BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏·海瑟威公司的股東：
致波克夏·海瑟威公司的股東：
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.
查理-蒙格，我的長期合作夥伴，我的工作是管理你的一部分儲蓄。我們很榮幸得到您的信任。
Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.
我們的職位有責任向您報告我們想知道的內容，宛如我們是缺席的所有人而您是經理人，我們喜歡通過這封年度信函以及年度會議直接與您交流。
Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
我們的政策是平等對待所有股東。所以，我們不與分析師或大型機構進行討論。此外，只要有可能，我們都會在週六早上發布重要的溝通信息，以最大限度地讓股東和媒體在週一市場開盤前有時間消化吸收新聞。
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.
查理-蒙格，我的長期合作夥伴，我的工作是管理你的一部分儲蓄。我們很榮幸得到您的信任。
Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.
我們的職位有責任向您報告我們想知道的內容，宛如我們是缺席的所有人而您是經理人，我們喜歡通過這封年度信函以及年度會議直接與您交流。
Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
我們的政策是平等對待所有股東。所以，我們不與分析師或大型機構進行討論。此外，只要有可能，我們都會在週六早上發布重要的溝通信息，以最大限度地讓股東和媒體在週一市場開盤前有時間消化吸收新聞。
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.
公司在定期向美國證券交易委員會（SEC）提交的年度10-K報告中列出了波克夏公司的大量事實和數據，並且我們在K-1至K-119頁上進行了復制。一些股東會覺得這個細節很吸引人；其他人只喜歡學習查理和我認為在波克夏公司的新事物或有趣的事物。
Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.
唉，2021年幾乎沒有此類行動。不過，我們確實在提高您的股票內在價值方面取得了合理進展。57年來，這項任務一直是我的首要職責。它將繼續如此。
What You Own
你擁有什麼
Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.
波克夏公司擁有各種各樣的企業，有些是全部，有些只是部分擁有。第二類主要由美國大型公司的有價普通股組成。此外，我們還擁有一些非美國公司股票，並參與了幾家合資企業或其他合作活動。
Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
無論我們採用何種所有權形式，我們的目標都是對具有持久經濟優勢和一流CEO的企業進行有意義的投資。請特別注意，我們持有股票是基於我們對其長期業務表現的預期，而不是因為我們將它們視為利用短時市場變動的工具。這一點很關鍵：查理和我不是選股者；我們是業務選擇者。
I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.
我犯了很多錯誤。因此，我們范圍廣泛的業務包括一些具有真正非凡經濟地位的企業，許多其他具有良好經濟特徵的企業，以及少數處於邊緣地位的企業。我們的普通股持倉的一個優勢是——有時——很容易以優惠價格分批購買優秀的企業。這種投機取巧的經歷在談判交易中是非常罕見的，而且從不會大量發生。當它在有價普通股市場上發生時，從錯誤中退出也容易得多。
I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.
我犯了很多錯誤。因此，我們范圍廣泛的業務包括一些具有真正非凡經濟地位的企業，許多其他具有良好經濟特徵的企業，以及少數處於邊緣地位的企業。我們的普通股持倉的一個優勢是——有時——很容易以優惠價格分批購買優秀的企業。這種投機取巧的經歷在談判交易中是非常罕見的，而且從不會大量發生。當它在有價普通股市場上發生時，從錯誤中退出也容易得多。
Surprise, Surprise
驚訝，驚訝
Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors: 以下是關於你們的公司的一些事情，即使是經驗豐富的投資者也經常會感到驚訝：
• Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.
許多人認為波克夏是一個龐大且有些奇怪的金融資產集合。事實上，波克夏擁有和經營的美國“基礎設施”資產——在我們的資產負債表上被分類為房地產、廠房和設備——比其他任何美國公司擁有和經營的都多。這種優勢從來都不是我們的目標。然而，這已成為事實。
At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire’s balance sheet at $158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.
截至年底，這些國內基礎設施資產在波克夏的資產負債表上的價值為1580億美元。這一數字在去年有所增加，並將繼續增加。波克夏永遠都在發展壯大。
• Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid
每一年，你的公司都要繳納大量的聯邦所得稅。
$3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of $402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.
例如，在2021年，我們繳納了33億美元，而美國財政部報告的企業所得稅收入總額為4020億美元。此外，波克夏還支付大量的州稅和外國稅。“我在辦公室做貢獻了”，這是波克夏股東們不容置疑的斷言。
Berkshire’s history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.
波克夏的歷史生動地說明了美國政府和美國企業之間無形且往往不被承認的金融合作關系。我們的故事始於1955年初，當時波克夏精紡和海瑟威製造同意合並他們的業務。在請求股東批准的請求中，這兩家歷史悠久的新英格蘭紡織公司表達了對合並的高度期望。
The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).
