earnings. In its last fiscal year the U.S. Government spent $2.6 trillion, or about $7 billion per day. Thus, for more than half of one day, Berkshire picked up the tab for all federal expenditures, ranging from Social Security and Medicare payments to the cost of our armed services. Had there been only 600 taxpayers like Berkshire, no one else in America would have needed to pay any federal income or payroll taxes.
波克夏2006 年的收益,要交納大約44 億美元的聯邦所得稅。美國政府在過去的財政年度(2006)花費了2.6 萬億,折合到每天大約是70 億。因而,波克夏為超過半天的全部聯邦開支買了單,包含了社會保障、醫療保險給付,以及軍費。如果有600個波克夏這樣的納稅人,那麼其餘所有的美國人民就無需再繳納聯邦所得稅或者薪酬稅。
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Our federal return last year, we should add, ran to 9,386 pages. To handle this filing, state and foreign tax returns, a myriad of SEC requirements, and all of the other matters involved in running Berkshire, we have gone all the way up to 19 employees at World Headquarters.
需要補充的是,去年我們的聯邦稅報稅文件就多達9386 頁。除了處理聯邦報稅?還有州和外國稅收申報、無數的證交會要求的表格、以及所有其他經營波克夏相關的事項,我們在全球總部大廈工作的多達19 名僱員忙了個底朝天。
This crew occupies 9,708 square feet of space, and Charlie – at World Headquarters West in Los Angeles – uses another 655 square feet. Our home-office payroll, including benefits and counting both locations, totaled $3,531,978 last year. We’re careful when spending your money.
這群員工佔據了9708平方英尺的辦公場所,查理使用座落於洛山磯的全球總部大廈西翼(World Headquarters West)的其他655平方英尺。波克夏總部2006年支付的員工薪水總額,包括津貼,此兩處辦公地點加總在一起是3,531,978美元。花你們(股東)的錢的時候,我們是很謹慎的。
Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers’ money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here’s an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule.
重量級的企業家經常抱怨政府花費無度,批評官僚政客花納稅人的錢時不節制的態度,不同於他們花自己錢的時候。但有時企業經理人的財務行為,也會因為掏錢的人不同而發生變化。我以在Salomon(所羅門兄弟公司)時的故事來舉證。80 年代這個公司有個名叫Jimmy 的理髮師,他每週來給公司高級職員免費理髮(費用由公司負擔)?有位指甲修理師父也會來。然後,因為執行一項費用削減措施,這些高級職員被告知費用自理。一位高層經理人(不是CEO)此前每週都找Jimmy 理髮的,立刻改成三週才理一次發。
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Every now and then Charlie and I catch on early to a tide-like trend, one brimming over with commercial promise. For example, though American Airlines (with its “miles”) and American Express (with credit card points) are credited as being trailblazers in granting customers “rewards,” Charlie and I were far ahead of them in spotting the appeal of this powerful idea. Excited by our insight, the two of us jumped into the reward business way back in 1970 by buying control of a trading stamp operation, Blue Chip Stamps. In that year, Blue Chip had sales of $126 million, and its stamps papered California.
查理和我時不時地能很早的趕上一些充滿商業機會的潮流。例如,美國航空(用“飛行里程”積分)和美國運通(用“信用卡點數”積分)被視為是客戶“積分計劃”的鼻祖,Charlie 和我遠在它們之前已看出這種絕妙想法的魅力。我們的發現很讓人興奮,在1970 年代我們通過買入郵票交易公司Blue Chip Stamps 的股權,獲取對它的控制,從而進入到用積分的方式做生意。在那一年,Blue Chip 的銷售收入達到1.26 億,它所賣的的郵票幾乎“貼滿”了加利福尼亞。
In 1970, indeed, about 60 billion of our stamps were licked by savers, pasted into books, and taken to Blue Chip redemption stores. Our catalog of rewards was 116 pages thick and chock full of tantalizing items. When I was told that even certain brothels and mortuaries gave stamps to their patrons, I felt I had finally found a sure thing.
事實上，1970 年我們有600 億張郵票被收集者使用,然後粘貼成冊,拿去Blue Chip 的兌換點。我們的兌換品類別編目厚達116 頁,充滿了各種誘人的玩意。當我被告知甚至某些妓院和停屍間也給主顧郵票的時候,我感覺我終於找到了鐵定賺錢的買賣。
Well, not quite. From the day Charlie and I stepped into the Blue Chip picture, the business went straight downhill. By 1980, sales had fallen to $19.4 million. And, by 1990, sales were bumping along at $1.5 million. No quitter, I redoubled my managerial efforts.
事實卻並非如我所想,從Charlie和我進入Blue Chip業務畫面的那天開始,生意直直的走下坡路。到1980 年,銷售收入滑落到1940 萬。到1990 年,銷售收入在150 萬上下跌跌撞撞。不能輕言放棄,我在管理上加倍努力。
Sales then fell another 98%. Last year, in Berkshire’s $98 billion of revenues, all of $25,920 (no zeros omitted) came from Blue Chip. Ever hopeful, Charlie and I soldier on.
