波克夏股東手冊(An Owner's Manual)

In June 1996, Berkshire’s Chairman, Warren E. Buffett, issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*” to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation. An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.

在 1996 年時，波克夏的董事長華倫‧巴菲特發行一本名為「股東手冊」的小冊子給波克夏 A 股及 B 股的股票持有人。其目的在闡釋波克夏營運所遵循的各種經濟守則。以下所示為更新後版本。

OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES
與股東密切相關的事業守則

At the time of the Blue Chip merger in 1983, I set down 13 owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach. As is appropriate for “principles,” all 13 remain alive and well today, and they are stated here in italics.
在 1983 年合併藍籌公司的時候，我立下了 13 項與股東密切相關的事業守則，希望這將協助新的股票持有人瞭解我們的管理方式。正如「守則」的意涵，13 項守則完整保留至今，在此將以斜體字條列。

1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.

1.雖然我們的形態是企業但我們的態度卻是合夥事業。查理‧孟格和我都將我們的股東視為經營合夥人，而我們自己則為經營伙伴 (由於持有的股權規模之故，姑且不論好壞，我們也是控制伙伴)。我們並未將公司視為所擁有事業資產的最終持有人，反而是將其視為我們股東擁有資產的一個管道。

Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.

查理跟我希望你們不要認為自己只是擁有一張價格會每天波動的紙張，而這張紙只是當某些使你緊張萬分的經濟或政治事件出現，你選擇拋售與否的選項之一。我們反倒希望你將自己視為是某個事業的部分所有人，而這事業是你願意永久保留的，如同你可能跟其他家庭成員共同擁有一座農場或是一間公寓一般。對我們而言，我們不會將波克夏的股東視為一群常變動的無名氏，而是願意將他們原本可以用以安度餘生的資金託付給我們一同參與冒險的伙伴。

The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a small fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.

證據顯示大部分的波克夏股東的確欣然接受這長期伙伴的概念。波克夏股票每年的周轉率相對其他大多數美國企業來說只是很小的比率，即便是把我所持有的股份排除在外來計算亦是如此。

In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.

實際上，我們的股東對波克夏股票的影響與波克夏對其投資的影響如出一轍。就好比波克夏亦是可口可樂或美國運通的股票持有人，我們視波克夏為這兩家卓越公司的不具管理權限的伙伴，而我們以公司長期發展的成果來衡量我們的績效而非每月股價的波動程度。事實上，就算這些公司在市場上長達數年都沒有交易或是報價，我們也完全不在意。如果我們抱持長期的展望，短期股價的變化對我們來說是無任何意義的，除非是他們出現提供我們增加其持股機會的誘人價格。

2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.

2.為了與波克夏股東導向一致，我們大部份的董事都將其大部分淨資產淨值投資在公司上，我們可是自食其力。

Charlie’s family has 90% or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have about 99%. In addition, many of my relatives—my sisters and cousins, for example—keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.

查理的家族有九成甚至更多的資產淨值形式是波克夏的持股；我個人則是 99%。除此之外，我很多親屬例如我的姊妹以及堂或表兄弟姊妹他們資產淨值中也都有很大比例是波克夏的持股。

Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.

查理跟我對於這種把雞蛋放在同一個籃子的情況感到放心，因為波克夏本身擁有各式各樣真正優異的企業。的確，我們深信波克夏擁有的股權無論具控制權與否，已經是近乎唯一在質與多樣性上兼具的公司。

Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.

查理跟我無法承諾你結果將會是如何。但是我們可以保證不論你是在哪個時期決定成為我們的合夥人，你的財富將與我們的財富一起成長。我們對於巨額薪酬、選擇權或是其他賺取超過你的好處沒興趣。我們只跟我們的合夥人賺同比例的錢。
此外，當我做了某項蠢事，我願你能從我也將蒙受同比例的損失這件事上得到一些慰藉。

3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.

我們長期的經濟目標(容我在稍後再對此作描述)是以每股內在事業價值為基礎追求波克夏最大的年化報酬率.。我們不用波克夏的公司規模來衡量其經濟重要性或績效；我們透過每股進程來決定。我們可以確定在未來巨幅擴張資本的基礎下將見到每股表現每況愈下。但若是我們的成長率沒有超越美國大型企業的平均水準我們將感到失望。

4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.

4.我們偏好透過直接擁有多種可產生現金且資本報酬恆常高於一般水準的事業群來達到我們的目標。我們次佳的選項則是透過我們旗下保險子公司在公開市場買進普通股進而擁有上述特質企業的部份股權。價格、可行性以及對保險資本的需求狀況決定我們在特定年期中的資產配置方式。

In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.
近幾年我們已經完成幾項併購。即便必定出現荒年，我們依舊期待後續數十年完成更多更大項目的併購案。若是這些收購接近我們過去所達到的品質，波克夏將得到更好的成果。

The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses—including additional pieces of businesses we already own—at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses, such as Coca-Cola, are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.

對我們最大的挑戰在於我們孕育新構想的速度必須跟我們產生現金的速度一樣快。基於這個因素，一個萎靡不振的股市比較可能讓我們發揮顯著的優勢。首先這樣可以降低所有企業的價格使其更可被收購。其次一個低迷的市場讓我們的保險公司得以用吸引人的價格買下卓越公司的部份股權(包括我們已經持有的公司也可增加其持股)。第三點，有些跟可口可樂同樣優異的公司，本身就是自家股份的長期買家，這意味他們跟我們都可以從買進較便宜的股票這件事上得到益處。

Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets—as it will from time to time—neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.

整體說來，波克夏及其長期持有人都可以從下跌的股市中得到好處，正如同一般食物採購人可以從食物價格下跌中得到利益一般。所以當股市總是一次又一次發生崩跌時，無需恐慌或是哭喪著臉，要知道這對波克夏來說可是天大的好消息。

5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.

5.由於我們對於事業所有權採兩手策略的態度並受限會計的先天限制，合併報表所載的盈餘數字可能僅揭露我們實際績效的一小部分而已。查裡跟我既身為公司的擁有人也是經理人，我們實際上會忽略這類合併數字。然而我們也會向你報告每個我們實質控制事業的盈餘，這才是我們認為最具重要性的數字。這些數字會在我們提供個別事業的資訊中一併出現，相信對於你在判斷他們的表現上會有幫助。

To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you.

為了讓事情簡單化，我們試著在年報中呈現給你真正值得關切的數字跟資訊。查理跟我付出大半心力在關注我們的事業表現如何以及各事業所處產業環境的運作情形。舉例來說，我們的事業體究竟是在搭產業循環的順風車或是被該產業大環境不佳拖下水？查理跟我需要確切知道目前的情況並藉此調整我們的預期。我們也會把我們的結論傳達給你知悉。

Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress—for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float”—we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.

長久以來，我們大部分的事業體都有超出我們預期的好表現。但有時也有令我們失望的情況發生，我們將盡可能坦率地向你告知這類信息一如我們過去在描述較愉快的經驗那般。當我們用非傳統的方法去評估我們的進程(例如你在我們的年報中所讀到的保險「浮存金」)，我們將試著解釋這些概念以及為何我們重視他們的原因。換句話說，我們深信在告知你我們的想法後，你不但能評估波克夏旗下的事業體，也能將其運用在管理及資產配置上。

6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.

6.會計推論並不影響我們的營運方針或資產配置決策。當併購成本相近，我們傾向購買在標準會計準則認定報告檯面下具有 2美元盈餘的標的，而非檯面上僅有 1美元盈餘者。這正是我們經常在收購一完整事業體(其盈餘為檯面上的算法)的一小部分(其盈餘大部分是在檯面下的)時會做出支付相當於一般估算兩倍價格決定的原因。總之在經年累月之後，我們期望這些檯面下盈餘最終將透過資本利得反映在我們事業的內在價值。

We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.

我們發現經過一段時日後我們投資部位的未分配盈餘對波克夏的益處與這些盈餘直接分派給波克夏相當(也因此都會被涵蓋在我們官方報告的盈餘中)。這令人滿意的結果之所以會發生，乃歸功於大部分我們的投資標的都是表現優異的企業，因為這些企業經常得以將產出的資本再用以創造極大的利益，例如用來再投資原來的事業或是買回庫藏股。很顯然地，我們所投資事業的每個資本運用決策，對我們而言並不像對其股票投資人一樣有利，但整體說來，他們每保留一美元盈餘，我們將從中得到遠超過一美元的好處。我們因此將實質盈餘視為我們營運年度收益的最佳寫照。

7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)

7.我們很謹慎地利用融資，並且當我們真的得借貸時，我們總試圖以長期固定利率的型態組織我們的負債。與可能對我們資產負債表造成高度槓桿的投資機會相比，我們更可能會拒絕的是那種僅僅看似吸引人的投資機會。這樣的保守原則對我們並非有利，但顧慮到我們對於被保險人、放款人以及許多將自己大半畢生心血交付給我們的股票持有人有道義及法律上的責任，這樣的作法卻能使我們感到安心。(誠如一位Indianapolis “500”獲勝的玩家所言：想要完成比賽獲得第一名，首先得先完成比賽)

The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.

查理跟我所運用的財務計算，絕對不會犧牲我們一夜好眠只為了換取一丁點額外的報償。我相信不須要為了追求我的親友們沒有或不需要的東西，而讓他們涉足不必要的風險。

Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $68 billion.

此外，波克夏已擁有兩種低成本且無風險的舉債來源：遞延所得稅及「浮存金」(我們擁有的保險事業所持有的另一種資金，主要是從我們收取保費後到需要賠付這段期間所衍生)，這允許我們可以更安全擁有遠超過單靠我們資產淨值所能持有限制的總資產。這兩種資金來源快速成長至今已達到總共 680 億美金的規模

Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt—an ability to have more assets working for us—but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.

更棒的是，這些資金到目前為止還經常是零成本的。遞延所得稅負債項目不需要利息，而且只要我們能打平再保的成本，營運產生的浮存金的成本一樣是零。當然啦，這兩者都是真的負債而非資產淨值，但他們是沒有附加條款或是到期日的負債。實際上，這兩者給我們債務的好處(有能力擁有更多資產來為我們工作)卻沒讓我們承受一般債務所具缺點的重擔。

Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.

當然，並沒有人可以保證未來我們還是可以獲取零成本的浮存金。但我們感覺我們跟其他保險同業有相同機會達到這個目標。不僅我們在過去達到這目標(排除你們的董事長所犯下的一些重大過失)，我們在 1996 年併購GEICO 後，大大增進我們取得零成本浮存金的可能性。

8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.

8.管理階層的「希望清單」將不會讓股東埋單。我們不會只為了多角化經營而用控制價格去購買整個企業，卻忽視股東的長期經濟利益。我們只會用你的錢去做我們用自己的錢會去做的事，就像你會權衡自己能透過多樣化自己的投資組合可獲取多少價值後才經由股市購買股票一般。

Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.

查理跟我只有在確信我們可以提高波克夏股票的每股內在價值之後才對該併購案感興趣。我們的酬勞多寡或是辦公室大小都跟波克夏資產負債表的規模無關。

9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.

9.我們覺得崇高的目標應該經常以成果來檢驗。我們透過評估每保留一美金盈餘經過一段時間後，股東們是否可從市值得到超過一美元效益，來檢測我們對保留盈餘的看法是否正確。至今為止，這樣的檢驗始終與我們的看法一致。我們將持續用往前回溯五年的基礎來運用這方式。隨著我們的資產淨值成長，要明智地運用保留盈餘將漸行困難。

We continue to pass the test, but the challenges of doing so have grown more difficult. If we reach the point that we can’t create extra value by retaining earnings, we will pay them out and let our shareholders deploy the funds.
我們持續通過測試，但挑戰卻日益艱鉅。假如我們達到無法從保留盈餘創造額外價值的轉捩點，我們將會把他們歸還給股東好讓他們可以自由運用這些資金。

10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance—not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company—and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to—on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

10.我們只有在當我們能付出跟獲取等量事業價值時才發行普通股。這規則適用於所有發行型態(不只是併購或公開發行，還包括股債轉換、股票選擇權以及可轉換有價證券)。在與整個企業價值不一致的前提下，我們將不會出售你的公司的一小部分(亦即總發行股數的對應數量)

When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued—and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.)

當我們於 1996 年售出 B 股時，部分投資人對我們指稱波克夏股票的價值並未被低估感到震驚。這樣的反應實在是毫無根據。他們應該感到震驚的反而是我們當初登記發行的股票被低估這件事才對。當公司的高層在公開發行期間明說或暗指他們的股票價值被低估時，通常時依據的是公司當時實際經濟情況，而非依照原股東的持有成本而言：因為假如他們的經理人刻意用80美分的價格出售實際價值1美元的資產，將對股東造成不公平的損失之前我們在發行 B 股時不曾犯過這樣的罪行，往後也絕對不會。(然而，我們在當時並未宣稱我們的股價被高估，許多媒體卻都報導我們確實有這麼做)。

11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.

11.你必須確實瞭解到查理跟我所分享的一種並不利於我們的財務表現態度：不管股價為何，我們毫無興趣出售波克夏旗下所擁有的優秀企業。只要我們預期他們至少會產出些許現金，並且只要我們對其勞資關係感到滿意，我們也非常不情願出售表現低於平均水準的事業體。我們只希望入主次級事業體這種資產配置的錯誤不再重複發生。我們將對那些聲稱只要對我們旗下表現不佳的事業體大幅提高資本支出即可讓公司回復到令人滿意收益的建議嚴正警告(這些推論看似前途似錦而且倡導人往往態度誠懇，但到了最後，對一個糟糕透頂的產業大量額外的投資通常得到的只是像陷入流沙般那樣苦苦掙扎)。儘管如此，唯利是圖的管理行為(每次都拋棄你認為最不具前景的事業體)並非我們的風格。我們寧願為保有全部成果而受點責罰，也不願意幹出那種勾當。

We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.

我們持續避免出現唯利是圖的行為。的確，我們在苦撐 20 年後最終仍在 1980 年代中期關閉我們的紡織事業，但這只因我們認為它已經陷入無窮無盡的營運虧損深淵之故。不過我們既不會以高價出售某些業務也不會摒棄我們表現較差的部分，我們會聚焦在解決造成它們表現不佳的原因。

12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.

12.我們將直言不諱地向你報告，並在評估企業價值時強調對其造成增減的重要項目。我們的指導手冊主要是告訴你那些即便我們彼此的立場互換，我們也會想知道的各事業體的實際營運狀況。我們絕對不會虧欠你。此外，就像一家傳播公司在資料正確性上對我們大打折扣是非常不可原諒一般，我們會對自家公司有更平衡及深入的報告內容，如同我們要求自己的新聞從業人員報導別人一般。我們同樣相信真誠對管理階層的好處會跟我們一樣：公開誤導其他人的 CEO 最終也會自欺欺人。

At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.

在波克夏你找不到會計花招或重組的「大澡堂」行為，也不會發現任何對季報或年報結果做任何的美化。我們總會告訴你我們在每一洞擊出多少竿且絕不會在計分卡上玩任何花樣。當保險準備金需要被粗略概估時，我們將試著沿用我們那套前後一致且保守的方式來施行。

大澡堂:如有許多工廠趁著颱風天排放污水以避免被察覺受罰一樣，上市上櫃公司在操縱盈餘方面也有類似的作法。有些(其實不少)公司為了讓獲利好看，通常會利用公司獲利很差的那一年把未來(或以前)可能要逐年提列的各種減損費用趁此機會提前(或延後)作一次性的提列。反正死豬不怕燙，公司獲利已經很差了，多提列一些費用也就不那麼敏感，被罵也只這麼一次。這種作法被稱之為「大澡堂」(Big Bath)，目的在於把未來(或以前)每年要逐年提列的費用提前(或延後)集中一次提列，以後(或以前)每年就可免提列該筆費用，獲利數字就可好看些。2008年全球金融風暴引起的衰退正好提供這種機會給許多有此(不良？)意圖的公司。


We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.

我們會用幾種方式跟你連繫。透過年度報告我試圖給所有股東在合理的文件篇幅中盡可能多的價值定義資訊。我們也會試著在發佈到網路上的季報中呈獻給你充足卻扼要的重要資訊，雖然這些並非出自我手(個人秀一年一次就夠了)。另一個重要的聯繫場合正是我們的年度聚會，在這裡查理跟我很樂意花五個小時甚至更多時間去回答各位有關波克夏的種種問題。但是有種交流的方式我們則無法提供：一對一的交談方式。這對於擁有成千上萬股東的波克夏來說實在窒礙難行。

In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.
在我們所有的聯絡方式中，我們試著確保沒有任何一個股東擁有優勢：我們不會遵循給財務預測的常規或是將其他有價值的資訊透露給分析師或大股東。我們的目標是讓所有股東在同一時間得到第一手訊息。

13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.

13.儘管我們有坦白這項行事方針，我們只會在法律要求的前提下，討論我們對於上市有價證券的買賣情形。絕妙的投資點子是很稀有而且珍貴的，且如同好產品或優秀企業併購案那般極易遭致競爭對手的覬覦。所以我們通常不討論我們的投資想法。這個禁令同樣適用於我們已經出售的股票(因為我們可能會再買回)以及謠傳說我們將買進的標的。如果我們否認所有報告內容但卻在其他場合表明「不予置評」，那麼這個不予評論就應該是確認了。

Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.

雖然我們仍然沒有意願對特定股票表達看法，我們卻可對我們的事業及投資哲學暢所欲言。我個人從睿智慷慨且堪稱金融史上最偉大的導師-班‧葛拉漢身上獲益良多，即使班的教誨也調教出其他波克夏新的投資對手，而我依舊深信從他學習到的雋永智慧亦將助我繼續前行。

TWO ADDED PRINCIPLES
兩項新增準則

14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.

14.在盡可能的情況下，我們希望每位波克夏的股東在他們持有股票的期間，可以透過同一時期公司每股的內在價值增減幅度等比例的反應在市價的增減紀錄上。這麼一來，波克夏的內在價值就必須和其市值的比例呈現一個定值，而我們傾向讓兩者是一比一的關係。如前所述，我們寧願看到波克夏的股價維持在公平的水準而非較高水準。很顯然地，查理跟我不會控制波克夏的股價。但是透過我們各種的行事方針及溝通管道，我們可以輪流鼓勵消息靈通且行為理性的投資人間接讓波克夏的股價趨於合理。我們「高低估一樣糟糕」的作法可能會讓某些投資人感到失望。然而，我們相信這樣的方式才是最有可能使波克夏吸引那些願意陪伴公司成長，而非是只想藉由其他投資人犯的過錯尋求利益的長期投資人。

15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.

