BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
給波克夏海瑟威的股東：
Berkshire earned $42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The four components of that figure are $21.9 billion of operating earnings, $4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a $26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an $11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.
根據公認的會計原則（通常稱為“ GAAP”），2020 年波克夏海瑟威的稅後合計利潤為 425 億美元。 該數字的四個組成部分是219億美元的營業收入，49億美元的已實現資本收益，267億美元的收益來自我們所持股票中存在的未實現資本淨收益的增加，最後是110億美元的虧損，因為我們所擁有的一些子公司和相關企業的價值減少而損失元。 所有項目均以稅後基礎列示。
Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.
即使營業利潤並不是在 GAAP 底下占比最大的分類，但它卻是最重要的。波克夏致力於增加這項目的數字，並想辦法收購具規模且優質企業。然而本公司在去年並沒有成功實現這兩項目標中任何一項。我們並沒有收購任何優質企業，營業利潤也減少了 9 %。但是我們透過保留盈餘與購回 5 % 的公司股權增加了波克夏海瑟薇的內在價值。
The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.
關於 GAAP 中資本利得／損失的部分，不管是未實現或實現的，每年都會根據股市的變化而浮動。而不管現在數據上呈現的如何，我與我的長期夥伴 Charlie Munger 都認為，波克夏持有資產將會帶來真實且豐盛的利潤。
As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks – at yearend worth $281 billion – as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.
我需要再次聲明。波克夏在年末結算時持有價值 2810 億美元的普通股，我與 Charlie 將這些視為我們實際參與的一系列商業行為。我們雖然無法控制這些公司，但是我們相當於共享了他們的長期成長。不過企業的保留盈餘雖然波克夏也共享其中，但這並不包含在會計的範圍內。會計只包含了企業發放的股利，而投資企業的資本成長卻沒有被計算在內。
What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value – lots of value – for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.
儘管投資企業的資本成長不出現在帳面上，但是我們不應對他們視而不見。這些保留盈餘正在為波克夏創造價值，相當可觀的價值。被投資者利用這些保留盈餘來擴大經營、增加資本、清除債務、或是買回股份（這可以在未來讓我們佔有更多他們未來的所得）。而我們也要持續強調，保留盈餘將繼續如它在美國商業史上一樣，持續發揮正面效應。這被卡內基與洛克菲勒證明有效的魔法，將繼續為股份持有者們帶來效果。
Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.
而想當然，世界上並沒有完美的投資。有些投資項目會使我們失望，並沒有成長或任何保留盈餘。但是其他項目會這麼做，甚至做出超出我們期望的成長。總體累計來說，我們期望這些保留盈餘在未來為波克夏帶來等價或更甚的資本利得。根據我們 56 年的經驗，這期望往往會被達成。
The final component in our GAAP figure – that ugly $11 billion write-down – is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company.
關於GAAP 中最後一個部分，為公司帶來 110 億美元的帳上虧損，我想可以歸咎於我在 2016 年對 Precision Castparts (PCC) 的錯誤決定。我在這家公司上花太多錢了。
No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers.
我這個決定並沒有被任何人誤導，純粹是我對 PCC 未來的平均收益過於樂觀。PCC 最大的客源來自於航空科技，而我的錯誤預測也在去年該產業中的逆境被顯示出來，相應的帶來了這年度的帳面虧損。
In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company – the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.
PCC 是它產業中的龍頭，我敢說我們收購了一家好公司。PCC 的 CEO，Mark Donegan 在我們收購之前就將自己獻身於那家公司之中。我們很幸運地可以讓他來繼續經營公司。
I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.
我相信我對 PCC 的評價是對的。在未來波克夏也會因為 PCC 的營利而獲得利潤。我的錯誤是在過於樂觀預測了他的「平均收益」，而導致了我以過高的價格購買了 PCC。
PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one.
儘管我並不是第一次犯像是對 PCC 的這種錯誤，但是這次的確算是個相當大的錯誤。
Two strings to Our Bow 我們還有一手
Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.
波克夏常常被稱為一個企業集團，往往這是描述一家公司擁有許多與其無相關的子公司，被人嘲笑像是大雜燴一般的負面評價。但這只是波克夏其中一個面向，要了解我們為什麼有別於傳統企業集團，就需要從一些歷史開始回顧。
Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.
往往企業在擴大經營時會以收購的方式來進行，但這會帶來兩個問題。其中一個原因是一間一流公司絕對不會想要把所有權轉換給別人。而追求完整收購的公司就只能從一些二流的公司中挑選收購對象，但從這些二流公司中我們無法釣到大魚。
Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you $10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my $5,000 cats.”)
在收購這些二流公司時，企業往往會為了得到這些公司的機密配方而支付極高的資金來取得控制權。但聰明的企業並不會這麼做，他們會鑄造屬於自己的金幣，並用他們作為貨幣來跟被收購公司交易。（用我兩隻價值 $5000 的貓來換你價值 $10000 的狗）
Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.
這種類似賺取匯差的方式需要透過精緻的包裝與具「想像力」的會計操作來達成，相當於在迷惑對方，甚至在詐欺的邊緣遊走。不過計畫順利時，就可以以兩倍的自身價值來獲取三倍的商業價值。
Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality.