此後銷售收入又跌落98%。去年,在波克夏980 億的總收入中,Blue Chip 總計貢獻了25920 美元(並沒有漏寫後面的0)。永遠都懷抱希望,Charlie 和我會戰鬥到底。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I mentioned last year that in my service on 19 corporate boards (not counting Berkshire or other controlled companies), I have been the Typhoid Mary of compensation committees. At only one company was I assigned to comp committee duty, and then I was promptly outvoted on the most crucial decision that we faced. My ostracism has been peculiar, considering that I certainly haven’t lacked experience in setting CEO pay. At Berkshire, after all, I am a one-man compensation committee who determines the salaries and incentives for the CEOs of around 40 significant operating businesses.
去年提到我服務於19 家公司的董事會(不包括波克夏和其他控股公司),我是被排除在薪酬委員會之外的Typhoid Mary([注]Typhoid Mary 是Mary Mallon 的暱稱,在美國的愛爾蘭廚師,1938 年被發現是傷寒菌攜帶者),只有一間公司任命我在薪酬委員會擔負職責,然後當我們對面臨的非常重大的問題進行表決時,我的提議總是被否決。考慮到我在製定CEO 薪酬方面絕不會缺乏經驗,我所遭受到的排擠真讓人納悶?在波克夏,作為薪酬委員會的唯一成員,我決定大約40 家重要的經營性企業的CEO的薪水和激勵制度。
How much time does this aspect of my job take? Virtually none. How many CEOs have voluntarily left us for other jobs in our 42-year history? Precisely none.
我的工作中這個層面的事務佔用了多少時間?幾乎沒有佔用?在我們42 年的歷史中有多少CEO 自願離職去到其他地方?精確的說，沒有一個!
Berkshire employs many different incentive arrangements, with their terms depending on such elements as the economic potential or capital intensity of a CEO’s business. Whatever the compensation arrangement, though, I try to keep it both simple and fair.
基於各位CEO 管理企業的經濟潛力或資本密度等因素,波克夏採納多種不同的激勵方式。無論是哪一種薪酬安排,我都盡力使之簡單和公平。
When we use incentives – and these can be large – they are always tied to the operating results for which a given CEO has authority. We issue no lottery tickets that carry payoffs unrelated to business performance. If a CEO bats .300, he gets paid for being a .300 hitter, even if circumstances outside of his control cause Berkshire to perform poorly. And if he bats .150, he doesn’t get a payoff just because the successes of others have enabled Berkshire to prosper mightily. An example: We now own $61 billion of equities at Berkshire, whose value can easily rise or fall by 10% in a given year. Why in the world should the pay of our operating executives be affected by such $6 billion swings, however important the gain or loss may be for shareholders?
當我們採用激勵措施時——這些措施可以是豐厚的——它們總是和特定CEO管治下的經營績效相掛鉤?我們不會發放和企業績效無關的就像中了大獎式的激勵計劃。如果某位CEO的打擊率是0.3,他獲得的報酬是作為一個0.3打擊率的打擊手該有的,即便超出他控制的環境因素造成波克夏的表現差勁。如果他的打擊率是0.15,他不會因為其他人的成功為波克夏帶來的繁榮而獲得補償。舉個例子，波克夏目前擁有610 億權益資產,波克夏的價值在特定年份可以輕而易舉的上升或者下跌10%。為什麼運營業務的經理人的薪水要受到這60億資產價值波動的影響?!無論這種漲跌對股東有多重要。
You’ve read loads about CEOs who have received astronomical compensation for mediocre results. Much less well-advertised is the fact that America’s CEOs also generally live the good life. Many, it should be emphasized, are exceptionally able, and almost all work far more than 40 hours a week. But they are usually treated like royalty in the process. (And we’re certainly going to keep it that way at Berkshire. Though Charlie still favors sackcloth and ashes, I prefer to be spoiled rotten. Berkshire owns The Pampered Chef; our wonderful office group has made me The Pampered Chief.)
你們已經讀到大量這樣的報導,關於CEO幹得雖然不怎麼樣,卻得到天文數字般的薪酬。美國的CEO 們一般而言過著優越的生活,這一事實遠遠沒得到很好地宣傳。要強調的是許多CEO 是非常稱職的,他們幾乎每週工作時間遠超過40 小時。但CEO 普遍被當作皇室般對待。(我們在波克夏當然會保持我們現在的做法。查理喜歡粗茶淡飯,我喜歡腐化一點。波克夏有“大廚”,我們的團隊把我變成了“大廚”。
CEO perks at one company are quickly copied elsewhere. “All the other kids have one” may seem a thought too juvenile to use as a rationale in the boardroom. But consultants employ precisely this argument, phrased more elegantly of course, when they make recommendations to comp committees.
