Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman's Letter
and is referred to in that letter.
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
| Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 | |||||||
| Annual Percentage Change | |||||||
| in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | Relative Results | |||||
| Year | (1) | (2) | (1)-(2) | ||||
| 1965 | 23.80 | 10.00 | 13.8 | ||||
| 1966 | 20.30 | (11.70) | 32.0 | ||||
| 1967 | 11.00 | 30.90 | (19.9) | ||||
| 1968 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 8.0 | ||||
| 1969 | 16.20 | (8.40) | 24.6 | ||||
| 1970 | 12.00 | 3.90 | 8.1 | ||||
| 1971 | 16.40 | 14.60 | 1.8 | ||||
| 1972 | 21.70 | 18.90 | 2.8 | ||||
| 1973 | 4.70 | (14.80) | 19.5 | ||||
| 1974 | 5.50 | (26.40) | 31.90 | ||||
| 1975 | 21.90 | 37.20 | (15.30) | ||||
| 1976 | 59.30 | 23.60 | 35.70 | ||||
| 1977 | 31.90 | (7.40) | 39.3 | ||||
| 1978 | 24.00 | 6.40 | 17.6 | ||||
| 1979 | 35.70 | 18.20 | 17.5 | ||||
| 1980 | 19.30 | 32.30 | (13.0) | ||||
| 1981 | 31.40 | (5.00) | 36.4 | ||||
| 1982 | 40.00 | 21.40 | 18.6 | ||||
| 1983 | 32.30 | 22.40 | 9.9 | ||||
| 1984 | 13.60 | 6.10 | 7.50 | ||||
| 1985 | 48.20 | 31.60 | 16.6 | ||||
| 1986 | 26.10 | 18.60 | 7.5 | ||||
| 1987 | 19.50 | 5.10 | 14.4 | ||||
| 1988 | 20.10 | 16.60 | 3.5 | ||||
| 1989 | 44.40 | 31.70 | 12.70 | ||||
| 1990 | 7.40 | (3.10) | 10.5 | ||||
| 1991 | 39.60 | 30.50 | 9.10 | ||||
| 1992 | 20.30 | 7.60 | 12.7 | ||||
| 1993 | 14.30 | 10.10 | 4.2 | ||||
| 1994 | 13.90 | 1.30 | 12.60 | ||||
| 1995 | 43.10 | 37.60 | 5.5 | ||||
| 1996 | 31.80 | 23.00 | 8.8 | ||||
| 1997 | 34.10 | 33.40 | .7 | ||||
| 1998 | 48.30 | 28.60 | 19.7 | ||||
| 1999 | 0.50 | 21.00 | (20.50) | ||||
| 2000 | 6.50 | (9.10) | 15.6 | ||||
| 2001 | (6.20) | (11.90) | 5.70 | ||||
| 2002 | 10.00 | (22.10) | 32.10 | ||||
| 2003 | 21.00 | 28.70 | (7.70) | ||||
| 2004 | 10.50 | 10.90 | (0.40) | ||||
| 2005 | 6.40 | 4.90 | 1.50 | ||||
| 2006 | 18.40 | 15.80 | 2.60 | ||||
| 2007 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 | ||||
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2007 | 21.1% | 10.3% | 10.80 | ||||
| Overall Gain — 1964-2007 | 400863.0% | 6840.0% | |||||
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：
Our gain in net worth during 2007 was $12.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 11%. Over the last 43 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $78,008, a rate of 21.1% compounded annually.*
波克夏在2007年的淨值收益為123億美元。a股與b股的每股淨值，都較去年成長11%。過去43年(即現任管理階層接手以來)，每股賬面價值由19美元增長為78,008美元，平均年復合成長率為21.1%。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A.
*在年報中所謂的每股數字係以A級普通股約當數為基礎，B級普通股擁有A級普通股三十分之一的權利。
Overall, our 76 operating businesses did well last year. The few that had problems were primarily those linked to housing, among them our brick, carpet and real estate brokerage operations. Their setbacks are minor and temporary. Our competitive position in these businesses remains strong, and we have firstclass CEOs who run them right, in good times or bad.
總體上，去年我們旗下的76家公司全部運行得很好。少數幾個出問題的業務主要是與房地產相關，包括我們的磚料、地毯以及房地產中介業務。他們受的影響是輕微的和暫時性的。我們在這些業務領域中的競爭優勢依然強大。我們擁有一流的管理層，無論好年景還是壞年景，相信他們總能把公司運營得很好。
Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the “weakened lending practices” I described in last year’s letter. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: “It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine.”
然而，一些主要的金融機構正面臨嚴重問題，原因是他們捲入了我去年致股東信中提到的“羸弱的放貸操作”(weakened lending practices)。富國銀行的ceo，john stumpf 對許多放貸機構最近的行為剖析道：“這個行業真有趣，老的賠錢方法還挺管用呢，卻又在發明新的賠錢方法。”
You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, “Please, God, Just One More Bubble.” Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower’s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA – house price appreciation – would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.
你可能記得2003年的時候，矽谷很流行一個車貼：“神啊，求求你再給個泡沫吧”。很不幸，這個願望很快就成真了：幾乎所有的美國人都認為房價會永遠上漲，這種堅信不疑令借款人的收入和現金損益表對放貸機構無足輕重，他們大把大把的把錢借給別人，相信房價上漲(hpa， house price appreciation)會解決所有問題。今天，我們國家裡不斷蔓延的痛苦，正是源於這種錯誤的信心。隨著房價的下跌，大量愚蠢的金融問題被曝光。對此你能學到經驗就是：只有在退潮的時候，你才能看出哪些人在裸泳。我們目睹那些最大金融機構的現狀，簡直是“慘不忍睹”。
Turning to happier thoughts, we can report that Berkshire’s newest acquisitions of size, TTI and Iscar, led by their CEOs, Paul Andrews and Jacob Harpaz respectively, performed magnificently in 2007. Iscar is as impressive a manufacturing operation as I’ve seen, a view I reported last year and that was confirmed by a visit I made in the fall to its extraordinary plant in Korea.
來點好消息，現在報告：波克夏最新規模收購的企業——tti和艾斯卡(iscar)公司，分別在他們的ceo paul andrews 和jacob harpaz領導下，2007年表現不俗。艾斯卡公司是我見過的製造企業中令人印象深刻的一家，去年我報告過這點，而秋天造訪它在韓國非比尋常的工廠後，更加深了。
Finally, our insurance business – the cornerstone of Berkshire – had an excellent year. Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business – more about them later. But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.
最後，作為波克夏公司中流砥柱的保險業務，這一年的業績非常出色，這部分要歸功於我們網羅了保險業中最好的一批經理人。剩下的是我們在2007年非常幸運，這是第二年美國沒有發生非常重大的災難。
That party is over. It’s a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008. Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise. Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so. If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse. So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.
不過盛宴已經結束。確定無疑的是：2008年，整個保險業，包括我們在內，利潤將明顯下滑。保費在降低，損失敞口卻無情地在擴大，即使美國繼續經歷第三個小災之年，保險業的利潤率也將下降4%或更多。如果遇上颶風或地震，結果將非常糟糕。所以在接下來的幾年裡要對較低的保險收益有所準備。
Yardsticks
Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $141 billion (not counting those in our finance or utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value).
波克夏的價值主要源於兩個方面。一是我們的投資：股票、債券及現金等價物。在年底這些投資的價值為141億美元(在計算時，我們排除了財務和運營部門所持有的部位，將其歸入第二塊價值裡)。
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保險浮存金，就是在保險業務中，發生的那部分由我們暫時掌管的，但不屬於我們的資金。在我們的投資中占到59億美元。只要保險業的賠付情況正常，浮存金就可以看作是“免費”獲得的，這意味著，我們獲得的保費，要與我們可能遭受的損失和產生的費用相當。當然，保險業是不確定的，總在收益和損失之間搖擺不定。在我們的歷史中，無論怎樣，我們都要有利可圖，所以我期望在未來，我們將繼續保持無虧損的狀況，甚至做得更好。如果我們做到了，股東們將看到我們的投資，將成為波克夏公司股東們，源源不絕的價值來源。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 66 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 76. In our early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we have put ever more emphasis on the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses.
波克夏公司的第二個價值組成部分是來自投資和保險以外的其他收入。 這些收益由66家非保險公司提供，詳見第76頁。在最初幾年，我們把重點放在投資方面。 但是，二十年來，我們更加重視非保險業務收入的發展。
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first we tabulate per-share investments at 14-year intervals. We exclude those applicable to minority interests.
下面的表格顯示了這種轉移，首先，我們在表格中按14年為間隔，列出每股所含的投資金額。我們排除了少數股權的收益。
| Per-Share Investments Investments | Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share | ||||||
| Year | Years | ||||||
| 1965 | $4 | ||||||
| 1979 | 577 | 1965-1979 | 42.80% | ||||
| 1993 | 13,961 | 1979-1993 | 25.60% | ||||
| 2007 | 90,343 | 1993-2007 | 14.30% | ||||
For the entire 42 years, our compounded annual gain in per-share investments was 27.1%. But the trend has been downward as we increasingly used our available funds to buy operating businesses.
在42年裡，我們每股年復合收益是27.1%。但是這一趨勢，隨著我們用我們可能有的資金，購買整個運營企業開始，已經下降。
Here’s the record on how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have grown, again on a pershare basis and after applicable minority interests.
下面的記錄反映了我們非保險業務的增長。同樣是基於扣除少數股權收益後的每股收益：
| Per-Share Investments Investments | Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share | ||||||
| Year | Years | ||||||
| 1965 | $4 | ||||||
| 1979 | 18 | 1965-1979 | 11.10% | ||||
| 1993 | 212 | 1979-1993 | 19.10% | ||||
| 2007 | 4,093 | 1993-2007 | 23.50% | ||||
For the entire period, the compounded annual gain was 17.8%, with gains accelerating as our focus shifted.
在整個時期內，每年的複合收益增長是17.8%，隨著我們投資重點的轉移，收益會加快增長。
Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire’s past record can’t be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.
儘管通過這些表格，讓你們對波克夏公司的收益增長歷史有了大致概念，也有助評估波克夏的內在價值，但是它們對於預測未來公司發展的可能性會有誤導。波克夏過去的增長紀錄，未來不要說複製，即使是接近這個水平都是不可能的。我們的資產和收益基數，現在對我們來說，已經大的不可能在未來獲得超常的增長。
Charlie Munger, my partner at Berkshire, and I will continue to measure our progress by the two yardsticks I have just described and will regularly update you on the results. Though we can’t come close to duplicating the past, we will do our best to make sure the future is not disappointing.
我在波克夏的搭檔——查理·孟格(charlie munger)和我將繼續按前面提到的兩個指標來衡量我們的進步，並定期將結果呈現給你們。儘管我們不可能接近地複製過去的增長，但是我們仍將努力確保未來的增長不令人失望。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.
我們的努力，得到了那些加入波克夏公司管理層們的有力支持。在一些方面，這是一個與眾不同的團體。首先，他們中的許多人在經濟上根本無需工作，在將生意賣給我們時，他們大都得到一大筆數目龐大的金錢。他們現在管理公司，只是因為他們對此樂此不疲，而不是因為需要錢。當然他們也希望獲得公平合理的報酬，但金錢，絕對不是他們如此辛勤而有效率工作的原因。
A second, somewhat related, point about these managers is that they have exactly the job they want for the rest of their working years. At almost any other company, key managers below the top aspire to keep climbing the pyramid. For them, the subsidiary or division they manage today is a way station – or so they hope. Indeed, if they are in their present positions five years from now, they may well feel like failures.
其次，在這些管理層身上，稍微能找的關聯性是，他們正從事著，想在自己剩餘工作年限裡，從事的工作。而在絕大多數其他公司裡，那些主要的經理們，只要還不是公司一把手，就熱衷於爬上公司權力金字塔的頂端。對於他們來說，他們現在管理的分支機構或部門，只是晉升途中的小站——或者他們希望是這樣。甚至，讓他們在目前的職位上待上五年，也會讓他們深感失敗。
Conversely, our CEOs’ scorecards for success are not whether they obtain my job but instead are the long-term performances of their businesses. Their decisions flow from a here-today, here-forever mindset. I think our rare and hard-to-replicate managerial structure gives Berkshire a real advantage.
相比之下，我們ceo們的“計分牌”上顯示的成功，不是坐上我的位置，而是他們企業的長期表現。他們的決策是基於“今天在這裡，永遠在這裡”的心態做出的。我想正是我們這種罕見和難以復制的管理結構，才是波克夏真正的優勢。
Acquisitions
併購案
Though our managers may be the best, we will need large and sensible acquisitions to get the growth in operating earnings we wish. Here, we made little progress in 2007 until very late in the year. Then, on Christmas day, Charlie and I finally earned our paychecks by contracting for the largest cash purchase in Berkshire’s history.
儘管我們的管理層是最棒的，我們仍需要進行明智的大型企業收購，以使我們業務收入增長符合我們的期望。這點上，我們直到2007年很晚的時候，才取得了一點進展。那是在聖誕節，查理和我簽約了在波克夏公司歷史上最大的現金收購，最終為我們自己掙到了當年的薪水。
The seeds of this transaction were planted in 1954. That fall, only three months into a new job, I was sent by my employers, Ben Graham and Jerry Newman, to a shareholders’ meeting of Rockwood Chocolate in Brooklyn. A young fellow had recently taken control of this company, a manufacturer of assorted cocoa-based items. He had then initiated a one-of-a-kind tender, offering 80 pounds of cocoa beans for each share of Rockwood stock. I described this transaction in a section of the 1988 annual report that explained arbitrage. I also told you that Jay Pritzker – the young fellow mentioned above – was the business genius behind this tax-efficient idea, the possibilities for which had escaped all the other experts who had thought about buying Rockwood, including my bosses, Ben and Jerry.
這次交易的種子早在1954年就播下了，那年夏天，剛得到新工作才三個月的我，被我的老闆本·格雷厄姆和傑瑞·紐曼派去參加rockwood巧克力公司在布魯克林召開的股東大會。一個年輕小伙子，剛控制了這家用可可豆做原料，生產多種產品的公司。他當時發明了一種絕無僅有的“代幣”，為每股rockwood公司的股票出價80磅可可豆。我在1988年給股東的信中描述過這次交易，也解釋了其中的套利機會。我要告訴你們jay pritzker，就是上面提到的那個小伙子——一個躲在那個節省稅款主意背後的商業天才。這種可行辦法逃過了其他想買rockwood股票專家們的眼睛，包括我的老闆本和傑瑞。
At the meeting, Jay was friendly and gave me an education on the 1954 tax code. I came away very impressed. Thereafter, I avidly followed Jay’s business dealings, which were many and brilliant. His valued partner was his brother, Bob, who for nearly 50 years ran Marmon Group, the home for most of the Pritzker businesses.
在那次股東大會上，jay友善地教了我很多，關於1954年度免稅代碼的知識，讓我在離開時對他印象深刻。此後，我熱心地跟踪著jay那些繁多但出色的生意。jay最有價值的伙伴是他的兄弟bob，後者負責的marmon集團，是jay許多公司的母公司。
Jay died in 1999, and Bob retired early in 2002. Around then, the Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors. Marmon’s largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers. The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 billion. All told, Marmon has $7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees.
在jay1999年去世後，bob在2002年初也退休了。pritzker家族決定逐步賣掉或重組他們的財產，其中包括marmon集團。marmon集團通過它的9個部門運營著125項生意，其中最大的一項是聯合槽罐車公司(union tank car)。算上它的加拿大公司，聯合槽罐車公司共擁有94,000輛鐵路槽罐車，被分別租賃給不同的貨主。這只“艦隊”的初置成本是5.1億美元，合計有7億美元的銷售額和大約20,000名員工。
We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years. Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings. Prior to our entry into the picture, the Pritzker family received substantial consideration from Marmon’s distribution of cash, investments and certain businesses.
我們不久將收購marmon集團60%的股權，並獲得六年裡公司事實上的全部收益。我們的初始費用是4.5億美元，我們最終購買的價格是基於一個依賴收益來計算的公式。在我們涉足其中之前，pritzker家族從marmon集團的現金分配、投資以及可靠的生意中獲得了可觀的收益。
This deal was done in the way Jay would have liked. We arrived at a price using only Marmon’s financial statements, employing no advisors and engaging in no nit-picking. I knew that the business would be exactly as the Pritzkers represented, and they knew that we would close on the dot, however chaotic financial markets might be. During the past year, many large deals have been renegotiated or killed entirely. With the Pritzkers, as with Berkshire, a deal is a deal.
