BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟薇公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟薇公司股東：
This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we
are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.
這封信是波克夏年度報告的一部分。作為一家上市公司，我們需要定期報告許多事實和數據給各位。
“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we
believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is
to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were
reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors,
trusting you with our savings.
然而，「報告」意味著更大的責任。除了規定的數據外，我們認為我們還應該向各位提供更多關於各位所擁有的資產以及我們的想法的評論。我們的目標是以我們希望各位使用的方式與各位溝通，如果我們的位置顛倒過來的話，也就是說，如果各位是波克夏的 CEO，而我和我的家人是消極的投資者，將我們的儲蓄委託給各位。
This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the
many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems
at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60
years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”
這種方法引導我們每年都要敘述各位透過波克夏股票間接擁有的許多企業的好與壞的發展。然而，在討論特定子公司的問題時，我們會盡量遵循 Tom Murphy 60 年前給我的建議：「公開讚揚，分類批評」。
Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire
錯誤 - 是的，我們在波克夏會犯錯
Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve
purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both
judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and
the 100% acquisitions of companies.
有時候，我在評估我為波克夏購買的企業的未來經濟狀況時犯了錯誤-每一項都是資本配置錯誤的案例。這種情況發生在對可交易股票的判斷上--我們將這些視為企業的部分所有權--以及對公司 100% 的收購上。
At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the
managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial
impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.
有時候，我在評估波克夏聘用的管理人員的能力或忠誠度時犯了錯誤。對忠誠度的失望造成的傷害可能超過其財務影響，這種痛苦可能接近婚姻失敗的程度。
A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal
sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.”
Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however
uncomfortable that may be.
在人事決策中，能有差強人意的打擊率就值得慶幸了。最大的罪過是延遲糾正錯誤，或是查理 · 蒙格 (Charlie Munger) 所說的「吮拇指」。他會告訴我，問題無法被祈禱消失。它們需要行動，無論這有多麼令人不舒服。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my
letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon,
I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it
has generally been happy talk and pictures.
在 2019 年至 2023 年期間，我在給各位的信中使用了 16 次「錯誤」或「失誤」這兩個詞。許多其他大型公司從未使用過這兩個詞。我應該承認，亞馬遜 (Amazon) 在其 2021 年的信中做了一些非常坦率的觀察。在其他地方，通常都是快樂的談話和圖片。
I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were
forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection,
always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited
discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)
我也曾擔任大型上市公司的董事，在這些公司的董事會會議或分析師電話會議上，「錯誤」或「錯誤」是禁忌詞。這種禁忌意味著管理上的完美，總是讓我感到緊張（儘管有時可能存在法律問題，使得有限的討論是明智的。我們生活在一個非常愛打官司的社會。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the
annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually
owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will
soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.
94 歲時，格雷格 · 阿貝爾 (Greg Abel) 將很快取代我擔任 CEO，並撰寫年度信件。格雷格也認同波克夏的信條，即波克夏 CEO 每年都對所有者負有「報告」的義務。他還明白，如果你開始欺騙你的股東，你很快就會相信自己的胡說八道，也會欺騙自己。
Pete Liegl – One of a Kind
皮特 · 利格爾 - 獨一無二
Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most
Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete
died in November, still working at 80.
請允許我停下來告訴各位皮特 · 利格爾 (Pete Liegl) 的非凡故事，這個人對大多數波克夏股東來說並不認識，但卻為他們的總體財富貢獻了數十億美元。皮特於 11 月去世，享年 80 歲，仍在工作。
I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on
June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about
the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100%
owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete
expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.
我第一次聽說 Forest River -皮特在印第安納州創立和管理的這家公司 - 是在 2005 年 6 月 21 日。那天，我收到了一封來自中間人的信，詳細介紹了這家休閒車（「RV」）製造商的相關數據。作者說，皮特是 Forest River 的 100% 所有者，他特別想賣給波克夏。他還告訴我皮特期望收到的價格。我喜歡這種毫不廢話的方式。
I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th
meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete
assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he
could assure financial security for his family.
我與 RV 經銷商進行了一些核實，喜歡我所了解到的，並安排了 6 月 28 日在奧馬哈舉行會議。皮特帶了他的妻子莎朗 (Sharon) 和女兒麗莎 (Lisa) 一起來。當我們見面時，皮特向我保證，他想繼續經營這項業務，但如果他能確保家人的財務安全，他會感到更舒服。
Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and
had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those
assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.