某間公司的CEO 津貼會迅速在其他公司得到復制。“所有其他孩子都有!”似乎是太孩子氣的想法,不該在董事會中被當作提高報酬的根據。但是顧問們在向薪酬委員會提供建議時,使用的就是這樣的一種根據,當然表述上會較為優雅。
Irrational and excessive comp practices will not be materially changed by disclosure or by “independent” comp committee members. Indeed, I think it’s likely that the reason I was rejected for service on so many comp committees was that I was regarded as too independent. Compensation reform will only occur if the largest institutional shareholders – it would only take a few – demand a fresh look at the whole system. The consultants’ present drill of deftly selecting “peer” companies to compare with their clients will only perpetuate present excesses.
不合理與過度的薪酬制度不會因為披露或者因為“獨立”的薪酬委員會成員而得到實質改變。事實上,我認為我被如此多的薪酬委員會拒絕不讓參與的原因,是我被認為太過獨立了。薪酬改革只有當最大型的機構股東-為數不多-要求整個薪酬體係有全新面貌時才會發生。顧問們熟練地挑選出“同樣的”公司,呈現出來與客戶公司進行比較,(表明應該擁有同樣的薪酬體系),只會使現有的(薪酬)過渡膨脹的做法一直延續下去。
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Last year I arranged for the bulk of my Berkshire holdings to go to five charitable foundations, thus carrying out part of my lifelong plan to eventually use all of my shares for philanthropic purposes. Details of the commitments I made, as well as the rationale for them, are posted on our website, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Taxes, I should note, had nothing to do with my decision or its timing. My federal and state income taxes in 2006 were exactly what they would have been had I not made my first contributions last summer, and the same point will apply to my 2007 contributions.
去年我把持有的大量波克夏股票捐贈給了5家濟世為懷的基金會,從而實現了我將最終把股份用於博愛目的之畢生計劃的一部分。我做出的委託安排的細節,以及這些委託的基本原則,公佈於我們的網站www.berkshirehathaway.com。我要說明的是,我的決定以及做出決定的時機,與稅收考慮無關。我的2006 年聯邦與州所得稅額,等同於如果我去年夏天沒做第一筆捐贈的應繳稅額,這一點也適用於我2007 年的捐贈。
In my will I’ve stipulated that the proceeds from all Berkshire shares I still own at death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within ten years after my estate is closed. Because my affairs are not complicated, it should take three years at most for this closing to occur. Adding this 13-year period to my expected lifespan of about 12 years (though, naturally, I’m aiming for more) means that proceeds from all of my Berkshire shares will likely be distributed for societal purposes over the next 25 years or so.
遵照我的願望,我已約定我去世時仍然擁有的波克夏股權產生的所有收益,在我財產被清算完畢後的十年中,都將被用於仁愛的目的。由於我的事業並不復雜,頂多只需要3 年時間來完成財產清算。將這13年加到我期望仍有的12年生命期(儘管,很自然的我希望更久)意味著來自於所有我持有的波克夏股票的收益,將有可能在往下的25 年中,分配於滿足社會目的。
I’ve set this schedule because I want the money to be spent relatively promptly by people I know to be capable, vigorous and motivated. These managerial attributes sometimes wane as institutions – particularly those that are exempt from market forces – age. Today, there are terrific people in charge at the five foundations. So at my death, why should they not move with dispatch to judiciously spend the money that remains?
制定這份時間表,是因為我想要由我認可的具備能力、精力旺盛和有內在動力激勵的人來相對迅速的用盡這筆錢。上述的管理屬性(指具備能力?精力旺盛和有內在動力激勵)有時隨著機構年齡的增長而衰退——尤其是那些不用面對市場的機構。今天,有極為能幹的人主導著此5 家基金會。因而當我去世後,他們難道不會迅速行動,明智的花掉剩下的錢。
Those people favoring perpetual foundations argue that in the future there will most certainly be large and important societal problems that philanthropy will need to address. I agree. But there will then also be many super-rich individuals and families whose wealth will exceed that of today’s Americans and to whom philanthropic organizations can make their case for funding. These funders can then judge firsthand which operations have both the vitality and the focus to best address the major societal problems that then exist. In this way, a market test of ideas and effectiveness can be applied. Some organizations will deserve major support while others will have outlived their usefulness. Even if the people above ground make their decisions imperfectly, they should be able to allocate funds more rationally than a decedent six feet under will have ordained decades earlier. Wills, of course, can always be rewritten, but it’s very unlikely that my thinking will change in a material way.
