注:相關圖表請自行參閱:波克夏股東信
依照慣例，第一頁是波克夏業績與標普500指數表現的對比，2019年，波克夏股價年度漲幅11%，而同期內，標普500指數計入股息再投資的整體回報率為31.5%。長期而言，1965年至2019年間，波克夏股價複合年均增長率為20.3%，大幅超過標普500指數10.0%的複合年均回報率；1964年至2019年間，波克夏股價累積增長率更達到驚人的2744,062%，遠高於標普500指數19784%的累積回報率。
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
波克夏海瑟威的各位股東：
波克夏2019財年基於通用會計準則（GAAP）的盈利為814億美元。具體而言，這一總數當中包含240億美元運營盈利，以及我們所持有股票產生的37億美元已兌現資本利得和537億美元的未兌現資本利得。前列所有均為稅後數據。
Berkshire earned $81.4 billion in 2019 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24 billion of operating earnings, $3.7 billion of realized capital gains and a $53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis.
關於這537億美元利得，必須做一個補充說明。根據2018年生效的新版通用會計準則，一家企業所持有的證券，即便是尚未兌現的利得和虧損淨變化也必須計入盈利數據。正如我們在去年股東信當中所澄清的，無論是我，還是和我一起管理波克夏的夥伴查理·孟格（Charlie Munger），我們對這種新規其實都持保留態度。
That $53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we stated in last year’s letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule.
這種新規會被推出和采用，本質上說來，其實是標誌著會計專業理念的一次重大改變。2018年之前，通用會計準則堅持認為，除非一家企業的生意就是證券交易本身，不然的話，投資組合當中未兌現的資本利得任何時候都不該被計入盈利，而未兌現的虧損也隻有在被認為是“非暫時性”的情況下才可以計入。現在，根據新規，波克夏必須將這些數據計入每個季度的盈利之中，不管這些證券的漲漲跌跌不管有多麽起伏不定，可能會造成怎樣的影響——對於眾多投資者、分析師和評論家來說，這也成了他們必須掌握的新知識。
The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted – with an exception for companies whose business was to trade securities – that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed “other than temporary.” Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarter’s bottom line – a key item of news for many investors, analysts and commentators – every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be.
波克夏2018年和2019年的具體數據其實正清楚地證明了我們對新規的判斷的正當性。正如我們發布的數據所顯示的，2018年是股市遭遇不順的一年，我們未兌現的利得縮減了206億美元之多，於是我們當年度的通用會計準則盈利就隻剩下了40億美元。至於2019年，如前所述，由於股票價格的上漲，我們未兌現的利得猛增了537億美元，使得通用會計準則盈利達到了前面所報告的814億美元。換言之，股市行情的變化使得我們的通用會計準則盈利猛增了令人瞠目結舌的1900%！
Berkshire’s 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by $20.6 billion, and we therefore reported GAAP earnings of only $4 billion. In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned $53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the $81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% increase in GAAP earnings!
然而，與會計世界不同的是，在我們認為的現實世界當中，波克夏所持有的股票總規模這兩年一直保持在大約2000億美元的水平，這些股票的內在價值也基本上都是在穩步而堅實地增長。
Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshire’s equity holdings averaged about $200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period.
查理和我呼籲大家專注於運營盈利——我們的這一數據2019年較之前一年基本沒有大的變化——同時不要去在意投資的季度或年度的利得或虧損，不管是已經兌現的還是尚未兌現的。
Charlie and I urge you to focus on operating earnings – which were little changed in 2019 – and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized.
我們的這種建議絕不是忽視或貶低波克夏這些投資的價值。查理和我都預計，我們的股票投資，雖然其一時間表現出的具體形態可能難以預測，高度不規律，但是長期角度而言，注定會為我們創造巨大的利得。我們為何會如此樂觀？下麵的章節將會展開討論。
Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect our equity holdings – as a group – to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion.
The Power of Retained Earnings
保留盈利的力量
1924年，一位名聲並不是那麽顯赫的經濟學家、理財顧問埃德加·勞倫斯 ·史密斯（Edgar Lawrence Smith）完成了一本《普通股的長期投資》（Common Stocks as Long Term Investments），這雖然隻是一本薄薄的冊子，但是卻改變了整個投資世界的麵貌。事實上，撰寫這本書的經曆也改變了史密斯本人，迫使他開始重新評估自己的投資信條。
In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stocks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs.
剛開始寫作的時候，他最初想要說明的觀點是，在通貨膨脹周期當中，股票的表現要好於債券，而在通貨緊縮周期當中，債券的回報則好過股票。看上去，這樣的觀點是合情合理的。可是接下來，史密斯自己都吃了一驚。
Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would deliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock.
事實上，在這本書的最開頭，史密斯就承認：“這些研究本身就是對失敗的記錄——事實並不能支持預設的觀點。”然而，這卻是投資者的幸事，因為失敗迫使史密斯更加深入地思考，去探索到底該如何評估股票的價值。
His book began, therefore, with a confession: “These studies are the record of a failure – the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory.” Luckily for investors, that failure led Smith to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated.
要把握住史密斯到底洞見了些什麽，我想最好還是引述一段關於他著作的最早期評論，來自約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）：“我一直讀完全書，才大致搞清楚了史密斯先生最新奇的，當然也是最重要的觀點到底是什麽。那些真正優秀的工業企業管理層是不會將他們每年所獲的利潤都全部派發給股東的，這是一個基本原則。哪怕不是所有年景，至少在好的年景下，這些企業都會留下一部分利潤，將其重新投入到其業務本身。這樣就創造出一種有利於可靠的工業投資的複利運營模式。經年累月，這筆可靠的工業財富的真實價值就會以複利速度增長，更不必說股東們還得到了源源不斷的股息。”
For the crux of Smith’s insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: “I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smith’s most important, and is certainly his most novel, point. Well-managed industrial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest (Keynes’ italics) operating in favour of a sound industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders.”
得到了這位經濟學大家的加持，史密斯一夜成名。
And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure.
在史密斯的這本著作出版之前，保留盈利的做法居然會讓股東們都感到不滿，這樣的邏輯，今人已經很難理解了。畢竟，我們現在都知道，當年的卡耐基、洛克菲勒和福特等大家族之所以能夠積累起令人瞠目結舌的巨大財富，靠的就是保留住很大一部分企業盈利，將其投入未來的成長，創造出更大的利潤。事實上，不光是這些巨頭們，在全美的範圍內，真不知有多少具體而微的資本家們是靠著重複同樣的劇本而發家致富的。
It’s difficult to understand why retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smith’s book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth and produce ever-greater profits.Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook.
然而，事實就是，在史密斯之前的年代當中，當企業所有權被分割成無數小片——“股票”，後者的購買者們通常都將自己的投資視作是針對市場行情變動的短期賭博，往最好聽裏說也不過就是投機而已——真正的紳士們青睞的是債券。
Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces – “stocks” – buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds.
不管投資者們變聰明的速度有多麽遲緩，到今天，保留盈利用於再投資的數學公式都已經被大家充分理解了。曾經被凱恩斯評為“新奇”的觀念，對於現在的高中生都已經是常識了——將儲蓄和複利結合，就可以創造奇跡。
Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed “novel”: combining savings with compound interest works wonders.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
在波克夏，查理和我一直以來都高度重視有效地運用保留盈利。有些時候，這份工作其實是很輕鬆的，可是在另外一些時候，這份工作用“困難”來形容都嫌不足——尤其是我們麵對著體量巨大，而且還在持續膨脹的現金的時候。
At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy – at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and evergrowing sums of money.
我們想要將自己所保留的這些資金投入使用，首選的目標就是投資於我們業已擁有的數量眾多、種類繁雜的生意當中。單單在過去十年時間裏，波克夏的折舊支出就累計達到650億美元，而內部的地皮、廠房和設備投資累計更達到1210億美元。再投資於運營資產永遠都是我們的優先考慮對象。
In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire’s depreciation charges have aggregated $65 billion whereas the company’s internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled $121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.
此外，我們還在持續尋求買進新的企業的機會，隻要後者能夠符合三個標準。首先，他們運營的淨有形資本必須能夠創造得體的回報。其次，經理人必須是德才兼備，既有能力又誠實。最後，買進價格必須合理。
In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
一旦我們找到了這樣的企業，隻要條件允許，我們都會希望將其100%全部收購下來。遺憾的是，符合我們前麵全部要求的大規模收購機會其實頗為稀有。在更多的時候，我們還是隻能去把握住股市波動當中湧現出的機會，去收購那些符合標準的上市公司的大量股份，但是往往並不能達到控股的程度。
When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.
無論我們到底是如何進行的投資——是控股了這些企業，還是隻通過市場購入了一大筆股權——波克夏的財務表現很大程度上都將取決於我們所投資的這些企業的未來盈利能力。隻不過，投資者必須明白，這兩種投資方式在會計層麵是存在著巨大差異的。
Whichever way we go – controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market – Berkshire’s financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.
那些我們控股的企業（具體定義為波克夏持有50%以上股權），他們各自的盈利都會直接計入我們報告的運營盈利數據。各位看到的就是實實在在的盈利。
In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.
至於那些非控股企業，即我們擁有相當數量股票的企業，隻有他們的股息才會被計入波克夏報告的運營盈利數據。當然，他們也會有自己的保留盈利，用來投入運轉、創造更多附加值，但是這一切都不會從波克夏發布的盈利數據當中直接體現出來。
In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They’re working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire’s reported earnings.
在幾乎所有其他的大企業財報當中，投資者都不會看到波克夏這種高度重視和列出“未實現盈利”的做法。可是，對於我們而言，這卻是一項非常重大，不容忽略的內容，必須詳細列出如下。
At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we’ll call this “nonrecognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.
以下，我們將列出我們通過股市投資的10支最重要成份股，具體條目包括我們持股占其全部股票的比例、我們所獲得的股息（基於當前年收益率、單位100萬美元），以及他們的盈利保留情況（2019年盈利減去已經派發的普通股和優先股股息、單位100萬美元）。
Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting – these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees – and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire’s share of the company’s future earnings.
顯然，這些我們隻是部分擁有的企業，我們最終能夠記錄下來的已兌現利得是不會與他們保留盈利當中根據“我們”持股比例計算出的結果準確對應的。雖然遺憾，但是也不能不承認，有些時候，保留盈利也可能會無功而返。隻不過，不管是根據邏輯常識，還是根據我們過往的經驗，我們都更加傾向於相信，這些企業和股票最終將實現的資本利得至少會與他們保留盈利當中屬於我們的份額相當，很可能還會猶有過之。（需要補充的是，當我們最終賣掉這些股票，實現利得，我們必須按照當時的稅率繳納聯邦所得稅，目前的適用稅率為21%。）
At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy – at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and evergrowing sums of money.
我們想要將自己所保留的這些資金投入使用，首選的目標就是投資於我們業已擁有的數量眾多、種類繁雜的生意當中。單單在過去十年時間裏，波克夏的折舊支出就累計達到650億美元，而內部的地皮、廠房和設備投資累計更達到1210億美元。再投資於運營資產永遠都是我們的優先考慮對象。
In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire’s depreciation charges have aggregated $65 billion whereas the company’s internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled $121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.
