BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. ACQUISITION CRITERIA
We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the following criteria:
我們渴望從企業負責人或者其代理人那裡，聽到有關符合我們所有如下標準的企業：
(1) Large purchases (at least $75 million of pre-tax earnings unless the business will fit into one of our existing units),
(1) 大型收購（至少 7500 萬美元的稅前利潤，除非此生意可納入我們現存的部門之一）
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
(2) 顯示出持續的盈利能力（我們對未來的預測並不感興趣，我們對“經營好轉”的情況 同樣不感興趣）
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企業有好的淨資產收益率，同時負擔著少量債務，甚至沒有債務。
(2) 顯示出持續的盈利能力（我們對未來的預測並不感興趣，我們對“經營好轉”的情況 同樣不感興趣）
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企業有好的淨資產收益率，同時負擔著少量債務，甚至沒有債務。
(4) Management in place (we can’t supply it),
(4)已有恰當的管理層（我們不能提供它）
(5) Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(5) 簡單的生意（如果有許多技術，我們無法理解它）
(6) An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 一個報價（我們不想在浪費我們的，或者賣方的時間，去談論，縱使只是初步地談論， 一個價格未知的交易）。
The larger the company, the greater will be our interest: We would like to make an acquisition in the $5-20 billion range. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
公司越大，我們的興趣越大：我們希望收購規模在 50 到 200 億美元之間的企業。然而，我 們對於接收我們可以在一般股票市場上進行購買的建議不感興趣。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer – customarily within five minutes – as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We don’t participate in auctions.
我們不會參與惡意收購。我們可以保證完全保密，並快速回答——通常是五分鐘內——我們 是否感興趣。我們更喜歡現金收購，但是當我們所收到的內在商業價值，和我們所付出的一 樣多的時候，我們會考慮發行股票。我們不會參與拍賣。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”
查理和我經常接觸到那些不接近我們標準的收購：我們發現如果你刊登廣告，有興趣買 柯利牧羊犬，許多人將打電話給你，打算賣給你他們的可卡獵犬。一首鄉村歌曲的歌詞表達 了我們對於新企業，經營好轉，或者拍賣式銷售的感受：“當電話不響的時候，你知道是我。”
波克夏：過去、現在和未來
In the Beginning
一切的開始
On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for $11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.
1964 年 5 月 6 日，波克夏•哈撒韋，當時是由一個叫做 Seabury Stanton 的人經營。送了一 封信給股東，打算用 11.375 元每股的價格，從股東手中，買 225，000 股。我期待著這個信 件，但卻驚訝於這個價格。
Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.
波克夏當時有 1，583，680 股在外在股本。巴菲特合夥人企業，即我管理的投資實體，並 實際上是我的所有淨資產的企業，大約擁有其 7％的股份。在那個投標寄給我前不久，Stanton 詢問我，要讓我的企業出售所持股份，要給出什麼價格。我回答說 11.50 元。他說：“好。 成交。”而後，波克夏的信件來了，價格少了 0.125 元（即還是 11.375）.我對 Stanton 的 行為感到憤怒，所以沒有投標。
That was a monumentally stupid decision
這是個巨大的愚蠢決定。
Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.
波克夏當時是一個北方的紡織品製造企業，處於困境之中。這個行業正在向南方轉移，不 論是隱喻的，還是物理上的。波克夏呢，因為多方面的原因，不能相應做出改變。
That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”
行業的問題，長期以來都被廣泛地理解。波克夏自身的董事會會議記錄，1954 年 7 月 29 日，記錄下了慘澹的事實：“新英格蘭地區的紡織行業在 40 年前就開始停業。在戰爭期間， 這個趨勢停止了。然而，這個趨勢一定會繼續，直到供給需求處於平衡為止。
About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing –both with roots in the 19th Century-- joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.
大約是董事會議一年後，兩家 19 世紀就成立的公司，波克夏公司和哈撒韋公司，走到了 一起，用了我們現在採用的名字。擁有 14 個工廠和 10，000 名員工，合併後的公司變成新 英格蘭地區的紡織巨頭。然而，兩家公司視為合併協議的文書，很快變成了自殺的契約。在 合併後的七年間，波克夏的經營整體上是虧損的，淨值減少了 37％。
Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.
與此同時，公司關閉了九個工廠，有時候用清償的收入去回購股票，這個模式，引起的我的 關注。
I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50,a wide discount from per-share working capital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.
1962 年 12 月，我用巴菲特合夥人企業，第一次購買了波克夏股票，預計更多的關閉工廠 和回購行為。那時候，股價是 7.5 美元，相比於運營資本 10.25 元和帳面價值 20.20 元，是 大幅度折價的。在這個價格買他家的股票，就像是撿讓人拋棄的煙蒂，還可以再吸一口。盡 管煙蒂可能難看或者乏味，吸的那口卻是免費的。然而，一旦享受了短暫的愉悅，就再也沒 有什麼能夠被期待的了。
Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was – my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.
波克夏隨後如預想的那樣：它很快地關閉了其他 2 個工廠，在 1964 年的運動中，它開始 用關閉公司的收入來回購股票。Stanton 那時候給的報價，是我們原始買入成本的 50％以上。 它們，我免費吸煙蒂的機會，正在等著我呢，在吸幾口後，我可以去別處尋找那些被拋棄的 煙蒂。
Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares.
相反地，憤怒於 Stanton 的欺騙，我忽視了他的回購報價，並開始大量地買入更多的伯克希 爾的股票。
By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish behavior – after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? – he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.
到 1965 年 4 月，巴菲特合夥人企業擁有 392，633 股（當時有 1，017，547 股外發股本）， 並且在 5 月上旬的董事會上，我們正式地控制了公司。通過 Seabury 和我的孩子氣的行為— —畢竟，1/8 美元，對於我或者他而言，算得了什麼？——他丟掉了他的工作，而我發現我 自己用了多於 25％的巴菲特合夥人企業的資本，投資在一個糟糕的生意，而且我對此生意 知之甚少。我變成了那只追逐汽車的小狗。
Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)
因為波克夏的運營損失和股票回購，它的淨資產，在 1964 年的財務年度末期，從 1955 年合併的 5500 萬美元的高峰，降到了 2200 萬美元。2200 萬美元全部都用在了紡織方面的 運營上，公司沒有多餘的現金，並且倒欠銀行 250 萬美元(波克夏1964 年年報，在本年報的 130－142 頁重新印製。)
For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.
有段時間我很幸運：波克夏很快就享受了兩年的好的運營狀況。更好的是，它在那幾年的 收入是不需要繳交收入稅收的，因為它擁有大量的延後虧損，源於前幾年的災難後果。
Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness – stupidity? – has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.
很快蜜月結束。在 1966 年之後的 18 年時間裡，我們在紡織行業，經歷了持續不斷的掙扎， 卻全無效果。但是倔強——愚蠢？——是有限度的。在 1985 年，我終於認輸了，關閉了運 營。
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Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.
我第一個錯誤，即把巴菲特合夥人的資源投入到將死的生意中，並未阻止我繼續犯錯，我快 速地惡化錯誤。事實上，我的第二個錯誤，要遠遠比第一個嚴重，最終是我職業生涯中最昂 貴的一個。
Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.
早在 1967 年，我讓波克夏 支付 860 萬美元去購買國家賠償公司 NICO，一個小型的， 但有前途的奧馬哈的保險公司（一個小的姐妹公司同樣包括在這筆交易中）保險行業是在我的舒適區的：我理解並喜歡這個行業。
Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me – me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake. Jack Ringwalt，
NICO 的擁有者，是我的長期朋友，他想把公司賣給我——我個人。他的報 價，決不是給波克夏這個公司的。所以，為什麼我為波克夏購買 NICO，而不是為巴菲 特合夥人企業呢？我有 48 年時間去想這個問題，始終沒想到好的答案。我只是犯了一個大 錯誤。
If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.
如果巴菲特合夥人是購買者，我的夥伴和我，將會擁有一個 100％的好生意，註定會形成構 造現今波克夏這樣的基礎。此外，我們的成長，將不會受到將近二十年時間的，困於紡織 運營中的無效資本的妨礙。最後，我們接下來的並購將會由我和我的合夥人完全擁有，而不 是還被其他 39％波克夏公司股東擁有，對於他們，我們是沒有義務的。儘管這些事實盯 著我的臉，我選擇將 100％好生意 NICO 給予了我擁有 61％股份的爛生意（波克夏•哈撒韋），這個決定最終將 1000 億美元左右，從巴菲特合夥人那兒，移給了一大堆陌生人。
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One more confession and then I’ll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain” based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless –surprise, surprise – Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.
再說一個懺悔，而後我就會進入到更加讓人開心的話題：你相信麼，在 1975 年，我買了 Waumbec Mills 公司，另一個新英格蘭地區的紡織企業？ 當然，這次購買的價格，是個“便 宜貨”的價格，之所以說是便宜貨，是基於我們獲得的資產，和協同它與波克夏現存的紡 織生意的計畫。然而——意外地，意外地——Waumbec 是一個災難，因為工廠幾年後就被 關閉了。 And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I’ve been spotted wandering around New England 好，現在有一些好消息了：北方的紡織行業終於消失了。如果你聽到我在英格蘭地區的困境感到痛苦，你從此不必再痛苦了。
Charlie Straightens Me Out
查理理順了我的思路
My cigar－butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.
當我管理小規模資金的時候，我的煙蒂策略非常的有效。事實上，我 1950 年代所獲得的許 多免費的煙蒂，使得那 10 年至今為止，是我人生中最好的 10 年，從相對和絕對投資表現上 來看。
Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.
然而，縱使是在當時，我也有一些非煙蒂類型的投資，最重要的是 GEICO 公司(政府雇員保 險公司)。多虧了 1951 年我和 Lorimer Davidson 的談話，他是一個很好的人，後來成為了該 公司的 CEO。從談話中，我得知 GEICO 是個極好的公司，並且很快地將我淨資產 9800 美 元的 65％投入去購買它的股票。⑦我早期歲月的大部分收益，來自於以低廉價格交易的普通 的公司。本傑明 格雷厄姆 教我這個技巧，而它是有效的。
But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.