那些贊成基金會永續運作的人爭辯說,將來非常確定是會出現重大社會問題需要仁愛之心的眷顧。我同意這種看法。但是那時也會有許多超級富裕的個人和家庭,他們的財富會超越今天的美國人所擁有的,慈善組織可以向這些家庭和個人爭取資金注入。這些捐贈人在他們所處的時代,進行第一手的判斷,哪一種做法能夠既具備活力,又具備專注性,最好的是處理當時存在的重大社會問題。以這種方式,對想法和有效性進行市場檢驗可以被採用。有些慈善組織會得到多數的捐贈人(注入資金),而其他組織實在沒有存在的意義。即便活著的人作出的決定不盡完美,他們還是能夠更為理性的分配基金,相比一個躺在地下6 英尺深處的死者在數十年前做出的規定。心願,當然可以不斷修改,但是我的想法非常不可能再發生實質的改變。
A few shareholders have expressed concern that sales of Berkshire by the foundations receiving shares will depress the stock. These fears are unwarranted. The annual trading volume of many stocks exceeds 100% of the outstanding shares, but nevertheless these stocks usually sell at prices approximating their intrinsic value. Berkshire also tends to sell at an appropriate price, but with annual volume that is only 15% of shares outstanding. At most, sales by the foundations receiving my shares will add three percentage points to annual trading volume, which will still leave Berkshire with a turnover ratio that is the lowest around.
一些股東表達了他們憂慮-“收到捐贈的基金會如果賣出波克夏股票會打壓價格”。這些憂慮是沒有根據的。許多股票的全年交易量超過流通在外股數的100%,但是儘管如此,這些股票通常在接近內在價值的價格進行交易。波克夏也傾向於在合適的價格交易,年度交易量只是流通在外股數的15%。接受我的股份的基金會的賣盤,頂多只能在年度交易量上加多3%,這使得波克夏的換手率仍將是市場上最低的。
Overall, Berkshire’s business performance will determine the price of our stock, and most of the time it will sell in a zone of reasonableness. It’s important that the foundations receive appropriate prices as they periodically sell Berkshire shares, but it’s also important that incoming shareholders don’t overpay. (See economic principle 14 on page 77.) By both our policies and shareholder communications, Charlie and I will do our best to ensure that Berkshire sells at neither a large discount nor large premium to intrinsic value.
總的來說,波克夏的企業績效會決定我們股票的價格,並且大多數時間會在合理的區間交易。非常重要的是,當基金會階段性賣出波克夏股份時,能夠獲得合理的價格,但是同樣重要的是新進入的股東不用付出過高價格。(參閱77頁的經濟學原理14)藉由我們的政策和股東間的溝通,Charlie 和我會盡力確保波克夏既不會以相對內在價值大的折讓,也不會以相對內在價值大的溢價進行交易。
The existence of foundation ownership will in no way influence our board’s decisions about dividends, repurchases, or the issuance of shares. We will follow exactly the same rule that has guided us in the past: What action will be likely to deliver the best result for shareholders over time?
基金會作為波克夏的股東,決不會影響我們董事會關於紅利、回購或股份發行的決定。我們會正確遵從過去指導我們的相同原則:什麼行動長期來看可以給股東帶來最好結果。
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In last year’s report I allegorically described the Gotrocks family – a clan that owned all of America’s businesses and that counterproductively attempted to increase its investment returns by paying ever-greater commissions and fees to “helpers.” Sad to say, the “family” continued its self-destructive ways in 2006.
去年的報告中我諷喻地講述了Gotrocks 家族-一個擁有全美國所有企業的宗族,它不明智的嘗試通過支付更多的佣金和費用給“幫忙的人”來提升投資回報?悲哀的說,這個“家族”在2006 年延續了它自我毀壞的做法。
In part the family persists in this folly because it harbors unrealistic expectations about obtainable returns. Sometimes these delusions are self-serving. For example, private pension plans can temporarily overstate their earnings, and public pension plans can defer the need for increased taxes, by using investment assumptions that are likely to be out of reach. Actuaries and auditors go along with these tactics, and it can be decades before the chickens come home to roost (at which point the CEO or public official who misled the world is apt to be gone).
這個家族堅持愚昧做法的部分解釋,是因為它對可以獲得的合理回報擁有不切實際的期望值。有時這些幻覺有自我欺騙的作用。比如,私人養老金計劃能夠暫時性的誇大它們的收益,而公共養老金計劃能夠延遲納稅,通過採用不太可能達成的投資假設。會計和審計人員認同這些策略,時間可以長達數十年,直到小雞仔也到了回歸故里頤養天年的時候,才會爆出問題(此時誤導世人的CEO 和公務人員很有可能已經離任)。
Meanwhile, Wall Street’s Pied Pipers of Performance will have encouraged the futile hopes of the family. The hapless Gotrocks will be assured that they all can achieve above-average investment performance – but only by paying ever-higher fees. Call this promise the adult version of Lake Woebegon.