例如，海瑟威的詢價向股東保證：“資源和管理的結合將造就紡織行業最強大、最高效的組織之一。”這種樂觀的觀點得到了該公司的顧問雷曼兄弟公司（Lehman Brothers）的支持（沒錯，就是那個雷曼兄弟）。
I’m sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.
我敢肯定，對於福爾河（波克夏）和新貝德福德（海瑟威）來說，這是一個令人愉快的日子。然而，當樂隊停止演奏、銀行家們回家後，股東們卻收獲了一場災難。
In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire’s owners watched the company’s net worth crater from$51.4 million to $22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire’s struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.
在合並後的九年裡，波克夏的所有者眼睜睜地看著公司的淨資產從5140萬美元跌至2210萬美元。這種下降在一定程度上是由股票回購、欠考慮的股息和工廠關閉造成的。但數千名員工9年的努力也帶來了經營虧損。波克夏的困境並不罕見：新英格蘭的紡織業已經悄無聲息地進入了漫長而不可逆轉的死亡之旅。
During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire’s troubles. All told, the company paid the government only $337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic $100 per day.
在合併後的9年裡，美國財政部也因波克夏的問題而蒙受損失。在此期間，這家公司總共只向政府繳納了 $337,359美元的所得稅——可憐啊，每天才100美元。
Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.
1965年初，事情有了轉機。波克夏任命了新管理層，重新配置了可用的現金，並將幾乎所有的收益投入到各種良好的業務中，其中大部分業務多年來一直保持良好。將收益再投資與復利的力量相結合，產生了神奇的效果，股東們發財了。
Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the $100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly $9 million daily to the Treasury.
應該指出的是，波克夏的所有者並不是這次航向調整的唯一受益者。他們“沉默的合作夥伴”，即美國財政部。隨後從該公司收取了數百億美元的所得稅。還記得每天100美元嗎？現在，波克夏每天向財政部支付約900萬美元。
In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge – indeed trumpet – the fact that Berkshire’s prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.
公平地說，我們的股東應該承認—實際上應該大肆宣揚—波克夏的繁榮是由於公司在美國運營而得到大力培養的。 如果沒有波克夏，我們的國家在1965年以後的幾年裡依然會表現得非常出色。 然而，如果沒有我們在美國的家，波克夏永遠不會成為今天的樣子。 當你看到國旗時，請說聲謝謝。
• From an $8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from $19 million when we entered the insurance business to $147 billion.
從1967年以860萬美元收購National Indemnity開始，波克夏已經成為保險“浮動”資金的世界領導者—這些我們持有並可以投資的資金，但不屬於我們。 包括一筆相對較小的人壽保險收入在內，波克夏的總浮動資金已從我們進入保險業務時的1900萬美元增長到1470億美元。
So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float.
到目前為止，這些浮存金的成本可以忽略不計。 雖然我們經歷過好幾年保險損失加運營費用超過保費的情況，但總體而言，我們從產生上市資金的承保活動中獲得了55年的適度利潤。
Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.
同樣重要的是，浮存金非常具有粘性。 我們保險業務的資金每天都在來來去去，但它們的總金額不會出現急劇下降。 因此，在浮動資產投資時，我們可以從長遠考慮。
If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased $9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP (“generally-accepted accounting principles”) presentation of earnings and net worth.
如果你還不熟悉浮存金的概念，我建議你參考第5頁的長篇解釋。 令我驚訝的是，我們的浮存金去年增加了90億美元，這種價值的累積對波克夏的所有者來說很重要，但卻沒有反映在我們的GAAP（“公認會計原則”）的收益和淨值報告中。
Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire’s good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, “None.”
我們在保險業創造的巨大價值，很大程度上要歸功於波克夏在1986年聘用阿吉特‧賈殷（ Ajit Jain．）時的好運氣。 我們第一次見面是在一個週六的早上，我很快地問阿吉特他在保險行業的經歷。 他回答說：“沒有。”
I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later.
我說“人無完人”，然後就雇了他。 那是我的幸運日：阿吉特實際上是我能做出的最完美的選擇。 更棒的是，35年後的今天，他依然如此。
One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.
關於保險的最後一個想法是：我認為，波克夏的浮存金很可能—但遠非確定—能夠在不造成長期承保損失的情況下得以維持。 但是，我可以肯定，在某些年裡，我們將經歷這種損失，也許涉及非常大的數額。
Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.
波克夏在應對災難性事件方面的能力是其他保險公司所沒有的—在我和查理去世後，這一優先地位將長期保持下去。
Our Four Giants
我們的四巨頭
Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices. 通過波克夏，我們的股東擁有數十家企業。 而其中一些公司又擁有自己的一系列子公司。 例如，Marmon有超過100個單獨業務，從租賃鐵路車廂到製造醫療設備。
• Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.
