| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| 2008 | (9.60) | (37.00) | 27.40 | ||||
| 2009 | 19.80 | 26.50 | (6.70) | ||||
| 2010 | 13.00 | 15.10 | (2.10) | ||||
| 2011 | 4.60 | 2.10 | 2.50 | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2011 | 19.8% | 9.2% | 10.60 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2011 | 513055.0% | 6397.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 4.6% in 2011. Over the last 47 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $99,860, a rate of 19.8% compounded annually.*
2011年我們的A股和B股每股賬面價值增長了4.6%。在過去47年，即現任管理層就職以來，賬面價值從每股19美元增長到99860美元，年復合增長19.8%。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I feel good about the company’s progress during 2011. Here are the highlights:
波克夏副董事長，我的合夥人查理·孟格對2011年公司取得的進展感到滿意，以下是要點：
• The primary job of a Board of Directors is to see that the right people are running the business and to be sure that the next generation of leaders is identified and ready to take over tomorrow. I have been on 19 corporate boards, and Berkshire’s directors are at the top of the list in the time and diligence they have devoted to succession planning. What’s more, their efforts have paid off.
• 董事會的主要工作是確保讓合適的人選來運營我們的業務，確認下一代領導人並讓他們做好準備明天就可以接管公司。我在19個公司董事會任職，波克夏董事們在繼承方案上投入的時間和努力是最多的。更重要的是，他們的努力得到了回報。
As 2011 started, Todd Combs joined us as an investment manager, and shortly after yearend Ted Weschler came aboard. Both of these men have outstanding investment skills and a deep commitment to Berkshire. Each will be handling a few billion dollars in 2012, but they have the brains, judgment and character to manage our entire portfolio when Charlie and I are no longer running Berkshire.
2011年開始的時候，Todd Combs作為一名投資經理加入了我們，在年末結束不久，Ted Weschler也加入了我們。他們兩個人都擁有傑出的投資技能，以及對波克夏的承諾。在2012年他們兩人只掌管數十億美元資金，但他們擁有的大腦、判斷力和魅力，可以在我和查理不再運營波克夏時掌管整個投資組合。
Your Board is equally enthusiastic about my successor as CEO, an individual to whom they have had a great deal of exposure and whose managerial and human qualities they admire. (We have two superb back-up candidates as well.) When a transfer of responsibility is required, it will be seamless, and Berkshire’s prospects will remain bright. More than 98% of my net worth is in Berkshire stock, all of which will go to various philanthropies. Being so heavily concentrated in one stock defies conventional wisdom. But I’m fine with this arrangement, knowing both the quality and diversity of the businesses we own and the caliber of the people who manage them. With these assets, my successor will enjoy a running start. Do not, however, infer from this discussion that Charlie and I are going anywhere; we continue to be in excellent health, and we love what we do.
你們的董事會對於誰會成為CEO的繼任人也同樣熱情。同樣我們也有兩個非常好的超級替補。我們到時候可以做到無縫交接，而波克夏的前途將保持光明。我的98%以上淨財富都是波克夏股票，他們將進入各種慈善基金。將如此多資金投入到一隻股票中並不符合傳統智慧。但我對這一安排感到滿意，我知道我們的業務質量好並且多元化，而管理他們的人又如此能幹。有了這些資產，我的繼任者就有了良好的開端。不要把這段話解讀為我和查理會去哪裡。我們仍非常健康，並且喜歡我們做的事情。
• On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004, with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many opportunities for “bolt-on” acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we’ve already agreed to three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager to expand his managerial domain.
• 在9月16日，我們收購了路博潤，一家生產添加劑和其他特殊化學製品的全球性公司。自James Hambrick在2004年成為CEO以來取得了傑出的成績。稅前利潤從1.47億美元增長到10.85億美元。路博潤在特殊化學領域將會有很多附加的收購機會。其實，我們已經同意了三起收購，成本為4.93億美元。James是一個有原則的買家，一個超級的公司運營者。查理和我都迫切希望擴張他的管理領域。
• Our major businesses did well last year. In fact, each of our five largest non-insurance companies – BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy – delivered record operating earnings. In aggregate these businesses earned more than $9 billion pre-tax in 2011. Contrast that to seven years ago, when we owned only one of the five, MidAmerican, whose pre-tax earnings were $393 million. Unless the economy weakens in 2012, each of our fabulous five should again set a record, with aggregate earnings comfortably topping $10 billion.
• 過去一年，我們的主要業務表現良好。事實上，我們的五大非保險業公司─BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy，都創下歷史性的營運利潤。這些公司在2011年一共貢獻了90億的稅前盈餘。相較7年前，我們只有其中的一家MidAmerican Energy，稅前利益只有3.93億。除非在2012年經濟疲弱，這五家神奇的公司應該可以持續創下記錄，總收入可以輕鬆達到100億的利潤。
• In total, our entire string of operating companies spent $8.2 billion for property, plant and equipment in 2011, smashing our previous record by more than $2 billion. About 95% of these outlays were made in the U.S., a fact that may surprise those who believe our country lacks investment opportunities. We welcome projects abroad, but expect the overwhelming majority of Berkshire’s future capital commitments to be in America. In 2012, these expenditures will again set a record.
總體來說，我們運營的所有公司2011年在房地產、工廠和設備上投入了82億美元，比之前的記錄還要高20億美元。大約有95%的支出都是在美國，這可能會讓那些覺得我們的國家缺乏投資機會的人感到吃驚。我們歡迎海外的項目，但是預期未來波克夏的資金承諾主要還是在美國。2012年這方面的開銷會再創紀錄。
• Our insurance operations continued their delivery of costless capital that funds a myriad of other opportunities. This business produces “float” – money that doesn’t belong to us, but that we get to invest for Berkshire’s benefit. And if we pay out less in losses and expenses than we receive in premiums, we additionally earn an underwriting profit, meaning the float costs us less than nothing. Though we are sure to have underwriting losses from time to time, we’ve now had nine consecutive years of underwriting profits, totaling about $17 billion. Over the same nine years our float increased from $41 billion to its current record of $70 billion. Insurance has been good to us
• 我們的保險業務繼續為無數其他機會提供沒有成本的資本。這個業務製造的是“浮款”——這些錢不屬於我們，但我們可將之用於投資給波克夏帶來好處。同時如果我們在虧損和成本方面的支出比我們收到的保費少，我們就贏得了一筆額外的承銷費用，意味這比浮款的成本比零還要少。儘管我們不時會出小一些承保損失，我們現在已經連續9年都獲得了承銷利潤，總額高達170億美元。在過去的9年時間，我們的浮款從410億美元上升到現在創紀錄的700億美元。保險是我們的一個好業務。
• Finally, we made two major investments in marketable securities: (1) a $5 billion 6% preferred stock of Bank of America that came with warrants allowing us to buy 700 million common shares at $7.14 per share any time before September 2, 2021; and (2) 63.9 million shares of IBM that cost us $10.9 billion. Counting IBM, we now have large ownership interests in four exceptional companies: 13.0% of American Express, 8.8% of Coca-Cola, 5.5% of IBM and 7.6% of Wells Fargo. (We also, of course, have many smaller, but important, positions.)
• 最後，我們在市場上做了兩項重大投資：1、50億美元購買美國銀行6%的優先股，同時獲得權證可以在2021年9月2日之前以每股7.14美元的價格購買7億股普通股。2、6390萬股IBM股票，成本為109億美元。加上IBM，我們現在在四家非常優秀的公司裡佔有大量股份：美國運通13%，可口可樂8.8%，IBM 5.5%，富國銀行7.6%。(當然，我們也擁有很多小一點，但同樣重要的倉位。)
We view these holdings as partnership interests in wonderful businesses, not as marketable securities to be bought or sold based on their near-term prospects. Our share of their earnings, however, are far from fully reflected in our earnings; only the dividends we receive from these businesses show up in our financial reports. Over time, though, the undistributed earnings of these companies that are attributable to our ownership are of huge importance to us. That’s because they will be used in a variety of ways to increase future earnings and dividends of the investee. They may also be devoted to stock repurchases, which will increase our share of the company’s future earnings.
我們將這些持倉視為在偉大的公司裡的合夥人利益，而不是基於短期前景可供出售的證券。這些公司的盈利情況還遠未反應在我們的盈利中。只有我們從這些公司的分紅反應在我們的財務報告中了。長期來說，在這些公司未分配的盈利中，歸屬我們所有權的那一部分對我們來說至關重要。因為我們將通過各種方式使用這些盈利，來增加未來的盈利和投資對象的分紅。他們也可以用來回購股票。
Had we owned our present positions throughout last year, our dividends from the “Big Four” would have been $862 million. That’s all that would have been reported in Berkshire’s income statement. Our share of this quartet’s earnings, however, would have been far greater: $3.3 billion. Charlie and I believe that the $2.4 billion that goes unreported on our books creates at least that amount of value for Berkshire as it fuels earnings gains in future years. We expect the combined earnings of the four – and their dividends as well – to increase in 2012 and, for that matter, almost every year for a long time to come. A decade from now, our current holdings of the four companies might well account for earnings of $7 billion, of which $2 billion in dividends would come to us.
如果我們在去年就持有我們現在的倉位，我們從這“四大”公司中就可以獲得8.62億美元的分紅。這一部分就會出現在波克夏的收入報告中。我們這個季度的盈利就會高得多，為33億美元。查理和我相信我們賬本上沒有報告的24億美元將為波克夏創造同等的價值，因為它可以增加未來數年的盈利。我們預期這四家公司的盈利和分紅2012年會繼續增長，並在未來許多年都會增長。十年後，我們持有的這四家公司盈利可能為我們帶來會70億美元盈利，其中有20億美元的分紅。
I’ve run out of good news. Here are some developments that hurt us during 2011:
我的好消息報完了。接下來是2011年傷害我們的一些事情：
• A few years back, I spent about $2 billion buying several bond issues of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility operation serving portions of Texas. That was a mistake – a big mistake. In large measure, the company’s prospects were tied to the price of natural gas, which tanked shortly after our purchase and remains depressed. Though we have annually received interest payments of about $102 million since our purchase, the company’s ability to pay will soon be exhausted unless gas prices rise substantially. We wrote down our investment by $1 billion in 2010 and by an additional $390 million last year.
•過去幾年，我花了20億美元購買了Energy Future Holdings發行的多種債券，後者是一家為德克薩斯州的部分地區提供服務的電力運營商。這是一個錯誤-巨大的錯誤。從大的方面衡量，這家公司的前景與天然氣價格的前景聯繫在一起，而後者在我們購買後大幅下跌並一直在低估徘徊。儘管自購買後我們每年收到大約1.02億美元的利息支付，但除非天然氣價格大幅上升，否則這家公司的支付能力將很快耗盡。我們在2010年對這筆投資提了10億美元減記。去年又補提了3.9億美元。
At yearend, we carried the bonds at their market value of $878 million. If gas prices remain at present levels, we will likely face a further loss, perhaps in an amount that will virtually wipe out our current carrying value. Conversely, a substantial increase in gas prices might allow us to recoup some, or even all, of our write-down. However things turn out, I totally miscalculated the gain/loss probabilities when I purchased the bonds. In tennis parlance, this was a major unforced error by your chairman.
在年底，我們將這筆債券的賬面價值按其市值8.78億美元確認。如果天然氣價格維持在目前水平，我們很可能將面臨更多損失，金額甚至最終能夠抹去目前的賬面價值。相反，如果天然氣價格大幅回升，我們將會恢復部分，甚至全部的減記額。無論結果如何，在我購買債券的時候都算錯了收益損失概率。在網球術語中，這是你們的主席一次非常重大的非受迫性失誤。
• Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in 2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That’s a lot of income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.
• 在2011年，三項大規模的同時也是非常有吸引力的固定收益投資被其發行人贖回了。瑞士再保險，高盛和GE在贖回證券時一共向我們支付了128億美元，這些證券此前每年給波克夏創造12億美元的稅前收益。這麼一大筆收益需要再投資，儘管我們對Lubrizol的收購抵消了大部分的影響。
• Last year, I told you that “a housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so.” I was dead wrong. We have five businesses whose results are significantly influenced by housing activity. The connection is direct at Clayton Homes, which is the largest producer of homes in the country, accounting for about 7% of those constructed during 2011.
• 去年，我告訴你們“房地產復甦很可能在一年左右時間內開始。”我錯的離譜。我們擁有5家企業，其業績受到房地產業的顯著影響。這直接影響了Clayton Homes的業績，後者是美國最大的移動房屋製造商，占到2011年此類房屋建造量的7%。
Additionally, Acme Brick, Shaw (carpet), Johns Manville (insulation) and MiTek (building products, primarily connector plates used in roofing) are all materially affected by construction activity. In aggregate, our five housing-related companies had pre-tax profits of $513 million in 2011. That’s similar to 2010 but down from $1.8 billion in 2006.
此外，Acme Brick，Shaw(地毯)，Johns Manville(隔熱層)和MiTek(建築產品)都受到建築活動的極大英系那個，我們的5家房地產相關公司在2011年共錄得稅前收益5.13億美元。這與2010年類似，但低於2006年的18億美元。
Housing will come back – you can be sure of that. Over time, the number of housing units necessarily matches the number of households (after allowing for a normal level of vacancies). For a period of years prior to 2008, however, America added more housing units than households. Inevitably, we ended up with far too many units and the bubble popped with a violence that shook the entire economy. That created still another problem for housing: Early in a recession, household formations slow, and in 2009 the decrease was dramatic.
