巴菲特致股東函 2009

		Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
		Annual Percentage Change
	in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire			in S&P 500 with Dividends Included			Relative Results
Year		(1)			(2)		(1)-(2)
1965		23.80			10.00		13.8
1966		20.30			(11.70)		32.0
1967		11.00			30.90		(19.9)
1968		19.00			11.00		8.0
1969		16.20			(8.40)		24.6
1970		12.00			3.90		8.1
1971		16.40			14.60		1.8
1972		21.70			18.90		2.8
1973		4.70			(14.80)		19.5
1974		5.50			(26.40)		31.90
1975		21.90			37.20		(15.30)
1976		59.30			23.60		35.70
1977		31.90			(7.40)		39.3
1978		24.00			6.40		17.6
1979		35.70			18.20		17.5
1980		19.30			32.30		(13.0)
1981		31.40			(5.00)		36.4
1982		40.00			21.40		18.6
1983		32.30			22.40		9.9
1984		13.60			6.10		7.50
1985		48.20			31.60		16.6
1986		26.10			18.60		7.5
1987		19.50			5.10		14.4
1988		20.10			16.60		3.5
1989		44.40			31.70		12.70
1990		7.40			(3.10)		10.5
1991		39.60			30.50		9.10
1992		20.30			7.60		12.7
1993		14.30			10.10		4.2
1994		13.90			1.30		12.60
1995		43.10			37.60		5.5
1996		31.80			23.00		8.8
1997		34.10			33.40		.7
1998		48.30			28.60		19.7
1999		0.50			21.00		(20.50)
2000		6.50			(9.10)		15.6
2001		(6.20)			(11.90)		5.70
2002		10.00			(22.10)		32.10
2003		21.00			28.70		(7.70)
2004		10.50			10.90		(0.40)
2005		6.40			4.90		1.50
2006		18.40			15.80		2.60
2007		11.00			5.50		5.50
2008		(9.60)			(37.00)		27.40
2009		19.80			26.50		(6.70)
Average Annual Gain — 1965-2009		20.3%			9.3%		11.00
Overall Gain — 1964-2009		434057.0%			5430.0%

說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. 

1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：

Our gain in net worth during 2009 was $21.8 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 19.8%. Over the last 45 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.*

2009年，公司淨利潤為218億美元，每股賬面價值增長了19.8%。也就是說，自從現任管理層接手公司之後，45年來，每股賬面價值從19美元增長到84，487美元，年復合增長率為20.3%。

*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。

Berkshire’s recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It’s important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire’s operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you – but particularly our new shareholders – to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I’m gone.

我們當前的股東人數大約為500，000名，而最近波克夏收購伯林頓北方公司的行為，至少又增加了65000名股東。對我和我長期合作夥伴查理·孟格來說，更重要的是，我們的所有者認同波克夏的業務、目標、約束和文化。因此，在每篇報告裡，我們都重述了引導我們的經濟原則。我強烈建議特別是新股東，要認真閱讀這些原則。歷年來波克夏一直恪守這些原則，而且將來我離開後也會繼續遵守下去。

In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.

此外，在股東信中，我們將再次審查下基本業務，希望能給伯林頓北方公司新來者提供新生定位培訓，同時對波克夏老員工提供一次培訓。

How We Measure Ourselves
我們如何衡量自己

Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have – or have not – accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.

從一開始，查理和我就對評估我們完成了什麼和未完成什麼堅持理性和堅決的標準。那防止我們抵擋不住誘惑。

Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?

選擇標普500作為我們的標準是一個很簡單的選擇，因為我們的股東幾乎不用花任何成本就可以通過持有指數基金來獲得相應的業績。他們為什麼要給我們錢來僅僅複製那個結果呢?

A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.

我們的一個更難的決定是如何計算波克夏相對標普S&P 500 的進展。有的觀點說用我們股價的變化。事實上，在一個長期的時間，這是最好的選擇。但每年股票價格是非常反复無常的。即使包括10年數據的估值，也會因估值期早期或末期特別高或低的價格而變得不正常。微軟的Steve Ballmer，GE的Jeff Immelt可以告訴你那個問題，當他們接手管理時，他們股票在極端的價格交易使他們痛苦不堪。

The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value – understated though it is – supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.

計算我們每年增長的最佳標準是波克夏每股內在價值的變化。可是，那個價值不可以通過任何接近精確地數據計算得出，因此，我們給他一個粗略的代替：每股賬面價值。另外，多數公司的賬面價值比他的內在價值少。波克夏無疑也是這種情況。總體來說，我們業務的價值遠超於他的賬面價值。我們非常重要的保險業務，這個差異是巨大的。即使如此，查理和我都認為賬面價值最有效跟踪內在價值的變化，即使它低估了內在價值。運用這種計算方法，正如這封信首段所述，從1965財政年度開始，我們賬面價格每年增長20.3%。

We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.

我們應該注意，如果我們用市場價格作為我們的標準，波克夏的業績看起來會更好;從1965財政年度開始，每年的複合增長率為22%。驚訝的是，複合年增長率小小的不同造成了這45年收益率的大大不同，市場價值收益率為801516%，賬面價值收益率為434057%。我們的市場收益率更好是因為1965年，波克夏以較低於賬面價值的價格賣了正在賺錢的紡織品資產，而現在，波克夏通常以高於賬面價值的價格賣一級業務。

Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 – and there have been 41 of these – during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.

總之，表格傳遞了三個信息，兩個是正面的，一個是非常負面的。首先，從1965-69開始，到2005-09結束，這41個五年期收益率，從來沒有超過標準普爾收益率。第二，當收益率為正時，雖然我們的表現落後於標準普爾，但在收益率為負的十一年，我們的表現一直比標準普爾好。換句話說，我們的防守比我們的進攻好，這種情況很可能會繼續下去。

The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.

一個很大的負面信息是，我們的業績優勢隨著我們規模的擴大而急劇下降，這個不好的趨勢是必然會繼續的。可以確定的是，波克夏有許多出色的業務和一些非常優秀的經理，他們在一個不一般的公司文化中發揮他們最大的智慧。查理和我相信這些因素日後會繼續產生高於平均水平的業績。但大量的因素總和鑄就了公司自己的發動力。我們未來的優勢，如果存在，將只是我們歷史中的一小部分。

What We Don’t Do
我們不做什麼

Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)

很久之前，查理說出了他最大的野心：”我所有想知道的就是我將會死在哪裡，因此我將不會去那裡。”這個智慧由偉大的普魯士數學家Jacobi激發，他建議”逆向，總是逆向”為解決困難的一個方法。(同樣，逆轉方法在用一個不那麼高尚的層面也適用：反著來唱一首歌曲，你很快會重新獲得你的車子，房子和妻子。)

Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
這裡是一些我們在波克夏運用查理的思想的例子：

• Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.

• 查理和我會避開一些我們評估不了未來的業務，無論他們的產品多麼好。以前，不用天才都可以預見例如汽車(1910年)、飛機(1930年)、和電視機(1950年)行業的巨大的增長。但之後的未來也包括了各方面的競爭，那會降低進入那些行業的幾乎所有公司的利潤。即使是倖存者也是遍體鱗傷。

Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.

即使查理和我可以清楚的預見某行業之後會有巨大的增長，那也不代表我們可以確定他的利潤率和資本收益率，因為有許多競爭者在為霸權這個地位作鬥爭。在波克夏，我們會堅持未來幾十年利潤可以預見的業務。即使如此，我們將會犯很多錯誤。

• We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.

• 我們從來不依靠陌生人的善意。太大以至於不會失敗不是波克夏的退路。相反，我們總是會安排我們的事務，任何可以想到的現金需求將會用我們自有流動資金滿足。另外，流動資金會從我們許多不同的業務盈利得到不斷補充。

When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured $15.5 billion into a business world that could otherwise look only to the federal government for help. Of that, $9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed – without delay – our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned

當2008年9月金融系統的心臟停止跳動的時候，波克夏是系統流動資金和資產的供應者，而不是懇求者。在危機的最高峰，我們投入了155億美元，否則他們只能向聯邦政府求助。其中的90億為三家很受推崇、並且曾經很安全的美國企業提供資金支持，而且沒有任何延遲，他們需要我們對信心的有形支持。剩下的65億美元滿足我們購買Wrigley的承諾，這項交易沒有中止過，然而在其他地方還充滿著恐慌。

We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cashequivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.