此外，我們還在持續尋求買進新的企業的機會，隻要後者能夠符合三個標準。首先，他們運營的淨有形資本必須能夠創造得體的回報。其次，經理人必須是德才兼備，既有能力又誠實。最後，買進價格必須合理。
In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
一旦我們找到了這樣的企業，隻要條件允許，我們都會希望將其100%全部收購下來。遺憾的是，符合我們前麵全部要求的大規模收購機會其實頗為稀有。在更多的時候，我們還是隻能去把握住股市波動當中湧現出的機會，去收購那些符合標準的上市公司的大量股份，但是往往並不能達到控股的程度。
When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.
無論我們到底是如何進行的投資——是控股了這些企業，還是隻通過市場購入了一大筆股權——波克夏的財務表現很大程度上都將取決於我們所投資的這些企業的未來盈利能力。隻不過，投資者必須明白，這兩種投資方式在會計層麵是存在著巨大差異的。
Whichever way we go – controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market – Berkshire’s financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.
那些我們控股的企業（具體定義為波克夏持有50%以上股權），他們各自的盈利都會直接計入我們報告的運營盈利數據。各位看到的就是實實在在的盈利。
In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.
至於那些非控股企業，即我們擁有相當數量股票的企業，隻有他們的股息才會被計入波克夏報告的運營盈利數據。當然，他們也會有自己的保留盈利，用來投入運轉、創造更多附加值，但是這一切都不會從波克夏發布的盈利數據當中直接體現出來。
In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They’re working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire’s reported earnings.
在幾乎所有其他的大企業財報當中，投資者都不會看到波克夏這種高度重視和列出“未實現盈利”的做法。可是，對於我們而言，這卻是一項非常重大，不容忽略的內容，必須詳細列出如下。
At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we’ll call this “nonrecognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.
以下，我們將列出我們通過股市投資的10支最重要成份股，具體條目包括我們持股占其全部股票的比例、我們所獲得的股息（基於當前年收益率、單位100萬美元），以及他們的盈利保留情況（2019年盈利減去已經派發的普通股和優先股股息、單位100萬美元）。
Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting – these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees – and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire’s share of the company’s future earnings.
顯然，這些我們隻是部分擁有的企業，我們最終能夠記錄下來的已兌現利得是不會與他們保留盈利當中根據“我們”持股比例計算出的結果準確對應的。雖然遺憾，但是也不能不承認，有些時候，保留盈利也可能會無功而返。隻不過，不管是根據邏輯常識，還是根據我們過往的經驗，我們都更加傾向於相信，這些企業和股票最終將實現的資本利得至少會與他們保留盈利當中屬於我們的份額相當，很可能還會猶有過之。（需要補充的是，當我們最終賣掉這些股票，實現利得，我們必須按照當時的稅率繳納聯邦所得稅，目前的適用稅率為21%。）
可以肯定地說，波克夏從這10家公司，以及我們做了股票投資的其他許多家公司所獲取的回報未來還將以極不規則的形態持續呈現。有時可能是基於某家企業自身的問題，有時可能是因為股市大盤的緣故，虧損總會周期性發生。與此同時，在另外一些時間段當中，我們的利得則可能會爆炸式增長，比如去年就是個例子。整體而言，我們投資兌現的保留盈利對於波克夏自身價值的增長無疑是具有重大意義的。
It is certain that Berkshire’s rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times – last year was one of those – our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire’s value.
史密斯完全正確。
Mr. Smith got it right.
Non-Insurance Operations
非保險業務
湯姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）是波克夏的重要董事，他是史上偉大的經理人之一。很早之前，他就給過我一些有關收購的重要建議：“要獲得優秀經理人的美譽，隻需確保你收購的是好企業即可。”
Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: “To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses.”
多年來，波克夏收購了許多公司，最初我全部將它們視為“好生意”。” 但是，最後有些公司卻令人失望，有不少簡直是徹底的災難。另一方麵，有不少公司卻超出了我的期望。
Over the years Berkshire has acquired many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as “good businesses.” Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes.
回顧我時好時壞的投資記錄時，我得出的結論是，收購就好比婚姻：當然，一開始婚姻是令人開心的，但之後現實往往會偏離婚前的預期。美妙的是，有些時候，新婚夫婦為雙方帶來了超出預期的幸福。而在另外一些情況下，幻滅也來得很快。將這些畫麵放到公司收購上麵，我不得不說，一般是收購者遇到不愉快的意外情況。在追求收購的階段，我們總是容易滿眼樂觀。
In reviewing my uneven record, I’ve concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding – but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party’s hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, I’d have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. It’s easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships.
按照這種類比，我想說我們的“婚姻”記錄大部分還算差強人意，各方皆大歡喜，都很滿意很久之前所做的決定。我們的一些合作關係如同田園般愜意。但是，有不少情況，事後很快會使我很納悶我在“求婚”時到底在想什麽，才會做出當時的決定。
Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed.
幸運的是，我的許多錯誤導致的後果因大多數令人失望的業務所具有的特點而有所減小：隨著時間的流逝，“表現不佳”的公司趨於停滯，隨即進入一種狀態：即它們的業務對波克夏資本的需要占比越來越小。與此同時，“表現良好”的公司往往會繼續增長，並以有吸引力的速度找到投資更多資本的機會。由於這兩種截然相反的軌跡，波克夏的投資勝出者使用的資產逐漸成為我們總資本的一部分。
Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the “poor” business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire’s capital. Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire’s winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.
我們拿波克夏最初的紡織業務為例，這是金融運作的一個極端例子。我們於1965年初獲得了該公司的控製權，而這個陷入困境的業務幾乎需要波克夏的全部資本。因此，在一段時間內，波克夏的未盈利紡織資產給我們的總體回報拖了嚴重的後腿。好在最終我們收購了一批“表現良好”的企業，1980年代初的這一轉變使得萎縮的紡織業務僅占去了我們一小部分資本。
As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire’s original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire’s capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshire’s non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.
如今，我們將你們的大部分資金投在能為運營所需的淨有形資產帶來良好乃至優異回報的可控製企業。我們的保險業務一直是佼佼者。這一業務具有特殊的特征，賦予其校準成功的獨特指標，這是許多投資者不熟悉的。我們將在下一章節再作具體討論。
Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metric for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section.
在接下來的幾段中，我們將各種非保險業務按收入規模分組（扣除利息、折舊、稅項、非現金補償、重組費用之後 – 所有這些令人討厭但非常實際的成本，公司的首席執行官們和華爾街有時會告訴投資者們不要理會）。你們可在K-6 – K-21和K-40 – K-52頁上閱讀有關這些業務的更多信息。
In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges – all of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 – K-21 and pages K-40 – K-52.
我們的BNSF鐵路和波克夏海瑟威能源公司（“ BHE”） – 波克夏非保險業務的兩大領頭羊– 2019年的共計收入83億美元（僅納入我們占BHE的91%份額），較2018年增長6%。
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) – the two lead dogs of Berkshire’s noninsurance group – earned a combined $8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018.
按照盈利排名（但下文中是按字母順序排列的），接下來的五家非保險子公司Clayton Home、International MetalWorking、Lubrizol、Marmon和Precision Castpart在2019年的總盈利為48億美元，與它們在2018年的收入相比變化不大。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of $4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.
再下來的五家子公司（Berkshire Hathaway Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw和TTI，同樣是按字母順序排列的）2019年的總盈利為19億美元，高於2018年的17億美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned $1.9 billion last year, up from the $1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.
波克夏擁有的其餘非保險業務——此類業務有很多——2019年的總盈利為27億美元，相比之下2018年為28億美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had aggregate earnings of $2.7 billion in 2019, down from $2.8 billion in 2018.
2019年，我們控製的非保險業務淨收入總額為177億美元，較2018年的172億美元增長了3%。收購和出售對這些結果幾乎沒有淨影響。
Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the $17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
我必須補充一點，強調波克夏公司的廣泛業務範圍。2011年，我們收購了總部位於俄亥俄州的Lubrizol公司，這是一家在全球範圍內生產和銷售石油添加劑的公司。2019 年9月26日，Lubrizol所屬的一家法國大型工廠遭遇了一場大火。
I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.
這場大火造成了嚴重的財產損失，Lubrizol的業務也因此遭到了嚴重破壞。即使如此，公司的財產損失和業務中斷損失將通過Lubrizol大量的保險追償得到緩解。
The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.
但是，正如已故的保羅·哈維（Paul Harvey）在他著名的廣播節目中所說的，“接下來是故事的結局。” Lubrizol最大的保險公司之一是波克夏旗下的公司。
But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.
在馬太福音6：3中，聖經指示我們：“你施舍的時候，不要讓你的左手知道右手所做的。” 你們的董事長顯然是遵照了聖經的囑咐。
In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.
Property/Casualty Insurance
財產/意外險
按照盈利排名（但下文中是按字母順序排列的），接下來的五家非保險子公司Clayton Home、International MetalWorking、Lubrizol、Marmon和Precision Castpart在2019年的總盈利為48億美元，與它們在2018年的收入相比變化不大。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of $4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.
再下來的五家子公司（Berkshire Hathaway Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw和TTI，同樣是按字母順序排列的）2019年的總盈利為19億美元，高於2018年的17億美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned $1.9 billion last year, up from the $1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.
波克夏擁有的其餘非保險業務——此類業務有很多——2019年的總盈利為27億美元，相比之下2018年為28億美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had aggregate earnings of $2.7 billion in 2019, down from $2.8 billion in 2018.
2019年，我們控製的非保險業務淨收入總額為177億美元，較2018年的172億美元增長了3%。收購和出售對這些結果幾乎沒有淨影響。
Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the $17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
我必須補充一點，強調波克夏公司的廣泛業務範圍。2011年，我們收購了總部位於俄亥俄州的Lubrizol公司，這是一家在全球範圍內生產和銷售石油添加劑的公司。2019 年9月26日，Lubrizol所屬的一家法國大型工廠遭遇了一場大火。
I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.
這場大火造成了嚴重的財產損失，Lubrizol的業務也因此遭到了嚴重破壞。即使如此，公司的財產損失和業務中斷損失將通過Lubrizol大量的保險追償得到緩解。
The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.
但是，正如已故的保羅·哈維（Paul Harvey）在他著名的廣播節目中所說的，“接下來是故事的結局。” Lubrizol最大的保險公司之一是波克夏旗下的公司。
But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.
在馬太福音6：3中，聖經指示我們：“你施舍的時候，不要讓你的左手知道右手所做的。” 你們的董事長顯然是遵照了聖經的囑咐。
In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.
Property/Casualty Insurance
財產/意外險
1967年以來，財產/意外險（P / C）業務一直是波克夏業績增長的引擎。1967年，波克夏以860萬美元收購了國民保險公司（National Indemnity）及其姊妹公司國民火災及海事保險公司（National Fire＆Marine）。如今，以淨資產衡量，國民保險公司是世界上最大的財產/意外險公司。保險業務重在履行承諾，而波克夏履行承諾的能力是無人能比的。
Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire’s ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.