這項交易，也是按jay喜歡的方式進行的。我們僅憑marmon集團的財務報表就出此價格，沒有僱用顧問和進行細緻的查證。我知道公司會和pritzker家族描述的情況一樣，同樣他們也知道，不論混亂的金融市場情況如何，我們都會說到做到。在過去的一年裡，許多大交易被重新談判或乾脆取消，但這個交易，對pritzker家族來說，像對波克夏一樣，一個交易就是一個交易(a deal is a deal)。
Marmon’s CEO, Frank Ptak, works closely with a long-time associate, John Nichols. John was formerly the highly successful CEO of Illinois Tool Works (ITW), where he teamed with Frank to run a mix of industrial businesses. Take a look at their ITW record; you’ll be impressed.
marmon集團的ceo，frank ptak有一個長期的合作者john nichols 。john從前是伊利諾斯工具公司(itw)很成功的ceo，在itw他和frank搭檔管理一個多種經營的工業集團。看一眼他們在itw的記錄，你會留下深刻印象。
Byron Trott of Goldman Sachs – whose praises I sang in the 2003 report – facilitated the Marmon transaction. Byron is the rare investment banker who puts himself in his client’s shoes. Charlie and I trust him completely.
高盛公司的byron trott——我在2003年給股東的信中曾對其大唱讚歌，促成了與marmon集團的交易。byron是那種很罕見的，能設身處地為客戶著想的投資銀行家，查理和我百分百地信任他。
You’ll like the code name that Goldman Sachs assigned the deal. Marmon entered the auto business in 1902 and exited it in 1933. Along the way it manufactured the Wasp, a car that won the first Indianapolis 500 race, held in 1911. So this deal was labeled “Indy 500.”
你們也會喜歡高盛公司為這個交易起的代號。因marmon集團在1902年-1933年曾涉足汽車業，他們製造的wasp品牌車，贏得了在1911年首次舉辦的印地安納布里斯500汽車賽，所以這個交易被稱為“印地500” 。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In May 2006, I spoke at a lunch at Ben Bridge, our Seattle-based jewelry chain. The audience was a number of its vendors, among them Dennis Ulrich, owner of a company that manufactured gold jewelry.
2006年5月，當我在我們擁有的ben bridge公司舉辦的午餐會上發言時，下面的聽眾很多就是出售這家位於西雅圖的，珠寶連鎖公司的賣主，他們中間就有dennis ulrich，他是一家金飾品製作公司的老闆。
In January 2007, Dennis called me, suggesting that with Berkshire’s support he could build a large jewelry supplier. We soon made a deal for his business, simultaneously purchasing a supplier of about equal size. The new company, Richline Group, has since made two smaller acquisitions. Even with those, Richline is far below the earnings threshold we normally require for purchases. I’m willing to bet, however, that Dennis – with the help of his partner, Dave Meleski – will build a large operation, earning good returns on capital employed.
2007年1月，dennis打電話給我，建議說如果能得到波克夏的支持，他可以締造出一個珠寶製造業巨人。不久我們與他達成了交易，同時又收購了另一家與他同等規模的公司，組成richline集團公司。新公司後來又做了兩筆較小的收購。即便如此，richline公司的收入水平也遠低於，我們通常要收購公司，所需達到的收入水平。不過我打賭，dennis在他的搭檔dave meleski的輔助下，將會建立起一個巨無霸，為投入的資本賺取可觀的回報。
Businesses – The Great, the Good and the Gruesome
公司——出色的，良好的和糟糕的
Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.
讓我們來看看，什麼樣的公司能讓我們眼前一亮。在關注於此時，我們同樣也要探討，哪些是我們期望極力避開的企業。
Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stockmarket purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
查理和我要尋找的公司是a)業務我們能理解;b)有持續發展的潛質;c)有可信賴有能力的管理層;d)一個誘人的標價。我們傾向買下整個公司，或者當管理層是我們的合夥夥伴時，至少買下80%的股份。如果控股收購的方式不可行，我們也很樂意在證券市場上簡單地買入那些出色公司的一小部分股權，這就好比擁有“希望之鑽”(hope diamond, 世界名鑽，重45.52克拉)的一小部分權益也好過擁有一整顆“萊茵石”(一種人造鑽石)。
A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the lowcost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.
一家真正偉大的公司必須要有一道“護城河”來保護投資獲得很好的回報。但資本主義的“動力學”使得，任何能賺去高額回報的生意“城堡”，都會受到競爭者重複不斷的攻擊。因此，一道難以逾越的屏障，比如成為低成本提供者，象蓋可保險(ceico)或好事多超市(costco),或者擁有像可口可樂、吉利、美國運通這樣曉譽世界的強大品牌，才是企業獲得持續成功的根本。商業史中充斥著“羅馬煙火筒”(roman candle)般光彩炫目的公司，它們所謂的“長溝深塹”最終被證明只是幻覺，很快就被對手跨越。
Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.
我們對“持續性”的評判標準，使我們排除了許多處在發展迅速，且變化不斷行業裡的公司。儘管資本主義的“創造性的破壞”對社會發展很有利，但它排除了投資的確定性。一道需要不斷重複開挖的“護城河”，最終根本就等於沒有護城河。
Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.
另外，這個標準也排除那些依靠某個偉大的管理者才能成功的企業。當然，一個令對手恐懼的ceo對任何企業都是一筆巨大資產，在波克夏，我們擁有相當數量這樣的經理人。他們的能力創造出巨大的財富，這是讓一般ceo們來運營，根本無法實現的。
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.
但是如果一個生意，依賴一個超級巨星才能產生好成效，那這個生意本身不會被認為是個好生意。一家在你們地區首席腦外科醫生領導下的醫療合夥公司，可能有著令人高興的巨大且增長的收入，但是這對它的將來說明不了什麼。隨著外科醫生的離開，合夥公司的“壁壘”也一起消失，即使你不能叫出梅奧診所(mayo clinic)(美國最好的醫院之一)ceo的名字，你也能計算出它的“壁壘”能持續多久。
Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.
我們要尋找的生意，是在穩定行業中，具有長期競爭優勢的公司。如果它的成長迅速，更好。但是即使沒有成長，那樣的生意也是值得的。我們只需簡單地把這些生意中獲得的可觀收益，去購買別處類似的企業。這裡沒有什麼規定說，錢是哪兒掙來的，你就必須花在哪兒。事實上，這樣的做法通常是一個錯誤：真正偉大的生意，不但能從有形資產中獲得巨大回報，而且在任何持續期內，不用拿出收益中的很大一部分再投資，以維持其高回報率。
Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.
讓我們來看看這種夢幻般生意的原型——我們擁有的喜詩糖果公司(see's candy)。盒裝巧克力業的經營，一點不會讓人興奮：在美國，人均的消費量非常低而且沒有增長。許多名噪一時的品牌都已消失，並且在過去40年中只有三個公司賺到的收益是超過象徵性的。真的，我相信，儘管喜詩糖果的收入大部分來源於很少幾個州，但卻占到整個行業將近一半的收入。
At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.
1972年當藍籌郵票公司(blue chip stamps)買下喜詩糖果時，它年銷售1,600萬磅的糖果。(那時查理和我控制著藍籌郵票公司，後來將其併入波克夏)，喜詩去年的銷售額是3,100萬磅，年增長率只有2%。然而由喜詩家族在50多年裡，建立起來的持久競爭優勢，隨後被chuck huggins和brad kinstler繼續鞏固，給波克夏創造出超乎尋常的成果。
We bought See’s for $25 million when its sales were $30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 million. The capital then required to conduct the business was $8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.
我們用2,500萬美元買下它時，它的銷售額是3,000萬美元，稅前所得少於500萬美元。企業的運營資本是800萬美元(每年有幾個月，它需要適度的季節性負債)。從此，公司為投入資本賺取60%的稅前所得。有兩個因素幫助了營運資金的最小化。一是，產品是現金銷售，消除了應收賬款;二是，生產和分銷的周期很短，使存貨最小化。
Last year See’s sales were $383 million, and pre-tax profits were $82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 million. This means we have had to reinvest only $32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth – and somewhat immodest financial growth – of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 billion. All of that, except for the $32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)
去年喜詩糖果的銷售是3.83億美元，稅前利潤是8,200萬美元，運營資金是4,000萬美元。這意味著從1972年以來，我們不得不再投資區區3,200萬美元，以適應它適度的規模增長，和稍許過度的財務增長。同時稅前收益總計是13.5億美元，扣除3,200萬美元後，所有這些收益都流到波克夏(或早些年的藍籌郵票公司)。利潤在繳納公司稅後，我們用餘下的錢買了其他有吸引力的公司。就像從亞當和夏娃最初喜好(adam and eve kick-started)的活動，帶來了60億人一樣，喜詩糖果開啟了我們後來的許多滾滾而來的新財源。(它對於波克夏來說，就如聖經上說的：“豐腴膏沃而且生養眾多”)
There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 million to $82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.
在美國的企業中，象喜詩糖果這樣的企業並不多。一般的做法是，要將公司的收入從5百萬美元提升到8200萬美元，需要投人4億美元或更多資金才能辦到。這是因為成長中的業務，既會因銷售額的上升，需要更多的營運資金，也會需要更多對固定資產的投資。
A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 million pre-tax on $400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation. It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.
一個公司為滿足它的成長，對資本的需求是否有大幅增長，正好證實它，是否能成為一項滿意的投資。順著回到我們的例子，當一個用4億美元的有形資產淨值，能賺到8200萬美元稅前收益的公司，實在沒有什麼好自慚形穢的，不過它業主的現金平衡表與喜詩糖果的是完全不同的。擁有一條不需要大量資金投入，就能帶來滾滾財源的業務，這真是太棒了!不信去問問微軟或谷歌(google)吧!
One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.
一個良好，但不出色生意的例子是我們擁有的飛安公司(flightsafty)。這家公司為它的消費者創造利益，就如同其他我知道的類似公司一樣。它同樣擁有一項持久的競爭優勢：參加飛行訓練，如果選擇其他公司，而不是它這家頂尖的飛機訓練公司，就像在一次外科手術前，對價格斤斤計較。
Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 million, and its net investment in fixed assets was $570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 million. But capital expenditures have totaled $1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 million, and we have 273 of them.) Our fixed assets, after depreciation, now amount to $1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 million, a gain of $159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.
當然，這項生意如果要增長，需要將收入中的很大一部分再投入。當我們1996年買下飛安公司時，它的稅前營運收入是1.11億美元，在固定資產上的淨投資是5.7億美元。自從我們買下後，在產生了總計9.23億美元的折舊費後，資本支出總計為16.35億美元，其中的大部分用來購買飛行訓練模擬器，以配合那些經常被提及的飛機的新型號。(一個模擬器花費超過1,200萬美元，我們有273個)，現在我們的固定資產，扣除折舊後，達到10.79億美元。稅前營運收入在2007年達到2.7億美元，與1996年比，增加了1.59億美元。這個收入帶給我們的回報，對於我們增加投入的5.09億美元投資來說還不錯，但和喜詩糖果帶給我們的，根本沒法比。
Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.
因此，如果僅僅計算經濟回報，飛安公司是一個良好的，但絕非超乎尋常的業務。它那種高投入高產出的經歷正是許多公司面臨的。例如，投資公用事業公司，我們巨大的投入在以很快的速度貶值。從現在開始的十年裡，我們可以從這個生意裡掙到相當多的錢，但是我們需要投入數十億美元才能實現它。
Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.
現在讓我們來說說糟糕的生意，比較差的生意是那種收入增長雖然迅速，但需要巨大投資來維持增長，過後又賺不到多少，甚至沒錢賺的生意。想想航空業，從萊特兄弟飛行成功的那天到現在，這個行業所謂的競爭優勢，被證明純粹子虛烏有。事實上，假如當時有某個富有遠見的資本家在基蒂霍克(kitty hawk，萊特兄弟試飛的地方)的話，他應該把奧利佛·萊特打下來，給他的後輩們幫上一個大忙。
The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.
航空公司從它開出第一個航班開始，對資本的需求就是貪得無厭的。投資者在本應對它避而遠之的時候，往往受到公司成長的吸引，將錢源源不斷地投入這個無底洞。就是我，也很慚愧地加入這場愚蠢的活動，1989年我讓波克夏買入美國航空公司(usair)的優先股。可付款支票上的墨跡未乾，美國航空就開始了盤旋下落，不久它就不再支付給我們優先股的股息。不過最後我們算是很幸運的。在又一輪被誤導的，對航空公司的樂觀情緒爆發時，我們在1998年賣掉了我們手裡的股票，竟然也大賺了一筆。在我們出售後的10年裡，美國航空申請破產了，兩次!
To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.
總結，對這三類“儲蓄存款賬戶”的看法。出色的賬戶，能逐年帶來異乎尋常高收益率增長;良好的賬戶，能帶來有吸引力回報率，掙到的錢也在增加;最後，那些糟糕的賬戶，既給不了足夠的收益率，又需要你為那些令人失望的回報繼續投入。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now it’s confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.
現在又到懺悔時間了。必須明確的是並沒有哪個諮詢顧問、董事會或投資銀行家，把我推到我將說的那些錯誤中去。用網球術語來說，它們都是主動失誤(unforced errors)。
To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase. The seller was asking $30 million, and I was adamant about not going above $25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.
就從我差點搞砸對喜詩糖果的收購說起。當時賣主開價3,000萬美元，而我堅持不能超過2,500萬美元。幸運的是，他退讓了。否則我的止步不前，讓這13.5億美元落入別人的腰包。
About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.
大約在收購喜詩糖果的時候，當時管理首府廣播公司(capital cities broadcasting)的湯姆·墨菲(tom murphy)打來電話，為國家廣播公司(nbc)位於達拉斯，沃爾斯堡的電視台開價3,500萬美元，電視台是屬於首府廣播公司買下的“沃爾斯堡報”，鑑於“相互持股”(cross-ownership)的法律規定，murphy不得不要剝離它。我知道電視台也是像喜詩糖果那樣的生意，實際上不需要什麼投資，就會獲得可觀的增長前景，它們很容易運營並且為所有人帶來滾滾財富。
Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear. But I didn’t listen.
此外，murph至今都是我們的一位老朋友——一位我欽佩的，出色的經理人和傑出人物。他了解電視這門生意的方方面面，而且除非他認為這個收購值得去做，否則不會給我打電話。實際上murphy已經把一個“買”字灌進了我的耳朵，可惜我充耳不聞。
In 2006, the station earned $73 million pre-tax, bringing its total earnings since I turned down the deal to at least $1 billion – almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say “no”? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)
在2006年，這個電視台賺到7,300萬美元的稅前收益。從我放棄那個交易至今，它一共賺取至少10億美元的收益——幾乎都是可以讓所有人另作他用的。不僅如此，該資產目前還有大約8億美元的資本價值。為什麼我要說“不”?唯一的解釋就是我的大腦度假去了，卻忘記通報我。(我的行為類似於政治家molly ivins說過的：“如果他的智商是出奇的低，你就需要一天用水澆他兩次。”)
Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock (25,203 shares of A). What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years. But that’s just the beginning: By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6% of a wonderful business – one now valued at $220 billion – to buy a worthless business.
終於，當我在dexter公司的問題上說了“是”的時候，我又犯了一個相當糟糕的錯誤。dexter公司是1993年我用價值4.33億美元的25203股波克夏的a股股票，買下的製鞋公司。在隨後幾年裡，不但我自認為的持續競爭優勢消失得無影無踪。而且這只是個開始：由於用的是波克夏的股票，我將這個錯誤放大很多。這次購買的費用對波克夏股東來說不是4億美元，而是近35億美元。說到底，我就是放棄一份，現在的價值是2200億美元，出色的生意的1.6%，買回了一項毫無價值的生意。
To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made. But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”
到此為止，dexter是我做的最糟糕的交易。但是你可以打賭，我將來還會犯更多的錯誤。bobby bare的鄉村歌曲中有一段歌詞，解釋了為什麼會如此頻繁的發生這樣的結果：“我決不會和一個醜女人上床，但當我確定醒來時，身邊總有幾個。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
現在，讓我們檢視波克夏公司4個主要的運營部門。每個部門都有完全不同的資產負債表和損益表特徵。因此，將他們合併一起，會阻礙分析。所以，我們把它們當作四種獨立業務來介紹，就像查理和我如何看待它們一樣。
Insurance
保險事業
The best anecdote I’ve heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney,
who asked his wife, Ann, “When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be
president?” To which she replied, “Honey, you weren’t in my wildest dreams.”
我在目前總統競選中聽到最有趣的故事是關於米特·羅姆尼(mitt romney)的，他問妻子安(ann)，“在我們年輕時，你有沒有在你最狂野不羈的夢裡想到過，我可能成為總統?”“親愛的，在我最狂野不羈的夢裡，沒有你!”