為了保持我們的財力我們付出了很高的代價。我們經常持有的二百多億準現金資產現在只產生很低的收益。但至少我們睡得很安穩。

• We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owneroriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly – or not at all – because of a stifling bureaucracy.

我們打算讓我們的下屬公司自己經營，我們不對他們在任何程度上的管理或者監督。這表示我們有時候會很晚才發現一些管理問題，還有一些運營和資金決策，如果諮詢查理和我的意見，將不會被執行。但是，我們大多數的經理人極好地使用我們賦予他們的獨立性，他們用保持所有者導向的態度回報我們對他們的信心，這是在一個巨大的機構無價的和非常少見的。我們寧願承受少數不良決策的可見代價，也不願意承受因為沈悶的官僚主義而造成的決策太慢(或者根本出不了決策)，而導致的無形成本。

With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed mediumsized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.

隨著我們對BNSF的收購，我們現在擁有257000僱員，和差不多幾百個不同的運營單位。我們希望每個單位擁有更多員工。但我們不會允許波克夏變成委員會，預算編制，多層管理層氾濫的臃腫機構。相反，我們計劃像分開管理的中大型規模的公司的集合那樣運營，他們大多數的決策制定發生在營運層。查理和我只限於分配資金，控制企業風險，挑選經理人和製定他們的薪酬。

• We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.

我們不會爭取華爾街的支持。基於媒體或者分析師意見的投資者不是我們的目標投資者。相反，我們需要合夥人，他們加入波克夏因為他們希望在一個他們了解的企業做長期投資，也因為這符合他們一致同意的政策。如果查理和我與其他合夥人參與一個小風險投資，我們會尋找和我們同步的人。我們知道，共同的目標和分享的命運造就開心的所有者與管理者的商業聯姻。就算是擴展到大規模投資也不會改變這個事實。

To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can’t be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.

建立一個和諧的股東群體，我們與我們的股東直接，及時地溝通。我們的目標是告訴你，如果我們的位置調換，我們會想知道的東西。另外，我們會在周末一早把我們的季度和年度財務信息公佈在網站上，因此，在讓你和其他投資者在非交易日有足夠的時間消化我們這個多面性的企業發生的事情(有時候，交易所期限要求在非星期五的日子披露)。這些事情不可以在幾段文字中充分地總結，也不可能作為記者有時候尋找的容易被記住的新聞標題。

Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: “We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 – and probably well beyond – but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall.” Many news organizations reported – indeed, blared – the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren’t predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.

例如，去年，我們看到簡要報告如何出問題。12830字的年度信文中有這麼一句：”例如，我們確定2009年經濟會蹣跚而行，或者比這好一點，但這個結論沒有告訴我們市場是上升還是下降。”許多新聞機構大張旗鼓地報導這句話的前半部分，卻沒有提及任何結尾部分。我認為這是可怕的新聞業：被誤導的讀者或者觀眾也許會覺得，查理和我對股票市場有不好的預測，即使我們不但在那個句子裡，在其他地方也清楚的表示我們不是在預測這個市場。被誤導的投資者為此付出了巨大的代價:信出來的那天，道瓊斯指數收於7063點，卻在年底上升到10428點。

Given a few experiences we’ve had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.

說明了類似的經歷以後，你可以明白，為什麼我選擇與你盡可能直接，完整地溝通。

************

Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

Insurance
保險

Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value – and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.

我們的財產保險業務(P/C)是波克夏增長背後的引擎，並且繼續會這樣。我們保險公司在賬面上的價值比他淨有形資產價值多155億，這正是我們“信譽”科目的數值。這些公司，比他們賬面價值有價值得多。

Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

保險公司運營模式的突出特點即預先收取保險費用而滯後支付客戶索賠。在一些極端情況下，如一些企業工人的事故賠償，滯後期甚至能夠達到幾十年之久。這種當前籌集資金而滯後支付的模式使得我們能夠得以持有大量資金，我們稱之為“流動資本”。儘管這部分資本最終將會流向客戶，但同時，我們能夠利用這部分資本進行投資並為波克夏帶來利潤。儘管不斷有保單及索賠被建立，但我們所持有的流動資金受保險交易量的保障仍能基本保持穩定。因此，隨著業務增長，我們的流動資金也會越來越多。

If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.

如果公司收取的保險費用超過了最終賠償及運營費用支出總額，那麼我們除流動資金的投資收入外還獲得了承保盈利收入。這種組合為我們提供了免費使用投資資本的機會，更有利的是，我們甚至還因為持有這部分資金而獲得了費用。當然，這一理想結果也產生了強烈的競爭，這種競爭使得近幾年大部分時間裡財產險行業整體在以虧損局面運營。事實上，這種虧損是整個行業為其所持有的流動資金支付的費用。並且，通常這一成本並不高。當然，不可避免在某些災難年中，保險業損失的成本會超過其流動資金帶來的收入。

In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from $16 million in 1967, when we entered the business, to $62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.

以我或許存有偏見的觀點來看，波克夏擁有全球最好的大型保險運營機構，並且無疑我們也擁有世界上最好的經理人。自1967年進入保險領域至2009年底，我們的流動資金從當時的1600萬美元上升至620億美元。更重要的是，我們已連續7年實現了承保盈利運營。我很有信心，在未來的大部分時間裡，我們也將能保持承保盈利的驕人局面。如果現實發展正如我的預計，那麼我們的流動資本將是免費的。即儘管持有多達620億美元的存款，我們仍可以在不必支付利息的情況下，使用這部分資金進行投資為我們帶來利潤。

Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.

我再次強調，免費使用流動資本並不是整個財產險行業的普遍現象，在大部分時間裡，保險費並不足以支付客戶要求的索賠及公司運營費用。波克夏取得的成績僅僅是因為我們擁有眾多出色的經理人完成了那些非比尋常的業務。我們保險公司的那些首席執行官們值得我們所有人去感謝，是他們使得波克夏的價值增加了數十億美元。

**********************

Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.

讓我們從GEICO開始，它因為8億年度廣告預算(差不多汽車保險領域廣告亞軍的兩倍)而出名。 GEICO由Tony Nicely管理，Tony 18歲加入公司，現在66歲的他依然每天出入公司，正如79歲的我。我們都為能在我們喜歡的行業工作而感到幸運。

GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.

GEICO同樣也給予了客戶們溫暖的感覺。自波克夏1996年接手GEICO以來，其市場佔有率由2.5%上升到了8.1%，即淨增了700 萬投保人。這些投保人或許是因為我們的壁虎形象可愛而與我們取得聯繫，但他們最終選擇了從我們這裡購買保險產品儲存大筆款項，並且因為對我們服務與價格的肯定而成為了我們穩定的客戶。

Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for $47 million. Over the years, large repurchases by the company of its own shares caused our position to grow to about 50% without our having bought any more shares. Then, on January 2, 1996, we acquired the remaining 50% of GEICO for $2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.

波克夏分兩步收購GEICO。在1967-80年，我們花了4700萬美金購買了公司三分之一股票，這些年中，公司大量回購他們自己的股票導致我們的持有增長到50%，我們不用再購買更多的股票。在1996年1月2日，我們用現金23億美元購買了GEICO剩下的50%股權，大約我們初次購買的50倍。

An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
有一個華爾街老笑話和我的經歷很相似：

Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.
顧客：謝天謝地我在5元時購買了XYZ。我聽說現在它18元了。

Broker: Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
經紀：是的，這只是開始。事實上，這個公司做得很好，18元時買比你當時的購買還好。

Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.
顧客：該死，我就知道我應該等等。

GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive . . .) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from $2.7 billion to $9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.