同時,華爾街上吹噓著績效的各式人等也鼓勵了這個家族去抱有這樣的無法達成的希望。不幸的Gotrocks 家族被確保他們能夠獲得高於平均績效的回報率——但是必須支付更高費用?我把這種承諾叫做成年人版本的“Woebegon湖”效應。[“Woebegon湖”指那裡所有的孩子都是比平均水平要高,不過,這樣的樂觀態度,只局限於個人的判斷。]
In 2006, promises and fees hit new highs. A flood of money went from institutional investors to the 2-and-20 crowd. For those innocent of this arrangement, let me explain: It’s a lopsided system whereby 2% of your principal is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes nothing – or, for that matter, loses you a bundle – and, additionally, 20% of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide. For example, a manager who achieves a gross return of 10% in a year will keep 3.6 percentage points – two points off the top plus 20% of the residual 8 points – leaving only 6.4 percentage points for his investors. On a $3 billion fund, this 6.4% net “performance” will deliver the manager a cool $108 million. He will receive this bonanza even though an index fund might have returned 15% to investors in the same period and charged them only a token fee.
在2006年,承諾收益率和費率再創新高。熱錢湧動,從機構投資者流向採用2 and 20 收費模式的管理人(即2%的管理費和20%的盈利報酬)。對於那些對此一無所知的人,我要解釋:這是不平等的體系,你的本金的2%每年支付給基金經理,即便他什麼都沒達成——甚至給你造成巨大損失— —此外,如果他成功了,利潤的20%需要支付給他,即便他的成功僅只是因為處於上升的大潮中。例如,一位在某一年份獲取10%總回報的經理人,會提取3.6%-2%加上餘下8%的20%-只留下6.4%給予他的投資者。對於一個30 億規模的基金,這6.4%的淨“績效”會給經理人帶來超爽的1.08億。他會收到一份不費吹灰之力得來的回報,即便指數基金在同期給投資者15%的回報而只能向客戶象徵性的收取一點費用。
The inexorable math of this grotesque arrangement is certain to make the Gotrocks family poorer over time than it would have been had it never heard of these “hyper-helpers.” Even so, the 2-and-20 action spreads. Its effects bring to mind the old adage: When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money.
這種可笑的安排中隱含的無情的數學,無疑會使得Gotrocks 家族隨著時間推延日漸貧困,而如果他們從未聽說過這些“過於好心的人”的話絕不會落得如此結局。儘管這樣,這種2and20的方式,還在日益蔓延。這種效應使我們想起古老的諺語:當有經驗的人向有錢的人建議一筆交易,多半是有錢的人最後剩下了經驗,而有經驗的人最後有了錢。
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Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager.
讓我告訴你華爾街上一個不錯的傢伙,我的長期朋友,去年已經90高齡的Walter Schloss,來結束這個段落。從1956 年到2002 年,Walter 管理著一個極為成功的投資合夥企業,在這個企業中他不拿走一分一毫,除非他的投資人賺到錢。我對的敬重,需要提請注意的是,不是基於事後的認識。整整50 年前,Walter 是我給St. Louis 一個尋求誠實能幹的投資管理人的家庭,給出的唯一推薦。
Walter did not go to business school, or for that matter, college. His office contained one file cabinet in 1956; the number mushroomed to four by 2002. Walter worked without a secretary, clerk or bookkeeper, his only associate being his son, Edwin, a graduate of the North Carolina School of the Arts. Walter and Edwin never came within a mile of inside information. Indeed, they used “outside” information only sparingly, generally selecting securities by certain simple statistical methods Walter learned while working for Ben Graham. When Walter and Edwin were asked in 1989 by Outstanding Investors Digest, “How would you summarize your approach?” Edwin replied, “We try to buy stocks cheap.” So much for Modern Portfolio Theory, technical analysis, macroeconomic thoughts and complex algorithms.
Walter沒有上過商業學校,更別說商學院了。1956年他的辦公室裡有一個文件櫃,這個數字到2002 年時已經迅速增加到4 個。Walter 工作時不需要秘書、書記員或者記帳人,他唯一的伙伴是他的兒子,Edwin,北卡羅林納藝術學校的畢業生。Walter和Edwin從不打聽內幕消息。事實上,他們非常謹慎的使用“外部”信息,他們通常以某種簡單的統計方式篩選證券,這個方法是Walter 為Ben Graham 工作時學來的。當Walter 和Edwin 在1989 年被《傑出投資者文摘》詢問“你如何總結你所採用的方法?”時,Edwin 回答說“我們試圖以便宜的價格購買股票”。(想想)那麼多人是推崇現代組合理論、技術分析、宏觀經濟考慮和復雜的算術運算!
Following a strategy that involved no real risk – defined as permanent loss of capital – Walter produced results over his 47 partnership years that dramatically surpassed those of the S&P 500. It’s particularly noteworthy that he built this record by investing in about 1,000 securities, mostly of a lackluster type. A few big winners did not account for his success. It’s safe to say that had millions of investment managers made trades by a) drawing stock names from a hat; b) purchasing these stocks in comparable amounts when Walter made a purchase; and then c) selling when Walter sold his pick, the luckiest of them would not have come close to equaling his record. There is simply no possibility that what Walter achieved over 47 years was due to chance.