When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation. Here’s how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:
在我們1967年首次進入財產和災難保險業時，我最狂野不羈的夢裡也沒有我們現在業務的景象。下面是我們買下國民保險公司(national indemnity)後最初5年的情況。
To put it charitably, we were a slow starter. But things changed. Here’s the record of the last five years:
客氣地說，我們是一個緩慢的開端，但情況變了，下面是我們最近5年的情況記錄。
This metamorphosis has been accomplished by some extraordinary managers. Let’s look at what each has achieved.
這種質變的完成靠的是一些出色的經理人，讓我們看看他們各自的完成情況。
•GEICO possesses the widest moat of any of our insurers, one carefully protected and expanded by Tony Nicely, its CEO. Last year – again – GEICO had the best growth record among major auto insurers, increasing its market share to 7.2%. When Berkshire acquired control in 1995, that share was 2.5%. Not coincidentally, annual ad expenditures by GEICO have increased from $31 million to $751 million during the same period.
•蓋可保險(geico)，在我們所有的保險公司裡擁有最寬的“護城河”，在ceo托尼·萊斯利(tony nicely)的細心維護和拓展下，去年，再一次，geico在主要車險保險公司中，取得了最好的增長記錄，市場份額上升到7.2%。當波克夏1995年控制它是，它的份額是2.5%。與此不相符的是，geico的年廣告支出同期從3,100萬美元，上升到7.51億美元。
Tony, now 64, joined GEICO at 18. Every day since, he has been passionate about the company – proud of how it could both save money for its customers and provide growth opportunities for its associates. Even now, with sales at $12 billion, Tony feels GEICO is just getting started. So do I.
托尼今年64歲了，18歲就進入geico。此後的每一天裡，他都對公司充滿熱情，對geico能做到，既為客戶省錢，又為員工提供發展機會而自豪。即使到現在，銷售額120億美元的情況下，托尼仍覺得geico的發展才剛開始，我也這麼想。
Here’s some evidence. In the last three years, GEICO has increased its share of the motorcycle market from 2.1% to 6%. We’ve also recently begun writing policies on ATVs and RVs. And in November we wrote our first commercial auto policy. GEICO and National Indemnity are working together in the commercial field, and early results are very encouraging.
這裡有些證據。在過去三年裡，geico在摩托車市場的份額從2.1%上升到6%。我們已經開始推出針對全路況車輛(atvs, all-terrain vehicles)和娛樂車輛(rvs, recreational vehicle)的險種，並11月份簽出了第一份商業車輛的保單。geico和國民保險公司(national indemnity)正一起進入商業車輛保險領域，而從最初的成果來看，非常鼓舞人心。
Even in aggregate, these lines will remain a small fraction of our personal auto volume. Nevertheless, they should deliver a growing stream of underwriting profits and float.
集合這些產品線，也只占我們私人車輛保險市場容量的一小部分。
•General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of “home-grown” float – $23 billion at yearend. This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire. Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.
•通用再保險公司(general re)——我們國際性的再保險公司，到目前為止是我們“土生土長”浮存金的最大來源，在年底達到230億美元。這項業務現在是波克夏一項巨大的資產。可是，我們的擁有卻是從提心吊膽開始的。
For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline. This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re. The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.
數十年裡，general re都被認為是再保險業裡的“蒂芙妮”(tiffany, 世界上最著名的奢侈品公司之一，以生產昂貴的銀器著稱)，以它的承保技巧和原則受到大家的推崇。不幸的是，這種聲譽其實已並不符實。當我1998年做出決定要併購general re時，完全忽略了這一個暇疵，那就是：general re在1998年的運營方式已經與它在1968年或1978年的不一樣了。
Now, thanks to Joe Brandon, General Re’s CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, the luster of the company has been restored. Joe and Tad have been running the business for six years and have been doing first-class business in a first-class way, to use the words of J. P. Morgan. They have restored discipline to underwriting, reserving and the selection of clients.
現在，多虧了general re的ceo joe brandon，以及他的搭檔tad montross，恢復了公司以往的光彩。joe和tad執掌公司已經六年，套用jp摩根的話，他們是用一流的方式來做一流的生意。他們恢復了對承保、儲備以及客戶的挑選上的原則。
Their job was made more difficult by costly and time-consuming legacy problems, both in the U.S. and abroad. Despite that diversion, Joe and Tad have delivered excellent underwriting results while skillfully repositioning the company for the future.
公司在國內和國外的遺留問題，耗費巨大且曠日持久，讓他們的工作更加困難。儘管有那樣的牽制，joe和tad通過技巧重新定位公司業務，已經帶來極好的承保結果。
•Since joining Berkshire in 1986, Ajit Jain has built a truly great specialty reinsurance operation from scratch. For one-of-a-kind mammoth transactions, the world now turns to him.
• 自從1986年加入波克夏，ajit jain 從草圖開始，建立起一套真正偉大的專業再保險業務，現在只要是那種獨一無二“猛獁象”般(mammoth)的大型交易，全世界都會來找他。
Last year I told you in detail about the Equitas transfer of huge, but capped, liabilities to Berkshire for a single premium of $7.1 billion. At this very early date, our experience has been good. But this doesn’t tell us much because it’s just one straw in a fifty-year-or-more wind. What we know for sure, however, is that the London team who joined us, headed by Scott Moser, is first-rate and has become a valuable asset for our insurance business.
去年，我告訴你們和意可達(equitas)達成巨額交易的詳情，但是現在事情有所變化，波克夏要承保的只是一筆保費為71億美元的單獨保險。對於此筆生意的初期情況，我們的經驗很管用，但這對於預計一根稻草，被風吹五十年或更長時間後的情況，這些經驗不能告訴我們更多。我們能確定知道的情況是，至少以scott moser為首的倫敦團隊加入了我們，他們是一流的並已經成為我們保險生意裡一筆有價值的財富。
• Finally, we have our smaller operations, which serve specialized segments of the insurance market. In aggregate, these companies have performed extraordinarily well, earning aboveaverage underwriting profits and delivering valuable float for investment.
• 最後，我們還有很小部分的業務，是服務於特殊細分的保險市場。總體上，這些公司運營情況出奇的好，賺取的保險利潤高於平均水平並為投資輸送了有價值的浮存金。
Last year BoatU.S., headed by Bill Oakerson, was added to the group. This company manages an association of about 650,000 boat owners, providing them services similar to those offered by AAA auto clubs to drivers. Among the association’s offerings is boat insurance. Learn more about this operation by visiting its display at the annual meeting.
去年，bill oakerson領導的美國遊艇公司(boatu.s.)加入了我們的團體。這個公司管理著一個約有65萬遊艇主組成的協會，提供給遊艇主的服務類似於aaa汽車俱樂部(auto clubs)提供給司機的。在協會提供服務之一是遊艇保險。想更多了解這方面情況，可以在每年的年會上參觀他們的展示。
Below we show the record of our four categories of property/casualty insurance.
下面顯示我們四個財產和災害保險部分的記錄.
* Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.
*從2006年5月19日起包括應用承保公司(applied underwriters)
Regulated Utility Business
政府管制的公用事業
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
在波克夏擁有87.4%股權的中美洲能源控股公司(midamerican energy holdings)旗下，包含許多不同種類的公用事業類公司。其中最大的分別為：(1) 約克希爾電力公司(yorkshire electricity)與北方電力公司(northern electronic)，它提供380萬用戶的電力供應，讓其成為英國第三大的電力供應商;(2 ) 中美洲能源(midamerican energy)，主要為愛荷華州72萬用戶提供電力;(3) 太平洋能源(pacific power)與石山能源公司(rocky mountain power)，主要電力供應範圍涵蓋美國西部六個州的170萬用戶;(4) 柯恩河(kern river)與北部天然氣管道公司(northern natural pipelines)，供應全美8%的天然氣消費量。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
我們在中美洲能源控股的經營夥伴是walter scott，和他兩位非常傑出的經理人，dave sokol 與greg abel。合作雙方各自擁有多少股票投票權並不重要，我們只在理智思考並達成一致意見後，才會採取重大的行動。與dave,greg和walter共事的八年加強了我最初的信念：波克希爾不可能找到比他們更好的合夥人。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
稍有不協的是，中美洲能源也擁有美國第二大房地產中介公司——美國家庭服務公司(homeservices of america)，這家公司經營20多個地區性品牌、擁有18,800個房動產經紀人員。去年是房屋銷售增長很緩慢的時期，而2008年很有可能更緩慢。不過，當質地良好的中介公司處於一個很合算的價格時，我們將會繼續進行收購。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operation:
以下是中美洲能源在營運上的關鍵數字：
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $70 in 2007 and $87 in 2006.
*包括了波克夏所得的利息(所有相關所得稅後的淨額), 分別是2007年的70美元，和2006年的87美元。
We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 per share in 1999, a year in which its per-share earnings were $2.59. Why the odd figure of $35.05? I originally decided the business was worth $35.00 per share to Berkshire. Now, I’m a “one-price” guy (remember See’s?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire’s offer. But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05. With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me. At the time, it hurt.
1999年，我們同意以每股35.05美元買下中美洲能源35,464,337股股票，這一年它的每股收益是2.59美元。為什麼會是35.05美元這樣一個有個零頭的數字呢?我最初認為它對波克夏的價值是35美元。到現在，我還是一個堅持“一口價”的人(還記得喜詩糖果的故事嗎?)，在幾天裡投資銀行家對中美洲能源的推薦，並未有幸打動我，讓我提高波克夏的出價。但是，最後，他們抓住了我軟弱的一剎那，我退讓了，告訴他們，我將出價每股35.05美元。就為我解釋的這個情況，他們可以告訴他們的客戶，他們已經榨出了我最後一枚鎳幣。這的確切中當時的要害。
Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 to help finance the acquisition of one of our pipelines. Lastly, in 2006, when MidAmerican bought PacifiCorp, we purchased 23,268,793 shares at $145 per share.
稍後，在2002年，波克夏又用每股60美元購買了670萬股股份的方式，提供資金幫助它收購一個我們的管道供應公司(pipelines)。最後，在2006年，當中美洲能源買下太平洋集團(pacificorp)時，我們又以每股145美元，買下23,268,793股中美洲能源的股票。
In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 per share. However, 77¢ of that was non-recurring – a reduction in deferred tax at our British utility, resulting from a lowering of the U.K. corporate tax rate. So call normalized earnings $15.01 per share. And yes, I’m glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.
在2007年，中美洲能源的每股收益是15.78美元。當然，有其中的77美分是一次性發生的，是由於英國的公司稅稅率降低，減少了我們的英國公用事業公司遞延稅額。所以，回復到正常的收益是每股15.01美元。是的，我很高興，被這樣榨乾並擠出額外的鎳幣。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造、服務和零售業務
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
現在我們詳細談談(cover the waterfront)波克夏這部分的業務。先看看，整個部分業務的資產負債表和損益表摘要
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
*不包含收購的會計調整
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 23% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.
這是一個包羅萬象的組合，從銷售棒棒糖到旅行用家庭拖車，去年賺到了令人高興的23%的平均有形淨資產(average tangible net worth)收益率。值得關注的是，達到這樣的收益回報，僅用了極小的財務槓桿。顯而易見的，我們擁有的是一些非常棒的企業。我們在收購它們中的很多家時，支付了高出淨資產相當多的溢價(premium)，這反映在資產負債表的商譽(goodwill)科目。事實上也縮小了平均持有價值(average carrying value)的收益率，到9.8%。
Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
這裡有一些關於這個組合中公司的值得告知的情況：
• Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville and MiTek were all hurt in 2007 by the sharp housing downturn, with their pre-tax earnings declining 27%, 41%, 38%, and 9% respectively. Overall, these companies earned $941 million pre-tax compared to $1.296 billion in 2006.
• 蕭氏地毯(shaw)，艾可美磚料(acme brick)，曼維爾公司(manville)，和邁鐵鋼架(mitek)全部受挫於2007年低迷的房地產市場，他們的稅前收益分別下降27%，41%，38%和9%。總共這些公司賺到了9.41億美元的稅前收益，同比2006年這個數字是12.96億美元。
Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.
去年，蕭氏地毯，艾可美磚料以及邁鐵鋼架盡情(tuck-in)地簽下收購合約，這些獲取物，對他們今後的收益很有幫助。你可以確信他們還會尋找更多這樣的收購。
• In a tough year for retailing, our standouts were See’s, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
• 在一個零售業的困難年裡，我們的傑出代表是喜詩糖果(see's)，波仙珠寶(borsheims)以及內布拉斯加家具賣場(nebraska furniture mart)。
Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See’s. We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire. But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance. The move could not have worked out better. In his two years, profits at See’s have increased more than 50%.
兩年前brad kinstler成為喜詩糖果的ceo。在波克夏，我們很少將經理們從一個行業調到另一個。但是伯德(brad)是一個例外，他以前負責我們的生產製服的fechheimer公司，和賽泊瑞斯保險(cypress insurance)。這項調動的效果好得不要再好，在他去的兩年，喜詩糖果的利潤有了超過50%的增加。
At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.
在波仙珠寶，銷售增加了15.1%，27%的收益得益於在股東周期間。兩年前susan jacques建議我們擴大營業面積，並重新定義商店風格。我曾表示懷疑，但事實證明susan是對的。
Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.
susan在25年前，作為時薪4美元的女售貨員，進入波仙珠寶。儘管她缺乏管理背景，但我在1994年毫不猶豫的讓她擔任ceo。她聰明、熱愛這項事業，也熱愛她的員工。這些在任何時候，足可以超過擁有一個工商管理碩示(mba)學位。
(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity. Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire’s earnings since we purchased it early in 2006. She is an owner’s dream. It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect. Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)
(旁白：查理和我都不是嚴重的“履歷迷”(big fans of resumes)。取而代之，我們聚焦在智力、激情和誠實正直。另一個我們的超級經理是cathy baron tamraz。她讓我們在2006年初收購的電線業務，取得矚目的增長。她是每個企業所有人夢寐以求想得到的那種經理人。(鑑於凱茜(cathy)會不顧一切地沖向目標)，因此呆在cathy和一項她的生意目標之間絕對是危險的。而眾所周知，她開始的職業是出租車司機。
Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million. These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country. In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.
最後，內布拉斯加家具賣場的收入創了記錄，它在奧馬哈(omaha)和堪薩斯城(kansas city)的店的銷售額雙雙達到大約4億美元。需要註明的是，這是國內最頂尖的兩家家居家具店。在一個對家具零售商來說，災難性的年度裡，堪薩斯店的銷售額增加8%，在奧馬哈是6%。
Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance. Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.
多虧有非凡的blumkin兄弟，ron和irv才會有這樣的表現。他們都是我親密的私人朋友和出色的生意人。
• Iscar continues its wondrous ways. Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive. The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China. For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable. Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China. In effect, we’ve now moved the brains to the tungsten. Major opportunities for growth await Iscar. Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.
•艾斯卡公司(iscar)繼續著它的輝煌。它的產品是小型碳化合金切割刀具，可以讓巨大而昂貴的工作機床有更高的生產率。它的碳化物原料——鎢，是在中國開採。數十年來，艾斯卡公司都是將鎢運到以色列，在那裡靠聰明的大腦把它們變成非常有價值的東西。2007年末，艾斯卡在中國大連開辦一家大型工廠。結果就是，我們現在把聰明的大腦搬到有鎢的地方。眾多成長的機會正等著艾斯卡公司。在eitan wertheimer, jacob harpaz, 和danny goldman領導下的管理團隊一定會抓住其中的很多。
• Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million. Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies – as runaway leaders in their fields – fully participated.
•飛行服務業在2007年創造了一項記錄，稅前收益增長49%，達到5.47億美元。對企業的商業飛行發展是異乎尋常的一年。我們的兩家公司，作為它們領域裡領先的龍頭企業，充分分享到增長。
FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings. We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots. Bruce Whitman, the company’s CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.
飛安公司(flightsafety)，我們的飛行員培訓公司，收入增長14%，稅前利潤增加20%。我們估計我們培訓了58%的美國企業的飛行員。公司的ceo，bruce whitman在2003年，從稱為“高級飛行訓練之父”——al ueltschi手中接過公司的領導權以來，證明自己是一個稱職的繼任者。
At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader. We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined. Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.
在NetJets這個發明噴射機部分所有權的公司裡，我們依然保持產業領先地位。現在在美國營運487架飛機，在歐洲營運135架，這個機隊是我們前三個競爭對手總合的兩倍之多，因為我們在大機艙的市場接近九成，在總市場價值部分是遠遠更多的。
The NetJets brand – with its promise of safety, service and security – grows stronger every year. Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli. If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn’t do better than Rich. No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn’t stop.