GEICO 2010年的增長可能減慢。美國汽車銷售量的下降導致汽車註冊的減少。另外，高失業率導致越來越多司機不買保險(那在幾乎任何地方都是非法的，但如果你失去了工作，但仍然想開車……)。但我們的“低成本生產者”地位，保證將來給我們帶來巨大的收入。 1995年，GEICO是國家最大的6架汽車保險商之一；現在我們排名第三。公司浮寸金從27億增長到96億。同樣重要，在波克夏擁有的14年裡，GEICO有13年實在承保利潤中經營的。

I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.

1951年我第一次訪問GEICO時，我很激動。當時我還是一個20歲的學生。謝謝Tony，我現在更加激動。

**********************

A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha – and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)

1985年的星期六一件波克夏歷史上非常重要的事情發生了。 Ajit Jain走進了我奧馬哈辦公室，我馬上知道我找到了一個超級巨星。 (他由Mike Goldberg挖掘，現在提升到St. Mike.)

We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.

我們馬上讓Ajit掌管國民保險公司的規模小，而且處於掙扎中的再保險業務。這些年來，他已經把這個業務變成保險界獨一無二的巨人。

Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits – and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was $7.1 billion. During 2009, he negotiated a life reinsurance contract that could produce $50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.

Ajit的運營部門今天之後30人，卻在保險業務很多方面創下了交易規模的記錄。 Ajit承保了十億美元限額，並且保留每一分的風險，而不是把他讓給其他保險公司。三年前，他接管了Lloyds銀行的巨額債務，讓他清算與27972投保放款人的債務關係，那一度威脅到這擁有322年曆史的機構的生存。那合約的保費是71億美金。 2009年間，他議定了一張人壽再保險合約，這合約將會在未來50甚至更多的年裡給我們帶來500億美金保費。

Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.

Ajit的業務正好和GEICO相反。在GEICO，我們有數百萬小保單，多數都是每年更新。 Ajit每年簽相對少保單，每年的變化也很大。在全世界，他現在已經被認為是當有非常重大或者不尋常需求需求保險的時候要找的人。

If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat – and you can only save one of us – swim to Ajit.
如果查理和我在一艘正在沉沒的小船裡，你只能救其中一人，向Ajit求救。

**********************

Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.

第三個保險業務很有影響力的是General Re。幾年前，這個業務還在麻煩中，現在，他是我們保險王冠上一顆閃閃發光的珠寶。

Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.

在Tad Montross的帶領下，General Re在2009年表現出色，也給我們帶來了帶一般大額的每美金保費浮寸金。除了General Re的財產保險業務，Tad和他的同事還大大發展了人壽再保險業務，這個業務正不斷地成長增值。

Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key – though only partially-owned – part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.

去年，General Re終於100%擁有Cologne Re. 這個收購從1995年開始，雖然當時只是部分擁有，那是我們進入全世界的其中一部分。 Tad和我將會在9月訪問Cologne，感謝他的經理們對波克夏所作的貢獻。

Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.

最後，我們擁有許多小一點的公司，他們多數都專注於保險界的其他部分。總之，正如下表所示，他們的業績一直都是可盈利，給我們帶來的浮寸金也是非常多的。查理和我非常珍惜這些公司和他們的經理人。

Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:

		(in $ millions)
		Underwriting Profit			Yearend Float
Insurance Operations		2009	2008		2009	2008
General Re		$477	$342		$21,014	$21,074
B-H Reinsurance		349	1,324		26,223	24,221
GEICO		649	916		9,613	8,454
Other Primary		84	210		5,061	4,739
Total		$1,559	$2,792		$61,911	$58,448

**********************

And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making. 

現在有一個慘痛的懺悔：去年你的董事長合上了一個非常昂貴的失敗業務的賬本，這完全是由他自己造成的。

For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right – but of the wrong type.

許多年以來，我一直在苦苦思考我們可以為我們數百萬忠誠的GEICO客戶提供的副產品。不幸的是，我成功了，我想到了我們必需賣我們的信用卡。原因是GEICO保單的持有者可能都有良好的信用風險，向他們提供有吸引力的信用卡可以給我們帶來好處。我們得到了正確地業務，但是錯誤的類型。

Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about $6.3 million before I finally woke up. We then sold our $98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.

在我最終清醒之前，我們的信用卡業務稅前損失為6300萬美金。於是我們以每美金55分的價格出售了我們問題應收賬款組合，再度損失4400萬美金。

GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the ––––– well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.

必需強調，GEICO的經理人從來不對我的主意感興趣。他們警告我，我們有可能得不到GEICO客戶的奶油，而是得到，讓我們叫他“非奶油”。我巧妙地暗示我比他們年長和聰明。

I was just older.
我只是比他們老。

Regulated Utility Business
公用事業業務

Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

波克夏擁有中美能源控股89.5%的股份。中美能源旗下有多家公用事業公司，其中最大的幾家包括：(1)Yorkshire Electricity and NorthernElectric，它擁有380萬終端用戶，是英國第三大電力公司；(2)中美能源，它服務著72.5萬電力用戶，主要集中在愛荷華；3)Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power，服務著西部六州的170萬電力用戶；(4)Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines，通過它運輸的天然氣占美國用量的6%。

MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners. They are truly a dream team.

中美能源控股有兩位了不起的管理者：Dave Sokol和Greg Abel。另外，我的老朋友Walter Scott及其家族持有該公司大部分股權。 Walter給任何經營都帶來了非一般多的業務。同Dave、Greg和Walter的十年合作讓我深信，波克夏找不到比他們更好的搭檔了，他們是真正的夢之隊。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.

有些讓人掃興的是，中美能源還擁有全美第二大房地產經紀公司HomeServices of America。這家公司有21個地方品牌和1.6萬個代理商。儘管去年對於房屋銷售而言仍是恐怖之年，但HomeServices取得了還算不錯的業績。另外，該公司還收購了一家芝加哥經紀公司，並且還將在合理價格水平上尋求收購其他高質量的經紀公司。十年之後，HomeService會比現在大得多。

			Earnings (in $ millions)
			2009		2008
U.K. Utilities			$248		$399
Iowa utility			285		425
Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006)			788		703
Pipelines			457		595
Home Services			43		(45)
Other (Net)			25		186
Earnings before corporate interest and tax			1,846		2,203
Constellation Energy*			-----		1,092
Interest, other than to Berkshire			(318)		(332)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt .			(58)		(111)
Income Tax			(313)		(1,002)
Net Earnings			$1,157		$1,850
Earnings Applicable to Berkshire**			$1,071		$1,704
Debt Owed to Others			19,579		19,145
Debt Owed to Berkshire			353		1,087

*Consists of a breakup fee of $175 million and a profit on our investment of $917 million.

**Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $38 in 2009 and $72 in 2008.

Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities’ regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.

我們的電力公用事業，多數都是提供壟斷服務，我們以一個與客戶服務領域共生的態度運營，那些使用者依靠我們提供一級服務並且為他們的未來投資。發電和大型輸電設備的許可和建造花費很長時間，因此我們必需有遠見。同時，我們希望公用事業管理者(為客戶服務)允許我們在使用絕資金滿足將來需求的時候有合適的回報。我們不應該期望管理者履行他們的承諾，除非我們是這樣。

Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.

Dave 和Greg保證我們正是這樣。國家調查公司一直都把我們Iowa和Western 公用事業放在或者接近他們行業排名的前頭。同樣，一個叫做Mastio的公司為43家美國管道公司排名，我們的Kern River和Northern Natural properties 並列獲得第二名。

Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned $2.5 billion, while in this same period spending $3 billion on wind generation facilities.

另外，我們將繼續投入巨資，不僅是為未來做準備，而且旨在使得這些業務更加環保。自我們十年前購得中美能源以來，這家公司還從沒分過紅。賺的錢全都投入到發展提高和擴大我們服務範圍的功能。一個明顯的例子，近三年，我們的Iowa和Western utilities賺了25億美金，但同一時期支出了30億在風力發電設備。

MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society’s credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the everincreasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.