皮特接著提到，他擁有一些出租給 Forest River 的房地產，這些房地產沒有包含在 6 月 21 日的信中。幾分鐘之內，我們就達成了這些資產的價格，因為我表示波克夏不需要進行評估，而只會接受他的估值。
Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation
should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I
recommend for general use.)
然後我們談到了另一個需要釐清的重點。我問皮特他的薪酬應該是多少，並補充說無論他說什麼，我都會接受。（我應該補充一點，我不建議普遍使用這種方法。）
Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I
looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay
me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he
named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what
the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant
acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I
didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.
皮特停頓了一下，他的妻子、女兒和我向前傾。然後他讓我們驚訝：「嗯，我看過波克夏的委託聲明，我不希望比我的老闆賺更多，所以每年給我 10 萬美元。」在我從地板上爬起來後，皮特補充說：「但是我們今年將賺取 X（他說出了一個數字），我希望每年獲得超過公司現在所交付的任何收益的 10% 的獎金。」我回答說：「好的，皮特，但是如果 Forest River 進行任何重大的收購，我們將對所使用的額外資本進行適當的調整。」我沒有定義「適當」或「重大」，但這些模糊的術語從未引起任何問題。
The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily
ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his
performance.
然後我們四個人去了奧馬哈的 Happy Hollow Club 吃晚餐，從此過上了幸福的生活。在接下來的 19 年裡，皮特表現出色。沒有競爭對手能接近他的表現。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few
owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the
businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m
dealing.
並非每家公司都擁有容易理解的業務，而且像皮特這樣的擁有者或經理人也屈指可數。而且，當然，我希望在波克夏購買的企業上犯下我應有的錯誤，並且有時在評估我所打交道的人的能力時出錯。
But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as
the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can
make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a
managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal
advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.
但是，我在企業的潛力以及經理人的能力和忠誠度方面也獲得了許多令人愉快的驚喜。而且我們的經驗是，一個成功的決策可以隨著時間的推移產生驚人的差異。（想想 GEICO 作為一項業務決策，Ajit Jain 作為一項管理決策，以及我幸運地找到查理 · 蒙格 (Charlie Munger) 作為獨一無二的合作夥伴、私人顧問和堅定的朋友。）錯誤會消失；贏家可以永遠綻放。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to
school. Never!
關於我們 CEO 的選擇還有一個重點：我從不看候選人去哪裡上學。從不！
Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are
plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even
by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more
important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to
stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)
當然，有些偉大的經理人畢業於最著名的學校。但是也有很多像皮特這樣的人，他們可能因為就讀於一所不太知名的學校，甚至是不費心完成學業而受益。看看我的朋友比爾 · 蓋茨 (Bill Gates)，他認為在一個將改變世界的爆炸性產業中起步遠比留在原地獲得一張可以掛在牆上的羊皮紙更重要。（閱讀他的新書《原始碼》。）
Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner,
long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this
report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited.
Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”
不久前，我透過電話認識了潔西卡 · 圖恩克爾 (Jessica Toonkel)，她的繼祖父本 · 羅斯納 (Ben Rosner) 很久以前為查理和我經營一家企業。本是一位零售天才，在準備這份報告時，我與潔西卡核實了本的學歷，我記得他的學歷有限。潔西卡的回答：「本從未上過六年級。」
was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in
lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate
with nature swamping nurture.
我很幸運能在三所優秀的大學接受教育。我熱切地相信終身學習。然而，我觀察到，很大一部分的商業才能是與生俱來的，天性淹沒了後天。
IPete Liegl was a natural.
皮特 · 利格爾是天生的。
Last Year’s Performance
去年的表現
In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating
businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in
investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings
of these highly-liquid short-term securities.
在 2024 年，波克夏的表現比我預期的要好，儘管我們的 189 家營運企業中有 53% 的收益下降。由於國債收益率的提高，我們的投資收入獲得了可預測的大幅增長，並且我們大幅增加了對這些高度流動性短期證券的持有，這對我們有所幫助。
Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the
performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way,
increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held
gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done.
Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.