網絡噴射機公司(netjets)的“netjets”這個品牌，隨著它對飛行安全、機上服務和人身安全方面的承諾，業務每年都有很強勁的增長。它的背後是一個充滿激情的人——richard santulli。如果你需要挑選一個人，和你待在一個散兵坑里，沒有比rich更好的了。不管前面有什麼障礙，都不能讓他停止。
Europe is the best example of how Rich’s tenacity leads to success. For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million. After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction. Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.
歐洲是一個很好的例子，證明rich的堅持不懈怎樣讓他走向成功。最初十年裡，在那裡我們只取得微不足道的財務進步，卻竟然積累了2.12億美元的運營虧損。自從rich把mark booth“拉上船”，負責歐洲的業務後，我們有了增長牽引機，現在我們的發展真是勢不可擋，去年的收入增加了3倍。
In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there. It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service. Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities – but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.
在11月，我們的主管們在網絡噴射公司，位於哥倫布市的總部碰頭，順便看了一下他們那兒複雜的操作部門。它擔負著每天大約1000架次全天候的飛行任務，客戶總是期待著頂尖的(top-notch)服務。我們的主管們離開時，對他們的設備和承載能力印象深刻，不過rich和他的員工給大家留下更為深刻的印象。
Finance and Finance Products
融資和金融產品
Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes. Clayton’s market share hit a record 31% last year. But industry volume continues to shrink: Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton. (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)
我們這部分主要的業務是克萊頓公司(clayton homes)，全美最大的預製房屋建造商和市場佔有者。去年克萊頓公司的市場份額達到創記錄的31%。但是行業規模在繼續萎縮：去年預製房屋的銷售數是9.6萬幢，低於2003年我們買下克萊頓公司時的13.1萬幢。(需要記得的是，當時還有一些評論員批評克萊頓的主管們，在行業周期的底部出售了公司)。
Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers. That’s why we include Clayton’s operation in this finance section. Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well. Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.
雖然克萊頓公司從出售和出租預製房屋中獲利，但是它收益的主要來源是一個金額110億美元，包含30萬個借款人的貸款資產組合(loan portfolio)。這就是為什麼我們將克萊頓公司的業務歸到金融這部分。儘管在2007年房地產金融領域遭遇了很多問題，但克萊頓公司的貸款資產組合卻運作良好。這一年裡逾期還款、喪失抵押品贖回權以及貸款損失的比例同我們此前作為業主時的情況相仿。
Clayton’s loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire. For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire’s borrowing cost – a fee that amounted to $85 million last year. Clayton’s 2007 pre-tax earnings of $526 million are after its paying this fee. The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in “other” in the following table.
克萊頓的貸款資產組合的資金一直由波克夏提供。為這筆資金，我們在波克夏借款成本上加1%後向克萊頓公司收取。去年該費用是8,500萬美元。扣除該項費用後，克萊頓公司2007年的稅前收入是5.26億美元。這項交易的另一面是波克夏記入8,500萬美元的收入，包含在下表中“其他”項下。
The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture. Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA. That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire. The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA’s earnings.
表列中，租賃業務包括經營拖車租賃業務的xtra公司，以及經營家具租賃的寇特家具(cort)。2007年，由於拖車利用率的明顯下降，導致xtra公司的收益下降(drop in)。公司去年還通過波克夏借款4億美元，增加利息支出的結果，將降低xtra公司的收益。
Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership. More will come.
在kevin clayton, bill franz和paul arnold的良好經營下，克萊頓公司、xtra公司和寇特家具都是很好的公司。在歸入波克夏旗下後，它們每個都進行了一系列的收購，以後會更多。
Investments
投資
We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.
下面列出到年底我們持有的股票，它們的市值至少是60億美元。
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*這是根據實際的購買價格，也是計算稅負的基準;這與一般公認會計原則所認定的“成本”，有一些不同，因為按照規定，賬面價值有時需要加以調高、或予以沖銷。
Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.
總的來說，我們所投資公司的表現讓我們欣慰。在2007年，我們持有市值最大的四家公司中的三家：美國運通、可口可樂以及寶潔公司，每股收益分別增長了12%、14%和14%。第四家富國銀行的收益由於房地產泡沫的破裂而稍有下降。不過，我相信它的內在價值還是在增加，即使增加了那麼一點點。
In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.
注意到美國運通公司和富國銀行都是henry wells和william fargo創建的。美國運通創建於1850年，富國銀行在1852年。寶潔公司和可口可樂公司分別開始於1837年和1886年。遊戲開始時我們都沒參加。
I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” – a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors – have widened during the year. All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.
我必須強調的是：在任何時候，我們不是通過投資品的市場價格來計算我們投資的進展。我們寧可用兩條適用在我們自己企業的測試標準，來衡量它們的成績。第一條標準，扣除整個行業預期增長後的實際收益增長。第二條，更主觀些，就是看它們的“護城河”是否這一年裡變得更寬，“護城河”是一種隱喻，指的是公司擁有的，會讓它的競爭對手日子難過的競爭優勢。這四大公司在這項測試中毫無疑問，都能得分。
We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion. By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina’s management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.
去年我們有一筆很大的賣出。在2002年和2003年，波克夏用4.88億美元買入中石油公司(petrochina)1.3%的股權。按這個價格，這個中石油公司的價值大約為370億美元。查理和我那時感覺該公司的內在價值大約應該為1000億美元。到2007年，兩個因素使得它的內在價值得到很大提高：油價的顯著攀升;以及中石油的管理層在石油和天然氣儲備上，下的大工夫。到去年下半年，公司的市值上升到2750億美元，大約是我們在與其他大型石油公司比較後，認為它應該有的價值。所以，我們把手里中石油的股票賣了40億美元。
A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government – defense, social security, you name it – for about four hours.
一個腳註：我們為在中石油交易上的收益向美國國稅局繳納了12億美元的稅。此筆稅款大約夠美國政府運作4小時的費用，這包括了國防、社會保障等，我能叫得出的所有費用。
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Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.
去年我告訴你們，我管理著波克夏62個衍生品合約。(我們還有一些合約，遺留在了通用再保險(general re)流失的賬簿裡)。今天，我們有94個這樣的合約，它們主要分為兩類。
First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.
第一類，我們籤的54個合約，承擔特定債券(certain bonds)，包括各種高收益率債券(high-yield indices)的違約風險。這些合約的到期日各不相同，從2009年到2013年。到年底，我們從這些合約中收到32億美元的額外獎勵，承擔了4.72億美元的虧損;並且在最壞的情況下(儘管這種極端的情況不太可能發生)，還需要再付出47億美元。
We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet
我們確定還會付出更多，但我相信，撇開我們能從持有的部分中大賺一筆不說，單單就從額外的回報來看，這些合約也證明是有價值的。在年底我們的資產負債表中，為這些合約的“風險敞口”，記錄了18億美元的“衍生合約負債”。
The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.
第二類合約，涉及到我們賣出的，針對四種股票指數(標準普爾500指數，加上三種國外的指數)的各種賣出期權(put option)合約。這些賣出期權的起始期限不是15年就是20年，它們會受到市場的影響。我們(通過賣出這樣合約，)收到45億美元的額外收入，也在年底，記錄了46億美元的負債。這些賣出期權合約只能在到期時，才會執行。它們的到期時間在2019年到2027年之間。屆時，只有在上述的股票指數水平，低於簽訂賣出期權合約時的，我們才需要付錢出去。同樣的，我相信這些合約，總體上將是盈利的。我們也將在持有這些合約的15或20年裡，通過用賣出這些合約獲得的收入去投資，獲得豐厚的收益。
Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.
對於我們的衍生品合約有兩點是很重要的。第一，在所有交易裡，我們都是通過賣出合約，收到錢的一方，這意味著我們並沒有對沖風險。
Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.
第二，這些衍生品合約適用的會計準則，不同於應用在我們資產投資組合上的。在資產投資組合中，資產價值的變化將以淨資產的形式，顯示在波克夏的資產負債表上，但它不會影響收益，除非我們出售(或是沖銷(write down))資產。而衍生品合約的價值變化，必須計入每季的收入中。
Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.
由此，我們持有的衍生品部位，有時會使公司報告的收益，產生很大的擺動，可查理和我相信這些部位的內在價值，其實變化很小。即便這些擺動在一個季度裡，輕易就達到10億美元或更多，他和我也將對此熟視無睹，我們希望你也如此。你可能想到，在我們的巨災保險業務中，經常準備面臨，短時間內報告：收益很快消失，和在相當長的時間內淨值很大增長的情況，交替出現。這也是我們在衍生品交易中所用的哲學。
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The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.
美元在2007年對其它主要貨幣進一步走弱，原因顯而易見：美國人喜愛購買其它地方生產的產品，超過世界其他地區的人們對美國產商品的喜愛。這就不可避免地，造成美國每天將大約價值20億美元的借據(iou,i own you)和資產輸送給世界其他地區。隨著時間過去，這種變賣，對美元造成壓力。
When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion. Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007. Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.
當美元貶值時，它既讓外國人能更便宜地購買我們的產品，又使它們的產品對美國公民來說變得更昂貴。這就是為什麼一種貶值的貨幣常被假設可以用來醫治貿易赤字。的確，美元大幅貶值後，美國的貿易赤字，毫無疑問會有所緩解。但是考慮一下這個現象：在2002年，歐元對美元的匯率平均在1：0.946，我們對德國(我們第五大貿易夥伴)的貿易赤字是360億美元。到了2007年，匯率平均在1：1.37，我們對德國的貿易赤字卻上升到450億美元。相似的情況是，美元對加元從2002年平均1：0.64，下跌到2007年的1：0.93。我們對加拿大的貿易赤字同樣也從2002年的500億美元上升到2007年的640美元。到目前為止，至少一個疲弱的美元，並不能對平衡我們的貿易起很大的作用。
There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?
最近大家都在談論主權財富基金，以及它們如何在購買大量美國公司的股份。這是我們自己造成的，並不是外國政府有什麼邪惡的陰謀。實際上，我們的貿易平衡仰仗在美國的巨額外國投資。當我們每天將20億美元強加給(force-feed)世界其他地區時，他們必定會在這裡投資點什麼。當他們選擇股票，而不是債券時，為什麼我們要抱怨呢?
Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.
美元的走弱，錯不在歐佩克(opec,石油輸出國組織)，中國及其他。別的發達國家和美國一樣，依賴石油進口，也在和從中國進口的產品競爭。美國應當發展出一套明智的貿易政策，而不是挑選出一些國家來懲罰或一些行業來保護。我們也不應該採取那些很容易引發報復的行動，那樣只會減少美國的出口，真正的貿易應該是我們和世界的其他地區之間互惠的。
Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)
我們的立法者應該認識到，這種貨幣流動的不平衡是不能持久的，所以現在需要調整政策，以求從本質上儘早減少這種不平衡。否則，我們每天強加給世界各地的20億美元，已經造成全球某些方面令人不快的消化不良。(要了解其他對我們難以容忍的貿易赤字的評述，請看艾倫·格林斯潘(alan greenspan)2004年11月19日的論述，聯邦開放市場委員會2004年6月29日的備忘錄，和本·伯南克(ben bernanke)2007年9月11日的講話)
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At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.
波克夏在2007年只持有一種直接外彙的頭寸。它就是——請屏住你的呼吸——巴西的貨幣雷亞爾(real)。就在不久以前，將美元兌換成雷亞爾被認為是不可想像的。畢竟，在上個世紀裡，多達5個版本的巴西貨幣，讓雷亞爾快變成狂歡節裡灑的小紙片了。當貨幣真實出現像許多國家一樣的情況：貨幣陷入發行、貶值，退出流通的周期性中，富有的巴西人為保護他們的財富，有時將大筆的錢轉移到美國。
But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.
但是任何採用這種看上去謹慎方式的巴西人，已經在過去5年中，損失了他一半的淨資產。這裡有從2002年到2007年底，每年雷亞爾對美元的指數記錄：100;122;133;152;166;199。每年雷亞爾都在走高，美元卻在下跌。此外，在這段時期裡，巴西政府還在市場中買入美元，以此來控制雷亞爾(的升值速度)，同時支撐美元(的下跌)。
Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)
我們直接外匯頭寸在過去5年中已經帶來23美元的稅前收益。另一方面，我們也從持有美國公司用其他貨幣發行的債券中獲利。例如，在2001年和2002年，我們以57%面值的價格，購買了3.1億歐元的亞馬遜公司(ama.com)的債券：票面利率6.875%，2010年到期。那時，亞馬遜公司的債券被標以“垃圾”(junk)級信用的價格在出售，儘管它們決不是。(對，在維吉尼亞(virginia)，你能夠偶爾發現市場是多麼可笑和無效，或者至少你可以在，除了某些主流商學院的金融系外的，任何地方發現它們。
The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.
亞馬遜債券的以歐元計價，對我們有更深層和重要的吸引力。在2002年我們購買的時候，歐元對美元的匯率是1：0.95。因此，我們的成本以美元計算，僅僅是1.69億美元。現在債券以102%面值的價格被出售，歐元對美元的匯率是1：1.47。在2005年和2006年一些我們的債券被贖回，我們從那裡獲得2.53億美元。我們保留的債券在年底，價值1.62億美元。在2.46億美元，我們已實現和未實現的收益裡，有1.18億美元是由於美元的下跌。都是貨幣自己幹的。
At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce evergrowing prosperity for its citizens.
在波克夏，我們將努力提高直接和間接來自國外的收益。即使我們能成功，我們的資產和收益仍將主要集中在美國。儘管我們國家在一個又一個領域裡的許多問題上的錯誤，是令人遺憾和不能寬恕的，但是美國法律的規則，市場經濟體系，以及社會精英的信仰都將為國民創造持久的繁榮。
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As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.
就像我以前告訴過你們的，我們已經對ceo的繼任人選做了充分的準備，因為我們擁有三個很出色的內部候選人。董事會很清楚的知道，一旦我無法勝任工作，不管是去世還是喪失能力，誰將被挑選，來接替我的工作。並且董事會還有兩個後備人選。
Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.
去年，我告訴你們，我們將盡快完成波克夏在投資業務上的繼任者計劃。我們的確現在確定了4個候選人，他們都能接替我的投資工作。他們都普遍擁有管理素質，並且他們對應邀到波克夏來工作，都顯示出強烈的興趣。董事會了解這四位的能力，並期待如果需要，可以僱傭到一個或更多的人。這些候選人都正當壯年，經濟上非常富有(well-to-do)，所有人希望能為波克夏工作的原因，並不是為了得到經濟上的補償。
(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)
(我很不情願地打消了，要在我死後繼續管理投資組合的念頭。也放棄我希望給“拓展視野”(thinking outside the box)，這項條款賦予的新含義)
Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings
充滿想像力的數字——上市公司們是如何給收益“注水”的
Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.” If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.
前參議員艾倫·辛普森(alan simpson)有句名言：“那些在華盛頓高速公路上開車的人，需要不怕交通堵塞”。假如他真的到少有人至的道路上找找，參議員會在那裡看到美國公司的會計們。
An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity – by unanimous agreement, no less – to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.
在“首選路線的問題”(road businesses prefer)上最重要的一次投票發生在1994年。迫於美國ceo們的壓力，美國參議院投票以88比9通過提案，讓美國財務會計準則委員會(fasb,financial accounting standards board)閉上了嘴。此前一項毫無異義的規定，讓fasb飽受指責，這項規定告知公司的首腦們，獎勵給他們的股票期權，是一種經濟補償，它們的價值將被作為一項費用計入公司的財務報表。
After the senators voted, the FASB – now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs – decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.
在參議員們投票後，fasb現在要求教授的會計準則，必須符合參議院第88號法令在註冊會計師(cpas)方面的規定。法令規定：對於期權，公司可以選擇兩種報告方式。“首選的”處理方式是：將期權的價值視為費用。不過法令也允許，當公司是按市場價值頒發期權時，可以忽略它的費用。
A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.” I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.
輪到美國的ceo們說真話的時候(a moment of truth)，他們的回應一點不光彩。在接下去的6年裡，入選標準普爾指數的500家公司中只有兩家，選擇了“首選的”路線。餘下公司的ceo們全都選擇了另一條低速路線，從而忽略了一大筆顯而易見的費用，只為在報表上，有更高的“收益”。我確信他們中的一些人也覺得，即使他們選擇把期權作為費用計入，他們的董事們也會在將來的某些時候，為了通過經理們渴望的“一次性授予(mega-giants)”(期權)，而重新考慮。
It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.
即便如此，對很多ceo來說，那條低速路還不夠好。在日趨削弱的公司章程裡有規定，如果期權，被以一個低於公司市場價值很多的行權價格授出，其導致的收益應保留在公司。不過，沒問題。為了規避這條惱人的規定，許多公司秘密地回溯授予期權的日期，造成他們是按當時的市場價格獲得期權的假相，而事實上，他們早因拿到低於市場的價格，而將收益納入囊中。
Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain – important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.