中美能源控股公司一直履行對社會的承諾，注重社會信譽，並因此受益：除個別情況外，管理者都讓我們的不斷增加的投資都取得了較為合理的回報，進而我們可以盡量滿足企業的生產需要。我們相信，我們能夠從我們的投資中得到應得的收益。

In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met – and we believe that they will be – Berkshire’s ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.

早期的日子，查理和我避開資金密集型行業，例如公用事業。確實，至今對投資者來說最好的行業仍然是那些高回報，並且不怎麼需要增加投資的行業。很幸運我們有許多這樣的業務，我們也願意購買更多。但是，估計波克夏會產生越來越多金錢的同時，今天的我們非常願意投入那些需要大量資金投入的行業。我們只期望在我們增加投資的這些行業會有合理的體面的回報。如果我們的期望是對的(我相信會的)，波克夏將如虎添翼，在未來幾十年中雖不能取得巨額收益，但是應該可以超過平均水平。

Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.

必須注意，我們的BNSF公司，與我們的電力公共事業公司具有很大的相似之處。兩者都是向消費者、社區以及整個國家的經濟發展提供基本服務，兩者都需要進行大量投資，遠多於幾十年後的這就提成。兩者都必須進行前瞻性規劃以滿足超越過去的需求，最後兩者都需要明智的監管者提供收益的穩定性，以便我們可以滿懷信心地進行投資，以保持，更換或者擴大設備。

We see a “social compact” existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should – and we believe will – understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.

正如我們的公用事業，我們發現了公共事業和鐵路事業之間有一個契約。如果有一方推卸義務，雙方都必然會蒙受損失。因此，雙方都必須明白鼓勵對方履行義務和自己履行義務的好處。很難想像我們的國家在沒有一級電力和鐵路系統的情況下發揮到經濟的最大潛力。我們將用行動證明這樣的一級系統是存在的。

In the future, BNSF results will be included in this “regulated utility” section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens – yes, tens – of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.

將來，BNSF業績可能併入公用事業部分，因為二者不但經濟特徵類似，而且他們所用的巨額貸款並非波克夏擔保。他們會保留大部分盈利。無論經濟環境如何，他們的收入和投資規模都很巨大，雖然鐵路會表現出多點的循環週期。總之，儘管我們投入了數百億的增加股本，我們預期這些行業將在今後為我們帶來巨大的收益。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造，服務和零售業

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏在這些行業中業務眾多。

		Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06                   (in $ millions)
Assets資產					Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益
Cash and equivalents			$3,018		Notes payable			$1,842
Accounts and notes receivable			5,066		Other current liabilities			7,414
Inventory			6,147		Total current liabilities			9,256
Other current assets			625
Total current assets			14,856
Goodwill and other intangibles			16,499		Deferred taxes			2834
Fixed assets			15,374		Term debt and other liabilities			6,240
Other assets			2,070		Equity			30,469
			$48,799					$48,799

		Earnings Statement (in $ millions)
					2009	2008	2007
Revenues					$61,665	$66,099	$59,100
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,422 in 2009, $1,280 in 2008 and $955 in 2007)
					59509	61937	55026
Interest expense (net)					98	139	127
Pre-tax income					2058*	4023*	3947*
Income taxes					945	1740	1594
Net income					$1113	$2283	$2353

*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009’s severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.

這個部分幾乎所有的公司都在2009嚴重經濟衰退中遭受了某種程度的損失。最大的例外是Mclane，麥克萊恩主要的業務是向零售商店提供日用品、食品及其它非食品類貨物，迄今為止其最大客戶是著名零售企業沃爾瑪。

Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of $344 million, which even so amounted to only slightly more than one cent per dollar on its huge sales of $31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets – practically all of which it owns – including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane’s prime asset, however, is Grady.

在Grady Rosier的帶領下，Mclane取得了稅前收益34400萬美金，相當於比他巨大銷售額312億美金美元多一分錢。 Mclane擁有一系列實物資產(基本上那就是他所有的一切)，包括3242輛拖車、2309輛牽引機及總面積達1520萬平方英尺的55個分銷中心。當然，Mclane最重要的資產是Grady。

We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:

我們有許多公司，即使銷售下降卻依然盈利，這是出色管理的成果。這主要歸功於其領導才能，以下是成就這一事實的首席執行官名單：

COMPANY                                                                          CEO

Benjamin Moore (paint)                                                 Denis Abrams 

Borsheims (jewelry retailing)                                         Susan Jacques 

H. H. Brown (manufacturing and retailing of shoes)     Jim Issler 

CTB (agricultural equipment)                                        Vic Mancinelli 

Dairy Queen                                                                   John Gainor 

Nebraska Furniture Mart (furniture retailing)                Ron and Irv Blumkin 

Pampered Chef (direct sales of kitchen tools)                Marla Gottschalk 

See’s (manufacturing and retailing of candy)                 Brad Kinstler 

Star Furniture (furniture retailing)                                  Bill Kimbrell

Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak’s Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.

上述個別企業所屬行業深受危機影響，但Marmon和Iscar卻能夠脫穎而出。儘管銷售減少27%，弗蘭克-普塔克(Frank Ptak)領導的Marmon公司創造了稅前利潤增長13.5%的歷史新高，弗蘭克的成本管理彌補了收益下滑。

Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar – not wars, recessions or competitors. The world’s two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar’s results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.

無論戰爭、衰退還是競爭都無法阻止位於以色列的Iscar公司前進的步伐。世界其他兩家小型切割工具的主要供應商年內大半時間虧本運營。儘管 Iscar業績也明顯下滑，但是依然盈利。一旦製造業復甦，Iscar將再創新高。由Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz 和Danny Goldman組成的領導團隊對此翹首以待。

Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were $227 million, an 82.5% decline from $1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.

每個我們擁有的與住房和商用建築相關的企業在2009年都相當困難。 Shaw，Johns Manville，Acme Brick和MiTek的稅前收入是2.27億美元，較2006年建築業高潮期的12.95億美元減少82.5%。上述企業仍將奮力掙扎，但其競爭力依然完好無損。

The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.

波克夏去年最大的問題是Netjets，多年來，NetJets曾將自身發展成為該行業最突出的企業，它擁有的飛機總價值超過其三大競爭對手的飛機價值總和。總之，我們在這個行業的領先地位是沒有受到挑戰的。

NetJets’ business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million. Moreover, the company’s debt has soared from $102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire’s guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It’s clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.

NetJet的運營有另外一個故事。在我們擁有他的11年裡，他的稅前損失打到15700萬美金。另外，公司的債務從收購時候的10200萬美金上升到去年4月的19億美金。如果沒有波克夏為債務作擔保，NetJet就會倒閉。很明顯我讓NetJet處於如此困境，讓你蒙受損失。但慶幸的是，我已經獲得救援。

Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to $1.4 billion, and, after suffering a staggering loss of $711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable. 

Dave Sokol，中美能源非常有智慧的成立者和運營者，8月的時候出任NetJets的CEO. 他的領導扭轉了NetJet: 債務減少到14億美金，在2009年蒙受了巨大損失71100萬美金之後，公司現在穩固地盈利中。

Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractionalownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more. 

最重要的是，Dave帶來的改變並沒有降低安全和服務的最高標準，這標準是NetJets的前任CEO Rich Santulli一直堅持的。 Dave 和我都非常有興趣保留這個標準，因為我們和我們的家庭在多數我們的飛行中都是用NetJets， 同樣我們許多的董事和經理人也一樣。我們沒有分配任何專門的飛機和團隊。我們的待遇和其他股東一樣，那表示，我們和其他每個人一樣，使用我們自己的飛機時也付出同樣的價格。總之，我們吃我們煮出來的東西。在航空行業，沒有其他證明書比這個更有力。

Finance and Financial Products
金融及金融產品

Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.

Clayton房屋公司是我們在這一領域的主要運作，它是組裝式和活動式房層的主要生產基地。當然，Clayton並不是一直佔據著第一的位置。 10年前，該領域中三大主要的製造企業Fleetwood、Champion and Oakwood曾擁有著該行業44%的產量。但是，這三家公司現在都已經破產。同時，整個行業的產量也從1999年的38.2萬套下降至2009年的6萬套。

The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.