我們的保險業務也實現了收益的大幅增長，這主要歸功於 GEICO 的出色表現。在過去的五年裡，Todd Combs 大幅重塑了 GEICO，提高了效率，並更新了核保實務。GEICO 是一顆長期持有的寶石，需要重新打磨，而 Todd 一直在不知疲倦地完成這項工作。雖然尚未完成，但 2024 年的改善是驚人的。
In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024,
reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been
announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a
truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one
per annum.
總體而言，財產 - 意外 (「P/C」) 保險定價在 2024 年有所增強，反映了對流風暴造成的損失大幅增加。氣候變遷可能已經宣布它的到來。然而，2024 年沒有發生「怪物」事件。總有一天，任何一天，都會發生一場真正驚人的保險損失——而且不能保證每年只會發生一次。
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that
appears later in this letter.
P/C 業務對波克夏來說至關重要，因此值得在本信後面進一步討論。
Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of
insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.
波克夏的鐵路和公用事業業務是我們保險以外最大的兩項業務，它們的總體收益有所提高。然而，兩者都還有很多事情要做。
Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to
100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in
Berkshire “B” shares.
在今年年底，我們以約 39 億美元的成本將我們對公用事業業務的所有權從約 92% 提高到 100%，其中 29 億美元以現金支付，餘額以波克夏「B」股支付。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly,
some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that
are reported on page K-68.
總而言之，我們在 2024 年記錄了 474 億美元的營運獲利。我們經常 - 有些讀者可能會抱怨 - 無休止地強調這個衡量標準，而不是 GAAP 規定的收益，這些收益已在 K-68 頁上報告.
Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether
realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else
would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and
unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year.
In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes
make the cash register ring like church bells.
我們的衡量標準不包括我們擁有的股票和債券的資本收益或損失，無論是已實現的還是未實現的. 隨著時間的推移，我們認為收益很可能會佔上風 - 否則我們為什麼要購買這些證券呢？ - 儘管每年的數字都會劇烈且不可預測地波動. 我們對這些承諾的期限幾乎總是遠長於一年。在許多情況下，我們的思考涉及數十年。這些長期投資有時會讓收銀機像教堂的鐘聲一樣響起.
Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after
depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for
us.
以下是我們看到的 2023-24 年收益的細分。所有計算均在扣除折舊、攤銷和所得稅後進行。EBITDA 是華爾街一個有缺陷的熱門指標，不適合我們.
(in $ millions)（單位：百萬美元） 2024 2023
Insurance-underwriting 保險承保 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 9,020 $ 5,428
Insurance-investment income 保險投資收入 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,670 9,567
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,031 5,087
Berkshire Hathaway Energy 波克夏能源 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,730 2,331
Other controlled businesses 其他受控企業 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,072 13,362
Non-controlled businesses* 非受控企業 * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,519 1,750
Other** 其他 ** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,395 (175)
Operating earnings 營運獲利 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $47,437 $37,350
* Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership
such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.
• 包括波克夏擁有 20% 至 50% 所有權的某些企業，例如卡夫亨氏 (Kraft Heinz)、西方石油 (Occidental Petroleum) 和 Berkadia。
** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and
approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated
debt.
**包括因我們使用非美元計價債務而產生的外幣兌換收益，2024 年約為 11 億美元，2023 年約為 2.11 億美元。
Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed
驚喜，驚喜！一項重要的美國紀錄被打破
Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a
mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize,
spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its
business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.
60 年前，現任管理階層接管了波克夏。此舉是一個錯誤 - 我的錯誤 - 並且困擾了我們 20 年。 我應該強調，查理立即發現了我明顯的錯誤：儘管我為波克夏支付的價格看起來很便宜，但它的業務 - 一個大型的北方紡織業務 - 卻走向了滅絕。
The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s
destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had
generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be
understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a
venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.
美國財政部（所有地方）已經收到了波克夏命運的沉默警告。1965 年，該公司沒有支付一毛錢的所得稅，這是一種恥辱，在該公司普遍存在了十年。對於有魅力的新創公司來說，這種經濟行為可能是可以理解的，但當它發生在美國工業的古老支柱身上時，這是一個閃爍的黃燈。波克夏正走向灰燼。
Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same
company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate
income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American
tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.