投資帶來的商業幻象會持續上一段時間，而華爾街喜歡因轉手而保證取得的手續費，媒體也喜歡這種幻象過程中的精彩故事。或許在一些時候，一飛沖天的股價某方面來說證明了這個幻象的「真實性」。
Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.
但當海水退潮時，就會知道什麼人在裸泳。歷史上有許多一度被分析師、媒體與投資銀行認為是商業天才的企業集團，他們創造的樂園最終卻成了永遠長眠的墓園。
Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.
而因此有了企業集團這樣不良的刻板印象。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.
我與 Charlie 想要波克夏「實際持有」旗下各式各樣具有良好的經濟潛力與管理者的公司。不管我們是否真的具有那些公司的控制權。
It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie – and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire – finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.
透過 Charlie 與我在波克夏 20 年的經營，我們終於明白當你可以部分持有一家不能控制的好公司，要比完全持有一家平庸的公司要好得多。
For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.
基於以上原因，波克夏擁有一系列可控與不可控的公司。與波克夏長期的競爭力、價格與管理性質為目標，我與 Charlie 將利用您們的資本做出我們認為最好的配置。而如果這樣的策略使我們無需耗費太多力氣，那自然是好事，因為我們不會因為任何困難度而獲得任何實際利益。雷根總統說過，雖然我知道人絕對不會因勤勞而累死，但是為什麼要冒這個風險呢？
If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems
基於以上原因，波克夏擁有一系列可控與不可控的公司。與波克夏長期的競爭力、價格與管理性質為目標，我與 Charlie 將利用您們的資本做出我們認為最好的配置。而如果這樣的策略使我們無需耗費太多力氣，那自然是好事，因為我們不會因為任何困難度而獲得任何實際利益。雷根總統說過，雖然我知道人絕對不會因勤勞而累死，但是為什麼要冒這個風險呢？
The family jewel and how we increased your shared in these gems
波克夏的獨特優勢，與我們將如何更加擴大它
On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.
在 A-1 頁我們列出了波克夏旗下擁有的子公司，這些公司在年底結算時總共雇用了 36 萬名員工。你可以在 10-K 處看到我們擁有控制權的子公司。不具有控制權的子公司列在第 7 頁。而一如既往，這是個具規模且多樣的列表。
Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.
波克夏最具有價值的資產是其中旗下的四個產業。我們完全持有其中三項，而另一項則持有 5.4% 的股份。而在資產意外保險的業務為最大宗，是波克夏 53 年以來的核心業務。
The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.
我們在產業中提供了優秀的保險業務，由 1986 年加入波克夏的管理者 Ajit Jain 經營著。他與波克夏的保險一樣出類拔萃。
Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.
總體來說，波克夏保險具有世界首屈一指的資本規模。多數保險業者因為沒有充分的現金流或足夠的信用評價而無法使用這樣的策略，它們往往專注於（也必須依賴）保險。而我們最大的財金優勢來自於由非保險業務提供了充沛的現金流，使我們可以採取證券導向的投資操作。
And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.
重要的是，現在無法從基金獲得可觀的利潤。你可以想像美國十年期公債從 1981 年 15.8 % 的殖利率，已經一路下滑到 2020 年底現在 0.93 %，足足下跌了 94 %。像是日本和德國這些重要國家，都因為持有美債的關係虧損了上兆元的虧損。這使得許多固定收益投資者、退休基金與保險公司陷入困境之中。對他們來說未來的路也將十分辛苦。
Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.
這些基金投資者，或許想透過轉手給非長期持有者來詐取非常微薄的收益。但是危險的債務並不完全等於極高的報酬率（反之亦然）。三十年前的債券市場曾經是一片榮景，但他們因為忽略了這個法則而自己招致了今天的下場。
Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.
波克夏現在擁有 1380 億美元的雖然不屬於公司，但可以由我們來進行配置的保險浮存金。我們能將這些錢放到債券、股票或是與現金等值的美國國庫券。浮存金如銀行業務一般，它們每日的進出並沒有為擁有者帶來資本的增減。而這被波克夏持有的巨量金額在未來多年也預計將維持在與現今差不多的水平。從過去到現在，要達到這件事對我們來說非常容易。雖然樂觀的推測有可能改變，但我相信我們有辦法繼續維持這個好表現。
I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.
歷年來我不斷在年度公開信中重複著，甚至接近嘮叨地去解釋波克夏的保險業務。因此波克夏的新股東們如果你們想要更了解我們是如何運作，可以到 2019 年度的公開信中找到關於保險業務與浮存金的篇幅（你也可以在 A-2 看到）。我認為了解波克夏保險業務可能帶來的風險與報酬對你們來說是一件重要的事情。
Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from $122 million to $3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.
我們排名第二與第三的重要資產（目前兩者難分軒輊），是我們完全持有的美國最大鐵路公司 BNSF（根據貨運量）與持有 5.4 % 的 Apple Inc. 股份。第四名的重要資產是我們持有 91 % 的波克夏海瑟威能源公司（BHE: Berkshire Hathaway Energy）。經過了 21 年的經營，BHE 的年收入從 122 萬元成長到了 34 億元，它在我們擁有的資產中絕對是獨一無二的。
I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.
在接下來我還會講更多關於 BNSF 與 BHE，但先讓我回到一年一度的慣例。我想要為你們再介紹一次波克夏的投資組合，而它們又為什麼會為你們帶來收益。* * * * * * * * * * * *
Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.