目前，整個行業處於混亂的局面源於兩個原因。第一，行業的發展取決於美國經濟能否實現恢復。這個理由涉及到美國新房屋的開工率(包含公寓部分)。 2009年，55.4萬套的新建房屋數創下了到目前為止我們所記錄的近50年來的最低點。然而，這是一個好消息。

People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts – the supply side of the picture – were running about two million annually. But household formations – the demand side – only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.

一些年以前，在新房屋開建時人們曾經想過這是一個好消息——市場供應——住房市場年供應量約為200萬套。但另一方面，新家庭組建——市場需求量——每年僅為120萬套。供求不平衡的狀態持續幾年後，國家必然要結束這種大量房屋剩餘的狀況。

There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.

有三種途徑來解決這一情況：第一，毀掉大量的房屋，與發生的“汽車換現金”計劃相似的摧毀汽車策略；第二，加速人們對住房的需求，鼓勵青年人同居，這一計劃不大可能遭受缺少志願者；第三，減少新建房屋數量，使其增長率低於家庭組建率；

Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.

我們的國家理智地選擇了第三個，這表示，在一年左右之內，住宅房問題政策非常支持我們，僅除了那些高端房子和某些濫建問題特別嚴重的地區。住房價格將會遠遠低於泡沫時期水平，當然，要不是每一個售房者或信貸方造成損失的同時，能夠使購房者從中受益。事實上，幾年前那些無法承擔購買適當房屋的家庭現在發現擁有一套住房成為了他們力所能及的事，那是因為房地產市場泡沫已經破裂。

The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.

第二個原因是針對企業建造的房屋：懲罰性的抵押貸款利率差異存在於擔保房屋與建造房屋之間。讓我來解釋一下為什麼利率的不同會給大量低收入美國民眾及Clayton公司雙方均造成問題。

The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 51⁄4%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.

住房抵押貸款市場受政府通過FHA，Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae表現出來的條例控制，它們的信貸標準佔有絕對的優勢，因為他們擔保的抵押貸款能夠實現證券化，實際上，並且均將其轉變成美國聯邦政府債務。目前，這種常見擁有擔保房屋的購買者，享有可以獲得利率僅為5.25%的30年期的貸款資格。此外，這些抵押貸款最近被美聯儲大量的購買，作為維持超低利率水平的舉措之一。

In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however – and, of course, most buyers do – the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.

相比而言，幾乎很少企業建造房屋的購房者有資格獲得受此擔保的抵押貸款。所以，一個建造房屋的購房者必須負擔他貸款9%的利率。對於那些採取現金支付方式的購房者，Clayton的住房擁有著極高的購買價值。如果購房者需要申請住房抵押貸款，當然，大部分購房者在理財成本上有差異，差距足以抵消企業建造住房在價格上的吸引力。

Last year I told you why our buyers – generally people with low incomes – performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.

去年，我曾告訴你們為什麼我們的購買者一般都收入不高但卻表現出了更好的信用。他們的態度決定了一切：他們購買房屋是為了居住，而並非再賣或者再融資。因此，我們的購買者通常選擇我們的貸款時，更多地是考慮自身實際確實收入(我們不製造“假貸款消息”)，並期待著某天他們能最終還清貸款。如果他們失業、存在健康問題或者離婚，我們也有可能面臨違約問題的發生。但是，他們並不會因為房屋的價值下降而放棄償還貸款。即使今天，面臨當前失業壓力劇增，對Clayton的拖欠和違約行為合理地存在但並沒有我們製造出重大麻煩。

We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.

我們爭取讓我們客戶的貸款取得與普通建設住宅同樣的處理，並且截至目前，我們僅僅取得了一些象徵性成功。許多擁有適當收入的家庭，但是有責任放棄自己建造的房屋。因為籌措資金的差別附屬於建築房屋使得每月高額的支出。如果限定條件不被放寬，以致不向那些符合首付和收入標準的購房者打開更低成本的資金條件，企業建房的發展空間注定將會越來越小。

Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn’t have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire’s interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire’s credit to support Clayton’s mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can’t borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.

儘管在這樣的情況之下，我仍相信Clayton在未來的時間裡能實現盈利運營。我們擁有一位將波克夏的利益視為自身利益的最好的CEO人選凱文-克萊頓(Kevin Clayton)。我們的產品是一流的，物美價廉的和不斷提高的。此外，我們會繼續使用波克夏的信譽去支持Clayton的抵押貸款計劃，我們確信它的穩固。即使如此，波克夏不可能將信貸利率降低到政府機構所能提供的水平，這一障礙將會限制我們的銷售，損害到Clayton和大量渴望低成本住房的有價值家庭的共同利益。

In the following table, Clayton’s earnings are net of the company’s payment to Berkshire for the use of its credit. Offsetting this cost to Clayton is an identical amount of income credited to Berkshire’s finance operation and included in “Other Income.” The cost and income amount was $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008.

在下表中，克萊頓的收入扣除了公司向波克夏支付信貸的費用。 將這筆費用抵扣給克萊頓是與波克夏的財務業務相同的收入，包括在“其他收入”中。2009年的成本和收入額為1.16億美元，2008年為9200萬美元。

The table also illustrates how severely our furniture (CORT) and trailer (XTRA) leasing operations have been hit by the recession. Though their competitive positions remain as strong as ever, we have yet to see any bounce in these businesses.

下面的圖表說明了去年的經濟危機對我們的家具和拖車租賃業務造成了多麼嚴重的影響。儘管他們的競爭地位仍如以往一樣牢固，但我們還沒有看到這方面業務有任何反彈跡象：

			(in $ millions)
			Pre-Tax Earnings
			2009	2008
Net investment income			$278	$330
Life and annuity operation			116	23
Leasing operations			14	87
Manufactured housing finance (Clayton)			187	206
Other*			186	141
Income before investment and derivatives gains or losses .			781	787

*Includes $116 million in 2009 and $92 million in 2008 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.

*上表金額包括波克夏於2009和2008兩年分別向Clayton收取的1.16億美元及9200萬美元的擔保費用；

************

At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country’s third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.

2009年底，我們已擁有全國第三大商業抵押貸款服務商Berkadia公司50%的股份。除了擁有2350億美元的投資管理資產外，公司是重要的抵押貸款發起人，在全國擁有25間辦公場所。儘管在接下來的幾年裡商業房地產將面臨巨大的挑戰，長久的發展機會對Berkadia具有重大的意義。

Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.

我們的合作夥伴Leucadia的運作被喬-斯坦伯格(Joe Steinberg)和伊恩-卡明(Ian Cumming)管理的。幾年前，當波克夏收購陷入困境的Finova時，我們就曾有過愉快的合作經歷。在決定的那個情況下，喬和伊恩所做的努力遠遠超出了份內工作，我總是給予鼓勵。自然地，當他們與我聯繫共同購買Capmark時我感到很高興。

Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let’s call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I’ll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia

我們將第一次的冒險也命名為Berkadia。所以，讓我們稱這次為Berkadia的兒子。有一天，我將寫你們的信中談論Berkadia的孫子。

Investments

投資

Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面，我們展示我們年終市場價值超過10億美元的普通股票投資。

					12/31/09
Shares	Company			Percentage of Company Owned	Cost	Market
					(dollars in millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company			12.7	$1,287	$6,143
225,000,000	BYD Company, Ltd.			9.9	232	1,986
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company			8.6	1,299	11,400
37,711,330	Conoco Phillips			2.5	2,741	1,926
28,530,467	Johnson & Johnson			1	1,724	1,838
130,272,500	Kraft Foods Inc.			8.8	4,330	3,541
3,947,554	POSCO			5.2	768	2,092
83,128,411	The Procter & Gamble Company			2.9	533	5,040
25,108,967	Sanofi-Aventis			1.9	2,027	1,979
234,247,373	Tesco			3	1,367	1,620
76,633,426	U.S. Bancorp			4	2,371	1,725
39,037,142	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.			1	1,893	2,087
334,235,585	Wells Fargo & Company			6.5	7,394	9,021
	Others				6,680	8,636
	Total Common Stocks				34,646	59,034

*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

*這是我們的實際成交價格，同時也是我們的稅基，GAAP“成本”在幾個個案中不同，這是由於提高賬面價值或減記帳面價值的不同要求。

In addition, we own positions in non-traded securities of Dow Chemical, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re and Wrigley with an aggregate cost of $21.1 billion and a carrying value of $26.0 billion. We purchased these five positions in the last 18 months. Setting aside the significant equity potential they provide us, these holdings deliver us an aggregate of $2.1 billion annually in dividends and interest. Finally, we owned 76,777,029 shares (22.5%) of BNSF at yearend, which we then carried at $85.78 per share, but which have subsequently been melded into our purchase of the entire company.