15.我們經常拿波克夏每股帳面價值的增益與 S&P 500指數的表現相比較。長此以往，我們希望能超越這個指標。要不然，為什麼我們的投資人還需要我們呢？然而這樣的檢驗方式有個特定的缺點，我將在下個章節描述這個缺點。此外，目前這樣的年增率比較方式已經比過去來得沒意義多了。此乃肇因於我們目前淨值中持有的股票其價值僅有一小部份與 S&P 500 連動，這與早年的情況截然不同。除此之外，S&P 股票收益乃全由其指數計算而得，而波克夏持股由於聯邦稅制的關係只有 65% 能計入。所以我們期望在股市了無生氣的年度裡勝過 S&P，而在股市過熱表現的幾年表現不佳我們倒不介意。


INTRINSIC VALUE
內在價值

Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.
現在讓我們把焦點放在我先前提到且將來你在年報中會遇到的一個名詞。

Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.

內在價值是個能提供唯一具邏輯估算各投資項目或事業體的相對吸引力的一個極重要概念。內在價值可以被簡單定義為：一個事業在其存續期間所有產出現金的折現值總合。

The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover—and this would apply even to Charlie and me—will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.

雖然內在價值的估算並不容易。如我們所提出的定義，內在價值乃是一個估計值而非一個確切的數字，而且隨著利率的變化或是對於未來現金流量的預估被修正，都需要對其重新估算。此外，就算兩個人看到一樣多的事實依據(這同樣適用在查理跟我的身上)，仍然不可避免出現些微差距的內在價值估算結果。這也是從未給你我們對於內在價值估算值的主要原因之一。雖然在我們年度報告中提供的諸多事實正是我們自己用以計算內在價值的基礎。

Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.

同時，我們定期報告我們每股的帳面價值，雖然這是個容易計算的數據，但實際能運用的情況卻有極其有限。這些限制並非從我們持有的那些上市有價證券中產生(其市值持續反映在我們帳上)。而是帳面價值不足以彰顯我們掌控的公司，其帳面上所載淨值可能完全迥異於內在價值。

The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.

情況也可能完全相反。舉例來說，在 1964 年我們確信波克夏每股帳面價值為 19.46 美元。然而這數字有些誇大了公司的內在價值，因為所有公司的資源幾乎與無利可圖的紡織事業牢牢綁在一起。我們的紡織事業相關資產所登載的帳面價值，既與其繼續營運的價值不符，也與其清算價值不相當。然而今日波克夏的情況剛好相反：目前我們的帳面價值遠低於波克夏的內在價值，主要原因在於我們所控管的很多事業體其內在價值比他們所登載的帳面價值高得多了。

Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.

即使上述的說明顯示帳面價值有不足之處，我們依舊給你波克夏的帳面價值等數字，因為如今這些數字提供一個儘管有些粗略、不充分但卻不失為追蹤波克夏內在價值的一個方式。換句話說，任何年度帳面價值變化的百分比很可能適度地接近其內在價值的年度波動程度。

You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

透過觀察大學教育這一種投資可以幫助你對於帳面價值跟內在價值之間的差異有更深刻的瞭解。我們先將教育成本視為他的「帳面價值」。假如這成本要是個很精確的數字，那麼應該將該名學生選擇求學而放棄工作所可能獲取的收入列入考量。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

在這個練習中，我們將忽略教育在非經濟性的重要效益並且只聚焦在其經濟價值上。首先，我們必須推估該名大學畢業生往後人生可賺取的收入，並扣除他若未受該項教育其工作所得的估計值。這給我們一個額外的獲利數字，接著將該數字以一個合適的利率折現，並回推到其畢業典禮當天。求得的結果相當於該教育的內在經濟價值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

有些大學畢業生將發現他們所受教育的帳面價值超過其內在價值，這表示無論是誰受該教育都是花冤枉錢。在其他情況，一項教育投資的內在價值將遠超過其帳面價值，而這結果證明資本被明智地分配。很顯然在所有情形下，帳面價值都是內在價值一個毫無意義的指標。


THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE
波克夏的管理

I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 246,000 employees, only 19 of these are at headquarters.

我認為透過討論波克夏今後的管理來作此篇總結應該是挺恰當的。如同我們股東相關守則第一條所述，查理跟我是波克夏的管理搭檔。但我們把管理事業群比較吃重的工作都交由子公司的經理人代勞。事實上，我們幾乎委派所有工作給其他人並退居幕後：雖然波克夏擁有 246,000 個員工，其中卻只有 19 位在總部服務。

Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.

查理跟我主要參與資產配置以及我們重要經理人的培植。這些經理人在他們獨挑大樑時最感到愉快，而這正是我們對待他們的方式。這樣的安排讓他們得以全權負責營運決策並且得以上繳多餘的資金給總部。而將多餘資金交付給我們可以讓他們不會為了要配置資金到他們個別事業上而遭遇各種用度金錢伴隨的誘惑而分神。甚且，查理跟我在投資運用這些資金上本來就比我們謹守自己領域的經理人浸淫在更大範圍的機會之中。

Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.

我們大部分的經理人本身都很富有，所以我們有責任創造一個可以鼓勵他們為波克夏工作的良好氛圍而不是花時間在打高爾夫球或釣魚上。這使我們必須公平地且設身處地以我們自己也願遵守的規範來對待他們。

As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.

提到資產配置，這可是一個查理跟我都很樂在其中且獲得不少寶貴經驗的活動。一般認知上，即便頭髮花白，在這個領域也不會受到任何影響：你不需要好的手眼協調能力或是健碩的肌肉就可以靈活調度資金(謝天謝地)。只要我們的心智精明依舊，查理跟我就能像從前一樣做好我們分內的工作。

On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.

一旦我撒手人寰，波克夏的股權結構將會改變但不致分崩離析：我所有的持股將不會為了現金遺贈或繳交稅金而出售。個人其餘部分的資產將會用來應付這類需求。所有波克夏的股票將分成十幾年漸次交付給各基金會託管。

At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.

在我死後，巴菲特家族將不會介入事業的管理，而只會當個堅實的股東協助遴選並監督經理人。當然，這些經理人何時上任得視我何時過世來決定，但是我可以事先決定管理架構：基本上我的工作將會分成兩部分。一個高層主管將會成為 CEO負責所有營運。投資相關的重擔則會落在一個或多個高階主管的身上。假如有一個新的合併案已經開始進行磋商，這些高階主管將會協同做出決策，當然啦，最後還是必須提交董事會同意才行。我們將會繼續保有一個關注股東權益的卓越董事會，其相關利益絕對會與你一致。

Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence.

一旦我們急切需要如我前述的管理架構，我們的董事們知道我對這兩項職務的建議人選。所有候選人目前不是正為波克夏工作就是隨時都可以走馬上任，他們都是我可以完全信任的人選。

I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact.

在繼任人選這個議題上，我將繼續保有董事資格。在我死後相當長的一段期間，我全部的遺產都會由波克夏股票組成，且這些股票將化為各基金會等價的資產，所以你可以確信董事們跟我對於繼任人選的問題必有通盤的考量並早已為此做好萬全準備。你同樣可以確定的是我們經營波克夏至今所運用的各項準則亦將持續帶領那些繼承我遺志的經理人，而我們非凡堅韌且定義明確的企業文化將原封不動地持續下去。

Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.

唯恐我們以哀戚作結，我要你知道我過去從未感到像現在這樣活力充沛，所以你大可放一百個心。我愛極了參與波克夏的運作，此外若享受生命有助於延年益壽，麥修撒拉(譯注：聖經記載非常高壽的人)的紀錄就岌岌可危了。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman

華倫‧巴菲特
董事長

巴菲特致股東函 2016

		Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
		Annual Percentage Change
	in Per-Share in S&P 500 Book Value of Berkshire			in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire			in S&P 500 with Dividends Included
Year
1965		23.80			49.50		10.00
1966		20.30			(3.40)		(11.70)
1967		11.00			13.30		30.90
1968		19.00			77.80		11.00
1969		16.20			19.40		(8.40)
1970		12.00			(4.60)		3.90
1971		16.40			80.50		14.60
1972		21.70			8.10		18.90
1973		4.70			(2.50)		(14.80)
1974		5.50			(48.70)		(26.40)
1975		21.90			2.50		37.20
1976		59.30			129.30		23.60
1977		31.90			46.80		(7.40)
1978		24.00			14.50		6.40
1979		35.70			102.50		18.20
1980		19.30			32.80		32.30
1981		31.40			31.80		(5.00)
1982		40.00			38.40		21.40
1983		32.30			69.00		22.40
1984		13.60			(2.70)		6.10
1985		48.20			93.70		31.60
1986		26.10			14.20		18.60
1987		19.50			4.60		5.10
1988		20.10			59.30		16.60
1989		44.40			84.60		31.70
1990		7.40			(23.10)		(3.10)
1991		39.60			35.60		30.50
1992		20.30			29.80		7.60
1993		14.30			38.90		1.10
1994		13.90			25.00		1.30
1995		43.10			57.40		37.60
1996		31.80			6.20		23.00
1997		34.10			34.90		33.40
1998		48.30			52.20		28.60
1999		0.50			(19.90)		21.00
2000		6.50			26.60		(9.10)
2001		(6.20)			6.50		(11.90)
2002		10.00			(3.80)		(22.10)
2003		21.00			15.80		28.70
2004		10.50			4.30		10.90
2005		6.40			0.80		4.90
2006		18.40			24.10		15.80
2007		11.00			28.70		5.50
2008		(9.60)			(31.80)		(37.00)
2009		19.80			2.70		26.50
2010		13.00			21.40		15.10
2011		4.60			(4.70)		2.10
2012		14.40			16.80		16.00
2013		18.20			32.70		32.40
2014		8.30			27.00		13.70
2015		6.40			(12.50)		1.40
2016		10.70			23.40		12.00
Average Annual Gain — 1965-2012
		19.0%			20.8%		9.7%
Overall Gain — 1964-2012		884319.0%			1972595.0%		12717.0%

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

說明：1965和1966年的財年截止日期為9月30日，1967年有15個月，截止至12月31日，其他年份財年與日曆年截止日相同。1979年開始，會計準則要求保險公司以市值計算所持有的權益類證券賬面價值，而此前準則要求以市價和歷史成本價孰低計量。上表中，波克夏1978年前的數據已經追溯調整以符合準則的要求。除此之外，所有結果依據原始數據進行計算。標普500指數的變動是稅前收益，而波克夏的數據是稅後收益。如果一個類似波克夏的公司擁有標普500指數的業績，並繳納相應稅收，在標普500回報為正的年份，其業績會落後於標普500，在標普500指數為負的年份，其回報會超過標普500指數。多年下來，稅收負擔將導致總體回報顯著落後於指數的變動。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致波克夏海瑟崴公司的全體股東：

Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over the last 52 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.*

2016年波克夏·哈撒韋公司凈值大增275億美元，公司A級和B級股票每股賬麵價值的漲幅都達到了10.7%。在過去的52年時間裏（即自現有管理層接管公司之后），公司每股賬面價值已從19美元漲至172108美元，綜合年增幅達到19%。

* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
*本報告中使用的所有每股數據適用於波克夏海瑟崴A股，B股數據為A股的1/1500。

During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”

在這52年裏的前半段時間裏，波克夏海瑟崴公司的凈值基本相當於企業自身的固有價值，其中原因正是由於公司大多數資源都以市場化債券的方式存在（這種債券的價值通常情況下會被重新估值。如果它們被出售，賣家所需負擔稅賦較少）。在華爾街，波克夏海瑟崴的資産負債表都採用逐日結算的辦法進行統計。

By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.

到了20世紀90年代早期，我們關注的焦點轉移至對其他企業的完全持有，這一策略使得公司經營情況和資産負債狀況的連動機制被實質性地解除了。值得注意的是，上述連動機制的解除主要原因在於被稱為GAAP(美國通用會計準則)會計準則的實施。這一要求企業必須遵守的準則，同此前我們利用市場化債券對企業價值進行管理的辦法較為不同。特別強調的是，我們所擁有的企業在遭遇虧損情況愈發明顯之時，其作為一個“失敗者”的價值需要被業績報表中被“減計”。相反，作為“勝利者”的企業價值從來不會被多估。

We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny.

我們已經經歷過兩種後果：在合併案已經基本敲定時，當我说同意時，公司對其他企業的收購往往會出現意料之外的結果。我們會做出一些十分低調的收購決定，而我給出的收購價格要比被收購企業的實際價格高出很多。這樣一來波克夏海瑟崴的帳面價值就會出現減計的情況。在過去我們所實施的一系列收購行動中也出現過一些贏家，其中有少數是規模較大的企業，但他們業績卻並未出現減計的情況。

We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.

我們對上述不對稱的會計準則並無反對。然而當經歷過一段時間之后，波克夏海瑟崴公司的實際價值和賬麵價值之間就會出現一定差異。今天，我們所投資的成功産品為公司帶來了大規模、持續增長且無記錄的業績增長，由此公司的實際價值已經遠遠超過賬麵價值。
上述情況在波克夏海瑟崴公司所投資的地産和傷亡保險公司以及其他大規模投資對象中都存在。

Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain – shown on the facing page – materially exceeds its book-value gain.

隨着時間的流逝，波克夏海瑟崴股價向著公司的實際價值發展，這也就解釋了為何在52年之后公司的市值遠遠超過賬麵價值。

What We Hope to Accomplish
我們希望達成的目標是：

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power per share to increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the U.S. economy. In addition, insurance mega-catastrophes or other industry-specific events may occasionally reduce earnings at Berkshire, even when most American businesses are doing well.

波克夏公司副主席、我的搭檔Charlie Munger和我都預測公司每股正常的收益能力將會呈現每年增長，受目前美國經濟疲軟的影響，現階段波克夏的實際收益將會有所下跌。與此同時，盡管公司在美國市場投資的大部分企業都業績良好，但包括保險在內的一些大型投資對象都會出現收益下降的情況。

It’s our job, though, to over time deliver significant growth, bumpy or not. After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors have opted to retain all earnings. Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained, in each year reinvesting many billions of dollars more than did the runner-up. Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.

我們的工作就是幫助公司業務實現大踏步的增長。作為你們投資的管理人，波克夏·哈撒韋的董事會成員一定會竭盡全力保護所有的投資收益。2015年和2016年內，波克夏均奪得美國企業美元收益保有量第一名的桂冠，其收益要比排名第二的企業多出數十億美元。

Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.

在一些時候，公司的盈利能力曾出現衰弱。查理和我沒有能夠將公司收益過度放大的能力，而在面對阻礙投資收益增長的障礙時，我和他將會採取適當的措施加以應對。
每隔大約十年時間，經濟環境就會出現惡化。但隨之而來的也有掙錢的良機，這時候我們是絶不會無動於衷的。

I earlier described our gradual shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from investment activities to one that grows in value by owning businesses. Launching that transition, we took baby steps – making small acquisitions whose impact on Berkshire’s profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable securities. Despite that cautious approach, I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring Dexter Shoe for $434 million in 1993. Dexter’s value promptly went to zero. The story gets worse: I used stock for the purchase, giving the sellers 25,203 shares of Berkshire that at yearend 2016 were worth more than $6 billion.

早些時候，我已經解釋過波克夏從一家通過投資行為獲得大部分利益的公司逐漸轉移至通過持有公司而使得后者價值提升的過程。盡管行事謹慎，我還是犯過錯誤。1993年時我花了4.34億美元收購Dexter Shoe，然而這家公司的價值迅速歸零。然而事情變得更加糟糕，我在購買Dexter Shoe時使用了我所持有的波克夏股票，我把25203股交給了Dexter Shoe的持有者，這些股份截止2016年底價值已超過60億美元。

That wreck was followed by three key happenings – two positive, one negative – that set us firmly on our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we acquired the half of GEICO we didn’t already own, a cash transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the world’s premier property/casualty business.

1996年初我們收購了GEICO一半的所有權，這是一筆現金交易，由此波克夏對GEICO的投資方式從投資組合轉變為全持有經營。在這之后GEICO也逐漸成長為我所認為的全球頂級的地産和傷亡保險業務企業。

Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock – a boatload of stock – to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that – despite the Biblical endorsement – is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).

不幸的是，我在1998年晚些時候完成對GEICO的收購之后竟愚蠢地使用波克夏的股份去收購General Reinsurance公司。在早期出現一些問題之后，General Reinsurance成為我們所投資的對象中表現優異的保險企業。我在收購General Reinsurance時為籌集資金髮行了272200股波克夏股票，這是我犯的一個嚴重錯誤。上述行動使得波克夏的流通股股份增長了21.8%。我的錯誤行為使得公司股東的付出要比他們獲得的更多。

Early in 2000, I atoned for that folly by buying 76% (since grown to 90%) of MidAmerican Energy, a brilliantly-managed utility business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make profitable and socially-useful investments. The MidAmerican cash purchase – I was learning – firmly launched us on our present course of (1) continuing to build our insurance operation; (2) energetically acquiring large and diversified non-insurance businesses and (3) largely making our deals from internally-generated cash. (Today, I would rather prep for a colonoscopy than issue Berkshire shares.)

2000年初期，我購買了MidAmerican Energy 76%的股份來補償波克夏在General Reinsurance交易中的虧損。MidAmerican Energy是一家管理層擁有豐富經驗的的公用事業公司，他為我們帶來了蘊含盈利和社會意義的商機。對MidAmerican Energy的收購也是採用的現金方式，在此基礎上：1、繼續加強我們保險投資方面業務發展；2、對非保險領域的企業進行積極的收購進而實現投資的多樣化；3、使用內部産生的現金來進行交易。

Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, de-emphasized though it is, has continued in the post-1998 period to grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains, interest, and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have provided us major help in financing the purchase of businesses. Though unconventional, Berkshire’s two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.

在1998年之后的時期，波克夏債券和股票的投資組合持續擴大，由此也為我們帶來豐厚的投資回報。上述回報為我們在收購其他企業時提供了堅實的資金保障。盡管方式不尋常，但波克夏在資金獲得方面採用的雙管齊下的方式為我們在投資決策時提供了實實在在的優勢。

Here’s our financial record since 1999, when the redirection of our business began in earnest. During the 18-year period covered, Berkshire’s outstanding shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring when we purchased BNSF. That, I’m happy to say, was one issuance of stock that made good sense.