我們被P/C業務吸引的原因之一是該行業的商業模式：P/C保險公司先收取保費後賠付。在極端情況下，一些理賠（如接觸石棉，或嚴重的工作場所事故）的賠付可能持續數十年。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
這種“先收取保費，後賠付”的模式讓P / C公司持有大筆資金 – 我們稱之為“浮存金” – 最終會賠付給其他人。與此同時，保險公司會將這筆浮存金拿去投資獲利。雖然個人的保單和理賠來來去去，但保險公司持有的保費收入相關的浮存金一般較為穩定。因此，隨著保險業務的增長，浮存金也隨之增長。下表所示為浮存金的具體增長情況：
This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
如果保費收入超過我們的費用和最終損失的總額，保險業務就實現承保利潤，從而增加浮存金產生的投資收入。當賺得這樣的利潤時，我們就可以使用免費資金，而且更好的是，我們還會因為持有這些資金而獲得回報。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
對於整個財產與意外險行業而言，目前浮存金的財務價值遠低於多年前。這是因為幾乎所有財產與意外險企業的標準投資戰略都嚴重且恰當地傾向於高級別債券。因此，利率變化對這些企業至關重要，而在過去十年裏，債券市場提供的利率低得可憐。
For the P/C industry as a whole, the financial value of float is now far less than it was for many years. That’s because the standard investment strategy for almost all P/C companies is heavily – and properly – skewed toward high-grade bonds. Changes in interest rates therefore matter enormously to these companies, and during the last decade the bond market has offered pathetically low rates.
由於保險公司年複一年地被迫（通過到期日或發行人贖回條款）將其“舊”投資組合轉換成收益率更低的新持倉，所以保險公司也受到了影響。這些保險公司曾經可以安全地從每一美元的浮存金中賺取5美分或6美分，但現在他們隻賺到2美分或3美分（如果他們的業務集中在深陷負利率泥潭的國家，甚至更少）。
Consequently, insurers suffered, as year by year they were forced – by maturities or issuer-call provisions – to recycle their “old” investment portfolios into new holdings providing much lower yields. Where once these insurers could safely earn 5 cents or 6 cents on each dollar of float, they now take in only 2 cents or 3 cents (or even less if their operations are concentrated in countries mired in the never-never land of negative rates).
一些保險公司可能會試圖通過購買低質量債券或承諾高收益的非流動性“另類”投資來減少收入損失。但是，這些都是危險的遊戲和活動，大多數機構都沒有足夠的裝備參與這樣的危險遊戲和活動。
Some insurers may try to mitigate their loss of revenue by buying lower-quality bonds or non-liquid “alternative” investments promising higher yields. But those are dangerous games and activities that most institutions are ill-equipped to play.
波克夏的情況總體上比保險公司要好。最重要的是，我們無與倫比的巨額資本、充裕的現金和多樣化的非保險收入，使我們擁有比業內其他公司更大的投資靈活性。我們擁有很多選擇，這些選擇總是對我們很有利，有時會給我們提供重大的機會。
Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous – and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.
與此同時，我們的財產與意外險公司有著良好的承保記錄。在過去的17年裏，波克夏有16年實現了承保利潤運營，隻有2017年例外，當時我們的稅前虧損高達32億美元。在整整17年的時間裏，我們的稅前利潤總計275億美元，其中2019年實現了4億美元。
Our P/C companies have meanwhile had an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 16 of the last 17 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was a whopping $3.2 billion. For the entire 17-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27.5 billion, of which $400 million was recorded in 2019.
這種記錄並非偶然：嚴格的風險評估是我們保險經理日常關注的焦點，他們知道，糟糕的承保業績可能會淹沒浮存金的回報。所有保險公司都隻是嘴上說說而已。但在波克夏，這是一種宗教，舊約風格的宗教。
That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the rewards of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
正如我過去一再做過的那樣，我現在要強調的是，保險業的美好結局遠非一件確定無疑的事情：在未來17年的16年裏，我們幾乎肯定不會獲得承保利潤。危險總是隱藏其中。
As I have repeatedly done in the past, I will emphasize now that happy outcomes in insurance are far from a sure thing: We will most certainly not have an underwriting profit in 16 of the next 17 years. Danger always lurks.
評估保險風險的錯誤可能是巨大的，可能需要很多年甚至幾十年的時間才能顯現和成熟。（想想石棉。）一場使卡特裏娜颶風和邁克爾颶風相形見絀的大災難將會發生，也許是明天，也許是幾十年後。“最大的災難”可能來自傳統來源，如風或者地震，也可能是完全出乎意料的，比如網絡攻擊的災難性後果超出了保險公司目前的預期。當這樣的大災難來襲時，波克夏就會得到它的損失份額，而且損失將會很大，非常大。然而，與許多其他保險公司不同，處理損失不會接近於耗盡我們的資源，我們將急於在第二天就增加我們的業務。
Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years – even decades – to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Close your eyes for a moment and try to envision a locale that might spawn a dynamic P/C insurer. New York? London? Silicon Valley?
威爾克斯-巴裏（Wilkes-Barre）怎麽樣？
How about Wilkes-Barre?
2012年末，我們保險業務非常寶貴的經理阿吉特-傑恩（Ajit Jain）打電話告訴我，他將以2.21億美元（約合當時公司的資產淨值）的價格收購賓夕法尼亞州那個小城的一家小公司 – GUARD Insurance Group。他還說，GUARD首席執行官賽-福格爾（Sy Foguel）將成為波克夏的明星。GUARD和賽都是我的新名字。
Late in 2012, Ajit Jain, the invaluable manager of our insurance operations, called to tell me that he was buying a tiny company – GUARD Insurance Group – in that small Pennsylvania city for $221 million (roughly its net worth at the time). He added that Sy Foguel, GUARD’s CEO, was going to be a star at Berkshire. Both GUARD and Sy were new names to me.
轉眼之間：2019年，GUARD的保費收入達到19億美元，較2012年增長了379%，承保利潤也令人滿意。自從加入波克夏以來，賽帶領公司進入了新產品和新地區，並將GUARD的浮存金增加了265%。
威爾克斯-巴裏（Wilkes-Barre）怎麽樣？
How about Wilkes-Barre?
2012年末，我們保險業務非常寶貴的經理阿吉特-傑恩（Ajit Jain）打電話告訴我，他將以2.21億美元（約合當時公司的資產淨值）的價格收購賓夕法尼亞州那個小城的一家小公司 – GUARD Insurance Group。他還說，GUARD首席執行官賽-福格爾（Sy Foguel）將成為波克夏的明星。GUARD和賽都是我的新名字。
Late in 2012, Ajit Jain, the invaluable manager of our insurance operations, called to tell me that he was buying a tiny company – GUARD Insurance Group – in that small Pennsylvania city for $221 million (roughly its net worth at the time). He added that Sy Foguel, GUARD’s CEO, was going to be a star at Berkshire. Both GUARD and Sy were new names to me.
轉眼之間：2019年，GUARD的保費收入達到19億美元，較2012年增長了379%，承保利潤也令人滿意。自從加入波克夏以來，賽帶領公司進入了新產品和新地區，並將GUARD的浮存金增加了265%。
Bingo and bingo: In 2019, GUARD had premium volume of $1.9 billion, up 379% since 2012, and also delivered a satisfactory underwriting profit. Since joining Berkshire, Sy has led the company into both new products and new regions of the country and has increased GUARD’s float by 265%.
1967年，奧馬哈似乎不太可能成為一個財產與意外險的巨頭跳板。威爾克斯-巴裏很可能會帶來類似的驚喜。
In 1967, Omaha seemed an unlikely launching pad for a P/C giant. Wilkes-Barre may well deliver a similar surprise.
Berkshire Hathaway Energy
波克夏海瑟威能源公司
波克夏海瑟威能源公司正在慶祝其在我們旗下的第20個年頭。周年紀念日表明我們應該在趕超公司的成就。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy is now celebrating its 20th year under our ownership. That anniversary suggests that we should be catching up with the company’s accomplishments.
我們就從電價這個話題開始。當波克夏在2000年進入公用事業領域時，它收購了BHE 76%的股份，該公司在愛荷華州的居民客戶的平均千瓦時電價為8.8美分。自那之後，居民客戶的電價每年上漲不到1%，我們承諾，到2028年，基本電價不會上漲。相比之下，愛荷華州另一家大型投資公司的情況是：去年，該公司對居民客戶收取的電價比BHE高出61%。最近，公用事業公司的費率上漲，將使這一差距擴大到70%。
We’ll start with the topic of electricity rates. When Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000, purchasing 76% of BHE, the company’s residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Prices for residential customers have since risen less than 1% a year, and we have promised that there will be no base rate price increases through 2028. In contrast, here’s what is happening at the other large investor-owned Iowa utility: Last year, the rates it charged its residential customers were 61% higher than BHE’s. Recently, that utility received a rate increase that will widen the gap to 70%.
我們和他們之間的巨大差異很大程度上是由於我們在將風能轉化為電能方麵取得的巨大成就。2021年，我們預計BHE在愛荷華州的運營將通過其擁有和運營的風力渦輪機產生約2520萬兆瓦時的電力。這樣的電力產量將完全滿足其愛荷華州客戶的年度需求，其約為2460萬兆瓦時。換句話說，我們的公用事業公司將在愛荷華州實現風能自給自足。
The extraordinary differential between our rates and theirs is largely the result of our huge accomplishments in converting wind into electricity. In 2021, we expect BHE’s operation to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity (MWh) in Iowa from wind turbines that it both owns and operates. That output will totally cover the annual needs of its Iowa customers, which run to about 24.6 million MWh. In other words, our utility will have attained wind self-sufficiency in the state of Iowa.
與此形成鮮明對比的是，愛荷華州的另一家公用事業公司，風力發電不足總發電量的10%。此外，據我們所知，到2021年，無論在哪裏，其他投資者擁有的公用事業公司都不可能實現風能自給自足。2000年，BHE服務於農業經濟；如今，它的五大客戶中有三個客戶是高科技巨頭。我認為，他們在愛荷華州建廠的決定部分是基於BHE提供可再生、低成本能源的能力。
In still another contrast, that other Iowa utility generates less than 10% of its power from wind. Furthermore, we know of no other investor-owned utility, wherever located, that by 2021 will have achieved a position of wind self-sufficiency. In 2000, BHE was serving an agricultural-based economy; today, three of its five largest customers are high-tech giants. I believe their decisions to site plants in Iowa were in part based upon BHE’s ability to deliver renewable, low-cost energy.
當然，風是斷斷續續的，我們在愛荷華州的葉片隻轉動了部分時間。在某些時段，當空氣靜止時，我們依靠非風力發電的能力來保證我們所需的電力。在情況相反的時候，我們將風能提供給我們的多餘電力賣給其他公用事業公司，通過所謂的“電網”為他們服務。我們賣給他們的電力替代了他們對碳資源的需求，比如煤或者天然氣。
Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource – coal, say, or natural gas.