此外，我們在道氏化學、通用電氣、高盛、瑞士再保險和箭牌的不可交易債券中持股，總成本是211億美元，賬面現行價值是260億美元。我們在過去十八個月收購了五個倉位。除了它們給我們提供的巨大的資產潛力之外，這些持有給我們帶來了總計21億美元的年度分紅和利息。最後，在年終我們擁有BNSF的76，777，029股(22.5%)，從其中我們可以從每股拿到85.78美元，但這已經混到我們購買整個公司的成本了。

In 2009, our largest sales were in ConocoPhillips, Moody’s, Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson (sales of the latter occurring after we had built our position earlier in the year). Charlie and I believe that all of these stocks will likely trade higher in the future. We made some sales early in 2009 to raise cash for our Dow and Swiss Re purchases and late in the year made other sales in anticipation of our BNSF purchase.

2009年，我們的最大的銷售額是康菲石油(ConocoPhillips)，穆迪(Moody's)、寶潔(Procter & Gamble)，以和瓊森(Johnson & Johnson)(後者的賣出發生在我們今年早期持倉)。我和查理相信所有這些股票都很可能在將來以更高的價格成交。早在2009年我們完成的一些銷售，為道氏和瑞士再保險籌集資金，今年最後完成的其他銷售來期待對BNSF的收購。

We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.

去年，我們曾告訴你們非常罕見的情況，存在於公司和市政公債市場。荒謬地，這些證券和美國國庫券相比非常便宜。我們通過一些購買進行了觀察，但是我應該做的更多。巨大的機會是很少發生的。當天上掉金子的時候，應該拿桶去接，而不是管子。

We entered 2008 with $44.3 billion of cash-equivalents, and we have since retained operating earnings of $17 billion. Nevertheless, at yearend 2009, our cash was down to $30.6 billion (with $8 billion earmarked for the BNSF acquisition). We’ve put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It’s been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business – through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market – and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two.

我們在進入2008年時，擁有443億美元的現金資產，之後我們獲得了170美元的經營收益。然而，在2009年，我們的現金減少到了306億美元(其中80億用於BNSF採購)，我們在過去混亂的兩年已經用了很多錢去運作。那是一個投資的理想時期：恐慌的氛圍是投資最好的朋友。那些只在評論者樂觀的時候投資的人，最後為這個無價值的保險付出了昂貴的價格。最後，在投資中計算為業務付出的成本——儘管只是在股票市場小部分的購買——這個業務表現為在隨後的十年或二十年的盈利。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts, which were then the subject of both controversy and misunderstanding. For that discussion, please go to www.berkshirehathaway.com. 

去年我詳細的介紹了我們的衍生品合約，引起了爭議和誤解。關於這個討論，請登陸網站www.berkshirehathaway.com。

We have since changed only a few of our positions. Some credit contracts have run off. The terms of about 10% of our equity put contracts have also changed: Maturities have been shortened and strike prices materially reduced. In these modifications, no money changed hands.

之後我們改變了幾個倉位。一些信用合約到期了。 10%的股票指數合約也改變了：期限縮短，成交價減少。這些改變中，沒有現金過手。

A few points from last year’s discussion are worth repeating:
去年中提高的幾點現在需要重申一下：

(1) Though it’s no sure thing, I expect our contracts in aggregate to deliver us a profit over their lifetime, even when investment income on the huge amount of float they provide us is excluded in the calculation. Our derivatives float – which is not included in the $62 billion of insurance float I described earlier – was about $6.3 billion at yearend.

(1)儘管不能確保，但我期望我們的合同總值將持續給我們帶來利潤，即使把投資收入大幅波動考慮在外。我們的衍生品浮存金——並不包括在之前提到的620億美元保險浮存金中，年終幾乎達到63億美元。

(2) Only a handful of our contracts require us to post collateral under any circumstances. At last year’s low point in the stock and credit markets, our posting requirement was $1.7 billion, a small fraction of the derivatives-related float we held. When we do post collateral, let me add, the securities we put up continue to earn money for our account.

(2)只有少數合同要求我們無論如何交付抵押保證金。去年，股市和信用市場價位走低，我們的支付要求是17億美元，只是我們擁有的衍生品相關浮存金的一小部分。當我們支付抵押保證金的時候，我們所支付的抵押品仍然在給我們賺錢。

(3) Finally, you should expect large swings in the carrying value of these contracts, items that can affect our reported quarterly earnings in a huge way but that do not affect our cash or investment holdings. That thought certainly fit 2009’s circumstances. Here are the pre-tax quarterly gains and losses from derivatives valuations that were part of our reported earnings last year:

(3)最後，這些合同的賬面價值會有大的波動，這會很大程度上影響我們的季度報告盈利，但是不會影響我們的現金或投資持有。這個想法很適合2009年的環境。這裡有去年我們報告中部分關於從衍生品股值中帶來的稅前季度損益：

Quarter            $ Gain (Loss) in Billions 

     1                           (1.517)

     2                             2.357

     3                            1.732

     4                            1.052

As we’ve explained, these wild swings neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. When we report to you, we will continue to separate out these figures (as we do realized investment gains and losses) so that you can more clearly view the earnings of our operating businesses. We are delighted that we hold the derivatives contracts that we do. To date we have significantly profited from the float they provide. We expect also to earn further investment income over the life of our contracts.

正如我們所解釋的，這些大幅震盪不會使我和查理高興或者煩惱。當我們報告給你的時候，你仍將區分這些數字(就像我們確實實現了收益或損失一樣)，目的是你就可以更清楚地看到我們所經營業務的盈利情況。我們很高興我們持有這些衍生品合同。至今我們已經從它們所提供的浮動中獲利頗豐。我們希望繼續通過這些合同賺取更多的投資收益。

We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced, just as we try to invest in mispriced stocks and bonds. Indeed, we first reported to you that we held such contracts in early 1998. The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society – dangers of which we’ve long warned, and that can be dynamite – arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred – nor will it.

我們長期以來一直投資我和查理認為錯誤定價了的衍生品合同，正如我們嘗試錯誤定價的股票和債券一樣。事實上，我們在1998年第一次報告我們擁有這些合同。我們一直都在警告衍生品給社會和相關人士帶來的危險，這可能是毀滅性的，當這些合同導致交易對手風險和/或舉債經營風險的時候風險達到頂點。在波克夏，這從來沒有發生過，將來也不會。

It’s my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.

讓波克夏遠離這些風險是我的職責所在。我和查理相信一位CEO一定不能忽視風險控制。這太重要了。在波克夏，我發起並監控每一項衍生品合同，除了在少數幾家的分公司運營相關的合同，例如中美能源控股公(MidAmerican)和General Re再保險公司。如果波克夏出現問題，那就是我的問題，決不會是風險委員會或者首席風險辦公室的責任。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.

我認為，一個大型金融機構的主管委員如果沒有建議CEO為風險承擔全部責任，那麼他們就是不負責任的。如果CEO不能勝任這項任務，那麼他應該尋找其他的工作。如果他無法做到，而政府需要投入資金的話，他和他的委員會應該承擔很大責任。

It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.

搞糟幾家全國最大金融機構的運營的不是股東。然而他們加重了負擔，他們在失敗的時候拋掉了持有價值的90%或更多。總之，他們在過去的兩年中的四次最大的金融颶風中已經損失了超過5000億美元。如果說這些持有者是“跳樓”，那麼簡直都是對“跳樓”這個詞的嘲諷。

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price – one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.