房地產會復甦的-你能夠對此確信無疑。長期看，房屋的數量需與家庭的數量相當(在考慮通常比例的空置率後)。然而，在2008年前的一段時期內，美國增加的房屋數量高於家庭數量。不可避免的，最終我們造了太多的房屋，泡沫破裂的威力動搖了整個經濟。這還給房地產業帶來了另一個問題：在衰退初期，新家庭形成的速度放緩，在2009年這一下滑非常劇烈。
That devastating supply/demand equation is now reversed: Every day we are creating more households than housing units. People may postpone hitching up during uncertain times, but eventually hormones take over. And while “doubling-up” may be the initial reaction of some during a recession, living with in-laws can quickly lose its allure.
這一毀滅性的供求關係等式如今逆轉了：每天新的家庭數量要多於房屋。人們可能在充滿不確定的時期擱置置業，但最終荷爾蒙會接管一切。在衰退期間，一些人最初的反映可能是“暫時同居一室”，但與對方父母同居一室很快會失去吸引力。
At our current annual pace of 600,000 housing starts – considerably less than the number of new households being formed – buyers and renters are sopping up what’s left of the old oversupply. (This process will run its course at different rates around the country; the supply-demand situation varies widely by locale.) While this healing takes place, however, our housing-related companies sputter, employing only 43,315 people compared to 58,769 in 2006. This hugely important sector of the economy, which includes not only construction but everything that feeds off of it, remains in a depression of its own. I believe this is the major reason a recovery in employment has so severely lagged the steady and substantial comeback we have seen in almost all other sectors of our economy.
我們目前每年建造60萬個家庭房屋-遠低於新家庭形成的數量-購買和租賃需求正在吸收此前遺留下的過度供給。(這一過程在美國各地已不同速率開展;不同地區的供需情形不同)。然而當這種修復發生時，我們的房地產相關企業卻手忙腳亂，他們在2006年的員工數字為58769，而如今卻只有43315。作為經濟中至關重要的部門，它不僅包含建築業，還包含所有對其依賴的行業，房地產業仍然在經歷其自身的衰退過程中。我相信這是就業復甦遠遠落後於我們在經濟的絕大部分行業所看到的穩固和顯著的複甦的原因。
Wise monetary and fiscal policies play an important role in tempering recessions, but these tools don’t create households nor eliminate excess housing units. Fortunately, demographics and our market system will restore the needed balance – probably before long. When that day comes, we will again build one million or more residential units annually. I believe pundits will be surprised at how far unemployment drops once that happens. They will then reawake to what has been true since 1776: America’s best days lie ahead.
明智的貨幣和財政政策在緩和衰退中起到重要作用，但這些政策工具不會創造家庭，也不能消除多餘的房屋。幸運的是，人口因素和我們的市場體係將會恢復所需的平衡-很可能在不久之後。當那一天來臨的時候，我們的年均住宅建造量將再度達到100萬棟或更多。我相信，一旦這種情形發生後，那些自命權威的人將對失業率的下降程度感到驚訝。他們將再度意識到1776年以來就一直確認的事實：美國的好日子還在前面。
Intrinsic Business Value
企業內含價值
Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn’t, we are overpaid at any price.
查理和我使用波克夏的每股內含價值的增長率來衡量我們的業績表現。如果我們的收益長期內超過標普500的表現，我們就配得上自己的薪水。如果未能超過，那麼我們得到的薪水太多了。
We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value. This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That’s because the amount by which Berkshire’s intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.
我們沒有辦法準確定位內含價值。儘管其價值被大幅低估，但我們確實有一個有效的代理指標：每股賬面價值。這一指標在大部分公司毫無意義。然而在波克夏，賬面價值大致追隨企業價值波動。這是因為波克夏的內含價值超過賬面價值的幅度不會每年大幅變化，儘管這一差異在大部分年份內都是增加的。長期看，這一差異在絕對值上可能越來越大，但企業價值/賬面價值的比例卻大致穩定，因為其分子、分母同時變大。
We’ve regularly emphasized that our book-value performance is almost certain to outpace the S&P 500 in a bad year for the stock market and just as certainly will fall short in a strong up-year. The test is how we do over time. Last year’s annual report included a table laying out results for the 42 five-year periods since we took over at Berkshire in 1965 (i.e., 1965-69, 1966-70, etc.). All showed our book value beating the S&P, and our string held for 2007-11. It will almost certainly snap, though, if the S&P 500 should put together a five-year winning streak (which it may well be on its way to doing as I write this).
我們強調我們的帳面價值增長表現在不好的年度，仍是超越標普500的表現。但同樣可以肯定，在強勢的年度，我們的增長會落後大盤表現。真正的考驗是我們的長期表現。去年的年報包含了一張表，列出自我們接手波克夏後的42個5年期間（例如1965-69,1966-70）的表現。所有期間顯示，我們的帳面價值表現擊敗標普，2007~2011仍持續保持。如果標普500指數開啟5年期連勝，肯定是搶購的。（在我寫下這段話時，股市可能正在如此進行。
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I also included two tables last year that set forth the key quantitative ingredients that will help you estimate our per-share intrinsic value. I won’t repeat the full discussion here; you can find it reproduced on pages 99-100. To update the tables shown there, our per-share investments in 2011 increased 4% to $98,366, and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 18% to $6,990 per share.
去年我列出了兩張表，闡明一些關鍵數據以幫助你估算我們每股的內在價值。上次那兩張表中需要有所更新的是，2011年每股投資增長4%至98366美元。我們從商業本身而非保險或投資獲得的稅前收益增長18%至每股6990美元。
Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our primary focus is on building operating earnings. Over time, the businesses we currently own should increase their aggregate earnings, and we hope also to purchase some large operations that will give us a further boost. We now have eight subsidiaries that would each be included in the Fortune 500 were they stand-alone companies. That leaves only 492 to go. My task is clear, and I’m on the prowl.
我和查理都樂見這兩方面的增長，但我們更關注營業收益。我們現在擁有的公司應該增加他們的總收入。同時，我們希望購入一些大型業務，以獲得更大的收入增長。我們現在有8個子公司位列財富500強，所以還剩492個選擇。我的任務非常明確，而我現在仍在考慮中。
Share Repurchases
股票回購
Last September, we announced that Berkshire would repurchase its shares at a price of up to 110% of book
value. We were in the market for only a few days – buying $67 million of stock – before the price advanced beyond
our limit. Nonetheless, the general importance of share repurchases suggests I should focus for a bit on the subject.
去年九月，我們宣布，波克夏將以最高為股票賬面價值的110%回購股份。我們入市僅幾天，在觸及我們所限定的價格之前，回購了價值6700萬美元的股份。
Charlie and I favor repurchases when two conditions are met: first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business value, conservatively calculated.
當滿足兩個條件時，我和查理會選擇股份回購：1、公司擁有充裕的資金來維持日常運轉和所需的現金流;2、股票價格遠低於保守估計的公司內在價值。
We have witnessed many bouts of repurchasing that failed our second test. Sometimes, of course, infractions – even serious ones – are innocent; many CEOs never stop believing their stock is cheap. In other instances, a less benign conclusion seems warranted. It doesn’t suffice to say that repurchases are being made to offset the dilution from stock issuances or simply because a company has excess cash. Continuing shareholders are hurt unless shares are purchased below intrinsic value. The first law of capital allocation – whether the money is slated for acquisitions or share repurchases – is that what is smart at one price is dumb at another. (One CEO who always stresses the price/value factor in repurchase decisions is Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan; I recommend that you read his annual letter.)
我們曾目睹很多股份回購併非滿足上述第二條條件。你要知道，很多CEO永遠認為他們公司的股票太便宜了。但事實上，股份回購併非簡單用來抵消股票增髮帶來的股權稀釋，或者僅僅因為公司手握多餘的現金。只有當回購價格低於股票內在價值時，繼續持有的股東才不會利益受損。考慮是否要收購或者股份回購時的第一準則是，在某一個價格你是明智的，但在另一個價格時你可能就是愚蠢的(what is smart at one price is dumb at another)。(摩根大通的Jamie Dimon就始終重視價格/價值因素在回購決定中的重要性。我建議你們去讀讀他的年度信。)
Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) Nevertheless, we don’t enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling.
當很多人在波克夏股票低於內在價值時拋售時，我和查理心情複雜。一方面，我們希望幫助繼續持有的股東獲得更豐厚的利潤，而最好的方法無疑是購入我們自己的股票，因為我們知道現在的股價只是內在價值的九成、八成，甚至更低。(這就像我們一位董事曾經說過的，這在就好比在一個水已流乾的桶裡，射那些已經停止跳躍的魚。)另一方面，我們並不希望我們的股東在股票價格還未達到內在價值時就出倉，儘管我們回購股份的價格或許比一些股東預設的出倉價位要高。我們回購時，希望那些退出的股東能充分意識到他們所拋售的資產究竟價值幾何。
At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.
我們預設回購價格上限為賬面價值的110%，回購明顯增加了波克夏每股的內在價值。而且我們買得越多，買的價格越便宜，繼續持有的股東獲得的利潤將更豐厚。因此，如果有機會，我們希望積極回購股票，甚至在價格上限或略低於價格上限的價位上。但是，你要知道，我們對支持股市並無興趣。另外，如果我們持有的現金少於200億美元，我們也不會進行股票回購操作。在波克夏，財務實力毫無疑問比其他所有事情都要重要。
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This discussion of repurchases offers me the chance to address the irrational reaction of many investors to changes in stock prices. When Berkshire buys stock in a company that is repurchasing shares, we hope for two events: First, we have the normal hope that earnings of the business will increase at a good clip for a long time to come; and second, we also hope that the stock underperforms in the market for a long time as well. A corollary to this second point: “Talking our book” about a stock we own – were that to be effective – would actually be harmful to Berkshire, not helpful as commentators customarily assume.
對回購的討論為我提供了一個闡述眾多投資者對股價變化非理性反應的機會。當波克夏購買一家正在回購股票的公司時，我希望出現兩件事情：首先，我們通常希望企業盈利在未來一段較長時期將有良好的增長;第二，我們還希望股票在相當長一段時間表現落後於大市。對第二點的一個推論就是：“按照我們的劇本”持有我們擁有的股票——假設這能夠有效——事實上將會對波克夏有害，而不是評論家慣常認為的有益。
Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisano did a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Their operational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.
讓我們以IBM為例。正如許多行業觀察者所知，其CEO郭士納(Lou Gerstner)和彭明盛(Sam Palmisano)作出了出色的工作，把IBM從20年前瀕臨破產變成了今天的卓越領先，他們的經營成果是極不平凡。
But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, a skill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, made value-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.
但是他們的財務管理也同樣輝煌，特別是近年來改善了公司的財務靈活性。事實上，我能認為沒有其他大公司有更好的財務管理，這一技能實實在在的增進了IBM股東的獲利。該公司明智地使用債務，幾乎全部用現金完成增值收購，並積極的回購自己的股票。
Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%. Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us. Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for the day: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?
今天IBM有11.6億股流通股，我們擁有約6390萬股占到5.5%。當然公司未來五年的盈利對我們而言尤其重要。除此之外該公司還可能會花500億美元左右在未來幾年回購股份。我們今天的測驗就是：一個長期投資者，比如波克夏，應該在這段時間內期待什麼呢?
I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.
我們不會讓你保留懸念。我們應該期待IBM股價在未來五年內下跌。
Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire 250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and we would own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-year period, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding after five years, of which we would own 6.5%.
讓我們做數學題。如果IBM股價在這一時間段的平均價格為200美元，公司將用500億美元收購2.5億股股票。這將導致流通股數量為9.1億股，我們將擁有7%的公司股份。反之如果股價未來五年以平均300美元的價格出售，IBM將僅僅能購買1.67億股。這將導致在五年後有約9.9億股流通股，而我們將擁有其中的6.5%
If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100 million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price” repurchase scenario had taken place.
如果IBM將盈利，比如第五年有200億美元，我們享受的份額將是一個完整的1億美元，而在“令人失望”較低股價下享受的收益大於高股價的情況。
The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance. These shareholders resemble a commuter who rejoices after the price of gas increases, simply because his tank contains a day’s supply.
邏輯很簡單：如果你將要在未來成為某隻股票的淨買方，要么直接用自己的錢購買或者間接(通過持有一家正在回購股票的公司)，當股價上升時你就受害，當股價不振時你獲益。不過，情感因素通常會令事情變得複雜：大多數人，包括將在未來成為淨買入者那些人，看到股價上升會覺得舒服。這些股東就像是看到汽油價格上漲感到高興的通勤者，僅僅因為他們的油箱裡已經裝滿了一天汽油。
Charlie and I don’t expect to win many of you over to our way of thinking – we’ve observed enough human behavior to know the futility of that – but we do want you to be aware of our personal calculus. And here a confession is in order: In my early days I, too, rejoiced when the market rose. Then I read Chapter Eight of Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the chapter dealing with how investors should view fluctuations in stock prices. Immediately the scales fell from my eyes, and low prices became my friend. Picking up that book was one of the luckiest moments in my life.
查理和我並不指望能贏得你們中的很多人用與我們相同的思維思考，我們已經觀察到了足夠多人的行為，知道這是徒勞的。但是我確實想要你了我們的個人算法。並且在這裡陳述是為了：在我早期的日子裡，我也樂於看到市場上漲。然後我讀到格雷厄姆的“聰明的投資者”第八章，這章說明了投資者如何對待股價的波動。立刻一切在我眼前發生了變化，低價成為了我的朋友。拿起那本書是我一生中最幸運的時刻之一。
In the end, the success of our IBM investment will be determined primarily by its future earnings. But an important secondary factor will be how many shares the company purchases with the substantial sums it is likely to devote to this activity. And if repurchases ever reduce the IBM shares outstanding to 63.9 million, I will abandon my famed frugality and give Berkshire employees a paid holiday.