快進 60 年，想像一下財政部的驚訝，當同一家公司 - 仍然以波克夏的名義經營 - 支付的企業所得稅遠多於美國政府從任何公司收到的稅款 - 甚至是市值數萬億美元的美國科技巨頭。
To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8
billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable
amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)
確切地說，波克夏去年向美國國稅局 (IRS) 支付了四筆款項，總計 268 億美元。這約佔美國所有企業支付的 5%。 （此外，我們還向外國政府和 44 個州支付了相當數量的所得稅。）
Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders
during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we
disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested
this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)
請注意允許這項打破紀錄的付款的一個關鍵因素：在 1965-2024 年期間，波克夏股東僅收到一次現金股息。1967 年 1 月 3 日，我們支付了我們唯一的付款——101,755 美元，即每股 A 股 10 美分。（我不記得我為什麼向波克夏董事會建議採取這項行動。現在這看起來像一場噩夢。）
For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that
enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S.
Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.
60 年來，波克夏股東認可持續再投資，這使得公司能夠建立其應稅收入。 現金所得稅支付給美國財政部，在第一個十年微不足道，現在總計超過 1,010 億美元…… 並且還在增加。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last
year.
巨大的數字可能難以想像。讓我重新計算我們去年支付的 268 億美元。
If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of
2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed
the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before
the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our
2025 tax payments.
如果波克夏在 2024 年全年每 20 分鐘向財政部寄出一張 100 萬美元的支票——想像 366 天和夜晚，因為 2024 年是閏年——我們仍然會在年底欠聯邦政府一筆可觀的款項。 事實上，要到一月份，財政部才會告訴我們，我們可以稍作喘息，睡一覺，並為我們 2025 年的稅款支付做好準備。
Where Your Money Is
各位的錢在哪裡
Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many
businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%.
These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from
identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems,
many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments.
We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.
波克夏的股權活動是靈活的。一方面，我們控制著許多企業的所有權，至少持有被投資者 80% 的股份。一般來說，我們擁有 100% 的所有權。這 189 家子公司與可交易的普通股有相似之處，但遠非完全相同。這個集合價值數千億美元，包括一些稀有寶石、許多良好但遠非出色的企業，以及一些令人失望的落後者。我們沒有任何主要的拖累，但我們有一些我不應該購買的。
In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly
profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and
Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for
their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion.
另一方面，我們擁有一些非常龐大且利潤豐厚的企業的小部分股份，這些企業都是家喻戶曉的企業，例如蘋果 (Apple)、美國運通 (American Express)、可口可樂 (Coca-Cola) 和穆迪 (Moody"s)。 許多這些公司在運營所需的淨有形股權上賺取非常高的回報。在年底，我們部分所有權的控股價值為 2,720 億美元。
Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small
fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very
occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.
可以理解的是，真正傑出的企業很少以完整的形式提供，但這些寶石的一小部分可以在星期一至星期五在華爾街購買，而且偶爾會以低廉的價格出售。
We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon
where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very
infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to
act at such times as did Charlie.
我們在選擇股權工具方面是不偏不倚的，根據我們在哪裡可以最好地部署各位（和我家人的）儲蓄來投資任何一種。通常，沒有什麼看起來有吸引力；很少有時候，我們發現自己身處機會之中。 格雷格 (Greg) 已經生動地展示了他在此類時刻採取行動的能力，查理 (Charlie) 也是如此。
With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake.
Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t
come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an
investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if
that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the
decisions being made.
對於可交易的股票，當我犯錯時，更容易改變方向。 應該強調的是，波克夏目前的規模削弱了這種寶貴的選擇。 我們無法隨時隨地進出。有時需要一年或更長時間才能建立或撤銷一項投資。 此外，對於少數股權的所有權，如果需要，我們無法改變管理階層，或者如果我們不滿意所做的決策，我們無法控制資本流的使用方式。
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility
in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses
unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners
seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for
us.
對於受控公司，我們可以決定這些決策，但在處理錯誤方面，我們的靈活性要小得多。實際上，波克夏幾乎從不出售受控企業，除非我們面臨我們認為永無止境的問題。 一個抵銷因素是，一些企業所有者因為我們堅定的行為而尋求波克夏。有時，這對我們來說可能是一個明確的優勢。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at
Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change.
While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to
$272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far
greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.
儘管一些評論員目前認為波克夏的現金狀況非常特殊，但各位的大部分資金仍然投資於股票。 這種偏好不會改變。 雖然我們在可交易股票中的所有權在去年從 3,540 億美元下降到 2,720 億美元，但我們非上市受控股票的價值略有增加，並且仍然遠大於可交易投資組合的價值。
Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority
of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have
international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent
assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.