一個失敗公司的CEO們和主管們，然而都毫髮無傷。他們機遇可能會因為這些災難而被削弱，但是他們還是過著上流社會的生活。這些CEO和主管們的行為應該改變：如果他們的公司和國家被他們的不負責任傷害了，他們應該付出代價，而不應該由公司或者保險來買單。在很多情況下，主管都從過多的金融胡蘿蔔中獲利，應該在他們的職業生涯中加入一些大棒了。

An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)
一個難以面對的真相

Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.

我們旗下的子公司去年為了現金做了幾項小型併購案，但是我們對BNSF鐵路的大型收購要求我們發行95000股波克夏股份，這接近已公開發行的6.1%。我和查理對發行波克夏股票的喜愛，正如我們享受結腸鏡檢查前的準備工作一樣。

The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?

我們不喜歡的原因很簡單。如果我們不能做夢以現在的市價賣掉全部波克夏股票的話，為什麼在世界上要以幾乎同樣低的發行價賣掉公司如此大的一部分呢？

In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares – the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.

評估換股併購時，目標公司的股東不僅注重認購公司股份的市場價，同樣也希望交易能夠給他們帶來所放棄的那些自己股份的內在價值。如果低於其內在價值，在僅交換股票的情況下，一般不可能成交。我們不能用一個被低估的股票去交換一個被完全反應價值的股票，這會損害股東利益。

Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 11⁄4 shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.

想像，假如你喜歡的話，公司A和公司B規模相同，且每股都是100億美元。它們的股票市面上都賣80美元每股。 A公司的CEO非常自信但不夠精明，他用1.25股去換B公司的1股，並正確地告訴主管們B公司每股100美元。然而他沒有認識到，他將讓他的股東們為B公司的每股支付125美元的內在價值。如果主管們沒有異議，那麼交易就成交了。 B公司的股東將擁有A公司和B公司聯合資產的55.6%，而A公司的股東只擁有44.4%。並不是A公司的每個人都是這次不明智交易的受害者。它的CEO將經營一個兩倍大的公司，帶來更多的名譽和利益。

If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)

如果是認購公司的股票被高估，情況就不同了：這會對認購者有利。這就是為什麼股市到處存在的泡沫將不可避免帶來一系列發行。如果按照他們股價的市場價值，他們可以多付款，因為事實上他們在使用偽幣。這種認購週期性發生。在二十世紀六十年代末的特殊時期，這種圈套很多。事實上，某些大公司就是通過這種方式建立起來的(當然沒有當事人公開承認內幕，但是私底下有許多消息傳出來)。

In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.

在BNSF鐵路的認購中，出售方的股東恰當地評估了我們所提出的100美元每股的報價。然而我們的成本卻稍高於此，因為這100美元是以股票形式。我和查理都相信股票的價值超過這個市場價。幸運的是，我們在市場上現金購買了BNSF的一大部分，因此我們的成本中只有30%是用波克夏股票購買的。

In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.

最後，我和查理認為，雖然要用股票支付30%的價格，但是這是我們一直以來所熟悉和喜歡的業務，並且能夠給我們帶來220億美元可支配的現金。額外的好處是，將由邁特-羅斯(Matt Rose)經營公司，我們對他很信任。我們同樣願意在幾年內再投資幾十億美元，如果能得到合理的回報。但是這還不一定。如果我們需要用更多的股票來認購，那就沒有意義了。我們會得不償失。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully inadequate – absolutely no indicator of its real value – had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.

我曾參加過幾十次股東會，討論認購案，通常，一些價格高昂的投資銀行給主管們提供諮詢。不可避免的，銀行家向給股東會的詳細評估了被收購公司的價值，強調其價值遠遠比市場價值高。在長達五十年的股東生涯中，我從沒聽到任何投資銀行(或管理層)討論公司所得到的真實價值。當交易涉及認購方股票的發行時，他們只使用市場價值，甚至在知道認購方股票被嚴重低估時仍然這麼做。

When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”

當股票被低估時，而主管從顧問獲得理性意見的方法看起來只有一種了，僱傭第二顧問，來反對提議的認購案，若交易不成交則得到酬勞。沒有這個，我們的建議永遠都是，“不要問理髮師你是不是該理髮了。”

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers – fine people and able bankers – not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.

我忍不住要告訴你很久以前的一個真實故事。那時我們在一個管理良好的大型銀行擁有一些股票，幾十年來法律都不允許認購。之後法律允許認購，我們的銀行立即開始尋找可能的交易。銀行經理們本來都是很有能力的銀行家，這時卻像沒見過女孩的男孩子。

They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.

他們很快盯上了一家較小規模的銀行，經營也很好。我們的銀行以較低的價格售出，幾乎接近賬面價值，而且價格/收益比很低。然而，那家小銀行被美國其他大型銀行哄抬，其價值幾乎達到賬面價值的三倍。不僅如此，他們要的是股票，而不是現金。

Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”

自然，我們的同事答應了。 “我們需要顯示我們開始認購了。而且這只是很小的交易。”他們這麼說就好像只有對股東造成很大傷害才能成為阻止他們的理由一樣。查理的反應是，“我們是否應該慶幸在草坪上尿尿的是吉娃娃，而不是聖伯納。”

The seller of the smaller bank – no fool – then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. “After the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, “I’m going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”

這家小銀行的老闆可不是傻瓜，他提出了談判中的最後一個要求。當時他的措辭可能比較含蓄，“在合併後，我將成為你的銀行的大股東，這是我淨資產中很大一部分。你們必須保證，你們再也不做這麼蠢的交易了。”

Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank – newly bigger – lived happily ever after.

是的，這個合併案通過了。小銀行的老闆賺了錢，我們則賠了錢。大銀行(現在規模更大了)的經理們卻活得更滋潤了。

The Annual Meeting
年會

Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year (up from 12 – no zeros omitted – in 1981). With our shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year. Therefore, we will have to make a few changes in the usual routine. There will be no change, however, in our enthusiasm for having you attend. Charlie and I like to meet you, answer your questions and – best of all – have you buy lots of goods from our businesses.

去年有大約35000人參加了年會(1981年僅12名)。隨著股東人數的增加，今年可能有更多人參會。因此，我們將對慣例做一些改變。儘管如此，我們對大家的熱情歡迎不減。我和查理將與大家見面，回答問題，最好還能讓你們購買更多的產品。

The meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 1st. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)

今年的年會將在五月一日週六召開。同往常一樣，哈奎斯特中心的大門會在早上七點準時敞開。八點半放映一部新的波克夏影片。九點半直接進入問答環節並持續到下午三點半 (中間在哈奎斯特用午餐)。在一個短暫的休息後，我和查理將在三點四十五分做會議總結。如果你決定在問答環節離開，請在查理講話的時候走(但要快，他講話很簡短)。

The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-squarefoot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I get testy and lock the exits.)

離開會議去做的最佳活動當然是購物。我們將在19萬平米的相鄰大廳裡擺滿各種波克夏商品。去年大家買東西都很努力，銷售額破了紀錄。今年大家還可以做的更好。 (友情提示，如果我發現銷量上不去將會很生氣，並把出口鎖上)。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

(GEICO)將設一個展台，有來自全國的優秀顧問為您服務，竭誠為您提供汽車保險建議。 GEICO將給您一個股東折扣(通常是8%)。我們開展業務的51個區域中的44個都允許了這個特別優惠。 (額外提示：這個折扣可以累積在其他優惠上)把你現在的保險拿來，看看能否再省點錢。我相信你們中至少50%可以。

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. Among the more than 30 books and DVDs it will offer are two new books by my sons: Howard’s Fragile, a volume filled with photos and commentary about lives of struggle around the globe and Peter’s Life Is What You Make It. Completing the family trilogy will be the debut of my sister Doris’s biography, a story focusing on her remarkable philanthropic activities. Also available will be Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the story of my partner. This book is something of a publishing miracle – never advertised, yet year after year selling many thousands of copies from its Internet site. (Should you need to ship your book purchases, a nearby shipping service will be available.)