去年我們用 247 億元買回了 80998 股的波克夏 A 股。所有股東持有者因為這項購回而不費吹灰之力的增加了 5.2 % 的持有價值。
Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.
我與 Charlie 認為，這個收購可以增加波克夏公司的內在價值，也在為未來任何波動做好充沛資金的準備。
In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.我想強調，購回作業並非任何簡單的操作。有鑒於過去許多美國公司的 CEO 為了購回過去低潮期而賣出的持股而耗費了公司可觀的資金，我們完全沒有重蹈這個歷史教訓的覆轍。波克夏反而在這裡展現了購回能帶來的強大效果。
Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.
在波克夏對 Apple 的投資中正展示了這件事。我們從 2016 年後期開始到 2018 年七月完成我們對蘋果大約 10 億股的建倉。這裡我指的是在波克夏主要帳戶底下的數目，有一些個別管理的蘋果股份在這之後被賣出。而在這之後波克夏擁有 5.2 % 的蘋果公司股份。
Our cost for that stake was $36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about $775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.
這項投資總共花了我們 360 億元，自那之後我們每年享有約 7.75 億元的股利。在 2020 更透過出清少量部位而賺得了 110 億元。就在我們賣出之後，神奇的是我們現在持有 5.4 % 的蘋果公司股份。
Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.
因為蘋果的購回，我們相當於不耗費任何成本完成了這次出清操作。在外股數的減少反而增加了我們對蘋果的持有占比。從 2018 到 2020 年底這兩年半的時間，加上透過購回波克夏的股份，你現在足足擁有比 2018 年七月多 10% 的蘋果股份。
But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21⁄2 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.
這項有效的操作未來將持續進行。波克夏將繼續進行股份回購並在未來計畫減資。而蘋果對同樣的操作表達出興趣。波克夏的持有者將因為回購繼續增加他們對 BNSF 與 BHE 的持有，也會繼續間接地增加他們持有蘋果公司的部分。
This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.
回購是一個漫長的過程，但在未來會展現它強而有力的效果。這項操作能讓投資者在一個不斷擴張的投資項目中維持他的持有地位。
The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.
And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”Investments
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.3 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of
以上是年底結算時波克夏擁有股份中市值前 15 大的列表。這裡因為我們對 Kraft Heinz 擁有部分經營權，因此沒有包括我們持有的 325, 442, 152（3 億多）股 Kraft Heinz 股份，在會計法則上需要用權益法來看待這項持股。
Kraft Heinz on December 31, 2020. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only$11.3 billion.
而根據 Kraft Heinz 的會計結算，波克夏的持有部分價值 133 億元。不過要注意的是，在市值方面是 113 億元。
Below we list o
A Tale of Two Cities
雙城記
Success stories abound throughout America. Since our country’s birth, individuals with an idea, ambition and often just a pittance of capital have succeeded beyond their dreams by creating something new or by improving the customer’s experience with something old.
在美國，成功的故事俯拾即是。自從這國家出生以來，只要有個創新的點子，或是能從舊的經驗中找到全新的體驗，搭配野心與少量的資本，人人都有辦法實現夢想甚至超越它。
Charlie and I journeyed throughout the nation to join with many of these individuals or their families. On the West Coast, we began the routine in 1972 with our purchase of See’s Candy. A full century ago, Mary See set out to deliver an age-old product that she had reinvented with special recipes. Added to her business plan were quaint stores staffed by friendly salespeople. Her first small outlet in Los Angeles eventually led to several hundred shops, spread throughout the West.
而我與 Charlie 一直都在尋找這類人的旅途上。自從 1972 年，我們在美國西岸找到了 See’s Candy。它由 Mary See 成立，她用獨門秘方改良了一個發行一年產品，搭配著能言善道的店員與精緻的店面，See’s Candy 從在洛杉磯的 Outlet 中，擴張到了整個美國西岸。
Today, Mrs. See’s creations continue to delight customers while providing life-long employment for thousands of women and men. Berkshire’s job is simply not to meddle with the company’s success. When a business manufactures and distributes a non-essential consumer product, the customer is the boss. And, after 100 years, the customer’s message to Berkshire remains clear: “Don’t mess with my candy.” (The website is https://www.sees.com/; try the peanut brittle.)
如今仍然可以看到 See’s 小姐的配方被人們享受著，而這企業也帶來了上千名的工作機會。波克夏一向知道不要去插手一家知道自己在做什麼的公司。對一個快消產業來說，顧客就是老大，而經過百年的驗證，顧客的結論十分淺顯易懂：別來動這獨門配方！Let’s move across the continent to Washington, D.C. In 1936, Leo Goodwin, along with his wife, Lillian, became convinced that auto insurance – a standardized product customarily purchased from agents – could be sold directly at a much lower price. Armed with $100,000, the pair took on giant insurers possessing 1,000 times or more their capital. Government Employees Insurance Company (later shortened to GEICO) was on its way.
我們從西岸再看到東岸的華盛頓。1936 年，Leo Gawdwin 與他的老婆 Lillian 認為在當時相當已相當普遍的汽車保險不應該是如此昂貴。他們用十萬美元的資本售出了相當於他們資本一千倍的汽車保險，也造就了後來美國最大的直銷保險公司——政府員工保險公司（GEICO）。By luck, I was exposed to the company’s potential a full 70 years ago. It instantly became my first love (of an investment sort). You know the rest of the story: Berkshire eventually became the 100% owner of GEICO, which at 84 years of age is constantly fine-tuning – but not changing – the vision of Leo and Lillian.