以下是我們自1999年業務重新定向以來的金融交易記錄。在這18年裏，波克夏公司流通股股價僅漲了8.3%，而大多數的增長發生在我們收購伯靈頓北聖太菲鐵路公司(BNSF)時。我很高興地說發行股票很有意義。

	After-Tax Earnings (in billions of dollars)
		Capital				Capital
Year	Operations(1)	Gains (2)		Year	Operations (1)	Gains (2)
1999	0.67	0.89		2008	9.64	(4.65)
2000	0.94	2.39		2009	7.57	0.49
2001	(0.13)	0.92		2010	11.09	1.87
2002	3.72	0.57		2011	10.78	(0.52)
2003	5.42	2.73		2012	12.60	2.23
2004	5.05	2.26		2013	15.14	4.34
2005	5.00	3.53		2014	16.55	3.32
2006	9.31	1.71		2015	17.36	6.73
2007	9.63	3.58		2016	17.57	6.50

(1) Including interest and dividends from investments, but excluding capital gains or losses.
(2) In very large part, this tabulation includes only realized capital gains or losses. Unrealized gains and losses are also included, however, when GAAP requires that treatment.

Our expectation is that investment gains will continue to be substantial – though totally random as to timing – and that these will supply significant funds for business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire’s superb corps of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them to grow by making bolt-on acquisitions. By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement in earnings will translate into equivalent per-share gains.

我們的預期是投資將繼續産生大量收益，儘管就時間而言是完全隨機的，並且這將為我們後續的收購活動提供大量的資金。與此同時，波克夏優秀的首席運營執行官們（主管）將致力於增加他們所管理的各項業務的收益，有時候他們會採取補強型收購方式來促進增長，通過避免增發波克夏公司股票，改善性收益的任何增長都將轉化為每股收益。

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Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings of Berkshire will be aided – as they have been throughout our managerial tenure – by America’s economic dynamism. One word sums up our country’s achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago – a span of time less than triple my days on earth – Americans have combined human ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any dreams of our forefathers.

我們為促進正常化每股收益大幅增長所採取的措施也得到了貫穿於我們整個管理生涯的美國經濟活力的幫助。如果要用一個詞來總結我們國家的成就，那就是奇跡。從240年前的零起點開始，美國人已經將人類創造力、市場系統、富有天賦和野心的移民以及法律法規融合在一起實現了超出我們先輩們夢想的富足。

You need not be an economist to understand how well our system has worked. Just look around you. See the 75 million owner-occupied homes, the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper-productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent-filled universities, you name it – they all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren lands, primitive structures and meager output of 1776. Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling $90 trillion.

你們不需要是經濟學家，就能了解我們的系統運作得多好。看看你們周圍，看看這7500萬套自有住房、肥沃的農田、2.6億輛汽車、超高生産力的工廠、健全的醫療中心、人才濟濟的大學，它們都意味着美國人從1776年貧瘠的土地、原始社會結構和貧弱的生産力起點至今獲得的純利。白手起家的美國人已經累積了共計90萬億美元的財富。

It’s true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance their purchases. If an owner defaults, however, his or her asset does not disappear or lose its usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily passes to an American lending institution that then disposes of it to an American buyer. Our nation’s wealth remains intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, “Money is always there, but the pockets change.”

當然，那些有車有房以及擁有其他資産的美國人們往往為了買這些負債纍纍，這也是事實。然而，如果一個美國人違約，他或者她的資産並不會消失或者喪失其可用性。通常，所有權會轉給借貸機構，之后該機構再轉賣一個美國人買家。我們國家的財富仍然完好無損。正如格特魯德-斯泰因指出得那樣，“錢總在那裏，只是裝錢的口袋不斷變化”。

Above all, it’s our market system – an economic traffic cop ably directing capital, brains and labor – that has created America’s abundance. This system has also been the primary factor in allocating rewards. Governmental redirection, through federal, state and local taxation, has in addition determined the distribution of a significant portion of the bounty.

總之，這就是我們的市場系統，一個經濟上的交警，指揮着創造了美國富足的資本、腦力和勞動力的流動。這個系統還是利益分配過程中的主要因素。此外，政府通過聯邦、州和地方稅務機關進行的重定向決定了一大部分財富的分配。

America has, for example, decided that those citizens in their productive years should help both the old and the young. Such forms of aid – sometimes enshrined as “entitlements” – are generally thought of as applying to the aged. But don’t forget that four million American babies are born each year with an entitlement to a public education. That societal commitment, largely financed at the local level, costs about $150,000 per baby. The annual cost totals more than $600 billion, which is about 31⁄2% of GDP.

例如，美國已確定那些處於盛年的公民應該幫助老者和年幼者。這類形式的幫助有時被稱為“權利”，通常被認為應該應用於老者。但是不要忘了每年出生的400萬嬰兒，他們有權利接受公共教育。這一社會投入大多由當地政府提供資金，每個嬰兒大約花費15萬美元。這部分年度總開支超過了6000億美元，大約相當於國內生産總值的3.5%。

However our wealth may be divided, the mind-boggling amounts you see around you belong almost exclusively to Americans. Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of little importance to our national balance sheet: Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in value.

然而我們的財富可能被分為好多部分，你們所看到的十分驚人的一大部分几乎完全屬於美國人。當然，外國人也擁有我們財富的一部分。然而這一部分對於我們的國家的資産負債表無足輕重：我們的公民擁有的海外財富在價值上完全與之相當。

Early Americans, we should emphasize, were neither smarter nor more hard working than those people who toiled century after century before them. But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed human potential, and their successors built upon it.

我們應強調一點，早期的美國人既不會比他們之前幾個世紀辛苦勞作的人們更聰明，也不會更努力工作。但是這些富有冒險精神的前輩們創造出了一個能挖掘人類潛能的系統，他們的后輩也能在這個基礎上繼續創造。

This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our progeny far into the future. Yes, the build-up of wealth will be interrupted for short periods from time to time. It will not, however, be stopped. I’ll repeat what I’ve both said in the past and expect to say in future years: Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.

這一經濟創新將源源不斷地增加我們后代的財富。當然財富堆積過程總會時不時被打斷一段時間。然而，它將不會被停止。我將重覆過去我已經说過的話，並且在未來也會重覆说——現在出生的美國人是美國曆史上最幸運的一代人。

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America’s economic achievements have led to staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.

美國的經濟成就已經為股東們帶來了驚人的利潤。在20世紀，道瓊斯工業平均指數從66點漲至11497點，實現了17320%的資本收益，其中大部分得益於穩定增加的分紅。這一趨勢將持續下去——截至2016年底，該指數又增長了72%至19763點。

American business – and consequently a basket of stocks – is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they peddle.

美國企業和一籃子股票在未來將必定更有價值。創新、生産力發展、企業家精神和富足的資本都將有所幫助。無處不在的懷疑論者們可能通過宣傳他們的悲觀預期而發跡。但是如果他們按照他們宣傳的廢話行動，那麼只有上帝才能幫助他們了。

Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines – even panics – that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur – not me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however, it tends to find us.”

當然，許多公司將被甩在后面，一些公司將倒閉。這些企業被淘汰是市場活力的結果。而且，未來將偶爾發生市場大幅下跌甚至恐慌，這將對所有股票産生實質性影響。沒人能告訴你們這些衝擊將何時發生。我做不到、查理做不到，經濟學家們也做不到，媒體更無能為力。紐約聯儲的梅格·麥康奈爾曾貼切地對這一恐慌現實進行了描述：“我們花了很多時間尋找系統性風險，然而事實上它傾向於找我們。”

During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.

在這樣可怕的歲月裏，你們應該牢記兩點：首先，大範圍的恐慌是作為投資者的你們的朋友，因為它會提供物美價廉的資産；其次，個人恐慌是你的敵人。這是毫無必要的。那些避開高的成本和不必要成本、持有許多大型、適當籌資的企業股票並坐等較長一段時間的投資者們將必定能夠獲得不錯的收益。

As for Berkshire, our size precludes a brilliant result: Prospective returns fall as assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire’s collection of good businesses, along with the company’s impregnable financial strength and owner-oriented culture, should deliver decent results. We won’t be satisfied with less.

至於波克夏公司，我們的規模使我們不大可能創造出卓越的業績：隨着資産增加，未來收益將下滑。但是，波克夏旗下的好企業以及本公司堅不可摧的財務實力和以股東利益為出發點的企業文化應該能創造出良好的業績。我們不會滿足於更少。

Share Repurchase
股份回購

In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I’d suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn’t that complicated.

至於波克夏公司，我們的規模使我們不大可能創造出卓越的業績：隨着資産增加，未來收益將下滑。但是，波克夏旗下的好企業以及本公司堅不可摧的財務實力和以股東利益為出發點的企業文化應該能創造出良好的業績。我們不會滿足於更少。

From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it’s always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.

在投資世界，有關股票回購的討論往往變得很激烈。但是我曾經建議這場辯論的參與者們深吸一口氣，評估回購的必要性並沒有那麼複雜。從退出股東的立場出發，回購往往帶來好處。雖然這些回購活動的每日影響通常很小，但對於一個賣家而言市場上多一個買家總是更好的。

 For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth $3,000 and one is bought out by the partnership for $900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of $50. If the exiting partner is paid $1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of $50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.

然而，對於持續股東，回購只有在股票被以低於內在價值的價格購買時才有意義。當遵循這一規則時，剩下的股票將獲得內在價值的即時增長。考慮一個簡單的類比：如果一家價值3000美元的企業有三個平等合伙人，其中一個人持有的股權被以900美元的價格買走，那麼剩下的其他兩個合伙人持有的股權將各自實現50美元的增長。如果退出合伙人得到了1100美元，那麼剩下的兩個合伙人將分別損失50美元。同樣的計算可應用到企業和它們的股東上。因此，“回購行為對持續股東而言是價值增加還是價值損失”的問題完全取決於回購價格。


It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn’t be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.

所以，企業回購股票公告幾乎從不會提到回購上限價格，這點令人費解。如果一家公司管理層要收購其他公司，那麼情況就一定不會是這樣的。價格將總是影響買或不買的決定。

When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.

當首席執行官們或董事會將回購自己的公司的流通股時，他們看起來往往注意不到價格。如果他們管理一家有着幾個股東的私企且評估買斷其中一位股東的股權是否明智時，他們是否有類似的表現呢？當然不會。記住回購不應該發生的兩個時候是很重要的，即使該公司的股價被低估了。

It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company’s shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.

一個是當一家企業需要所有可用資金來維持，或者擴張其運營而進一步增加債務很麻煩時，這個時候資金的內部需要應該優先考慮。這一例外狀況需以企業在做出必要開支后擁有光明的前景為前提。

The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.

第二種例外狀況在企業的收購行為提供了比回購被低估股票更大價值時成為現實。很久以前，波克夏經常不得不在這兩個方案中做出選擇。按照我們目前的規模，這一問題不大可能出現。

My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”

我的建議——在討論回購前，首席執行官和董事會應該站起來做出一致聲明“在一個價格上這麼做是明智，在另一個價格上就是愚蠢”。

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To recap Berkshire’s own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can’t be precise.

概括下波克夏自己的回購政策：我被授權以低於帳面價值的120%購買大量波克夏的股票，因為我們的董事會已總結出按照這一價格水平購買能給持續股東帶來即時且實際的利益。我們估計，120%的帳面價值遠低於波克夏的內在價值，因為內在價值的計算並不精確，所以這一價差是恰當的。

The authorization given me does not mean that we will “prop” our stock’s price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.

賦予我這一權限並不意味着：我們將維持股價處於120%比率的水平。如果這一水平達到，我們將試圖把“以增值價格進行有意義購買”這一願望和“不要過度影響市場”這一目標融合在一起。

To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire’s intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that’s fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price – it’s no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases – nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out “partners” at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.

迄今為止，回購我們的股票被證明是很難的事情，因為我們已明確描述了我們的回購政策，也已經表達了我們的觀點“波克夏的內在價值遠高於120%的帳面價值”。如果是這樣，那也沒關係。查理和我更願意看到波克夏股票以和內在價值相差無幾的價格出售，而並不希望它們以不合理的高價或太低的價格出售。擁有對他們的購買行為感到后悔的股東並不有趣。而且，折價買斷合夥人的股權也不是令人滿意的賺錢方式。盡管如此，市場環境也可能創造出“回購將使持續和退出股東同時受益”的情況。如果是這樣，我們將做好行動準備。

One final observation for this section: As the subject of repurchases has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them un-American – characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavors. That simply isn’t the case: Both American corporations and private investors are today awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed. I’m not aware of any enticing project that in recent years has died for lack of capital. (Call us if you have a candidate.)

這一部分的最後一個發現：隨着回購的話題越來越熱門，一些人們已經接近於稱之為“反美國方式的”，認為它們是轉移了生産所需資金的企業罪行。根本不是這樣——美國企業和私人投資者們都擁有大量資金，期望其被有效利用。這些年我並沒有看到任何誘人的項目因資金缺乏而夭折。

Insurance
保險

Let’s now look at Berkshire’s various businesses, starting with our most important sector, insurance. The property/casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

現在讓我們看看波克夏各種各樣的業務項目吧，從我們最重要的部門保險開始。保險業的財險部分一直是自1967年我們斥資860萬美元收購國民保險公司和國家消防和海洋保險公司以來推動我們發展的引擎。現在國民保險公司按凈值計算是全世界最大的財險公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

我們被財險業務吸引的原因之一是其金融特徵：財險公司提前收到保險費，之后再支付理賠金。在極端情況下，例如理賠産生於接觸石棉，款項支付可延續好幾十年。這種現在收以后付的模式使得財險公司持有大量流動資金。與此同時，保險公司能出於自己的利益進行投資。雖然個人保單和索賠變化不定，但保險公司持有的流動資金往往較保險費保持相對穩定。其結果是，隨着企業發展，流動資金也增長。至於如何發展，如下圖所示：

Year         Float (in millions) 
1970               $ 39
1980                237
1990             1,632
2000           27,871
2010           65,832
2016           91,577


We recently wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than $100 billion. Beyond that one-time boost, float at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of large run-off contracts whose float is certain to drift downward.

我們最近簽了一份大額保單，能夠將流動資金增加至超過1000億美元。除了一次性增加外，政府僱員保險公司和數個專門項目的流動資金將必定大幅增加。然而，國民保險公司的再保險部門卻是大型徑流合同的當事人，其流動資金必定一路下滑。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. It will never be compromised.

我們可能早晚都要經歷流動資金下滑。如果這樣，那麼下滑將是逐漸的，每年至多不會超過3%。我們保險合同的本質是，我們從不會受到一定金額資金的立即或近期需求的影響，即使該數額資金對我們的現金資源至關重要的。這一結構是經過精心設計的，是我們保險公司無與倫比的財務實力的重要部分。它將永遠不會受到損害。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我們的保費超過了我們開支和最終損失的合計數，那麼我們的保險業務將登記承保利潤，從而增加流動資金創造的投資收益。當賺到這樣的利潤時，我們將享受自由資金的使用，更好的是，持有它們都獲益。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

不幸的是，所有保險公司都想要實現這一幸福結局的願望造成了競爭激烈，有時使得整個財險行業一邊承受保險損失一邊運作。實際上，這一損失就是保險行業持有流動資金付出的代價。競爭動態幾乎確保了——盡管所有保險公司享有流動收入，但整個保險行業將繼續其“以有形資産回報率低於正常值以下的水平獲取收益”的糟糕表現。

This outcome is made more certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of almost all P/C companies – though not those of Berkshire – are heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high-yielding legacy investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding a pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall. For that reason, and others as well, it’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case of companies that specialize in reinsurance.

這一結局因為現在存在於全世界的極低利率政策而變得更加確定。幾乎所有財險公司的投資組合都集中於債券，由於這些高收益的傳統投資的成熟及其被收益微薄的債券取代，流動資金的收益將持續減少。出於這個和其他原因，未來十年保險行業的業績將不及過去十年創下的紀錄，這是毋庸置疑的事，尤其對於那些專門從事再保險的公司。

Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage; occasionally, they offer us major opportunities. When others are constrained, our choices expand.

然而，我卻看好我們自己的發展前景。波克夏無與倫比的財務實力允許我們在投資上更靈活，而不僅僅局限於那些財險公司通常採用的投資方式。我們擁有許多投資選擇，這是我們的一大優勢，而且它們也提供給我們許多機會。當其他同類公司受到限制時，我們的選擇卻增加了。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $28 billion. That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

更重要的是，我們的財險公司擁有卓越的承保業績。波克夏現在已連續14年實現承保盈利，期間我們的稅前收益已經達到了共計280億美元。這樣的成績並非意外事件——我們所有的保險經理們每天都密切進行嚴格的風險評估，他們都知道盡管流動資金很有價值，其優勢也可能被糟糕的承包業績埋沒。所有保險公司都口頭表達過這一觀點。而在波克夏，這是一個信仰，就像舊約聖經那樣的。

So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as a typical liability is a major mistake. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses – a huge $27 billion to more than six million claimants in 2016 – and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.

因此我們的流動資金如何影響內在價值呢？當分析師們計算波克夏的帳面價值時，我們全部流動資金就被當作債務進行扣除，就好像我們明天就要將這筆錢付出去，可能無法填滿那樣。但將流動資金視為典型債務是一個重大錯誤。它應該被視為周轉資金。每天，我們支付舊的賠償金和相關費用，2016年超過600萬份索賠申請，總金額270億美元，這無疑減少流動資金。當然可以肯定的是，我們每天簽下新的保險合同，從而增加了流動資金。

If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises – because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.

如果我們的周轉金是零成本且長期的，我相信它將是這樣的，這一負債實際值就遠低於會計意義上的負債值。欠下將永遠不會離開房子的1美元與欠下明天就將出房門且不能被取代的1美元，完全是兩碼事。然而這兩種類型的負債在美國通用會計準則下被平等對待。

A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included in our book-value figure. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.