十多年裡，針對股票期權，荒謬的會計規則正在淡出，但是其他這樣的會計手段依然存在——其中比較重要的是：一個公司計算養老金費用時，使用的投資回報假設。許多公司會繼續選定這種假設，這種情況將會毫不奇怪的出現，這樣的假設能讓他們報告“超過實際”(less-than-solid)的虛假收益。從363家進入標準普爾指數的公司製定的養老金計劃，2006年這個投資回報假設是8%。讓我們看看這個假設實現的可能性。
The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.
在所有的養老基金中，平均持有債券和現金的比例大約是28%，這部分資產的回報率不會超過5%。更高的收益，當然是有可能達到的，不過伴隨而來的是，造成與之相對稱(或更大)損失的風險。
This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments – must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.
並且這意味著剩餘72%的養老金資產——將主要是投資公司的股權。不是直接持有股票，就是透過，比如對沖基金(hedge funds)或私人股權投資(private-equity investments)這樣的載體間接持有。如果要使整個資產收益達到假設的8%，這部分資產必須掙到9.2%的收益，並且那種收益回報，必須是扣除所有交易費用後的，但是現在的交易費用遠比它們先前的高。
How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.
這種期望的真實性有多少呢?讓我們回顧一些，我在兩年前提到的數據：在整個20世紀，道瓊斯指數(dow)從66點漲到11,497點。這個增長看上去很大，但換算成每年的複合增長，不過5.3%。如果一個投資者，持有道瓊斯指數整整一個世紀，在期間的很多時候，他會收到很慷慨的分紅，但在最後的幾年裡，分紅大約也只有2%左右。20世紀是一個多麼精彩的世紀。
Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.
想想現在這個世紀。投資者如果僅僅想達到5.3%的市值增長，那道瓊斯指數，最近低於13,000點，也將在2099年12月31日時，收報於200萬點!就是在100年裡，為達到年平均5.3 %的收益水平，需要道瓊斯指數上漲198.8萬點，在這個世紀的頭八年裡，我們只取得不到2000點的上漲。
It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?
有趣的是，市場評論人士在道瓊斯指數有可能跨越，諸如14,000點或15,000點這樣千點整數位時，都會有規律的加快呼吸。如果他們保持這種反應，按本世紀內年增長5.3%計算，他們在餘下的92年裡，至少要將經歷1,986次這樣的體驗。雖然說什麼事都可能發生，但我們真的相信這樣的事能發生嗎?
Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and highpriced managers (“helpers”).
紅利收益繼續徘徊在2%左右。即使股票年平均增長，能達到上世紀5.3%的水平，養老金計劃中的股票部分，在考慮支出0.5%的費用後，收益將不會超過7%左右。並且0.5%的費用估算，對於邀請投資顧問和高身價經理們——所謂的“投資助理”(helper)出馬，已經是相當保守的了。
Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.
每個人很自然的，期望收益超過市場的平均水平。那些“投資助理”由衷的(bless their hearts)鼓勵和灌輸他們的客戶這種觀念。但是作為一類，僱傭這些投資助理的群體。他們收益一定是低於平均水平。原因很簡單：1)所有投資者都不可避免賺到：一個平均的投資回報，減去交易費用;2)被動型投資者和指數投資者，由於從頭至尾他們的交易很不活躍，他們賺到的收益是：平均收益水平，減去一個非常低的交易費用。3)在賺取市場平均收益的群體中，剩下的一部分就是——交易活躍的投資者。但是這個群體也因此會招致高額的交易、管理和顧問諮詢費用。所以交易活躍的投資者，相比他們那些不活躍的“同胞們”(brethren)，會抹去很大一部分的投資回報。這意味著：“懵懂無知”(know-nothing)的被動型投資者(與他們相比)一定會勝出。
I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about doubledigit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.
我還必須指出，在本世紀裡，想從股票中賺到10%年收益的人，他們的如意算盤是2%的年收益來自分紅，8%來自股價上漲。但這無異於他們是在預計：2100年道瓊斯指數會在2,400萬點的水平!如果你的理財顧問告訴你，會從股票上賺到兩位數的投資回報，那就把上面的數字解釋給他聽，一定會讓他感到狼狽。許多“投資助理”顯然是童話“綠野仙踪”(alice in wonderland)裡，那個說：“為什麼，我在早飯前，有時已經相信了超過六件不可能發生的事情呢?”話的女王的直系後代。所以要謹防那些油嘴滑舌的投資助理，嚮往你頭腦裡塞進幻的時候，同時也在往自己的口袋裡揣著酬金。
Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.
一些公司在歐洲也有類似和美國一樣的養老金計劃，並且在他們的會計賬上，幾乎所有美國養老金計劃的假定收益，都高於海外的。這種差異令人困惑：為什麼這些公司不派他們的美國經理們，去負責公司海外養老金計劃的資產，讓他們能將自己的神奇魔力，一樣作用到這些資產上?我從來沒有看到關於這種迷惑的解釋，但是負責審查這些假定投資回報的審計人員和核算師也似乎對此沒有疑問。
What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.
不過，對於為什麼ceo們要選擇一個如此高投資收益假設的原因，並不讓人困惑：這樣他們就可以報告更高的公司收益。而且即便他們，如我認為的那樣，確實是錯的，那惡果(chicken come home to roost)在他們退休後的很長時間裡，也不會發生。
After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”
數十年來，美國公司掩藏(push the envelope)(收益)，或是更壞的企圖，想盡可能高的報告當前收益的行為，應該好收斂了。他們應該聽聽我搭檔查理·孟格的話：“如果你三次把球擊出左邊界，那下次擊打時，瞄得稍微靠向右些。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.
無論公司在養老金費用上耍得花樣，如何讓股東們逡巡止步於道上(in store down the road)，納稅人要經歷的打擊，要遠勝公司股東們許多倍。公共養老金雖然承諾巨大，但在很多方面，養老基金卻嚴重不足。只是因為引爆這顆定時炸彈的導火索還很長，政治家們畏縮於稅收會造成的傷痛。反正只有在這些員去世後很久，這些問題才會出現。員們很容易就制定出，這些養老的承諾，涉及有時是哪些不滿40歲人的提早年退休計劃;慷慨的生活費(cost-of-living)調整計劃。在這個人們壽命越來越長而通貨膨脹又是必然的世界裡，那些承諾將決不會很容易的兌現。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.
儘管在美國公司會計賬目中推行一個“誠信系統”已經失敗，但我需要說明的是，在大量波克夏資產負債表的項目中，它是確實存在的。在每個我們提供給你們的報表中，我們必須為我們保險的業務估算損失儲備金。如果我們的估算有誤，將意味著我們的資產負債表和損益表都是錯的。所以很自然的，我們儘自己所能讓這部分估算精確。然而，在每一個我們估算的報告中，也一定會有差錯。
At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.
在2007年底，我們顯示560億美元的保險負債。這表示我們推測，在年底前我們需要對所有可能損失事件，最終進行賠付的金額，(除去大約30億美元按現值已經被貼現的儲備金)。我們為知道的數以千計的保單，為它們每個，記上一美元的價值，來反映我們相信需要支付哪些。在某些案子裡，由工傷賠償保障引發的，對某些嚴重傷害的索賠，會延續50年或更長的時期裡，都產生賠付。
We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.
我們當然會對在年底前已發生的損失，準備大筆的儲備金，這不包括我們已聽說的損失。有時，被保險人也不知道是否有損失發生。(想想哪些經年未被發現的職務侵占案件。)我們有時候接到索賠，損失來自我們幾十年前承保的保單。
A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000. He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10. He paid that, too – and still another $10 charge he received a month later. When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”
一則我好幾年前告訴你們的故事可以顯現出我們在正確估計負債損失的問題：一個老兄到歐洲出個重要的差，他老妹打給他告知父親去世的消息，哥哥告訴她無法趕回去但是她不用花一毛錢辦喪事，因為老哥會出。當他回家時，他妹告訴他說喪事辦得很隆重然後把八千塊的帳單拿給他，他把款項付清了但一個月之後從殯儀館那裏收到十塊的帳單，他當然也還是付掉了 – 然後一個月後他又收到另一筆十塊帳單。當第三筆十元帳單在下個月寄給他的時候，這個困惑的老兄打電話問妹妹這是怎麼一回事。「喔！」她回答，「我忘了告訴你，老爸下葬的時候他身上穿的那套衣服是租的。」
At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.
在我們的保險公司，我們有一個未知的，但確實相當大，數量的“租賃的西裝”被埋在世界各地。我們正試圖精確估算出他們的賬單。在十或二十年後，我們就能恰當估算出，我們現在的估計有多不准確。即使那個估算出人意料，我個人相信，我們聲明的撥備也是充足的，不過在過去，我也犯過好幾次錯誤。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
我們今年的股東大會將在5月3日，星期六舉行。與往常一樣，奎斯特中心(qwest center)在上午7點開門，一部關於波克夏的新影片將在8點半放映。在9點半開始，我們直接進入解答問題階段(question-and-answer)，(中間休息一下，在奎斯特中心的看台上吃午飯)，直到下午3點。接著，在稍作休息後，查理和我將在3點15分，召開年度股東大會。如果在白天的問答階段你打算離開的話，拜託請在查理講話時，這樣做。
The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300- square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (If necessary, I’ll lock the doors.)
離開最好的理由，當然是購物。在毗鄰會議區，我們闢出194,300平方英尺的場地，擺滿波克夏旗下公司的產品，希望能滿足你們的購物慾望。去年，由於27,000名與會人士各盡其力，幾乎所有的攤位的銷售額記錄都大幅上升。但是，今年你們能做的更好。(如果需要，我會鎖上所有的門。)
This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that this 1,550- square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value. And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.
今年我們將再次展示克萊頓公司的預製房屋(特點是艾可美(acme)的磚塊;蕭氏(shaw)的地毯;約翰·曼維爾公司(john manville)的隔熱材料;和邁鐵(mitek)的扣件;凱夫瑞(carefree)的遮陽蓬;內布拉斯加家具中心(nfm)的家具。你會發現這間1,550平方英尺的房屋，售價在69,500美元，送貨費用另加。在你買下房屋後，考慮一下攤位附近叢林河流(forest river)公司的娛樂車(rv)和浮舟。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
蓋可保險(geico)將有一個攤位，來自全國的頂尖保險顧問齊聚於此，他們全部準備給你提供車輛保險的報價。在大多情況裡，蓋可保險能給你一個特殊的股東折扣(通常是8%)。這個特殊的報價在我們全美50個州中的45個營業網點，都適用。(補充一點：如果你有資格享受另一個折扣，比如給特定團體的折扣，這些折扣不能累加。)帶上你已有保險的詳細資料，讓我們看看是否能幫你省錢。我相信我們能做到，至少幫你省下至少50%的保費。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you.
星期六，在奧馬哈機場，netjet公司像以往一樣陳列他們的飛機供你們參觀。netjet公司在奎斯特中心的攤位上，你也可以看到這些飛機的資料。坐大巴來奧馬哈的，乘你的新飛機離開吧。你可以帶上所有你想帶的定型髮膠和剪刀，和你一起上飛機。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie’s book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies. For those of you who can’t make the meeting, go to poorcharliesalmanack.com to order a copy.
接著，如果你還有錢剩下，去看看書蟲公司(bookworm)的攤位，你會找到大約25種圖書和dvd碟片，以《窮查理寶典》(poor charlie's almanack)為首，全部打折。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
這份報告附加的股東會資料有個輔助文件，告訴你要參加會議跟其他活動所要具備的東西。機加酒跟租車，我們跟美國運通有簽約(800-799-6634)，給您特別的服務。Carol Pederson是這些事宜的負責窗口，她每年都為我們做得很好，我很感謝她。到時候房間會很難訂，但是交給Carol你就會訂得到。
我在目前總統競選中聽到最有趣的故事是關於米特·羅姆尼(mitt romney)的，他問妻子安(ann)，“在我們年輕時，你有沒有在你最狂野不羈的夢裡想到過，我可能成為總統?”“親愛的，在我最狂野不羈的夢裡，沒有你!”
When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation. Here’s how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:
在我們1967年首次進入財產和災難保險業時，我最狂野不羈的夢裡也沒有我們現在業務的景象。下面是我們買下國民保險公司(national indemnity)後最初5年的情況。
| Year | Underwriting Profit (Loss) | Float | ||
| (in millions) | ||||
| 1967 | $0.40 | $18.50 | ||
| 1968 | 0.6 | 21.3 | ||
| 1969 | 0.1 | 25.4 | ||
| 1970 | -0.4 | 39.4 | ||
| 1971 | 1.4 | 65.6 | ||
To put it charitably, we were a slow starter. But things changed. Here’s the record of the last five years:
客氣地說，我們是一個緩慢的開端，但情況變了，下面是我們最近5年的情況記錄。
| Year | Underwriting Profit (Loss) | Float | ||
| (in millions) | ||||
| 2003 | $1,718.00 | $44,220.00 | ||
| 2004 | 1,551 | 46,094 | ||
| 2005 | 53 | 49,287 | ||
| 2006 | 3,838 | 50,887 | ||
| 2007 | 3,374 | 58,698 | ||
This metamorphosis has been accomplished by some extraordinary managers. Let’s look at what each has achieved.
這種質變的完成靠的是一些出色的經理人，讓我們看看他們各自的完成情況。
•GEICO possesses the widest moat of any of our insurers, one carefully protected and expanded by Tony Nicely, its CEO. Last year – again – GEICO had the best growth record among major auto insurers, increasing its market share to 7.2%. When Berkshire acquired control in 1995, that share was 2.5%. Not coincidentally, annual ad expenditures by GEICO have increased from $31 million to $751 million during the same period.
•蓋可保險(geico)，在我們所有的保險公司裡擁有最寬的“護城河”，在ceo托尼·萊斯利(tony nicely)的細心維護和拓展下，去年，再一次，geico在主要車險保險公司中，取得了最好的增長記錄，市場份額上升到7.2%。當波克夏1995年控制它是，它的份額是2.5%。與此不相符的是，geico的年廣告支出同期從3,100萬美元，上升到7.51億美元。
Tony, now 64, joined GEICO at 18. Every day since, he has been passionate about the company – proud of how it could both save money for its customers and provide growth opportunities for its associates. Even now, with sales at $12 billion, Tony feels GEICO is just getting started. So do I.
托尼今年64歲了，18歲就進入geico。此後的每一天裡，他都對公司充滿熱情，對geico能做到，既為客戶省錢，又為員工提供發展機會而自豪。即使到現在，銷售額120億美元的情況下，托尼仍覺得geico的發展才剛開始，我也這麼想。
Here’s some evidence. In the last three years, GEICO has increased its share of the motorcycle market from 2.1% to 6%. We’ve also recently begun writing policies on ATVs and RVs. And in November we wrote our first commercial auto policy. GEICO and National Indemnity are working together in the commercial field, and early results are very encouraging.
這裡有些證據。在過去三年裡，geico在摩托車市場的份額從2.1%上升到6%。我們已經開始推出針對全路況車輛(atvs, all-terrain vehicles)和娛樂車輛(rvs, recreational vehicle)的險種，並11月份簽出了第一份商業車輛的保單。geico和國民保險公司(national indemnity)正一起進入商業車輛保險領域，而從最初的成果來看，非常鼓舞人心。
Even in aggregate, these lines will remain a small fraction of our personal auto volume. Nevertheless, they should deliver a growing stream of underwriting profits and float.
集合這些產品線，也只占我們私人車輛保險市場容量的一小部分。
•General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of “home-grown” float – $23 billion at yearend. This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire. Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.
•通用再保險公司(general re)——我們國際性的再保險公司，到目前為止是我們“土生土長”浮存金的最大來源，在年底達到230億美元。這項業務現在是波克夏一項巨大的資產。可是，我們的擁有卻是從提心吊膽開始的。
For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline. This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re. The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.
數十年裡，general re都被認為是再保險業裡的“蒂芙妮”(tiffany, 世界上最著名的奢侈品公司之一，以生產昂貴的銀器著稱)，以它的承保技巧和原則受到大家的推崇。不幸的是，這種聲譽其實已並不符實。當我1998年做出決定要併購general re時，完全忽略了這一個暇疵，那就是：general re在1998年的運營方式已經與它在1968年或1978年的不一樣了。
Now, thanks to Joe Brandon, General Re’s CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, the luster of the company has been restored. Joe and Tad have been running the business for six years and have been doing first-class business in a first-class way, to use the words of J. P. Morgan. They have restored discipline to underwriting, reserving and the selection of clients.