一定要光顧書蟲書吧。它提供30餘種書和DVD，其中有兩本我兒子新出的書：《哈佛碎片(Howard's Fragile)》，其中有採自全球的照片和評論，另一本是：彼得的生活由你造就(Peter's Life Is What You Make It。)。完成家庭三部曲的是我妹妹的處女作《桃瑞斯自傳(Doris’s biography)》，這本書講述了她著名的慈善活動。還有《可憐查理編年史(Charlie’s Almanac)》，這是我合夥人的故事。它是出版屆的奇蹟——從不打任何廣告，然後每年都在網上售出上千本。如果您需要將買的書郵寄回去的話，旁邊就有郵遞服務。

If you are a big spender – or, for that matter, merely a gawker – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing.

如果您是一位骨灰級購物狂——或者只是喜歡到處看看，可以在在周六中午到下午五點光顧奧瑪哈機場東側的伊里亞特飛機(Elliott Aviation)。 NetJet公司的飛機艦隊將讓您心跳加速。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

有一個隨信附件告訴您如何獲取參會憑證，來參加會議和其它活動。至於航班、酒店和汽車租賃，我們仍將與美國運通(800-799-6634)合作，為您提供專門的服務。卡洛爾-彼得森(Carol Pedersen)將一如既往為我們處理相關事務，我知道這很繁雜，在此對她表示感謝。酒店房間可能很難找，但是通過卡洛爾應該能訂到。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday, May 3rd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Berkyville BBQ to which you are all invited.

內布拉斯加家具商場(NFM)位於72街上道奇和太平洋(16.49,0.00,0.00%)之間，佔地77英畝，在這裡我們將召開“波克夏週末”特價促銷。要得到波克夏折扣，你必須在四月二十九日週四到五月三日週一之間光臨並出示參會證。本季特價包括了幾個大牌產品，這幾個牌子通常是沒有任何折扣的，但由於是股東周末，所以有例外。我們感謝他們的支持。 NFM在周一至週六早十點到晚九點開放，週日是早上十點到晚上六點。週六下午五點半到晚八點，NFM都舉行燒烤晚會，邀請所有與會者。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 2nd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在博希姆珠寶(Borsheim's)，我們將再次召開兩場股東專場活動。首先將是一個雞尾酒招待會，在四月三十日週五下午6點到晚上10點。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 26th through Saturday, May 8th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder. Enter with rhinestones; leave with diamonds. My daughter tells me that the more you buy, the more you save (kids say the darnedest things).

然後是一個大型聚會，在五月二日週日早上九點到下午四點。週六，我們將開放到下午六點。我們將在博希姆週末迎來大批顧客。為了您的方便，股東優惠將從四月二十六日週一持續到五月八日週六。在此期間，請出示您的參會卡或者股東證明來享受優惠。開奧拓來，帶奔馳走。我的女兒告訴我買的越多，省得越多。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.

週日，在博希姆外面的大廳，兩屆美國國際象棋冠軍帕特里克-沃夫(Patrick Wolff)將以一敵六，盲棋應戰挑戰者。著名的達拉斯魔術師貝克(Norman Beck)將進行精彩表演。

Our special treat for shareholders this year will be the return of my friend, Ariel Hsing, the country’s top-ranked junior table tennis player (and a good bet to win at the Olympics some day). Now 14, Ariel came to the annual meeting four years ago and demolished all comers, including me. (You can witness my humiliating defeat on YouTube; just type in Ariel Hsing Berkshire.)

今年的特別活動能夠是我一位朋友的再次光臨，她就是邢延華(Ariel Hsing)，全國頂級乒乓球運動員(將來很有可能獲得奧運會獎牌)。今年14歲的邢延華四年前參加過年會，打敗了所有挑戰者，包括我。 (你可以在 YouTube上參觀我被打敗的過程，只要輸入Ariel Hsing Berkshire即可)

Naturally, I’ve been plotting a comeback and will take her on outside of Borsheims at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. It will be a three-point match, and after I soften her up, all shareholders are invited to try their luck at similar three-point contests. Winners will be given a box of See’s candy. We will have equipment available, but bring your own paddle if you think it will help. (It won’t.)

當然，我一直在策劃她的再次光臨，她將在周日下午一點出現。所有的股東都可以試試運氣。獲獎者將獲得一籃See's糖果。我們將準備現成的球拍，但你也可以帶上自己的球拍，如果你覺得有所幫助的話(其實不會有差別)。

Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year, though, it was overwhelmed by demand. With many more diners expected this year, I’ve asked my friend, Donna Sheehan, at Piccolo’s – another favorite restaurant of mine – to serve shareholders on Sunday as well. (Piccolo’s giant root beer float is mandatory for any fan of fine dining.) I plan to eat at both restaurants: All of the weekend action makes me really hungry, and I have favorite dishes at each spot. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.

戈瑞餐館(Gorat's)將在五月二日週日開放波克夏股東專場，從下午一點至晚上十點。去年簡直人滿為患。今年我已經讓我的朋友，皮科洛 (Piccolo’s)餐館的唐納-希恩(Donna Sheehan)，我的另一家最愛的餐館，為股東在周日提供用餐服務。我計劃兩個餐廳都去，週日的活動將讓我胃口大開，我在兩家都有最愛的菜。要在葛瑞訂餐，請在四月一日撥打電話402-551-3733(但不要提前)，皮科洛電話是402-342-9038。

Regrettably, we will not be able to have a reception for international visitors this year. Our count grew to about 800 last year, and my simply signing one item per person took about 21⁄2 hours. Since we expect even more international visitors this year, Charlie and I decided we must drop this function. But be assured, we welcome every international visitor who comes.

遺憾的是，今年我們將不能為外國客人提供特別接待。我們國際客戶去年增加了800個。既然今年要增加更多的國際客人，我和查理決定取消特殊接待。但是我們仍然一如既往地歡迎與會的國際客人。

Last year we changed our method of determining what questions would be asked at the meeting and received many dozens of letters applauding the new arrangement. We will therefore again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.

去年我們改變了問答環節挑選問題的方法，會後很多人表示喜歡這樣的安排。所以今年我們將同樣由這三位財經記者主持問答環節，他們將通過電子郵件收集股東的問題，並對我和查理進行提問。

The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)

這三位記者和他們的電子郵件分別是：財富雜誌記者卡羅爾-盧米斯(Carol Loomis)：cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC記者貝基-奎克(Becky Quick)：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com ；紐約時報記者安德魯-羅斯-索金(Andrew Ross Sorkin)： arsorkin@nytimes.com。從提交的問題中，每位記者將選擇十幾個他認為最有趣最重要的問題。希望你們的郵件盡量簡潔明了，並且不超過兩個問題。 (並註明是否介意透露姓名。)

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.

我和查理事先都不知道問題。記者們會挑選一些有挑戰性的，這正是我們所喜歡的。

We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We’ve added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group. 

我們將在周六八點十五分通過十三台手機抽籤選出問題。在會議上，我將輪流回答記者提的問題和抽中的問題。我們已經將提問時間延長了三十分鐘，所以每組大概能有三十個問題。

***********

At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).

查理今年86歲，我79歲，我們仍然感到很幸運。我們在美國出生，我們的父母讓我們接受了良好的教育，我們有美好的家庭和良好的健康，我們擁有的商業天賦給我們帶來了財富，比那些跟我們一樣為社會做出貢獻的人獲得的要多。不僅如此，我們一直以來都熱愛我們的工作，我們通過工作幫助了無數的有才華的合夥人，事實上這些年來，我們的工作變得越來越引人入勝，簡直可以跳著踢踏舞去上班。如果需要的話，我們簡直願意花錢來保留我們的工作(但請不要告訴公司委員會)。

Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.

當然，沒有什麼比同我們的股東合夥人相聚更加讓人開心的了。所以，加入我們五月一日在哈奎斯特召開的年度伍德斯托克音樂節吧。我們在那裡見。

Warren E. Buffett 

Chairman of the Board

February 26, 2010

華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2010年2月26日