Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway
Charlie
Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.
Though born
and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere.
Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him. In
1962, he decided that he should take up money management.
Three years
later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying
control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he
would tell me how to correct my mistake.
In what I
next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime
invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose
money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected
that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.
Nevertheless,
Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying
another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it
wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair
businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned
from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.”
With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.
Many years
later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked
me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in
this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us,
ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.
In reality,
Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the
“general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.
Charlie
never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the
bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part
older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me
the reins, and when I blundered he never – never –reminded me of my mistake.
In the
physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who
had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire
has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the
construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.
BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY INC.
To
the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致波克夏海瑟威公司股東：
Berkshire has
more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a
letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group
of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
波克夏有超過三百萬的股東帳戶，我負責每年寫一封信，這封信對這樣一個多樣化且不斷變化的所有者群體來說很有用，其中許多人希望了解更多關於他們的投資資訊。
Charlie Munger,
for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation
identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the
regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to
Berkshire shareholders.
查理·蒙格是我幾十年來管理波克夏的合作夥伴，他對這一項義務的看法與我是一致的，並希望我今年能以正常的方式與你們溝通。在對波克夏股東的責任問題上，他和我的看法一致。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Writers find it
useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a
mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust
Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude
people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people
who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot”
stocks).
作家會發現讓讀者尋找具像化的描述很有幫助，他們往往希望吸引大眾讀者。在波克夏，我們有一個範圍有限的目標：那些信任波克夏，並將他們的積蓄託付給波克夏，且沒有預期將來會轉售這些股份的投資者（在態度上類似於那些希望透過儲蓄來購買農場或租售房產的人，而不是喜歡用多餘資金購買彩券或"熱門"股票的人）。
Over the years,
Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and
their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear
every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer
or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年來，波克夏吸引了大量這樣的"終身"股東及他們的後代。我們珍惜他們的存在，並認為他們有權每年聽到我們所傳達的好或壞的消息，這些消息直接來自他們的CEO，而不是由投資者顧問或永遠提供樂觀主義和糖衣砲彈的溝通顧問。
In visualizing
the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am
lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce
her.
在知道波克夏的股東是什麼樣的人後，我很幸運有一個完美的心理模型，我的妹妹Bertie，讓我來介紹她。
For openers,
Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never,
however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We
never will.
首先，Bertie聰明、睿智，喜歡挑戰我的思考方式。但我們從未有過大吵大鬧，
關係也沒有出現過裂痕，以後也不會。
Furthermore,
Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings
in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will
read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her
honest answers.
此外，Bertie和她的三個女兒都有很大一部分積蓄購入了波克夏的股票。她們的持股時間跨度長達數十年，每年Bertie都會閱讀我寫的信。我的工作就是預測她的問題，並給她誠實的答案。
Bertie, like
most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA
exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t
consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s
winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase
competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to
the neighbors showing its location.
Bertie像大多數人一樣，了解許多會計術語，但她還沒有準備好參加CPA考試。她關注商業新聞，每天閱讀四份報紙，但不認為自己是經濟專家。她很理智，可以說非常理智，本能地知道專家永遠應該被忽視。畢竟，如果可以靠預測明天而獲勝的人，她會隨意分享她的寶貴見解，並增加競爭性購買嗎？這就好比找到了金子，然後把標示金子位置的地圖遞給鄰居。
Bertie
understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of
humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She
knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
Bertie了解激勵的力量（無論好壞）、人類的弱點以及觀察人類行為時可以識別的"資訊"。她知道誰在"推銷"， 誰可以信任。簡而言之，她不會被任何人愚弄。
So, what would interest Bertie this year?
那麼，Bertie今年會對什麼感興趣呢？
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction
經營業績，事實與虛構
Let’s begin with
the numbers. The official annual
report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount
of information – some important, some trivial.
讓我們從數字開始。官方年度報告從K-1報告開始，長達124頁。它充滿了大量的資訊—有些重要，有些微不足道。
Among its
disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page
K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings
(loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96
billion for 2023.
在其披露中，許多所有者以及財經記者將關注K-72頁。在那裡，他們會找到眾所周知的“底線”，標有“淨收益（虧損）”。這些數字顯示，2021年的淨收益為900億美元，2022年為230億美元，2023年為960億美元。
What in the world is going on?
這到底是怎麼回事？
You seek
guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are
promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte
& Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our
opinion, the financial statements . . . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . .
. . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years
in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . . . .”
你在尋求指導，並被告知計算這些「收益」的程序是由一個清醒和有資質的財務會計準則委員會（以下簡稱「FASB」）頒布的，由一個敬業和勤奮的美國證券交易委員會（以下簡稱「SEC」）授權，並由德勤（以下簡稱「D&T」）的世界級專業人士進行審計。在K-67頁上，德勤毫不留情：「我們認為，財務報表在所有重大方面（斜體字）公平地呈現公司的財務狀況及其營運結果，截至2023年12月31日止三年中的每一年。
So sanctified,
this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout
the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their
job – and, legally, they have.
如此神聖化之後，這個沒有用處的"淨收入"數字很快就透過網路和媒體傳遍了全世界。各方都認為他們已經完成了自己的工作—以法律層面，他們的確完成了。
We, however, are
left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our
view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find
somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a
business. Accordingly, Berkshire also
reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9
billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我們仍感到不適。在波克夏，我們的觀點是「收益」應該是一個Bertie會發現有些用處的合理概念，但只是作為評估企業的起點。因此，波克夏也向Bertie和你報告了我們所稱的「經營收益」。這是他們所講述的故事：2021年為276億美元；2022年為309億美元，2023年為374億美元。
The primary difference between the mandated
figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital
gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until
2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several
centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high.
But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
波克夏所偏好的規定數字與強制規定數字之間的主要差異在於，我們排除了有時可能超過每天50億美元的未實現資本利得或損失。諷刺的是，我們的「偏好」直到2018年才基本上成為規則，當時才被強制規定的「改進」所取代。幾個世紀前，伽利略的經驗本應教導我們，不要隨意改變來自高層的規定。但在波克夏，我們可是很固執的。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Make no mistake
about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s
value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar
amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been
doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
資本利得的重要性毋庸置疑：我預計在未來幾十年，它們將是波克夏價值成長的非常重要組成部分。否則，我們為什麼要將你(和Bertie’s)的巨額資金，就像我投資生涯中自己的資金一樣，投資於市場上的股票？
I can’t remember
a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I
have not had a majority of my net
worth in equities, U.S.-based
equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100
on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by
the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers
around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have
needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
我不記得自1942年3月11日（我第一次買股票的日子）以來的任何一段時間，我沒有將大部分淨資產投入到股票中，即使是美國的股票。到目前為止，一切都很好。1942年那個決定命運的那一天，我"扣下板機"的那一刻，美國道瓊工業平均指數跌破了100 點。放學時，我損失了大約5美元。很快，情況發生了逆轉，現在該指數徘徊在38000 點左右。對投資者來說，美國一直是個了不起的國家。他們所需要做的就是靜靜地坐著，不聽任何人的話。
It is more than
silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on
“earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day
and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught
me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it
becomes a weighing machine.”
然而，根據「收益」來判斷波克夏的投資價值是非常愚蠢的，因為「收益」包含了股票市場變幻莫測的日日夜夜，甚至包含了股市每年的波動。正如Ben Graham教導我的，"從短期來看，市場就像一台投票機；從長期來看，它就成了一台稱重機"。
What We Do
我們做了什麼
Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a
portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and
enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time
while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to
predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know
the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
我們在波克夏的目標很簡單：我們希望擁全部或部分經濟效益良好、基本且持久的企業。在資本主義中，有些企業會長期蓬勃發展，而有些則會被證明是個「無底洞」。要預測哪些企業會成為贏家或輸家，會比你想像的困難得多。那些聲稱他們知道答案的人要不是自欺欺人，就是江湖郎中(推銷員)。
At Berkshire, we
particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one
of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost
beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a
lifetime of leisure.
在波克夏，我們特別青睞那些未來能夠以高回報率投入額外資本的稀有企業，擁有一家這樣的公司，然後靜靜地坐著，就可以創造無法估量的財富，甚至是持有者的繼承人有時也可以過著一輩子的悠閒生活。
We also hope
these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that
is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share
of disappointments.
我們也希望這些受青睞的企業由能幹且值得信賴的管理者經營，儘管這更難判斷。波克夏在這方面也有令人失望的地方。
In 1863, Hugh
McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all
national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a
rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many
bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the
wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy
to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it
was in 1863.