但是，這個方法的一個主要的弱 點逐漸地變得明顯起來：煙蒂投資法的可擴展性，僅僅只到了某個程度。對大規模資金，它 可能就不那麼好用。
In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)
另外，儘管用便宜的價格購買不良的生意，作為短期投資可能具有吸引力。它們是構造龐大 而且持久的企業的錯誤基礎。挑選可以結婚的夥伴，相比于約會，顯然需要更多嚴格的條件 （波克夏，應該在此標明，可能是一個非常令人滿意的“約會”：如果我們將股份以 11.375元賣給了 Seabury Stanton，巴菲特合夥人企業 在波克夏身上的加權年回報，將會到達大 約 40％左右。）
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It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar－butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off – and we did.
上天派了查理·孟格，來打破我的煙蒂投資習慣，並且為建立一個可以將大的投資規模和滿意利潤 相結合的方式，指明了方向。查理生長在距離我現在所住的地方大約幾百英尺的地方，年輕 時候，和我一樣，在我祖父的雜貨店裡工作過。然而，直到 1959 年我們才第一次見面，那 時候他早已經離開奧馬哈，定居洛杉磯了。我那時候 28 歲，他是 35。介紹我們認識的奧馬 哈醫生預測說，我們會合得來——我們確實是。
If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”
如果你參加我們的年會，就知道查理有著多 樣的才華，驚人的記憶力，和一些堅定的看法。我並不真的是思路不清，我們有時候也不是 意見一致。然而，在 56 年裡，我們沒有爭吵過。當我們意見分歧，查理往往用這句話結束 我們的對話：“沃倫，再考慮看看，你會贊成我的，因為你是個聰明人，而我是對的。
” What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today – some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.
你們大多數人所不知道的是，建築是查理的愛好之一。儘管他以執業律師身份開始自己的職 業生涯（那時候薪水 15 美元一小時），查理第一次真的賺到錢，是在他三十幾歲的時候， 通過設計並且建造了洛杉磯附近的 5 個公寓樓項目。同時，他設計了他自己現在住的房子— —大約 55 年之後。（像我一樣，如果他對周圍環境感到滿意，他就不願意挪動。）在最近 幾年，查理設計了斯坦福和密西根大學的大的宿舍群，今天，91 歲高齡的他，正建設其他項目。
From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most important architectural feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.
依我看來，查理最重要的建築功績，是設計了今天的波克夏。他給我的設計圖很簡單：忘 記你所知道的，以極好的價格買入普通生意，相反地，以合理的價格買入極好的生意。
Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie’s input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when – ahem － I had attended three). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been built to Charlie’s blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire’s subsidiaries doing the real work as sub-contractors.
改變我的行為，不是一個容易的計畫（問問我的家人）。我在沒有查理的教誨以前，獲得了 還不錯的成功，所以為什麼我應該去聽一個律師的話，他又沒有在商學院待過（而我——咳 咳——待過三個）。但是查理不厭其煩地對我重複他的商業和投資的箴言，而且他的邏輯是 不可反駁的。結果，波克夏依據查理的設計圖建立了。我的角色變成了總承包人，而伯克 希爾諸多子公司的 CEO 們，則作為次承包人，做著實際工作。
The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional backsliding on my part－remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity then to buy See’s Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.
1972 年，是波克夏的一個轉折年（儘管還是有我的偶然的滑坡——還記得我 1975 年買 Waumbec 的故事麼）。我們那時候有了機會為藍籌郵票公司購買喜詩糖果，查理·孟格，我和波克夏擁有藍籌郵票公司的大量股票，並且藍籌郵票後來併入了波克夏。
See’s was a legendary West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about $4 million pre－tax while utilizing only $8 million of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet: a broad and durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing power. That strength was virtually certain to give See’s major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize with only minor amounts of incremental investment. In other words, See’s could be expected to gush cash for decades to come.
喜詩是傳奇的西海岸製造商和零售商，主營盒裝巧克力，那時候年盈利大約 400 萬稅前利潤， 但是卻僅僅用了 800 萬美元的淨有形資產。另外，公司擁有未曾體現在它財報上的巨大的資 產：廣泛的，持久的競爭優勢，賦予它巨大的定價能力。這個優勢實際上長期確定了喜詩糖 果盈利上的主要收益。更好的是，僅僅需要很小的投資增量，這些收益就將會實現。換句話 說，喜詩糖果在未來幾十年裡，可以被期待會有巨大的現金流。
The family controlling See’s wanted $30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn’t want to pay more than $25 million and wasn’t all that enthusiastic even at that figure. (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp.) My misguided caution could have scuttled a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our $25 million bid.
控制喜詩糖果的家族，希望要價 3000 萬美元，查理正確地指出它值這個價錢。但我並不想支付超過 2500 萬美元的價格，並且縱使真的是 2500 萬美元賣給我，我也不是那麼真的那麼 熱情（三倍於有形資產的價格讓我倒吸一口涼氣）。我的錯誤的謹慎，差一點破壞了這樁極 好的收購。但是，幸運的是，賣方決定同意我們 2500 萬美元的報價。
To date, See’s has earned $1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only $40 million. See’s has thus been able to distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable profits. (Envision rabbits breeding.) Additionally, through watching See’s in action, I gained a business education about the value of powerful brands that opened my eyes to many other profitable investments.
迄今為止，喜詩糖果賺取了 19 億稅前利潤，而它的成長，僅僅需要增加 4000 萬美元而已。 喜詩因此可以分派大量金錢，幫助波克夏去購買其他生意，而這些生意反過來，又可以為波克夏提供大量可分配利潤（想像一樣小兔繁殖）。另外，經由觀察喜詩的交易，我獲得 了有關強大品牌的商業教育，開拓了我的眼光，投向許多其他富有利潤的投資。
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Even with Charlie’s blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate because of foreign competition. And I simply didn’t see that coming.
縱使有了查理的設計，自 Waumbec 之後，我還是犯了很多錯了。最可怕的錯誤是 Dexter 鞋 業。當我們於 1993 年購買該公司的時候，它有很好的記錄，在我眼中，全然不像煙蒂股。 然而，因為外國的競爭，它的競爭優勢，很快蒸發。而我根本沒有發現這點。
Consequently, Berkshire paid $433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn’t come close to recording the magnitude of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about $5.7 billion. As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.
結果，波克夏支付了 4.33 億美元給 Dexter，並且，非常迅速地，它的價值降到了 0. 然而， GAAP 會計準則，卻沒有很好地反映出我錯誤的巨大。事實是我給了 Dexter 波克夏股票， 而不是現金，我用於購買的那部分股票，現在價值大約 57 億美元。作為一場金融災難，這是那種值得被寫進吉尼斯世界紀錄的。
Several of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business – which Berkshire most certainly is – for ownership of a so-so business irreparably destroys value.
我隨後的幾個錯誤，同樣包括使用波克夏的股票去購買那些利潤註定會衰退的公司。這類 的錯誤是致命的。用好的公司的股票——波克夏必然是的——去交換一般般的，不可挽回 地會毀滅價值的公司股票。
We’ve also suffered financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an 49 acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.
我們同樣遭受財務上的損失，當這個錯誤由波克夏參股的公司犯下的時候（有時候，這些 錯誤發生在當我是他們的董事的時候）。太經常地，CEO 們看上去對一個基本的現實視而 不見：在並購中，你所給出的股份的內在價值，不應當高於你所獲得的公司股份的內在價值。
I’ve yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-for stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker’s focus will be on describing “customary” premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions - an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition – or whether the deal will increase the acquirer’s earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his “helpers” will often conjure up fanciful “synergies.” (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I’ve never heard “dis-synergies” mentioned, though I’ve witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms.They should instead be standard practice.
我至今沒有看到，有投資銀行家量化這個重要的數學依據，當他面對潛在的收購者的董事會， 做一個換股收購演說的時候。相反地，這些銀行家的專注點，將是描述“通常的”，最近被 用於兼併收購的市場價格溢價——一種絕對愚蠢的方式來衡量兼併的吸引力——或者是否 這個交易將會增加收購者的每股收益（它本身應該不是決定性的）。在努力獲得想要的每股 收益數字的過程中，氣喘吁吁的 CEO 和他的“幫助者”將會經常地變出美好的“協同效應”。 （多年來，作為 19 個公司的董事，我至今沒有聽過“不協同”被人提到過，雖然我見過許 多這樣的事情在收購完成之後發生。）兼併收購的事後剖析，即現實會被誠實地與原本的計 劃相比較，很少出現在美國的董事會會議室裡。而這一過程（兼併收購的事後評估）應當成為標準慣例
I can promise you that long after I’m gone, Berkshire’s CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can’t get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive “fairness” opinion endorsing that swap). 。
我可以向你保證，在我走後多年 之內，在為任何兼併發行股份以前，波克夏的 CEO 和董事會，將會仔細地做好內在價值 的計算。你不可能通過支付 100 美元，去交易 80 美元的方式，變得富裕。（即使你的顧問 曾經幫你出具昂貴的“公平交易”的意見，為這種交換背書）。
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Overall, Berkshire’s acquisitions have worked out well – and very well in the case of a few large ones. So,too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their marketprices so any gains – including those unrealized – are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire’s subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.
總的來說，波克夏的兼併做得不錯—— 並且就一些大的交易來說，做得非常不錯。所以， 同樣的，我們會在證券市場上投資。後者總是在我們的財報上以市場價值計算，所以任何的 收益——包括那些尚未實現的——將很快在我們的淨資產上體現出來。但是那些我們完全買 斷的公司，從來不會在我們的財報上向上地重計，即使當我們能出售它們，獲得多於它們現 存帳面價值幾十億美元的收入。這些不被記錄的收益，在波克夏的子公司中的價值是非常 巨大的，在過去的十年裡，增長特別迅速。
Listening to Charlie has paid off.