最後，IBM的帶給我的投資成本主要取決於它未來的盈利。但是一個重要的輔助因素是，公司願意拿出多少可觀的資金來購買自己的股票。如果回購一旦令IBM的流通股跌到了6390萬股，那麼我將放棄我們著名的節儉，給波克夏公司所有員工有薪假期。
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Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them. Because we may be repurchasing Berkshire shares from some of you, we will offer our thoughts in each section as to how intrinsic value compares to carrying value.
現在，來檢查我們四大主要營運項目。每項項目的資產負債表、損益表各有不同，放在一塊看會妨礙分析。因此，我們切成四個獨立的個體，我和查理就是這樣看業務的。因為我們可能會從股東手中回購股票，所以我們也會提共對各項業務的內涵價值，相對於帳面價值孰高孰低的看法。
Insurance
保險業
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
首先看保險，波克夏的核心業務，這個在過去幾年推動我們發展的引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
財產險保險公司在前期收保費和以後支付索賠，極端的例子下，比如那些工人事故賠償，可能要幾十年才會產生支付。這個現在收錢，以後付款的模式讓我們持有大量現金，我們稱這位“浮動”的錢，並最終向流到別人的地方。與此同時，我們將投資這些浮存金令波克夏收益。雖然個人保單來來往往，但是我們持有的浮存金相對於保費量仍然保持穩定。因此隨著我們業務的增長，浮動金也在增長。下表反應了這項事實：
Year Float (in $ millions)
1970 $ 39
1980 237
1990 1,632
2000 27,871
2010 65,832
2011 70,571
It’s unlikely that our float will grow much – if at all – from its current level. That’s mainly because we already have an outsized amount relative to our premium volume. Were there to be a decline in float, I will add, it would almost certainly be very gradual and therefore impose no unusual demand for funds on us.
我們的浮存金從目前的水平上可能不會再增長多少，如果還有的話。這主要是因為相對於我們的保費收入，已經有一個超大型的浮存金規模。浮存金是否會出現一個下降，我將會補充，它將幾乎肯定以一個緩慢的形式出現，因此不會令我們付出大量資金。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. For example, State Farm, by farthe country’slargestinsurer and a well-managed company besides, has incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the last eleven years. There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry is resourceful in creating new ones.
如果我們的保費收入超過我們的開支和最終損失的總額，我們把浮存金產生的獲利加入到投資收入中。當這樣的一個利潤發生時，我們享受自由使用資金——並且更好的是，持有資金還能獲利。不幸的是，所有保險人希望發生的情況導致了激烈競爭，如此激烈導致大量年份中財產保險業整體出現虧損。比如State Farm，這個迄今為止美國最大的保險公司，並且作為一個良好管理的公司，在過去11年中的8年產生承保虧損。保險業出現虧損的方式有很多，這個行業有辦法創造新的虧損。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for nine consecutive years, our gain for the period having totaled $17 billion. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most – though certainly not all – future years. If we accomplish that, our float will be better than cost-free. We will profit just as we would if some party deposited $70.6 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.
正如本報告第一部分所指出的，我們經營的業務連續九年有承保利潤，我們在這階段的收益總計達到170億美元。我們相信我們將在大多數年份繼續承保利潤，但肯定不是全部年份。如果我們果我們實現這個目標，我們的浮存金將好過免費午餐。我們的獲利就像是如果某些團體在我們這裡存了706億美元，向我們支付一筆費用持有這些錢，並允許我們用這筆錢為自己獲利投資。
So how does this attractive float affect intrinsic value calculations? Our float is deducted in full as a liability in calculating Berkshire’s book value, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to view float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, the true value of this liability is far lower than the accounting liability
那麼這些浮存金是如何影響內在價值的估算呢?我們的浮存金作為一筆負債從波克夏的賬簿中減去，如同我們要在明天付掉，並且無法補充它。但這是一種對浮存金不正確的看法，而正確的看法應該是作為周轉基金來看。如果浮存金既是無成本的，又是長期持久的，這個負債的真正價值遠低於會計定義上的負債。
Partially offsetting this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” attributable to our insurance companies that is included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. If an insurance business produces large and sustained underwriting losses, any goodwill asset attributable to it should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
部分抵消這種誇大的負債是對我們保險公司的155億美元“商譽”作為資產納入賬簿，事實上，商譽代表了我們為浮存金支付的價格。然而商譽的成本沒有體現真正的價值。如果如果保險業產生巨大和持續的承保損失，任何任何商譽的資產都應該被視為毫無價值，不論其原始成本多少。
Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would pay to purchase float of similar quality – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds book value.
幸運的是，在波克夏情況並非如此。查理和我認為我們保險業務的商譽的真正經濟價值——我們將以此作為支付購買浮存金—— 要遠遠超過其歷史賬面價值。我們的浮存金價值是其中的一個原因——一個很大的原因——這就是我們為什麼相信波克夏的內在商業價值大大超過帳面價值。
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: We don’t think there is much “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In most years, including 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
讓我再次強調一點，無成本的浮存金不是整體財產保險業預期都能產生的結果：我不認為有很多“波克夏”式的浮存金在保險業界中存在。在大多數年份裡，包括2011年，該行業的保費收入已不足以支付索賠和費用。因此，該行業幾十年來的有形資產整體回報為，遠遠短低於美國工業企業的平均回報。這一遺憾的表現幾乎可以肯定將繼續。波克夏優秀經濟性只是因為我們有某些了不起的經理人在運營某些非凡的保險業務。讓我告訴你們一些主要的部門。
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First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in that respect than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever faced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a moderate profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. Concurrently, all other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, and some would face insolvency.
以浮存金規模計，排名第一的是Ajit Jain管理的波克夏海瑟崴再保險集團。Ajit擔保的風險沒有別的人願意或者有資本能接納得了。他的運作結合了容量、速度、果斷。最重要的是，他的思維方式在保險業中獨一無二。然而他從來沒有把波克夏暴露到與我們的資源不適當的風險中。事實上事實上，我們在這方面比大多數大型保險公司更為保守。舉例來說，如果保險業應該經歷一個從一些虧損2500億美元特大災難——損失相當於任何時候曾經歷的三倍——作為一個整體波克夏可能會錄得適度利潤的一年，因為它有許多盈利流。目前所有其他主要保險公司和再保險公司都離上漲的紅色很遠，有些人還將面臨破產。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $34 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By these accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Charlie would gladly trade me for a second Ajit. Alas, there is none.
從1985年開始，Ajit已創造了有340億美元浮存金的保險業務和巨大的承保利潤，一個沒有任何其他保險公司的首席執行官能夠接近的壯舉。這些成就使他為波克夏價增加了數十億美元的價值。查理很樂意拿我換第二個Ajit，但是第二個不存在。
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We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我們另一個強力保險部門是由Tad Montross管理的General Re。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively evaluate the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
作為一個優秀保險人他的經營要堅持四條準則，他必須(1)了解所有敞口可能會導致的保單損失;(2)保守評估任何敞口可能導致的真實損失以及可能造成的成本(3)設置能提供利潤的一保費，能平均的把兩個潛在損失成本和運營費用都覆蓋在內(4)如果不能得到適當的保費溢價。願意離場。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that their competitors are eagerly writing. That old line, “The other guy is doing it so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Indeed, a good underwriter needs an independent mindset akin to that of the senior citizen who received a call from his wife while driving home. “Albert, be careful,” she warned, “I just heard on the radio that there’s a car going the wrong way down the Interstate.” “Mabel, they don’t know the half of it,” replied Albert, “It’s not just one car, there are hundreds of them.”
許多保險公司通過前三個測試但第四個不及格。他們就是無法轉身離開其競爭對手都熱切進入的業務。老話：“其他人正在這麼幹所以我們必須也乾”，在任何行業都會出問題。，但是沒有其他行業的情況會比保險業更壞。事實上，一個好的有獨立思維的承報人，必須像在開車回家途中接到妻子電話的那個人一樣聰明。”“Albert,當心“，她妻子警告：”我剛剛聽到廣播說有一輛成出問題卡在了州際公路上。“Mabel，他們根本什麼都不懂，“Albert回答說，“不只是一輛車，而是有上百輛”。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. In the first few years after we acquired it, General Re was a major headache. Now it’s a treasure.
Tad明白保險業四條軍規，而這也反映到他的成績單上。General Re在他的領導下創造了巨大的浮存金，我們希望，從平均的角度而言他能繼續。在我們收購General Re的最初幾年，它是一個麻煩，現在它是一筆財富。
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Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 61 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 50 years of service in 2011.
最後還有GEICO，這個保險人讓我在61年前獲得了經驗。GEICO由Tony Nicely運營，他18歲加入公司，2011年已經供職了50年。
GEICO’s much-envied record comes from Tony’s brilliant execution of a superb and almostimpossible-to-replicate business model. During Tony’s 18-year tenure as CEO, our market share has grown from 2.0% to 9.3%. If it had instead remained static – as it had for more than a decade before he took over – our premium volume would now be $3.3 billion rather than the $15.4 billion we attained in 2011. The extra value created by Tony and his associates is a major element in Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value.
GEICO令人羨慕的業績，來自Tony完美的執行一個幾乎無法被複製的運營模式。在他擔任CEO的18年中，我們的市場份額從2.0%增長到9.3%。如果公司的仍然維持靜止的份額——如同他擔任CEO以前的情況——那麼現在我們的保費將是33億美元而不是實際在2011年獲得的154億美元。Tony和他的同事創造的的額外價值，是波克夏的內在價值超過賬面價值的主要元素。
There is still more than 90% of the auto-insurance market left for GEICO to rake in. Don’t bet against Tony acquiring chunks of it year after year in the future. Our low costs permit low prices, and every day more Americans discover that the Gecko is doing them a favor when he urges them to visit GEICO.com for a quote. (Our lizard has another endearing quality: Unlike human spokesmen or spokeswomen who expensively represent other insurance companies, our little fellow has no agent.)
汽車保險市場仍有90%可供GEICO去攻略。千萬別打賭TONY不能在未來獲取市占。我們的低成本， 讓我們可以提供低保費，而且每天會有更多的美國人會發現，當GEICO促使他們拜訪GEICO的網站時，他們可以獲得低廉的保費。
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In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了我們擁有的三大主要保險業務，我們還有一群較小的公司，他們中大多數在做保險業務中最奇怪的業務。總體而言，他們的一貫有盈利，並且向我們提供了巨大的浮動。查理和我把這些公司和經理們當作珍寶。
At yearend, we acquired Princeton Insurance, a New Jersey writer of medical malpractice policies. This bolt-on transaction expands the managerial domain of Tim Kenesey, the star CEO of Medical Protective, our Indiana-based med-mal insurer. Princeton brings with it more than $600 million of float, an amount that is included in the following table.
年末我們收購了Princeton Insurance，一家承保醫療事故的保險人。這一閃電交易使得我們的明星Medical Protective的明星CEO有更大的管理空間。Princeton能帶來6億美元的浮存金，數字包括在下表。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2011 | 2010 | 2011 | 2010 | ||
| General Re | -$714 | $452 | $33,728 | $20,049 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 144 | 176 | 19,714 | 30,370 | ||
| GEICO | 576 | 1,117 | 11,169 | 10,272 | ||
| Other Primary | 242 | 268 | 5,960 | 5,141 | ||
| Total | $248 | $2,013 | $70,571 | $65,832 | ||
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.
在所有大型的保險公司中，波克夏是世界上最好的。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses
受監管，重資本行業
We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our many other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own sector in this letter and also split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我們擁有兩家非常大的企業，BNSF和中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)，他們重要的共同特點使其與許多我們的其他企業截然不同。因此，我們在這封信裡將他們單列一個版塊，在我們GAAP財務報表中也將其單獨列報。
A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply covers their interest requirements. In a less than robust economy during 2011, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x. At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.
這兩家公司的關鍵特點是他們對長期，受監管資產的巨額投資，這些投資部分由非波克夏擔保的大額長期債務融資。不需要我們的信用：兩家公司在糟糕商業環境下的盈利能力足以覆蓋其利息要求。在2011年的疲軟經濟下，BNSF的利息覆蓋率為9.5倍。同時，對於中美能源，兩項關鍵指標確保了其在所有環境下償付債務的能力：其收益能力來自於獨家提供必需的服務和多元化的收入來源，使其免受任何單一監管機構行動的影響。
Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.
以噸-公里計，鐵路承擔了美國城市間貨運量的42%，而BNSF運輸量要多於其他鐵路，占到行業總量的37%。簡單的算術就能告訴你，美國城市間運輸量的15%是由BNSF運輸的。毫不誇張的說，鐵路是我們經濟的循環系統。而你們的鐵路是主幹線。
All of this places a huge responsibility on us. We must, without fail, maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with 13,000 bridges, 80 tunnels, 6,900 locomotives and 78,600 freight cars. This job requires us to have ample financial resources under all economic scenarios and to have the human talent that can instantly and effectively deal with the vicissitudes of nature, such as the widespread flooding BNSF labored under last summer.