波克夏海瑟威目前與小沃爾特-斯科特（Walter Scott, Jr.）和格雷格-阿貝爾（Greg Abel）共同持有BHE 91%的股份。自從我們收購以來，BHE從未向波克夏海瑟威支付過股息，而且隨著時間的流逝，BHE保留了280億美元的盈利。這種模式在公用事業領域是個例外，公用事業公司通常會支付高額股息，有時甚至超過80%的盈利。我們的觀點是：我們可以投資的越多，我們就越青睞它。
Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained $28 billion of earnings. That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends – sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings. Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it.
今天，BHE擁有運營人才和經驗來管理真正的大型公用事業項目，這些項目需要1000億美元或更多的投資，能夠支持造福我們的國家、我們的社區和我們的股東的基礎設施。
Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects – requiring investments of $100 billion or more – that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.
Investments
投資
以下所列出的是截至去年年底我們所持市值最大的15隻普通股。在此，我們排除了卡夫亨氏的持股（325442152股），因為波克夏本身隻是控股集團的一部分，所以必須用“股權”的方法來解釋這筆投資。在波克夏的資產負債表上，若按通用會計準則計算，波克夏所持卡夫亨氏的股份價值138億美元，相當於2019年12月31日波克夏在卡夫亨氏經審計的淨值中所占份額。到去年年底，我們在卡夫亨氏的持股市值僅為105億美元。
Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource – coal, say, or natural gas.
波克夏海瑟威目前與小沃爾特-斯科特（Walter Scott, Jr.）和格雷格-阿貝爾（Greg Abel）共同持有BHE 91%的股份。自從我們收購以來，BHE從未向波克夏海瑟威支付過股息，而且隨著時間的流逝，BHE保留了280億美元的盈利。這種模式在公用事業領域是個例外，公用事業公司通常會支付高額股息，有時甚至超過80%的盈利。我們的觀點是：我們可以投資的越多，我們就越青睞它。
Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained $28 billion of earnings. That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends – sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings. Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it.
今天，BHE擁有運營人才和經驗來管理真正的大型公用事業項目，這些項目需要1000億美元或更多的投資，能夠支持造福我們的國家、我們的社區和我們的股東的基礎設施。
Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects – requiring investments of $100 billion or more – that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.
Investments
投資
以下所列出的是截至去年年底我們所持市值最大的15隻普通股。在此，我們排除了卡夫亨氏的持股（325442152股），因為波克夏本身隻是控股集團的一部分，所以必須用“股權”的方法來解釋這筆投資。在波克夏的資產負債表上，若按通用會計準則計算，波克夏所持卡夫亨氏的股份價值138億美元，相當於2019年12月31日波克夏在卡夫亨氏經審計的淨值中所占份額。到去年年底，我們在卡夫亨氏的持股市值僅為105億美元。
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz at December 31, 2019. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only $10.5 billion.
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
* 不包括波克夏子公司的養老基金所持有的股份。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** 這是我們的實際購買價格，也是我們的計稅基礎。
*** Includes $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum Corporation consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock.
***包括對西方石油公司數額為100億美元的投資。這筆投資由優先股以及可購買普通股的認股權證組成。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** 這是我們的實際購買價格，也是我們的計稅基礎。
*** Includes $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum Corporation consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock.
***包括對西方石油公司數額為100億美元的投資。這筆投資由優先股以及可購買普通股的認股權證組成。
查理和我都沒有把以上這些股票（總計持股市值2480億美元）當作是精心收集的潛力股。當前這場金融鬧劇將要結束，因為“華爾街”的降級、美聯儲可能采取的行動、可能出現的政治動向、經濟學家的預測，或者其他任何可能成為當前熱門話題的東西，都將終止這場鬧劇。
Charlie and I do not view the $248 billion detailed above as a collection of stock market wagers – dalliances to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” an earnings “miss,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.
相反，我們把這些公司看作是一個我們進行部分持股的集合。若按加權計算，這些公司運營業務所需的有形淨資產淨利超過20%。這些公司不需要過度舉債就可以盈利。
What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.
在任何情況下，那些規模巨大、成熟且易於理解的企業的訂單回報率都是引人矚目的。與很多投資者在過去十年裏所接受的債券回報率（比如說30年期美國國債的收益率是2.5%或更低）相比，這些公司的回報率的確令人感到興奮。
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 21⁄2% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
查理和我從來不喜歡玩預測利率的遊戲，因為我們不知道未來一年、十年或三十年裏利率的平均值是多少。我們或許有些偏見地認為，在這個話題上發表意見的權威人士，恰恰是通過這種行為，透露出的更多的是和他們自己有關的信息，而不是關於未來的信息。
Forecasting interest rates has never been our game, and Charlie and I have no idea what rates will average over the next year, or ten or thirty years. Our perhaps jaundiced view is that the pundits who opine on these subjects reveal, by that very behavior, far more about themselves than they reveal about the future.
我們可以說的是，如果在未來幾十年裏和當前利率接近的利率占上風，公司稅也維持在企業當下正在享受著的低水平，那麽幾乎可以肯定的是，隨著時間的推移，股票的表現將遠遠好於長期固定利率債務工具。
What we can say is that if something close to current rates should prevail over the coming decades and if corporate tax rates also remain near the low level businesses now enjoy, it is almost certain that equities will over time perform far better than long-term, fixed-rate debt instruments.
在給出這一樂觀預測的同時，我們也要發出一項警告：未來股價可能會發生任何變化。有時，股市會暴跌，幅度可能是50%，也可能會更大。但是，對於那些不用借錢來炒股、且能夠控製自己情緒的人來說，去年我曾在文章中寫過的“美國經濟順風車”，再加上史密斯所謂的“複合奇跡”，會助推股票成為更好的長期選擇。其他人呢？當心！
That rosy prediction comes with a warning: Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater. But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr. Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others?
Beware!
The Road Ahead
未來的路
30年前，我的朋友約瑟夫·羅森菲爾德（家住美國中西部），收到了當地一家報紙發來的一封信。這封信讓羅森菲爾德很惱火，當時他已經80多歲了。報紙直截了當地要求喬提供一些生平數據，準備在他去世後用在他的訃告中。羅森菲爾德沒有回信。接下來怎麽樣呢？1個月後，他收到了那家報紙發來的第二封信，而且還是封加急信。
Three decades ago, my Midwestern friend, Joe Rosenfield, then in his 80s, received an irritating letter from his local newspaper. In blunt words, the paper asked for biographical data it planned to use in Joe’s obituary. Joe didn’t respond. So? A month later, he got a second letter from the paper, this one labeled “URGENT.”
查理和我很糟就已經進入了類似的“加急”階段。對於我們來說，這顯然不是什麽喜訊。但是，波克夏的股東們不必焦慮：你的公司已經為我們的離開做好了百分百的準備。
Charlie and I long ago entered the urgent zone. That’s not exactly great news for us. But Berkshire shareholders need not worry: Your company is 100% prepared for our departure.
我們之所以如此樂觀，主要基於五大原因：
第一，波克夏的資產部署在各種各樣的全資或部分擁有的企業身上，這些企業的資本回報率很吸引人。
第二，波克夏將旗下所控製業務定位在一個單一實體，這種現狀賦予了該公司一些重要且持久的經濟優勢。
第三，波克夏將一如既往地以一種可讓本公司抵禦極端外部衝擊的方式來管理財務事務。
第四，我們擁有經驗豐富且忠心耿耿的頂尖經理人。對於他們來說，管理波克夏遠遠不止是一份高薪和/或有聲望的工作。
第五，波克夏的董事們——你們的守護者——一直專注於股東的福利，以及培育一種在超大型企業中很罕見的文化。（拉裏-坎寧安和斯蒂芬妮-古巴在合著的新書《信任的邊緣》中探討了這種文化的價值。在我們的年會上，可以看到這本書。）
The two of us base our optimism upon five factors. First, Berkshire’s assets are deployed in an extraordinary variety of wholly or partly-owned businesses that, averaged out, earn attractive returns on the capital they use. Second, Berkshire’s positioning of its “controlled” businesses within a single entity endows it with some important and enduring economic advantages. Third, Berkshire’s financial affairs will unfailingly be managed in a manner allowing the company to withstand external shocks of an extreme nature. Fourth, we possess skilled and devoted top managers for whom running Berkshire is far more than simply having a high-paying and/or prestigious job. Finally, Berkshire’s directors – your guardians – are constantly focused on both the welfare of owners and the nurturing of a culture that is rare among giant corporations. (The value of this culture is explored in Margin of Trust, a new book by Larry Cunningham and Stephanie Cuba that will be available at our annual meeting.)
還有一些特別實際的原因促使查理和我想要確保波克夏在我們離開後的日子裏繼續繁榮昌盛：孟格家族持有的波克夏股票規模，遠超過該家族的其他投資；我高達99%的淨身價靠的是波克夏股票。我從來沒有賣過波克夏股票，以後也不打算這麽做。除了慈善捐贈和送人小禮物之外，我唯一一次動過波克夏股票，是在1980年。當年，我和其他被選出的波克夏股東們，用波克夏的一些股票換了伊利諾斯州一家銀行的股票。早在1969年，波克夏收購了這家銀行。1980年，因為銀行控股公司法的變化，我們必須卸載該行。
Charlie and I have very pragmatic reasons for wanting to assure Berkshire’s prosperity in the years following our exit: The Mungers have Berkshire holdings that dwarf any of the family’s other investments, and I have a full 99% of my net worth lodged in Berkshire stock. I have never sold any shares and have no plans to do so. My only disposal of Berkshire shares, aside from charitable donations and minor personal gifts, took place in 1980, when I, along with other Berkshire stockholders who elected to participate, exchanged some of our Berkshire shares for the shares of an Illinois bank that Berkshire had purchased in 1969 and that, in 1980, needed to be offloaded because of changes in the bank holding company law.
今天，我在遺囑中已經明確指明了執行人——以及在遺囑關閉後接替他們管理我的遺產的受托人——不要出售波克夏股票。我的遺囑還免除了遺囑執行人和受托人的責任，因為他們要維持的顯然是極度集中的資產。
Today, my will specifically directs its executors – as well as the trustees who will succeed them in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any Berkshire shares. My will also absolves both the executors and the trustees from liability for maintaining what obviously will be an extreme concentration of assets.
根據我的遺囑，執行人以及受托人每年會將我的一部分A股轉換成B股，然後將B股分發給不同的基金會。這些基金會將被要求迅速分配所獲得的捐款。總的來說，據我估算，在我去世
12年-15年後我所持有的波克夏股票會進入市場。
The will goes on to instruct the executors – and, in time, the trustees – to each year convert a portion of my A shares into B shares and then distribute the Bs to various foundations. Those foundations will be required to deploy their grants promptly. In all, I estimate that it will take 12 to 15 years for the entirety of the Berkshire shares I hold at my death to move into the market.
沒有我遺囑的指令，直到安排好的分配日期之前，我所持有的所有波克夏股票應該不會易主。在安排好的日期，我的遺囑執行人和受托人將會在他們的臨時控製下出售波克夏股票，並且對到期的美國國債進行再投資。這樣的策略將使受托人免受公眾的批評，也免於因未能按照“謹慎的人”標準行事而承擔個人責任的可能性。
Absent my will’s directive that all my Berkshire shares should be held until their scheduled distribution dates, the “safe” course for both my executors and trustees would be to sell the Berkshire shares under their temporary control and reinvest the proceeds in U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities matching the scheduled dates for distributions. That strategy would leave the fiduciaries immune from both public criticism and the possibility of personal liability for failure to act in accordance with the “prudent man” standard.