波克夏股東可以放心，我們將永遠將其大部分資金部署在股票中——主要是美國股票，儘管其中許多公司將擁有重要的國際業務。 波克夏永遠不會偏好持有現金等價資產，而不是持有優質企業的所有權，無論是控股權還是部分所有權。
Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this
reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come
close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.
如果財政愚蠢盛行，紙幣的價值可能會蒸發。 在一些國家，這種魯莽的做法已經成為習慣，而且在我國短暫的歷史中，美國也曾多次瀕臨崩潰。固定息票債券不能提供防止貨幣失控的保護。
Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way
to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s
citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful
voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities
throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will
continue to do so.
然而，只要一個國家的公民需要企業以及具有所需才能的個人所提供的商品或服務，他們通常會找到應對貨幣不穩定的方法。 個人技能也是如此。由於缺乏運動天賦、美妙的聲音、醫療或法律技能，或者在這方面缺乏任何特殊才能，我一生都不得不依賴股票。 實際上，我一直依賴美國企業的成功，並且我將繼續這樣做。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by
citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This
system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now
than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.
公民的明智 - 最好是有想像力 - 管理儲蓄，這是推動社會不斷增長的所需商品和服務產出的必要條件。 這個系統被稱為資本主義。它有其缺點和弊端 - 在某些方面比以往任何時候都更加令人髮指- -但它也能創造出其他經濟體系無法比擬的奇蹟。
America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could
not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution
was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.
美國就是一個例證。 我們國家在短短 235 年的歷史中所取得的進步，即使是 1789 年制憲和國家力量得到釋放時最樂觀的殖民者也無法想像。
True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own
savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed
those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had
consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.
誠然，我們國家在初期有時會向國外借款以補充我們自己的儲蓄。但是，同時，我們需要許多美國人持續儲蓄，然後需要這些儲蓄者或其他美國人明智地部署由此提供的資本。 如果美國消耗了它所生產的一切，這個國家就會原地打轉。
The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many
scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with
their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also
much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or
disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output
beyond the dreams of any colonist.
美國的進程並不總是美好的 - 我們的國家永遠都有許多無賴和推銷員，他們試圖利用那些錯誤地將儲蓄託付給他們的人。 但即使存在這種不當行為 - 今天仍然有充分的效力 - 以及許多由於殘酷的競爭或顛覆性創新而最終失敗的資本部署，美國人的儲蓄也提供了數量和質量超出任何殖民者夢想的產出。
From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on,
pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
從只有 400 萬人口的基礎——儘管早期發生了一場殘酷的內戰，使美國人互相對立——美國在極短的時間內改變了世界。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by
foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this
reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture
of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.
在很小的程度上，波克夏股東透過放棄股息，從而選擇再投資而不是消費，參與了美國的奇蹟。 最初，這種再投資微不足道，幾乎毫無意義，但隨著時間的推移，它像蘑菇一樣增長，反映了持續的儲蓄文化與長期複利的神奇結合。
Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished.
Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal.
Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.
波克夏的活動現在影響到我們國家的各個角落。而且我們還沒有完成。 公司的死亡有很多原因，但與人類的命運不同，衰老本身並不是致命的。今天的波克夏比 1965 年更年輕。
However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have
achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the
success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.
然而，正如查理和我一直承認的那樣，波克夏如果不是在美國，就不可能取得這樣的成果，而即使波克夏從未存在過，美國也會取得它所取得的每一項成功。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send
you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for
no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we
need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on
your part.
因此，感謝你，山姆大叔。 總有一天，各位在波克夏的侄子和侄女希望向各位寄出比我們在 2024 年支付的金額更大的款項。 明智地使用它。 照顧許多那些沒有任何過錯，卻在生活中遇到挫折的人。 他們值得更好的待遇。 永遠不要忘記，我們需要各位維持穩定的貨幣，而這個結果需要各位的智慧和警惕。
Property-Casualty Insurance
財產 - 意外保險
P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial
model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.
P/C 保險仍然是波克夏的核心業務。 該行業遵循一種在大型企業中很少見——非常罕見——的財務模式。
Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment,
etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their
CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price
is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to
ignore.
通常，公司在銷售其產品或服務之前——或與之同時——會產生勞動力、材料、庫存、廠房和設備等的成本。 因此，他們的 CEO 對於在銷售產品之前了解其成本有很好的了解。 如果售價低於其成本，管理人員很快就會發現他們有問題。 難以忽視的現金流失。
When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our
product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years.