我與 Charlie 很幸運地在 70 年前得知了這家公司並看出了他們的潛力。GEICO 也成為我後來第一個成功，剩下的歷史想必已經家喻戶曉。波克夏後來百分之百持有了 GEICO，到現在經過了 84 年仍然持續成功營運著，也證明了當初 Leo 與 Lillian 的想法是正確的。There has been, however, a change in the company’s size. In 1937, its first full year of operation, GEICO did $238,288 of business. Last year the figure was $35 billion.
值得一提的是，GEICO 的公司規模如今十分可觀。從 1937 第一年的完整營運的營收 24 萬元， 到去年結算時年營收是 350 億元。
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Today, with much of finance, media, government and tech located in coastal areas, it’s easy to overlook the many miracles occurring in middle America. Let’s focus on two communities that provide stunning illustrations of the talent and ambition existing throughout our country.
如今在美國灣區，在這個科技重鎮可以看到許多商業奇蹟正在發生。不過請允許我聚焦到其中兩個擁有驚人天賦與野心的社區中。
You will not be surprised that I begin with Omaha.
你絕對不會想到我第一個講的會是奧瑪哈這個地方。
In 1940, Jack Ringwalt, a graduate of Omaha’s Central High School (the alma mater as well of Charlie, my dad, my first wife, our three children and two grandchildren), decided to start a property/casualty insurance company funded by $125,000 in capital.
1940 年時，Jack Ringwalt 畢業於奧馬哈中央高中（這裡也是我、查理、我第一任老婆、我三個小孩與兩個孫子的母校）。Jack 決定用 $12,5000 的資本創立了一家保險公司。
Jack’s dream was preposterous, requiring his pipsqueak operation – somewhat pompously christened as National Indemnity – to compete with giant insurers, all of which operated with abundant capital. Additionally, those competitors were solidly entrenched with nationwide networks of well-funded and long-established local agents. Under Jack’s plan, National Indemnity, unlike GEICO, would itself use whatever agencies deigned to accept it and consequently enjoy no cost advantage in its acquisition of business. To overcome those formidable handicaps, National Indemnity focused on “odd-ball” risks, which were deemed unimportant by the “big boys.” And, improbably, the strategy succeeded.
這在當時簡直是太荒謬了，他創立了公司—— National Indemnity（國家保障公司），試圖用他那微不足道的業務來與在各地擁有精良銷售員與人脈網的大型保險公司對抗。Jack 當時不計一切代價承接下所有可能的保險業務，有些甚至無利可圖。而後來，Jack 這個怪招竟然出乎意料的成功了。
Jack was honest, shrewd, likeable and a bit quirky. In particular, he disliked regulators. When he periodically became annoyed with their supervision, he would feel an urge to sell his company.
而 Jack 是個誠實、精明、令人喜歡卻又有點古怪的人。更精確來說，他討厭常規。而當他開始因被監督而感到厭煩時，賣掉公司的衝動油然而生。
Fortunately, I was nearby on one of those occasions. Jack liked the idea of joining Berkshire, and we made a deal in 1967, taking all of 15 minutes to reach a handshake. I never asked for an audit.
我幸運地又再次出現在這機會旁邊。Jack 想要加入波克夏，而我們僅花了短短 15 分鐘就達成協議。我甚至沒有對 Jack 公司做過任何審計。
Today National Indemnity is the only company in the world prepared to insure certain giant risks. And, yes, it remains based in Omaha, a few miles from Berkshire’s home office.
如今國家保障公司是世界上唯一有能力承擔巨大風險的保險公司。而它仍然位於奧馬哈，與波克夏只有幾英里的距離。
Over the years, we have purchased four additional businesses from Omaha families, the best known among them being Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”). The company’s founder, Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”), arrived in Seattle in 1915 as a Russian emigrant, unable to read or speak English. She settled in Omaha several years later and by 1936 had saved $2,500 with which to start a furniture store.
在後來幾年，我們在奧馬哈陸續收購了四家公司。其中最有名的應該是 Nebreska Furniture Mart （NFM）。它是由當時俄羅斯移民 Rose Blumkin（B 小姊）所創立。她在 1915 年移民西雅圖，當時的她完全沒有任何英文能力。但是後來經過幾年她在 1936 年用 $2500 的存款在奧馬哈創立了一間家俱行。
Competitors and suppliers ignored her, and for a time their judgment seemed correct: World War II stalled her business, and at yearend 1946, the company’s net worth had grown to only $72,264. Cash, both in the till and on deposit, totaled $50 (that’s not a typo).
當時其他競爭者不把她放在眼裡，認為她無足輕重。而有一段時間的確如此，當時二次世界大戰使得她的公司經營陷入停滯。在 1946 年底，NFM 僅僅價值 $72,264，並擁有 $50 的現金。（只有兩位數並不是打錯數字）然而，NFM 最價值連城的資產遠遠超過這數字所能表現。
One invaluable asset, however, went unrecorded in the 1946 figures: Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s only son, had rejoined the store after four years in the U.S. Army. Louie fought at Normandy’s Omaha Beach following the D-Day invasion, earned a Purple Heart for injuries sustained in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally sailed home in November 1945.