聽查理的話有了回報。
波克夏的今天
Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.
波克夏現在是個龐雜的企業集團（conglomerate），並且持續不斷地試圖變得更為龐雜。
Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible reputation with investors. And they richly deserve it. Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I will go on to describe why the conglomerate form brings huge and enduring advantages to Berkshire.
企業集團，應當承認，在投資者中有著糟糕的聲譽。並且，它們確實應該得到這種聲譽。讓 我們先解釋一下，為什麼它們收到冷落，然後我將繼續描述為什麼企業集團的形式會給伯克 希爾帶來巨大的，持續的優勢。
Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s. The drill for conglomerate CEOs then was simple: By personality, promotion or dubious accounting – and often by all three – these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate’s stock to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as possible to acquire another business selling at ten-or-so times earnings. They immediately applied “pooling” accounting to the acquisition, which – with not a dime’s worth of change in the underlying businesses – automatically increased per-share earnings, and used the rise as proof of managerial genius. They next explained to investors that this sort of talent justified the maintenance, or even the enhancement, of the acquirer’s p/e multiple. And, finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure and thereby create ever-increasing per-share earnings.
自從我進入了商業世界，企業集團享受了很長一段時間的，極端受歡迎的狀態，其中，最為 愚蠢的階段發生在 1960 年末期。那時候，大型聯合企業 CEO 的把戲非常的簡單：依靠人格 魅力，依靠宣傳，或者依靠可疑的會計操作——經常是三者一起用——這些管理者把一個新 組建的企業集團股價推升到，比如說，20 倍的淨利（即市盈率 20），然後儘快地發行股票， 用以收購其他的市盈率 10 倍上下公司。它們立即應用“股權聯營法”（pooling）的會計方 法處理收購，使得儘管被兼併的公司價值完全沒有任何的變化，但是其每股收益卻自動地增 加，並把這種增加作為自己管理才華的體現。他們接著對投資者解釋說，這種才能，證明收 購公司的 P/E 倍數13的持續，甚至增加的合理性。最後，他們許諾會無盡地重複這個過程， 所以會創造一直增長的每股收益。
Wall Street’s love affair with this hocus-pocus intensified as the 1960s rolled by. The Street’s denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per-share earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that generate huge fees for investment bankers. Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the conglomerates’ accounting and sometimes even made suggestions as to how to further juice the numbers. For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical sensitivities.
60 年代後，華爾街對這種把戲的喜愛大大增加。華爾街的居民們，總是願意放棄對增加每 股收益的可疑方法的懷疑，特別是，如果這些把戲，能為投資銀行家們製造大量報酬的時候。 會計師們願意在企業集團的會計報表上潑灑他們的聖水，有時候，甚至為如何進一步合理解 釋這些數位提供建議。
Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
正是因為擴張的企業集團中，每股收益的增加，是源於 P/E 的差異，它的 CEO 不得不尋找 低 P/E 的公司。這些，當然了，是典型的平庸生意，有著很差的長期前景。這種衝動，甚至 連海底的魚都不放過，往往使得企業集團所收購的企業，變得越來越垃圾。
The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an adoring press. Companies such as ITT, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, and LTV were lionized, and their CEOs became celebrities. (These once-famous conglomerates are now long gone. As Yogi Berra said, “Every Napoleon meets his Watergate.”)
對兼併收購活動結果，盲目崇拜的媒體煽風點火。諸如 ITT, Litton Industies，Gulf & Western 和 LTV 等公司受到了追捧，它們的 CEO 變成了名人（這些曾經出名的企業集團早就不在了。 就像 Yogi Berra 說的，“每個拿破崙都會遇到水門。”）
Back then, accounting shenanigans of all sorts – many of them ridiculously transparent – were excused or overlooked. Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus: Shareholders in those instances could be sure that reported earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating realities of the business might become.
在當時，各種各樣的會計詭計——它們中許多都很可笑，很容易識破的—— 被原諒了，或 者被忽視了。事實上，在快速擴張的企業集團的領導位置中，有個會計造假專家，被視為是 巨大的優勢：股東在那種情況下，能夠被確保的是，報告16的利潤將不會讓人失望，不管運 營的實際狀況可能變得多壞。
In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive CEO bragged of his “bold, imaginative accounting.” Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods, seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.
在 1960 年末期，我參加了一個會議，會議上一個兼併公司的 CEO 吹噓著他的“大膽的，富 有想像力的會計” 大多數的分析師聽著他的話，報以讚賞的點頭，認為他們發現了一個其預期一定會實現的經理人，不論經營結果是如何。
Eventually, however, the clock struck twelve, and everything turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again, it became evident that business models based on the serial issuances of overpriced shares – just like chain-letter models – most assuredly redistribute wealth, but in no way create it. Both phenomena, nevertheless, periodically blossom in our country – they are every promoter’s dream – though often they appear in a carefully-crafted disguise.The ending is always the same: Money flows from the gullible to the fraudster. And with stocks, unlike chain letters, the sums hijacked can be staggering.
然而，結果，時鐘卡在了十二點，一切變回了南瓜和老鼠，再一次地，顯而易見地，基於一 系列的高價股份發行而撐起來的商業模式——就像連鎖信模式——最確實地重新分配了財 富，但不論如何，不會創造它。然而，所有的現象，都在我們國家短暫地盛行過——它們是 每個宣導者的夢——雖然它們往往以精心設計的騙局出現。 結局縱使相同的：金錢從輕信的人流向行騙者。對於股票，不像連鎖信，被綁架的金額是令 人震驚的。
At both BPL and Berkshire, we have never invested in companies that are hell-bent on issuing shares. That behavior is one of the surest indicators of a promotion-minded management, weak accounting, a stock that is overpriced and – all too often – outright dishonesty.
在巴菲特合夥企業和波克夏公司，我們從未17投資于拼命發行股票的公司。這種行為，是 以下情況的，最確定的標誌之一 —— 有推銷想法的管理層，糟糕的會計，高估的股價，還 有——往往地—— 全然地不誠實。
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So what do Charlie and I find so attractive about Berkshire’s conglomerate structure? To put the case simply: If the conglomerate form is used judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long-term capital growth.
所以，查理和我發現了什麼，才會認為波克夏企業的集團結構如此吸引人？ 簡單地說： 如果企業集團形式被明智地使用，它是一種最大化長期資金增長的理想形式。
One of the heralded virtues of capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds. The argument is that markets will direct investment to promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither. That is true: With all its excesses, market-driven allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.
資本主義所能宣告的美德之一，就是能有效地分配資金。市場將會直接地投資到有希望的生 意中，並且拒絕那些註定要凋零的生意。這是真的：縱然是有過度的情況，市場主導的資金 分配往往遠勝過其他的方法。
Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational movement of capital. As those 1954 Berkshire minutes made clear, capital withdrawals within the textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of managements. Indeed, I myself delayed abandoning our obsolete textile mills for far too long.
然而，它們往往是理性的資本流動的障礙。就像 1954 年，波克夏公司所清晰體現的那樣， 在紡織工業中的資本撤離，早就應當發生，然而卻被自私的管理層的空虛期盼，延後了好幾 十年。確實地，我自己大大推遲了放棄我們廢棄的紡織工廠的時間。
A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated activities. A move of that kind would usually require that long-time associates be fired and mistakes be admitted. Moreover, it’s unlikely that CEO would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment job even if he or she was inclined to undertake it.
一個資金配置在衰退產業的 CEO，很少選擇大規模地重新分配資本於不相關的活動中。這 樣的行為，往往需要開除長期的夥伴，並且需要他承認錯誤。此外，那個 CEO 不太可能就 是你希望承擔重新配置工作的經理人，即使這個 CEO 想要承擔這個工作。
At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed – among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.
在股東的層面，稅收和摩擦成本，對於個人投資者具有重要作用，當他們打算重新分配資本 於公司和行業的時候。即使免稅的機構投資者也面臨比較大的費用，當他們運作資本的時候， 因為他們往往需要仲介去完成這個工作18。無數張嘴，進行了昂貴的品嘗，而後吵吵嚷嚷— —在他們中間，是投資銀行家，會計師，諮詢師，律師和諸如杠杆收購者的資本重新分配者。 金錢洗牌可不便宜。
In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
相反地，一個企業集團，比如波克夏，是完美的設置，用以理性地配置資本，並且以是最 小的成本配置。當然，僅僅形成它，並不保證會成功。我們犯了無數錯誤，並且我們將會犯 更多。然而，我們的結構優勢，是令人敬畏的。
At Berkshire, we can – without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs – move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.
在波克夏，我們能夠－在不承受稅負或者其他花費的情況下——從縱使增加投資也機會有 限的生意，向有更大希望的其它部門那裡，轉移巨大的資本。 另外，我們不因為一生都投身於一個特定行業，而受到歷史偏見的影響，也不會遭受來自同伴的壓力，他們有既定利益，希望保持現狀。這是重要的：如果馬兒能控制投資決定，那麼 可能就不會有汽車行業了。
Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses – a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day – in small pieces, to be sure – are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.
其他由我們所擁有的主要優勢，是購買好生意的一部分的能力——又稱為普通股。這不是大 多數管理層的所作所為。在我們的歷史中，這種策略性的取捨顯得非常的有益；廣泛的選擇 總是使得決策更好。股票市場每天給予我們的企業報價—— 一小部分的，確然——經常遠 遠地，比我們同時地收到它們公司整體的報價，還要具有吸引力。另外，我們從股票市場上 實現的收益，幫助我們做了許多大型的收購，沒有這些收益，這些收購就會超出我們的財務能力。
In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster – a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond thos realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
事實上，世界是屬於波克夏的19——世界提供給我們範圍廣泛的機會，遠遠超出大多數的 企業。我們，當然，會限制只投資於那些我們能夠評估其經濟前景的企業。這是一個重要的 限制：查理和我不知道很多企業未來十年將會如何。但是這個限制，大大地小於，那些經驗 被限定在一個領域的管理者。
I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.