(We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years
ago.)
在撰寫 P/C 保險時，我們會預先收到付款，並且會在很久以後才知道我們的產品讓我們付出了什麼代價——有時真相大白的時刻會延遲長達 30 年或更長時間。 （我們仍在為 50 年或更久以前發生的石棉風險支付大量款項。）
This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before
they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing
money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is
happening.
這種運營模式具有在產生大部分費用之前向 P/C 保險公司提供現金的理想效果，但也帶來了公司可能在虧損——有時是巨額虧損——的風險，然後 CEO 和董事才會意識到發生了什麼。
Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage
in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to
executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical
malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious
profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be
particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful:
History reveals a large number of each species.
某些保險業務最大限度地減少了這種不匹配，例如農作物保險或冰雹損害，在這些保險業務中，損失會很快被報告、評估和支付。 然而，其他業務可能會導致高管和股東的幸福感，因為公司正在破產。 考慮醫療事故或產品責任等承保範圍。 在「長尾」業務中，P/C 保險公司可能會向其所有者和監管機構報告多年——甚至數十年——的巨額但虛構的利潤。 如果 CEO 是一個樂觀主義者或一個騙子，那麼會計處理可能尤其危險。這些可能性並非憑空想像：歷史揭示了大量這兩個物種。
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed
Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small
underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been
sufficient.
近幾十年來，這種「先收錢，後付款」的模式使得波克夏能夠投資大量資金（「浮動」），同時普遍提供我們認為較小的承保利潤。 我們對「驚喜」進行估計，到目前為止，這些估計已經足夠。
We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our
activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally
take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious
litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
我們不會因為我們的活動所遭受的巨大且不斷增長的損失支付而感到沮喪。（當我寫這篇文章時，請想想野火。）我們的職責是對這些損失進行定價以吸收這些損失，並在出現驚喜時冷靜地接受我們的損失。 我們的職責還要對抗「失控」的判決、虛假的訴訟和徹頭徹尾的欺詐行為。
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based
company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial
strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in
relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of
compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not
ensure foresight.
在 Ajit 的領導下，我們的保險業務已經從一家默默無聞的奧馬哈公司發展成為世界領導者，以其對風險的品味和像直布羅陀一樣的財務實力而聞名。 此外，相對於我們收到的任何報酬，Greg、我們的董事和我自己在波克夏的投資都非常大。我們不使用期權或其他單方面的薪酬形式；如果各位賠錢，我們也會賠錢。 這種方法鼓勵謹慎，但不能確保遠見。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for
insurance.
P/C 保險的增長取決於經濟風險的增加。 沒有風險——就不需要保險。
Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there
are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property
damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly
unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
僅僅回想 135 年前，當時世界上沒有汽車、卡車或飛機。現在僅美國就有 3 億輛汽車，這是一支每天造成巨大損失的大型車隊。 因颶風、龍捲風和野火造成的財產損失是巨大的、不斷增長的，並且在其模式和最終成本方面越來越難以預測。
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages,
but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our
minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally
abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float
but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
為這些承保範圍撰寫十年期的保單是愚蠢的——說這是瘋狂的——但我們認為一年期承擔此類風險通常是可以控制的。 如果我們改變主意，我們會更改我們提供的合約。 在我的一生中，汽車保險公司普遍放棄了一年期的保單，轉而採用六個月的保單。這種變化減少了浮動，但允許更明智的核保。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can
provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are
inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That
policy is corporate suicide.
沒有一家私人保險公司願意承擔波克夏可以提供的風險。 有時，這種優勢可能很重要。 但是，當價格不夠時，我們也需要收縮。我們絕不能為了留在遊戲中而撰寫定價不足的保單。 這種策略是企業自殺。
Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for
optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our
underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
正確地為 P/C 保險定價既是藝術，也是科學，而且絕對不是樂觀主義者的業務。招募 Ajit 的波克夏高管 Mike Goldberg 說得最好：「我們希望我們的核保人員每天上班時都感到緊張，但不要癱瘓。」
* * * * * * * * * * * *
All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and
psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers
and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers
(no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance
delivers for investment.