B 姊唯一的兒子 Louie 為美軍服役四年。他曾參與過諾曼第登陸，並因為在阿登戰役中受傷而獲得紫心獎章。而他在 1945 年 11 月回到美國與他媽媽重逢。在他們重逢之後，沒有任何事難得倒這對母子。
Once Mrs. B and Louie were reunited, there was no stopping NFM. Driven by their dream, mother and son worked days, nights and weekends. The result was a retailing miracle.
他們不斷辛勤的工作，創造了 NFM 這個零售奇蹟。
By 1983, the pair had created a business worth $60 million. That year, on my birthday, Berkshire purchased 80% of NFM, again without an audit. I counted on Blumkin family members to run the business; the third and fourth generation do so today. Mrs. B, it should be noted, worked daily until she was 103 – a ridiculously premature retirement age as judged by Charlie and me.
到了 1983 年，這對母子建立出了價值六千萬的商業帝國。那年在我的生日時，再一次在沒有做任何審計下波克夏購入了百分之八十的 NFM 股權。我相信 B 姊與他往後世代的家人有辦法好好經營 NFM。（值得一提的是 B 姊工作到了 103 歲）
NFM now owns the three largest home-furnishings stores in the U.S. Each set a sales record in 2020, a feat achieved despite the closing of NFM’s stores for more than six weeks because of COVID-19.
儘管今年 2020 因為 COVID-19 的關係 NFM 停業了 6 週，NFM 現在是全美銷售額第三大的家俱零售業者。
A post-script to this story says it all: When Mrs. B’s large family gathered for holiday meals, she always asked that they sing a song before eating. Her selection never varied: Irving Berlin’s “God Bless America.”
而這則故事的後記說明了為什麼美國是美國。直到現在每到了節慶 B 姊家族聚餐時，B 姊會要求大家在餐前一起合唱一首歌：《天佑美國》。
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Let’s move somewhat east to Knoxville, the third largest city in Tennessee. There, Berkshire has ownership in two remarkable companies – Clayton Homes (100% owned) and Pilot Travel Centers (38% owned now, but headed for 80% in 2023).
讓我們把故事從奧馬哈移到田納西的第三大城市—— 諾克斯維爾（Knoxville）。波克夏在這裡擁有兩個優秀的公司—— Clayton Homes 克雷頓住宅（完全持有）與 Pilot Travel Centers 百樂旅遊（目前持有 38%，但計畫將在 2023 持有 80%）。
Each company was started by a young man who had graduated from the University of Tennessee and stayed put in Knoxville. Neither had a meaningful amount of capital nor wealthy parents.
這兩家公司有許多共通點。都是有為的田納西青年，在畢業於田納西大學後創立。後來也讓公司持續地留在田納西。這兩位青年在當時也都沒有優渥的家庭背景與充足的資本。
But, so what? Today, Clayton and Pilot each have annual pre-tax earnings of more than $1 billion. Together they employ about 47,000 men and women.
但這對他們來說並不是阻礙。如今 Clayton 與 Pilot 的稅前年營收均超過十億元，兩家公司底下總共有 47,000 名員工。
Jim Clayton, after several other business ventures, founded Clayton Homes on a shoestring in 1956, and “Big Jim” Haslam started what became Pilot Travel Centers in 1958 by purchasing a service station for $6,000. Each of the men later brought into the business a son with the same passion, values and brains as his father. Sometimes there is a magic to genes.
Jim Clayton，在經過多次投資後於 1956 年創立了克雷頓住宅；而「大吉」Jim Haslam 在 1958 年用 $6000 收購了一個服務站後創立了百樂旅遊。巧合的是，後來這兩位先生的兒子同樣以不亞於他們父親的熱情與精力加入了公司的經營。果真虎父無犬子。
“Big Jim” Haslam, now 90, has recently authored an inspirational book in which he relates how Jim Clayton’s son, Kevin, encouraged the Haslams to sell a large portion of Pilot to Berkshire. Every retailer knows that satisfied customers are a store’s best salespeople. That’s true when businesses are changing hands as well.
大吉現在 90 歲。前陣子他在一部他的著作上提到了 Clayton 的兒子 Kevin 是如何鼓勵大吉把大量的百樂旅遊股份賣給波克夏。因為每個成功的零售者都知道，一個滿意的顧客會成為他們最好的推銷者。而轉手給波克夏正是同樣的道理。
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When you next fly over Knoxville or Omaha, tip your hat to the Claytons, Haslams and Blumkins as well as to the army of successful entrepreneurs who populate every part of our country. These builders needed America’s framework for prosperity – a unique experiment when it was crafted in 1789 – to achieve their potential. In turn, America needed citizens like Jim C., Jim H., Mrs. B and Louie to accomplish the miracles our founding fathers sought.
如果你有機會飛過諾克斯威爾或奧馬哈，不妨在心中對 Clayton、Haslem、 B 姊等這些成功的企業家致意。同樣成功的企業家遍佈著美國，這群人需要自 1789 年因為一場實驗而創建的美國，而相對的美國也須要這群人來達成當初創國者們心中所期盼的願景。
Today, many people forge similar miracles throughout the world, creating a spread of prosperity that benefits all of humanity. In its brief 232 years of existence, however, there has been no incubator for unleashing human potential like America. Despite some severe interruptions, our country’s economic progress has been breathtaking.