我剛才提到了相比於它的商業模型的資本需求，喜詩糖果產生了大量利潤。我們喜歡，當然 了，明智地使用那些資金，去擴張我們的糖果生產。但是我們多次嘗試如此去做，大體上卻 是無效的。所以，在沒有招致無效稅負或摩擦成本的情況下，我們使用這些喜詩糖果產生的 多餘資金去購買其他的企業。如果喜詩仍然是一個單獨的企業，它的收益就要分配給投資者， 用來重新配置，有時候是在被抽取了重稅之後，而且幾乎總是要耗費巨大的摩擦成本和代理 成本。
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Berkshire has one further advantage that has become increasingly important over the years: We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of many outstanding businesses.
波克夏有一個更進一步的優勢，多年來，這個優勢變得越來越重要：我們現在成為了很多 傑出企業擁有者和管理者的選擇。
Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)
當擁有成功的企業的家族，想要出售他們的企業時，他們有多種選擇。往往地，最好的選擇 是什麼也不做。在生命中，的確是有比擁有一個自己極為瞭解的，有前途的企業更加糟糕的 事情20但是端坐著是不受華爾街待見的（不要問理髮師你需不需要理髮）
When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.
當家庭成員的一部分人想要出售，而另一部分人想要繼續經營的時候，公開發行股票往往變 得有理了。但是，當所有者想要完全地出售，他們通常考慮兩個途徑之一。
The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however – and there are plenty of them – usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “She got the goldmine, I got the shaft.”
第一個途徑，是出售給那些垂涎三尺，正想通過合併兩家公司，達到“協同效應”的競爭對 手。這種收購者總是考慮排除賣方的大量夥伴，即那些幫助所有者建立這個事業的人。然而， 一個體貼的所有者——有很多這樣的人——往往不想讓他的長期夥伴悲傷地唱舊的鄉村音 樂：“她得到了金礦，我得到了不公平對待”。
The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s – remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? – these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”
第二種選擇是華爾街的買家。多年來，這種收購方準確地稱他們自己為“杠杆收購公司”。 當這詞彙在 1990 年代獲得了惡名——記得 RJR 收購案和門口的野蠻人？22——這些買家匆 忙地將他們自己標記為“私募股權”。
The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.
名字可能改變，但是核心一直不變：事實上在所有的私募股權收購案中，權益（equity）大 幅度地減少，負債（debt）堆積。實際上，私募股權購買者提供給出售者的數額，部分地， 是由購買者評估計算，被收購的公司所能承受的債務最大數額 所決定的。
Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.
接著，如果事情發展順利，權益（equity）開始建立，杠杆收購方往往將尋求利用新的借貸 來進行重新杠杆。他們通常接著使用收益的一部分去支付巨大的利息，使得權益大幅度減少， 有時候甚至到了負值。
In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
事實真相是，對以許多私募股權購買者，“權益”是一個可恨的詞彙； 他們喜愛的是負債。 並且，因為負債現在如此便宜，這些收購者經常能夠支付高價。接著，公司會被重新出售， 經常賣給其他的杠杠收購者。事實上，公司變成了一件商品。
Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.
波克夏提供了想賣出的公司所有者第三種選擇：永久的家，在這個家裡公司的人和文化將 被保留（雖然，偶爾地，管理上的變化將是需要的）。除此之外，我們收購的任何商業，大 幅度地增加他的金融優勢和增長能力。面對銀行和華爾街分析師的日子也永遠地結束了。
Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.
一些出售者不考慮這些事情。但是，當出售者考慮的時候，波克夏就不會有很多競爭了。
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Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.
有時候評論員提議波克夏剝離一部分的公司。這些建議沒有道理。我們所擁有的公司，作 為波克夏的一部分，比作為獨立的實體要更有價值。一個原因是，我們能夠立即而且不用 付稅地，在企業之間移動資本，或者投入新的公司。另外，一些花費會全部或者部分地重複，如果運營是分離的話。這兒有個最明顯的例子：波克夏花費微不足道的錢在單一的董事會 上；如果我們幾十個的子公司都被分離出來，總的董事會花費將增加。所以，一樣地，監管 和管理支援也會增加。
Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.
最後，對於子公司 A，有時候會因為我們擁有子公司 B，而產生重要的稅負效能。例如，一 些稅收計入貸方方式，之所以可以在我們的事業公司使用，只是因為在波克夏的其他公司 的運營中，我們產生了巨大數額的稅收收入。這給予了波克夏•哈撒韋能源一個巨大的優 勢，相比於發展風能和太陽能的大多數公共事業公司。
Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge that assertion?)
投資銀行家，因他們的參與而獲得報酬，持續不斷地催促著收購方，支付高於公眾持股公司 市場價 20％至 50％的溢價。銀行家們告訴購買者，這個溢價是有道理的，因為“控制價值”， 並且因為一旦收購方的 CEO 控制了被收購公司，好的事情就要發生了（急於收購的管理者 將怎樣挑戰這個臆斷？）
A few years later, bankers – bearing straight faces – again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)
一些年以後，銀行家們——繃著張臉——又一次出現了，並且熱切地催促分拆早期兼併的公 司，目的是要“解鎖股東的價值”。分拆，當然，剝離了它宣稱的有“控制價值”的母公司， 沒有任何賠償性支付。銀行家解釋說，分拆後的公司將會繁榮，因為它的管理將會更加具有 企業家精神，從令人窒息的官僚的母公司中解脫出來（我們早前見到的有才幹的 CEO 就這 麼點本事）
If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)
如果這些已經剝離的公司日後希望重新收購分拆的業務，它大概將又一次被銀行家所催促， 為了這種特權支付龐大的“控制”溢價。（銀行界的這類心理“彈性”引起了一種說法，費 用常常導致交易，而不是交易導致了費用）
It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.
如果可能的話，當然，有一天監管層會要求波克夏公司的分拆或者出售。波克夏於 1979 年實施了這種分拆，當時新的，有關持有銀行的監管要求，迫使我們剝離一家位於 Rockford 市, Illinois 州的銀行。
Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire’s ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.
然而，自發的分拆，對我們而言毫無道理。我們將損失控制價值，資本分配的彈性，並且， 在一些情況下，重要的稅收優勢。考慮到源于波克夏的所有權的運營和財務優勢，如果運 營分拆後的公司，我們子公司那群聰明的 CEO 們，現在將面臨困境，而不能如此有效運營。 另外，母公司和分拆後的公司，一旦分離，將可能被課以適量地更多花費，相比于現存的合 並狀況。
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Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let’s look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I’ll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of D Magazine. Look it up on the Internet.
在我離開分拆話題以前，讓我們看個從企業集團中學到的教訓：LTV。我將在這兒做總結， 但那些想看好的金融故事的人應當閱讀在 1982 年 10 月 D Magazine 發表的有關 Jimmy Ling 的文章。上網查查。
Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
經過一些列眼花繚亂的公司操作，Ling 將 LTV 從 1965 年僅僅 3600 萬 美元銷售額，帶到了世界 500 強第 14 名，僅僅花了 2 年時間。Ling，應當注明，從未展現 過任何的管理技巧。但是查理很久以前對我說，不要低估那些高估自己的人。並且，Ling 在那方面無人可比。
Ling’s strategy, which he labeled “project redeployment,” was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: “Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.” The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
Ling 策略，他標名為“專案重新部署”，是買入大公司，然後部分地分拆它的各種部門。 在 LTV 的 1966 年度報告，他解釋了接下來將要發生的魔法：“最重要的是，兼併一定要滿 足 2＋2＝5（或 6）的公式。”媒體，公眾和華爾街喜歡這類的講話。
In 1967 Ling bought, a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and 60 pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals , each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
在 1976 年，Ling 買了 Wilson & Co. 一個巨大的肉類包裝企業，同時也有高爾夫設備和藥 業的權益。很快地，和分拆母公司成三家公司，Wilson & Co. (肉類包裝), Wilson 體育用品 和 Wilson 製藥，每一個都被部分地分拆。這些公司很快被華爾街稱為 肉球，高爾夫球，呆瓜。
Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s,Ling’s empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, fired.
隨後很快，很清楚的是，就像 Icarus 一樣，Ling 飛得太靠近太陽了。在 1970 年代初期， Ling 的帝國消散，他本人也被分拆出了 LTV，就是，被解雇了。
Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have “worked.” Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.
定期地，金融市場會和現 實脫離－你可以依賴它。更多的 Jimmy Ling 們會出現。他們將看起來和聽起來很權威。媒 體將抓住他們的每一個字。銀行家們將為他們的生意打架。他們說的話將近期“發揮作用”。 他們早期的跟隨著將會覺得非常明智。我們的建議是：不論他們說什麼，永遠不要忘記 2＋ 2 將會永遠等於 4.並且當某些人告訴你這個數學公式如何落伍——拉上皮包拉鍊，去度假， 幾年後回來以便宜的價格購買股票。
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Today Berkshire possesses 今天的波克夏擁有
(1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (1) 無與倫比的一系列公司，它們中的大部分，有著很好的經濟前景
(2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire;
(2) 骨幹的管理層，他們少有例外地，往往投身於他們所經營的子公司和波克夏母公司。 (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under all circumstances;
(3)一個極好的多樣化收入，極佳的財務優勢，和大量的流動資金，這些我們會在所有情 況下保持。
(4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and
(4)對於許多的所有者和管理者來說，在考慮出售他們的生意的時候，我們公司是他們的 第一選擇
(5) in a point related to the preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50 years to develop and that is now rock-solid.
(5) 和前面有關的一點是，文化，在許多方面，和大多數的大公司不同，我們公司花了 50 年時間去發展公司文化，現在它堅如磐石。
These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.