總之，我們喜歡 P/C 保險業務。 波克夏可以在財務上和心理上處理極端的損失而不會眨眼。 我們也不依賴再保險公司，這給了我們物質和持久的成本優勢。 最後，我們擁有傑出的經理人（不是樂觀主義者），並且特別擅長利用 P/C 保險公司提供的用於投資的大量資金。
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax
profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our
float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and,
with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
在過去的 20 年裡，我們的保險業務產生了 320 億美元的稅後承保利潤，約佔銷售額的 3。3 美分（扣除所得稅後）。 同時，我們的浮動資金從 460 億美元增加到 1,710 億美元。 隨著時間的推移，浮動資金可能會略有增長，並且憑藉明智的核保（以及一些運氣），有合理的希望實現無成本。
Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments
波克夏增加對日本的投資
A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in
Japan.
我們以美國為中心的戰略的一個小但重要的例外是我們在日本不斷增長的投資。
It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese
companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The
five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these
large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but
others that operate throughout the world.
自波克夏開始購買五家日本公司的股票以來，已經過去了近六年，這些公司以與波克夏本身有些相似的方式非常成功地運營。 這五家公司是（按字母順序排列）：伊藤忠商事 (ITOCHU)、丸紅 (Marubeni)、三菱 (Mitsubishi)、三井 (Mitsui) 和住友 (Sumitomo)。 這些大型企業中的每一家又擁有大量業務的權益，其中許多業務位於日本，但其他業務遍布全球。
Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at
their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have
passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times
with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their
managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.
波克夏於 2019 年 7 月首次對這五家公司進行了購買。 我們只是查看了它們的財務記錄，並對其股票的低廉價格感到驚訝。 隨著時間的推移，我們對這些公司的欽佩之情一直在增長。 Greg 曾多次與他們會面，我經常關注他們的進展。 我們都喜歡他們的資本部署、他們的管理階層以及他們對待投資者的態度。
Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their
shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their
compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
這五家公司中的每一家都會在適當的時候增加股息，它們會在合理的情況下回購其股票，並且它們的頂級管理人員在薪酬計劃方面的積極性遠不如它們的美國同行。
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting
their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10%
of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to
moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five
increase somewhat.
我們對這五家公司的持股是為了非常長期的目標，並且我們致力於支持它們的董事會。 從一開始，我們也同意將波克夏對每家公司股份的持股比例保持在 10% 以下。 但是，當我們接近這個上限時，這五家公司同意適度放寬上限。 隨著時間的推移，各位可能會看到波克夏對所有五家公司的所有權略有增加。
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value
of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.
在年底，波克夏的總成本（以美元計算）為 138 億美元，我們持股的市值總計 235 億美元。
Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its
yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on
future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality.
We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation
of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of
after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.
同時，波克夏一直在不斷地——但並非按照任何公式——增加其日元計價的借款。 所有借款均為固定利率，沒有「浮動利率」。 Greg 和我對未來的外匯匯率沒有任何看法，因此尋求一種接近貨幣中性的倉位。 然而，根據 GAAP 規則，我們需要在我們的收益中定期確認對我們借入的日元的任何收益或損失的計算，並且在年底，由於美元走強，我們包含了 23 億美元的稅後收益，其中 8。5 億美元發生在 2024 年。
I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for
many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five
companies in the future.
我預計 Greg 和他的最終繼任者將在未來幾十年內持有這種日本倉位，並且波克夏將找到其他方法在未來與這五家公司高效地合作。
We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual
dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million
and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.
我們也喜歡我們日元平衡策略的當前計算方式。當我寫這篇文章時，預計 2025 年來自日本投資的年度股息收入總計約為 8。12 億美元，而我們日元計價債務的利息成本約為 1。35 億美元。
The Annual Gathering in Omaha
在奧馬哈舉行的年度聚會
I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed
schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your
questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of
Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.
我希望各位能在 5 月 3 日在奧馬哈與我們會面。 我們今年遵循略有變化的時間表，但基本內容保持不變。 我們的目標是各位能得到許多問題的解答，與朋友聯繫，並對奧馬哈留下良好的印象。 這座城市期待各位的來訪。
We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire
products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday
from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks
running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.
我們將擁有與以往相同的志願者團隊，為各位提供各種波克夏產品，這些產品將減輕各位的錢包並點亮各位的一天。 像往常一樣，我們將在星期五中午至下午 5 點開放，提供可愛的 Squishmallows、來自 Fruit of the Loom 的內衣、Brooks 跑鞋以及其他各種誘惑各位的商品。
Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s
Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.