如今世界上不斷的有類似的成功發生，而這些成功持續造福著人類。但沒有任何其他國家可以像美國一樣，在 232 年的歷史中如此孵化出這些卓越的成功。儘管中途有些小差錯，但是我們國家的經濟進展實在是令人驚艷。
Beyond that, we retain our constitutional aspiration of becoming “a more perfect union.” Progress on that front has been slow, uneven and often discouraging. We have, however, moved forward and will continue to do so.
處此之外，我們也持續追逐憲法所設下的願景——成為一個真正完美的聯合。儘管進展緩慢得令人失望，但我們現在正持續在朝這願景前進。相信未來也將會如此。
Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.
我在這裡為以上給出一個堅定的結論：絕對不要看空美國。
The Berkshire Partnership 永遠的「波克夏態度」
Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.
波克夏海瑟薇設立於美國德拉瓦州（補充：這裡完善的公司法使得公司們喜歡設立於此）。特拉瓦州法要求所有董事會成員必須以企業與其持有人謀取最大的福利為宗旨。而我們也奉之為圭臬。
In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.
波克夏一直以來遵守著四大宗旨——為顧客盡力奉獻、為員工盡養護之責、為借款者信守承諾、為社會建立良好形象。
None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.
然而這四個宗旨所提及的群體完全對公司股利、策略、或選才沒有任何的決定權。所有的責任都落在董事們上，他們肩負著回應所有人期待的義務。每天致力為公司謀取更長遠的利益。
Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.
其實除了法律要求之外，我與 Charlie 都覺得自己身負一種使命感。我們覺得有義務為「每一個」波克夏的股東持有者奮鬥。讓我來解釋為什麼我們有這樣的使命感，而使命感又如何每日推動著我們前進。
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Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).
在我成立波克夏以前，我在一系列的合夥事業中為他們理財。在 1956 年時是 3 家，隨著時間規模也越來越龐大。到了 1962 年，我將 12 家公司整併，成立了巴菲特合夥事業有限公司（BPL: Buffet Partnership Limited）。
By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.
當時我將我和妻子的所有身家都投了進去，與一些夥伴們成立公司。在公司我並沒有任何固定薪水。作為合夥人，在滿足所有其他合夥人都得到至少 6% 的收益之後，我才能分配到報酬。不足額的話將會從我未來的報酬中扣除。所幸這樣的合夥關係從來不需要走到後者提到的情況，BPL 從來沒有揮出低於「標準竿」的成績。隨著時間，我身邊大部分人慢慢將他們的財產都投進了我的合夥公司。
Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.
Charlie 則在 1962 年建立了他的合夥公司，與我同樣地為自己的公司盡心盡力。我們當時都沒有任何機構投資者，大部分的合夥人也沒有雄厚的財力。他們投資了公司只因為他們相信我和 Charlie 會對他們的資本視如己出，而他們也的確做對了。我和 Charlie 厭惡任何資產的損失。所以如果我們無法為他們資產增值，也絕對不敢讓他們的資產成為我們的一部份。
I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.
自從 1965 年 BPL 得到波克夏的控制權以來，我踏入了商業經營這個領域。我在 1969 年解散 BPL 並將其按比例分配成了現金與三支股票，其中最有價值的是 70.5% 的波克夏股權。
Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.
後來在 1977 年 Charlie 也結束了他公司的營運來轉而分配到間合夥公司上。而剛好其中一家——藍籌印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps），正是剛剛那三隻股票之一。
In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the same page.
1983 年時藍籌與波克夏合併，合夥人數量從 1900 人成長到了 2900 人。我和查理與所有新舊股東踏上了同一條船。
Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.
正如 1983 時波克夏年報中公司商業原則中第一條所說，「雖然我們如今是龐大的法人公司，但我們的態度永遠是像當初創業一樣（Although our form is corporate, our attitude is corporate）」。這代表著我與 Charlie 從 1983 年以來在波克夏的競競業業。，未來波克夏也絕對會抱著這態度繼續前進。
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Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.
波克夏的持有權主要分佈在五個地方。其中一個是作為「創辦者」的我。不過我這部分在這些年來被我拿去經營各式各樣的慈善事業後即將消失。
Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.
剩下四個部分中的兩個分別被兩種機構投資者所持有。他們雖然都負責管理他人的資產，但兩者卻有著截然不同的投資方式。
In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.
其中一個部分的持有者是那些指數型基金。基金現在在市場上是個不斷擴張的部分，他們簡而言之就只是在模仿那些市場上的加權指數。他們自動導航一樣，根據加權來進行買賣。指數型基金最喜歡的就是 S&P 500，而波克夏也是這個加權指數的成分之一。因此指數型基金持有波克夏的唯一理由是因為他們「必須」持有波克夏（因為他們就是在模仿 S&P 500）。
In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.
另一個部分的持有者則是那些專業的信託基金。這些信託業者受來自各方的顧客之託，經過重重的分析與考量之後進行操作。要知道主動投資者們必須在市場上各顯神通來為他們的客戶獲得報酬。有利用高瞻遠矚而獲利的長期投資者、或是利用以奈秒（nanosecond）為單位進行演算法交易的高手、也有根據總經分析來來去去的景氣投資者。
We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.
我得說這是個值得尊敬的困難差事。而在這些信託找到更好的標的之前，我們很高興可以為這部分的「主動」投資者代為效勞。
Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.