這些優勢為我們提供了發展的美妙基礎。
The Next 50 Years at Berkshire
波克夏未來 50 年
Now let’s take a look at the road ahead. Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far off the mark. With that warning, I will tell you what I would say to my family today if they asked me about Berkshire’s future.
現在讓我們看看前方的道路。記住，如果我打算在五十年前判斷接下來的事，我的預測當然 將會大大偏離實際。在這點告誡之後，我將會告訴你，如果我的家庭問我波克夏的未來， 我說些什麼。
First and definitely foremost, I believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for patient Berkshire shareholders is as low as can be found among single-company investments. That’s because our per-share intrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over time.
首先和必然最為重要的是，我相信對於耐心的波克夏投資者而言，永久性的資本損失的機 率，是對單一公司的投資中所能找到最低的。這是因為我們的每股內在商業價值，隨著時間 推移，幾乎是確定增加的。
This cheery prediction comes, however, with an important caution: If an investor’s entry point into Berkshire stock is unusually high – at a price, say, approaching double book value, which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached – it may well be many years before the investor can realize a profit. In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash speculation if it is bought at an elevated price. Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.
然而，這個讓人歡快的預言，卻伴隨著一個重要的謹慎因素：如果波克夏投資者的買入點 不同尋常地高——在一個價格，也就是說，幾乎接近了兩倍的帳面價值，雖然波克夏的股 票只是偶爾地到達這個價格——它可能需要很多年才能讓投資者能夠實現盈利。換句話說， 一個明智的投資可能變成匆忙的投機，如果股票是被高價購買的。波克夏也不會豁免於這 個真理。
Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price modestly above the level at which the company would repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a reasonable period of time. Berkshire’s directors will only authorize repurchases at a price they believe to be well below intrinsic value. (In our view, that is an essential criterion for repurchases that is often ignored by other managements.)
然而，投資者在比于公司回購股份稍微高一點的價格購買波克夏的股票，應當在一個合理 的時間內產生收益。波克夏的董事們僅會在他們相信回購價格遠低於內在價值時，才會批 准回購25。（在我們的觀念中，這是回購的基本標準，這標準經常被其他管理者忽視）
For those investors who plan to sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no assurances,whatever the entry price. Movements of the general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely be far more important in determining your results than the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades ago: “In the short-term the market is a voting machine; in the long-run it acts as a weighing machine.” Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors – amateurs and professionals alike – border on lunacy.
對於那些打算在買入後一兩年內出售股票的投資者而言，我不能夠提供任何保證，不論他們 的買入價格是多少。在如此短的時間內，總體股票市場的變動，對於你結果的影響，將可能 遠遠重要于波克夏股份內在價值相伴發生的變化。就像本傑明 格雷厄姆幾十年前說的： “在短期內，市場是台投票機；在長期內，市場表現得像台稱重機。偶然地，投資者的投票決定——業餘者和投資者都 一樣——近似於神經病
Since I know of no way to reliably predict market movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only if you expect to hold them for at least five years. Those who seek short-term profits should look elsewhere.
因為我知道沒有方法能夠可靠地預測市場變動，我推薦除非你打算持有它們至少五年，否則 你別買波克夏的股票。那些謀求短期利潤的人應當到別處看看。
Another warning: Berkshire shares should not be purchased with borrowed money. There have been three times since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high point. Someday, something close to this kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when. Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for investors. But it could well be a disastrous choice for speculators employing leverage.
另一個告誡：不應當用借來的錢購買波克夏的股票。自從 1965 年以來，曾經有過三次， 我們的股價是從高點跌下大約 50％的。有朝一日，像這類的下跌事情將會再次發生，並且 沒人知道是何時。波克夏將幾乎確定地，會成為投資者27滿意的持有標的。但是它同樣能 成為運用杠杆的投機者的災難性選擇。
I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is essentially zero.We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.
我相信，發生導致波克夏遭遇財務問題的事件機率大體為零。我們總是為千年的洪水做准 備；事實上，如果它發生了，我們將把救生衣賣給那些沒有準備的人。在 2008－2009 的崩 潰中，波克夏作為一個“第一反應者”發揮著重要作用，並且我們此後多於一倍地28增強 了我們的資產負債表和盈利能力。你們的公司是美國商業的直布羅陀29並且將會繼續如此。
Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.
財務維持能力要求一家公司在所有30情況下保持三個優勢：（1）一個巨大且可靠的盈利流 （2）大量的流動資產 並且（3）沒有31重大的近期現金需求。忽視了最後一條，常常導致 公司經歷意想不到的問題：太經常地，賺錢的公司的 CEO 們，感覺他們將總是能夠償還到 期債務，不論它們規模多大。在 2008－2009 年，許多管理者領教了這個思維模式有多麼危 險。
Here’s how we will always stand on the three essentials. First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array of businesses. Our shareholders now own many large companies that have durable competitive advantages, and we will acquire more of those in the future. Our diversification assures Berkshire’s continued profitability, even if a catastrophe causes insurance losses that far exceed any previously experienced.
以下是我們將如何始終32堅持這三個原則：首先，我們的盈利流是巨大的並且來自一大批企 業。我們的股東現在擁有許多具備持續競爭優勢的大型公司，並且我們在未來將收購更多。 我們的多元化保證了波克夏持續的盈利能力，縱使發生一個大災難，產生遠遠超越過去任 何經歷的保險損失。
Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized – as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag on such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.
接下來是現金。在一個運作良好的企業中，現金有時候被認為是需要最小化的東西——作為 沒有收益的資產，拖累淨資產收益率之類的收益標誌。現金，然而，對於企業而言，就像空 氣對於人：當它存在的時候，從來不想它，但當缺了它的時候，卻是心裡唯一想的事物。
American business provided a case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many long-prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their checks would bounce in the days ahead. Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.
美國企業在 2008 年提供了這方面的案例研究。在那年九月份，許多長期興盛的公司突然想 知道，是否它們的支票會在未來的日子裡拒付。一夜之間，它們的財務空氣消失了。
At Berkshire, our “breathing” went uninterrupted. Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to American businesses.
在波克夏，我們的“呼吸”毫無阻礙地進行著。事實上，在九月末、十月初期的三個星期 時間內，我們提供了 156 億美元的新資金給美國的企業。
We could do that because we always maintain at least $20 billion – and usually far more – in cash equivalents. And by that we mean U.S. Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so, except when it is truly needed. When bills come due, only cash is legal tender. Don’t leave home without it.
我們能夠做到這點，因為我們總是 保持最少 200 億美元——並且常常遠多於此——的現金等價物。並且在此，我們說的是美國 國債，而不是那些聲稱提供流動性，並且實際上能夠這麼做的現金替代物，除了33當它們真的被需要的時候。當債務到期，只有現金是法定貨幣。出行不能沒有它。
Finally – getting to our third point – we will never engage in operating or investment practices that can result in sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose Berkshire to short-term debt maturities of size nor enter into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that could require large collateral calls.
最後——到達我們的第三點——我們從不參與運營或投資會導致突然需要大量資金的企業。 那意味著，我們將不會把波克夏暴露在短期到期的債務，不會進入衍生品契約，或者其他 需要大量抵押物的企業協議
Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.
幾年以前，我們參與了某些衍生品合約，我們相信是大幅地被錯誤定價，並且只需要少量的 抵押物。這些已經被證明相當地有利可圖。然而，最近，新訂立的衍生品合約需要完全的抵 押物。這終結了我們對於衍生品的興趣，不論它們可能提供何種的盈利潛力。幾年來，我們 沒有簽署這些合約，除了少數是因為我們的公共事業公司的運營需要。
Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline – but only at a very slow pace.
此外，我們將不會簽署那些客戶可以選擇取出現金的保險合約。一些人壽保險產品包含了贖 回特徵，使得它們在極端恐慌的時候易受“流動”的影響。然而，那類的合同，不會出現在 我們所採用的財產保險世界中。即使我們的保費數量會減少，我們的浮存金會減少——但是 只在很慢的速度。
The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will happen. Though practically all days are relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain. (I felt no special apprehension on December 6, 1941 or September 10, 2001.) And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.
對於一些人而言，這種保守是極端的，我們保守的原因，是因為完全地可以預測，人們會偶 爾地恐慌，但完全不可預測，何時會發生。雖然實際上所有的日子相對地無事，明天總是不 確定的。（在 1941 年 12 月 6 日35，或者 2001 年 9 月 11 日，我沒有感到特別不安。）如果 你不能預測明天會發生什麼，你必須為無論發生什麼做好準備。
A CEO who is 64 and plans to retire at 65 may have his own special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny chance of happening in a given year. He may, in fact, be “right” 99% of the time. Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us. We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds you’ve entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100 chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to risk losing what you need in pursuing what you simply desire.
一個 64 歲並且打算在 65 歲退休的 CEO，可能有他自己的特殊計算，以評估在一年內僅有 很小發生概率的風險。他可能，實際上，99％的時間都是“正確”的。然而，那些幾率，對 我們沒有吸引力。我們將永遠不會用你們託付給我們的資金，玩財務的俄羅斯輪盤36，即使 隱喻的槍有 100 個槍膛，且僅有一發子彈。在我們看來，冒著損失你需要的，去追求你僅僅 渴望的，是瘋狂的。
Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year to build the underlying per-share earning power of Berkshire. That does not mean operating earnings will increase each year – far from it. TheU.S.economy will ebb and flow – though mostly flow – and, when it weakens, so will our current earnings. But we will continue to achieve organic gains, make bolt-on acquisitions and enter new fields. I believe, therefore, that Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.
儘管我們保守，我想我們將能夠每年繼續增加波克夏潛在的每股盈利能力。這並不意味著 經營收益將每年增加——遠非如此。美國經濟將起起伏伏——雖然主要是上漲——並且，當 它減弱的時候，我們當前的盈利也會減弱。但是我們將繼續取得逐步的收益，做追加並購， 並且進入新的領域。所以，我相信，波克夏將會每年增加它的潛在盈利能力。
In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, competition, and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are blessed to have the United Statesas our home field.