所有這一切使我們肩負重任。我們必須維護好和提升我們23000公里長的鐵路以及1.3萬座橋，80座隧道，6900台機車以及78600台運輸車輛。這一工作要求我們在所有經濟情形下都有足夠的財務資源以及能夠迅速而有效的處理千變萬化的行業特徵的人才。
To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. The three other major U.S. railroads are making similar outlays. Though many people decry our country’s inadequate infrastructure spending, that criticism cannot be levied against the railroad industry. It is pouring money – funds from the private sector – into the investment projects needed to provide better and more extensive service in the future. If railroads were not making these huge expenditures, our country’s publicly-financed highway system would face even greater congestion and maintenance problems than exist today.
為了能完成社會義務，BNSF定期投資額遠大於其折舊支出，2011年這一差額達到18億美元。美國的三大主要鐵路都做了類似投入。儘管許多人指責我們國家的基礎設施支出不足，但這一批評對鐵路行業並不合適。這一行業正將私人部門的資金滾滾投入各種投資項目，這些項目將在未來提供更好和更多的服務。如果鐵路沒有做出這樣龐大的支出，我們國家公共部門融資的高速公路系統將面臨更大的擁堵和維護問題。
Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits. But I am confident it will do so because of the value it delivers. Many years ago Ben Franklin counseled, “Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee.” Translating this to our regulated businesses, he might today say, “Take care of your customer, and the regulator – your customer’s representative – will take care of you.” Good behavior by each party begets good behavior in return.
類似BNSF這種的大額投資如果不能獲得合適收益將會非常愚蠢。但我非常有信心，由於其所提供的價值，BNSF會盈利。正如多年前Ben Franklin所說的話，對應到我們的受監管業務，他會說：“照顧好你的客戶，那麼監管者-代表著你的客戶也會照顧你。”做好事有好報。
At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.
在中美能源，我們參與了類似的“社會契約”。我們預期將撥出越來越多的金額來滿足我們客戶未來的需求。如果我們同時能夠可靠而有效的運營，我們直到我們將能在這些投資上獲得公平的收益。
MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.
波克夏持有中美能源89.8%的股份，後者向美國國內的250萬客戶提供電力服務，是愛荷華，猶他和懷俄明州的最大供應商，並且是其他6個州的重要供應商。我們的輸氣管運輸著這個國家8%的天然氣。很明顯，數百萬的美國人每天要依賴我們。他們從未失望。
When MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.
當中美能源在2002年收購Northern Natural的輸氣管時，這家公司的有危機被行業的領先機構評為行業43家公司中的最後一位。在最近的報告中，Northern Natural已經列到第二位。第一位則是我們的另一家輸氣公司，Kern River.
In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. In the most recent survey of customer satisfaction, MidAmerican’s U.S. utilities ranked second among 60 utility groups surveyed. The story was far different not many years back when MidAmerican acquired these properties.
在電氣行業中，中美能源有著無可比擬的記錄。在最近的客戶滿意度調查中，中美能源美國公用事業部分位列受調查的60家公用事業機構中位列第2.而這一切與多年前中美能源收購這些資產時大相徑庭。
MidAmerican will have 3,316 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2012, far more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that we have invested or committed to wind is a staggering $6 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn. In addition, late last year we took on two solar projects – one 100%-owned in California and the other 49%-owned in Arizona – that will cost about $3 billion to construct. Many more wind and solar projects will almost certainly follow.
到2012年底，中美能源將擁有3316兆瓦風電運營，遠超美國其他電力公用事業機構。我們已經投資以及承諾的風能領域的投資達到驚人的60億美元。我們能夠做出如此投資是因為中美能源保留了所有的收益，不像其他公用事業企業幾乎將其收益全部支付給股東。此外，去年底我們上馬了2個太陽能項目，一個是100%獨資的加州項目，另一個亞利桑那州的項目佔股49%，這些項目將需要30億美元建設。後續還有更多風能和太陽能項目。
As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:
正如你現在可以看出來的，我對BNSF的Matt Rose和中美能源的Greg Abel為社會做出的貢獻感到驕傲。我對他們為波克夏的股東做出的貢獻同樣驕傲和感謝。在我們的資產負債表的賬面價值中，BNSF和中美能源商譽的賬面價值總計200億美元。對每一例，我和查理都相信目前的內含價值遠高於賬面價值。製造業、服務業、零售業運營波克夏這一部分的業務面面俱到。讓我們來看一下資產負債表和整個集團的盈利報告。
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $8 in 2011 and $19 in 2010.
In the book value recorded on our balance sheet, BNSF and MidAmerican carry substantial goodwill components totaling $20 billion. In each instance, however, Charlie and I believe current intrinsic value is far greater than book value.
在我們的資產負債表記錄的賬面價值中，BNSF和MidAmerican持有總額達200億美元的大量商譽組成部分。 不過，查理和我在每種情況下都認為現在的內在價值遠大於賬面價值。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業、零售業經營
受監管，重資本行業
We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our many other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own sector in this letter and also split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我們擁有兩家非常大的企業，BNSF和中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)，他們重要的共同特點使其與許多我們的其他企業截然不同。因此，我們在這封信裡將他們單列一個版塊，在我們GAAP財務報表中也將其單獨列報。
A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that even under terrible business conditions amply covers their interest requirements. In a less than robust economy during 2011, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.5x. At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: The stability of earnings that is inherent in our exclusively offering an essential service and a diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from the actions of any single regulatory body.
這兩家公司的關鍵特點是他們對長期，受監管資產的巨額投資，這些投資部分由非波克夏擔保的大額長期債務融資。不需要我們的信用：兩家公司在糟糕商業環境下的盈利能力足以覆蓋其利息要求。在2011年的疲軟經濟下，BNSF的利息覆蓋率為9.5倍。同時，對於中美能源，兩項關鍵指標確保了其在所有環境下償付債務的能力：其收益能力來自於獨家提供必需的服務和多元化的收入來源，使其免受任何單一監管機構行動的影響。
Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that about 15% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. It is no exaggeration to characterize railroads as the circulatory system of our economy. Your railroad is the largest artery.
以噸-公里計，鐵路承擔了美國城市間貨運量的42%，而BNSF運輸量要多於其他鐵路，占到行業總量的37%。簡單的算術就能告訴你，美國城市間運輸量的15%是由BNSF運輸的。毫不誇張的說，鐵路是我們經濟的循環系統。而你們的鐵路是主幹線。
All of this places a huge responsibility on us. We must, without fail, maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with 13,000 bridges, 80 tunnels, 6,900 locomotives and 78,600 freight cars. This job requires us to have ample financial resources under all economic scenarios and to have the human talent that can instantly and effectively deal with the vicissitudes of nature, such as the widespread flooding BNSF labored under last summer.
所有這一切使我們肩負重任。我們必須維護好和提升我們23000公里長的鐵路以及1.3萬座橋，80座隧道，6900台機車以及78600台運輸車輛。這一工作要求我們在所有經濟情形下都有足夠的財務資源以及能夠迅速而有效的處理千變萬化的行業特徵的人才。
To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. The three other major U.S. railroads are making similar outlays. Though many people decry our country’s inadequate infrastructure spending, that criticism cannot be levied against the railroad industry. It is pouring money – funds from the private sector – into the investment projects needed to provide better and more extensive service in the future. If railroads were not making these huge expenditures, our country’s publicly-financed highway system would face even greater congestion and maintenance problems than exist today.
為了能完成社會義務，BNSF定期投資額遠大於其折舊支出，2011年這一差額達到18億美元。美國的三大主要鐵路都做了類似投入。儘管許多人指責我們國家的基礎設施支出不足，但這一批評對鐵路行業並不合適。這一行業正將私人部門的資金滾滾投入各種投資項目，這些項目將在未來提供更好和更多的服務。如果鐵路沒有做出這樣龐大的支出，我們國家公共部門融資的高速公路系統將面臨更大的擁堵和維護問題。
Massive investments of the sort that BNSF is making would be foolish if it could not earn appropriate returns on the incremental sums it commits. But I am confident it will do so because of the value it delivers. Many years ago Ben Franklin counseled, “Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee.” Translating this to our regulated businesses, he might today say, “Take care of your customer, and the regulator – your customer’s representative – will take care of you.” Good behavior by each party begets good behavior in return.
類似BNSF這種的大額投資如果不能獲得合適收益將會非常愚蠢。但我非常有信心，由於其所提供的價值，BNSF會盈利。正如多年前Ben Franklin所說的話，對應到我們的受監管業務，他會說：“照顧好你的客戶，那麼監管者-代表著你的客戶也會照顧你。”做好事有好報。
At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.
在中美能源，我們參與了類似的“社會契約”。我們預期將撥出越來越多的金額來滿足我們客戶未來的需求。如果我們同時能夠可靠而有效的運營，我們直到我們將能在這些投資上獲得公平的收益。
MidAmerican, 89.8% owned by Berkshire, supplies 2.5 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Utah and Wyoming and as an important provider in six other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day. They haven’t been disappointed.
波克夏持有中美能源89.8%的股份，後者向美國國內的250萬客戶提供電力服務，是愛荷華，猶他和懷俄明州的最大供應商，並且是其他6個州的重要供應商。我們的輸氣管運輸著這個國家8%的天然氣。很明顯，數百萬的美國人每天要依賴我們。他們從未失望。
When MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.
當中美能源在2002年收購Northern Natural的輸氣管時，這家公司的有危機被行業的領先機構評為行業43家公司中的最後一位。在最近的報告中，Northern Natural已經列到第二位。第一位則是我們的另一家輸氣公司，Kern River.
In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. In the most recent survey of customer satisfaction, MidAmerican’s U.S. utilities ranked second among 60 utility groups surveyed. The story was far different not many years back when MidAmerican acquired these properties.
在電氣行業中，中美能源有著無可比擬的記錄。在最近的客戶滿意度調查中，中美能源美國公用事業部分位列受調查的60家公用事業機構中位列第2.而這一切與多年前中美能源收購這些資產時大相徑庭。
MidAmerican will have 3,316 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2012, far more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that we have invested or committed to wind is a staggering $6 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn. In addition, late last year we took on two solar projects – one 100%-owned in California and the other 49%-owned in Arizona – that will cost about $3 billion to construct. Many more wind and solar projects will almost certainly follow.
到2012年底，中美能源將擁有3316兆瓦風電運營，遠超美國其他電力公用事業機構。我們已經投資以及承諾的風能領域的投資達到驚人的60億美元。我們能夠做出如此投資是因為中美能源保留了所有的收益，不像其他公用事業企業幾乎將其收益全部支付給股東。此外，去年底我們上馬了2個太陽能項目，一個是100%獨資的加州項目，另一個亞利桑那州的項目佔股49%，這些項目將需要30億美元建設。後續還有更多風能和太陽能項目。
As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:
正如你現在可以看出來的，我對BNSF的Matt Rose和中美能源的Greg Abel為社會做出的貢獻感到驕傲。我對他們為波克夏的股東做出的貢獻同樣驕傲和感謝。在我們的資產負債表的賬面價值中，BNSF和中美能源商譽的賬面價值總計200億美元。對每一例，我和查理都相信目前的內含價值遠高於賬面價值。製造業、服務業、零售業運營波克夏這一部分的業務面面俱到。讓我們來看一下資產負債表和整個集團的盈利報告。
| MidAmerican | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2011 | 2010 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $469 | $333 | |||
| Iowa utility | 279 | 279 | |||
| Western utilities | 771 | 783 | |||
| Pipelines | 388 | 378 | |||
| Home Services | 39 | 42 | |||
| Other (Net) | 36 | 47 | |||
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,982 | 1,862 | |||
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (323) | (323) | |||
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt . | (13) | (30) | |||
| Income Tax | (315) | (271) | |||
| Net Earnings | $1,131 | $1,238 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire* | $1,204 | $1,131 | |||
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $8 in 2011 and $19 in 2010.
| BNSF (Historical accounting through 2/12/10; purchase accounting subsequently) | Earnings (in $ millions) | ||||
| 2011 | 2010 | ||||
| Revenues | 19,548 | 16,850 | |||
| Operating earnings | 5,310 | 4,495 | |||
| Interest (Net) | 560 | 507 | |||
| Pre-Tax earnings | 4,741 | 3,988 | |||
| Net earnings | 2,972 | 2,459 | |||
In the book value recorded on our balance sheet, BNSF and MidAmerican carry substantial goodwill components totaling $20 billion. In each instance, however, Charlie and I believe current intrinsic value is far greater than book value.
在我們的資產負債表記錄的賬面價值中，BNSF和MidAmerican持有總額達200億美元的大量商譽組成部分。 不過，查理和我在每種情況下都認為現在的內在價值遠大於賬面價值。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業、零售業經營
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
波克夏這塊業務可說是包羅萬象，先來看整體的資產負債表以及盈餘表。
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $4,241 | Notes payable | $1,611 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 6,584 | Other current liabilities | 15,124 | |||||
| Inventory | 8,975 | Total current liabilities | 16,735 | |||||
| Other current assets | 631 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 20,431 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 24,755 | Deferred taxes | 4661 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 17,866 | Term debt and other liabilities | 6,214 | |||||
| Other assets | 3,661 | Non-controlling interests | 2,410 | |||||
| $66,713 | Berkshire equity | 36,693 | ||||||
| $66,713 | ||||||||
| Earnings Statement (in $ millions) | |||||||
| 2011** | 2010 | 2009 | |||||
| Revenues | $72,406 | $66,610 | $61,665 | ||||
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of $1,431 in 2011,$1,362 in 2010 and $1,422 in 2009) | |||||||
| 67239 | 62225 | 59509 | |||||
| Interest expense (net) | 130 | 111 | 98 | ||||
| Pre-tax income | 5037* | 4274* | 2058* | ||||
| Income taxes | 1998 | 1812 | 945 | ||||
| Net income | 3039 | 2462 | 1113 | ||||
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments. **Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.