我本人感到安心的是，在處置期內，波克夏的股票將可提供一種安全的、有回報的投資。也許會發生一些事件證明我是錯的，這種可能性總是存在的——可能性不大，但也不能忽略不計。但我相信，與傳統的行動方案相比，我的指示很可能會為社會提供更多的資源。
I myself feel comfortable that Berkshire shares will provide a safe and rewarding investment during the disposal period. There is always a chance – unlikely, but not negligible – that events will prove me wrong. I believe, however, that there is a high probability that my directive will deliver substantially greater resources to society than would result from a conventional course of action.
就我“只有波克夏”的指示而言，其關鍵在於我對波克夏的董事們未來的判斷力和忠誠度抱有信心。他們經常都會麵臨華爾街人士的考驗，與其爭奪服務費。對許多公司來說，這些華爾街“超級銷售員”可能會勝出。但我預計，在波克夏不會出現這種情況。
Key to my “Berkshire-only” instructions is my faith in the future judgment and fidelity of Berkshire directors. They will regularly be tested by Wall Streeters bearing fees. At many companies, these super-salesmen might win. I do not, however, expect that to happen at Berkshire.
Boards of Directors
董事會
近年以來，企業董事會的構成及其宗旨都已成為人們關注的熱點問題。在以前，有關董事會責任的爭論在很大程度上僅限於在律師們之間展開；而在今天，機構投資者和政治家們也加入了進來。
In recent years, both the composition of corporate boards and their purpose have become hot topics. Once, debate about the responsibilities of boards was largely limited to lawyers; today, institutional investors and politicians have weighed in as well.
就討論企業治理的問題而言，我的資曆包括，在過去62年時間裏，我曾擔任21家上市公司（詳見下文橫線以下部分）的董事。除了兩家公司之外，我在其他公司中都持有並代表著大量股權。在少數公司中，我曾試圖實施重要的改變。
My credentials for discussing corporate governance include the fact that, over the last 62 years, I have served as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies (listed below). In all but two of them, I have represented a substantial holding of stock. In a few cases, I have tried to implement important change.
在我服務於這些公司的最初30年左右的時間裏，董事會中很少會有女性，除非她代表著企業的控股家族。應該指出的是，今年是第19修正案出台100周年，該修正案保障了美國婦女投票發聲的權利。她們在董事會中獲得類似地位的工作則仍在進行中。
During the first 30 or so years of my services, it was rare to find a woman in the room unless she represented a family controlling the enterprise. This year, it should be noted, marks the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which guaranteed American women the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth. Their attaining similar status in a board room remains a work in progress.
多年以來，許多有關董事會組成和職責的新規則和指導方針已經出台。然而，董事們麵臨的根本挑戰一如既往：找到並留住一位才華橫溢的首席執行官——當然，還需要誠實正直的品質——而且他/她會將自己的整個商業生涯都奉獻給公司。通常情況下，這項任務是很艱巨的。但是，一旦董事們做對這件事情，其他就什麽都不用做了。但是，如果他們搞砸了這件事
Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO – possessing integrity, for sure – who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime. Often, that task is hard. When directors get it right, though, they need to do little else. But when they mess it up, . . . . . .
現在，審計委員會的工作比以往努力多了，並且幾乎總是會以應有的嚴苛態度對待這項工作。盡管如此，這些委員會仍舊比不過那些想要玩弄數字的經理人，而他們之所以會喜歡這種玩弄數字的不當行為，是因為受到了盈利“指引”的禍害以及公司CEO們想要“達到預期業績”的願望。 我有過與玩弄數字的公司CEO直接打交道的經驗（謝天謝地，這種經驗並不多），這種經驗表明，他們這樣做經常都是出於自我價值感的推動，而不是出於對財務利益的渴望。
Audit committees now work much harder than they once did and almost always view the job with appropriate seriousness. Nevertheless, these committees remain no match for managers who wish to game numbers, an offense that has been encouraged by the scourge of earnings “guidance” and the desire of CEOs to “hit the number.” My direct experience (limited, thankfully) with CEOs who have played with a company’s numbers indicates that they were more often prompted by ego than by a desire for financial gain.
薪酬委員會現在則比以往更多地依賴顧問了，這將使得薪酬安排變得更加複雜——什麽樣的委員會成員才會想要就盯著那麽一項薪酬計劃，年複一年地對大筆費用的支付作出解釋呢？——而且，閱讀代理材料已成為一種令人厭煩的體驗。
Compensation committees now rely much more heavily on consultants than they used to. Consequently, compensation arrangements have become more complicated – what committee member wants to explain paying large fees year after year for a simple plan? – and the reading of proxy material has become a mind-numbing experience.
在企業治理方麵，有一項非常重要的改進已經得到批準：定期組織董事“執行會議”，公司CEO不得與會。 在此之前，很少會有關於CEO職能、並購決策和薪酬的坦率討論。
One very important improvement in corporate governance has been mandated: a regularly-scheduled “executive session” of directors at which the CEO is barred. Prior to that change, truly frank discussions of a CEO’s skills, acquisition decisions and compensation were rare.
對董事會成員而言，收購提案仍舊是個特別棘手的問題。 進行交易的法律流程已經得到完善和擴展（相關費用也得到了恰當的描述），但我還沒看到過有哪個渴望進行並購交易的CEO會引入一位熟悉內情而又理智的批評人士來提出反對意見。就這一點來說，我也沒能做到獨善其身。
Acquisition proposals remain a particularly vexing problem for board members. The legal orchestration for making deals has been refined and expanded (a word aptly describing attendant costs as well). But I have yet to see a CEO who craves an acquisition bring in an informed and articulate critic to argue against it. And yes, include me among the guilty.
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波克夏、Blue Chip Stamp、Cap Cities-ABC、可口可樂、Data Documents、Dempster、General Growth、吉列、卡夫亨氏、Maracaibo Oil、Munsingears、奧馬哈國民銀行、Pinkerton’s、Portland Gas Light、所羅門公司、Sanborn Map、Tribune Oil、美國航空、Vornado、華盛頓郵報公司、Wesco Financial。
Berkshire, Blue Chip Stamps, Cap Cities-ABC, Coca-Cola, Data Documents, Dempster, General Growth, Gillette, Kraft Heinz, Maracaibo Oil, Munsingwear, Omaha National Bank, Pinkerton’s, Portland Gas Light, Salomon,Sanborn Map, Tribune Oil, U.S. Air, Vornado, Washington Post, Wesco Financial
總體而言，如今台麵上擺滿了首席執行官和他/她員工們喜聞樂見的交易方案。對於一家公司來說，聘請兩名“專家”收購顧問（一名讚成，一名反對）向董事會傳達他或她對擬議中交易的看法將是一項有趣的做法。比方說，最終意見獲得采納的顧問將獲得另一位顧問酬勞的10倍作為獎勵。但不要屏息等待這項改革（的到來）：當前的製度，無論對股東來說有什麽缺點，對首席執行官和許多享受交易的顧問和其他專業人士來說都非常有效。當我們考慮到華爾街的建議時，一個古老的警告永遠是正確的：不要問理發師你是否需要理發。
Overall, the deck is stacked in favor of the deal that’s coveted by the CEO and his/her obliging staff. It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board – with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.
多年來，董事會“獨立性”已成為一個新的值得關注的話題。然而，與這個話題相關的一個關鍵點幾乎總是被忽視，那就是董事薪酬現在飆升到了一個水平，一個不可避免地使薪酬成為影響許多並不富裕董事成員潛意識行為的水平。試想一下，一位董事一年六次左右，花上幾天“舒適”時間開董事會會議，收入就可以在25萬至30萬美元之間。通常，擁有一個這樣董事職位人的收入是美國家庭年收入中位數的三到四倍（我曾錯過了這樣一個富足的機會：在20世紀60年代初，作為Portland Gas Light的董事，我每年的服務報酬為100美元。為了賺到這筆可觀的收入，我每年需要往返緬因州四次）。
Over the years, board “independence” has become a new area of emphasis. One key point relating to this topic, though, is almost invariably overlooked: Director compensation has now soared to a level that inevitably makes pay a subconscious factor affecting the behavior of many non-wealthy members. Think, for a moment, of the director earning $250,000-300,000 for board meetings consuming a pleasant couple of days six or so times a year. Frequently, the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S. households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100 annually for my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)
現在（董事）工作有保障嗎？是的。董事會成員可能會被“禮貌地”忽視，但他們卻很少被解雇。取而代之的是，相當寬鬆的年齡限製（通常是70歲或更高）被視為是禮貌驅逐公司董事的標準行事方法。
And job security now? It’s fabulous. Board members may get politely ignored, but they seldom get fired. Instead, generous age limits – usually 70 or higher – act as the standard method for the genteel ejection of directors.
難怪一位不富有的董事（non-wealthy director，簡稱“NWD”）現在希望、甚至渴望被邀請加入第二家公司的董事會，從而幫助自己躍升至50-60萬美元的收入階層。為了實現這一目標，NWD將需要一些幫助。一家尋找董事會成員的公司CEO幾乎肯定會向NWD的現任CEO核實NWD是否是一個“好”董事。當然，所謂的“好”隻是個暗號。如果NWD嚴重挑戰他/她現任CEO的薪酬或收購夢想，他/她的（董事）候選人資格將悄無聲息地抹去。在尋找董事時，首席執行官們並不是在尋找鬥牛犬，隻有可卡犬會被帶回家。
Is it any wonder that a non-wealthy director (“NWD”) now hopes – or even yearns – to be asked to join a second board, thereby vaulting into the $500,000-600,000 class? To achieve this goal, the NWD will need help. The CEO of a company searching for board members will almost certainly check with the NWD’s current CEO as to whether NWD is a “good” director. “Good,” of course, is a code word. If the NWD has seriously challenged his/her present CEO’s compensation or acquisition dreams, his or her candidacy will silently die. When seeking directors, CEOs don’t look for pit bulls. It’s the cocker spaniel that gets taken home.
儘管不合邏輯，但如今幾乎所有董事都被歸類為“獨立（董事）”，然而許多擁有與公司興衰密切相關的董事又被認為缺乏這一獨立性。不久前，我查看了一家美國大公司的委托書材料，發現有8名董事從未用自己的錢購買過該公司股票（當然，他們得到了股票獎勵，作為自己豐厚現金薪酬的補充）。這家公司長期以來一直（表現）落後，但董事們待遇卻非常好。
Despite the illogic of it all, the director for whom fees are important – indeed, craved – is almost universally classified as “independent” while many directors possessing fortunes very substantially linked to the welfare of the corporation are deemed lacking in independence. Not long ago, I looked at the proxy material of a large American company and found that eight directors had never purchased a share of the company’s stock using their own money. (They, of course, had received grants of stock as a supplement to their generous cash compensation.) This particular company had long been a laggard, but the directors were doing wonderfully.