盡管如此，我們“四大”業務公司的運營佔了波克夏公司價值的很大一部分。 名列前茅的是我們的保險公司集群。 波克夏實際上擁有該集團100%的股份，我們之前描述過該集團龐大的浮存金。 我們為支持這些保險公司的承諾而投入的巨額資金，進一步擴大了這些保險公司的投資資產。
The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.
保險業務是為波克夏量身定做的。產品永遠不會過時，營收通常會隨著經濟增長和通貨膨脹而增加。此外，誠信和資本將永遠重要。我們公司能夠而且一定會經營得很好。
There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire’s operation, however, would be almost impossible.
當然，還有其他一些保險公司擁有出色的商業模式和前景。然而，要復制波克夏的經營模式幾乎是不可能的。
• Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to $100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job.
蘋果，按年底市值計算，是我們的亞軍，是我們另一種類型的持倉。在這裡，我們的持股比例僅為5.55%，高於一年前的5.39%。這個增幅聽起來像是小菜一碟。但考慮到蘋果2021年的收益中，每0.1%的持股都是1億美元。我們並沒有花費波克夏的資金進行增持，蘋果的回購起了作用。
It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us $785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering $5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.
有一點值得一提，那就是只有蘋果的股息才會被計入波克夏的財報。去年，蘋果支付了我們7.85億美元的股息。然而，按照我們在蘋果公司的“持股份額”，利潤達到了驚人的56億美元。該公司保留了大部分利潤用於回購蘋果股票，這一舉動值我們給它一個大大的贊。蘋果公司才華橫溢的首席執行官蒂姆-庫克將蘋果產品的用戶視為自己的初戀，這無可厚非，但他的其他支持者也同樣受益匪淺。
• BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America’s carbon emissions would soar.
BNSF，我們的第三大持倉，依然是美國商業的頭號動脈，它是這個國家和波克夏不可或缺的資產。如果BNSF運輸的產品改用卡車運輸，那麼美國的碳排放量將飆升。
Your railroad had record earnings of $6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull )
BNSF 2021年的利潤達到了創紀錄的60億美元。這裡需要指出的是，我們談論的是我們喜歡的老式算法：扣除利息、稅收、折舊、攤銷和所有形式計提後的利潤。（我們的這種算法也發出了一個警告：隨著股市上漲，對利潤的進行“調整”，禮貌的說法，已經變得更加頻繁，也更加不切實際。恕我直言，牛市造就了財務造假．．．）
BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.
BNSF的火車去年行駛了1.43億英裡，運送了5.35億噸貨物。這兩項成就都遠遠超過了其他任何一家美國鐵路公司。你可以為你的鐵路感到驕傲。
• BHE, our final Giant, earned a record $4 billion in 2021. That’s up more than 30-fold from the $122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.
我們另一隻重倉股BHE在2021年賺了創紀錄的40億美元。這比2000年的利潤1.22億美元增長了30多倍，那一年波克夏第一次購買了BHE的股票。現在，波克夏持有該公司91.1%的股份。
BHE’s record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol’s and Greg Abel’s leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.
BHE的社會成就與其財務業績一樣引人注目。該公司在2000年沒有風能，也沒有太陽能發電。當時，它只是被認為是美國龐大的電力事業行業中一個相對較新的、較小的參與者。隨後，在大衛-索科爾和格雷格-阿貝爾的領導下，BHE成為了一家公用事業公司（請不要抱怨），以及美國風能、太陽能和輸電領域的領軍企業。
Greg’s report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.
格雷格關於這些成就的報告出現在A-3和A-4頁。你會發現那裡的介紹絕對不是時下流行的“洗綠”故事。早在2007年開始，BHE每年都會詳細介紹其在可再生能源和輸電方面的計劃和業績。
To further review this information, visit BHE’s website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.
想進一步瞭解這些信息，請訪問BHE的網站brkenergy.com。在那裡，你會看到該公司長期以來一直在實施應對氣候變化的舉措，這些舉措消耗了其所有的收入。但前方有更多的機會。BHE擁有良好的管理、經驗、資本，可以滿足國家對大型電力項目的需求。
Investments
投資
Now let’s talk about companies we don’t control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire’s two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to $34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.
現在讓我們來談談我們無法控制的公司，這個列表再次提到了蘋果。下面表格列出了我們持倉市值最大的15只股票，其中幾只是波克夏的兩位長期投資經理托德‧庫姆斯（Todd Combs）和特德‧韋施勒（Ted Weschler）選擇的。到2021年底，這對明星投資經理對340億美元的投資擁有完全的權力，其中許多投資都沒有達到我們在表中使用的門檻值。此外，托德和特德管理的相當大一部分資金存在波克夏旗下企業的各種養老金計劃中，這些計劃的資產未包含在此表中。
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.