This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business being purchased or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor. Charlie’s has been better; he voted no more than “present” on several of my errant purchases.
這個集團的公司出售從棒棒糖到飛機等產品。有一些業務極佳，沒有槓桿的淨有形資產稅後盈利可達25%至100%以上。其他一些產品回報則在12%-20%。但也有一些回報很糟糕，這是因為我在分配資本時犯了一些嚴重的錯誤。之所以犯錯，是因我錯誤地判斷了這些公司的競爭力活該行業未來運營的經濟狀況。我嘗試在做併購時要看10年或20年，但有時我的視力並不好。查理比我的要好;他在我錯誤收購的一些案例中投了反對票。
Berkshire’s newer shareholders may be puzzled over our decision to hold on to my mistakes. After all, their earnings can never be consequential to Berkshire’s valuation, and problem companies require more managerial time than winners. Any management consultant or Wall Street advisor would look at our laggards and say “dump them.”
波克夏比較新的股東可能會對我繼續自己錯誤的決定感到迷惑。不管怎樣，他們的盈利對波克夏來說並不重要，而有問題的公司比優秀的公司需要更多管理時間。管理諮詢或或華爾街顧問都會看著我們這些落後的公司，然後說“扔掉他們”。
That won’t happen. For 29 years, we have regularly laid out Berkshire’s economic principles in these reports (pages 93-98) and Number 11 describes our general reluctance to sell poor performers (which, in most cases, lag because of industry factors rather than managerial shortcomings). Our approach is far from Darwinian, and many of you may disapprove of it. I can understand your position. However, we have made – and continue to make – a commitment to the sellers of businesses we buy that we will retain those businesses through thick and thin. So far, the dollar cost of that commitment has not been substantial and may well be offset by the goodwill it builds among prospective sellers looking for the right permanent home for their treasured business and loyal associates. These owners know that what they get with us can’t be delivered by others and that our commitments will be good for many decades to come.
這種情況並不會發生。過去29年來，我們經常會羅列波克夏的經濟準則，其中第11條講的是我們總體上會抵制出售表現糟糕的公司(很多情況落後都是因為行業原因，而不是管理的缺陷)。我們的與達爾文主義者相差很遠，你們很多人可能會不同意。我可以理解你們的立場。但我們曾經對賣家承諾過，並將繼續承諾，不管是順境還是逆境，我們都會保留這些公司。到目前為止，這些承諾的美元成本並不高，他們在潛在買家中建立的商譽可能已經抵消了這些成本。這些買家在為他們寶貴的業務和忠實的伙伴尋找一個合適且永久的家。這些買家知道他們無法從其他地方得到從我們身上得到的，我們對他們的承諾未來數十年對他們對會有益。
Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.
但是請你們理解，查理和我既不是受虐狂，也不是盲目樂觀。如果在第11條規則中的任何一個缺點出現，如果這些業務長期很可能會現金枯竭，如果勞工衝突很流行，我們將採取快速果斷的決定。在我們47年曆史中，這種情況只發生過幾次，我們現在擁有的業務沒有一個因陷入困境而要求我們考慮放棄。
************
The steady and substantial comeback in the U.S. economy since mid-2009 is clear from the earnings
shown at the front of this section. This compilation includes 54 of our companies. But one of these, Marmon, is
itself the owner of 140 operations in eleven distinct business sectors. In short, when you look at Berkshire, you
are looking across corporate America. So let’s dig a little deeper to gain a greater insight into what has happened
in the last few years.
這一部分前面的盈利表格可以看出，美國經濟自2009年中以來穩步持續復甦。這一部分共包括54家公司。但其中一個公司Marmon在11個地區業務部門擁有140家企業。簡而言之，當你看波克夏的時候，你就是在整個美國經濟。所以讓我們進一步挖掘，看看過去幾年發生了什麼。
The four housing-related companies in this section (a group that excludes Clayton, which is carried
under Finance and Financial Products) had aggregate pre-tax earnings of $227 million in 2009, $362 million in
2010 and $359 million in 2011. If you subtract these earnings from those in the combined statement, you will see
that our multiple and diverse non-housing operations earned $1,831 million in 2009, $3,912 million in 2010 and
$4,678 million in 2011. About $291 million of the 2011 earnings came from the Lubrizol acquisition. The profile
of the remaining 2011 earnings – $4,387 million – illustrates the comeback of much of America from the
devastation wrought by the 2008 financial panic. Though housing-related businesses remain in the emergency
room, most other businesses have left the hospital with their health fully restored.
這一部分中四個與房地產有關的公司(這一部分將除去Clayton，它被歸入金融和金融產品中)，他們總稅前盈利2009年為2.27億美元，2010年3.62億美元，2011年3.59億美元。如果把房地產公司從聯合報告中去除，你會發現我們多元化的非房地產業務2009年盈利18.31億美元，2010年盈利39.12億美元，2011年盈利46.78億美元。2011年大約有2.91億美元盈利來自於路博潤併購。剩餘的43.87億美元盈利則說明美國已經從2008年金融恐慌的破壞中恢復過來。雖然房市相關業務還留在急診室，但其他大多數業務都已經離開醫院，完全康復。
************
Almost all of our managers delivered outstanding performances last year, among them those managers
who run housing-related businesses and were therefore fighting hurricane-force headwinds. Here are a few examples:
幾乎我們所有的經理去年都有優秀的業績，其中一些房市相關的經歷正在對抗颶風般的經濟逆境。幾個案例：
• Vic Mancinelli again set a record at CTB, our agricultural equipment operation. We purchased CTB in
2002 for $139 million. It has subsequently distributed $180 million to Berkshire, last year earned $124
million pre-tax and has $109 million in cash. Vic has made a number of bolt-on acquisitions over the
years, including a meaningful one he signed up after yearend.
• TTI, our electric components distributor, increased its sales to a record $2.1 billion, up 12.4% from 2010. Earnings also hit a record, up 127% from 2007, the year in which we purchased the business. In 2011, TTI performed far better than the large publicly-traded companies in its field. That’s no surprise: Paul Andrews and his associates have been besting them for years. Charlie and I are delighted that Paul negotiated a large bolt-on acquisition early in 2012. We hope more follow.
• TTI是我們的電子組件經銷商，其銷售收入增加至21億美元，比2010年高12.4%。盈利也創下紀錄，自2007年以來增長了127%。我們就是在2007年收購TTI的。在2011年，TTI的表現比這個領域其他大型公共交易公司的表現要好得多。這絲毫不出意外：Paul Andrews和他的伙伴們已經有很多年都打敗了他們。查理和我很高興Paul在2012年初在討論一項大型的附帶併購。我們期待更多進展。
• Iscar, our 80%-owned cutting-tools operation, continues to amaze us. Its sales growth and overall performance are unique in its industry. Iscar’s managers – Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman – are brilliant strategists and operators. When the economic world was cratering in November 2008, they stepped up to buy Tungaloy, a leading Japanese cutting-tool manufacturer. Tungaloy suffered significant damage when the tsunami hit north of Tokyo last spring. But you wouldn’t know that now: Tungaloy went on to set a sales record in 2011. I visited the Iwaki plant in November and was inspired by the dedication and enthusiasm of Tungaloy’s management, as well as its staff. They are a wonderful group and deserve your admiration and thanks.
• Iscar是一家割削工具公司，我們擁有80%股份，它繼續給我們帶來驚奇。他的銷售增長和整體業績在其行業中是獨一無二的。Iscar的經理Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz和Danny Goldman是聰明的戰略家和運營者。在全世界經濟在2008年11月崩潰時，他們出售收購了Tungaloy，一家領先的日本割削公司製造商。去年春天東京遭到海嘯衝擊時，Tungaloy遭受了嚴重打打擊。但你不會想到現在怎麼樣：Tungaloy銷售在2011年創下紀錄。我在11月參觀了他們在Iwaki的工廠，對Tungaloy管理層及員工的熱情和貢獻印象深刻。他們是一個了不起的團體，值得我們尊敬和感謝。
• McLane, our huge distribution company that is run by Grady Rosier, added important new customers in 2011 and set a pre-tax earnings record of $370 million. Since its purchase in 2003 for $1.5 billion, the company has had pre-tax earnings of $2.4 billion and also increased its LIFO reserve by $230 million because the prices of the retail products it distributes (candy, gum, cigarettes, etc.) have risen. Grady runs a logistical machine second to none. You can look for bolt-ons at McLane, particularly in our new wine-and-spirits distribution business.
• 我們的大型經銷商McLance由Grady Rosier公司運營，在2011年新增了重要的新客戶，並創下3.7億美元的稅前盈利紀錄。我們在2003年以15億美元收購了該公司，從那時到現在，他們帶來了24億美元的稅前盈利，並增加了2.3億美元LIFO儲備，因為其經銷的產品(糖果、口香糖、香煙)價格增長了。在運營這台物流機器方面，沒有人比得上Grady。McLance接下來可能還會有一些附加併購，特別是在我們新的葡萄酒和烈酒分銷生意上。
• Jordan Hansell took over at NetJets in April and delivered 2011 pre-tax earnings of $227 million. That is a particularly impressive performance because the sale of new planes was slow during most of the year. In December, however, there was an uptick that was more than seasonally normal. How permanent it will be is uncertain.
• Jordan Hansell在4月份接管Netjets，2011年的稅前盈利為2.27億美元。這是非常了不起的業績，因為新飛機銷售在過去一年大多數時候都很緩慢。12月出現了上漲趨勢，且比季節性正常情況要多。但這種情況能持續多久還不確定。
A few years ago NetJets was my number one worry: Its costs were far out of line with revenues, and cash was hemorrhaging. Without Berkshire’s support, NetJets would have gone broke. These problems are behind us, and Jordan is now delivering steady profits from a well-controlled and smoothly-running operation. NetJets is proceeding on a plan to enter China with some first-class partners, a move that will widen our business “moat.” No other fractional-ownership operator has remotely the size and breadth of the NetJets operation, and none ever will. NetJets’ unrelenting focus on safety and service has paid off in the marketplace.
幾年之前NetJest是我最大的擔憂：它的成本遠超收入，且現金一直在流血。沒有波克夏的支持，NetJets將走向破產。我們已經將這些問題留在了後面，Jordan現在正從管理良好運營順暢的業務中帶來穩定的利潤。NetJests正計劃與一些頭等艙合夥人推進一項進入中國的方案。這一動作將進一步拓寬我們的商業“護城河”。其他的少數股權公司在規模和範圍上都與NetJets相差甚遠，未來也沒有人可以趕上它。NetJets堅持不懈專注於安全和服務已經在市場上帶來了回報。
• It’s a joy to watch Marmon’s progress under Frank Ptak’s leadership. In addition to achieving internal growth, Frank regularly makes bolt-on acquisitions that, in aggregate, will materially increase Marmon’s earning power. (He did three, costing about $270 million, in the last few months.) Joint ventures around the world are another opportunity for Marmon. At midyear Marmon partnered with the Kundalia family in an Indian crane operation that is already delivering substantial profits. This is Marmon’s second venture with the family, following a successful wire and cable partnership instituted a few years ago.
• 我們很高興看到Marmon在Frank Ptak的領導下取得進步。除了取得內部增長外，Frank不斷做附加併購，這些併購加起來將大幅增加Marmon的盈利能力。(在過去幾個月裡他花費2.7億美元收購了三家公司。)全球範圍內的合資企業對Marmon來說也是一個機會。去年年中Marmon與一頓的起重機公司Kundalia家族合作，目前已經產生了大量利潤。這是Marmon與該家族合作的第二個企業，之前他們合資的電線電纜公司也很成功。
Of the eleven major sectors in which Marmon operates, ten delivered gains in earnings last year. You can be confident of higher earnings from Marmon in the years ahead.
在Marmon運營的11個主要行業中，有10個行業在過去一年貢獻了盈利。你應該有信心未來數年Marmon會有更高的盈利。
• “Buy commodities, sell brands” has long been a formula for business success. It has produced enormous and sustained profits for Coca-Cola since 1886 and Wrigley since 1891. On a smaller scale, we have enjoyed good fortune with this approach at See’s Candy since we purchased it 40 years ago.
• “買商品，賣品牌”多年來一直是企業成功的一個方程式。這一方程式讓可口可樂自1886年以來，箭牌自1891年以來都產生了巨大且可持續的利潤。而在較小的公司方面，40年前我們收購喜詩糖果，用這一方法也帶來了大量財富。
Last year See’s had record pre-tax earnings of $83 million, bringing its total since we bought it to $1.65 billion. Contrast that figure with our purchase price of $25 million and our yearend carrying-value (net of cash) of less than zero. (Yes, you read that right; capital employed at See’s fluctuates seasonally, hitting a low after Christmas.) Credit Brad Kinstler for taking the company to new heights since he became CEO in 2006.
去年喜詩稅前盈利8300萬美元創新紀錄，我們收購喜詩以來總盈利達到了16.5億美元。可以比較一下，我們在收購喜詩的時候只花了2500萬美元。這一切都歸功於Brad Kinstler，他在2006年就任CEO後將公司帶到了新的高度。
• Nebraska Furniture Mart (80% owned) set an earnings record in 2011, netting more than ten times what it did in 1983, when we acquired our stake.
• 內布拉斯加家具市場(簡稱NFM，我們持有80%)盈利在2011年創新紀錄，比1983年我們收購它的時候高出十倍多。
But that’s not the big news. More important was NFM’s acquisition of a 433-acre tract north of Dallas on which we will build what is almost certain to be the highest-volume home-furnishings store in the country. Currently, that title is shared by our two stores in Omaha and Kansas City, each of which had record-setting sales of more than $400 million in 2011. It will be several years before the Texas store is completed, but I look forward to cutting the ribbon at the opening. (At Berkshire, the managers do the work; I take the bows.)