最後一個部分的持有者是那些散戶。他們跟上段提到的信託基金很像，透過主動進出市場來獲利。他們或許會把波克夏股份作為下筆交易的資金來源。
All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.
我們不反對這樣的做法，畢竟波克夏也有些財產是為了這個目的而存在。不過如果你將長期持有波克夏的話我們將建立起非常親密的夥伴關係。而歷史也見證了，那些決定長期持有波克夏的投資者如今仍然是波克夏的股東之一。
A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.
其中一個股東是一位在奧馬哈的眼科醫生，也是我的朋友之一 Stan Truhlsen，他今年 2020.11.13 剛滿 100 歲。1959 年時在奧馬哈他與其他十位年輕醫生決定與我創辦一項合夥事業，並將其命名為 Emdee Limited。如今我每年還會自年度名人晚會上與 Stan 夫妻共進晚餐。
When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.
而這個合夥關係自從 1969 年被轉分配為波克夏股權時，當中沒有任何一位醫生賣出了他們的股份。他們雖然可能對市場投資一竅不通，但他們知道波克夏將他們是為真正的事業夥伴。
Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?
如今這群持有人也都九十多歲了，加上我與查理現在分別 90 和 97 歲，我開始合理懷疑會不會持有波克夏也是長生的秘訣之一？
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Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.
波克夏持有者這個大家庭是如此特殊又有價值，這也就是為什麼你會發現我們並不會去華爾街招蜂引蝶。我們「已經擁有」需要的投資者，而且不認為在外面有比這現在這群人更好的替代了。
There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.
而浮沉在外的波克夏股份就是這麼多，只有這麼多車票能夠搭上我們這班車。
Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?
我與 Charlie 替現在持有它們的人開心，也希望大家不要頻繁的交易它。畢竟你有聽過別人隨隨便便就丟棄朋友或婚姻的嗎？
In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.
就像 Phil Fisher 在 1958 年時的著作所提到的。做吃的不管是賣夜市小吃還是法式餐廳都能夠吸引顧客且有利可圖。但如果你今天賣小吃明天又賣法式，那你註定會吃失敗。對顧客的形象與提供顧客的服務要別無二致。
At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.
而在波克夏，我們已經賣了 56 年的夜市小吃了。而我們也相當珍惜這些年願意駐足於此的常客。The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors. “Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.
當然並不是所有人都喜歡我們這種夜市小吃。市場上有成千上萬的投資者自然會投其所好。不管是基本面籌碼面技術面都有它的擁護者。市場也因此永遠是個熱鬧的地方。
Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”
當然你有辦法從各種類型的投資中獲利，畢竟這時一個正期望值的遊戲。說誇張一點，找隻不會亂賣股票的猴子從 S&P 500 隨意挑選 50 家公司進行投資，而在經過時間的累積後，猴子也能因為股利與資本利得而獲利。
Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.
當然市場還有股票以外的商品，你可以投資房市或其他事業，他們都能為你帶來許多財富。但要記住，只要你讓時間成為你的朋友，在變化與波動中保持內心的平靜，你就能夠獲利。不過華爾街充斥著比猴子更不沉著冷靜的人，而頻繁的交易帶來的手續費仍然讓華爾街每年不斷獲利。
When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.
如果你有幸成為波克夏的持股者之一，我們希望你了解我們葫蘆裡賣的是什麼藥。經過這些年的經營，儘管我們無法保證獲利，但我們有能力做到並且正在獲利著。
And so, too, will our successors.
衷心希望你也把我們與未來的後繼者，都當成你的夥伴。
A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You 波克夏的一項驚人數據
Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment – the sort of assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country – with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company. Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is $154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant and equipment of $127 billion.
最近我得知一項我從來沒想過的一項事實：波克夏是現在擁有最多「美國固定資產」的美國公司（固定資產例如土地、工廠、設備）。今年波克夏的國內固定資產在折舊後總計 1540 億元，第二名則是 AT&T 的 1270 億元。
Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not, in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses – and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.
不過消息本身並不會為我們帶來任何實際的獲利。要知道擁有資產與獲利並不是等價的關係。最好的作法是在維持低邊際成本下也維持良好的邊際效益，並且有辦法能用少量資本來擴大規模。而我們實際上也擁有幾家這種優質體質的公司，它們正逐漸成長茁壯。
Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants – BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of $4.2 billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned $8.3 billion.
不過重資產公司也能是一項好投資。我們在 BNSF 與 BFE 正是這個分類中的巨人。在波克夏 2011 第一次完全持有 BNSF 時，兩家公司的合計年營收是 42 億元。到了 2020，合計年營達到 83 億元。
BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.
雖然這兩家公司在未來會勢必會面對資本支出，但是好消息是他們應該也能夠繼續提供良好的投資報酬。
Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By a significant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.
讓我們先來看看 BNSF。美國一年 15% 的運輸哩程是由 BNSF 負責，並且在各項運輸上都有龍頭地位，也維持著良好的獲利率。
The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.
美國鐵路的歷史發展十分有趣。經歷了興建的狂潮、到過度興建的泡沫、破產、重組與整併之後，鐵路業如今總算逐漸成熟。
BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf.
BNSF 從 1850 時負責在伊利諾斯（Illinois）的十二哩路到現在於全國興建了 390 條幹線。你可以在 http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf 看到更多關於公司的發展史。
Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested $41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay $20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.