採納一個排除真實風險(定義為資本金發生永久性損失)的策略,Walter在47年合夥制投資企業中創造的結果——引人矚目的超越S&P 500 的績效。尤其值得注意的是,他是通過投資大約1000 種證券來建立這個記錄的,中間許多品種屬於黯淡無光的類型。少數幾個大贏家品種說明不了他的成功。可靠的說,如果有100萬投資經理人做交易,通過a)隨意選出一個股票b)當Walter 買入時,購買相似數量的這個股票;然後c)當Walter 賣出他選擇的股票時,賣出同樣的股票,他們中最幸運的人也不會接近與Walter 的記錄。將Walter 在47 年間獲取的成就歸因於運氣,這在概率上是講不通的。
I first publicly discussed Walter’s remarkable record in 1984. At that time “efficient market theory” (EMT) was the centerpiece of investment instruction at most major business schools. This theory, as then most commonly taught, held that the price of any stock at any moment is not demonstrably mispriced, which means that no investor can be expected to overperform the stock market averages using only publicly-available information (though some will do so by luck). When I talked about Walter 23 years ago, his record forcefully contradicted this dogma.
我在1984 年第一次公開討論了Walter 引人矚目的績效記錄。那時“有效市場理論”在大多數主要的商學院是投資教育課程的核心要件。這個在當時廣為講授的理論,堅稱任何股票在任何時點的價格,不會被明顯的錯誤定價,這意味著沒有投資者可以期待僅僅依靠公開獲取的信息來跑贏股票市場的平均回報,有人能做到也是運氣使然。當我23 年前談到Walter 時,他的記錄強有力的駁斥了這個教條。
And what did members of the academic community do when they were exposed to this new and important evidence? Unfortunately, they reacted in all-too-human fashion: Rather than opening their minds, they closed their eyes. To my knowledge no business school teaching EMT made any attempt to study Walter’s performance and what it meant for the school’s cherished theory.
當把這新的重要記錄陳列到學院派成員面前時,他們作何回應了。不幸的是,他們的反應方式淪於世俗:不是打開心靈,而是緊閉雙目。就我所知,沒有一所教授有效市場理論的商學院願意嘗試研究Walter 的績效,以及這份績效對於商學院膜拜的理論意味著什麼。
Instead, the faculties of the schools went merrily on their way presenting EMT as having the certainty of scripture. Typically, a finance instructor who had the nerve to question EMT had about as much chance of major promotion as Galileo had of being named Pope.
相反,商學院的教員們繼續愉悅的講授有效市場理論,彷彿有如聖經詞句般的莊嚴。能夠對這個理論抱有懷疑勇氣的金融學教員,擁有和Galileo 被稱為大師一樣的晉級為權威人士的機遇。
Tens of thousands of students were therefore sent out into life believing that on every day the price of every stock was “right” (or, more accurately, not demonstrably wrong) and that attempts to evaluate businesses – that is, stocks – were useless. Walter meanwhile went on overperforming, his job made easier by the misguided instructions that had been given to those young minds. After all, if you are in the shipping business, it’s helpful to have all of your potential competitors be taught that the earth is flat.
成千上萬的學生因此踏上人生旅途的時候,信奉每天各種股票的價格都是正確的(或者,更精確的說,沒有顯著誤定價格),以及嘗試評估企業——也就是股票— —是無用的。而此時Walter 繼續他戰勝市場之旅,他的工作由於這些誤人子弟的教育灌輸給了那些年輕人,而變得更為輕鬆。畢竟,如果你在航運業,如果你的潛在競爭力都被灌輸了地球是平的觀念,這對你是有幫助的。
Maybe it was a good thing for his investors that Walter didn’t go to college.
Walter 沒有上大學,這或許對他的投資人而言是件好事。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東會
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 5th. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
我們今年的會議定於5 月5 日(星期六)召開。一如以往,Qwest 中心的大門會在早晨7 點開放,最新攝製的波克夏短片會在8:30展映。9:30我們會直接進入到問答環節,這會持續到下午3:00,中間有個午餐間歇就安排在Qwest。此後,稍作休息,在3:15 分,Charlie 和我會召集年度股東會。如果你決定在問答環節離開,請選擇Charlie 講話的時候。
The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300 square foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 24,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But records are made to be broken, and I know you can do better.
離開的最好理由,當然是為了購物。我們在會議區相鄰的194300 平方英尺的大廳中佈滿了波克夏之附屬企業的各種產品,期望能幫助到你。去年來開會的24000 人熱情購物推升銷售額到新記錄。但是記錄的設立本身就是為了來打破的,我知道你們還能做得更好。
This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that the home, priced at $139,900, delivers excellent value. Last year, a helper at the Qwest bought one of two homes on display well before we opened the doors to shareholders. Flanking the Clayton home on the exhibition floor this year will be an RV and pontoon boat from Forest River.