1863年，美國第一任主計長（Comptroller）Hugh McCulloch給所有國家銀行寫了一封信。他的指示中包括這樣的警告：「永遠不要和流氓打交道時，期望阻止他欺騙你。」許多自認為可以「管理」這個無賴問題的銀行家，已經從McCulloch的建議中領悟到了智慧，我也是如此。人不是那麼容易看穿的，真誠和同情很容易偽造，現在和1863年一樣。
This combination
of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long
been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates
to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.
長期以來，我在尋找收購目標時追求兩個關鍵條件的組合，有一段時間，我們有大量的候選人需要評估，如果我錯過了一個——而我錯過了很多個——另一個總會出現。
Those days are
long behind us; size did us in,
though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
但那些日子早已過去；規模讓我們陷入困境，同時收購競爭加劇也是一個因素。
Berkshire now
has – by far – the largest GAAP net
worth recorded by any American
business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend
figure of $561 billion. The total
GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American
business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not
yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
目前，波克夏的GAAP（美國通用會計準則）淨資產是美國企業中最高的，創紀錄的營業利潤和強勁的股市使波克夏的年末淨資產達到5,610億美元。2022年，標普500中其他499家公司的淨資產規模為8.9兆美元。（2023年的數字尚未統計，但不太可能大幅超過9.5兆美元。）
By this measure,
Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling
our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period,
particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that
immediately juices net worth).
按照這項衡量標準，波克夏海瑟威目前佔了近6%的份額。在五年內想要讓我們龐大的基數翻倍是不可能的，特別是因為我們非常反對發行股票（這行為會立即增加淨值）。
There remain
only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle
at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others.
Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively
priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital
deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
在這個國家，只有少數幾家公司有能力真正改變波克夏的發展，它們已不斷被我們和其他人反覆挑選。有些我們可以評估，有些我們不能。而且，如果我們可以的話，它們的價格必須要有吸引力。在美國以外的地方，波克夏海瑟威基本上沒有對資本配置有意義的候選者。總而言之，我們不可能有令人瞠目結舌的成績。
Nevertheless,
managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side,
after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of
various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects
than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge
winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a
small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who
regard 65 as just another birthday.
儘管如此，管理波克夏然是一件有趣的事情，而且總是有趣的。積極的一面是，經過59年的整合，我們現在擁有各種業務的一部分或100%，按加權計算，這些業務的前景略好於大多數美國大公司。憑藉著運氣和勇氣，從大量的數十個決定中湧現出幾個巨大的贏家。我們現在有一小群長期擔任經理的人，他們從來不會考慮去其他地方，他們把65歲僅僅視為另一個生日。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Berkshire
benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize
treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance
will always be to our country and our
shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
波克夏受益於不尋常的堅定且清晰的目標。雖然我們強調善待我們的員工、社區和供應商——誰不希望這樣做？但我們始終忠於國家和我們的股東。我們永遠不會忘記，儘管你的錢和我們的錢在一起，但它並不屬於我們。
With that focus,
and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and,
more important, should also operate
with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond
“slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t
the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.
憑藉這種專注，以及我們目前的業務組合，波克夏應該比一般的美國公司做得好一點，更重要的是，應以大大降低的在營運中的資本永久減損的風險。不過，「略好」以外的任何事情都是一廂情願，當Bertie全力以赴投資波克夏時，這樣的願望還沒有實現——但現在已經實現了。
Our Not-So-Secret Weapon
我們不那麼秘密的武器
Occasionally,
markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and
fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can –
and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish
as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe
that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to
September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis,
and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t
happen often – but they will happen.
偶爾，市場和/或經濟會導致一些基本面良好的大型企業的股票和債券出現明顯錯誤定價。的確，市場能夠也必將在不可預測地情況下失靈甚至消失，就像1914年的4個月和2001年的幾天一樣。如果你認為美國投資者現在比過去更穩定，那就回想一下2008年9月的情況。通訊的速度和技術的奇蹟使世界範圍內的即時癱瘓成為可能，自從煙霧信號以來，我們已經走了很長一段路，這種突然的恐慌不會經常發生，但還是會發生。
Berkshire’s
ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and
certainty of performance may offer us
an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively
larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better
taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far
more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now
resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
波克夏能夠以巨額資金和業績的確定性迅速應對市場動盪，這可能偶爾會給我們大規模機會。雖然股票市場比我們早年大得多，但今天的活躍市場參與者既不比我在學校時更穩定，也不比我在學校時受過更好的教育。不管出於什麼原因，現在的市場表現出比我年輕時更像賭場，賭場現在存在於許多家庭中，每天都在誘惑居民。
One fact of
financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its
figurative sense – would like its
customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’ juices to flow is
feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed – not by
everyone but always by someone.