在一些年裡，收益將會是大量的，在其他時候，它們將是少量的。市場，競爭和機會將會決 定何時機會出現在我們面前。儘管這些，波克夏將繼續保持前進，由一批我們現在擁有的 可靠的企業，和我們將購買的新企業所驅動。此外，在多數年份裡，我們國家的經濟的這將 為公司提供強烈的助力。上帝保佑，我們有美國作為主場。
The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains – measured by percentages, not by dollars – cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great.
壞消息是，波克夏的長期收益——用百分比衡量，而不是美元——不能夠急劇的增長，並 且將不會接近在過去 50 年裡取得的收益。其數字已經變得過於龐大。我想波克夏將超越 平均的美國公司的表現，但是我們的優勢，如果有的話，不會太大。
Eventually – probably between ten and twenty years from now – Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings. At that time our directors will need to determine whether the best method to distribute the excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchases or both. If Berkshire shares are selling below intrinsic business value, massive repurchases will almost certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your directors will make the right decision.
最終——可能從現在起十年到二十年的時間——波克夏的盈利和資本資源將到達一個水 平，將使得管理者不能明智地重新投資所有的公司盈利。在那時候，我們的主管將需要決定 是否最好的分配多餘盈利的方式是通過股息，股份回購，或者二者皆是。如果波克夏的股 份是低於內在商業價值的價格出售，大量的回購將幾乎確定地是最好的選擇。你能夠放心的 是你的主管們將會做出正確的決定。
No company will be more shareholder-minded than Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have annually reaffirmed our Shareholder Principles (see page 117), always leading off with: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” This covenant with you is etched in stone.
沒有公司會比波克夏公司更加重視股東。在超過 30 年的時間裡，我們每年重申我們的股 東原則（參見 117 頁），總是以此開頭：“雖然我們的形式是公司，我們的態度是合夥制。” 這個與你們之間的協議，是刻在石頭上的。
We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise of partnership. None took the job for the money: In an arrangement almost non-existent elsewhere, our directors are paid only token fees. They receive their rewards instead through ownership of Berkshire shares and the satisfaction that comes from being good stewards of an important enterprise.
我們有個很博學的和以商業為導向的董事會，準備執行合夥制的承諾。沒有人為了金錢而做 工作：在一個幾乎不存在於別處的安排之下，我們的董事僅僅收取象徵性的費用。取而代之 的是，他們通過波克夏股份的所有權，接受他們的回報，並且從當好一個重要企業的管家 中，獲得滿足感。
The shares that they and their families own – which, in many cases, are worth very substantial sums – were purchased in the market (rather than their materializing through options or grants). In addition, unlike almost all other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. At Berkshire, directors walk in your shoes.
他們和他們的家庭所擁有的股份—— 在很多情況下，價值非常大的金額——是從市場中購 買的（而不是通過他們的期權或者補助實現的）。另外，不像幾乎所有其他大型上市公司， 我們沒有董事和職員的責任保險。在波克夏，董事們站在你的立場看問題。
To further ensure continuation of our culture, I have suggested that my son, Howard, succeed me as a nonexecutive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is to make change easier if the wrong CEO should ever be employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move forcefully. I can assure you that this problem has a very low probability of arising at Berkshire – likely as low as at any public company. In my service on the boards of nineteen public companies, however, I’ve seen how hard it is to replace a mediocre CEO if that person is also Chairman. (The deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.)
為了繼續保證我們文化的延續性，我建議我的兒子，霍華德，接替我作為公司的非執行主席。 我希望如此的唯一原因是，如果錯誤的 CEO 被聘用，需要主席強制解聘他，改變起來會更 加簡單。我可以對你們保證，這個問題在波克夏發生概率很低——就像在任何上市公司發生的概率一樣低。然而，在我所服務的十九家上市公司的董事會中，我曾見過要替代一個平 庸的 CEO 是多麼困難，如果那人又是主席的話。(換人行為通常會完成，但是幾乎總是非常 晚。)
If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at the job other than that required of all directors. He will simply be a safety valve to whom any director can go if he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other directors are expressing doubts as well. Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard’s chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and properly addressed.
如果當選，霍華德將會無償服務並且將不在此工作上花費任何時間，除非所有的董事要求。 他將僅僅成為安全閥，任何董事都能夠找他，如果他或者她擔憂 CEO 的情況，並且希望知 道是否其他的董事也同樣表示出疑慮。如果多個董事表示擔憂，霍華德的主席地位將使得事 情快速和合理地解決。
Choosing the right CEO is all-important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily a job of capital allocation, coupled with the selection and retention of outstanding managers to captain our operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires the replacement of a subsidiary’s CEO when that is called for. These duties require Berkshire’s CEO to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior. It’s important as well that he knows his limits. (As Tom Watson, Sr. of IBM said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.”)
選擇正確的 CEO 是非常重要的，並且在波克夏的董事會中是一件 值得花費很多時間的事情。管理波克夏主要是資本配置的工作，還有選擇和保留出色的管 理者，去領導我們的運營子公司。顯然地，工作同樣需要替換子公司的 CEO，如果需要的 話。這些職責需要波克夏的 CEO 是個理性的，鎮靜的和果斷的人，並且知道自己的局限 性。（正如 Tom Watson，IBM 的高管說的，“我不是天才，但我在某些領域方聰明，並且我在那些領域堅持。”）
Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be “all in” for the company, not for himself. (I’m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can’t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it’s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO’s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it’s clear to them that shareholders’ interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking
品格是最重要的：一個波克夏的 CEO 必須為了公司“投入所有”，而不是為了他自己。 （我使用男性代詞以避免笨拙的措辭，但性別不應當決定誰成為 CEO。）他不得不賺取遠 多於可能需要的金錢。但重要的是，自大和貪婪都不會促使他伸手索要報酬，以趕上他那些 用最奢侈的方式補償的同輩，縱使他的成就遠勝於他們的。一個 CEO 的行為對經理人有巨 大的影響：如果他們清楚，對 CEO 而言，股東的利益是至高無上的，他們將，少有例外地， 同樣抱有這樣的想法。
My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past.
我的繼任者將需要具備一個其他的特殊優點：有能力擺脫企業衰退的因素，即傲慢，官僚和 自滿。當這些公司癌症轉移，縱使最強的公司都會衰退。有眾多的例子去證明這個觀點，但 為了保持友誼，我將僅僅從那些遙遠的過去發掘案例
In their glory days, General Motors, IBM, Sears Roebuck and U.S. Steel sat atop huge industries. Their strengths seemed unassailable. But the destructive behavior I deplored above eventually led each of them to fall to depths that their CEOs and directors had not long before thought impossible. Their one-time financial strength and their historical earning power proved no defense.
在巔峰時期，通用汽車，IBM, 西爾斯羅巴克，和美國鋼鐵在幾大行業排行榜首。它們的優 點看上去無懈可擊。但是我上文所譴責的破壞性行為，最終使得它們中的每一個，都掉入了 其 CEO 和董事在不久前都認為不可能的深淵。它們一時的財務優勢，和他們歷史的盈利能 力被證明毫無保護作用。
Only a vigilant and determined CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire grows ever larger. He must never forget Charlie’s plea: “Tell me where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” If our noneconomic values were to be lost, much of Berkshire’s economic value would collapse as well. “Tone at the top” will be key to maintaining Berkshire’s special culture.
當波克夏變得更加龐大的時候，僅有警惕的和堅定的 CEO 能夠避開此種削弱力量。他必 須永遠不忘查理的請求：“告訴我，我會在哪裡死去，所以我將永遠不會去那兒。” 如果 我們的非經濟價值會損失，大部分的波克夏經濟價值同樣會崩塌。“高層基調”將是保持波克夏特殊文化的關鍵。
Fortunately, the structure our future CEOs will need to be successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire is not a giant company but rather a collection of large companies. At headquarters, we have never had a committee nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets (though many use them as an important internal tool). We don’t have a legal office nor departments that other companies take for granted: human relations, public relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name it.
幸運的是，使得我們未來的 CEO 們成功，所需要的結構已經切實地準備好了。現在存在于波克夏的，特別授權的許可權是對官僚主義的理想解藥。在運營的意義上，波克夏不是一 個大的公司，而是一群大公司。在總部，我們從未有委員會，也從不要求我們的子公司提交 預算（雖然許多公司使用它們作為重要的內部工具）。我們不擁有法律辦公室，也不擁有其 他公司認為理所應當的部門：人力關係，公共關係，投資者關係，戰略，並購，但凡你想得 起來的。
We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a dammed fool. To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operations with a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired their businesses. With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed.
我們，當然，有定期進行的審計職務；沒道理成為一個積累問題的傻瓜。38然而，我們以一 種不尋常的程度，相信我們的經理們會以熱情的管家觀念，進行他們的運營。畢竟，他們正 在做的，正是我們收購他們企業前的事情。此外，除了偶爾的例外，相比於一連串的指令， 無盡的檢查，層層的官僚制度所取得的成績，我們的信任要產生更好的結果。如果位置顛倒 的話，查理和我嘗試以我們所希望的被對待的方式，和我們的管理者互動，
Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to know well. Our directors also believe that an incoming CEO should be relatively young, so that he or she can have a long run in the job. Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over ten years at the helm. (It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.) And they are not likely to retire at 65 either (or have you noticed?) .
我們的董事相信，我們未來的 CEO 們，將來自波克夏董事會已經逐步瞭解清楚的內部候 選人中。我們的董事同樣相信，新任的 CEO 應當相對地年輕，所以他或者她能夠長期工作。 如果 CEO 們領導企業的時間平均遠超十年，波克夏將最好地運營。（很難教會一隻新狗 舊的把戲。）並且他們也不可能在 65 歲退休（或者你已經注意到了什麼嗎？）
In both Berkshire’s business acquisitions and large, tailored investment moves, it is important that our counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with Berkshire’s CEO. Developing confidence of that sort and cementing relationships takes time. The payoff, though, can be huge.