現在，多虧了general re的ceo joe brandon，以及他的搭檔tad montross，恢復了公司以往的光彩。joe和tad執掌公司已經六年，套用jp摩根的話，他們是用一流的方式來做一流的生意。他們恢復了對承保、儲備以及客戶的挑選上的原則。
Their job was made more difficult by costly and time-consuming legacy problems, both in the U.S. and abroad. Despite that diversion, Joe and Tad have delivered excellent underwriting results while skillfully repositioning the company for the future.
公司在國內和國外的遺留問題，耗費巨大且曠日持久，讓他們的工作更加困難。儘管有那樣的牽制，joe和tad通過技巧重新定位公司業務，已經帶來極好的承保結果。
•Since joining Berkshire in 1986, Ajit Jain has built a truly great specialty reinsurance operation from scratch. For one-of-a-kind mammoth transactions, the world now turns to him.
• 自從1986年加入波克夏，ajit jain 從草圖開始，建立起一套真正偉大的專業再保險業務，現在只要是那種獨一無二“猛獁象”般(mammoth)的大型交易，全世界都會來找他。
Last year I told you in detail about the Equitas transfer of huge, but capped, liabilities to Berkshire for a single premium of $7.1 billion. At this very early date, our experience has been good. But this doesn’t tell us much because it’s just one straw in a fifty-year-or-more wind. What we know for sure, however, is that the London team who joined us, headed by Scott Moser, is first-rate and has become a valuable asset for our insurance business.
去年，我告訴你們和意可達(equitas)達成巨額交易的詳情，但是現在事情有所變化，波克夏要承保的只是一筆保費為71億美元的單獨保險。對於此筆生意的初期情況，我們的經驗很管用，但這對於預計一根稻草，被風吹五十年或更長時間後的情況，這些經驗不能告訴我們更多。我們能確定知道的情況是，至少以scott moser為首的倫敦團隊加入了我們，他們是一流的並已經成為我們保險生意裡一筆有價值的財富。
• Finally, we have our smaller operations, which serve specialized segments of the insurance market. In aggregate, these companies have performed extraordinarily well, earning aboveaverage underwriting profits and delivering valuable float for investment.
• 最後，我們還有很小部分的業務，是服務於特殊細分的保險市場。總體上，這些公司運營情況出奇的好，賺取的保險利潤高於平均水平並為投資輸送了有價值的浮存金。
Last year BoatU.S., headed by Bill Oakerson, was added to the group. This company manages an association of about 650,000 boat owners, providing them services similar to those offered by AAA auto clubs to drivers. Among the association’s offerings is boat insurance. Learn more about this operation by visiting its display at the annual meeting.
去年，bill oakerson領導的美國遊艇公司(boatu.s.)加入了我們的團體。這個公司管理著一個約有65萬遊艇主組成的協會，提供給遊艇主的服務類似於aaa汽車俱樂部(auto clubs)提供給司機的。在協會提供服務之一是遊艇保險。想更多了解這方面情況，可以在每年的年會上參觀他們的展示。
Below we show the record of our four categories of property/casualty insurance.
下面顯示我們四個財產和災害保險部分的記錄.
| (in $ millions) | ||||||
| Underwriting Profit | Yearend Float | |||||
| Insurance Operations | 2007 | 2006 | 2007 | 2006 | ||
| General Re | $555 | $526 | $23,009 | $22,827 | ||
| B-H Reinsurance | 1,427 | 1,658 | 23,692 | 16,860 | ||
| GEICO | 1,113 | 1,314 | 7,768 | 7,171 | ||
| Other Primary* | 279 | 340 | * | 4,229 | 4,029* | |
| Total | $3,374 | $3,838 | $58,698 | $50,887 | ||
* Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.
*從2006年5月19日起包括應用承保公司(applied underwriters)
Regulated Utility Business
政府管制的公用事業
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
在波克夏擁有87.4%股權的中美洲能源控股公司(midamerican energy holdings)旗下，包含許多不同種類的公用事業類公司。其中最大的分別為：(1) 約克希爾電力公司(yorkshire electricity)與北方電力公司(northern electronic)，它提供380萬用戶的電力供應，讓其成為英國第三大的電力供應商;(2 ) 中美洲能源(midamerican energy)，主要為愛荷華州72萬用戶提供電力;(3) 太平洋能源(pacific power)與石山能源公司(rocky mountain power)，主要電力供應範圍涵蓋美國西部六個州的170萬用戶;(4) 柯恩河(kern river)與北部天然氣管道公司(northern natural pipelines)，供應全美8%的天然氣消費量。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
我們在中美洲能源控股的經營夥伴是walter scott，和他兩位非常傑出的經理人，dave sokol 與greg abel。合作雙方各自擁有多少股票投票權並不重要，我們只在理智思考並達成一致意見後，才會採取重大的行動。與dave,greg和walter共事的八年加強了我最初的信念：波克希爾不可能找到比他們更好的合夥人。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
稍有不協的是，中美洲能源也擁有美國第二大房地產中介公司——美國家庭服務公司(homeservices of america)，這家公司經營20多個地區性品牌、擁有18,800個房動產經紀人員。去年是房屋銷售增長很緩慢的時期，而2008年很有可能更緩慢。不過，當質地良好的中介公司處於一個很合算的價格時，我們將會繼續進行收購。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operation:
以下是中美洲能源在營運上的關鍵數字：
| Earnings (in $ millions) | |||||
| 2007 | 2006 | ||||
| U.K. Utilities | $337 | $338 | |||
| Iowa utility | 412 | 348 | |||
| Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006) | 692 | 356 | |||
| Pipelines | 473 | 376 | |||
| Home Services | 42 | 74 | |||
| Other (Net) | 130 | 226 | |||
| Earnings before corporate interest and tax | 2,086 | 1,737 | |||
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (312) | (261) | |||
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt . | (108) | (134) | |||
| Income Tax | (477) | (426) | |||
| Net Earnings | $1,189 | $916 | |||
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire* | $1,114 | $885 | |||
| Debt Owed to Others | 19,002 | 16,946 | |||
| Debt Owed to Berkshire | 821 | 1,055 | |||
*Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $70 in 2007 and $87 in 2006.
*包括了波克夏所得的利息(所有相關所得稅後的淨額), 分別是2007年的70美元，和2006年的87美元。
We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 per share in 1999, a year in which its per-share earnings were $2.59. Why the odd figure of $35.05? I originally decided the business was worth $35.00 per share to Berkshire. Now, I’m a “one-price” guy (remember See’s?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire’s offer. But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05. With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me. At the time, it hurt.
1999年，我們同意以每股35.05美元買下中美洲能源35,464,337股股票，這一年它的每股收益是2.59美元。為什麼會是35.05美元這樣一個有個零頭的數字呢?我最初認為它對波克夏的價值是35美元。到現在，我還是一個堅持“一口價”的人(還記得喜詩糖果的故事嗎?)，在幾天裡投資銀行家對中美洲能源的推薦，並未有幸打動我，讓我提高波克夏的出價。但是，最後，他們抓住了我軟弱的一剎那，我退讓了，告訴他們，我將出價每股35.05美元。就為我解釋的這個情況，他們可以告訴他們的客戶，他們已經榨出了我最後一枚鎳幣。這的確切中當時的要害。
Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 to help finance the acquisition of one of our pipelines. Lastly, in 2006, when MidAmerican bought PacifiCorp, we purchased 23,268,793 shares at $145 per share.
稍後，在2002年，波克夏又用每股60美元購買了670萬股股份的方式，提供資金幫助它收購一個我們的管道供應公司(pipelines)。最後，在2006年，當中美洲能源買下太平洋集團(pacificorp)時，我們又以每股145美元，買下23,268,793股中美洲能源的股票。
In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 per share. However, 77¢ of that was non-recurring – a reduction in deferred tax at our British utility, resulting from a lowering of the U.K. corporate tax rate. So call normalized earnings $15.01 per share. And yes, I’m glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.
在2007年，中美洲能源的每股收益是15.78美元。當然，有其中的77美分是一次性發生的，是由於英國的公司稅稅率降低，減少了我們的英國公用事業公司遞延稅額。所以，回復到正常的收益是每股15.01美元。是的，我很高興，被這樣榨乾並擠出額外的鎳幣。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造、服務和零售業務
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
現在我們詳細談談(cover the waterfront)波克夏這部分的業務。先看看，整個部分業務的資產負債表和損益表摘要
| Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/06 (in $ millions) | ||||||||
| Assets資產 | Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益 | |||||||
| Cash and equivalents | $2,080 | Notes payable | $1,278 | |||||
| Accounts and notes receivable | 4,488 | Other current liabilities | 7,852 | |||||
| Inventory | 5,793 | Total current liabilities | 8,930 | |||||
| Other current assets | 470 | |||||||
| Total current assets | 12,831 | |||||||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 14,201 | Deferred taxes | 828 | |||||
| Fixed assets | 9,605 | Term debt and other liabilities | 3,079 | |||||
| Other assets | 1,685 | Equity | 25,485 | |||||
| $38,322 | $38,322 | |||||||
*Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
*不包含收購的會計調整
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 23% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth – a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet – and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.
這是一個包羅萬象的組合，從銷售棒棒糖到旅行用家庭拖車，去年賺到了令人高興的23%的平均有形淨資產(average tangible net worth)收益率。值得關注的是，達到這樣的收益回報，僅用了極小的財務槓桿。顯而易見的，我們擁有的是一些非常棒的企業。我們在收購它們中的很多家時，支付了高出淨資產相當多的溢價(premium)，這反映在資產負債表的商譽(goodwill)科目。事實上也縮小了平均持有價值(average carrying value)的收益率，到9.8%。
Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:
這裡有一些關於這個組合中公司的值得告知的情況：
• Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville and MiTek were all hurt in 2007 by the sharp housing downturn, with their pre-tax earnings declining 27%, 41%, 38%, and 9% respectively. Overall, these companies earned $941 million pre-tax compared to $1.296 billion in 2006.
• 蕭氏地毯(shaw)，艾可美磚料(acme brick)，曼維爾公司(manville)，和邁鐵鋼架(mitek)全部受挫於2007年低迷的房地產市場，他們的稅前收益分別下降27%，41%，38%和9%。總共這些公司賺到了9.41億美元的稅前收益，同比2006年這個數字是12.96億美元。
Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.
去年，蕭氏地毯，艾可美磚料以及邁鐵鋼架盡情(tuck-in)地簽下收購合約，這些獲取物，對他們今後的收益很有幫助。你可以確信他們還會尋找更多這樣的收購。
• In a tough year for retailing, our standouts were See’s, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.
• 在一個零售業的困難年裡，我們的傑出代表是喜詩糖果(see's)，波仙珠寶(borsheims)以及內布拉斯加家具賣場(nebraska furniture mart)。
Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See’s. We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire. But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance. The move could not have worked out better. In his two years, profits at See’s have increased more than 50%.
兩年前brad kinstler成為喜詩糖果的ceo。在波克夏，我們很少將經理們從一個行業調到另一個。但是伯德(brad)是一個例外，他以前負責我們的生產製服的fechheimer公司，和賽泊瑞斯保險(cypress insurance)。這項調動的效果好得不要再好，在他去的兩年，喜詩糖果的利潤有了超過50%的增加。
At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.
在波仙珠寶，銷售增加了15.1%，27%的收益得益於在股東周期間。兩年前susan jacques建議我們擴大營業面積，並重新定義商店風格。我曾表示懷疑，但事實證明susan是對的。
Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.
susan在25年前，作為時薪4美元的女售貨員，進入波仙珠寶。儘管她缺乏管理背景，但我在1994年毫不猶豫的讓她擔任ceo。她聰明、熱愛這項事業，也熱愛她的員工。這些在任何時候，足可以超過擁有一個工商管理碩示(mba)學位。
(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity. Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire’s earnings since we purchased it early in 2006. She is an owner’s dream. It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect. Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)
(旁白：查理和我都不是嚴重的“履歷迷”(big fans of resumes)。取而代之，我們聚焦在智力、激情和誠實正直。另一個我們的超級經理是cathy baron tamraz。她讓我們在2006年初收購的電線業務，取得矚目的增長。她是每個企業所有人夢寐以求想得到的那種經理人。(鑑於凱茜(cathy)會不顧一切地沖向目標)，因此呆在cathy和一項她的生意目標之間絕對是危險的。而眾所周知，她開始的職業是出租車司機。
Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million. These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country. In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.
最後，內布拉斯加家具賣場的收入創了記錄，它在奧馬哈(omaha)和堪薩斯城(kansas city)的店的銷售額雙雙達到大約4億美元。需要註明的是，這是國內最頂尖的兩家家居家具店。在一個對家具零售商來說，災難性的年度裡，堪薩斯店的銷售額增加8%，在奧馬哈是6%。
Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance. Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.
多虧有非凡的blumkin兄弟，ron和irv才會有這樣的表現。他們都是我親密的私人朋友和出色的生意人。
• Iscar continues its wondrous ways. Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive. The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China. For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable. Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China. In effect, we’ve now moved the brains to the tungsten. Major opportunities for growth await Iscar. Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.
•艾斯卡公司(iscar)繼續著它的輝煌。它的產品是小型碳化合金切割刀具，可以讓巨大而昂貴的工作機床有更高的生產率。它的碳化物原料——鎢，是在中國開採。數十年來，艾斯卡公司都是將鎢運到以色列，在那裡靠聰明的大腦把它們變成非常有價值的東西。2007年末，艾斯卡在中國大連開辦一家大型工廠。結果就是，我們現在把聰明的大腦搬到有鎢的地方。眾多成長的機會正等著艾斯卡公司。在eitan wertheimer, jacob harpaz, 和danny goldman領導下的管理團隊一定會抓住其中的很多。
• Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million. Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies – as runaway leaders in their fields – fully participated.
•飛行服務業在2007年創造了一項記錄，稅前收益增長49%，達到5.47億美元。對企業的商業飛行發展是異乎尋常的一年。我們的兩家公司，作為它們領域裡領先的龍頭企業，充分分享到增長。
FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings. We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots. Bruce Whitman, the company’s CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.
飛安公司(flightsafety)，我們的飛行員培訓公司，收入增長14%，稅前利潤增加20%。我們估計我們培訓了58%的美國企業的飛行員。公司的ceo，bruce whitman在2003年，從稱為“高級飛行訓練之父”——al ueltschi手中接過公司的領導權以來，證明自己是一個稱職的繼任者。
At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader. We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined. Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.
在NetJets這個發明噴射機部分所有權的公司裡，我們依然保持產業領先地位。現在在美國營運487架飛機，在歐洲營運135架，這個機隊是我們前三個競爭對手總合的兩倍之多，因為我們在大機艙的市場接近九成，在總市場價值部分是遠遠更多的。
The NetJets brand – with its promise of safety, service and security – grows stronger every year. Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli. If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn’t do better than Rich. No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn’t stop.
網絡噴射機公司(netjets)的“netjets”這個品牌，隨著它對飛行安全、機上服務和人身安全方面的承諾，業務每年都有很強勁的增長。它的背後是一個充滿激情的人——richard santulli。如果你需要挑選一個人，和你待在一個散兵坑里，沒有比rich更好的了。不管前面有什麼障礙，都不能讓他停止。
Europe is the best example of how Rich’s tenacity leads to success. For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million. After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction. Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.
歐洲是一個很好的例子，證明rich的堅持不懈怎樣讓他走向成功。最初十年裡，在那裡我們只取得微不足道的財務進步，卻竟然積累了2.12億美元的運營虧損。自從rich把mark booth“拉上船”，負責歐洲的業務後，我們有了增長牽引機，現在我們的發展真是勢不可擋，去年的收入增加了3倍。
In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there. It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service. Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities – but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.
在11月，我們的主管們在網絡噴射公司，位於哥倫布市的總部碰頭，順便看了一下他們那兒複雜的操作部門。它擔負著每天大約1000架次全天候的飛行任務，客戶總是期待著頂尖的(top-notch)服務。我們的主管們離開時，對他們的設備和承載能力印象深刻，不過rich和他的員工給大家留下更為深刻的印象。
Finance and Finance Products
融資和金融產品
Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes. Clayton’s market share hit a record 31% last year. But industry volume continues to shrink: Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton. (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)
我們這部分主要的業務是克萊頓公司(clayton homes)，全美最大的預製房屋建造商和市場佔有者。去年克萊頓公司的市場份額達到創記錄的31%。但是行業規模在繼續萎縮：去年預製房屋的銷售數是9.6萬幢，低於2003年我們買下克萊頓公司時的13.1萬幢。(需要記得的是，當時還有一些評論員批評克萊頓的主管們，在行業周期的底部出售了公司)。
Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers. That’s why we include Clayton’s operation in this finance section. Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well. Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.