當然，用自己的錢購買所有權並不能創造智慧，也不能確保商業成功。然而，當我們投資組合內公司的董事有用他們自己錢購買股票的經驗，而不是簡單地獲贈時，我會感覺更好。
Paid-with-my-own-money ownership, of course, does not create wisdom or ensure business smarts. Nevertheless, I feel better when directors of our portfolio companies have had the experience of purchasing shares with their savings, rather than simply having been the recipients of grants.
Here, a pause is due: I’d like you to know that almost all of the directors I have met over the years have been decent, likable and intelligent. They dressed well, made good neighbors and were fine citizens. I’ve enjoyed their company. Among the group are some men and women that I would not have met except for our mutual board service and who have become close friends.
然而，這些善良的人中有許多是我永遠不會選擇來處理金錢或商業事務的人。因為這根本不是他們的遊戲場。
Nevertheless, many of these good souls are people whom I would never have chosen to handle money or business matters. It simply was not their game.
反過來，他們也永遠不會在拔牙、裝修房子或改善高爾夫球技方麵向我求助。此外，如果我被安排在“與星共舞”（Dancing With The Stars）節目中露麵，我會立即尋求證人保護計劃的庇護。我們總會在這件事或那件事上無所建樹。對於我們大多數人來說，這個（無所建樹的）清單很長。但需要認識到的重要一點是，如果你是鮑比·費舍爾（Bobby Fischer，美國國際象棋棋手），你必須為了錢而下棋。
They, in turn, would never have asked me for help in removing a tooth, decorating their home or improving their golf swing. Moreover, if I were ever scheduled to appear on Dancing With the Stars, I would immediately seek refuge in the Witness Protection Program. We are all duds at one thing or another. For most of us, the list is long. The important point to recognize is that if you are Bobby Fischer, you must play only chess for money.
在波克夏，我們將繼續尋找精通商業的董事，他們以主人翁精神為導向，並對我們的公司有強烈的特定興趣。思想和原則，而不是機器人般的“流程”將指導他們的行動。當然，在代表你的利益（進行投資）時，他們會尋找用心取悅客戶、珍惜自己同事、努力成為自己所在社區和國家好公民的經理人。
在過去的報告中，我們已經討論了股票回購的意義和無用性。我們的想法歸結為：波克夏隻有在以下情況下才會回購股票：a）查理和我認為它的售價低於其價值，以及b）公司在完成回購後，仍會擁有充足的現金。
In past reports, we’ve discussed both the sense and nonsense of stock repurchases. Our thinking, boiled down: Berkshire will buy back its stock only if a) Charlie and I believe that it is selling for less than it is worth and b) the company, upon completing the repurchase, is left with ample cash.
（股票）內在價值的計算很不精確。因此，我們兩人都沒有對以非常真實的95美分購買估值為1美元的商品感到任何緊迫性，。2019年，波克夏的價格/價值等式有時是適度有利（股票回購）的，我們花了50億美元回購了公司約1%的股份。
Calculations of intrinsic value are far from precise. Consequently, neither of us feels any urgency to buy an estimated $1 of value for a very real 95 cents. In 2019, the Berkshire price/value equation was modestly favorable at times, and we spent $5 billion in repurchasing about 1% of the company.
隨著時間的推移，我們希望波克夏的股票數量下降。如果股價低於實際價值的情況（正如我們估計的那樣）繼續發生，我們很可能會在回購股票上變得更加積極。然而，我們不會在任何水平支撐股價。
Over time, we want Berkshire’s share count to go down. If the price-to-value discount (as we estimate it) widens, we will likely become more aggressive in purchasing shares. We will not, however, prop the stock at any level.
持有價值至少2000萬美元A類股或B類股，並有意向波克夏出售股票的股東可能希望他們的經紀人聯係波克夏的馬克·米勒德（Mark Millard），電話是402-346-1400。我們需要您在打定主意出售股票的情況下，在中部時間上午8：00-8：30或下午3：00-3：30之間給馬克打電話。
Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
2019年，波克夏向美國財政部匯出36億美元，用於支付當前所得稅。同期，美國政府收到了2430億美元的企業所得稅。從這些統計數據中，你可以為你的公司繳納了美國所有公司繳納聯邦所得稅的1.5%而感到自豪。
In 2019, Berkshire sent $3.6 billion to the U.S. Treasury to pay its current income tax. The U.S. government collected $243 billion from corporate income tax payments during the same period. From these statistics, you can take pride that your company delivered 11⁄2% of the federal income taxes paid by all of corporate America.
55年前，當波克夏進入當下的企業集團結構時，公司無需繳納聯邦所得稅（這也是有充分理由的：因為在此前十年裏，這家苦苦掙紮的企業錄得淨虧損）。從那時起，由於波克夏保留了幾乎所有的收益，這項政策的受益者已不僅僅是公司股東，聯邦政府也同樣受益。（因為）在未來的大部分時間裏，我們都希望並期待著向財政部上繳更大的金額。
Fifty-five years ago, when Berkshire entered its current incarnation, the company paid nothing in federal income tax. (For good reason, too: Over the previous decade, the struggling business had recorded a net loss.) Since then, as Berkshire retained nearly all of its earnings, the beneficiaries of that policy became not only the company’s shareholders but also the federal government. In most future years, we both hope and expect to send far larger sums to the Treasury.
在任何情況下，那些規模巨大、成熟且易於理解的企業的訂單回報率都是引人矚目的。與很多投資者在過去十年裏所接受的債券回報率（比如說30年期美國國債的收益率是2.5%或更低）相比，這些公司的回報率的確令人感到興奮。
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 21⁄2% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
查理和我從來不喜歡玩預測利率的遊戲，因為我們不知道未來一年、十年或三十年裏利率的平均值是多少。我們或許有些偏見地認為，在這個話題上發表意見的權威人士，恰恰是通過這種行為，透露出的更多的是和他們自己有關的信息，而不是關於未來的信息。
Forecasting interest rates has never been our game, and Charlie and I have no idea what rates will average over the next year, or ten or thirty years. Our perhaps jaundiced view is that the pundits who opine on these subjects reveal, by that very behavior, far more about themselves than they reveal about the future.
我們可以說的是，如果在未來幾十年裏和當前利率接近的利率占上風，公司稅也維持在企業當下正在享受著的低水平，那麽幾乎可以肯定的是，隨著時間的推移，股票的表現將遠遠好於長期固定利率債務工具。
What we can say is that if something close to current rates should prevail over the coming decades and if corporate tax rates also remain near the low level businesses now enjoy, it is almost certain that equities will over time perform far better than long-term, fixed-rate debt instruments.
在給出這一樂觀預測的同時，我們也要發出一項警告：未來股價可能會發生任何變化。有時，股市會暴跌，幅度可能是50%，也可能會更大。但是，對於那些不用借錢來炒股、且能夠控製自己情緒的人來說，去年我曾在文章中寫過的“美國經濟順風車”，再加上史密斯所謂的“複合奇跡”，會助推股票成為更好的長期選擇。其他人呢？當心！
That rosy prediction comes with a warning: Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater. But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr. Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others?
Beware!
The Road Ahead
未來的路
30年前，我的朋友約瑟夫·羅森菲爾德（家住美國中西部），收到了當地一家報紙發來的一封信。這封信讓羅森菲爾德很惱火，當時他已經80多歲了。報紙直截了當地要求喬提供一些生平數據，準備在他去世後用在他的訃告中。羅森菲爾德沒有回信。接下來怎麽樣呢？1個月後，他收到了那家報紙發來的第二封信，而且還是封加急信。
Three decades ago, my Midwestern friend, Joe Rosenfield, then in his 80s, received an irritating letter from his local newspaper. In blunt words, the paper asked for biographical data it planned to use in Joe’s obituary. Joe didn’t respond. So? A month later, he got a second letter from the paper, this one labeled “URGENT.”
查理和我很糟就已經進入了類似的“加急”階段。對於我們來說，這顯然不是什麽喜訊。但是，波克夏的股東們不必焦慮：你的公司已經為我們的離開做好了百分百的準備。
Charlie and I long ago entered the urgent zone. That’s not exactly great news for us. But Berkshire shareholders need not worry: Your company is 100% prepared for our departure.
我們之所以如此樂觀，主要基於五大原因：
第一，波克夏的資產部署在各種各樣的全資或部分擁有的企業身上，這些企業的資本回報率很吸引人。
第二，波克夏將旗下所控製業務定位在一個單一實體，這種現狀賦予了該公司一些重要且持久的經濟優勢。
第三，波克夏將一如既往地以一種可讓本公司抵禦極端外部衝擊的方式來管理財務事務。
第四，我們擁有經驗豐富且忠心耿耿的頂尖經理人。對於他們來說，管理波克夏遠遠不止是一份高薪和/或有聲望的工作。
第五，波克夏的董事們——你們的守護者——一直專注於股東的福利，以及培育一種在超大型企業中很罕見的文化。（拉裏-坎寧安和斯蒂芬妮-古巴在合著的新書《信任的邊緣》中探討了這種文化的價值。在我們的年會上，可以看到這本書。）
The two of us base our optimism upon five factors. First, Berkshire’s assets are deployed in an extraordinary variety of wholly or partly-owned businesses that, averaged out, earn attractive returns on the capital they use. Second, Berkshire’s positioning of its “controlled” businesses within a single entity endows it with some important and enduring economic advantages. Third, Berkshire’s financial affairs will unfailingly be managed in a manner allowing the company to withstand external shocks of an extreme nature. Fourth, we possess skilled and devoted top managers for whom running Berkshire is far more than simply having a high-paying and/or prestigious job. Finally, Berkshire’s directors – your guardians – are constantly focused on both the welfare of owners and the nurturing of a culture that is rare among giant corporations. (The value of this culture is explored in Margin of Trust, a new book by Larry Cunningham and Stephanie Cuba that will be available at our annual meeting.)
還有一些特別實際的原因促使查理和我想要確保波克夏在我們離開後的日子裏繼續繁榮昌盛：孟格家族持有的波克夏股票規模，遠超過該家族的其他投資；我高達99%的淨身價靠的是波克夏股票。我從來沒有賣過波克夏股票，以後也不打算這麽做。除了慈善捐贈和送人小禮物之外，我唯一一次動過波克夏股票，是在1980年。當年，我和其他被選出的波克夏股東們，用波克夏的一些股票換了伊利諾斯州一家銀行的股票。早在1969年，波克夏收購了這家銀行。1980年，因為銀行控股公司法的變化，我們必須卸載該行。
Charlie and I have very pragmatic reasons for wanting to assure Berkshire’s prosperity in the years following our exit: The Mungers have Berkshire holdings that dwarf any of the family’s other investments, and I have a full 99% of my net worth lodged in Berkshire stock. I have never sold any shares and have no plans to do so. My only disposal of Berkshire shares, aside from charitable donations and minor personal gifts, took place in 1980, when I, along with other Berkshire stockholders who elected to participate, exchanged some of our Berkshire shares for the shares of an Illinois bank that Berkshire had purchased in 1969 and that, in 1980, needed to be offloaded because of changes in the bank holding company law.