我們購買保險公司時産生且被計入我們帳面價值的155億美元商譽資産抵消了該誇大了的負債的一部分。在很大程度上，該資産代表着我們為我們保險運營産生流動資金的能力支付的價格。然而商譽的成本與其真正價值無關。例如，如果一家保險公司承受着大量且長期的承保損失，那麼其賬面上的任何商譽資産都應該被視為毫無價值，不管其最初成本是多少。

Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000 when float was $28 billion. Yet we have subsequently increased our float by $64 billion, a gain that in no way is reflected in our book value. This unrecorded asset is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value far exceeds its book value.

幸運的是，這並不是對波克夏的描述。Charlie和我相信我們保險商譽的經濟價值遠超過了其歷史帳面價值。實際上，我們保險業務所承載的全部155億美元商譽早在2000年就存在於我們的帳面上，當時流動資金為280億美元。現在我們的流動資金已增加了640億美元，而這一增長卻絲毫也沒有反映在我們的帳面價值上。這一沒有記錄的資産是我們相信波克夏的內在業務價值遠超過其帳面價值的主要原因。

************

Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.

波克夏極具吸引力的保險經濟學之所以存在，僅僅因為我們擁有一些了不起的經理，他們進行嚴格的運作，在大多數情況下採用難以複製的經營模式。讓我告訴你們主要部分。

First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.

按照流動資金規模排名第一的是波克夏再保險集團，由阿吉特·傑恩掌舵。阿吉特所保的風險是其他任何人都不願意或者沒有資本承擔的。他的運作結合了能力、速度、決斷力和保險行業獨有的思維方式。然而他從未令波克夏陷入和我們的資源相比不適當的風險中。

Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year. Our many streams of non-insurance earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.

確實，波克夏在規避風險方面比大多數的大型保險公司都更保守。例如，如果保險行業因一些重大災難要承受2500億美元的損失，那麼波克夏還有可能在當年實現盈利。我們的許多非保險利潤流將彌補其損失。此外，我們擁有大量的現金，渴望在可能已經一團糟的保險市場創下新的業績。與此同時，其他大型保險公司和再保險公司將陷於虧損中，即使沒有破産。

When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. If there were ever to be another Ajit and you could swap me for him, don’t hesitate. Make the trade!

當1986年某個周六，阿吉特邁進波克夏的辦公室時，他並沒有任何保險行業的經驗。然而我們當時的保險經理麥克-戈登伯格將我們薄弱且陷入困境的再保險部門交給了他。自那以來，阿吉特已為波克夏股東創造了數百億美元的價值。

************

We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.

我們還有另一個再保險強隊在通用再保險公司，在最近以前一直由塔德·蒙彼利埃管理着。在通用再保險公司工作了39年后，塔德於2016年退休了。塔德在各個方面都是佼佼者，我們對他感激萬分。與阿吉特一起工作了16年的卡拉·萊圭爾是通用再保險公司的現任首席執行官。

At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.

實際上，良好的保險業運營需要堅持四大原則。它必須：1、了解所有可能引起一份保單發生損失的風險；2、保守評估可能造成損失和代價的任何風險的可能性；3、設置在支付未來損失和運管成本后仍能盈利的保費；4、如果不能獲得恰當保費願意放棄。

Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy underwriting, and neither will Kara.

許多保險公司都能通過前三大考驗，卻在最后一個上栽了跟頭。他們不能拒絶其競爭對手迫切想要簽下的業務。傳統的“其他人都在做，所以我們也必須做”觀點在任何行業都造成了麻煩，但這些麻煩都不足以和它在保險業製造的麻煩相比。塔德從不聽信於草率承保的無意義理由，卡拉也將如此。

************

Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016.

最後是GEICO保險公司，這家公司66年前在我的心中燃起了火焰，該火焰至今一直燃燒着。該公司由托尼·奈斯利管理著，他18歲就進入這家公司，到2016年已有55個年頭。

Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and soundness to the job. (The latter quality is essential to sustained success. As Charlie says, it’s great to have a manager with a 160 IQ – unless he thinks it’s 180.) Like Ajit, Tony has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.

1993年托尼成為GEICO公司首席執行官，自那以后公司蓬勃發展。沒有比托尼更好的管理者了，他將他的傑出、奉獻和穩健等品質融入了這份工作。（這些品質是繼續取得成功的關鍵，就如同Charlie所说的，寧可要一個智商160的經理，也不要一個看起來智商是180的經理。）和阿吉特一樣，托尼也為波克夏創造了數百億美元的價值。

On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. The company’s annual sales were then $8 million; In 2016, GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.

在1951年初訪GEICO公司時，我就被這家公司所擁有的巨大成本優勢所震撼。我很清楚地知道，這家公司將取得成功，因為它值得。那時GEICO公司的年銷售額是800萬美元，2016年該公司每三個小時就能實現800萬美元銷售額。

Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver those. In fact, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.

汽車保險是大多數家庭的主要開支。儲蓄對他們很重要——僅低成本的運作能夠實現這點。實際上，至少40%讀了這封信的人們能通過與GEICO公司簽訂保單來存錢。那麼別讀了，現在就行動打電話800-847-7536來投保吧。

GEICO’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross. As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year, ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume. That’s up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from 8,575 to 36,085.

GEICO公司的低成本創造出了一條競爭者們難以逾越的鴻溝。其結果是，這家公司的市場份額年年都在增長，截至2016年底，它已佔據了保險業約12%的市場份額。1995年，波克夏取得對該公司的控制權時，其市場份額僅為2.5%。在此期間，其員工數量也從8575人增至36085人。

GEICO’s growth accelerated dramatically during the second half of 2016. Loss costs throughout the auto-insurance industry had been increasing at an unexpected pace and some competitors lost their enthusiasm for taking on new customers. GEICO’s reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to accelerate its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets, knowing that it will surely rise again.

從2016年下半年開始，GEICO公司業績增長顯著加快。期間，整個汽車保險行業的損失成本正在以令人意想不到的速度增長，而部分競爭對手也因此開始失去了接受新客戶的熱情。但GEICO公司對於利潤空間被壓縮的應對措施是加快在新業務領域的努力。未雨綢繆，把握時機。

GEICO continues on a roll as I send you this letter. When insurance prices increase, people shop more. And when they shop, GEICO wins.

就像我在這封信件中所言，目前，GEICO公司的業績仍然處於左右搖擺的情況。不過，當保險價格開始上升時，人們就會購買更多保險，而GEICO公司最終也會成為贏家。

Have you called yet? (800-847-7536 or go to geico.com)

************

 In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this group has earned $4.7 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume – while increasing its float from $943 million to $11.6 billion.

除了三大主要保險業務運行實體之外，我們還擁有一些規模較小的公司，它們的主要從事商業類保險業務。總體來看，這些小公司的業務也是一個規模較大的，不斷增長的，而且非常有價值的業務板塊。這些小公司持續不斷地創造了承保盈利。據了解，與競爭對手相比，這些小公司通常都表現更出色。在過去14年時間裏，這些小公司組成的群體已為我們贏得了近47億美元承保盈利——相當於其承保金額總數的13%——而其浮動盈利也從9.47億美元上升至116億美元。

Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run: We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a world-wide operation. Instead, he and his crew delivered significant underwriting profits throughout the start-up period. BHSI’s volume increased 40% in 2016, reaching $1.3 billion. It’s clear to me that the company is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.

在2年多前，我們成立了波克夏專業保險公司（BHSI），這家公司也是以上小公司群體中的一員。我們做出的第一個決定就是讓皮特·伊斯特伍德（Peter Eastwood）來掌管這家公司。事後證明，這絶對是一個英明的決定：最初，我們預期這家公司將會在成立伊始的數年中出現重大虧損，因為在全球業務實施過程中，皮特·伊斯特伍德首先需要建立與業務相關的人員和基礎設施等基本條件。相反的是，在公司成立之初的創業期間，皮特和他的團隊就已經為公司貢獻了顯著的承保利潤。2016年時，波克夏公司的業務規模已增加40%，至13億美元。顯而易見，這家公司注定將會成為全球一流財險/人身傷害險公司（P/C insurers）中的佼佼者。

Here’s a recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division:
以下就是該公司稅前承保盈利情況和年終浮動收益情況的細分表：

		(in $ millions)
		Underwriting Profit			Yearend Float
Insurance Operations		2016	2015		2016	2015
General Re		$822	$421		$45,081	$44,108
B-H Reinsurance		190	132		17,699	18,560
GEICO		462	460		17,148	15,148
Other Primary		657	824		11,649	9,906
Total		$2,131	$1,837		$91,577	$87,722

Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a range of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that time will only make more valuable.

對於波克夏公司的傑出管理者們來说，他們首先採用的金融實力和一系列的業務模式成為保險行業資産保護的一道護城河，這種保護作用是獨一無二的。而對於波克夏公司的股東來说，這種組合優勢成為了他們一筆巨大的財富。而隨着時間流逝，這種財富價值也將會日趨顯著。

Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses

Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.

此外，作為調整後的資本密集型企業，BNSF鐵路公司和波克夏能源公司（BHE）90%的股份由我們控制。它們也是我們控制的兩家涉及公共事業領域的企業。在這裏，也准備分享將它們從波克夏公司其他業務中區分以後的重要特徵。因此，在這份信中，我們將這兩家公司進行了單獨區分，並將它們合併後的財務報表也從我們的符合美國通用會計準則（GAAP）的資産負債和損益表中剝離出來。去年，這兩家主要企業的收入占波克夏公司整個稅後收入的33%。

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

這兩家企業有一個共同的關鍵特點，就是其擁有的巨大投資，屬於長期、可調節的資産。這些資産部分地受到大量長期債務的融資支持，但不需要波克夏公司的信用擔保。事實上，這兩家公司都不需要我們的信用擔保，因為每個公司都有自己的盈利能力。甚至是在經濟條件比較糟糕的情況下，它們也能夠超越對自己的盈利要求。以去年為例，對於各個鐵路運輸公司來说，是相對不太理想的一年，但BNSF鐵路公司的利息償付比率超過6：1（我們對償付比率的定義是，息稅前收益和利息之間的比值，而不是EBITDA與利息之間的比值。后者是一個常用的衡量指標，但我們認為有嚴重缺陷）。

At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.

同時，對於波克夏能源公司（BHE）來说，有兩大因素確保這家公司在任何外部環境下，都有能力償付自己的債務。首先是針對所有公共事業，其可以在經濟衰退期間保持盈利。因為這些企業提供的是社會基本功能方面的服務，所以社會對它的需求保持着非常穩定的狀態。第二個因素是部分公共事業具有一些特定的優勢，比如它們有着不斷擴大的多元化收益優勢。這一優勢可以保證波克夏能源公司（BHE）免遭任何單一監管機構帶來的嚴重傷害。這些多樣化來源的利潤，再加上其母公司擁有的先天優勢，可以讓該公司及其子公司能夠大幅降低債務成本。這一經濟因素也讓我們和我們的客戶從中受益。

All told, BHE and BNSF invested $8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to their segments of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.

總體來说，去年，波克夏能源公司（BHE）和BNSF鐵路運輸公司在工廠建設和設備購買方面的投資額為89億美元。這是以上兩家公司對美國基礎建設重建做出的一個重大承諾。只要能夠保證合理的利潤回報，我們就喜歡做這樣的投資——在這一方面，我們對政府未來的監管決策給予大量的信任。

Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.

我們充滿信心是有一定道理的。依據我們過去積累的經驗和知識來看，在交通運輸和能源領域，社會永遠都會需要大規模的投資。從政府的自身利益出發，其對投資者的熱心支持將能夠確保資金持續不斷地進入其基本建設項目。對於我們在業務運行中採取一定方式來獲得政府監管部門和其代表者對此的批准，也與我們追求的自身利益相一致。

Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 7.1¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.9¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.5¢, Illinois 9.2¢, Minnesota 10.0¢. The national average is 10.3¢. We have promised Iowans that our base rates will not increase until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.

較低的價格將會是取得本地選民認同的最有力方式。在艾奧瓦州，波克夏能源公司（BHE）的平均零售電價為7.1美分/度。在阿蘭特地區，該州其他主要電力供應商的平均零售電價為9.9美分/度。以下是相鄰各州的可比電價：內布拉斯加州9.0美分/度，密蘇里州9.5美分/度，伊利諾斯州9.2美分/度，明尼蘇達州10.0美分/度。而整個美國國內的平均電價為10.3美分/度。因此，我們在艾奧瓦州州承諾，最早截止到2029年時，我們的這一基本零售電價不會上漲。我們的最低價格，其實就是給經濟拮据的客戶一種真金白銀式的幫助。

At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance the load is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads ranged from 4¢ to 5¢.

對於BNSF鐵路公司來说，與其他主要鐵路運輸企業進行價格對比是非常困難的一件事，因為這些企業在貨物混合和平均運輸距離方面存在顯著差異。在這裏，我們提供了一個粗略的衡量標準。去年，BNSF鐵路公司的每噸/英裏貨物的基本收入價格為3美分。而其他四家美國主要鐵路貨運企業的運輸價格範圍在每噸/英裏4-5美分之間。

Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to rivaling Iowa, where last year the megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to our Iowa retail customers. New wind projects that are underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.

無論波克夏能源公司（BHE）還是BNSF鐵路公司，都已經成為環境友好型技術企業的領導者。在風力發電領域，沒有任何一個州能夠與艾奧瓦州相提並論。去年，我們在該州風力發電量的55%被零售給當地用戶使用。目前，新的風力發電項目也正在全力推進。預期到2020年時，我們風力發電總量的89%將會提供給該州使用。

Bargain-basement electric rates carry second-order benefits with them. Iowa has attracted large hightech installations, both because of its low prices for electricity (which data centers use in huge quantities) and because most tech CEOs are enthusiastic about using renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy, Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.

此外，協議電價比率的增加對該州用戶也有利，同樣也能夠為以上公司帶來新的利潤。目前，艾奧瓦州已經吸引了大量高科技企業來安家落戶。對於高科技企業來说，一方面艾奧瓦州較低的電力價格（這一核心數據已經被大量引用）非常有吸引力；另一反面，很多高科技企業的管理層都對新能源的使用充滿熱情。當談及風能資源時，艾奧瓦州可以被稱作是美國的沙地阿拉伯。

BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. Those economics make railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.

BNSF鐵路公司屬於美國國內I類鐵路運輸企業，其僅使用一加侖的柴油就可以將一噸貨物運輸到500英裏之外的地方。這些經濟指標讓鐵路運輸效率超過卡車運輸效率四倍以上。此外，鐵路運輸可以緩解公路運輸的擁堵問題——對於政府花在交通設施維護方面的公共財政支出來说——這也是一個主要的節省途徑。

All told, BHE and BNSF own assets that are of major importance to our country as well as to shareholders of Berkshire. Here are the key financial figures for both:

總之，無論對美國，還是對波克夏公司的股東們，波克夏能源公司（BHE）和BNSF鐵路公司所擁有的資産具有非常重大的意義。以下表格中就是兩家公司的關鍵財務數據：

BNSF			Earnings (in $ millions)
			2016	2015	2014
Revenues			$19,829	$21,967	$23,239
Operating earnings			13,144	14,264	16,237
Operating earnings before interest and taxes			6,685	7,703	7,002
Interest (Net)			992	928	833
Income taxes			2,124	2,527	2,300
Net earnings			$3,569	$4,248	$3,869

Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90% owned)			Earnings (in $ millions)
			2016	2015	2014
U.K. Utilities			$367	$460	$527
Iowa utility			392	314	298
Nevada utilities			559	586	549
PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah)			1,105	1,026	1,010
Gas Pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River)			413	401	379
Canadian transmission utility			147	170	16
Renewable projects			157	175	194
HomeServices			225	191	139
Other (Net)			73	27	26
Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes			3,438	3,350	3,138
Interest			465	499	427
Income Taxes			431	481	616
Net Earnings			$2,542	$2,370	$2,095
Earnings Applicable to Berkshire			$2,287	$2,132	$1,882

HomeServices may appear out of place in the above table. But it came with our purchase of MidAmerican (now BHE) in 1999 – and we are lucky that it did.

上表中，另一家公司HomeServices的財務數據沒反映出來。但這家公司是我們在1999年時收購MidAmerican公司（目前的波克夏能源公司）的一部分——對HomeServices公司的收購，也是非常值得肯定的投資決策。

HomeServices owns 38 realty companies with more than 29,000 agents who operate in 28 states. Last year it purchased four realtors, including Houlihan Lawrence, the leader in New York’s Westchester County (in a transaction that closed shortly after yearend).

截止目前，HomeServices公司在美國國內28個州擁有38家物業公司，其員工超過2.9萬人。去年，該公司收購了4家房地産經紀商，其中就包括Houlihan Lawrence房地産公司。Houlihan Lawrence公司是紐約西切斯特縣區房地産行業中的領先者（這項收購交易剛在年底時完成）。

In real estate parlance, representing either a buyer or a seller is called a “side,” with the representation of both counting as two sides. Last year, our owned realtors participated in 244,000 sides, totaling $86 billion in volume.

用房地産慣常的说法，買方或者賣方被稱作是“一方”，而買賣雙方集於一身則被稱作是“雙方”。去年，我們擁有的來自“雙方”的房地産經紀人有24.4萬人次，總的交易量為860億美元。

HomeServices also franchises many operations throughout the country that use our name. We like both aspects of the real estate business and expect to acquire many realtors and franchisees during the next decade.

HomeServices公司的多項業務遍及美國國內，並擁有大量加盟特許經銷商。我們對房地産行業的方方面面都感到非常滿意。預期在未來十年時間裏，該公司將會迎來更多的房地産經紀商和特許加盟商。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
製造業、服務業和零售業

Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

在製造業、服務業和零售業方面，我們投資很多製造、服務和零售企業。它們生産銷售覆蓋很多領域的産品，從棒棒糖到噴氣式飛機，涉獵廣泛。在下表中，我們將這些企業作為一個整體考慮，並對它們的資産負債和盈利情況進行了對比：

		Balance Sheet 資產負債表 12/31/16 (in $ millions)
Assets資產					Liabilities and Equity負債及股東權益
Cash and equivalents			$8,073		Notes payable			$2,054
Accounts and notes receivable			11,183		Other current liabilities			12,464
Inventory			15,727		Total current liabilities			14,518
Other current assets			1039
Total current assets			36,022
Goodwill and other intangibles			71,473		Deferred taxes			12044
Fixed assets			18,915		Term debt and other liabilities			10,943
Other assets			3,183		Non-controlling interests			579
			$129,593		Berkshire equity			91,509
								$129,593

		Earnings Statement (in $ millions)
					2016	2015	2014
Revenues					$120,059	$107,825	$97,689
Operating expenses					111383	100607	90788
Interest expense (net)					214	103	109
Pre-tax income					8462	7115	6792
Income taxes and non-controlling interests					2831	2432	2324
Net income					$5,631	$4,683	$4,468

Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella. For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units, serving widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive owns 83 dealerships, operating in nine states.