經濟活動中的一個事實永遠不應該被忘記。華爾街——用這個詞的比喻意義來說——希望它的客戶賺錢，但真正讓它的客戶熱血沸騰的是狂熱的活動。在這種時候，任何一樣可以被推銷的愚蠢的東西都會被大力推銷—不是每個人都這麼做，但總是有人這麼做。
Occasionally,
the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant
perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next
door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has
trumped morality.
有些時候，場面會變得醜陋。政客們變的被激怒了；最明目張膽的犯罪者跑掉了，逍遙法外；而你隔壁的朋友會變得困惑、貧窮，有時還想要報復。他了解到，金錢壓倒了道德。
One investment rule at Berkshire has not
and will not change: Never risk
permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of
compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be –
rewarding if you make a couple of
good decisions during a lifetime and
avoid serious mistakes.
波克夏的一項投資規則從未改變也不會改變：永遠不要冒資本永久性損失的風險。由於美國的順風和複利的力量，如果你在一生中做出了幾個正確的決定，避免了嚴重的錯誤，那麼我們經營的領域將會是有益的，而且將會得到回報。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I believe
Berkshire can handle financial
disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one
we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s
goal will be to function as an asset
to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather
than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited
the conflagration.
我相信波克夏公司能夠應對前所未有的金融災難，我們不會放棄這種能力。當經濟動盪發生時，波克夏的目標將是成為國家的一筆資產——就像它在2008- 2009年以一種非常微小的方式發揮作用一樣並幫助撲滅金融大火，而不是成為眾多無意間或有意點燃大火的公司之一。
Our goal is
realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings
delivered after interest costs, taxes
and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA” is a banned
measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash,
even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness,
fear and near-paralysis.
我們的目標是現實的。波克夏的優勢來自於它在扣除利息成本、稅收和大量折舊及攤銷費用（「EBITDA」在波克夏是被禁止使用的衡量標準）後交付的多樣化的收益。即使國家遭遇長期的經濟疲軟，恐懼甚至幾乎癱瘓，我們也以最低的現金要求展開業務。
Berkshire does
not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary.
Annual debt maturities are never material.
波克夏目前不支付股息，股票回購是100%的自由裁量權。年度債務到期日從來都不重要。
Your company
also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury
bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary.
During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated
cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank
lines or debt markets. We did not predict
the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.
你們的公司持有的現金和美國國債數量也遠遠超出了傳統觀點所認為的必要水準。在2008年的恐慌中，波克夏從營運中獲得現金，沒有以任何方式依賴商業票據、銀行貸款或債券市場。我們沒有預測到發生經濟危機的準確時間，但我們總是為此做好準備。
Extreme fiscal
conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in
ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution
will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a
fortress-like building thought to be
fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended
periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any
of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
極端的財政保守主義是我們對那些加入我們波克夏所有權人所做的企業承諾。在大多數年份裡——實際上是在漫長的幾十年裡——我們的謹慎很可能被證明是不必要的行為——就像對一座被認為是防火的堡壘式建築的保險政策一樣。但波克夏並不想對Bertie或任何信任我們的個人造成永久性的財務損失——長期的收益縮水是無法避免的。
Berkshire is built to last.
波克夏經久不衰。
Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable
讓我們感到舒適的非受控企業
Last year I
mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions –
Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple
position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they
are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
去年我提到，波克夏長期持有兩隻股票，可口可樂和美國運通。這兩家公司不像我們對蘋果的持股那麼大，每隻股票只佔波克夏公認會計準則淨值的4-5%。但它們是有價值的資產，也說明了我們的想法。
American Express
began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store
in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on
newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years
and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even
mismanaged.
美國運通於1850年開始運營，可口可樂於1886年在亞特蘭大的一家藥局誕生。（波克夏不太喜歡新公司）。多年來，兩家公司都曾嘗試向不相關的領域擴張，但沒有任何成功。在過去 –
但肯定不是現在
– 兩家公司甚至都出現了管理不善的局面。
But each was
hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions
called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX
became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the
need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
但兩家公司都在其主營業務項目上取得了巨大成功，並根據情況在各地進行了重組。而且，最重要的是，他們的產品「走向世界」。可口可樂和美國運通的核心產品都在世界各地家喻戶曉，而充足的現金流和對毋庸置疑的金融信任的需求是我們這個世界永恆的必需品。
During 2023, we
did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van
Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again
rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends.
Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in
2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost
of our long-ago purchase.
在2023年期間，我們沒有買賣美國運通或可口可樂的股票，持續沉睡了20年之後，局勢早已時過境遷。去年，這兩家公司再次透過增加獲利和分紅來獎勵我們的無動於衷。事實上，在2023年，我們從美國運通獲得的收益份額，已經大大超過了我們很久以前購買的13億美元成本。
Both AMEX and
Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the
case of AMEX – and we will most
certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business
than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
2024 年，美國運通和可口可樂幾乎肯定都會增加股息，其中美國運通約為16%，我們肯定會在這一年中保持我們的持股整年不變，難道我能創造出比這兩家公司更好的全球業務嗎？正如Bertie會告訴你，"不可能"。
Though Berkshire
did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last
year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work
to increase your participation in every
asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my
usual caveat: All stock repurchases
should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value
becomes stupid if done at a premium.
雖然波克夏在2023 年沒有增持這兩家公司的股票，但由於我們在波克夏進行了股票回購，去年你在可口可樂和美國運通的間接所有權略有增加。這種回購有助於增加您對撥
刻下所擁有的每項資產的參與。對於這個顯而易見但經常被忽視的事實，我還要加上我一貫的告誡：所有的股票回購都應該取決於價格。如果以高於商業價值的價格回購股票，那麼明智的做法就會變得愚蠢。
The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you
find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many
mediocre decisions that are inevitable.
可口可樂和美國運通給我們的教訓是什麼？當你發現一家真正出色的企業時，請堅持投資下去。耐心總是有回報的，選擇一個出色的企業可以對沖掉許多不可避免的平庸決策。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
This year, I
would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain
indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to
our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both
positions during 2023.
今年，我想介紹另外兩項我們計劃將無限期維持的投資。就像可口可樂和美國運通一樣，相對於我們擁有的資源而言，這些投資投入並不巨大。但它們是值得的，而且我們能夠在2023 年增加這兩項投資的部位。
At yearend,
Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned
warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price.
Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no
interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast
oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in
carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has
yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s
interest.
截至年底，波克夏持有西方石油公司27.8%的普通股，同時也持有認股權證，在五年多的時間裡，我們可以選擇以固定價格大幅增持股份。
雖然我們非常喜歡我們的所有權和選擇權，但波克夏無意收購或管理西方石油公司。我們尤其看好西方石油公司在美國擁有的大量石油和天然氣資產，以及它在碳捕集方面的領先地位，儘管這種技術的經濟可行性仍有待驗證。這兩項活動都非常符合我們的國家利益。
Not so long ago,
the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no
meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million
barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s
needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S.
mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily
dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in
oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
不久前，美國還嚴重依賴外國石油，而碳捕捉技術也沒有重要的支持者。事實上，1975 年，美國的石油產量為每天800 萬桶石油當量（"BOEPD"），此產量遠遠無法滿足國家的需求。美國的能源狀況曾在第二次世界大戰中為美國的動員提供了有利條件，但現在，變得嚴重依賴外國有潛在不穩定性的供應商。據預測，石油產量將可能進一步下降，伴隨著未來石油用量的增加。
For a long time,
the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million
BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating –
this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
長期以來，這種悲觀情緒似乎是正確的，到2007年，產量下降到500萬桶/日。同時，美國政府於1975年建立了戰略石油儲備（「SPR」），以緩解美國自給自足能力受到侵蝕的問題，儘管這一問題無法完全消除。
And then –
Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy
dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC
no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production
that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our
country would be very – very –
nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it
found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would
have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
然後，哈利路亞！頁岩經濟在2011年變得可行，我們對能源的依賴結束了。現在，美國的石油產量已超過1,300萬桶/日，OPEC不再佔上風。西方石油公司在美國的石油年產量每年都接近SPR的全部庫存。如果美國國內的石油產量一直維持在500萬桶/日的水平，並且嚴重依賴非美國石油來源，那麼我們國家的資源如今就會非常非常緊張。從這個水準來看，如果外國石油供應不上，那麼SPR在幾個月內就會被清空。
Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在Vicki Hollub（西方石油總裁兼CEO）的領導下，西方石油正在為美國和股東做正確的事情。沒有人知道未來一個月、一年或十年油價會如何變動。但Vicki確實知道如何將石油和岩石分開，這是一種非同尋常的才能，對她的股東和她的國家都很有價值。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Additionally,
Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very
large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner
somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings
in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with
their managements.