在波克夏的企業並購和大型的，為波克夏量身定制的投資行動中，重要的一點是，我們 的對手方熟悉並放心于波克夏的 CEO。形成那種的信任並且鞏固關係需要時間。回報， 然而，可能是巨大的。
Both the board and I believe we now have the right person to succeed me as CEO – a successor ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down. In certain important respects, this person will do a better job than I am doing.
董事會和我都相信我們現在有合適的人選去繼承我 CEO 的位置—— 在我死後或者退位之 後，有一個繼承者準備好擔當此項工作。在某些重要的方面，這個人將做得比我現在做的還 要好。
Investments will always be of great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several specialists. They will report to the CEO because their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment managers will enjoy great autonomy. In this area, too, we are in fine shape for decades to come. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, each of whom has spent several years on Berkshire’s investment team, are firstrate in all respects and can be of particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.
對波克夏而言，投資將總是非常重要的，並將由多位專家處理。他們將對 CEO 報告，因 為他們的投資決定，在廣闊意義上，需要和波克夏的運營和並購專案相協調。然而，總的 來說，我們的投資經理將享受很大的自主權。在這方面，同樣，我們未來幾十年將處於良好 的情況。Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler，他們都在波克夏的投資團隊花了許多年時間，在 所有方面都是一流的，能夠在評估並購方面，給予 CEO 特別的幫助。
All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right people in place – the right directors, managers and prospective successors to those managers. Our culture, furthermore, is embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative. To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves. For very good reasons, business owners and operating managers with values similar to ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a one-of-a-kind and permanent home.
總之，為了查理和我離開舞臺後的歲月，波克夏被完美地安置。我們準備了正確的人選— —正確的董事們，管理者們和那些管理者們可能的繼任者。另外，我們的文化，是根植於他 們全體成員的。我們的系統同樣是可再生的。在大的程度上，好和壞的文化都自我選擇永存 它們自身。那些和我們價值觀相同的企業所有者和運營管理者，將繼續被波克夏，一個獨 一無二的和永恆的家所吸引，是有理由的。
I would be remiss if I didn’t salute another key constituency that makes Berkshire special: our shareholders. Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in spades at last year’s annual meeting, where the shareholders were offered a proxy resolution:
如果我沒有像其他重要的，使波克夏特別的關鍵支持者們致敬，那我將是不負責的：我們 的股東。波克夏的確具有一個不同於任何其他巨型企業的所有者基礎。這個事實在去年年 會上被肯定地證實，那時候股東收到一個代理人的解決方案：
RESOLVED: Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs and since the owners unlike Warren are not multi billionaires, the board shall consider paying a meaningful annual dividend on the shares.
解決方案：鑒於公司已有的資金多於它所需要的，並且因為所有者們不像巴菲特那樣是億萬 富翁，董事會應當考慮支付有意義的每年分紅。
The sponsoring shareholder of that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes had been tallied, and they were enlightening.
倡議此解決方案的股東從未出現在會議上，所以他的提議沒有被正式地提出。然而，代理投 票還是被清點了，並且它們是富有啟發性的。
Not surprisingly, the A shares – owned by relatively few shareholders, each with a large economic interest – voted “no” on the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.
不出意外地，A 股——由相對少數股東持有， 他們每一個人都有大的經濟利益——在分紅問題上投了“不”，差額是 89 比 1.
The remarkable vote was that of our B shareholders. They number in the hundreds of thousands – perhaps even totaling one million – and they voted 660,759,855 “no” and 13,927,026 “yes,” a ratio of about 47 to 1.
引人注目的投票是我們 B 股股東的投票。他們的數量成千上萬——可能甚至總數一百萬人 ——他們投票是 660,759,855 “不”和 13,927,026 “是,” 比例大約 47 比 1。
Our directors recommended a “no” vote but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares voting said, in effect, “Don’t send us a dividend but instead reinvest all of the earnings.” To have our fellow owners – large and small – be so in sync with our managerial philosophy is both remarkable and rewarding.
我們的董事們推薦“不”票但除此之外，公司沒有打算影響股東。然而，98％的股份實際上 投票說，“不要給我們紅利，而是取而代之地，重新投資所有的盈利。”擁有我們的股東— —大的和小的——都和我們的管理哲學如此同步，是不同尋常的，也是有回報的。
I am a lucky fellow to have you as partners.
有你們做夥伴，我真是幸運的傢伙。
華倫·巴菲特
Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future
副董事長的想法:過去和未來
To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏•哈撒韋股東：
I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.
我近距離地觀察了波克夏在華倫·巴菲特領導下過去五十年不同尋常的成功。現在看上去 是合適的時候，讓我獨立地補充，不論他本人會做出何種的紀念性評論。我將嘗試著做 5 件事情。
(1) Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,
(1) 描述其管理系統和政策，使得一個小型的，註定要失敗的紡織商品企業，變成現在的 龐大的波克夏，
(2) Explain how the management system and policies came into being,
(2) 解釋管理系統和政策如何形成
(3) Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,
(3) 解釋，在某種程度上，為什麼波克夏做得如此之好。
(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and
(4)如果巴菲特很快就卸任的話，預測是否不同尋常的好結果會繼續，並且
(5) Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
(5) 考慮是否波克夏過去 50 年的優異成績有些啟示，可能在別處也被證明有用。
The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:
巴菲特領導下的波克夏的管理系統和政策（在此統稱為“波克夏系統”）很早就就固定， 並且描述如下：
(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.
(1)波克夏將是一個分散的企業集團, 其僅會反對那些不能做出令人滿意預測的業務類型。
(2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.
(2) 它的母公司將會做幾乎所有類型的生意，通過獨立的股份有限子公司，子公司 CEO 們 的經營將會有極大自治權
(3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.
(3) 企業集團的總部幾乎沒有任何東西，除了一個小辦公司套間，包括一個主席，一個 CFO， 一些主要幫助 CFO 做審計，內部控制的助手。
(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.
(4) 波克夏子公司將顯著地總會包括災害保險公司。這些成群的保險公司將被期待著及 時產生可靠的承保收入，並且也會產生大量的“浮存金”（來自還未支付的保險負債）用於 投資。
(5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.
(5) 沒有顯著的，系統性的人員系統，股票期權系統，其他激勵系統，退休系統，或者諸 如此類系統，因為子公司將有他們自己的系統，而系統常常是不同的。
(6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.
(6) 波克夏主席自己將僅做很少的事情
(i) He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.
(i)他將管理幾乎所有的證券投資，它們通常屬於波克夏的災害保險公司。
(ii) He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.
(ii)他將選擇所有重要子公司的 CEO，他將會確定他們的報酬，並且從他們每個人的私人 推薦中獲得繼任者（人選），如果突然需要繼任者的話。
(iii) He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.
(iii)他將在子公司增加了它們的競爭優勢之後，配置其不需要的大部分現金，理想的配置 是使用那些現金去收購新的子公司。
(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.
(iv) 若子公司 CEO 有任何聯絡的需要，他將立即能夠被聯絡，並且他將幾乎不需要另外的聯絡。
(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours 75 of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.
(v) 他將在他的年度報告中撰寫長篇的，有邏輯的，有用的信件，此信件將被設計成，如 果他本人是一個僅僅被動持有的股東，所希望成為的樣子，並且他將能花幾小時的時間，在 年度股東大會上回答問題。
(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.
(vi)他將嘗試著成為，一個對顧客、股東和其他在職者而言，長期運作良好的文化的榜樣， 在他卸任前後都是如此。
(vii) His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and
(vii) 他的首要任務將是保留大量時間安靜地閱讀和思考，特別是那些可能提高他的決策的 學習，不論他變得多老，並且
(viii) He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing. (viii)他也將花費許多時間在熱情地欽佩他人的成就
(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.
(7)新的子公司將通常被現金收購，而不是新發行股票。
(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.
(8) 只要能用一美元的留存利潤，為股東創造多於一美元的市場價值，波克夏就將不會 支付股利。
(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters. (9) 關於購買新子公司，波克夏將尋求以合理的價格購買好的生意，此生意是主席能夠 很好地理解的。波克夏將同樣希望（該公司）有一個好的 CEO 在任，他被期待繼續長期 留任，並且能在不需要總部説明的情況下，很好地管理公司
(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.
(10) 關於選擇子公司的 CEO，波克夏將設法確保其可靠，有技能，有活力並熱愛 CEO 所在企業和環境。
(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary. (11) 作為重要的優先選擇的方式, 波克夏將幾乎不會出售子公司。
(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary. (12) 波克夏幾乎不會將子公司的 CEO 調到其他不相關子公司（任職）
(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.
(13)波克夏將不會強迫子公司的 CEO 僅因為年齡退休
(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.
(14) 波克夏將少有債務未清償，因為它試圖保持 (i) 在任何狀況下，實質上完美的信譽 和 (ii) 當出現不同尋常的機會的時候，容易獲得可以調配的現金和貸款。
(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.
（15）對潛在的大公司的賣家而言，波克夏將總是友好的。一個此類公司的報價，將獲得 快速的關注。在波克夏，只有主席和一兩個其他人，會知道這個報價，如果此報價沒有導 致交易的話。並且他們將不會告訴局外人有關交易的事。
Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.
波克夏系統的要素和它們聚集的規模都是如此不同尋常。據我所知，沒有其他的大型企業 具備一半這樣的要素。
How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?
波克夏如何恰好擁有一個如此與眾不同的企業性格呢？
Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.
嗯，巴菲特，即使當年僅有 34 歲而已，控制了大約 45％的波克夏股份，並且完全被其他 大股東所信任。他能夠建立任何他所想要的系統。並且他也這麼做了，創造了波克夏系統。
Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.