*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.
※ 這是我們的實際買入價，也是我們的計稅基礎。
※※ 由BHE持有；因此，波克夏股東僅持有該頭寸91.1%的權益。
※※※ 包括對西方石油公司100億美元的投資，包括優先股和購買普通股的認股權證，這一組合現在價值107億美元。
現在讓我們來談談我們無法控制的公司，這個列表再次提到了蘋果。下面表格列出了我們持倉市值最大的15只股票，其中幾只是波克夏的兩位長期投資經理托德‧庫姆斯（Todd Combs）和特德‧韋施勒（Ted Weschler）選擇的。到2021年底，這對明星投資經理對340億美元的投資擁有完全的權力，其中許多投資都沒有達到我們在表中使用的門檻值。此外，托德和特德管理的相當大一部分資金存在波克夏旗下企業的各種養老金計劃中，這些計劃的資產未包含在此表中。
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.
*** Includes a $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at $10.7 billion.
※ 這是我們的實際買入價，也是我們的計稅基礎。
※※ 由BHE持有；因此，波克夏股東僅持有該頭寸91.1%的權益。
※※※ 包括對西方石油公司100億美元的投資，包括優先股和購買普通股的認股權證，這一組合現在價值107億美元。
In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the “equity” method, not market value, and carried at $13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of $45 billion.
除了腳注位置的西方控股（Occidental holding）和各種普通股頭寸外，波克夏哈撒韋公司還擁有卡夫亨氏（Kraft Hein）26.6% 的權益 （採用“股權”方法計算，而非市場價值，價值為131億美元）和Pilot 公司38.6%的權益。Pilot公司是旅遊中心的龍頭企業，該公司去年的收入為 450 億美元。
Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted “equity” accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot’s earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.
自從我們在 2017 年購買了Pilot 的股份以來，這部分股份已進行了“股權”會計處理。在2023年初，波克夏將購買Pilot的額外權益，這將使我們的所有權提高到80%，並導致我們在財務報表中充分整合Pilot的收益、資產和負債。
自從我們在 2017 年購買了Pilot 的股份以來，這部分股份已進行了“股權”會計處理。在2023年初，波克夏將購買Pilot的額外權益，這將使我們的所有權提高到80%，並導致我們在財務報表中充分整合Pilot的收益、資產和負債。
U.S. Treasury Bills
美國國債
Berkshire’s balance sheet includes $144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, $120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about 1¤2 of 1% of the publicly-held national debt. 波克夏的資產負債表包括1440億美元的現金和現金等價物（不包括持有的BNSF和BHE）。其中，1200億美元以美國國債的形式持有，全部在一年之內到期。這使波克夏為1%公開持有的國債中的約1/2提供了資金。
Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than $30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.
查理和我已承諾，波克夏（連同我們除BNSF和BHE以外的子公司）將始終持有超過300億美元的現金和等價物。我們希望您的公司在財務上堅不可摧，從不依賴陌生人（甚至朋友）的善意。我們倆都喜歡睡個好覺，我們希望我們的債權人、保險索賠人和您也這樣做。
But $144 billion?
但是需要1440億美元之多？
That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was $114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)
我向你保證，這筆巨款並不是愛國主義的瘋狂表現。查理和我也沒有失去對企業所有權的壓倒性偏好。事實上，80年前的1942年3月11日，當我購買了三股Cities Services優先股時，我第一次表現出對此的熱情。它們的成本是114.75美元，花費了我所有的積蓄。（當天道瓊斯工業平均指數收於99點，這一事實應該向你喊話：永遠不要做空美國。）
After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My favored status throughout that period was 100% – and still is. Berkshire’s current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for long- term holding.
在我最初遭受虧損之後，我總是將至少80%的淨資產投資在股票上。在那段時間裡，我最青睞的狀態是100%—現在仍然如此。波克夏目前在企業中80%左右的倉位，是我未能找到符合我們長期持有標准的整個公司或其中一小部分（即可銷售的股票）的結果。
Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.
查理和我在過去不時忍受著類似的重倉現金狀況。這些時期從來不是令人愉快的，也不是永久性的。而且，幸運的是，在2020年和2021年期間，我們有一個溫和的有吸引力的替代方案來部署資本。請繼續閱讀。
Share Repurchases
股份回購
There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire’s controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire’s resources. 我們可以通過三種方式增加您的投資價值。第一種方式始終是我們心目中的重中之重：通過內部增長或收購來提高波克夏控股業務的長期盈利能力。今天，內部機會帶來的回報遠高於收購。然而，與波克夏的資源相比，這些機會的規模很小。
Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.