但這並不是什麼大新聞。更重要的新聞是，NFM收購了達拉斯以北433英畝的廣大土地，我們將要在此建造全美最大的傢俱商店。目前，全美最大的兩家傢俱商店是我們在奧馬哈和堪薩斯的商店，每一家在2011年都創下超過4億美元的歷史紀錄。德州的商店尚要數年才能完工，我希望在開幕時剪綵。（在波克夏，經理人負責工作，我則接受喝采）
Our new store, which will offer an unequalled variety of merchandise sold at prices that can’t be matched, will bring huge crowds from near and far. This drawing power and our extensive holdings of land at the site should enable us to attract a number of other major stores. (If any high-volume retailers are reading this, contact me.)
Our experience with NFM and the Blumkin family that runs it has been a real joy. The business was built by Rose Blumkin (known to all as “Mrs. B”), who started the company in 1937 with $500 and a dream. She sold me our interest when she was 89 and worked until she was 103. (After retiring, she died the next year, a sequence I point out to any other Berkshire manager who even thinks of retiring.)
我們在NFM上的經驗，以及Blumkin家族的管理都是愉快的經歷。1937年，Rose Blumkin(我們所有人都稱為B女士)為了一個夢想，用500美元創建了這家公司。當她89歲的時候把公司的股份賣給我們，並一直工作到103歲。(她退休後一年就去世了。我把這個結果告訴過所有想過退休的波克夏經理。)
Mrs. B’s son, Louie, now 92, helped his mother build the business after he returned from World War II and, along with his wife, Fran, has been my friend for 55 years. In turn, Louie’s sons, Ron and Irv, have taken the company to new heights, first opening the Kansas City store and now gearing up for Texas.
B女士的兒子Louie現在92歲，他從二戰歸來後就一直幫他的母親打造這份生意，他的妻子Fran過去55年都是我的朋友。Louie的兒子Ron和Irv將公司帶到了新的高度，他們先是開了堪薩斯商店，現在又在著手準備德州的。
The “boys” and I have had many great times together, and I count them among my best friends. The Blumkins are a remarkable family. Never inclined to let an extraordinary gene pool go to waste, I am rejoicing these days because several members of the fourth Blumkin generation have joined NFM.
兩個“男孩”和我一起度過了許多美好時光，我將他們做為我最好的朋友。Blumkins是了不起的家族。他們從未讓優秀的基因庫浪費，最近Blumkin第四代家族的幾位成員加入NFM讓我感到高興。
Overall, the intrinsic value of the businesses in this Berkshire sector significantly exceeds their book value. For many of the smaller companies, however, this is not true. I have made more than my share of mistakes buying small companies. Charlie long ago told me, “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well,” and I should have listened harder. In any event, our large purchases have generally worked well – extraordinarily well in a few cases – and overall this sector is a winner for us.
總體來說，波克夏這一部分的內在價值大大超過他們的賬面價值。但對很多更小的公司，情況不是這樣的。我在購買小公司方面犯錯更多。查理很早之前就告訴過我，“如果有些事根本就不值得做，也不值得把它做好，”我本應聽他的話。總體來說，我們的大型收購都表現不錯，有一些非常優秀。總體來說我們在這個領域是贏家。
************
Certain shareholders have told me they hunger for more discussions of accounting arcana. So here’s a bit of GAAP-mandated nonsense I hope both of them enjoy.
有一些股東告訴我們，他們渴望了解更多對會計奧秘的討論。那我就談一點對GAAP的胡說八道。
Common sense would tell you that our varied subsidiaries should be carried on our books at their cost plus the earnings they have retained since our purchase (unless their economic value has materially decreased, in which case an appropriate write-down must be taken). And that’s essentially the reality at Berkshire – except for the weird situation at Marmon.
常識告訴你，我們的各個附屬公司表現在我們的賬本上時，都是用從我們購買他們時的成本加上留存盈利(除非他們的經濟價值大幅下降，必須減記)。波克夏的現實基本就是這樣的，出來Marmon的情況比較糟糕。
We purchased 64% of the company in 2008 and put this interest on our books at our cost, $4.8 billion. So far, so good. Then, in early 2011, pursuant to our original contract with the Pritzker family, we purchased an additional 16%, paying $1.5 billion as called for by a formula that reflected Marmon’s increased value. In this instance, however, we were required to immediately write off $614 million of the purchase price retroactive to the end of 2010. (Don’t ask!) Obviously, this write-off had no connection to economic reality. The excess of Marmon’s intrinsic value over its carrying value is widened by this meaningless write-down.
我們在2008年收購了該公司64%的股份，在我們賬面上記下了48億美元成本。到目前為止一切順利。在2011年初，我們按照與Pritzker家族的最初合同，有支付了15億美元購買了16%股份(當時Marmon的價值已經上升)。於是我們被要求馬上對2010年底的購買價格減記6.14億美元。很明顯，這個減記與經濟活動沒有關係。在這個沒有意義的減記中，實際上Marmon的內在價值上升了。
Finance and Financial Products
金融與金融產品
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
這個部門是我們企業中最小的部門，包括兩家租賃公司，XTRA(拖車)和CORT(家具)，以及美國領先的活動房屋製造商和融資提供方Clayton Homes。除了這些100%控股的子公司，我們在這一類業務中還包括一系列金融資產以及Berkadia Commercial Mortgage50%的權益。
It’s instructive to look at what transpired at our three operating businesses after the economy fell off a cliff in late 2008, because their experiences illuminate the fractured recovery that later came along.
在2008年末經濟跌落懸崖後，觀察我們的三家公司業務運營所體現的情況是很有幫助的，因為他們的經歷顯示出隨後到來的經濟的部分複蘇。
Results at our two leasing companies mirrored the “non-housing” economy. Their combined pre-tax earnings were $13 million in 2009, $53 million in 2010 and $155 million in 2011, an improvement reflecting the steady recovery we have seen in almost all of our non-housing businesses. In contrast, Clayton’s world of manufactured housing (just like site-built housing) has endured a veritable depression, experiencing no recovery to date. Manufactured housing sales in the nation were 49,789 homes in 2009, 50,046 in 2010 and 51,606 in 2011. (When housing was booming in 2005, they were 146,744.)
我們兩家租賃公司的業績表現是“除房地產外”經濟的體現。他們的稅前收益合計在2009年為1300萬美元，2010年為5300萬美元，而2011年為1.55億美元，這一提升反映了我們在絕大部分非房地產業務中所看到的穩步復甦勢頭。相比之下，Clayton的活動房屋業務經歷了名副其實的蕭條，至今未曾恢復。美國的活動房屋銷售量在2009年為49789戶，2010年為50046戶，2011年為51606戶(而在2005年房地產繁榮時，這一數字為146744戶)。
Despite these difficult times, Clayton has continued to operate profitably, largely because its mortgage portfolio has performed well under trying circumstances. Because we are the largest lender in the manufactured homes sector and are also normally lending to lower-and-middle-income families, you might expect us to suffer heavy losses during a housing meltdown. But by sticking to old-fashioned loan policies – meaningful down payments and monthly payments with a sensible relationship to regular income – Clayton has kept losses to acceptable levels. It has done so even though many of our borrowers have had negative equity for some time.
儘管時局艱辛，但Clayton還是繼續盈利，大部分是因為其抵押貸款組合在令人頭痛的條件下表現良好。因為我們是移動房屋業最大的借貸者且通常貸款給中低收入家庭，你可能預期我們將在房地產崩潰中承受沉重的損失。但通過對傳統貸款政策的堅守，即有意義的，與固定收入相適應的首付和月供，Clayton已經將損失維持在可以接受的水平。甚至在我們的許多藉款人在部分房屋上擁有負權益時也做到了這點。
As is well-known, the U.S. went off the rails in its home-ownership and mortgage-lending policies, and for these mistakes our economy is now paying a huge price. All of us participated in the destructive behavior – government, lenders, borrowers, the media, rating agencies, you name it. At the core of the folly was the almost universal belief that the value of houses was certain to increase over time and that any dips would be inconsequential. The acceptance of this premise justified almost any price and practice in housing transactions. Homeowners everywhere felt richer and rushed to “monetize” the increased value of their homes by refinancings. These massive cash infusions fueled a consumption binge throughout our economy. It all seemed great fun while it lasted. (A largely unnoted fact: Large numbers of people who have “lost” their house through foreclosure have actually realized a profit because they carried out refinancings earlier that gave them cash in excess of their cost. In these cases, the evicted homeowner was the winner, and the victim was the lender.)
眾所周知，美國在其房屋所有權和抵押貸款政策上出了問題，而我們的經濟如今正在為這些錯誤付出巨大的代價。我們所有人都參與了這一毀滅性的行為-包括政府、貸款人、借款人、媒體以及評級機構等。這些愚蠢行為的核心是幾乎所有人都相信房屋的價格必定會一直上漲，任何下跌都是不合理的。真是對這一前提的接受使得房地產交易中任何價格和行為都是合理的。各地的房屋擁有者們感到自己變得富裕，爭相通過再融資將其房屋增值部分“貨幣化”。這類大規模資金注入推動了全國各地的消費狂潮。當這股潮流持續的時候看起來一切都很好。(一個幾乎不被注意的事實是“許多在止贖中“失去”房屋的人事實上已經獲得了收益，因為他們在此前通過再融資獲得的資金超過其成本。這這類情況下，遭驅逐的房主是獲勝的一方，而貸款人才是受害者)。
In 2007, the bubble burst, just as all bubbles must. We are now in the fourth year of a cure that, though long and painful, is sure to succeed. Today, household formations are consistently exceeding housing starts.
2007年，泡沫破裂，正如所有泡沫必定會經歷的那樣。我們如今已是在泡沫破裂後逐漸恢復的第4個年頭，儘管這一恢復過程漫長而痛苦，但終將成功。今天，新家庭形成數量持續高於房屋開工數量。
Clayton’s earnings should improve materially when the nation’s excess housing inventory is worked off. As I see things today, however, I believe the intrinsic value of the three businesses in this sector does not differ materially from their book value.
當全國的超額房屋存貨被消耗完後，Clayton的收益應該會大幅提高。然而，正如我所理解的，我相信這三家企業的內含價值與其賬面價值沒有顯著差異。
Investments
投資
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
以下顯示我們的普通股投資年底市值逾10億美元。
| 12/31/11 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 13 | $1,287 | $7,151 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.8 | 1,299 | 13,994 | ||
| 63,905,931 | International Business Machines Corp. | 2.3 | 2027 | 2121 | ||
| 29,109,637 | Conoco Phillips | 5.5 | 10,856 | 11,751 | ||
| 31,416,127 | Johnson & Johnson | 1.2 | 1,880 | 2,060 | ||
| 79,034,713 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 4.5 | 2,589 | 2,953 | ||
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.3 | 2,990 | 2,464 | ||
| 3,947,555 | POSCO | 5.1 | 768 | 1,301 | ||
| 72,391,036 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 2.6 | 464 | 4,829 | ||
| 25,848,838 | Sanofi | 1.9 | 2,055 | 1,900 | ||
| 291,577,428 | Tesco plc | 3.6 | 1,719 | 1,827 | ||
| 78,060,769 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.1 | 2,401 | 2,112 | ||
| 39,037,142 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.1 | 1,893 | 2,333 | ||
| 400,015,828 | Wells Fargo & Company | 7.6 | 9,086 | 11,024 | ||
| Others | 6,895 | 9,171 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks | 48,209 | 76,991 | ||||
We made few changes in our investment holdings during 2011. But three moves were important: our purchases of IBM and Bank of America and the $1 billion addition we made to our Wells Fargo position.
2011年，我們的投資持股很少變動。但重要的變動有3次：我們購買了IBM和美國銀行的股份，還增持了10億美元的富國銀行股份。
The banking industry is back on its feet, and Wells Fargo is prospering. Its earnings are strong, its assets solid and its capital at record levels. At Bank of America, some huge mistakes were made by prior management. Brian Moynihan has made excellent progress in cleaning these up, though the completion of that process will take a number of years. Concurrently, he is nurturing a huge and attractive underlying business that will endure long after today’s problems are forgotten. Our warrants to buy 700 million Bank of America shares will likely be of great value before they expire.
銀行業東山再起，富國銀行正走向繁榮，其收益表現強勁，其資產穩固可靠，其資本處於創紀錄高位。美國銀行此前的管理層犯下了一些大錯誤。該行首席執行官Brian Moynihan在清理失誤方面取得出色的進展，不過完成這一過程需要多年時間。目前，他在培養一家具有吸引力和潛力的大企業。這家企業會在今天的問題被人們遺忘很久之後還屹立不倒。我們購買7億美國銀行股份的那些認購權證將可能在它們到期以前擁有巨大的價值。
As was the case with Coca-Cola in 1988 and the railroads in 2006, I was late to the IBM party. I have been reading the company’s annual report for more than 50 years, but it wasn’t until a Saturday in March last year that my thinking crystallized. As Thoreau said, “It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.”
與1988年和2006年分別投資可口可樂和鐵路一樣，我也沒有趕早買入IBM。這家公司的年報我已經讀了50多年，可直到去年3月的一個星期六，我才感到柳暗花明。正如梭羅所說：“要緊的不是你看到的，而是你看到了什麼。”
Todd Combs built a $1.75 billion portfolio (at cost) last year, and Ted Weschler will soon create one of similar size. Each of them receives 80% of his performance compensation from his own results and 20% from his partner’s. When our quarterly filings report relatively small holdings, these are not likely to be buys I made (though the media often overlook that point) but rather holdings denoting purchases by Todd or Ted.