幾乎每個要素的選擇，都是因為巴菲特相信，在他的領導下，它將幫助最大化波克夏的成 就。他不打算為其他的企業，創造一個適用於所有的系統。事實上，波克夏的子公司們並 不需要在它們自身的運營中使用波克夏的系統。並且即使採用不同的系統，一些公司也很 興盛。
What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?
當巴菲特設計波克夏系統的時候，他的目標是什麼？
Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:
(1) He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.
(2) He wanted win/win results everywhere--in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.
(3) He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.
(4) He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.
(5) He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.
嗯，這些年來，我分析了幾個重要的因素：
(1) 他特別希望，持續最大化多數此系統中重要人員的理性，技巧和奉獻精神，從他自己 開始。
(2) 他希望處處都有 雙贏 的結果——比如說，用忠誠待人的方式，去獲得忠誠
(3) 他希望做出最大化長期結果的決定，從通常持續在位足夠長時間，以承擔決定結果的 決策者那裡尋求（決策答案/參考）
(4) 他希望最小化總部內，來自龐大官僚機構的，幾乎不可避免的負面影響
(5) 他希望親身地做出貢獻，像本傑明 格雷厄姆教授那樣，傳播他所獲得的智慧。
When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.
當巴菲特開發波克夏系統的時候，他預見到了所有後來發生的好處麼？不。巴菲特磕磕絆 絆地通過實踐的進化，才獲得了一些好處。但是，當他看到有用的結果時，他強化了它們的 成因。
Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?
為什麼波克夏在巴菲特的領導下做得如此出色？
Only four large factors occur to me:
(1) The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,
(2) The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,
(3) Good luck, and
(4) The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.
我只想到四大因素：
(1) 巴菲特有益的特性
(2) 波克夏系統有益的特性
(3) 好運，以及
(4) 一些股東和其他崇拜者，包括一些媒體界人士，不尋常地強烈的，有傳染性的忠誠
I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.
我相信所有四個因素都存在且有用。但是沉重的貨物，是由有益的特性，不尋常的忠誠，和 他們之間的關係，所承載的。
In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.
特別地, 巴菲特決定限制他的業務於少數類型，而且最大化他的注意力於此類類型，並持續 如此做了 50 年，非常出色。巴菲特的成功和羅傑 費德勒成為網球高手的原因是一樣的。
Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.
巴菲特，事實上，使用了著名棒球教練 John Wooden 的致勝方法。John Wooden 在學會分配 幾乎所有的上場時間給他最好的七名球員之後，基本上就經常地獲得勝利。採用這種方式， 對手總是面對他最好的球員，而不是次好的。並且，因有額外的比賽時間，最好的球員比一 般球員提升更多。
And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.
而且巴菲特的情況大大超越了 Wooden，因為技能的練習集中於一個人，而不是七個，隨著 他 50 年間變得越來越老，他的技能提升再提升，而不是像棒球運動員的技能那樣退化。
Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.
此外，以在長期服務的，重要子公司的 CEO 身上集中如此多才華和權力的方式，巴菲特也 創造了強大的 Wooden 式效果。並且此類效果提高了 CEO 的能力和子公司的成績。
Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.
然後，因為波克夏系統授予了許多子公司和它們的 CEO 所渴望的自治，以及波克夏變 得成功且著名，這些結果吸引更多，更好的子公司進入到波克夏，也吸引了更好的 CEO。
And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”
更好的子公司和 CEO 需要總部更少的關注，創造常被稱為“良性迴圈”（的局面）。
How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?
總是將災害保險公司，作為重要的子公司，對波克夏的發展而言有多麼好？
Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.
不可思議地好。波克夏的雄心是無由地強烈，並且，縱使如此，它得到的它所想要的。
Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.
災害保險經常投資於普通股，其價值大概以股東權益計算，正如波克夏的保險子公司做的 那樣。並且，在過去 50 年裡，標準普爾 500 指數每年提供大約 10％的稅前收益，創造了重 要的推力。
And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.
並且，在巴菲特時代早期的幾十年裡，波克夏保險子公司內的普通股大幅地勝過指數，正 如巴菲特所期待的那樣。隨後，當波克夏龐大的持股規模和收入稅收考慮，導致戰勝指數 部分的收益退化到不重要的時候（或許不是永遠的），其他的和更好的優勢出現了。Ajit Jain 從零開始創造了一個龐大的再保險公司，產生巨量的“浮存金”和大量承保收益。並且 GEICO 整個併入了波克夏，隨後 GEICO 的市場價值變成原來的四倍。還有，其他的波克夏保險運營大幅度地提高，主要是憑藉企業的聲譽優勢，承保條款，尋找和留在好的利基市場， 並招募和保留傑出的人才。
Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.
隨後，晚些時候，因為波克夏幾乎獨特且很可靠的企業人格和大的規模，變得非常著名， 它的保險子公司獲得並抓住了許多吸引人的，其他公司所不能獲得的機會，去購買非公開發 行的有價證券。這些有價證券的大多數，有固定的到期期限，並產生良好的結果。
Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.
波克夏在保險領域不可思議的結果不是自然而然的。通常地，一個災害保險公司是平庸結 果的製造者，縱使是在相當好地管理下。此種結果沒什麼作用。波克夏的更好結果，是如 此令人震驚地巨大，我相信巴菲特現在難以再次創造它，如果其變回到一個小公司，縱使巴 菲特保持他的聰明且回復年輕。
Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.
波克夏因為成為分散的企業集團而痛苦麼？不，通過範圍更廣泛的經營，它的機會有效地 擴大了。並且，在其他地方很普遍的負面影響，通過巴菲特的技能得以避免。
Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.
為什麼波克夏傾向于用現金購買公司，而不是它自己的股票？嗯，通過交換獲得的任何股 份，要與所讓出的波克夏股份價值相當，是很困難的。
Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?
為什麼在保險公司之外，波克夏為股東而進行的公司收購，進展如此順利，當此類收購的 通常結果，對於（其他公司的）收購者的股東而言是壞的時候？
Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.
嗯，波克夏，依據設計，有方法論上的優勢，以補充它更好的機會。它從未設立與“收購 部門”等價的部門，在壓力下購買公司。並且它從不依賴於“幫助者”的建議，他們一定有 支援交易的偏見。而且巴菲特自以為走投無路，正如他聲稱沒有專業知識，但是他知道的比 大多數公司管理者還要多，知道哪些在商業中有用，哪些沒用，借助于他作為一個被動投資 者的長期經驗。並且，最後地，即使當波克夏比其他公司獲得更好的機會，巴菲特經常表 現出幾乎非人的耐心，並很少購買。舉例說來，在他控制波克夏公司的前十年裡，巴菲特 看著一個公司（紡織）走向死亡，兩家新公司進入，淨增一家公司。
What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually 81 sure things.
在巴菲特的領導下，波克夏所犯的大錯有哪些？嗯，雖然主動作為的錯誤是普遍的，但幾 乎所有大的錯誤都是源於沒有購買，包括當沃爾瑪一定會發展極為順利的時候，沒有購買它 的股票。遺漏的錯誤是同樣重要的。波克夏如果能夠足夠聰明，認識到那些事實上確定的 機會，並且抓住一些，其淨值現在將至少多出 500 億美元。
The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.
在我清單上，接著上一個任務的是：如果巴菲特很快就卸任的話，預測是否不同尋常的好結 果會繼續。
The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.
回答是：是的。波克夏在它的子公司中已經具備許多公司（可延續的）勢頭，根植於許多 長期競爭優勢。
Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.
另外，它的鐵路和公共事業子公司現在提供非常令人滿意的機會，以在新的固定資產上，投 資大量金額。並且許多子公司現在正參與明智的“附加的”並購。
Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.
假設大部分的波克夏系統保持原樣，現在所展現的勢頭和機會的結合是如此巨大，以至於波克夏將幾乎肯定會繼續在非常長時間內，優於一般的企業，縱使（1）巴菲特明天離開， （2）他的繼任者是只有平庸能力的人，並且（3）波克夏決不再購買一個大公司。
But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.
但是，在這個巴菲特很快離開的假設之下，他的繼任者將不是“僅有平庸能力”的。例如， Ajit Jain 和 Greg Abel 是已經證明表現的人，他們的表現可能將會被描述為“世界級”。如 果讓我選擇，我會用“世界領先”描述。在一些重要的方面，他們中每一個都是比巴菲特更 好的企業管理者。
And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.
並且我相信 Jain 和 Abel 都不會（1）離開波克夏，不論其他人開價如何 （2）要求大幅改 變波克夏系統
Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.
我也不認為令人滿意的新企業購買將會隨著巴菲特離開而結束。鑒於波克夏現在如此龐 大，和我們面臨的激進投資主義時代，我認為一些令人滿意的收購機會將會來到，並且伯克 希爾的 600 億美元現金將有益地減少。
My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
我最後的任務是考慮是否波克夏過去 50 年的優異成績有些啟示，可能在別處也被證明有 用。
The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.
答案顯而易見的是。在巴菲特的早期幾年，波克夏面前有一個大任務：將一個小的儲藏物， 變成一個巨大而有用的企業。而且它會採用長期避免官僚主義，和很大程度上依賴于深思熟 慮的領導人的方式，去解決問題，因為他會繼續進步，並且請來更多像他自己一樣的人。
Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.
與典型的大公司系統相比較，它們的總部很官僚，並有一串 CEO 在大約 59 歲入職，此後很 少停下來安靜思考，且很快因固定的退休年齡而被迫離職。
I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.
我相信，波克夏系統版本將會被更加經常地在別處嘗試，並且官僚主義最壞的屬性將會被 更經常地像癌症般對待，它們是如此類似。一個好的修正官僚主義的例子，是喬治 馬歇爾 創造的，當時他從議會獲得權力，忽略選擇將軍所需的級別，從而幫助贏得了二戰。 Sincerely,
查理·孟格