我們的第二個選擇是購買許多公開交易的良好或優秀企業的非控股部分權益。有時，這樣的可能性既眾多又極具吸引力。然而如今，我們幾乎沒有發現什麼能讓我們興奮的東西。
That’s largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.
這在很大程度上是因為一個真理：長期低利率推動所有生產性投資的價格上漲，無論是股票、公寓、農場、油井等等。其他因素也會影響估值，但利率始終很重要。
Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)
我們創造價值的最後一條途徑是回購波克夏的股票。通過這個簡單的舉動，我們增加了您在波克夏擁有的許多受控和非受控企業中的份額。當價格/價值等式正確時，這條途徑是我們增加您財富的最簡單、最確定的方式。（除了為持續股東增加價值外，其他幾方也獲得了收益：回購對回購股份的賣方和社會都有一定的好處。）
Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.
我們的第二個選擇是購買許多公開交易的良好或優秀企業的非控股部分權益。有時，這樣的可能性既眾多又極具吸引力。然而如今，我們幾乎沒有發現什麼能讓我們興奮的東西。
That’s largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.
這在很大程度上是因為一個真理：長期低利率推動所有生產性投資的價格上漲，無論是股票、公寓、農場、油井等等。其他因素也會影響估值，但利率始終很重要。
Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)
我們創造價值的最後一條途徑是回購波克夏的股票。通過這個簡單的舉動，我們增加了您在波克夏擁有的許多受控和非受控企業中的份額。當價格/價值等式正確時，這條途徑是我們增加您財富的最簡單、最確定的方式。（除了為持續股東增加價值外，其他幾方也獲得了收益：回購對回購股份的賣方和社會都有一定的好處。）
Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire’s owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of $51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody’s).
週期性地，隨著替代路徑變得沒有吸引力，回購對波克夏公司的股東來說變得很有意義。因此，在過去兩年中，我們回購了截止2019年末外部流通股的9%，總成本517億美元。這筆支出使我們的長期股東擁有波克夏所有業務的約10%，無論這些業務是全資擁有（如BNSF和GEICO）還是部分擁有（如可口可樂和穆迪）。
I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don’t want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of $1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.
我想強調的是，要使波克夏公司的股票回購有意義，我們的股票必須提供適當的價值。我們不想為其他公司的股票多付錢，如果我們在回購波克夏股票時支出過高，那就得不償失。從去年年底到2022年2月23日以來，我們以12億美元的成本回購了更多股票。我們的胃口仍然很大，但將始終取決於價格。
It should be noted that Berkshire’s buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.
應該指出的是，波克夏股票的回購機會有限，因為它擁有一流的投資者基礎。如果我們的股票被短期投機者大量持有，其價格波動和交易量都會大幅放大。這種重塑將為我們提供更多通過回購創造價值的機會。盡管如此，查理和我更喜歡我們擁有的股東，盡管他們令人欽佩的買入並持有的態度限制了長期股東從機會性回購中獲利的程度。
Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from $79,387 per “A” share to $99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.
最後，波克夏公司特有的一個容易被忽視的價值計算：正如我們所討論的，正確類型的保險“浮存金”對我們來說很有價值。碰巧的是，回購會自動增加每股“浮存金”額度。這一數字在過去兩年中增長了25%——從每股“A”類股79387美元增至99497美元，如前所述，這在一定程度上歸功於回購。
週期性地，隨著替代路徑變得沒有吸引力，回購對波克夏公司的股東來說變得很有意義。因此，在過去兩年中，我們回購了截止2019年末外部流通股的9%，總成本517億美元。這筆支出使我們的長期股東擁有波克夏所有業務的約10%，無論這些業務是全資擁有（如BNSF和GEICO）還是部分擁有（如可口可樂和穆迪）。
I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don’t want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of $1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.
我想強調的是，要使波克夏公司的股票回購有意義，我們的股票必須提供適當的價值。我們不想為其他公司的股票多付錢，如果我們在回購波克夏股票時支出過高，那就得不償失。從去年年底到2022年2月23日以來，我們以12億美元的成本回購了更多股票。我們的胃口仍然很大，但將始終取決於價格。
It should be noted that Berkshire’s buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.
應該指出的是，波克夏股票的回購機會有限，因為它擁有一流的投資者基礎。如果我們的股票被短期投機者大量持有，其價格波動和交易量都會大幅放大。這種重塑將為我們提供更多通過回購創造價值的機會。盡管如此，查理和我更喜歡我們擁有的股東，盡管他們令人欽佩的買入並持有的態度限制了長期股東從機會性回購中獲利的程度。
Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from $79,387 per “A” share to $99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.