同樣，我們只會出售一本書。 去年我們推出了《窮查理寶典》，並且售罄——5,000 本在星期六結束營業之前消失了。
This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova,
who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand
at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her
imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and
design.
今年我們將提供《波克夏哈撒韋 60 年》。 2015 年，我要求 Carrie Sova 嘗試編寫一本關於波克夏的輕鬆歷史，她在她的許多職責中管理著年度會議的大部分活動。 我給予她充分的權力來運用她的想像力，她很快就製作了一本書，其獨創性、內容和設計讓我驚嘆不已。
Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each
summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play
baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with
her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue,
featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.
隨後，Carrie 離開了波克夏去撫養家庭，現在有三個孩子。 但是每年夏天，波克夏辦公室的工作人員都會聚在一起觀看奧馬哈風暴追逐者隊與三 A 級對手進行棒球比賽。 我邀請了一些校友加入我們，Carrie 通常會和她的家人一起來。 在今年的活動中，我厚顏無恥地問她是否願意製作一個 60 週年紀念版，其中包含查理的照片、引言和鮮為人知的故事。
Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently,
we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from
7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.
即使有三個年幼的孩子要照顧，Carrie 立即說「願意」。 因此，我們將在星期五下午和星期六早上 7 點至下午 4 點提供 5,000 本新書。
Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I
suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the
Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family,
beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades
been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed
books, I will match.
Carrie 拒絕為她在新「查理」版本上的大量工作支付任何費用。 我建議她和我共同簽署 20 本書，贈送給任何向 Stephen Center 捐款 5,000 美元的股東，該中心為南奧馬哈的無家可歸的成人和兒童提供服務。 Kizer 家族，從我的老朋友 Carrie 的祖父 Bill Kizer, Sr
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky
knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers,
investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of
both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give
our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.
貝琪·奎克(Becky Quick)將在週六報導我們經過某種程度重新設計的聚會。貝琪(Becky)對波克夏瞭若指掌，總是安排對經理、投資者、股東和偶爾出現的名人進行有趣的訪談。她和她的 CNBC 團隊在向全球轉播我們的會議並存檔大量波克夏相關資料方面做得非常出色。將存檔的想法歸功於我們的導演史蒂夫·伯克。
We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will
make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions
between Becky and the audience.
今年我們不會放映電影，而是會稍微提前在早上 8 點舉行會議。我將做一些介紹性發言，然後我們將立即進入問答環節，貝琪和觀眾輪流提問。
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at
10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will
disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly
the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)
葛瑞格和阿吉特將和我一起回答問題，我們將在上午 10:30 休息半小時。當我們在上午 11:00 恢復會議時，只有葛瑞格會和我一起在台上。今年我們將在下午 1:00 解散，但展覽區將開放購物至下午 4:00。您可以在第 16 頁找到有關週末活動的完整詳細資訊。特別注意週日早上一直很受歡迎的布魯克斯路跑活動。（我會睡覺。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the
meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the
genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)
Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for
communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative
merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.
我聰明又好看的妹妹伯蒂（去年我寫過她）將和她的兩個女兒（也都很好看）一起參加會議。觀察家們都認為，產生這種令人眼花繚亂的結果的基因只在女性一方流傳。（嘆息。）伯蒂現在 91 歲了，我們每週日都使用老式電話進行交流。我們討論老年生活的樂趣，並討論我們手杖的相對優點等令人興奮的話題。就我而言，它的作用僅限於避免臉朝下摔倒。
But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When
a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male
ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have
no data to counter her assertion.
但伯蒂經常通過聲稱她享有額外的好處來勝過我：她告訴我，當一個女人使用手杖時，男人就不會「追求」她了。伯蒂的解釋是，男性的自尊心是如此之強，以至於拄著手杖的老太太根本不是一個合適的目標。目前，我沒有任何資料可以反駁她的說法。
But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would
appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its
job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will
bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.
但我有所懷疑。在會議上，我從台上看不到太多東西，如果與會者能留意伯蒂，我將不勝感激。讓我知道手杖是否真的在發揮作用。我打賭她會被男人包圍。對於那些有一定年紀的人來說，這一幕會讓人想起思嘉·歐哈拉和她在《亂世佳人》中的一大群男性崇拜者。