今天，我在遺囑中已經明確指明了執行人——以及在遺囑關閉後接替他們管理我的遺產的受托人——不要出售波克夏股票。我的遺囑還免除了遺囑執行人和受托人的責任，因為他們要維持的顯然是極度集中的資產。
Today, my will specifically directs its executors – as well as the trustees who will succeed them in administering my estate after the will is closed – not to sell any Berkshire shares. My will also absolves both the executors and the trustees from liability for maintaining what obviously will be an extreme concentration of assets.
根據我的遺囑，執行人以及受托人每年會將我的一部分A股轉換成B股，然後將B股分發給不同的基金會。這些基金會將被要求迅速分配所獲得的捐款。總的來說，據我估算，在我去世
12年-15年後我所持有的波克夏股票會進入市場。
The will goes on to instruct the executors – and, in time, the trustees – to each year convert a portion of my A shares into B shares and then distribute the Bs to various foundations. Those foundations will be required to deploy their grants promptly. In all, I estimate that it will take 12 to 15 years for the entirety of the Berkshire shares I hold at my death to move into the market.
沒有我遺囑的指令，直到安排好的分配日期之前，我所持有的所有波克夏股票應該不會易主。在安排好的日期，我的遺囑執行人和受托人將會在他們的臨時控製下出售波克夏股票，並且對到期的美國國債進行再投資。這樣的策略將使受托人免受公眾的批評，也免於因未能按照“謹慎的人”標準行事而承擔個人責任的可能性。
Absent my will’s directive that all my Berkshire shares should be held until their scheduled distribution dates, the “safe” course for both my executors and trustees would be to sell the Berkshire shares under their temporary control and reinvest the proceeds in U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities matching the scheduled dates for distributions. That strategy would leave the fiduciaries immune from both public criticism and the possibility of personal liability for failure to act in accordance with the “prudent man” standard.
我本人感到安心的是，在處置期內，波克夏的股票將可提供一種安全的、有回報的投資。也許會發生一些事件證明我是錯的，這種可能性總是存在的——可能性不大，但也不能忽略不計。但我相信，與傳統的行動方案相比，我的指示很可能會為社會提供更多的資源。
I myself feel comfortable that Berkshire shares will provide a safe and rewarding investment during the disposal period. There is always a chance – unlikely, but not negligible – that events will prove me wrong. I believe, however, that there is a high probability that my directive will deliver substantially greater resources to society than would result from a conventional course of action.
就我“只有波克夏”的指示而言，其關鍵在於我對波克夏的董事們未來的判斷力和忠誠度抱有信心。他們經常都會麵臨華爾街人士的考驗，與其爭奪服務費。對許多公司來說，這些華爾街“超級銷售員”可能會勝出。但我預計，在波克夏不會出現這種情況。
Key to my “Berkshire-only” instructions is my faith in the future judgment and fidelity of Berkshire directors. They will regularly be tested by Wall Streeters bearing fees. At many companies, these super-salesmen might win. I do not, however, expect that to happen at Berkshire.
Boards of Directors
董事會
近年以來，企業董事會的構成及其宗旨都已成為人們關注的熱點問題。在以前，有關董事會責任的爭論在很大程度上僅限於在律師們之間展開；而在今天，機構投資者和政治家們也加入了進來。
In recent years, both the composition of corporate boards and their purpose have become hot topics. Once, debate about the responsibilities of boards was largely limited to lawyers; today, institutional investors and politicians have weighed in as well.
就討論企業治理的問題而言，我的資曆包括，在過去62年時間裏，我曾擔任21家上市公司（詳見下文橫線以下部分）的董事。除了兩家公司之外，我在其他公司中都持有並代表著大量股權。在少數公司中，我曾試圖實施重要的改變。
My credentials for discussing corporate governance include the fact that, over the last 62 years, I have served as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies (listed below). In all but two of them, I have represented a substantial holding of stock. In a few cases, I have tried to implement important change.
在我服務於這些公司的最初30年左右的時間裏，董事會中很少會有女性，除非她代表著企業的控股家族。應該指出的是，今年是第19修正案出台100周年，該修正案保障了美國婦女投票發聲的權利。她們在董事會中獲得類似地位的工作則仍在進行中。
During the first 30 or so years of my services, it was rare to find a woman in the room unless she represented a family controlling the enterprise. This year, it should be noted, marks the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which guaranteed American women the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth. Their attaining similar status in a board room remains a work in progress.
多年以來，許多有關董事會組成和職責的新規則和指導方針已經出台。然而，董事們麵臨的根本挑戰一如既往：找到並留住一位才華橫溢的首席執行官——當然，還需要誠實正直的品質——而且他/她會將自己的整個商業生涯都奉獻給公司。通常情況下，這項任務是很艱巨的。但是，一旦董事們做對這件事情，其他就什麽都不用做了。但是，如果他們搞砸了這件事
Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO – possessing integrity, for sure – who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime. Often, that task is hard. When directors get it right, though, they need to do little else. But when they mess it up, . . . . . .
現在，審計委員會的工作比以往努力多了，並且幾乎總是會以應有的嚴苛態度對待這項工作。盡管如此，這些委員會仍舊比不過那些想要玩弄數字的經理人，而他們之所以會喜歡這種玩弄數字的不當行為，是因為受到了盈利“指引”的禍害以及公司CEO們想要“達到預期業績”的願望。 我有過與玩弄數字的公司CEO直接打交道的經驗（謝天謝地，這種經驗並不多），這種經驗表明，他們這樣做經常都是出於自我價值感的推動，而不是出於對財務利益的渴望。
Audit committees now work much harder than they once did and almost always view the job with appropriate seriousness. Nevertheless, these committees remain no match for managers who wish to game numbers, an offense that has been encouraged by the scourge of earnings “guidance” and the desire of CEOs to “hit the number.” My direct experience (limited, thankfully) with CEOs who have played with a company’s numbers indicates that they were more often prompted by ego than by a desire for financial gain.
薪酬委員會現在則比以往更多地依賴顧問了，這將使得薪酬安排變得更加複雜——什麽樣的委員會成員才會想要就盯著那麽一項薪酬計劃，年複一年地對大筆費用的支付作出解釋呢？——而且，閱讀代理材料已成為一種令人厭煩的體驗。
Compensation committees now rely much more heavily on consultants than they used to. Consequently, compensation arrangements have become more complicated – what committee member wants to explain paying large fees year after year for a simple plan? – and the reading of proxy material has become a mind-numbing experience.
在企業治理方麵，有一項非常重要的改進已經得到批準：定期組織董事“執行會議”，公司CEO不得與會。 在此之前，很少會有關於CEO職能、並購決策和薪酬的坦率討論。
One very important improvement in corporate governance has been mandated: a regularly-scheduled “executive session” of directors at which the CEO is barred. Prior to that change, truly frank discussions of a CEO’s skills, acquisition decisions and compensation were rare.
對董事會成員而言，收購提案仍舊是個特別棘手的問題。 進行交易的法律流程已經得到完善和擴展（相關費用也得到了恰當的描述），但我還沒看到過有哪個渴望進行並購交易的CEO會引入一位熟悉內情而又理智的批評人士來提出反對意見。就這一點來說，我也沒能做到獨善其身。
Acquisition proposals remain a particularly vexing problem for board members. The legal orchestration for making deals has been refined and expanded (a word aptly describing attendant costs as well). But I have yet to see a CEO who craves an acquisition bring in an informed and articulate critic to argue against it. And yes, include me among the guilty.
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波克夏、Blue Chip Stamp、Cap Cities-ABC、可口可樂、Data Documents、Dempster、General Growth、吉列、卡夫亨氏、Maracaibo Oil、Munsingears、奧馬哈國民銀行、Pinkerton’s、Portland Gas Light、所羅門公司、Sanborn Map、Tribune Oil、美國航空、Vornado、華盛頓郵報公司、Wesco Financial。
Berkshire, Blue Chip Stamps, Cap Cities-ABC, Coca-Cola, Data Documents, Dempster, General Growth, Gillette, Kraft Heinz, Maracaibo Oil, Munsingwear, Omaha National Bank, Pinkerton’s, Portland Gas Light, Salomon,Sanborn Map, Tribune Oil, U.S. Air, Vornado, Washington Post, Wesco Financial
總體而言，如今台麵上擺滿了首席執行官和他/她員工們喜聞樂見的交易方案。對於一家公司來說，聘請兩名“專家”收購顧問（一名讚成，一名反對）向董事會傳達他或她對擬議中交易的看法將是一項有趣的做法。比方說，最終意見獲得采納的顧問將獲得另一位顧問酬勞的10倍作為獎勵。但不要屏息等待這項改革（的到來）：當前的製度，無論對股東來說有什麽缺點，對首席執行官和許多享受交易的顧問和其他專業人士來說都非常有效。當我們考慮到華爾街的建議時，一個古老的警告永遠是正確的：不要問理發師你是否需要理發。
Overall, the deck is stacked in favor of the deal that’s coveted by the CEO and his/her obliging staff. It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board – with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.
多年來，董事會“獨立性”已成為一個新的值得關注的話題。然而，與這個話題相關的一個關鍵點幾乎總是被忽視，那就是董事薪酬現在飆升到了一個水平，一個不可避免地使薪酬成為影響許多並不富裕董事成員潛意識行為的水平。試想一下，一位董事一年六次左右，花上幾天“舒適”時間開董事會會議，收入就可以在25萬至30萬美元之間。通常，擁有一個這樣董事職位人的收入是美國家庭年收入中位數的三到四倍（我曾錯過了這樣一個富足的機會：在20世紀60年代初，作為Portland Gas Light的董事，我每年的服務報酬為100美元。為了賺到這筆可觀的收入，我每年需要往返緬因州四次）。
Over the years, board “independence” has become a new area of emphasis. One key point relating to this topic, though, is almost invariably overlooked: Director compensation has now soared to a level that inevitably makes pay a subconscious factor affecting the behavior of many non-wealthy members. Think, for a moment, of the director earning $250,000-300,000 for board meetings consuming a pleasant couple of days six or so times a year. Frequently, the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S. households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100 annually for my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)
現在（董事）工作有保障嗎？是的。董事會成員可能會被“禮貌地”忽視，但他們卻很少被解雇。取而代之的是，相當寬鬆的年齡限製（通常是70歲或更高）被視為是禮貌驅逐公司董事的標準行事方法。
And job security now? It’s fabulous. Board members may get politely ignored, but they seldom get fired. Instead, generous age limits – usually 70 or higher – act as the standard method for the genteel ejection of directors.