最後，波克夏公司特有的一個容易被忽視的價值計算：正如我們所討論的，正確類型的保險“浮存金”對我們來說很有價值。碰巧的是，回購會自動增加每股“浮存金”額度。這一數字在過去兩年中增長了25%——從每股“A”類股79387美元增至99497美元，如前所述，這在一定程度上歸功於回購。
A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business
一個了不起的男人和一個了不起的生意
Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life – in both his business and his personal pursuits – Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told. 去年，保羅安德魯斯去世。保羅是波克夏位於沃斯堡的子公司TTI的創始人兼首席執行官。在他的一生中—無論是在他的事業中還是在他的個人追求中—保羅都悄悄地展示了查理和我所欽佩的所有品質。他的故事應該被宣講。
In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul.
1971年，當災難發生時，保羅正在通用動力公司擔任采購代理。在失去一份巨額國防合同後，該公司解僱了包括保羅在內的數千名員工。
With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using $500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled $112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of $7.7 billion.
由於他的第一個孩子即將呱呱墜地，保羅決定賭上自己，用他的500美元積蓄創立了Tex-Tronics公司（後來更名為 TTI）。該公司開始銷售小型電子元件，第一年的銷售額總計112000美元。如今，TTI公司銷售超過100萬種不同的商品，年銷售額達77億美元。
But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend’s early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man’s family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?
但回溯到2006年：時年63歲的保羅發現自己對家人、工作和同事都很滿意。但他有一個揮之不去的擔憂，因為他剛剛目睹了一位朋友的早逝，以及隨之而來的對其家庭和企業的災難性後果。保羅在2006年問自己，如果他意外死去，許多依賴他的人會發生什麼？
For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative “synergies” – savings that would be achieved as the acquiror slashed duplicated functions at TTI.
整整一年，保羅一直在為自己的選擇而苦苦掙扎。把公司賣給競爭對手？從嚴格的經濟角度來看，這種選擇是最有意義的。畢竟，競爭對手可以預見到有利可圖的“協同效應”——當收購方汰除TTI的重復業務部門時，就可以節省成本。
But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer’s home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.
但是，這樣的收購這肯定還會保留其首席財務官、法律顧問、人力資源部門。因此，TTI公司的同一職能部門將被集體裁員。而且啊！如果需要一個新的配送中心，收購方的家鄉肯定會比沃思堡更受青睞。
Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled – aptly so – a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.
不管在財政上有什麼好處，保羅很快就得出結論，把公司賣給競爭對手不適合他。接著，他考慮尋找一個金融買家——這個物種曾被恰當地稱為槓桿收購公司。但保羅知道，這樣的買家會專注於“退出策略”。誰知道那會是什麼呢？ 考慮到這一切，保羅發現自己沒有興趣把自己35年苦心經營的成果交給一個中間商。
When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying – in far more tactful phrasing than this – “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.
當保羅見到我時，他解釋了為什麼他把這兩個備選買家排除在外。然後，他總結了自己的困境，用了比這更委婉的措辭——“在考慮了一年其他選擇後，我想把公司賣給伯克希爾，因為你是唯一剩下的人。”所以我提出了報價，保羅答應了。一次會面，一頓午餐，達成了一筆交易。
To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.
說我們從此過上了幸福的生活，這樣說都不足以表達。當波克夏收購TTI時，該公司有2387名員工。現在這個數字是8043。其中很大一部分增長發生在沃斯堡及其周邊地區。公司的盈利增長了673%。
Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I’m too busy now.”
每年，我都會打電話給保羅，告訴他他的薪水應該大幅增加。每年，他都會告訴我，“我們可以明年再談，華倫，我現在太忙了。”
When Greg Abel and I attended Paul’s memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI’s first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.
當格雷格‧阿貝爾和我參加保羅的追悼會時，我們見到了他的子女、孫輩、長期合作夥伴（包括TTI的首位員工），以及約翰‧羅奇（John Roach），他是波克夏在2000年收購的沃斯堡一家公司的前首席執行官。約翰把他的朋友保羅引到奧馬哈，本能地知道我們會是絕配。
At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.
在追悼會上，格雷格和我聽說了很多保羅默默支持的人和組織。他的慷慨是非凡的——總是致力於改善他人的生活，尤其是沃斯堡的人。
In all ways,Paul was a class act.
在所有方面，保羅都是個傑出的人。
運氣——偶爾是非凡的運氣——在波克夏發揮了作用。如果保羅和我沒有共同的朋友約翰‧羅奇，TTI也不會在我們這裡安家。但這份豐盛的幸運大餐僅僅是個開始。TTI很快就將波克夏引向了其最重要的收購。
Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary’s CEO and learn more about the acquiree’s activities.