這張財務報表中包括了44家向公司總部直接彙報業務的企業。但其中部分企業又受很多個人的投資與管理。例如，Marmon公司有175家獨立運行的業務單元，並向很多不同領域的市場提供服務，而波克夏汽車公司在美國國內擁有83家經銷商，業務覆蓋美國九個州。

This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew. Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that, in a couple of instances, exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.

這些企業合在一起就像是一個雜牌軍。不過，部分企業的營收情況可以通過其未槓桿化的有形凈資産來衡量。而且在很多情況下，甚至在100%的情況下，這些企業帶來的回報也非常出色。這些企業中，絶大多數是盈利能力良好的實體企業，其産生的利潤率在12-20%之間。

A few, however – these are serious blunders I made in my job of capital allocation – produce very poor returns. In most cases, I was wrong when I originally sized up the economic characteristics of these companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. In a couple of instances, I stumbled in assessing either the fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in place. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie – never bashful – is around to say “no” to my worst ideas.

不過，需指出的是，在我的資産配置過程中也存在少量的重大錯誤——也産生了非常糟糕的回報。大多數情況下，當我最初對這些企業或行業的經濟特點進行把握時，錯誤就會出現。而現在我們也正在為這些錯誤判斷付出代價。在另外一些例子中，我對這些現任管理者，或者即將上任的管理者其忠誠度和能力偶爾會進行評估。我還會犯更多的錯誤，你可以關注這些錯誤。不幸的是，查理——從不為錯誤害羞——只是對很多糟糕想法说“不”。

Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing, service and retailing group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after-tax on that capital.

從單一的實體企業來考慮，以上很多企業在製造業、服務業和零售行業都是非常優秀的企業之一。在2016年期間，這些企業的有形凈資産平均值在240億美元左右。它們持有大量超額現金且幾乎沒有債務纏身，其資本帶來的稅後收益在24%左右。

Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because Duracell and Precision Castparts (both bought in 2016) will for the first time contribute a full year’s earnings to this group. Additionally, Duracell incurred significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.

當然，對於一個經濟狀況非常出色的企業來说，如果其帶來過高的服務價格，那麼該企業就可能會成為一個比較糟糕的投資項目。對於大部分企業來说，我們已經為其有形凈資産付出了相當高的溢價成本。這些成本被詳細反映在資産平衡表的信譽和其他無形資産方面。總體來说，在資本回報方面，我們得到了一個體面的回報率。在這一領域，我們已進行了部署。在沒有經濟衰退影響的前提下，以上整個企業群體在2017年的盈利可能會增加。部分原因是Duracell公司(金霸王電池)和Precision Castparts公司（精密機件公司，2016年時買入）將會首次為該群體貢獻全年盈利。除此之外， Duracell公司2016年曾經發生過的高額轉型成本，本年度將不會再發生。

We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 90 - 94. Be aware, though, that it’s the growth of the Berkshire forest that counts. It would be foolish to focus over-intently on any single tree.

對以上群體中的很多小企業，我們無法一一給出具體的評論。此外，它們的競爭對手（無論是現在還是將來的），也會仔細研讀這份報告。對我們的少數業務來说，如果外界知悉這些數據，可能會讓我們處於不利地位。因此，我們的一些業務在波克夏公司的評估報告中沒有給出詳細的材料，只是披露了一些需要公開的內容。在本報告的第90-94頁中，你可以找到很多有關我們業務的詳細內容。但需要知道的是，這個增長是整個波克夏公司層面上的一個增長。任何關注某一個企業或業務增長的做法都是非常愚蠢的。


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For several years I have told you that the income and expense data shown in this section does not conform to GAAP. I have explained that this divergence occurs primarily because of GAAP-ordered rules regarding purchase-accounting adjustments that require the full amortization of certain intangibles over periods averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those amortization “expenses” are not truly an economic cost. Our goal in diverging from GAAP in this section is to present the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which Charlie and I view and analyze them.

過去數年裏，我一直告訴投資者，在本部分中提供的收入和支出費用數據並不符合美國通用會計準則（GAAP）。對這一分歧問題，我給出的解釋是，GAAP準則關於收購時的會計調整規定，無形資産的攤銷需要一定的周期時間，這一周期的平均時間在19年左右。但從我們的觀點來看，大部分的攤銷“費用”並不是真正的經濟成本。我們在這一領域的目標偏離了GAAP準則，但所給出的數字卻反映了一個事實：那就是查理在使用這些數字進行分析和判斷。

On page 54 we itemize $15.4 billion of intangibles that are yet to be amortized by annual charges to earnings. (More intangibles to be amortized will be created as we make new acquisitions.) On that page, we show that the 2016 amortization charge to GAAP earnings was $1.5 billion, up $384 million from 2015. My judgment is that about 20% of the 2016 charge is a “real” cost.

在本報告的第54頁，我們列出了總額為154億美元的無形資産，其攤銷費用還尚未在年度營收費用中扣除。隨着新收購業務的進行，將會産生更多無形資産攤銷費用。在第54頁，我們還給出了按照GAAP準則計算的收益支出費用，其中2016年無形資産攤銷費用為15億美元。與2015年相比，新增3.84億美元。我個人的判斷是，2016年攤銷費用中的20%是“真實”成本。

Eventually amortization charges fully write off the related asset. When that happens – most often at the 15-year mark – the GAAP earnings we report will increase without any true improvement in the underlying economics of Berkshire’s business. (My gift to my successor.)

最終，全部攤銷費用將會從相關資産中抵消。當這種情況發生時（通常以15年期為標誌），按照GAAP準則的盈利要求，在我們的報告中，波克夏公司的基本金融業務將不會出現任何實質性的改善（這是我留個繼任者的禮物）。

Now that I’ve described a GAAP expense that I believe to be overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is GAAP-prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those charges materially understate true economic costs. Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was rampant. As inflation subsided – thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker – the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue. But the problem still prevails, big time, in the railroad industry, where current costs for many depreciable items far outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are considerably higher than true economic earnings.

現在我描述了被自己認為誇大的GAAP支出費用，而該會計準則帶來的失真，也讓我産生了一種非常不愉快的感覺。現在所提到的主題內容是GAAP準則所規定的折舊費用，該費用的發生必須要基於一個歷史成本。然而，在某些情況下，這種費用嚴重低估了真正的經濟成本。有大量的文字記載了上個世紀70-80年代時，當通貨膨脹爆發后所出現的這一現象。隨着通脹消退（我們要感謝美聯儲前主席保羅·沃爾克的英勇行動），讓折舊費用不足以構成一個經濟問題。但問題依然存在。很多時候，鐵路運輸行業的很多折舊項目其現行成本其實遠超過歷史成本，一個不可避免的結果是，整個鐵路行業的報告盈利遠遠高於其真正的經濟收益。

At BNSF, to get down to particulars, our GAAP depreciation charge last year was $2.1 billion. But were we to spend that sum and no more annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less competitive. The reality is that – simply to hold our own – we need to spend far more than the cost we show for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will prevail for decades.

從具體的會計項目來看，伯靈頓北聖太菲鐵路運輸公司（BNSF）的賬目上，按照GAAP一般公認會計原則計算，去年公司計提了總額21億美元的折舊費用。但是，如果我們公司之前一次性把這筆錢花掉而不是每年計提折舊費用，公司旗下的鐵路資産將很快出現質量下降的問題，公司業務的競爭力也將隨之下降。因此，在伯靈頓北聖太菲鐵路運輸公司持有的資産上，我們實際上花費了比會計賬目中折舊費用更多的資金。不僅如此，未來幾十年中，這種會計折舊費用和實際經營開支之間的較大差異將持續出現。

All that said, Charlie and I love our railroad, which was one of our better purchases
儘管如此，查理和我都非常看好我們的鐵路運輸資産和業務，這也是我們最好的幾個收購項目之一。

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Too many managements – and the number seems to grow every year – are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature, “adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based compensation” as expenses.

如今，太多公司管理層在尋找各種各樣的辦法向股東彙報公司調整后凈利潤，並試圖在財報中突出強調這一個高於符合一般公認會計原則凈利潤的數字。同時，每年都有越來越多的公司管理層這樣做。在實際工作中，會計人員有很多辦法來施展他們的財務技巧。其中，將“公司重組費用”和“股權補償”剔除在經營費用開支項目之外，成為這些公司最喜歡使用的兩個財技。

Charlie and I want managements, in their commentary, to describe unusual items – good or bad – that affect the GAAP numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous. That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be “helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry participants.

查理和我希望公司管理層在每份財報的備注部分，不論好壞，詳細说明會影響符合一般公認會計原則業績數字的非經常性損益項目的來源。畢竟，我們看公司過去的業績數字是為了更好地預測公司未來的業績表現。但是，如果一個公司的管理層經常通過避開實際費用開支而強調調整后每股收益，那我們會感到非常緊張，因為這種不好的行為會傳染。一個公司中，如果CEO刻意尋找粉飾財務數字的途徑，這種態度通常會在公司內部形成一種鼓勵底層員工也努力粉飾財務數字的企業文化。如果企業高層的目標僅僅是為了展示一個好看的財務數字，那麼保險公司可能會低估賠款准備金的數額，這種行為過去毀滅了許多公司。

Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.” In truth, business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street will be tempted to make up the numbers.

查理和我在聽到一些分析師大舉讚揚那些總能達成預期業績目標的公司管理層時，都會感到很不安。事實上，公司業務發展是很難預測的，因此公司也很難總是達成業績預期。因此，企業總會不可避免地出現實際業績低於預期水平的情況。這種問題出現時，太過於關注股價表現的公司CEO就有可能粉飾財務數字。

Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.” Berkshire, I would say, has been restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965. Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other choice. And today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every year at Berkshire. That’s because there are always things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses. Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.

讓我們深入探討一下喜歡將“公司重組費用”和“股權補償”不計入經營費用開支項目的公司管理層。首先我們來看看“公司重組費用”。從1965年我們買下波克夏公司之后，我認為公司就一直在不停進行着重組。那時，公司旗下僅僅只有一個北方地區的紡織業務，公司在重組方面沒有什麼選擇余地。如今，每年波克夏公司內部都會進行大量重組活動，這是因為公司旗下數百家子公司中，總有一些業務需要變革。正如我之前提到的，去年我們在金霸王公司的重組上投入了大量資金，以確保公司在未來幾十年中能維持市場競爭力。

We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning power. If there were to be some truly major expenses in a single year, I would, of course, mention it in my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one-time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained clearly to owners. That’s precisely what the CEO of Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company’s directors (who include me). But, to tell owners year after year, “Don’t count this,” when management is simply making business adjustments that are necessary, is misleading. And too many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.

但是，我們還從來沒有將公司重組費用單獨列出，然后告訴你在估測波克夏公司的正常盈利能力時不要考慮這些非經常損益項目。在某一年中，如果確實存在一些大額費用開支項目的話，我當然會在公司財報的備注部分中说明這些費用開支。事實上，當公司旗下某個業務需要進行全面重組的話，例如當年卡夫公司和亨氏公司合併，我們認為要向公司的股東清楚解釋花費這一大筆巨額資金合併兩家公司業務的理由。而卡夫亨氏公司的首席執行官也是這麼做的，管理層说明的理由也得到了包括我個人在內的公司董事會批准。但是，如果每一年公司管理層都告訴股東一些“公司重組費用”不應當計入企業業績評估，而這些業績調整項目實際上都是公司經營必需的開支，那麼公司管理層就是在誤導股東。不僅如此，許多股票分析師和財經記者也都輕信了這種粉飾后的財務數字。

To say “stock-based compensation” is not an expense is even more cavalier. CEOs who go down that road are, in effect, saying to shareholders, “If you pay me a bundle in options or restricted stock, don’t worry about its effect on earnings. I’ll ‘adjust’ it away.”

不僅如此，一些公司管理層更大膽宣稱“股權補償”方面的開支不屬於公司經營費用開支項目。實際上，這樣做的公司高層只習慣是在告訴股東：“如果公司向我支付一系列股票期權或限制性股票來作為薪酬，股東就不用擔心薪酬對公司盈利表現的影響，因為我會把這些開支調整掉”。

To explore this maneuver further, join me for a moment in a visit to a make-believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is to juice Berkshire’s reported earnings. Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.

為更好地認清一些公司管理層使用的粉飾財務數據的財技，讓我們來觀摩一個假想的炮製漂亮財務數據的會計實驗室，這個實驗室的唯一目標就是粉飾波克夏公司財報中披露的財務數字。一些充滿想象力的會計師正在等着我們，迫切地想要展示他們的財技，讓我們一起去看看吧。

Listen carefully while I tell these enablers that stock-based compensation usually comprises at least 20% of total compensation for the top three or four executives at most large companies. Pay attention, too, as I explain that Berkshire has several hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so. I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all of these payments to Berkshire’s executives as an expense.

注意，我曾说過對於許多大型企業最高層的三到四名高管而言，股權補償應當占高管全部薪酬的20%以上。但是，你們更應當注意的一點是，在波克夏公司旗下各個子公司中任職的數百名高管中，他們獲得股權補償報酬比例與其他公司類似，但波克夏公司僅僅使用現金來支付這筆報酬。不僅如此，我自然而然地也把所有這些當作股權補償開支付給波克夏公司旗下高管的資金，都計入公司的經營費用開支項目中。

My accounting minions suppress a giggle and immediately point out that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount to “cash paid in lieu of stock-based compensation” and is therefore not a “true” expense. So – presto! – Berkshire, too, can have “adjusted” earnings.

但是，一些會計人員可能會難掩笑意，立即向我指出在支付給波克夏公司旗下高管的薪資報酬中，20%的報酬可計入“代替股權補償而支付的現金”一欄中，因此這筆開支實際上可以不算入“實際”經營費用開支。所以，波克夏公司是不是也可以向股東彙報“調整后”的凈利潤？

Back to reality: If CEOs want to leave out stock-based compensation in reporting earnings, they should be required to affirm to their owners one of two propositions: why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost or why a payroll cost should be excluded when calculating earnings.

讓我們回歸現實。如果一個公司的CEO想要在披露財務數據時，不計入股權補償開支，這些公司高管應向公司股東解釋以下兩個問題：為什麼支付給公司職員的現金等價物不應當計入公司經營費用開支，或者為什麼在計算公司凈利潤時需要將工資開支排除在外？

During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the 1960s, the story was told of a CEO who, as his company revved up to go public, asked prospective auditors, “What is two plus two?” The answer that won the assignment, of course, was, “What number do you have in mind?”

在上個世紀六十年代中，當時企業粉飾財務數字的情況非常普遍。曾有這樣一個故事，一個公司即將上市，這個公司的首席執行官問備選的審計師：“二加二等於幾？“一個審計師回答道：”CEO你心裏想的數字是多少呢？“而這個審計師最終拿下了這個工作機會。

Finance and Financial Products
金融和金融産品

Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). Each is the leader in its field.

目前，我們公司的租賃和租借業務是由CORT公司（負責傢具租賃業務）、XTRA公司（負責半自動拖車租賃業務）以及Marmon公司（主要負責油罐車、貨車、聯運罐式集裝箱和起重機租賃服務）具體運營。這三家公司每一個都是各自細分領域內的龍頭企業。

We also include Clayton Homes in this section. This company receives most of its revenue from the sale of manufactured homes, but derives the bulk of its earnings from its large mortgage portfolio. Last year, Clayton became America’s largest home builder, delivering 42,075 units that accounted for 5% of all new American homes. (In fairness, other large builders do far more dollar volume than Clayton because they sell site-built homes that command much higher prices.)

同時，這章節中我們也會講到克萊頓房屋公司（Clayton Homes）。克萊頓房屋公司大部分營收是從銷售活動房屋的業務中獲得的，但公司旗下規模巨大的房屋按揭貸款投資組合貢獻了公司大部分的凈利潤。去年，克萊頓房屋公司成為美國最大的房屋建造公司，共計建成42075棟房屋，占美國新建房屋總數的5%。公平地说，其他大型房屋建造企業建成房屋的實際價值遠超過克萊頓房屋公司，因為這些公司主要銷售現場建造的房屋，這種房屋的市場價格較高。

In 2015, Clayton branched out, purchasing its first site-builder. Two similar acquisitions followed in 2016, and more will come. Site-built houses are expected to amount to 3% or so of Clayton’s unit sales in 2017 and will likely deliver about 14% of its dollar volume.

2015年，克萊頓房屋公司開始擴大業務規模，買下了第一家現場建造房屋的公司。2016年，克萊頓房屋公司又進行了另外兩次類似的收購活動。未來，克萊頓房屋公司還將繼續收購其他標的。在2017年中，預計現場建造房屋業務在克萊頓房屋公司房屋銷售量中占比將達到3%以上，在銷售總額占比將達到14%左右。

Even so, Clayton’s focus will always be manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of new American homes costing less than $150,000. Clayton manufactures close to one-half of the total. That is a far cry from Clayton’s position in 2003 when Berkshire purchased the company. It then ranked third in the industry in units sold and employed 6,731 people. Now, when its new acquisitions are included, the employee count is 14,677. And that number will increase in the future.

儘管如此，克萊頓房屋公司的業務重心將仍然放在建造活動房屋上，目前，在總費用低於15萬美元的全美新建房屋市場中，活動房屋占比高達70%左右。而克萊頓房屋公司目前在活動房屋領域的市場份額約為一半，這比2003年波克夏公司收購該房屋公司時的業績表現有大幅提升。當時，克萊頓房屋公司在行業房屋銷量排名第三，員工數量僅為6731人。如今，算上克萊頓房屋公司新收購的公司在內，整個公司的員工總數已上升到14677人。未來，克萊頓房屋公司的員工規模還將繼續擴大。

Clayton’s earnings in recent years have materially benefited from extraordinarily low interest rates. The company’s mortgage loans to home-buyers are at fixed-rates and for long terms (averaging 25 years at inception). But Clayton’s own borrowings are short-term credits that re-price frequently. When rates plunge, Clayton’s earnings from its portfolio greatly increase. We normally would shun that kind of lend-long, borrowshort approach, which can cause major problems for financial institutions. As a whole, however, Berkshire is always asset-sensitive, meaning that higher short-term rates will benefit our consolidated earnings, even as they hurt at Clayton.