雖然克萊頓公司從出售和出租預製房屋中獲利，但是它收益的主要來源是一個金額110億美元，包含30萬個借款人的貸款資產組合(loan portfolio)。這就是為什麼我們將克萊頓公司的業務歸到金融這部分。儘管在2007年房地產金融領域遭遇了很多問題，但克萊頓公司的貸款資產組合卻運作良好。這一年裡逾期還款、喪失抵押品贖回權以及貸款損失的比例同我們此前作為業主時的情況相仿。
Clayton’s loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire. For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire’s borrowing cost – a fee that amounted to $85 million last year. Clayton’s 2007 pre-tax earnings of $526 million are after its paying this fee. The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in “other” in the following table.
克萊頓的貸款資產組合的資金一直由波克夏提供。為這筆資金，我們在波克夏借款成本上加1%後向克萊頓公司收取。去年該費用是8,500萬美元。扣除該項費用後，克萊頓公司2007年的稅前收入是5.26億美元。這項交易的另一面是波克夏記入8,500萬美元的收入，包含在下表中“其他”項下。
| (in $ millions) | ||||
| Pre-Tax Earnings | ||||
| 2007 | 2005 | |||
| Trading – Ordinary Income | $272 | $274 | ||
| Life and annuity operation | (60) | 29 | ||
| Leasing operations | 111 | 182 | ||
| Manufactured housing finance (Clayton) | 526 | 513 | ||
| Other | 157 | 159 | ||
| Income before capital gains | 1,006 | 1,157 | ||
| Trading – Capital Gains | 105 | 938 | ||
| Total | $1,111 | $2,095 | ||
The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture. Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA. That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire. The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA’s earnings.
表列中，租賃業務包括經營拖車租賃業務的xtra公司，以及經營家具租賃的寇特家具(cort)。2007年，由於拖車利用率的明顯下降，導致xtra公司的收益下降(drop in)。公司去年還通過波克夏借款4億美元，增加利息支出的結果，將降低xtra公司的收益。
Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership. More will come.
在kevin clayton, bill franz和paul arnold的良好經營下，克萊頓公司、xtra公司和寇特家具都是很好的公司。在歸入波克夏旗下後，它們每個都進行了一系列的收購，以後會更多。
Investments
投資
We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.
下面列出到年底我們持有的股票，它們的市值至少是60億美元。
| 12/31/07 | ||||||
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | ||||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 13.1 | $1,287 | $7,887 | ||
| 35,563,200 | Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc. | 4.8 | 1,718 | 1,861 | ||
| 60,828,818 | Burlington Northern Santa Fe | 17.5 | 4,731 | 5,063 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 12,274 | ||
| 17,508,700 | Conoco Phillips | 1.1 | 1,039 | 1,546 | ||
| 64,271,948 | Johnson & Johnson | 2.2 | 3,943 | 4,287 | ||
| 124,393,800 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 8.1 | 4,152 | 4,059 | ||
| 48,000,000 | Moodyís Corporation | 19.1 | 499 | 1,714 | ||
| 3,486,006 | POSCO | 4.5 | 572 | 2,136 | ||
| 101,472,000 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 3.3 | 1,030 | 7,450 | ||
| 17,170,953 | Sanofi-Aventis | 1.3 | 1,466 | 1,575 | ||
| 227,307,000 | Tesco | 2.9 | 1,326 | 2,156 | ||
| 75,176,026 | US Bancorp | 4.4 | 2,417 | 2,386 | ||
| 17,072,192 | USG Corp | 17.2 | 536 | 611 | ||
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 0.5 | 942 | 948 | ||
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | 18.2 | 11 | 1,367 | ||
| 303,407,068 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.2 | 6,677 | 9,160 | ||
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance | 16.3 | 369 | 886 | ||
| Others | 5,238 | 7,633 | ||||
| Total Common Stocks | 39,252 | 74,999 | ||||
*This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
*這是根據實際的購買價格，也是計算稅負的基準;這與一般公認會計原則所認定的“成本”，有一些不同，因為按照規定，賬面價值有時需要加以調高、或予以沖銷。
Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.
總的來說，我們所投資公司的表現讓我們欣慰。在2007年，我們持有市值最大的四家公司中的三家：美國運通、可口可樂以及寶潔公司，每股收益分別增長了12%、14%和14%。第四家富國銀行的收益由於房地產泡沫的破裂而稍有下降。不過，我相信它的內在價值還是在增加，即使增加了那麼一點點。
In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.
注意到美國運通公司和富國銀行都是henry wells和william fargo創建的。美國運通創建於1850年，富國銀行在1852年。寶潔公司和可口可樂公司分別開始於1837年和1886年。遊戲開始時我們都沒參加。
I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” – a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors – have widened during the year. All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.
我必須強調的是：在任何時候，我們不是通過投資品的市場價格來計算我們投資的進展。我們寧可用兩條適用在我們自己企業的測試標準，來衡量它們的成績。第一條標準，扣除整個行業預期增長後的實際收益增長。第二條，更主觀些，就是看它們的“護城河”是否這一年裡變得更寬，“護城河”是一種隱喻，指的是公司擁有的，會讓它的競爭對手日子難過的競爭優勢。這四大公司在這項測試中毫無疑問，都能得分。
We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 million, a price that valued the entire business at about $37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 billion. By 2007, two factors had materially increased its value: the price of oil had climbed significantly, and PetroChina’s management had done a great job in building oil and gas reserves. In the second half of last year, the market value of the company rose to $275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.
去年我們有一筆很大的賣出。在2002年和2003年，波克夏用4.88億美元買入中石油公司(petrochina)1.3%的股權。按這個價格，這個中石油公司的價值大約為370億美元。查理和我那時感覺該公司的內在價值大約應該為1000億美元。到2007年，兩個因素使得它的內在價值得到很大提高：油價的顯著攀升;以及中石油的管理層在石油和天然氣儲備上，下的大工夫。到去年下半年，公司的市值上升到2750億美元，大約是我們在與其他大型石油公司比較後，認為它應該有的價值。所以，我們把手里中石油的股票賣了40億美元。
A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government – defense, social security, you name it – for about four hours.
一個腳註：我們為在中石油交易上的收益向美國國稅局繳納了12億美元的稅。此筆稅款大約夠美國政府運作4小時的費用，這包括了國防、社會保障等，我能叫得出的所有費用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.
去年我告訴你們，我管理著波克夏62個衍生品合約。(我們還有一些合約，遺留在了通用再保險(general re)流失的賬簿裡)。今天，我們有94個這樣的合約，它們主要分為兩類。
First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.
第一類，我們籤的54個合約，承擔特定債券(certain bonds)，包括各種高收益率債券(high-yield indices)的違約風險。這些合約的到期日各不相同，從2009年到2013年。到年底，我們從這些合約中收到32億美元的額外獎勵，承擔了4.72億美元的虧損;並且在最壞的情況下(儘管這種極端的情況不太可能發生)，還需要再付出47億美元。
We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet
我們確定還會付出更多，但我相信，撇開我們能從持有的部分中大賺一筆不說，單單就從額外的回報來看，這些合約也證明是有價值的。在年底我們的資產負債表中，為這些合約的“風險敞口”，記錄了18億美元的“衍生合約負債”。
The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.
第二類合約，涉及到我們賣出的，針對四種股票指數(標準普爾500指數，加上三種國外的指數)的各種賣出期權(put option)合約。這些賣出期權的起始期限不是15年就是20年，它們會受到市場的影響。我們(通過賣出這樣合約，)收到45億美元的額外收入，也在年底，記錄了46億美元的負債。這些賣出期權合約只能在到期時，才會執行。它們的到期時間在2019年到2027年之間。屆時，只有在上述的股票指數水平，低於簽訂賣出期權合約時的，我們才需要付錢出去。同樣的，我相信這些合約，總體上將是盈利的。我們也將在持有這些合約的15或20年裡，通過用賣出這些合約獲得的收入去投資，獲得豐厚的收益。
Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.
對於我們的衍生品合約有兩點是很重要的。第一，在所有交易裡，我們都是通過賣出合約，收到錢的一方，這意味著我們並沒有對沖風險。
Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.
第二，這些衍生品合約適用的會計準則，不同於應用在我們資產投資組合上的。在資產投資組合中，資產價值的變化將以淨資產的形式，顯示在波克夏的資產負債表上，但它不會影響收益，除非我們出售(或是沖銷(write down))資產。而衍生品合約的價值變化，必須計入每季的收入中。
Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.
由此，我們持有的衍生品部位，有時會使公司報告的收益，產生很大的擺動，可查理和我相信這些部位的內在價值，其實變化很小。即便這些擺動在一個季度裡，輕易就達到10億美元或更多，他和我也將對此熟視無睹，我們希望你也如此。你可能想到，在我們的巨災保險業務中，經常準備面臨，短時間內報告：收益很快消失，和在相當長的時間內淨值很大增長的情況，交替出現。這也是我們在衍生品交易中所用的哲學。
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The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.
美元在2007年對其它主要貨幣進一步走弱，原因顯而易見：美國人喜愛購買其它地方生產的產品，超過世界其他地區的人們對美國產商品的喜愛。這就不可避免地，造成美國每天將大約價值20億美元的借據(iou,i own you)和資產輸送給世界其他地區。隨著時間過去，這種變賣，對美元造成壓力。
When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 billion, whereas in 2007, with the Euro averaging $1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 billion. Similarly, the Canadian dollar averaged 64¢ in 2002 and 93¢ in 2007. Yet our trade deficit with Canada rose as well, from $50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.
當美元貶值時，它既讓外國人能更便宜地購買我們的產品，又使它們的產品對美國公民來說變得更昂貴。這就是為什麼一種貶值的貨幣常被假設可以用來醫治貿易赤字。的確，美元大幅貶值後，美國的貿易赤字，毫無疑問會有所緩解。但是考慮一下這個現象：在2002年，歐元對美元的匯率平均在1：0.946，我們對德國(我們第五大貿易夥伴)的貿易赤字是360億美元。到了2007年，匯率平均在1：1.37，我們對德國的貿易赤字卻上升到450億美元。相似的情況是，美元對加元從2002年平均1：0.64，下跌到2007年的1：0.93。我們對加拿大的貿易赤字同樣也從2002年的500億美元上升到2007年的640美元。到目前為止，至少一個疲弱的美元，並不能對平衡我們的貿易起很大的作用。
There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?
最近大家都在談論主權財富基金，以及它們如何在購買大量美國公司的股份。這是我們自己造成的，並不是外國政府有什麼邪惡的陰謀。實際上，我們的貿易平衡仰仗在美國的巨額外國投資。當我們每天將20億美元強加給(force-feed)世界其他地區時，他們必定會在這裡投資點什麼。當他們選擇股票，而不是債券時，為什麼我們要抱怨呢?
Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.
美元的走弱，錯不在歐佩克(opec,石油輸出國組織)，中國及其他。別的發達國家和美國一樣，依賴石油進口，也在和從中國進口的產品競爭。美國應當發展出一套明智的貿易政策，而不是挑選出一些國家來懲罰或一些行業來保護。我們也不應該採取那些很容易引發報復的行動，那樣只會減少美國的出口，真正的貿易應該是我們和世界的其他地區之間互惠的。
Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)
我們的立法者應該認識到，這種貨幣流動的不平衡是不能持久的，所以現在需要調整政策，以求從本質上儘早減少這種不平衡。否則，我們每天強加給世界各地的20億美元，已經造成全球某些方面令人不快的消化不良。(要了解其他對我們難以容忍的貿易赤字的評述，請看艾倫·格林斯潘(alan greenspan)2004年11月19日的論述，聯邦開放市場委員會2004年6月29日的備忘錄，和本·伯南克(ben bernanke)2007年9月11日的講話)
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At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.
波克夏在2007年只持有一種直接外彙的頭寸。它就是——請屏住你的呼吸——巴西的貨幣雷亞爾(real)。就在不久以前，將美元兌換成雷亞爾被認為是不可想像的。畢竟，在上個世紀裡，多達5個版本的巴西貨幣，讓雷亞爾快變成狂歡節裡灑的小紙片了。當貨幣真實出現像許多國家一樣的情況：貨幣陷入發行、貶值，退出流通的周期性中，富有的巴西人為保護他們的財富，有時將大筆的錢轉移到美國。
But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.
但是任何採用這種看上去謹慎方式的巴西人，已經在過去5年中，損失了他一半的淨資產。這裡有從2002年到2007年底，每年雷亞爾對美元的指數記錄：100;122;133;152;166;199。每年雷亞爾都在走高，美元卻在下跌。此外，在這段時期裡，巴西政府還在市場中買入美元，以此來控制雷亞爾(的升值速度)，同時支撐美元(的下跌)。
Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)
我們直接外匯頭寸在過去5年中已經帶來23美元的稅前收益。另一方面，我們也從持有美國公司用其他貨幣發行的債券中獲利。例如，在2001年和2002年，我們以57%面值的價格，購買了3.1億歐元的亞馬遜公司(ama.com)的債券：票面利率6.875%，2010年到期。那時，亞馬遜公司的債券被標以“垃圾”(junk)級信用的價格在出售，儘管它們決不是。(對，在維吉尼亞(virginia)，你能夠偶爾發現市場是多麼可笑和無效，或者至少你可以在，除了某些主流商學院的金融系外的，任何地方發現它們。
The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.
亞馬遜債券的以歐元計價，對我們有更深層和重要的吸引力。在2002年我們購買的時候，歐元對美元的匯率是1：0.95。因此，我們的成本以美元計算，僅僅是1.69億美元。現在債券以102%面值的價格被出售，歐元對美元的匯率是1：1.47。在2005年和2006年一些我們的債券被贖回，我們從那裡獲得2.53億美元。我們保留的債券在年底，價值1.62億美元。在2.46億美元，我們已實現和未實現的收益裡，有1.18億美元是由於美元的下跌。都是貨幣自己幹的。
At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce evergrowing prosperity for its citizens.
在波克夏，我們將努力提高直接和間接來自國外的收益。即使我們能成功，我們的資產和收益仍將主要集中在美國。儘管我們國家在一個又一個領域裡的許多問題上的錯誤，是令人遺憾和不能寬恕的，但是美國法律的規則，市場經濟體系，以及社會精英的信仰都將為國民創造持久的繁榮。
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As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.
就像我以前告訴過你們的，我們已經對ceo的繼任人選做了充分的準備，因為我們擁有三個很出色的內部候選人。董事會很清楚的知道，一旦我無法勝任工作，不管是去世還是喪失能力，誰將被挑選，來接替我的工作。並且董事會還有兩個後備人選。
Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.
去年，我告訴你們，我們將盡快完成波克夏在投資業務上的繼任者計劃。我們的確現在確定了4個候選人，他們都能接替我的投資工作。他們都普遍擁有管理素質，並且他們對應邀到波克夏來工作，都顯示出強烈的興趣。董事會了解這四位的能力，並期待如果需要，可以僱傭到一個或更多的人。這些候選人都正當壯年，經濟上非常富有(well-to-do)，所有人希望能為波克夏工作的原因，並不是為了得到經濟上的補償。
(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death – abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)
(我很不情願地打消了，要在我死後繼續管理投資組合的念頭。也放棄我希望給“拓展視野”(thinking outside the box)，這項條款賦予的新含義)
Fanciful Figures – How Public Companies Juice Earnings
充滿想像力的數字——上市公司們是如何給收益“注水”的
Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.” If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.
前參議員艾倫·辛普森(alan simpson)有句名言：“那些在華盛頓高速公路上開車的人，需要不怕交通堵塞”。假如他真的到少有人至的道路上找找，參議員會在那裡看到美國公司的會計們。
An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity – by unanimous agreement, no less – to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.
在“首選路線的問題”(road businesses prefer)上最重要的一次投票發生在1994年。迫於美國ceo們的壓力，美國參議院投票以88比9通過提案，讓美國財務會計準則委員會(fasb,financial accounting standards board)閉上了嘴。此前一項毫無異義的規定，讓fasb飽受指責，這項規定告知公司的首腦們，獎勵給他們的股票期權，是一種經濟補償，它們的價值將被作為一項費用計入公司的財務報表。
After the senators voted, the FASB – now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs – decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.
在參議員們投票後，fasb現在要求教授的會計準則，必須符合參議院第88號法令在註冊會計師(cpas)方面的規定。法令規定：對於期權，公司可以選擇兩種報告方式。“首選的”處理方式是：將期權的價值視為費用。不過法令也允許，當公司是按市場價值頒發期權時，可以忽略它的費用。
A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.” I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.
輪到美國的ceo們說真話的時候(a moment of truth)，他們的回應一點不光彩。在接下去的6年裡，入選標準普爾指數的500家公司中只有兩家，選擇了“首選的”路線。餘下公司的ceo們全都選擇了另一條低速路線，從而忽略了一大筆顯而易見的費用，只為在報表上，有更高的“收益”。我確信他們中的一些人也覺得，即使他們選擇把期權作為費用計入，他們的董事們也會在將來的某些時候，為了通過經理們渴望的“一次性授予(mega-giants)”(期權)，而重新考慮。
It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.