Todd Combs去年構建了17.5億美元的投資組合，Ted Weschler將很快打造一個同樣規模的投資組合。他們每個人都會憑藉個人成績得到80%的績效獎金和20%的合夥人獎勵。我們的季度報告分別匯報了小額持倉，這些不可能是我買入的股份(但媒體通常誇大了這點)，而是Todd或者Ted名下購買的股份。
One additional point about these two new arrivals. Both Ted and Todd will be helpful to the next CEO of Berkshire in making acquisitions. They have excellent “business minds” that grasp the economic forces likely to determine the future of a wide variety of businesses. They are aided in their thinking by an understanding of what is predictable and what is unknowable.
對這兩位新人有一點要補充。Ted和Todd都會幫助下任波克夏的首席執行官進行收購。他們擁有優秀的“商業頭腦”，能捕捉到可能決定多種類別企業未來的經濟動力。他們了解什麼是可以預計到的，什麼是不可知的，這有助於他們思考判斷。
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There is little new to report on our derivatives positions, which we have described in detail in past reports. (Annual reports since 1977 are available at www.berkshirehathaway.com.) One important industry change, however, must be noted: Though our existing contracts have very minor collateral requirements, the rules have changed for new positions. Consequently, we will not be initiating any major derivatives positions. We shun contracts of any type that could require the instant posting of collateral. The possibility of some sudden and huge posting requirement – arising from an out-of-the-blue event such as a worldwide financial panic or massive terrorist attack – is inconsistent with our primary objectives of redundant liquidity and unquestioned financial strength.
關於我們的衍生品倉位，沒有什麼新東西可報告的，過去的報告中已經詳細解說。(1977年以來的年報可以登錄www.berkshirehathaway.com查閱。)然而，必須指出一個重要的行業變動：雖然我們現有合約要求的抵押非常少，但新倉位的情況有所不同。因此，我們不會建立任何大規模的衍生品倉位。我們杜絕各類可能要求立即提供抵押的合約。可能有些提供極大抵押的突然要求——來自世界範圍內金融恐慌或者大批恐怖分子襲擊這樣的意外事件——與我們過多流動性的組要目標和毋庸置疑的財力不符。
Our insurance-like derivatives contracts, whereby we pay if various issues included in high-yield bond indices default, are coming to a close. The contracts that most exposed us to losses have already expired, and the remainder will terminate soon. In 2011, we paid out $86 million on two losses, bringing our total payments to $2.6 billion. We are almost certain to realize a final “underwriting profit” on this portfolio because the premiums we received were $3.4 billion, and our future losses are apt to be minor. In addition, we will have averaged about $2 billion of float over the five-year life of these contracts. This successful result during a time of great credit stress underscores the importance of obtaining a premium that is commensurate with the risk.
我們類似保險的衍生品合約就要到期。如果包括高收益率債券指數違約在內的各種問題出現就會賠付。我們虧損風險最大的那些合約已經過期，剩下的會很快到期。2011年，我們為兩筆虧損賠付8600萬美元，這讓我們的總付款額達到了26億美元。我們幾乎確定認識到了這一投資組合最終的“減記利潤”，因為我們收到的溢價是34億美元，今後的虧損會低於這一金額。此外，我們的這類合約5年內平均浮動抵押為20億美元。在面臨巨大信貸壓力的時期取得了這樣的成功表現，這突出表明，獲得一個與風險相匹配的險的溢價有多重要。
Charlie and I continue to believe that our equity-put positions will produce a significant profit, considering both the $4.2 billion of float we will have held for more than fifteen years and the $222 million profit we’ve already realized on contracts that we repurchased. At yearend, Berkshire’s book value reflected a liability of $8.5 billion for the remaining contracts; if they had all come due at that time our payment would have been $6.2 billion.
考慮到我們會在15年左右持有42億美元的浮動抵押，而且我們已經發現我們回購的合約盈利2.22億美元，查理和我仍然認為，我們的賣權倉位將產生可觀的利潤。2011年年底，波克夏的面值反映出，現存合約負債85億美元。如果這些合約全部在我們支付之時到期，實際金額就是62億美元。
The Basic Choices for Investors and the One We Strongly Prefer
投資者的基本選擇與我們的強烈偏好
Investing is often described as the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes have been paid on nominal gains – in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.
投資行為被形容這樣一個過程：在今天投出資金，預期未來能收回更多的錢。在波克夏，我們對此要求更高，我們將投資定義為將今天的購買力轉移給他人而預期在未來收到合理的購買力(扣除對名義收益的稅收)。更簡潔的說法是，投資是放棄今天的消費，為了在以後的日子裡能夠有能力更多的消費。
From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability – the reasoned probability – of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing-power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a non-fluctuating asset can be laden with risk.
從我們的定義中可以得出一個重要的推論：投資的風險並非被beta衡量(華爾街以此衡量波動性以及風險)，而是由概率衡量-合理的概率-即投資導致其主人在持有期間損失的購買力的概率。資產價格經常大幅波動，而只要他們在其持有期間內可以合理確信提供增加的購買力，那麼這些資產就不是風險高的。而正如我們將看到的，一個波動性小的資產也能充滿風險。
Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.
投資有許多種且變化多端。然而，投資概率主要有三個類型，理解每個類型的特徵是非常重要的。因此，讓我們了解下這一領域。
• Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.” In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.
• 部分投資是以給定的貨幣計價的，包括貨幣市場基金，債券，抵押貸款，銀行存款以及其他工具。大部分基於貨幣的投資被認為是“安全”的。事實上，他們是最危險的資產之一。他們的beta是零，但風險巨大。
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.
在過去一個世紀，這些工具毀了許多國家投資者的購買力，即使是其持有者持續收到定期的利息和本金支付。此外，這一丑陋的結果將一直重複發生。政府決定了貨幣的最終價值，但係統的力量不時會使他們被製造通脹的政策所吸引。而這類政策經常失控。
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”
即使在美國，儘管對穩定貨幣的願望非常強烈，自我在1965年接管波克夏的管理之後，美元仍然貶值了驚人的86%。那時的1美元的價值不低於今天的7美元。因此，為了能夠維持購買力，對於免稅的機構來說，其在這段期間內的債券投資收益需達到年化4.3%。而如果這家機構的投資經理認為其收到的利息是“收益”的話，那他是在開玩笑。
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.
對於需要支付稅收的你我來說，情況就更糟了。在同樣的47年時間段內，持續的對美國國債滾動投資產生每年5.7%的收益。這聽起來很令人滿意。但如果個人投資者需要支付平均25%的個人所得稅時，這5.7%的回報率以真實收入衡量毫無收益。可見的所得稅將削減投資者1.4%的收益，而不可見的通脹“稅”則超過所得稅的三倍，而投資者很可能只是認為所得稅才是其主要負擔。儘管我們的貨幣上印有“我們信仰上帝”的語句，但操作我們政府印鈔機的雙手卻都是人。
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.
當然，高利率可以彌補購買者基於貨幣的投資所面臨的通脹風險。確實，上世紀80年代早期的利率在這方面做得很好。然而如今的利率無法彌補投資者所需承擔的購買力風險。如今的債券應該標上警示標識。
Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
因此，在如今的條件下，我不喜歡基於貨幣的投資。即使如此，波克夏仍然持有大量此類投資，主要是短期品種。但不管利率怎樣，在波克夏，對充足流動性的需求佔據核心位置，且永不忽視。為了滿足這一需求，我們主要持有美國國債，這是在絕大部分混亂的經濟情況下對於流動性唯一可靠的投資。我們的目前的流動性水平是200億美元;100億美元時我們最低要求。
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we’ve exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: “Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.”
在流動性和監管層對我們的要求以外，我們購買貨幣相關證券只是因為其提供超常收益的可能性-或是因為一特定信貸工具被錯誤定價，例如在定期的垃圾債券市場可能發生的，或是因為利率上升到一定程度，使得在其下降時，足以在高收益債券上實現大額收益。儘管我們曾經在過去利用過這類機會-也可能再次這麼做，但我們如今對這一前景持悲觀態度。對於如今的情形，華爾街謝爾比Cullom Davis在很久以前說的話看起來很適用“債券此前被推銷為提供無風險收益，而如今的價格實際上是在提供無收益風險。”
• The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.
• 第二類投資包括的資產是指那些實際不產生任何收益，但買家在認為其他人未來會為此支付更高的價格的期望下所購買的資產，這些買家也清楚這些資產永遠不具有生產性。17世紀的鬱金香就是此類買家的最愛。
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.
這類投資要求有足夠容量的買家市場，而這些買家受到誘惑是因為他們相信這一購買市場將持續擴大。持有者並非被這些資產的生產力所激勵，這些資產永遠不會生產，而是堅信他們在未來會對其更渴望。
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.
這一類別最主要的資產就是黃金，後者是對其他所有資產(尤其是貨幣)恐懼的投資者的最愛。然而黃金有兩個顯著的缺點，用途不廣且不具有生產性。確實，黃金有一些工業和裝飾的用途，但此類用途的需求優先，且不足以吸收新的產量。同時，如果你一直持有一盎司黃金，到最後你將仍然只擁有一盎司。
激勵大部分黃金購買者的動機是他們相信恐懼的等級將會增長。在過去的十年，這一想法被證明是正確的。此外，上升的價格自身會產生額外的購買熱情，吸引那些認為價格上升證實其投資理論的購買者。當大量投資者湧入時，這一結果就自我實現了。但只是暫時。
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”
在過去15年，互聯網股票和房地產業都已經證實了這一理論：起初明智的理論加上廣為宣傳的價格上升能夠創造出驚人的多餘需求。在這些泡沫中，許多起初充滿懷疑的投資者屈服於所謂市場的“證據”，而購買者群體的擴大在一段時間內足以使得這場盛宴持續。但泡沫吹得大了不可避免會破裂。那個時候那句古老的諺語又將得到證實：“明智的人開頭，蠢蛋收尾。”
Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At $1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
今天，全球黃金儲量約17萬公噸。假如把它們熔鑄成一個每面約68英尺的立方體。(設想它可以輕輕鬆鬆地放在一個棒球內場。)如果每盎司黃金價格1750美元，也就是我寫下這些內容時的金價，這個立方體的價值大約9.6萬億美元。我們稱它立方體A。
Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?
然後來創造一個和立方體A價格相同的立方體B。為此，我們要買下美國所有的耕地(4億英畝，年產值2000億美元)，以及16家埃克森美孚公司(全球利潤最高的公司，年利潤超過400億美元)。買下這些以後，我們還有1萬億美元可以用來零花。你能想像到，一個9.6萬億美元在手的投資者會選立方體A還是立方體B?
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
不計對現存黃金令人吃驚的估值，目前的價格讓今天的黃金年產值達到約1600億美元。買家——不論是珠寶和工業用戶還是投資者——都必須不斷消化增加的供應。這僅僅是為了維持現有價格的平衡。
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.
一個世紀以後，無論可能用哪種貨幣，4億英畝農田都會生產出大量的玉米、小麥、棉花和其他作物，繼續帶來有價值的回報。埃克森美孚則可能分紅數万億美元，持有16家這樣的公司會新增數万億美元。而17萬噸黃金既不會增加規模，也不能創造任何產品。你可以深情撫摸它，它卻不會有回應。
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
還得承認，當距今一個世紀的未來人類擔憂的時候，可能還會有很多人蜂擁而上為黃金。但我相信，一個世紀過去，目前價格9.6萬億美元的立方體A這期間的複合價值增長率會遠遠不及立方體B。
• Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
我們的前兩個資產類別在恐懼情緒達到頂峰時最受歡迎。對經濟崩潰的恐慌將散戶推向貨幣基礎的資產，首當其衝的是美國債務。而且，對貨幣崩潰的恐慌又將這些散戶推向黃金這種沒有產出能力的資產。2008年底，我們風聞的是“現金為王”，當時應該配置現金，不應持有。同樣地，20世紀80年代初，我們聽說的是“現金如垃圾”，當時的固定美元投資處於我們記憶中最有吸引力的水平。在這些情況下，需要從眾心理支持的投資者為求得心安付出了代價。
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.
我自己最青睞的——你知道，就要講到了——是我們的第三類資產：投資於有生產力的資產，無論是企業、農場，還是房地產。在理想的情況下，這些資產應該能在通脹時期讓產出保持自身的購買力價值，同時只需要盡可能最少的新增資本投入。農場、房地產和可口可樂、IBM這樣的很多企業，以及我們自己的See's Candy(譯註：逾90年曆史的美國老牌糖果與巧克力食品公司)都能滿足這雙重考驗。其他特定的公司——比如我們那些受管制的公共事業公司——都不能通過上述考驗，因為它們在通脹的環境下需要大量資本。為了增加收益，它們的所有者必須增加投資。即便如此，第三類投資也仍會超越毫無生產力和以貨幣為基礎的資產。
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.