過去幾年中，克萊頓房屋公司的盈利表現大幅提升，主要歸功於超低的利率環境。克萊頓房屋公司發放給購房者的房屋按揭貸款主要是長期的固定利率貸款（平均貸款年限長達25年）。但是，克萊頓房屋公司自身的負債主要集中在短期信貸，這些貸款會定期重新定價。當市場利率下行時，克萊頓房屋公司從這些房屋按揭貸款投資中獲得的凈利潤會大幅上升。通常，我們會避開這種長貸短接的商業模式，因為這種業務模式會對金融機構造成嚴重的問題。但是，整體來看，波克夏公司的業績表現對資産端利率更敏感，也就是说如果短期利率上行，波克夏公司的合併后凈利潤會上升，即使克萊頓房屋公司這一部分業務的凈利潤會下降。

Last year Clayton had to foreclose on 8,304 manufactured-housing mortgages, about 2.5% of its total portfolio. Customer demographics help explain that percentage. Clayton’s customers are usually lower-income families with mediocre credit scores; many are supported by jobs that will be at risk in any recession; many, similarly, have financial profiles that will be damaged by divorce or death to an extent that would not be typical for a high-income family. Those risks that our customers face are partly mitigated because almost all have a strong desire to own a home and because they enjoy reasonable monthly payments that average only $587, including the cost of insurance and property taxes.

去年，對8304例活動房屋住房按揭貸款，克萊頓房屋公司不得不收回抵押的房屋資産，約占房屋按揭貸款投資組合的2.5%。造成房屋按揭貸款違約的一部分原因是消費者人口分佈因素。一般而言，克萊頓房屋公司的消費者群體是低收入家庭，這些消費者的信用評級得分較差，許多人都從事於經濟陷入危機時首先會受到衝擊的職業。同時，許多消費者的財務狀況會由於離婚或親人離世而受到較大打擊，通常高收入家庭財務狀況受到此類事件的影響較小。但是，几乎這些消費者都有很強的慾望想要買房，同時這些貸款者每月需要償還的住房按揭貸款數額也僅為587美元，這個數字包括保險費用和房産稅，因此克萊頓房屋公司的業務風險在一定程度上被抵消。

Clayton also has long had programs that help borrowers through difficulties. The two most popular are loan extensions and payment forgiveness. Last year about 11,000 borrowers received extensions, and 3,800 had $3.4 million of scheduled payments permanently canceled by Clayton. The company does not earn interest or fees when these loss-mitigation moves are made. Our experience is that 93% of borrowers helped through these programs in the last two years now remain in their homes. Since we lose significant sums on foreclosures – losses last year totaled $150 million – our assistance programs end up helping Clayton as well as its borrowers.

同時，克萊頓房屋公司一直以來都堅持幫助有財務困難的房屋按揭貸款者渡過難關的項目。其中，最受歡迎的兩個財務支持項目是貸款延期和債務豁免。去年，約有11000名房屋按揭貸款者獲得了貸款延期許可，另外克萊頓房屋公司豁免了3800人應還的房屋按揭貸款，總額高達340萬美元。當克萊頓房屋公司批准這些項目時，公司不會賺到任何利息或手續費收入。但是，我們發現，過去兩年中，93%接受財務支持的住房按揭貸款者仍居住在自己的住房中。盡管我們再收回抵押房屋資産方面損失了較大一筆錢，去年這方面的損失高達1.5億美元，但克萊頓房屋公司提供的財務支持項目最終同時幫助了公司自己和申請房屋按揭貸款的消費者。

Clayton and Berkshire have been a wonderful partnership. Kevin Clayton came to us with a best-in-class management group and culture. Berkshire, in turn, provided unmatched staying power when the manufacturedhome industry fell apart during the Great Recession. (As other lenders to the industry vanished, Clayton supplied credit not only to its own dealers but also to dealers who sold the products of its competitors.) At Berkshire, we never count on synergies when we acquire companies. Truly important ones, however, surfaced after our purchase of Clayton.

一直以來，克萊頓房屋公司和波克夏公司之間維持了非常良好的合作伙伴關係。凱文·克萊頓為公司帶來了一流的管理層和企業文化。同時，波克夏公司則為克萊頓房屋公司提供了無可企及的長期支持，即使經濟大衰退時期活動房屋建造行業出現較大危機。當房屋建造行業其他領軍企業消失后，克萊頓房屋公司不僅為自己的經銷商提供信貸支持，也為銷售競爭對手産品的經銷商提供貸款。在波克夏公司內部，我們在收購其他公司時從來不寄希望於兩家公司的協同效應，但是，在克萊頓房屋公司這裏，我們在收購克萊頓房屋公司后創造了非常重要的協同效應。

Marmon’s railcar business experienced a major slowdown in demand last year, which will cause earnings to decline in 2017. Fleet utilization was 91% in December, down from 97% a year earlier, with the drop particularly severe at the large fleet we purchased from General Electric in 2015. Marmon’s crane and container rentals have weakened as well.

去年，Marmon公司的軌道車租賃業務出現了較大衰退，這將導致2017年公司整體凈利潤下降。2016年十二月，Marmon公司旗下車隊的租用率為91%，低於去年同期租用率97%。我們在2015年從通用電氣公司手中收購的大型汽車的租用率下降尤其嚴重。同時，Marmon公司旗下的起重機和集裝箱的租用率也出現不同程度的下降。

Big swings in railcar demand have occurred in the past and they will continue. Nevertheless, we very much like this business and expect decent returns on equity capital over the years. Tank cars are Marmon’s specialty. People often associate tank cars with the transportation of crude oil; in fact, they are essential to a great variety of shippers.

過去一段時間內，軌道車的市場需求量出現較大波動，而這種情況未來將繼續持續下去。盡管如此，我們仍然非常看好這個業務，並預計未來幾年中這個業務將為我們創造良好的股權回報率。油罐車租賃業務是Marmon公司的強項。通常，人們會認為油罐車僅僅是用於運輸原油，但是實際上，這種油罐車可以用於運輸多種多樣的貨物。

Over time, we expect to expand our railcar operation. Meanwhile, Marmon is making a number of bolt-on acquisitions whose results are included in the Manufacturing, Service and Retailing section.

未來一段時間內，我們預計將繼續擴大軌道車租賃業務的規模。與此同時，Marmon公司也在進行一系列補強型併購交易，這些交易對公司財務業績的影響將在製造、服務和零售章節中具體描述。

Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for our finance-related companies:
以下是我們旗下金融行業相關企業稅前凈利潤的情況（不計資本利得或損失）。

		2016	2015	2014
			(in millions)
Berkadia (our 50% share) .		$91	$74	$122
Clayton		744	706	558
CORT		60	55	36
Marmon–Containers and Cranes		126	192	238
Marmon – Railcars		654	546	442
XTRA		179	172	147
Net financial income*		276	341	296
		$2,130	$2,086	$1,839

* Excludes capital gains or losses

Investments
投資

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. The 325,442,152 shares Berkshire owns of Kraft Heinz are carried on our balance sheet at a GAAP figure of $15.3 billion and had a yearend market value of $28.4 billion. Our cost basis for the shares is $9.8 billion.

以下我們列出了截至去年年底市值最大的十五大普通股投資情況。我們沒有列出在卡夫亨氏公司中的持股情況，因為波克夏公司是控股集團的一部分，因此必須使用權益法來披露這一部分投資。目前，波克夏公司持有卡夫亨氏公司325，442，152股股票，這些股權投資資産列入波克夏公司的資産負債表，按照一般標準會計準則計算，這些股權投資的公允價值為153億美元，截止去年年底市值為284億美元。對這部分股權資産，波克夏公司計入的進賬成本為98億美元。

					12/31/16
Shares*	Company			Percentage of Company Owned	Cost**	Market
					(dollars in millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company			16.8	$1,287	$11,231
61,242,652	Apple Inc.			1.1	6,747	7,093
6,789,054	Charter Communications, Inc.			2.5	1,210	1,955
400,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company			9.3	1,299	16,584
54,934,718	Delta Airlines Inc.			7.5	2,299	2,702
11,390,582	The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.			2.9	654	2,727
81,232,303	International Business Machines Corp.			8.5	13,815	13,484
24,669,778	Moody’s Corporation .			12.9	248	2,326
74,587,892	Phillips 66			14.4	5,841	6,445
22,169,930	Sanofi			1.7	1,692	1,791
43,203,775	Southwest Airlines Co.			7	1,757	2,153
101,859,335	U.S. Bancorp			6	3,239	5,233
26,620,184	United Continental Holdings Inc.			8.4	1,477	1,940
43,387,980	USG Corp			29.7	836	1,253
500,000,000	Wells Fargo & Company			10	12,730	27,555
	Others				10,697	17,560
	Total Common Stocks Carried at Market				65,828	122,032

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.

*不計波克夏公司旗下子公司的養老基金持有的股票資産
**這是波克夏公司實際購買股票的成本價，也是公司計算資本所得稅的根據。在一些情況下，符合一般通用會計標準的成本與實際成本不相同，這是因為根據一般通用會計標準的規定，公司對一些股票進行資産減值計提處理。

Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently, manages more than $10 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly trade sheets. Included in the $21 billion that the two manage is about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.

上述表格中列出的一些股票是Todd Combs或Ted Weschler做出投資決定的，這兩位與我一起管理波克夏公司旗下的投資資産。同時，他們倆每個人獨立管理的資産規模哦都超過100億美元。通常，我會通過查看每個月的股票交易清單來了解他們做出的投資決策。在這兩個人管理的總規模高達210億美元的投資資産中，還包括總額約76億美元的養老金資産，這些資産屬於波克夏公司旗下一些子公司。需要注意的是，這些養老金資産並沒有被包括在此前列出的波克夏公司股票持有情況列表中。

************

Excluded from the table – but important – is our ownership of $5 billion of preferred stock issued by Bank of America. This stock, which pays us $300 million per year, also carries with it a valuable warrant allowing Berkshire to purchase 700 million common shares of Bank of America for $5 billion at any time before September 2, 2021. At yearend, that privilege would have delivered us a profit of $10.5 billion. If it wishes, Berkshire can use its preferred shares to satisfy the $5 billion cost of exercising the warrant.

除之前那個表格中列出的股票持有情況外，波克夏公司還持有總額高達50億美元的美國銀行公司發行的優先股。這些優先股每年會給波克夏公司支付3億美元的股息紅利，並附帶優厚的股票權證。波克夏公司可以在2021年9月2日之前的任何時間點上，以50億美元的價格買入美國銀行公司7億普通股。截止去年年底，這部分優先股附帶的權證能夠為波克夏公司創造105億美元的凈利潤。如果願意，波克夏公司可以使用優先股來支付權證行權時所需的50億美元資金。

If the dividend rate on Bank of America common stock – now 30 cents annually – should rise above 44 cents before 2021, we would anticipate making a cashless exchange of our preferred into common. If the common dividend remains below 44 cents, it is highly probable that we will exercise the warrant immediately before it expires.

目前美國銀行普通股每年的股票分紅為30美分，如果美國銀行普通股的股票分紅在2021年之前上升至44美分以上，波克夏公司預計將把優先股轉化為普通股，並且不用支付任何現金。如果美國銀行普通股的股票分紅屆時仍然低於44美分，波克夏公司很可能在優先股附帶的權證到期之前立即行權。

Many of our investees, including Bank of America, have been repurchasing shares, some quite aggressively. We very much like this behavior because we believe the repurchased shares have in most cases been underpriced. (Undervaluation, after all, is why we own these positions.) When a company grows and outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders.

包括美國銀行在內的多家波克夏公司投資過的公司，一直以來都在回購股票。許多公司回購股票的數額相當驚人。我們非常喜歡這種股票回購，因為我們相信大多數情況下，公司回購的股票在市場中是被低估的。畢竟，我們持有這些股票的原因也是因為我們相信這些股票被低估了。當一個公司的經營規模不斷擴大，但流通股數量不斷下降，股東將會非常受益。

************

It’s important for you to understand that 95% of the $86 billion of “cash and equivalents” (which in my mind includes U.S. Treasury Bills) shown on our balance sheet are held by entities in the United States and, consequently, is not subject to any repatriation tax. Moreover, repatriation of the remaining funds would trigger only minor taxes because much of that money has been earned in countries that themselves impose meaningful corporate taxes. Those payments become an offset to U.S. tax when money is brought home.

投資者應當明白，波克夏公司賬面上持有的總額高達860億美元的”現金及等價物“中（這部分資産大部分是美國國債），其中95%的資産是波克夏公司旗下美國注冊機構持有的。因此，這些資産都不需要繳納任何匯回稅。不僅如此，剩餘現金及等價物在迴流至美國境內時，也只需要繳納小額稅費，因為大部分迴流的凈利潤是在企業所得稅稅率較高的國家産生的，波克夏公司已為這些資金支付了較高的所得稅。當公司將這些海外資金轉回美國時，這些已經繳納的企業所得稅可以抵消美國政府徵收的稅費。

These explanations are important because many cash-rich American companies hold a large portion of their funds in jurisdictions imposing very low taxes. Such companies hope – and may well be proved right – that the tax levied for bringing these funds to America will soon be materially reduced. In the meantime, these companies are limited as to how they can use that cash. In other words, off-shore cash is simply not worth as much as cash held at home.

這些说明對股東很重要，因為許多現金充裕的美國企業手中持有的大部分現金都滯留在企業所得稅非常低的國家和地區。這些公司希望美國政府很快大幅下調對迴流資金徵收的稅費。盡管這些企業的想法可能是對的，但這些企業目前在運用這些資金方面受到諸多限制。也就是说，這些留在離岸市場的資金並不像在美國境內持有的現金資産那樣有價值。

Berkshire has a partial offset to the favorable geographical location of its cash, which is that much of it is held in our insurance subsidiaries. Though we have many alternatives for investing this cash, we do not have the unlimited choices that we would enjoy if the cash were held by the parent company, Berkshire. We do have an ability annually to distribute large amounts of cash from our insurers to the parent – though here, too, there are limits. Overall, cash held at our insurers is a very valuable asset, but one slightly less valuable to us than is cash held at the parent level.

不過，儘管大量現金在美國境內是波克夏公司現金資産的一個地理優勢，但是另一個問題在一定程度上抵消了波克夏公司的這種現金優勢。目前，波克夏公司旗下的大部分現金資産是由公司的多個保險子公司持有的。盡管我們仍然有許多不同的途徑來投資這些現金資産，但是如果這些現金資産是由波克夏母公司持有，我們的投資選擇將不受限制。每年，公司可選擇將大量現金從旗下的保險子公司轉移至母公司手中，但是這種做法也有自身的局限性。整體來看，波克夏公司旗下的保險子公司持有的現金資産對整個集團而言非常重要，但是如果這些現金能夠由母公司持有，這些資産將能夠發揮更大的價值。

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Sometimes the comments of shareholders or media imply that we will own certain stocks “forever.” It is true that we own some stocks that I have no intention of selling for as far as the eye can see (and we’re talking 20/20 vision). But we have made no commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable securities forever.

有時，來自股東或媒體的言論暗示，波克夏公司將永遠持有一些股票資産。事實上，我們持有一些股票，只要我還保持健康就不准備賣掉這些股票。但是，我們並沒有做出任何形式的承諾，承諾波克夏公司將永遠持有這些可以在市場中自由交易的證券資産。

Confusion about this point may have resulted from a too-casual reading of Economic Principle 11 on pages 110 - 111, which has been included in our annual reports since 1983. That principle covers controlled businesses, not marketable securities. This year I’ve added a final sentence to #11 to ensure that our owners understand that we regard any marketable security as available for sale, however unlikely such a sale now seems.

如果有人沒有弄明白這個問題，可能是因為他沒有認真讀第11條經濟學原理。從1983年以來，波克夏公司年報中第110至第111頁一直保留了這條原理。這條經濟學原理涉及如何控制公司業務發展，而不是控制可以自由交易的證券資産。今年，我又給第11條經濟學原理加了一條總結性陳述，以確保公司的股東明白，波克夏公司認為任何在市場中自由交易的證券資産都有可能被出售，儘管目前來看公司不太可能出售這個證券資産。.

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Before we leave this investment section, a few educational words about dividends and taxes: Berkshire, like most corporations, nets considerably more from a dollar of dividends than it reaps from a dollar of capital gains. That will probably surprise those of our shareholders who are accustomed to thinking of capital gains as the route to tax-favored returns.

在我們結束投資這一章節之前，我想對股票分紅和稅費說幾句話。波克夏公司與大多數公司一樣，一美元的股票分紅比一美元的資本利得能為公司創造更大的凈利潤。對於那些習慣性將資本利得看做提高稅后收益唯一途徑的股東來说，這可能有些意外。

But here’s the corporate math. Every $1 of capital gains that a corporation realizes carries with it 35 cents of federal income tax (and often state income tax as well). The tax on dividends received from domestic corporations, however, is consistently lower, though rates vary depending on the status of the recipient.

但是，我們可以做有關一些企業凈利潤的簡單計算。一個企業每實現一美元的資本利得，需要繳納35美分的聯邦所得稅，有時這個企業還要額外繳納當地的收入所得稅。但是，對於從投資美國國內企業中獲得的股票分紅收入，企業需要繳納的所得稅要低得多，盡管具體的企業所得稅稅率取決於這個企業的性質。

For a non-insurance company – which describes Berkshire Hathaway, the parent – the federal tax rate is effectively 101⁄2 cents per $1 of dividends received. Furthermore, a non-insurance company that owns more than 20% of an investee owes taxes of only 7 cents per $1 of dividends. That rate applies, for example, to the substantial dividends we receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held by the parent company. (The rationale for the low corporate taxes on dividends is that the dividend-paying investee has already paid its own corporate tax on the earnings being distributed.)

對一家非保險公司來说（波克夏就是一家非保險公司），每1美元的股息聯邦稅率為10.5美分。此外，如果一家非保險公司持有一家被投資公司超過20%的股份，那麼每1美元的股息只需繳納7美分的聯邦稅。比如，波克夏以母公司的身份直接持有卡夫亨氏27%的股份，從中産生的大量股息適用的稅率就是每1美元7美分。（股息繳納低公司稅的原因在於支付股息的被投資公司已經對分發的利潤繳納了自己的公司稅。）

Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries pay a tax rate on dividends that is somewhat higher than that applying to non-insurance companies, though the rate is still well below the 35% hitting capital gains. Property/casualty companies owe about 14% in taxes on most dividends they receive. Their tax rate falls, though, to about 11% if they own more than 20% of a U.S.-based investee.