難怪一位不富有的董事（non-wealthy director，簡稱“NWD”）現在希望、甚至渴望被邀請加入第二家公司的董事會，從而幫助自己躍升至50-60萬美元的收入階層。為了實現這一目標，NWD將需要一些幫助。一家尋找董事會成員的公司CEO幾乎肯定會向NWD的現任CEO核實NWD是否是一個“好”董事。當然，所謂的“好”隻是個暗號。如果NWD嚴重挑戰他/她現任CEO的薪酬或收購夢想，他/她的（董事）候選人資格將悄無聲息地抹去。在尋找董事時，首席執行官們並不是在尋找鬥牛犬，隻有可卡犬會被帶回家。
Is it any wonder that a non-wealthy director (“NWD”) now hopes – or even yearns – to be asked to join a second board, thereby vaulting into the $500,000-600,000 class? To achieve this goal, the NWD will need help. The CEO of a company searching for board members will almost certainly check with the NWD’s current CEO as to whether NWD is a “good” director. “Good,” of course, is a code word. If the NWD has seriously challenged his/her present CEO’s compensation or acquisition dreams, his or her candidacy will silently die. When seeking directors, CEOs don’t look for pit bulls. It’s the cocker spaniel that gets taken home.
儘管不合邏輯，但如今幾乎所有董事都被歸類為“獨立（董事）”，然而許多擁有與公司興衰密切相關的董事又被認為缺乏這一獨立性。不久前，我查看了一家美國大公司的委托書材料，發現有8名董事從未用自己的錢購買過該公司股票（當然，他們得到了股票獎勵，作為自己豐厚現金薪酬的補充）。這家公司長期以來一直（表現）落後，但董事們待遇卻非常好。
Despite the illogic of it all, the director for whom fees are important – indeed, craved – is almost universally classified as “independent” while many directors possessing fortunes very substantially linked to the welfare of the corporation are deemed lacking in independence. Not long ago, I looked at the proxy material of a large American company and found that eight directors had never purchased a share of the company’s stock using their own money. (They, of course, had received grants of stock as a supplement to their generous cash compensation.) This particular company had long been a laggard, but the directors were doing wonderfully.
當然，用自己的錢購買所有權並不能創造智慧，也不能確保商業成功。然而，當我們投資組合內公司的董事有用他們自己錢購買股票的經驗，而不是簡單地獲贈時，我會感覺更好。
Paid-with-my-own-money ownership, of course, does not create wisdom or ensure business smarts. Nevertheless, I feel better when directors of our portfolio companies have had the experience of purchasing shares with their savings, rather than simply having been the recipients of grants.
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在這裏，我應該停頓一下：我想讓你知道，這些年來我見過的幾乎所有董事都很像樣、討人喜歡且聰明。他們衣著光鮮，是好鄰居、也是好公民，我很享受他們的陪伴。在這群人中，有一些人如果不是因為我們共同的董事會服務，我是不會認識他們的，他們如今已經成為了我親密的朋友。
Here, a pause is due: I’d like you to know that almost all of the directors I have met over the years have been decent, likable and intelligent. They dressed well, made good neighbors and were fine citizens. I’ve enjoyed their company. Among the group are some men and women that I would not have met except for our mutual board service and who have become close friends.
然而，這些善良的人中有許多是我永遠不會選擇來處理金錢或商業事務的人。因為這根本不是他們的遊戲場。
Nevertheless, many of these good souls are people whom I would never have chosen to handle money or business matters. It simply was not their game.
反過來，他們也永遠不會在拔牙、裝修房子或改善高爾夫球技方麵向我求助。此外，如果我被安排在“與星共舞”（Dancing With The Stars）節目中露麵，我會立即尋求證人保護計劃的庇護。我們總會在這件事或那件事上無所建樹。對於我們大多數人來說，這個（無所建樹的）清單很長。但需要認識到的重要一點是，如果你是鮑比·費舍爾（Bobby Fischer，美國國際象棋棋手），你必須為了錢而下棋。
They, in turn, would never have asked me for help in removing a tooth, decorating their home or improving their golf swing. Moreover, if I were ever scheduled to appear on Dancing With the Stars, I would immediately seek refuge in the Witness Protection Program. We are all duds at one thing or another. For most of us, the list is long. The important point to recognize is that if you are Bobby Fischer, you must play only chess for money.
在波克夏，我們將繼續尋找精通商業的董事，他們以主人翁精神為導向，並對我們的公司有強烈的特定興趣。思想和原則，而不是機器人般的“流程”將指導他們的行動。當然，在代表你的利益（進行投資）時，他們會尋找用心取悅客戶、珍惜自己同事、努力成為自己所在社區和國家好公民的經理人。
At Berkshire, we will continue to look for business-savvy directors who are owner-oriented and arrive with a strong specific interest in our company. Thought and principles, not robot-like “process,” will guide their actions. In representing your interests, they will, of course, seek managers whose goals include delighting their customers, cherishing their associates and acting as good citizens of both their communities and our country.
這些目標並不新鮮。這是60年前有能力CEO們的目標，現在仍是如此。否則又有誰該具備這些能力呢？
Those objectives are not new. They were the goals of able CEOs sixty years ago and remain so. Who would have it otherwise?
Short Subjects
其他內容
這些目標並不新鮮。這是60年前有能力CEO們的目標，現在仍是如此。否則又有誰該具備這些能力呢？
Those objectives are not new. They were the goals of able CEOs sixty years ago and remain so. Who would have it otherwise?
Short Subjects
其他內容
In past reports, we’ve discussed both the sense and nonsense of stock repurchases. Our thinking, boiled down: Berkshire will buy back its stock only if a) Charlie and I believe that it is selling for less than it is worth and b) the company, upon completing the repurchase, is left with ample cash.
（股票）內在價值的計算很不精確。因此，我們兩人都沒有對以非常真實的95美分購買估值為1美元的商品感到任何緊迫性，。2019年，波克夏的價格/價值等式有時是適度有利（股票回購）的，我們花了50億美元回購了公司約1%的股份。
Calculations of intrinsic value are far from precise. Consequently, neither of us feels any urgency to buy an estimated $1 of value for a very real 95 cents. In 2019, the Berkshire price/value equation was modestly favorable at times, and we spent $5 billion in repurchasing about 1% of the company.
隨著時間的推移，我們希望波克夏的股票數量下降。如果股價低於實際價值的情況（正如我們估計的那樣）繼續發生，我們很可能會在回購股票上變得更加積極。然而，我們不會在任何水平支撐股價。
Over time, we want Berkshire’s share count to go down. If the price-to-value discount (as we estimate it) widens, we will likely become more aggressive in purchasing shares. We will not, however, prop the stock at any level.
持有價值至少2000萬美元A類股或B類股，並有意向波克夏出售股票的股東可能希望他們的經紀人聯係波克夏的馬克·米勒德（Mark Millard），電話是402-346-1400。我們需要您在打定主意出售股票的情況下，在中部時間上午8：00-8：30或下午3：00-3：30之間給馬克打電話。
Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.
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2019年，波克夏向美國財政部匯出36億美元，用於支付當前所得稅。同期，美國政府收到了2430億美元的企業所得稅。從這些統計數據中，你可以為你的公司繳納了美國所有公司繳納聯邦所得稅的1.5%而感到自豪。
In 2019, Berkshire sent $3.6 billion to the U.S. Treasury to pay its current income tax. The U.S. government collected $243 billion from corporate income tax payments during the same period. From these statistics, you can take pride that your company delivered 11⁄2% of the federal income taxes paid by all of corporate America.
55年前，當波克夏進入當下的企業集團結構時，公司無需繳納聯邦所得稅（這也是有充分理由的：因為在此前十年裏，這家苦苦掙紮的企業錄得淨虧損）。從那時起，由於波克夏保留了幾乎所有的收益，這項政策的受益者已不僅僅是公司股東，聯邦政府也同樣受益。（因為）在未來的大部分時間裏，我們都希望並期待著向財政部上繳更大的金額。
Fifty-five years ago, when Berkshire entered its current incarnation, the company paid nothing in federal income tax. (For good reason, too: Over the previous decade, the struggling business had recorded a net loss.) Since then, as Berkshire retained nearly all of its earnings, the beneficiaries of that policy became not only the company’s shareholders but also the federal government. In most future years, we both hope and expect to send far larger sums to the Treasury.
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在A-2-A-3頁，您可以找到我們將於2020年5月2日舉行年會的詳細情況。像往常一樣，雅虎將在全球範圍內直播這一活動。然而，我們的形式將有一個重要的變化：股東、媒體和董事會成員建議，讓我們的兩位關鍵運營經理阿吉特·賈因（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿貝爾（Greg Abel）在年會上有更多的曝光率。這一變化非常有意義。無論是作為經理人還是個人，他們都是傑出的個體，你應該從他們那裏聽到更多。
On pages A-2 – A-3, you will find details about our annual meeting, which will be held on May 2, 2020. Yahoo, as usual, will be streaming the event worldwide. There will be one important change, however, in our format: I’ve had suggestions from shareholders, media and board members that Ajit Jain and Greg Abel – our two key operating managers – be given more exposure at the meeting. That change makes great sense. They are outstanding individuals, both as managers and as human beings, and you should hear more from them.
今年發送問題給我們三名長期任職新聞人員的股東可以指定向阿吉特或格雷格提出問題。就像查理和我一樣，他們也將完全不知道這些問題是什麽。
在A-2-A-3頁，您可以找到我們將於2020年5月2日舉行年會的詳細情況。像往常一樣，雅虎將在全球範圍內直播這一活動。然而，我們的形式將有一個重要的變化：股東、媒體和董事會成員建議，讓我們的兩位關鍵運營經理阿吉特·賈因（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿貝爾（Greg Abel）在年會上有更多的曝光率。這一變化非常有意義。無論是作為經理人還是個人，他們都是傑出的個體，你應該從他們那裏聽到更多。
On pages A-2 – A-3, you will find details about our annual meeting, which will be held on May 2, 2020. Yahoo, as usual, will be streaming the event worldwide. There will be one important change, however, in our format: I’ve had suggestions from shareholders, media and board members that Ajit Jain and Greg Abel – our two key operating managers – be given more exposure at the meeting. That change makes great sense. They are outstanding individuals, both as managers and as human beings, and you should hear more from them.
今年發送問題給我們三名長期任職新聞人員的股東可以指定向阿吉特或格雷格提出問題。就像查理和我一樣，他們也將完全不知道這些問題是什麽。
Shareholders who this year send a question to be asked by our three long-serving journalists may specify that it be posed to Ajit or Greg. They, like Charlie and me, will not have even a hint of what the questions will be.
記者將與觀眾輪流提問，觀眾也可以直接向我們四個人中的任何一個提問。所以，請擦亮你的獠牙。
The journalists will alternate questions with those from the audience, who also can direct questions to any of the four of us. So polish up your zingers.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
記者將與觀眾輪流提問，觀眾也可以直接向我們四個人中的任何一個提問。所以，請擦亮你的獠牙。
The journalists will alternate questions with those from the audience, who also can direct questions to any of the four of us. So polish up your zingers.
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今年5月2日，歡迎來奧馬哈。在這裡與你的資本家同行，購買一些波克夏產品，盡情享受。查理和我，還有整個波克夏家庭都期待著見到你。
On May 2nd, come to Omaha. Meet your fellow capitalists. Buy some Berkshire products. Have fun. Charlie and I – along with the entire Berkshire gang – are looking forward to seeing you.
On May 2nd, come to Omaha. Meet your fellow capitalists. Buy some Berkshire products. Have fun. Charlie and I – along with the entire Berkshire gang – are looking forward to seeing you.
February 22, 2020 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
2020年2月22日 董事會主席 華倫·巴菲特