一個世紀過去，不管那時的貨幣是黃金、海貝、鯊魚牙，還是(和今天一樣的)一張紙，人們都願意用他們每日勞作的幾分鐘時間換來喝一杯可口可樂，或者吃一些See's Candy的花生薄片糖。未來的美國人會出售更多的商品，消費更多的食品，需要的生活空間也比現在多。人們永遠都會用自己生產的換取他人生產的。
Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk” to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
我們國家的企業會繼續高效地運送我們國民需要的商品和服務。這好比說，這些商業“奶牛”活了幾個世紀，產了比以往更多的“牛奶”。它們的價值不是由交換的中介決定，而是由它們產奶的能力而定。對奶牛的主人而言，銷售牛奶會是複利交易，就像20世紀道指由66點漲至11497萬點時那樣(當時也支付了大量的股息)。波克夏的目標將是增持第一等企業的股權。我們首先會選擇整體持有——但我們也會通過持有大量可交易股票成為所有者。我相信，任何一段較長的時間內，事實都會證明，這類投資在我們考查的三類資產中是長線贏家。更重要的是，它最為安全。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 5th at the CenturyLink Center (renamed from “Qwest”). Last year, Carrie Kizer debuted as the ringmaster and earned a lifetime assignment. Everyone loved the job she did – especially me.
年度會議將於5月5日星期六在CenturyLink Center（更名為“Qwest”）舉行。 凱莉·凱澤（Carrie Kizer）去年首次出任監督，獲得了終身任務。 每個人都喜歡她所做的工作 - 特別是我。
Soon after the 7 a.m. opening of the doors, we will have a new activity: The Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Late last year, Berkshire purchased the Omaha World-Herald and, in my meeting with its shareholder-employees, I told of the folding and throwing skills I developed while delivering 500,000 papers as a teenager.
在上午7點開門後不久，我們將有一個新的活動：報紙折騰的挑戰。 去年年底，波克夏購買了“奧馬哈世界先驅報”，在與我的股東僱員見面時，我講述了我在十幾歲時交付50萬份報紙時所開發的折疊和投擲技巧。
I immediately saw skepticism in the eyes of the audience. That was no surprise to me. After all, the reporters’ mantra is: “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” So now I have to back up my claim. At the meeting, I will take on all comers in making 35-foot tosses of the World-Herald to a Clayton porch. Any challenger whose paper lands closer to the doorstep than mine will receive a dilly bar. I’ve asked Dairy Queen to supply several for the contest, though I doubt that any will be needed. We will have a large stack of papers. Grab one. Fold it (no rubber bands). Take your best shot. Make my day.
我立即在觀眾眼中看到了懷疑。 這對我來說並不奇怪。 畢竟，記者的口頭禪是：“如果你媽媽說她愛你，那就去檢查一下。”所以現在我必須支持我的說法。 在會議上，我將帶領所有來者將“世界先驅報”（World-Herald）的35英尺長的投擲到克萊頓門廊。 任何挑戰者的紙張離我家門口比較近的時候都會收到一個窄條。 我已經要求乳業皇后提供幾個比賽，但我懷疑是否需要。 我們將有大量的文件。 抓住一個。 折疊它（沒有橡皮筋）。 把你最好的鏡頭。 讓我的一天。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
8點半，將播放一部新的波克夏電影。 一個小時後，我們將開始問答時間（在CenturyLink的展位中午休息），持續到3:30。 經過短暫的休息，查理和我將在3:45召開年會。 如果你決定在白天的問題期間離開，請在查理談話的時候這樣做。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,249 pairs of Justin boots, 11,254 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Quikut knives (that’s 15 knives per minute) and 6,126 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, a Marmon product whose very existence was news to me. (The product I focus on is money.) But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.
退出的最好理由當然是購物。 我們將通過使用幾十個波克夏子公司的產品填充毗鄰會議區的194,300平方英尺的大廳來幫助您做到這一點。 去年，你做了你自己的一部分，大部分地區銷售額創紀錄。 在九個小時的時間裡，我們售出了1,249雙Justin靴子，11,254磅See糖果，8,000 Quikut刀（每分鐘15刀）和6,126雙Wellont Lamont手套，這是一款Marmon產品，其存在對我來說是新聞。 （我關注的產品是金錢。）但是你可以做得更好。 請記住：任何說金錢的人都不會購買幸福，但在我們的會議上卻沒有消費。
Among the new exhibitors this year will be Brooks, our running-shoe company. Brooks has been gobbling up market share and in 2011 had a sales gain of 34%, its tenth consecutive year of record volume. Drop by and congratulate Jim Weber, the company’s CEO. And be sure to buy a couple of pairs of limited edition “Berkshire Hathaway Running Shoes.”
今年的新參展商中有我們的跑鞋公司Brooks。 布魯克斯一直在吞噬市場份額，並在2011年連續第十年錄得銷量增長34％。 祝賀公司首席執行官吉姆·韋伯（Jim Weber） 而且一定要買幾雙限量版“波克夏海瑟崴跑鞋”。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO將設一個攤位，有來自全國的優秀顧問為您服務，竭誠為您提供汽車保險建議。 GEICO將給您一個股東折扣(通常是8%)。我們開展業務的51個區域中的44個都允許了這個特別優惠。 (額外提示：這個折扣可以累積在其他優惠上)把你現在的保險拿來，看看能否再省點錢。我相信你們中至少50%我們可以做到。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. I recommend MiTek, an informative history of one of our very successful subsidiaries. You’ll learn how my interest in the company was originally piqued by my receiving in the mail a hunk of ugly metal whose purpose I couldn’t fathom. Since we bought MiTek in 2001, it has made 33 “tuck-in” acquisitions, almost all successful. I think you’ll also like a short book that Peter Bevelin has put together explaining Berkshire’s investment and operating principles. It sums up what Charlie and I have been saying over the years in annual reports and at annual meetings. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
一定要去看書蟲。 它將攜帶超過35本書和DVD，其中包括一些新的。 我推薦MiTek，這是我們非常成功的子公司之一。 你會知道我對這家公司的興趣最初是怎樣被我郵寄的一大堆醜陋的金屬所激怒的，我的目的是我無法理解的。 自2001年收購MiTek以來，已經進行了33次“折扣”收購，幾乎都取得了成功。 我想你也會喜歡Peter Bevelin為解釋波克夏公司的投資和經營原則而編寫的一本小冊子。 它總結了查理和我多年來在年度報告和年會上所說的話。 如果您需要運送您的圖書購買，附近將提供送貨服務。
If you are a big spender – or aspire to become one – visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. I’ll OK your credit.
如果你是一個大消費者，或渴望成為一個 - 在中午和下午5:00之間，在奧馬哈機場東側的Elliott航空公司。 在星期六。 在那裡，我們將有一個NetJets飛機機隊，將讓你的脈搏賽車。 乘公共汽車過來 私人飛機離開。 我會確定你的信用。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
本報告所附的代理資料的附件說明了您如何獲得您將需要用於參加會議和其他活動的憑證。 航空公司有時為波克夏週末提高價格。 如果你從很遠的地方來，比較飛往堪薩斯城和奧馬哈的成本。 兩個城市之間的車程約為二點五個小時，也許可以節省很多錢，特別是如果你打算在奧馬哈租一輛車的話。 把錢花在我們身上。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $32.7 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that exceeds the yearly sales of most furniture stores. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m.to 9 p.m.Mondaythrough Saturday, and 10 a.m.to 6 p.m. on Sunday.On Saturdaythis year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
位於道奇與太平洋之間的第72街77英畝的內布拉斯加家具市場，我們將再次獲得“波克夏週末”折扣價格。 去年，該店在年度會議上的銷售額達到了3270萬美元，超過了大多數家具店的年銷售額。 要獲得波克夏折扣，您必須在5月1日星期二和5月7日星期一之間進行購買，並出示您的會議憑證。 這個時期的特殊定價，甚至會適用於一些通常對打折有著嚴格規定的著名製造商的產品，但是，在我們的股東周末的精神下，它已經為你制定了一個例外。 我們感謝他們的合作。 NFM的開放時間為上午10點到下午9點，週六到週六，上午10點到下午6點。 星期天。星期六，星期六下午五點三十分 到下午8點，NFM正在邀請您參加野餐。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 2 p.m., I will be clerking at Borsheims, desperate to beat my sales figure from last year. So come take advantage of me. Ask me for my “Crazy Warren” price.
在Borsheims，我們將再次有兩個股東的事件。 第一場將是下午六點的雞尾酒招待會。 到下午9點 5月4日星期五。 第二，主要盛會將於5月6日星期日上午9時至下午4時舉行。 星期六，我們將開放至下午六點。 星期天下午2點左右，我將在Borsheims做文員，絕望的打敗了去年的銷售數字。 所以來利用我吧。 問我的“瘋狂的沃倫”價格。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
週末我們將在Borsheim's迎來大批顧客。為了您的方便，股東優惠將從四月二十五日週一持續到五月七日週六。在此期間，請出示您的參會卡或者股東證明來享受優惠。
星期天，在Borsheims以外的商場裡，兩次美國國際象棋冠軍被蒙住眼睛的Patrick Wolff將以六人一組的身份迎戰所有來到這裡的人。 附近，來自達拉斯的一位傑出的魔術師諾曼·貝克（Norman Beck）將會圍觀在場。 此外，週日下午，我們將有兩位世界頂級橋樑專家鮑勃•哈曼（Bob Hamman）和沙龍•奧斯伯格（Sharon Osberg）與我們的股東進行溝通。 兩名非專家 - 查理和我 - 也將在桌面上。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. (Actuarial tables tell me that I can consume another 12 million calories before my death. I’m terrified at the thought of leaving any of these behind, so will be frontloading on Sunday.) Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before) and at Piccolo’s, call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, show some class and order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
5月6日星期天，Gorat's和Piccolo將再次為Berkshire股東開放。 兩人將一直服務到下午10點，戈拉特下午1點開門。 和短笛在下午4點開幕。 這些餐館是我最喜歡的，星期天晚上我會在這兩個餐廳吃飯。 （精算表告訴我，我可以在我死之前消耗1200萬卡路里的熱量，因為想到把這些東西留在後面，所以會在星期天的時候加載），請記住：要在戈拉特預訂，請致電402 4月1日（但不是之前）和短笛的電話號碼是402-342-9038。 在短笛的，顯示一些課程，並訂購一個巨大的根啤酒浮法甜點。 只有sissies得到小的。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
今年我們將同樣由這三位財經記者主持問答時間，他們將通過電子郵件收集股東的問題，並對我和查理進行提問。這三位記者和他們的電子郵件是：財富雜誌的Carol Loomis, e-mail：cloomis@fortunemail.com，CNBC記者Becky Quick，BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, 紐約時報記者Andrew Ross Sorkin， arsorkin@nytimes.com。
從提交的問題中，每位記者將選擇十幾個他認為最有趣最重要的問題。希望你們的郵件盡量簡潔明了，並且不超過兩個問題。 (並註明是否介意透露姓名。)
This year we are adding a second panel of three financial analysts who follow Berkshire. They are Cliff Gallant of KBW, Jay Gelb of Barclays Capital and Gary Ransom of Dowling and Partners. These analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience.
今年，我們又增加了一個由三名財務分析師組成的小組，他們跟隨波克夏。 他們是KBW的Cliff Gallant，Barclays Capital的Jay Gelb和Dowling and Partners的Gary Ransom。 這些分析師將帶來自己的波克夏具體問題，並與記者和觀眾交替。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our new panel will let analysts ask questions – perhaps even a few technical ones – in a manner that may be helpful to many shareholders.
查理和我相信，所有的股東都應該能夠同時獲得新的波克夏信息，也應該有足夠的時間來分析這些信息，這就是為什麼我們在周五收盤後試圖發布財務信息的原因。 我們不會一對一地向大型機構投資者或分析師講話。 我們的新小組將讓分析師以一種對許多股東有幫助的方式提出問題 - 甚至可能是一些技術問題。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 13 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
查理和我都不會有太多的線索要問的問題。 我們知道記者和分析師會想出一些困難的，這就是我們喜歡的方式。 總而言之，我們預計至少有54個問題，這將允許每個分析師和記者6個，聽眾18個。 如果還有一些額外的時間，我們會從觀眾中拿走更多。 觀眾提問者將通過在位於競技場和主溢流室的13個麥克風中的每一個在上午8點15分進行的圖紙來確定。
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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
有充分的理由，我經常讚揚我們的運營經理的成就。 他們是真正的全明星，他們經營的業務就好像他們是家庭擁有的唯一資產。 我相信他們的心態是以股東為導向的，可以在大型上市公司中找到。 大多數人沒有經濟需要工作; 打擊企業“本壘打”的喜悅和他們的薪水一樣意義重大。
Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
然而，同樣重要的是在我們的公司辦公室與我一起工作的23名男女（全都在一層，這是我們打算保留它的方式！）。
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements and files a 17,839-page Federal income tax return – hello, Guinness! – as well as state and foreign returns. Additionally, they respond to countless shareholder and media inquiries, get out the annual report, prepare for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinate the Board’s activities – and the list goes on and on.
這個團隊有效地處理了SEC的許多事務和其他監管機關的要求，歸檔處理了17,839頁聯邦所得稅納稅申報表以及本國與外國收益率，回應了無數股東和傳媒的查詢，產出年度報告，準備為全國最大的年度會議上，協調董事會的活動 – 還有很多不勝枚舉的例子。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.
他們處理所有這些業務，令人難以置信的有效率，使我的生活輕鬆和快樂。 他們的努力也顯現在波克夏相關的活動上：他們處理 48所大學（選自200名申請人）到底誰本學期能將學生送到奧馬哈與我相處一天，同時也處理各種我收到的請求，安排我的行程，甚至午餐幫我帶漢堡，。 有沒有CEO可以(像我)這麼好了。
This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and tell them so.
對辦公室的組員我有最深切的感謝，這也是你們應得的。四月三十日來我們的資本主義伍德斯托克節吧，並這麼告訴他們。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 25, 2012
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2012年2月25日