波克夏旗下保險子公司在股息上支付的稅率要比非保險公司繳納的稅率高，雖然這個稅率要遠低於35%的資本利得稅。財産/意外傷害害保險公司對獲得的大部分股息需要繳納14%的稅。但如果保險公司持有一家位於美國的被投資公司20%的股份，那麼稅率會下降到11%。

And that’s our tax lesson for today.
這就是我們今天需要學習的稅務課。

“下注”（你的資金如何進入華爾街）
“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street)

In this section, you will encounter, early on, the story of an investment bet I made nine years ago and, next, some strong opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played a role in the bet.

這部分內容中，我首先會告訴你一筆我在9年前做出的投資，然后分享一些在投資上的觀點。作為一名初學者，我想簡單的描述一下Long Bets，這是一家在我投資中起到了一定作用的獨特機構。

Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.

Long Bets是由亞馬遜的CEO傑夫-貝佐斯（Jeff Bezos）資助成立的，是一個管理長期賭注的非盈利組織。為加入賭注，“賭點提出者”在Longbets.org網站上提出一個命題，很久后，這個命題將會被證明是對還是錯。在提出命題后，他們會等待一個持相反觀點的人在賭局的另外一端下注。當一名“懷疑者”站出來時，賭局的雙方會各自指定一家慈善組織作為他們賭局獲勝的受益人；在Long Bets上下注，然后在Long Bets網站上寫一篇短文來為命題辯護。當賭局結束時，Long Bets會支付獲勝的慈善組織。

Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:
Long Bets很有意思，下面就是兩個例子。

In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer – or ‘machine intelligence’ – will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.

2002年，企業家米切爾-卡普爾（Mitch Kapor）宣稱，“到2029年時，沒有任何電腦——或機器智能——能通過圖靈測試”。圖靈測試能判斷計算機是否具有人類思維能力。發明家雷-庫茲威爾（Ray Kurzweil）採取了相反的觀點。雙方對各自的觀點押下10000美元的賭注。我不知道誰能贏得賭注，但是我相信電腦是不會複製查理（此處指笨蛋）的。

That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were $1,000 each. To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his action. He promptly laid off $500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)

同一年，微軟的克雷格·蒙迪（Craig Mundie）稱到2030年，無人駕駛飛機將會運送乘客。而谷歌的埃裏克·施密特（Eric Schmidt）則持相反的觀點。他們二人各自的賭注為1000美金。最近，我提出加入埃裏克的賭注，他迅速把1000美元的賭注給了我500美元。

Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)

現在，說說我自己的賭注和歷史。在2005年波克夏公司的年報中，我指出，從整體來看，由專業人員進行的主動投資管理，在多年的時間內表現會落后於選擇被動投資的業餘人員。我解釋道，一系列“幫助者”（指職業投資管理人）向他們客戶徵收的大量費用，從整體來看，比起那些選擇投資低成本指數基金的業餘人員來说，會讓他們客戶的表現更糟糕。

Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds – wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five – to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?

隨後，我下了50萬美元的賭注，稱在一段很長的時間內，任何一名職業投資人可選擇至少5隻對沖基金（那種很受歡迎並且費用很高的投資工具），在這段很長的時間內，職業投資人選擇對沖基金的表現會落后於只收取象徵性費用的標普500指數基金的表現。我提出賭注期限為10年，並點名低成本的Vanguard S&P基金來證明我的賭注。隨后，我充滿期待地等待各個基金經理（他們可以把自己管理的基金包括在5隻基金內）蜂湧而來，來為他們的職業提供辯護。畢竟是這些基金經理催促着客戶給他們的投資能力下了幾十億美元的賭注。既然這樣，他們就不應該害怕把自己的錢拿出來一點，和我玩這個賭注。

What followed was the sound of silence. Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man – Ted Seides – stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form a fund-of-funds – in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.

隨之而來的是寂靜之聲。數千名職業投資經理人通過兜售他們選股的能力累積了驚人的財富，但卻只有一名職業投資經理人——泰德-西德斯（Ted Seides）站了出來回應我的挑戰。泰德是Protégé Partners的聯合經理人，他從有限合伙人手中籌集資金形成了基金的基金——換句話说，泰德的基金是投資了多隻對沖基金的基金。

I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.

在賭注之前，我並不知道泰德，但我喜歡他，欽佩他願意把他的錢下注到他口中所说的地方。他對我很直接，並且在提供我倆都需要的用於監測賭注的數據上，他很慎密。

For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund. The five he selected had invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a single manager.

在Protégé Partners這一方，泰德挑選了五隻基金的基金。這五隻基金的表現會進行平均，然后和我選擇的Vanguard S&P指數基金進行對比。泰德選擇的五隻基金把資金投資到了100多隻對沖基金內，這意味着泰德基金的基金錶現不會因為某一個基金經理人的表現好壞受到影響。

Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.

當然，每只投資對沖基金的基金其收取的費用是分層的。在這種疊加的收費模式中，占比較大部分的費用是由對沖基金收取的；而每只投資對沖基金的基金還會因為挑選對沖基金經理人的技巧而收取額外的費用。

Here are the results for the first nine years of the bet – figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the charitable beneficiary I designated to get any bet winnings I earned, will be the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.

賭注前9年的結果如下圖所示。在賭注中，我指定Girls Inc．of Omaha這個慈善組織為受益人，可獲得我贏得的賭金。如今，賭注前9年的結果肯定會讓這個慈善組織迫不及待的要在明年1月打開郵箱，這是毋庸置疑的。

              Fund of         Fund of         Fund of        Fund of       Fund of          S&P
Year       Funds A        Funds B        Funds C       Funds D      Funds E      Index Fund
2008         -16.5%          -22.3%         -21.3%         -29.3%        -30.1%        -37.0%
2009          11.3%           14.5%           21.4%           16.5%        16.8%          26.6%
2010            5.9%             6.8%           13.3%            4.9%         11.9%          15.1%
2011           -6.3%           -1.3%             5.9%            -6.3%         -2.8%           2.1%
2012            3.4%             9.6%             5.7%             6.2%          9.1%          16.0%
2013            10.5%          15.2%            8.8%           14.2%        14.4%          32.3%
2014            4.7%              4.0%           18.9%            0.7%         -2.1%          13.6%
2015            1.6%              2.5%            5.4%             1.4%         -5.0%            1.4%
2016             -2.9%            1.7%           -1.4%             2.5%          4.4%          11.9%
Gain to Date 8.7%           28.3%           62.8%            2.9%          7.5%           85.4%

Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, see their annual audits.

從上圖可看出，2008年到現在，五隻基金的基金的收益率分別為8.7%，28.3%，62.8%，2.9%和7.5%，而標普指數基金的收益率為85.4%。按我與Protégé Partners的協議，這五隻基金的名字沒有公開，但我看了他們的年度審計報告。

The compounded annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short” positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks would have provided a tailwind for index funds.

截至目前，指數基金按複利計算的年度增長率為7.1%，這個收益率對一段時間內的股市來说是很典型的。這是一個很重要的事實：在賭注的這9年內，表現異常疲軟的股市可能會促進對沖基金的表現，因為許多對沖基金持有大規模“空頭”倉位。相反，如果9年內股市帶來很不尋常的高收益，那麼這對指數基金是很有利的。

Instead we operated in what I would call a “neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016, an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means $1 million invested in those funds would have gained $220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have gained $854,000.

事實是，我們處於一個“中性”的環境中。在這樣一個環境中，五支基金到2016年底的按年複利計算的平均收益率僅僅為2.2%，也就是说在這五支基金中各投資100萬美元到現在你會獲得22萬美元的利潤。而指數基金的收益會高達85.4萬美元。

Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.

記住，對管理基礎對沖基金的100多名經理人而言，他們每個人都有巨大的經濟動機去獲取最大的投資收益。此外，由於是根據基礎基金的業績表現獲得業績報酬，泰德選擇的5位組合基金經理同樣有動機盡可能選擇最好的對沖基金經理。

I’m certain that in almost all cases the managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for their investors were dismal – really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved – fees that were totally unwarranted by performance – were such that their managers were showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”

我可以確定，在任何情況下，兩種基金的管理人員都是誠實和聰明的人。然而，基金投資者獲得的投資收益卻很慘淡，非常地慘淡。而且，其中所有基金和組合基金收取的巨額固定手續費（該手續費與基金的業績表現完全無關），使經理們在過去9年裏都能旱澇保收。正如戈登·蓋柯（Gordon Gekko）所言：“手續費的收取從未停下過。”

The underlying hedge-fund managers in our bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.

在我們的賭局中，對沖基金的經理從有限合伙人獲得報酬。在對沖基金流行的“2/20”費率機制下，該報酬有可能達到平均水平。“2/20”費率機制是指收取2%的固定年費，即使投資出現巨大虧損，也必須支付，另外從利潤中提成20%且無法追回（如果盈利年份后出現虧損的年份）。在這種不公平的安排下，只要對沖基金的操盤手有能力積累大量的基金資産，並由基金經理進行管理，那麼這些經理中的很多人就會變得非常富有，即使他們的投資表現不佳。

Still, we’re not through with fees. Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds, some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees. Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% – gulp! – of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly – and with virtually no cost – achieved on their own.

不過，我們還沒有結束收費。記住，同樣需要“喂飽”組合基金經理。這些經理會額外收取固定的手續費，通常為資産總額的1%。這樣一來，盡管5隻組合基金的整體表現不佳，但一些經理還是過了幾年的好日子，並收取了“業績”報酬。因此，我估計在過去9年裏，5隻組合基金獲得的收益中有約60%都流向了兩類基金經理的腰包！這就是他們為達成所謂業績而給自己發放的無恥獎勵。在几乎不用付成本的情況下，數百位有限合伙人僅憑自己的力量都能輕易實現這些業績。

In my opinion, the disappointing results for hedge-fund investors that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in the future. I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced (and that is still posted there). Here is what I asserted:

在我看來，這次賭局暴露了對沖基金投資者而言令人失望的業績表現，几乎可以肯定其在未來還會出現。賭局開始時，我在Long Bets網站上發布了一份聲明，其中羅列了我這種看法的理由。以下是我的主張：

Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S&P 500 will outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.

從2008年1月1日開始並於2017年12月31日截止的過去十年裏，如果對業績的衡量不包含手續費、成本和費用，則標準普爾500指數的表現將超過對沖基金的基金組合的表現。

A lot of very smart people set out to do better than average in securities markets. Call them active investors.

許多非常聰明的人打算在證券市場上獲得超過平均水平的投資收益，我們將其稱為主動投資者。

Their opposites, passive investors, will by definition do about average. In aggregate their positions will more or less approximate those of an index fund. Therefore, the balance of the universe—the active investors—must do about average as well. However, these investors will incur far greater costs. So, on balance, their aggregate results after these costs will be worse than those of the passive investors.

與他們相對的是被動投資者，按照定義，他們尋求獲得市場平均收益。總的來说，他們的倉位大致接近指數基金的倉位。因此，市場的平衡方，即主動投資者也必須獲得市場平均收益。然而，這些投資者承擔的成本將高得多。因此，總的來说，在扣除這些成本后，他們總體的投資收益將比被動投資者差。

Costs skyrocket when large annual fees, large performance fees, and active trading costs are all added to the active investor’s equation. Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because their fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge funds in which the funds of funds are invested.

當大筆年費、巨額業績報酬及活躍交易的成本全都加入到主動投資者的費用方程式時，其承擔的成本就會大幅上漲。由於對沖基金收取了巨額手續費，對沖基金的基金在此基礎上再收取手續費，所以對沖基金的基金特別重視該成本問題。組合基金投資於對沖基金。

A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing, and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of funds.

有很多聰明的人參與到對沖基金的運營。但在很大程度上，他們付出的努力沒有任何效果。他們高智商帶來的收益並不能超過他們強加給投資者的成本。平均而言，隨着時間的推移，相較於投資一組組合基金，投資低成本指數基金的投資者會獲得更高收益。

So that was my argument – and now let me put it into a simple equation. If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point – not worth detailing – that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial.

這就是我的觀點，現在我把它放進一個簡易方程。如果A組（主動投資者）和B組（被動投資者）構成總體投資市場，而且B組扣除成本前的投資收益一定會達到平均水平，那麼A組也一定會達到平均投資收益。成本更低的一組將獲勝。如果A組成本過高，其虧空將是巨大的。

There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches. In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified – early on – only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.

當然，長期來看，部分有經驗的人很有可能超過標準普爾指數的表現。然而，在我的一生中，我早期發現的這類專業人士也不過十個左右罷了，只有他們能完成這一壯舉。

There are no doubt many hundreds of people – perhaps thousands – whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well. Bill Ruane – a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul – said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”

毫無疑問，有成百上千的人我從未見過，他們的能力可與我認識的人相媲美。畢竟，跑贏大盤並非不可能。不過問題在於，大多數試圖跑贏大盤的經理最終都會失敗。也有很大可能請您投資的人會跟其他人一樣，不能幫您獲得良好的投資收益。比爾·魯安是真正了不起的人。60年前我就認為，從長期來看，他几乎肯定能提供優秀的投資回報。他说得好：“在投資管理中，投資者的檔次劃分是從創新者到模仿者，再到衆多的無能者。”

Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.

像部分業餘愛好者一樣，一些專業投資人士在短期內也會因為走運而獲得高收益，這讓尋找罕見的值得為其付出高報酬的高收費經理變得更為困難。如果1000位經理人在年初進行市場預測，則至少有一位經理的預測很可能在未來連續九年裏都是正確的。當然，1000隻猴子中也有可能出現一個貌似無所不知的預言家。但二者間仍然存在差異：幸運的猴子不會遇到人們排隊找它投資的情況。

Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation – namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees.

最後，有三個有關聯的事實，使得成功的投資醞釀著失敗。首先，良好的投資履歷會吸引大量投資資金；其次，巨額的資金總是保證投資業績之錨：幾百萬的資金容易管理，幾十億的資金就不好管了；第三，由於大多數經理人的個人認識，即所管理的資金越多，收取的手續費就越多，所以他們仍然會尋求獲得新的投資資金。

These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore, . . . I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”

這三點對我來说不是什麼新鮮事：1966年1月，當時我管理着4400萬美元的資金。我給我的有限合伙人寫了一封信，信中稱：“我覺得資金規模越大越可能損害未來的投資業績，而不是增加業績。對我個人的投資業績而言，這不一定成立，但對您的投資業績就是成立的。因此，我打算BPL(巴菲特合伙有限公司)不再接受新的合伙人。我已經通知蘇茜，如果我們有更多的孩子，就由她來為他們尋找其他的合伙人。”

The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.

當華爾街人士管理數萬億美元，收取高昂手續費時，通常是經理人獲得豐厚利潤，而不是客戶。大型和小型小投資者均應堅持投資低成本指數基金。

************

If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the handsdown choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra-low-cost index funds. In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their investors large rewards while delivering them nothing – or, as in our bet, less than nothing – of added value.

如果要樹立一座雕像，用來紀念為美國投資者做出最大貢獻的人，毫無疑問應該選擇傑克·博格爾（Jack Bogle）。幾十年來，傑克一直敦促投資者投資於超低成本的指數基金。在他的投資生涯中，有大量財富流向了經理人的腰包，而他所積累的財富只占到其中很小一部分。這些經理人向投資者許諾帶來豐厚回報，而實際上他們根本沒帶來回報，或者像我們賭局中的情況，帶來的回報幾近於無。

In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment-management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me.

早些年，傑克常常被投資管理行業嘲笑。然而，今天他欣慰地獲悉，他已幫助數以百萬計的投資者用自己的儲蓄實現了更高的回報，否則他們獲得的收益要低得多。他是他們的英雄，也是我的英雄。

************

Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually followed my suggestion.

多年來，經常有人請求我提供投資建議，我通常給的建議是，投資低成本的標準普爾500指數基金。值得肯定的是，我的只有中等收入水平的朋友通常都採納了我的建議。

I believe, however, that none of the mega-rich individuals, institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice when I’ve given it to them. Instead, these investors politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to the siren song of a high-fee manager or, in the case of many institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper-helper called a consultant.

然而，當我把這一建議提供給超級富豪、機構或養老基金時，他們誰都沒有聽我的建議。相反，這些投資者會禮貌地對我的建議表示感謝，然后去聽收取高額手續費經理的言論，或者許多機構會向另一種稱為顧問的超級助手尋求建議。

That professional, however, faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment consultant telling clients, year after year, to keep adding to an index fund replicating the S&P 500? That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper-helpers, however, if they recommend small managerial shifts every year or so. That advice is often delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable investment “styles” or current economic trends make the shift appropriate.

然而，這些專業人士面臨着一個問題。你能想象一個投資顧問會年復一年地告訴客戶，不斷增加對複製標普500指數基金的投資嗎？這樣做是職業自殺。然而，如果他們每年都推薦小幅改變管理策略，巨額手續費將流向這些超級助手。這些建議往往是艱澀難懂的胡扯，解釋為什麼流行的投資“風格”，或當前的經濟趨勢適於進行這種改變。

The wealthy are accustomed to feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food, schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports ticket, you name it. Their money, they feel, should buy them something superior compared to what the masses receive.

有錢人習慣性地認為，自己在生活中理所應當獲得最好的食物、學校教育、娛樂、住房、整形手術、體育彩票等等。他們認為，用自己的錢買到的東西應該比其他普通大衆買到的更優質。

In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” – wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like – have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is –on an expectancy basis – clearly the best choice. My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than $100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.

在生活中的很多方面，財富確實可以換來優質的産品或服務。因此，對金融“精英”而言，包括富有的個人、養老基金、大學捐贈基金等，他們很難恭順地簽約投資普通人只需花幾千美元也能投資的金融産品或服務。富人的這種不情願通常很流行，即使是有爭議的産品（在預期的基礎上）明顯是最好的投資選擇。我的計算表明，過去十年裏，精英尋求優質投資建議造成的浪費總計超過1000億美元。想想看：對幾萬億美元的資産即使收取1%的手續費，加起來也有這麼多。當然，並不是十年前將資金投入對沖基金的所有投資者都會落后於標準普爾的回報率。但我認為，我對總虧空的計算還是保守的。

Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades have to be made up by local taxpayers.