今年我們會再次陳列Calyton 活動房屋(由Acme 磚、Shaw 地毯、Johns Manville 絕緣材料、MiTek緊固件、Carefree遮陽篷和NFM家私搭建與裝點)。你會發現這所定價139900的活動房屋,提供了卓越的價值。去年早在我們開門迎接股東前,Qwest 的一位義工就購買了展示的兩幢房屋中的一幢。這個樓層的展品中,位於Clayton 活動房屋側面的是來自Forest River的休閒車和水上的士。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use (sparingly, of course).
GEICO 會設立一個配備了來在全國的幾位頂級顧問的席位,這些顧問樂意為您提供汽車保險報價。通常GEICO 能夠給予您一個股東特別折扣(一般是8%)。在我們經營汽車保險的50個受管轄區域中,45個區域批准了這樣一個特別報價。(補充說明的一點是:這個折扣不是累計適用的,比若你夠格申請另外的險種-例如那些給予特定團體的)。將你目前投保的細節材料帶過來,我們核對一下是否能夠幫助你省錢。至少你們中的50%,我想可以幫你省到錢。當你身處那個席位時,可以簽約使用新的GEICO 信用卡,我目前就使用它(當然我挺節儉的)。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel that you wish on board with you.
星期六在Omaha 機場,我們照例會把NetJets 的飛機進行編隊,以便於你們視察。請在Netjets 位於Qwest 的展位前駐足停留片刻,學著觀賞這些飛機。來Omaha 的時候請坐巴士,走的時候可以搭乘你們的新飛機。把你要攜帶的所有的髮膠也一同帶上飛機。
In the Bookworm’s corner of our bazaar, there will be about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. (One hapless soul last year asked Charlie what he should do if he didn’t enjoy the book. Back came a Mungerism: “No problem – just give it to someone more intelligent.”) We’ve added a few titles this year. Among them are Seeking Wisdom: From Darwin to Munger by Peter Bevelin, a long-time Swedish shareholder of Berkshire, and Fred Schwed’s classic, Where are the Customers’ Yachts? This book was first published in 1940 and is now in its 4th edition. The funniest book ever written about investing, it lightly delivers many truly important messages on the subject.
在我們的大集市裡Bookworm的攤位上,會有大約25種書和DVD打折出售,列為其首的又是《窮查理年鑑》。(一個不幸的靈魂去年問Charlie,“如果感受不到閱讀這本書的喜悅,該怎麼辦?”,他得到了孟格式的回答——“沒問題，就請把這本書贈給更有智慧的人。”)我們今年增添了一些新的標題。展出的書中包括波克夏的瑞典籍長期股東Reter Bevelin 寫的《尋找智慧——從達爾文到孟格》,和Fred Schweb 的經典之作《客戶的遊艇在哪裡》,這本書1940年首次出版,目前已是第四版。這是以投資為主題出版過的書中最好的一本,它睿智的闡釋了關於投資主題的許多真知灼見。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
這份報告內含的授權材料的附件,解釋了你們怎樣才能獲取憑據,你們需要它來獲得參與會議和其他活動的核准。涉及到航班、酒店和租車,我們此次仍然和American Express(美國運通800-799-6634)簽約來給你提供專門服務。處理這些事務的Carol Pedersen 每年都為我們打理的井然有序,非常感謝她?酒店房間可能比較難找,但你與Carol 聯繫的話就會沒問題。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM ten years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30 million in 2006. I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.
座落在Dodge 和Pacifi 之間的72 大街上的佔地77 英畝的Nebraska 家具城,會再次提供“波克夏週末”的打折價格。我們是10 年前開始在NFM 搞這項特惠活動的,期間“週末”銷售收入從1997 年的530 萬美金上升到2006 年的3000 萬美金?當我想著這銷售額時,我不免起了雞皮疙瘩。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 3rd and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a special shareholder picnic featuring chicken and beef tacos (and hamburgers for traditionalists like me).