即便如此，對很多ceo來說，那條低速路還不夠好。在日趨削弱的公司章程裡有規定，如果期權，被以一個低於公司市場價值很多的行權價格授出，其導致的收益應保留在公司。不過，沒問題。為了規避這條惱人的規定，許多公司秘密地回溯授予期權的日期，造成他們是按當時的市場價格獲得期權的假相，而事實上，他們早因拿到低於市場的價格，而將收益納入囊中。
Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain – important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.
十多年裡，針對股票期權，荒謬的會計規則正在淡出，但是其他這樣的會計手段依然存在——其中比較重要的是：一個公司計算養老金費用時，使用的投資回報假設。許多公司會繼續選定這種假設，這種情況將會毫不奇怪的出現，這樣的假設能讓他們報告“超過實際”(less-than-solid)的虛假收益。從363家進入標準普爾指數的公司製定的養老金計劃，2006年這個投資回報假設是8%。讓我們看看這個假設實現的可能性。
The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.
在所有的養老基金中，平均持有債券和現金的比例大約是28%，這部分資產的回報率不會超過5%。更高的收益，當然是有可能達到的，不過伴隨而來的是，造成與之相對稱(或更大)損失的風險。
This means that the remaining 72% of assets – which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments – must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.
並且這意味著剩餘72%的養老金資產——將主要是投資公司的股權。不是直接持有股票，就是透過，比如對沖基金(hedge funds)或私人股權投資(private-equity investments)這樣的載體間接持有。如果要使整個資產收益達到假設的8%，這部分資產必須掙到9.2%的收益，並且那種收益回報，必須是扣除所有交易費用後的，但是現在的交易費用遠比它們先前的高。
How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.
這種期望的真實性有多少呢?讓我們回顧一些，我在兩年前提到的數據：在整個20世紀，道瓊斯指數(dow)從66點漲到11,497點。這個增長看上去很大，但換算成每年的複合增長，不過5.3%。如果一個投資者，持有道瓊斯指數整整一個世紀，在期間的很多時候，他會收到很慷慨的分紅，但在最後的幾年裡，分紅大約也只有2%左右。20世紀是一個多麼精彩的世紀。
Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow – recently below 13,000 – would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.
想想現在這個世紀。投資者如果僅僅想達到5.3%的市值增長，那道瓊斯指數，最近低於13,000點，也將在2099年12月31日時，收報於200萬點!就是在100年裡，為達到年平均5.3 %的收益水平，需要道瓊斯指數上漲198.8萬點，在這個世紀的頭八年裡，我們只取得不到2000點的上漲。
It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?
有趣的是，市場評論人士在道瓊斯指數有可能跨越，諸如14,000點或15,000點這樣千點整數位時，都會有規律的加快呼吸。如果他們保持這種反應，按本世紀內年增長5.3%計算，他們在餘下的92年裡，至少要將經歷1,986次這樣的體驗。雖然說什麼事都可能發生，但我們真的相信這樣的事能發生嗎?
Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets – allowing for expenses of .5% – would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and highpriced managers (“helpers”).
紅利收益繼續徘徊在2%左右。即使股票年平均增長，能達到上世紀5.3%的水平，養老金計劃中的股票部分，在考慮支出0.5%的費用後，收益將不會超過7%左右。並且0.5%的費用估算，對於邀請投資顧問和高身價經理們——所謂的“投資助理”(helper)出馬，已經是相當保守的了。
Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers – bless their hearts – will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group – the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group – the “know-nothings” – must win.
每個人很自然的，期望收益超過市場的平均水平。那些“投資助理”由衷的(bless their hearts)鼓勵和灌輸他們的客戶這種觀念。但是作為一類，僱傭這些投資助理的群體。他們收益一定是低於平均水平。原因很簡單：1)所有投資者都不可避免賺到：一個平均的投資回報，減去交易費用;2)被動型投資者和指數投資者，由於從頭至尾他們的交易很不活躍，他們賺到的收益是：平均收益水平，減去一個非常低的交易費用。3)在賺取市場平均收益的群體中，剩下的一部分就是——交易活躍的投資者。但是這個群體也因此會招致高額的交易、管理和顧問諮詢費用。所以交易活躍的投資者，相比他們那些不活躍的“同胞們”(brethren)，會抹去很大一部分的投資回報。這意味著：“懵懂無知”(know-nothing)的被動型投資者(與他們相比)一定會勝出。
I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century – envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation – are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about doubledigit returns from equities, explain this math to him – not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.
我還必須指出，在本世紀裡，想從股票中賺到10%年收益的人，他們的如意算盤是2%的年收益來自分紅，8%來自股價上漲。但這無異於他們是在預計：2100年道瓊斯指數會在2,400萬點的水平!如果你的理財顧問告訴你，會從股票上賺到兩位數的投資回報，那就把上面的數字解釋給他聽，一定會讓他感到狼狽。許多“投資助理”顯然是童話“綠野仙踪”(alice in wonderland)裡，那個說：“為什麼，我在早飯前，有時已經相信了超過六件不可能發生的事情呢?”話的女王的直系後代。所以要謹防那些油嘴滑舌的投資助理，嚮往你頭腦裡塞進幻的時候，同時也在往自己的口袋裡揣著酬金。
Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.
一些公司在歐洲也有類似和美國一樣的養老金計劃，並且在他們的會計賬上，幾乎所有美國養老金計劃的假定收益，都高於海外的。這種差異令人困惑：為什麼這些公司不派他們的美國經理們，去負責公司海外養老金計劃的資產，讓他們能將自己的神奇魔力，一樣作用到這些資產上?我從來沒有看到關於這種迷惑的解釋，但是負責審查這些假定投資回報的審計人員和核算師也似乎對此沒有疑問。
What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.
不過，對於為什麼ceo們要選擇一個如此高投資收益假設的原因，並不讓人困惑：這樣他們就可以報告更高的公司收益。而且即便他們，如我認為的那樣，確實是錯的，那惡果(chicken come home to roost)在他們退休後的很長時間裡，也不會發生。
After decades of pushing the envelope – or worse – in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”
數十年來，美國公司掩藏(push the envelope)(收益)，或是更壞的企圖，想盡可能高的報告當前收益的行為，應該好收斂了。他們應該聽聽我搭檔查理·孟格的話：“如果你三次把球擊出左邊界，那下次擊打時，瞄得稍微靠向右些。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.
無論公司在養老金費用上耍得花樣，如何讓股東們逡巡止步於道上(in store down the road)，納稅人要經歷的打擊，要遠勝公司股東們許多倍。公共養老金雖然承諾巨大，但在很多方面，養老基金卻嚴重不足。只是因為引爆這顆定時炸彈的導火索還很長，政治家們畏縮於稅收會造成的傷痛。反正只有在這些員去世後很久，這些問題才會出現。員們很容易就制定出，這些養老的承諾，涉及有時是哪些不滿40歲人的提早年退休計劃;慷慨的生活費(cost-of-living)調整計劃。在這個人們壽命越來越長而通貨膨脹又是必然的世界裡，那些承諾將決不會很容易的兌現。
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Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.
儘管在美國公司會計賬目中推行一個“誠信系統”已經失敗，但我需要說明的是，在大量波克夏資產負債表的項目中，它是確實存在的。在每個我們提供給你們的報表中，我們必須為我們保險的業務估算損失儲備金。如果我們的估算有誤，將意味著我們的資產負債表和損益表都是錯的。所以很自然的，我們儘自己所能讓這部分估算精確。然而，在每一個我們估算的報告中，也一定會有差錯。
At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 billion that represents our guess as to what we will eventually pay for all loss events that occurred before yearend (except for about $3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.
在2007年底，我們顯示560億美元的保險負債。這表示我們推測，在年底前我們需要對所有可能損失事件，最終進行賠付的金額，(除去大約30億美元按現值已經被貼現的儲備金)。我們為知道的數以千計的保單，為它們每個，記上一美元的價值，來反映我們相信需要支付哪些。在某些案子裡，由工傷賠償保障引發的，對某些嚴重傷害的索賠，會延續50年或更長的時期裡，都產生賠付。
We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.
我們當然會對在年底前已發生的損失，準備大筆的儲備金，這不包括我們已聽說的損失。有時，被保險人也不知道是否有損失發生。(想想哪些經年未被發現的職務侵占案件。)我們有時候接到索賠，損失來自我們幾十年前承保的保單。
A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral, whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8,000. He paid up but a month later received a bill from the mortuary for $10. He paid that, too – and still another $10 charge he received a month later. When a third $10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh,” she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”
一則我好幾年前告訴你們的故事可以顯現出我們在正確估計負債損失的問題：一個老兄到歐洲出個重要的差，他老妹打給他告知父親去世的消息，哥哥告訴她無法趕回去但是她不用花一毛錢辦喪事，因為老哥會出。當他回家時，他妹告訴他說喪事辦得很隆重然後把八千塊的帳單拿給他，他把款項付清了但一個月之後從殯儀館那裏收到十塊的帳單，他當然也還是付掉了 – 然後一個月後他又收到另一筆十塊帳單。當第三筆十元帳單在下個月寄給他的時候，這個困惑的老兄打電話問妹妹這是怎麼一回事。「喔！」她回答，「我忘了告訴你，老爸下葬的時候他身上穿的那套衣服是租的。」
At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.
在我們的保險公司，我們有一個未知的，但確實相當大，數量的“租賃的西裝”被埋在世界各地。我們正試圖精確估算出他們的賬單。在十或二十年後，我們就能恰當估算出，我們現在的估計有多不准確。即使那個估算出人意料，我個人相信，我們聲明的撥備也是充足的，不過在過去，我也犯過好幾次錯誤。
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
我們今年的股東大會將在5月3日，星期六舉行。與往常一樣，奎斯特中心(qwest center)在上午7點開門，一部關於波克夏的新影片將在8點半放映。在9點半開始，我們直接進入解答問題階段(question-and-answer)，(中間休息一下，在奎斯特中心的看台上吃午飯)，直到下午3點。接著，在稍作休息後，查理和我將在3點15分，召開年度股東大會。如果在白天的問答階段你打算離開的話，拜託請在查理講話時，這樣做。
The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300- square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (If necessary, I’ll lock the doors.)
離開最好的理由，當然是購物。在毗鄰會議區，我們闢出194,300平方英尺的場地，擺滿波克夏旗下公司的產品，希望能滿足你們的購物慾望。去年，由於27,000名與會人士各盡其力，幾乎所有的攤位的銷售額記錄都大幅上升。但是，今年你們能做的更好。(如果需要，我會鎖上所有的門。)
This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that this 1,550- square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value. And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.
今年我們將再次展示克萊頓公司的預製房屋(特點是艾可美(acme)的磚塊;蕭氏(shaw)的地毯;約翰·曼維爾公司(john manville)的隔熱材料;和邁鐵(mitek)的扣件;凱夫瑞(carefree)的遮陽蓬;內布拉斯加家具中心(nfm)的家具。你會發現這間1,550平方英尺的房屋，售價在69,500美元，送貨費用另加。在你買下房屋後，考慮一下攤位附近叢林河流(forest river)公司的娛樂車(rv)和浮舟。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
蓋可保險(geico)將有一個攤位，來自全國的頂尖保險顧問齊聚於此，他們全部準備給你提供車輛保險的報價。在大多情況裡，蓋可保險能給你一個特殊的股東折扣(通常是8%)。這個特殊的報價在我們全美50個州中的45個營業網點，都適用。(補充一點：如果你有資格享受另一個折扣，比如給特定團體的折扣，這些折扣不能累加。)帶上你已有保險的詳細資料，讓我們看看是否能幫你省錢。我相信我們能做到，至少幫你省下至少50%的保費。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you.
星期六，在奧馬哈機場，netjet公司像以往一樣陳列他們的飛機供你們參觀。netjet公司在奎斯特中心的攤位上，你也可以看到這些飛機的資料。坐大巴來奧馬哈的，乘你的新飛機離開吧。你可以帶上所有你想帶的定型髮膠和剪刀，和你一起上飛機。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs – all discounted – led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie’s book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies. For those of you who can’t make the meeting, go to poorcharliesalmanack.com to order a copy.
接著，如果你還有錢剩下，去看看書蟲公司(bookworm)的攤位，你會找到大約25種圖書和dvd碟片，以《窮查理寶典》(poor charlie's almanack)為首，全部打折。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
這份報告附加的股東會資料有個輔助文件，告訴你要參加會議跟其他活動所要具備的東西。機加酒跟租車，我們跟美國運通有簽約(800-799-6634)，給您特別的服務。Carol Pederson是這些事宜的負責窗口，她每年都為我們做得很好，我很感謝她。到時候房間會很難訂，但是交給Carol你就會訂得到。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM eleven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to $30.9 million in 2007. This is more volume than most furniture stores register in a year.
在Nebraska Furniture Mart，處於在七十二街的Dodge和Pacific中間的一個七十七英畝場地，我們會再次舉辦「波克夏周末」折扣活動。這個活動是在十一年前由NFM開始的，這個活動的銷售量從97年的五百三十萬元成長到07年的三千萬九千元，這比大多數家具店在一年內註冊的量還多。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.
在Nebraska Furniture Mart，處於在七十二街的Dodge和Pacific中間的一個七十七英畝場地，我們會再次舉辦「波克夏周末」折扣活動。這個活動是在十一年前由NFM開始的，這個活動的銷售量從97年的五百三十萬元成長到07年的三千萬九千元，這比大多數家具店在一年內註冊的量還多。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.
要拿到波克夏折扣，你要在五月一日星期四到五月五號星期一之間購買，還要秀出你的會議資料。這個特賣期間甚至會連一些精品等級幾乎不打折的商品都包含在內，但是為了這個股東周末活動的精神，特別為你們破例打折，我們很感謝他們的合作。NFM營業時間從早上十點到晚上九點，周一到周六；周日從早上十點到下午六店。今年的周六從下午五點半到八點，NFM有個Baja Beach Bash準備牛肉和雞肉墨西哥捲餅讓大家享用。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在Borsheims，我們會再次舉辦兩個只有股東才能參加的活動。第一個是在五月二日星期五從下午六點到十點的雞尾酒接待會；第二個，也就是主宴會，會在五月四號禮拜天從早上九點到下午四點舉行，周六我們會開到下午六點。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience,
therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th.
During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a
brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
在Borsheims整個周末會很擠，所以為了你們方便，股東價從四月二十八日星期一到五月十號星期日都適用。在那期間，請秀出你的股東會資料或是營業員交易單以證明你是波克夏股東。
On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers – who will have their eyes wide open – in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日在Borsheims外的帳篷，二度美國棋王Patrick Wolff會矇住眼，挑戰所有人 – 挑戰者眼睛都張開 – 他以一對六；旁邊有Norman Beck，一個達拉斯來的著名魔術師，要變些戲法給大家瞧瞧；另外我們還有Bob Hamman和Sharon Osberg，兩位世界級的橋牌專家，在周日下午可以跟大家玩橋牌。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 915 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,487 including 656 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).
Gorats會在五月四日星期天再次只為波克夏的股東開門營業，而且會從下午四點到十點供餐。去年他們在股東會周日為二百四十人席提供了九百一十五份晚餐。三天總賣出2,487份晚餐，包括656份丁骨牛排，前菜由cognoscenti提供。請記得要在當天來到Gorat’s，你一定要訂位，訂位專線為402-551-3733，從四月一日開始(但是不可以在之前打)。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
我們會再次於周日下午四點鐘為從美國以外地區的股東提供接待，每年我們股東會從世界各地來很多人，孟格和我要確定我們親自迎接自遠方來的朋友，去年我們和四百多位從各個國家來的朋友一起享受大會，任何從美加以外地區來的股東都會領取到一份特別的股東會資料。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 3rd at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
在八十四歲和七十七歲的年齡，孟格和我還是過著超出夢想的幸運生活：我們在美國出生，有很棒的父母看著我們受良好教育，現在享受很好的家庭生活跟健康身體，而且還有一個天生的生意頭腦可以讓我們得以受到不成比例的收穫，相對於那些比我們更努力以及貢獻社會更多的人而言。再來，我們長期擁有自己喜愛的工作，在期間受到一些有天份且互相激勵的同事以不盡其數的方式幫助。每天對我們來說都是刺激的，難怪我們去工作途中都在手舞足蹈，但是沒有比和我們的股東夥伴一起在波克夏年會上聚首更歡樂的了，所以在五月三日於Quest一起加入這個年度的資本家的搖滾盛會吧，到時候見！
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 2008
華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2008年2月