公職人員的養老基金遭受了很大經濟損失。不幸地是，這些基金中很多都資金不足，部分原因是他們遭受了雙重打擊：投資表現不佳加巨額手續費。資産由此産生的虧空將由當地納稅人在未來幾十年裏補足。

Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”

人類的行為不會改變。富有的個人、養老基金、捐贈基金等仍然會認為，他們應該獲得一些“額外”的投資建議。那些巧妙地利用了這種心理的顧問將變得非常富有。今年的魔藥可能是對沖基金，明年可能又是別的什麼。有一句格言預測了誇口作出這些承諾可能帶來的結果：“當一個有錢的人遇到一個有經驗的人時，有經驗的人最終會獲得金錢，而有錢的人會帶着經驗離開。”

Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better result than any other?

很久以前，我的姐夫荷馬·羅傑斯（Homer Rogers）是一位佣金代理人，他在奧馬哈的牧場工作。我問他是如何誘導農民或農場主雇佣他來幫他們把豬或牛銷售給四大罐頭食品公司的買家（SWIFT、Cudahy、Wilson和Armour）。畢竟，豬的情況很明確，而買家也很專業，他們非常清楚牲畜究竟值多少錢。然后，我問荷馬，有銷售代理比其他代理做得更好嗎？

Homer gave me a pitying look and said: “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.

荷馬同情地看了我一眼说：“沃倫，你怎麼賣給他們不重要，重要的是你如何告訴他們。”在牧場起作用的東西同樣適用於華爾街。

************

 And, finally, let me offer an olive branch to Wall Streeters, many of them good friends of mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees – even outrageous fees – to investment bankers who bring us acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid substantial sums for over-performance to our two in-house investment managers – and we hope to make even larger payments to them in the future.

最后，我要向華爾街人士伸出橄欖枝，他們中的很多人是我的好朋友。波克夏願意為協助我們收購的投資銀行家支付費用，甚至是高得離譜的費用。此外，因管理的投資跑贏大盤，我們已經為公司內部兩位投資經理支付了大筆報酬，我們希望將來能給他們付出更高的報酬。

To get biblical (Ephesians 3:18), I know the height and the depth and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that simple four-letter word – fees – when it is spoken to Wall Street. And when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully write a big check.

根據《聖經》（《以弗所書》3章18節），在對華爾街講“手續費”時，我認識到這簡單的三個字所釋放出能量的高度、深度、長度和寬度。當這種能量給波克夏帶來價值的時候，我會欣然簽一張大支票。

The Annual Meeting

股東年會

Last year we partnered with Yahoo to air the first-ever webcast of our annual meeting. Thanks to Andy Serwer and his Yahoo crew, the production was a success in all respects, registering 1.1 million unique visits in real-time viewing and 11.5 million more in replays (many of those, to be sure, called up by viewers interested in only certain segments of the webcast).

去年，我們與雅虎合作，首次通過網路直播年會。感謝安迪•蘇安迪和他的雅虎團隊，從各方面來看此次直播很成功。有110萬獨立訪問者即時流覽，有超過1150萬訪問者重播內容(誠然，其中很多重播是由只對網上直播的部分內容感興趣的觀眾打開)。

Berkshire’s thank-you mail for initiating the webcast included many notes from three constituencies: the elderly who find travel difficult; the thrifty who find it expensive to travel to Omaha; and those who cannot attend a Saturday meeting for religious reasons.

波克夏為發起網路直播的雅虎發出了致謝郵件，郵件中包括三類人的信件摘要：有出行困難的老人，還有覺得前往奧馬哈費用昂貴的節儉人士，以及由於宗教原因而不能參加週六會議的人。

The webcast cut attendance at last year’s meeting to about 37,000 people (we can’t get a precise count), which was down about 10%. Nevertheless, both Berkshire’s subsidiaries and Omaha hotels and restaurants racked up huge sales. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s sales broke their 2015 record volume by 3%, with the Omaha store recording one-week volume of $45.5 million.

網路直播使去年出席會議的人數減少至37000人(我們不能得到準確的數字)，下降約10%。然而，波克夏公司的子公司和奧馬哈的酒店和餐館實現了巨大銷售。Nebraska Furniture Mart打破了2015年的銷售記錄，銷售增長3%。奧馬哈的店鋪僅一周就錄得4550萬美元的銷售額。

Our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink were open from noon until 5 p.m. on Friday and drew a crowd of 12,000 bargain-hunting shareholders. We will repeat those Friday shopping hours this year on May 5th. Bring money.

從週五中午到下午5點，波克夏的展出單位在CenturyLink中心對外開放，吸引了12000名股東淘便宜貨。今年5月5日，我們的營業時間與去年相同。請把錢帶上。

The annual meeting falls on May 6th and will again be webcast by Yahoo, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both those interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.

年會在5月6日舉行，並將再次由雅虎進行網上直播，網址是https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream，網路直播將在中部夏令時間上午9時開始。雅虎將在會議開始前和午休期間採訪董事、經理、股東和知名人士。這些採訪和會議將同聲傳譯成普通話。

For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:30 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting. It will run an hour or so. That is somewhat longer than usual because three proxy items are to be presented by their proponents, who will be given a reasonable amount of time to state their case.

對於那些親自參加會議的人，CenturyLink將在週六早上7:00開門，方便他們在股東電影播放前購物。電影將在8:30開始播放。問答會9:30開始，持續到下午3:30，中午午休一小時。最後，在下午3:45，我們將正式開始股東會議，會議將持續一個小時左右。由於三個代理專案的提議者將進行演示，我們將給予他們合理的時間用於陳述，所以會議會比往常稍長。

On Saturday morning, we will have our sixth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be the porch of a Clayton Home, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). The competition will begin about 7:45, and I’ll take on ten or so competitors selected a few minutes earlier by my assistant, Deb Bosanek.

星期六上午，我們將開展第六屆國際報紙投遞挑戰賽。目標地點仍是克雷頓之家(Clayton home)的門廊，其與投擲線的距離剛好為35英尺。在我青少年時期，我曾短暫做過送報紙的工作，我送了大概50萬份報紙，所以我覺得自己很擅長這個遊戲。向我挑戰吧！讓我難堪吧！打倒我吧！報紙大概有36到42頁，你必須自己折疊它們(不許用橡皮筋)。比賽將在早晨7點45分開始，我將與十名左右的投擲手進行對決，這些投擲手由我的助手Deb Bosanek在稍早前幾分鐘挑選。

Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.

您的購物地點是一個19.43萬平方英尺的大廳，它就在會場旁邊，波克夏旗下的數十家子公司的產品將在這裡出售。向那些為自己產品月臺的波克夏經理們問好吧。記得看看伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路公司(BNSF)的鐵路佈局圖，它是為了向我們的公司致敬而設計，您和您的孩子一定會為它著迷。

Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle we eat throughout the Saturday meeting takes its toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.

我們經營的Brooks跑鞋今年還會出售會議紀念款。買一雙之後，穿上它參加我們周日早晨8點舉行的第四屆“波克夏5公里”活動吧。起跑點設在CenturyLink，您可以在和會議入場券一起寄過去的《參會者指南》中看到更多相關的詳細資訊。參加這個比賽您就會發現自己在和波克夏的經理、董事和合夥人一起跑步。 (不過查理和我要多睡會兒，因為我們在週六吃了太多的軟糖和花生脆)。這項活動的參賽者正在逐年增多，也幫我們創下了另一個記錄。

A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 21% from 2015. I predict we will be up again this year.

購物區的GEICO展位配備的員工是我們公司來自全國各地的頂尖顧問。去年開會時，我們通過優惠政策創下了銷售記錄，銷量較2015年增長21%。我預計今年我們的銷量還會增長，所以請停下來問下價。

So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.

大多數情況下，GEICO會給你個股東折扣(通常為8%左右)。我們經營的51個展位元中有44個都會提供這個優惠價。 (補充一點：該折扣不能和其他折扣同時使用，比如特定群體享受的折扣。)帶上您已經有的折扣券再看看我們的價錢，您就會發現真的可以省好多錢。用省下的錢買我們的其他產品吧！

Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. The best book I read last year was Shoe Dog, by Nike’s Phil Knight. Phil is a very wise, intelligent and competitive fellow who is also a gifted storyteller. The Bookworm will have piles of Shoe Dog as well as several investment classics by Jack Bogle.

一定要去Bookworm看看，我們將在那裡展出35本書和一些DVD，其中有一些是新出來的。我去年讀過的最好的書是《Shoe Dog》，作者是耐克的菲爾·奈特。菲爾是一個非常聰明、睿智和競爭性很強的人，也是一個天生的會講故事的人。Bookworm將展出一大批《Shoe Dog》以及傑克•柏格爾撰寫的經典投資書籍。

The Bookworm will once again offer our history of the highlights (and lowlights) of Berkshire’s first 50 years. Non-attendees of the meeting can find the book on eBay. Just type in: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition).

Bookworm將再次推出相關書籍，介紹波克夏前50年創業史的起起伏伏，未參會者可以在易貝上找到這本書，只需鍵入：《波克夏.海瑟崴公司：慶祝50周年贏利夥伴關係(第二版)》。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend – though I must admit I have developed some tolerance, bordering on enthusiasm, for that practice now that Berkshire has made large investments in America’s four major carriers. Nevertheless, if you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21/2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.

這份報告的附件材料可以告訴您如何獲得年會及其他活動的入場券，機票有時會在波克夏周前提價。然而我不得不承認，由於波克夏在美國四大航空公司進行了大量投資，我對此已經能在一定程度上容忍，甚至近乎抱有熱情了。不過，如果您從很遠的地方來，比較一下飛到坎薩斯城和奧馬哈的成本，兩座城市間有2.5小時的車程。可能飛到坎薩斯城節約的錢比較多，一對夫妻省下的錢可達1000多美元，把剩下的錢花在我們的產品上吧！

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 2nd and Monday, May 8th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.

在位於72街的占地72英畝的Nebraska Furniture Mart中，我們將再次舉行“波克夏週末”折扣價活動。要在NFM獲得波克夏的折扣優惠，您必須在5月2日的週二和5月8日的週一之間進行購買，同時還要出示您的會議入場券。一些平常絕不打折的知名企業這次也參加了特價活動。本著股東週末活動的精神，他們為您破了例，我們非常感謝他們的配合。在“波克夏週末”，NFM將在工作日從上午10點營業至晚上9點，週六將從上午10點營業至晚上9點半，周日從上午10點營業至晚上8點。週六下午5點半至晚上8點半，NFM將舉辦野餐活動，我們邀請所有股東參加。

This year we have good news for shareholders in the Kansas City and Dallas metro markets who can’t attend the meeting or perhaps prefer the webcast. From May 2nd through May 8th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to their local NFM store will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.

在坎薩斯城和達拉斯地鐵市場不能出席會議，或更喜歡網路直播的股東們，今年我們有好消息給他們了。從5月2日到5月8日，股東向當地NFM商店出示會議入場券或證明是波克夏股東的其它文件(如經紀聲明)，可享受與訪問奧馬哈商店股東一樣的折扣。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 5th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 7th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).

在波克夏公司，我們又將舉行兩場只有股東參加的活動。第一場是雞尾酒招待會，從5月5日週五下午6時持續到晚上9點；第二場是主慶祝活動，將從5月7日周日的上午9點持續到下午4點。週六，我們將開放到下午6時。記住，你買的越多，省的錢也越多(當我們逛商店時，我的女兒這樣告訴我)。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1st through Saturday, May 13th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.

整個週末，我們將有大量的客戶在Borsheims商場聚集。 為方便起見，從5月1日星期一至5月13日星期六，我們將推出“股東折扣”，大家可以獲得較為吸引人的“股東價格”。在股東大會時間段內，請提供您的參會憑證或經紀帳戶憑證，將自己標識為股東，顯示您擁有我們的股票。

On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician and motivational speaker from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. I will join them at some point and hope Ajit, Charlie and Bill Gates will do so also.

星期天，在Borsheims商城的外面，來自達拉斯的魔術師和勵志演說家諾曼·貝克(Norman Beck)，將讓參會者大吃一驚。我們還有更高級的玩法，我們將有兩個世界頂級橋牌高手Bob Hamman和Sharonber到現場，可在星期天下午與我們的股東一起“玩橋牌”。如果他們建議改變遊戲的玩法，我可能會在某個時候加入他們的牌局，希望Ajit，Charlie和比爾·蓋茨也能和我玩一把橋牌。

My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. Now, she’s a senior at Princeton (after interning last summer at JPMorgan Chase). If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.)

我的朋友Ariel Hsing(美國乒乓球奧運選手)也將在星期天到達商場，在現場接受乒乓球愛好者的挑戰。我在她九歲時就認識了，即使那時我也無法打贏她得分。Ariel曾代表美國國家隊出征2012年的奧運會，現在她是普林斯頓大學的大學生(去年夏天在摩根大通實習後)。如果你不介意自己尷尬，想測試你的乒乓技能，下午1點就來Borsheims商城吧。比爾·蓋茨去年對戰Ariel就打得不錯，所以他今年可能準備再次挑戰她。(個人建議：賭Ariel會贏比爾·蓋茨)

Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 3rd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.

Gorat's大飯店將於5月7日星期日下午一點至晚上十點專門為Berkshire股東開放供應。如果需要在要在Gorat's預訂，請在4月3日(但不是之前)致電402-551-3733。 為了顯示您是一個資深的用餐者，可以點T形牛骨和薯餅。

We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.

我們將設立有三個財經記者為主的問答時間段，屆時三位元記者會問Charlie和我一些問題。這些問題都是股東們事先通過電子郵件提交給他們。記者和他們電子郵寄地址是：傑出商業記者Carol Loomis，郵寄地址是loomisbrk@gmail.com；CNBC的Becky Quick，郵寄地址是BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；《紐約時報》的“安德魯·羅斯·索金(Andrew Ross Sorkin)，郵箱地址是arsorkin@nytimes.com。

From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)

對於提交的問題，每個記者將可以選擇其中感興趣、或者對股東十分重要的最多六個問題。記者需要讓自己的問題保持簡潔，所以各位要避免在最後一刻發送至他們的郵箱；問題要與波克夏密切相關，這樣你的問題就很有可能被選中；在您發送的任何一封電子郵件中，請不要超過2個問題。(在您的電子郵件中，請注明您是否願意如果你的問題被問到時，你的名字被提到。)

An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.

伴隨的問題將由三位分析師問跟波克夏哈撒韋公司。此外，今年的保險專家將是巴克萊的傑·傑布林(Jay Gelb)。解答我們的非保險業務的問題的專家來自Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 和Gregg Warren of Morningstar這幾家企業。因為我們將進行的是股東大會，希望分析師和記者來提出問題，以增加股東對他們投資的理解和知識。

Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.

Charlie和我將會通過問答環節來瞭解我們的方向和問題，找到這麼多的線索有些時候會很困難，那是肯定的，這就是我們喜歡的方式。當然，問答環節不允許一次提多個問題，我們想給盡可能多的人提問的機會。我們的目標是讓你離開會議更多地瞭解波克夏，同時願你在奧馬哈時玩得開心。

All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.

總之，我們預計至少有54個問題會當成提出，屆時將允許每個有機會提問的分析師和記者提出六個，其中有18個問題從觀眾中產生。在年會的上午8:15舉行抽籤儀式，選出提問的觀眾。有11個麥克風安裝在大廳，用於主持人唱票。

While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).

  

在我談到股東獲得知識的時候，讓我提醒你們，Charlie和我都相信所有的股東應該不約而同地已經知曉了波克夏發佈的新資訊，如果可能的話，他們應該有充足的時間在交易發生前消化和分析這些資訊。這就是我們試圖在週五晚些時候或者週六早上發佈財務資料的原因，也是我們年度股東大會總在週六召開的原因。

We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.

我們並沒有遵循“與大型機構投資者或者分析師們一對一面談，像我們對所有其他股東一樣熱情接待它們”的慣例。沒有誰比“經濟能力有限卻信任我們、用他們一大部分儲蓄投資我們公司”的股東們更重要。由於我日復一日地經營這家公司，在我寫這封信的時候，這些投資者的樣子就會浮現在我的腦海裡。

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For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.

出於善意的理由，我定期表揚取得成就的運營經理們。他們真的是全明星隊員，管理旗下企業就像它們是他們家擁有的唯一資產。我還相信我們經理們的思維方式是以股東利益為導向的，大型上市公司的管理者們也是如此。我們的大多數經理都沒有工作的經濟需要，實現業務全壘打的快樂對他們而言要多於工資給他們帶來的快樂。

 Equally important, however, are the men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,450-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,580 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.

與我一道工作的男士和女士都同等重要。這個團隊有效應對美國證券交易委員會和其他監管部門的形形色色要求，提交長達30450頁的聯邦所得稅申報表，監督著3580份國家稅申報表的歸檔，對無數的股東和媒體詢問作出回應，製作年報，準備這場規模最大的年會，協調董事會活動，檢查這封信的內容及清單等。

They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help Carrie Sova – our talented ringmaster at the annual meeting – deliver an interesting and entertaining weekend for our shareholders. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.

他們愉快地處理所有這些事務，並且效率難以置信地高，讓我的生活簡單快樂。他們的努力不僅僅局限于和波克夏有關的活動。例如，去年他們和送學生到奧馬哈與我問答一日的40所大學交涉。他們還處理我收到的所有請求，安排我的行程，甚至給我帶漢堡包和炸薯條作為午餐。此外，他們還樂於幫助我的助理凱莉·索瓦安排年會事宜，從而讓我們的股東度過了一個有趣且愉快的週末。他們自豪于為波克夏工作，我則自豪於擁有他們。

 I’m a lucky guy, very fortunate in being surrounded by this excellent staff, a team of highly-talented operating managers and a boardroom of very wise and experienced directors. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 6th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to seeing you.

我是一個幸運兒，很幸運有這些優秀的員工、這支天資極高的運營經理團隊以及明智且經驗豐富的董事們圍繞在我身邊。歡迎大家5月6日蒞臨奧馬哈，這個資本主義的搖籃。我們所有人都期待看到你

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 25, 2017

華倫．巴菲特
董事會主席
2017年2月25日