為了獲得波克夏的折扣價,你必須在5 月3 日(星期四)-5 月7 日(星期一)之間購買才可以,這兩天包括在內,你還需要出示你的會議憑據。這個期間的特惠價格甚至可以適用於幾家聲譽崇隆的製造商的產品,原本它們是有著嚴格的不打折規矩的,但是在我們股東周末的感染下,也願意破例一回。我們對他們的合作很感激。NFM 的營業時間是星期一至星期六從上午10點到晚上9 點,星期天是上午10點到下午6點。今年星期六,從下午5:30 到晚上8 點,NFM 有一個特別的股東野餐會,提供雞肉和牛肉夾餅(還有給予像我這樣的傳統人士的漢堡包)。
At a remodeled and expanded Borsheim’s, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在一家改擴建後的Borsheim's 店(珠寶店),我們會再次舉辦兩場只有股東可以參與的活動。第一場是5 月4 日(星期五)從晚上6 點到10 點的雞尾酒招待會。第二場是主歡慶會,從5月6 日早晨9 點到下午4 點。星期六,Borsheim's 會開放到下午6 點。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整個週末Borsheim's 會有龐大的人流。為了你的方便起見,股東能夠享受的優惠價格期間從4 月30 日(星期四)延續到5 月12 日(星期六)。在此期間,通過出示會議憑據或者經紀商的聲明文件來證明您的股東身份。
On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheim’s, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Last year I carried on a conversation with Patrick while he played in this manner. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
星期天,在Borsheim's外的一個帳篷裡,兩屆美國國際象棋冠軍Patrick Wolff會以一敵六,以盲棋應戰所有挑戰者,當然挑戰者是圓睜雙目的。去年當Patrick 以這種方式下棋時我還和他聊了一會。附近,來自Dallas 的引人矚目的魔術師Norman Beck 會以戲法迷惑旁觀者。除此,Bob Hamman 和Sharon Osberg,兩位世界頂尖橋牌專家,星期天下午蒞臨與股東展開較量。
To add to the Sunday fun at Borsheim’s, Ariel Hsing will play table tennis (ping-pong to the uninitiated) from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. against anyone brave enough to take her on. Ariel, though only 11, is ranked number one among girls under 16 in the U.S. (and number 1 among both boys and girls under 12). The week I turned 75 I played Ariel, then 9 and barely tall enough to see across the table, thinking I would take it easy on her so as not to crush her young spirit. Instead she crushed me. I’ve since devised a plan that will give me a chance against her. At 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will initiate play with a 2-point game against Ariel. If I somehow win the first point, I will then feign injury and claim victory. After this strenuous encounter wears Ariel down, our shareholders can then try their luck against her.
為了增添星期天Borsheim's 的樂趣,Ariel Hsing 將以乒乓球從下午1 點到4 點對抗敢於挑戰她的來賓。Ariel,雖然僅有11 歲,但在美國16 歲一下女子組乒乓選手中名冠第一。(在12 歲以下男女孩混合組名列第一)。我步入75 歲的那個星期和Ariel 打了球,她當時只有9 歲,幾乎身高還不足以看過檯面,我心想著可以輕鬆取勝,但是不要打消她的勁頭。相反她打倒了我。從那時開始我制定了一個會給我戰勝她的機會的計劃。星期六下午1點,我會率先和Ariel來個2分制的比賽。如果我用盡辦法贏得第1 分,我會假裝受傷,並宣稱獲得勝利。經過我首場奮勇比賽消耗了Ariel 的體能,我們的股東隨後可以碰碰運氣,看能不能勝過Ariel。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
Gorat's(牛排館)5 月6 日(星期六)會再次只對波克夏的股東開放,從下午4 點到晚上10點提供服務。請記住如果那天你要去Gorat's 的話,一定要預定座位。訂座電話時402-551-3733,時間是4 月1 日(不能提前)。
In the 2006-2007 school year, 35 university classes, including one from IBMEC in Brazil, will come to Omaha for sessions with me. I take almost all – in aggregate, more than 2,000 students – to lunch at Gorat’s. And they love it. To learn why, come join us on Sunday.
在2006-2007 學年,35 個大學班級,包括來自於巴西IBMEC 商學院的一個班,來Omaha 與我交流。我和所有2000 名學生一起在Gorat's 吃午餐。他們很喜歡那裡。想知道為什麼的話,請星期六過來加入到我們當中。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
星期六下午4 點我們會再次為來自北美洲以外的股東召開歡迎會。每年我們的會議引來全世界的許多人,Charlie 和我想親自歡迎這些來自遠方的客人。去年我們非常開心與來自(北美以外)數十個國家的400 名股東歡聚一堂。美國和加拿大以外的股東會收到特別憑據和指示,告知如何參加這項活動。
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Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to other people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped every day in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tapdance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 5th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
查理和我是極為幸運的。我們生於美國，有非常好的父母讓我們接受優秀的教育;擁有極好的家庭,身體健康;有著與生俱來的商業因子，這使我們以特別的方式獲得一個不成比例的巨大成功— —與那些為我們的社會福祉奉獻良多或者更多的人相比。另外,我們長期從事自己喜歡的職業,每天得到頗具才乾和精神快樂的同事不可計數的幫助。我們跳著舞去上班,這可不奇怪了。但對我們而言,沒有什麼樂趣能夠比得上與股東,也就是我們的合夥人在波克夏的股東會上相聚一堂。因此請在5 月5 日到Qwest 加入我們,參加資本家們的搖滾盛會,我們那裡再見!
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2007
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2007 年2 月28 日
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2007
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2007 年2 月28 日