每年秋天，波克夏的董事們都會聚集在一起，聽取幾位高管的陳述。我們有時會根據近期收購的地點來選擇會議地點，這意味著董事們可以與新子公司的首席執行官見面，並更多地瞭解被收購方的活動。
In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad’s headquarters.
在2009年秋天，我們選擇了沃斯堡，這樣我們就可以訪問TTI。當時，總部同樣位於沃思堡的BNSF是我們持有股份第三多的公司。盡管有這麼多的股份，我卻從來沒有去過這家鐵路公司的總部。
Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board’s opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF’s third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.
我的助理黛布·博薩內克（Deb Bosanek）將董事會的開幕晚宴安排在10月22日。與此同時，那天我安排早一點到達去見馬特·羅斯（Matt Rose），他是BNSF的首席執行官，我一直欽佩他的成就。當我確定這個日期的時候，我並不知道我們的聚會將與BNSF在22日晚些時候發布第三季度盈利報告同時舉行。
The market reacted badly to the railroad’s results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF’s earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn’t feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.
市場對這家鐵路公司的業績反應不佳。“大衰退”在那年第三季度全面爆發，BNSF的盈利情況反映了這種衰退。經濟前景也很黯淡，華爾街對鐵路或其他很多東西也不友好。
On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.
第二天，我再次與馬特會面，並建議波克夏將為鐵路公司提供一個比作為上市公司所能期望的更好的長期歸宿。我還告訴他波克夏願意支付的最高價格。
Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I’ll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.
馬特將這一提議轉達給了他的董事和顧問。經過忙碌的11天後，波克夏和BNSF宣佈了一項確定交易。在這裡，我要做一個罕見的預測：BNSF將成為一個世紀後波克夏海瑟威公司和我們國家的關鍵資產。
The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn’t sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.
如果保羅‧安德魯斯（Paul Andrews）沒有將波克夏視為TTI的合適歸宿地，BNSF的收購就永遠不會發生。
When Greg Abel and I attended Paul’s memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI’s first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.
當格雷格‧阿貝爾和我參加保羅的追悼會時，我們見到了他的子女、孫輩、長期合作夥伴（包括TTI的首位員工），以及約翰‧羅奇（John Roach），他是波克夏在2000年收購的沃斯堡一家公司的前首席執行官。約翰把他的朋友保羅引到奧馬哈，本能地知道我們會是絕配。
At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.
在追悼會上，格雷格和我聽說了很多保羅默默支持的人和組織。他的慷慨是非凡的——總是致力於改善他人的生活，尤其是沃斯堡的人。
In all ways,Paul was a class act.
在所有方面，保羅都是個傑出的人。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Good luck – occasionally extraordinary luck – has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend – John Roach – TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.運氣——偶爾是非凡的運氣——在波克夏發揮了作用。如果保羅和我沒有共同的朋友約翰‧羅奇，TTI也不會在我們這裡安家。但這份豐盛的幸運大餐僅僅是個開始。TTI很快就將波克夏引向了其最重要的收購。
Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary’s CEO and learn more about the acquiree’s activities.
每年秋天，波克夏的董事們都會聚集在一起，聽取幾位高管的陳述。我們有時會根據近期收購的地點來選擇會議地點，這意味著董事們可以與新子公司的首席執行官見面，並更多地瞭解被收購方的活動。
In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad’s headquarters.
在2009年秋天，我們選擇了沃斯堡，這樣我們就可以訪問TTI。當時，總部同樣位於沃思堡的BNSF是我們持有股份第三多的公司。盡管有這麼多的股份，我卻從來沒有去過這家鐵路公司的總部。
Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board’s opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF’s third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the 22nd.
我的助理黛布·博薩內克（Deb Bosanek）將董事會的開幕晚宴安排在10月22日。與此同時，那天我安排早一點到達去見馬特·羅斯（Matt Rose），他是BNSF的首席執行官，我一直欽佩他的成就。當我確定這個日期的時候，我並不知道我們的聚會將與BNSF在22日晚些時候發布第三季度盈利報告同時舉行。
The market reacted badly to the railroad’s results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF’s earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn’t feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.
市場對這家鐵路公司的業績反應不佳。“大衰退”在那年第三季度全面爆發，BNSF的盈利情況反映了這種衰退。經濟前景也很黯淡，華爾街對鐵路或其他很多東西也不友好。
On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.
第二天，我再次與馬特會面，並建議波克夏將為鐵路公司提供一個比作為上市公司所能期望的更好的長期歸宿。我還告訴他波克夏願意支付的最高價格。
Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I’ll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.