波克夏在 2010 上半年收購了 BNSF。自從收購開始已經投資了 410 億元的在固定資產上。其中 200 億元是折舊費，因為鐵路遍佈各種地形，有些極端的氣候或季節性的洪水都會使鐵道折損。BNSF 不斷致力於保證它所有 23,000 英里鐵道的安全。
Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire – $41.8 billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after it both fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about $2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.
然而儘管有著如此高的支出，BNSF 在平衡損益並且保持 20 億元的現金流下一共發放給了波克夏 418 億元的股利。如此保守的財務策略讓他 BNSF 可以以極低的利率借款，也不需要波克夏為其擔保任何項目。
One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.
關於 BNSF 的最後一件事。我必須要說 BNSF 的 CEO Carl Ice 與他的副手 Katie Farmer 在去年非常成功地在這個行業的低潮期控制了支出數目。儘管總貨運量下降了 7%，但是營收卻上升了 2.9%。Carl 將在年底退休並交由 Katie 接手。Carl 我像你保證相信這些鐵路會繼續被好好照顧的。
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
而與 BNSF 不同的是，BHE 不會對普通股持有者發放股利。這是在電力公司中少見的策略，而 BHE 21 年來一直都是如此從未改變過。不像鐵路，美國的能源通路還有很長一段路要走，而完成重大的整併就需要鉅額的花費。這個花費將大到用過去 21 年與一些未來數十年的盈餘才能夠打平。我們對此深信不疑，也期望這項投資在未來會帶給我們充沛的報酬。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its $18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
舉例來說，目前 BHE 正在進行一項耗費 180 億元電廠開發計畫，想要將在美國西岸很大一部份的老舊發電廠重新整併一翻。從 2006 年開工至今，計畫在 2030 年完工。你沒聽錯，就是 2030 年。未來對可再生能源的需求也使得我們這項計畫勢在必行。因為歷史因素使得火力發電場位於人口密集區，而讓後來開始的再生能源必須位於郊區。這是一項困境。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.
只有非常少量的企業或政府他單位有辦法應付這項浩大工程。而 BHE 在考量美國的經濟、政治與法治環境後，於 2006 年決定開始著手處理它。在產生任何有意義的價值之前，這件事必須投入上億元的資金，管線橫跨數州也需要通過各項法規要求與地主的負責合約，更要說服那些守舊或抱持著新科技是一蹴可幾的白日夢者。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.
儘管未來勢必還有更多變數要面對，我們我們也十分肯定這項工程會延誤。但同樣肯定的是 BHE 有足夠的管理階層、企業投入、與財務背景來完成我們對未來的保證。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.
就算西岸電力整併計畫距離完工還有不少年，但我們還在尋找「更多」像這樣的機會。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
不管怎麼樣，BHE 將會是未來再生能源的領導者。
The Annual Meeting 年度會議
Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.
去年 2 月 22 日，我宣布了關於年度會議的計畫卻隨即在一個月後宣告失敗。
Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg, Berkshire’s CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked. Greg Abel, one of Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”
總部辦公室的成員，Melissa Shapiro、Marc Hamburg（波克夏的 CFO）馬上想到了應變計畫。我與波克夏其中一位副董事長 Greg Abel 將在一個可以容納 18,000 位觀眾的講堂上要進行演說。我與 Greg 甚至「演出」開始的 45 分鐘之前才抵達會場。
Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 years ago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.
我的助理 Debbie Bosanek 用我在家裡拼貼的各種文字與圖片製作了 25 頁的投影片。並由一個我並不知道名字但十分精良的現場團隊將投影片投射在會場上；
Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See’s peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.
由 Yahoo 提供了直撥串流服務，容納了破紀錄等級的觀看人數；CNBC 的 Becky Quick 遠端地為我與 Greg 的 4 小時演講在無數觀看者與上千名股東中挑選出問題；而 See’s Candy 的威化巧克力與可口可樂則為我們提供了能量。
This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream.
今年 5 月 1 日，我們計畫將再一次舉行線上年度會議。再一次要麻煩 Yahoo 與 CNBC 的完美支援。直撥將在 EDT 1 P.M. 開始。連結是：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。
Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.
EDT 1:30 ~ 5:00 會是問題時間；正式會議將是 EDT 5:00 ~ 5:30 左右。一如既往的你可以將你的問題寄到 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com。
And now – drum roll, please – a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 31⁄2-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.
那麼，請允許我隆重宣佈（緊鑼密鼓 緊鑼密鼓）⋯⋯今年的會議將在洛杉磯舉行。而這次我與 Charlie 將在台上回答問題以及分享我們的看法。去年以來我很想他，而更重要的是「你們」應該也蠻想他的。另外我們敬重的副董事 Ajit Jain 與 Greg Abel 也將為大家回答他們相關領域的問題。Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well.
記得在 Yahoo 加入我們的年度會議，也記得要把困難的問題都丟給 Charlie。我們會十分享受這次的會議，也希望你們也如此。
Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.
不過當然我們更希望能與你們面對面。希望這件事可以在 2022 發生。我已經等不及要在奧馬哈總部與所有子公司的大家來場「真正的」年度會議了！
February 27, 2021
2021 年 2 月 27 日
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
董事長 華倫．巴菲特