馬特將這一提議轉達給了他的董事和顧問。經過忙碌的11天後，波克夏和BNSF宣佈了一項確定交易。在這裡，我要做一個罕見的預測：BNSF將成為一個世紀後波克夏海瑟威公司和我們國家的關鍵資產。
The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn’t sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.
如果保羅‧安德魯斯（Paul Andrews）沒有將波克夏視為TTI的合適歸宿地，BNSF的收購就永遠不會發生。
Thanks
致謝
I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018. 70年前，我教了我的第一堂投資課。從那以後，我幾乎每年都很享受與各個年齡段的學生一起工作，最終在2018年“退休”。
Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson’s fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.
一直以來，我最難的聽眾是我孫子所在的五年級班級。11歲的孩子們在座位上扭來扭去，茫然地看著我，直到我提到可口可樂（Coca-Cola）及其著名的秘密配方。立刻，每個人都舉起手來，我明白了“秘密”對孩子們來說是一種誘惑。
Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.
教學和寫作一樣，幫助我發展和理清了自己的思路。查理稱這種現象為猩猩效應：如果你和一隻猩猩坐在一起，仔細地向它解釋你的一個寶貴想法，你可能會留下一隻迷惑不解的靈長類動物，但你自己的思維會更清晰。
Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”
和大學生交談則要有效得多。我敦促他們在（1）這個領域找工作，（2）如果他們不需要錢的話，找他們想找的人一起工作。我承認，經濟現實可能會干擾這種尋找。即便如此，我敦促學生們永遠不要放棄追求，因為當他們找到那種工作時，他們就不再是“工作”了。
Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as part- timers at my grandfather’s grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.
查理和我，我們自己，在經歷了一些早期的挫折後，走上了這條解放的道路。我們都是在我祖父的雜貨店裡做兼職，查理1940年，我1942年。我們每個人都被分配了無聊的任務，報酬也很少，這絕對不是我們想要的。後來，查理開始從事法律工作，而我則嘗試著賣證券。我們對工作的滿意度仍然不高。
Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It’s a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.
最後，在波克夏，我們找到了自己喜歡做的事情。除了極少數例外，我們現在已經與我們喜歡和信任的人“工作”了幾十年。與保羅‧安德魯斯（Paul Andrews）或我去年告訴過你的波克夏大家庭這樣的經理人共事，是一種生活樂趣。在我們的總部，我們雇傭正派和有才華的人-沒有笨蛋。每年的平均流動率大概是一個人。
I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction working
for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.
然而，我想強調另一件事，它使我們的工作變得有趣和滿意----為您工作。對查理和我來說，沒有什麼比獲得個人長期股東的信任更值得的了。幾十年來，他們加入我們，期望我們成為他們資金的可靠託管人。
Obviously, we can’t select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.
顯然，我們不能選擇我們的股東，如果我們的經營形式是合夥的話，我們可以這樣做。任何人今天都可以購買波克夏的股票，並打算很快再出售這些股票。當然，我們會有一些這樣的股東，就像我們會有指數基金持有大量波克夏股票，只是因為它們被要求這麼做。
To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large– some might say excessive – portion of their savings.
波克夏的股東是一個龐大的個人和家庭團隊，他們選擇加入我們，意願接近“至死不渝”，到了一個不同尋常的程度。他們把很大一部分——有些人可能會說是過多的存款託付給我們。
Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.
這些股東有時會承認，波克夏可能遠不是他們本可以做出的最佳選擇。但他們會補充說，在他們最滿意的投資對象中，波克夏的排名靠前。一般而言，那些對自己的投資感到舒服的人，將比那些被不斷變化的頭條新聞、傳言和承諾所影響的人獲得更好的回報。
Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”
長線股東既是查理和我一直尋求的“合夥人”，也是我們在波克夏做決策時一直考慮的“合夥人”。我們想對他們說：“為你們‘工作’感覺很好，我們感謝你們的信任。”
The Annual Meeting
年度股東大會
Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29th through Sunday, May 1st. The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.日期已經確定。波克夏公司將於4月29日（週五）至5月1日（週日）在奧馬哈舉行年度股東大會。關於股東大會的細節寫在A-1和A-2頁。奧馬哈急切地等待著你的到來，我也一樣。
I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy’s masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family’s use. Join me.
我要用一個廣告來結束這封信。“表弟”吉米-巴菲特設計了一款浮式“派對”遊艇，目前由波克夏子公司Forest River生產。這款遊艇將於4月29日在波克夏股東大會上發布。而且，僅在兩天時間內，股東可以以10%的折扣購買吉米的傑作。你們的董事長會買一艘供家人使用，加入我吧。
February 26, 2022 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
2022年2月26日 華倫·巴菲特 董事長