此外，波克夏繼續長期被動地持有日本五大商社股份，每家公司的經營方式都高度多元化，與波克夏本身的經營方式有些類似。去年，Greg Abel（波克夏副董事長）和我前往東京與這五家公司的管理層交談後，我們增持了這五家公司的股票。
Berkshire now
owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate
outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.)
Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares
that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6
trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However,
the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars
was 61% or $8 billion.
目前，波克夏分別持有這五家公司約9%的股份。（一個小問題是：日本公司計算流通股的方式與美國不同）波克夏也向每家公司承諾，不會購買超過9.9%的股份。我們對這五家公司的投資成本共1.6兆日圓，五家公司的年末市值達2.9兆日圓。然而，由於近年來日圓走軟，我們年底未實現的美元收益為61%，即80億美元。
Neither Greg nor
I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t
believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed
most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds.
This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has
more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The
weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum
that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over
the 2020-23 period.
Greg和我都不相信我們能預測主要貨幣的市場價格，我們也不相信能僱用有這種能力的人才。因此，波克夏透過發行1.3兆日圓債券為其在日本的大部分部位提供資金。這些債券在日本很受歡迎，我相信波克夏的未償日圓債務比其他美國公司都要多。日圓貶值為波克夏帶來了19億美元的年終收益，根據美國通用會計(GAAP)準則，這筆收益將定期計入2020-23年期間的收益。
In certain
important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and
Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those
customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number
of its outstanding shares at attractive
prices.
在某些重要方面，伊藤忠商事、丸紅、三菱、三井和住友這五家公司都遵循著對股東友善的政策，這比美國的慣例要好得多。自從我們開始收購日本股票以來，這五家公司都以具有吸引力的價格減少了流通股的數量。
Meanwhile, the
managements of all five companies have been far
less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United
States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are
used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase
shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
同時，這五家公司的管理階層對自身報酬的要求遠不如美國公司那麼激進。還要注意的是，這五家公司每家都只將大約1/3的收益用於分紅。這五家公司留存的巨額資金既用於建立其眾多業務，也在較小程度上用於回購股票。與波克夏一樣，這五家公司也不願發行股票。
An additional
benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to
opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed
and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours.
And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that
Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly
available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
波克夏得到的另一個好處是，我們的投資有可能為我們帶來在全球範圍內與五家管理完善、備受尊敬的大公司合作的機會，他們的利益關係網絡比我們廣泛得多。而且，日本公司的執行長們也很欣慰地知道，波克夏將始終擁有龐大的流動資源，無論這些合作夥伴的規模有多大，都可以立即獲得這些資源。
Our Japanese
purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building
positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended
period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is
an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我們從2019年7月4日開始買日本股票。鑑於波克夏目前的規模，透過公開市場購買建立頭寸需要極大的耐心和較長時間的「友好」價格期。這個過程就像讓一艘戰艦轉彎，這是波克夏早期沒有遇到的重要劣勢。
The Scorecard in 2023
2023年記分卡
Every quarter we issue a press release
that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to
what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
我們每季都會發布新聞稿，以類似於下圖的方式報告我們的營運收益（或虧損）總結情況。以下是全年總結：
|
|
(in $ millions) |
|
|
2023 2022 |
|
Insurance-underwriting . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
$ 5,428 $ (30) |
|
Insurance-investment
income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
9,567 6,484 |
|
Railroad . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
5,087 5,946 |
|
Utilities and energy . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
2,331 3,904 |
|
Other businesses and
miscellaneous items . . . . . . . |
14,937 14,549 |
|
Operating earnings . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
$37,350 $30,853 |
At Berkshire’s
annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which
had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the
outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance
businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by
decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire
Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of
operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill
position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the
pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both
because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in
the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had
strengthened.
Insurance came through as expected. I
erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at
each.
在2023年5月6日波克夏的年度股東大會上，我介紹了當天一早發布的第一季業績。隨後，我簡短地總結了全年的展望：
（1）2023年，我們大多數非保險業務的獲利都將下降；
（2）我們最大的兩家非保險業務，鐵路業務（BNSF）和能源業務（BHE）的良好業績將緩解這一下降，這兩家公司在2022年合計佔營業收入的30%以上；
（3）我們的投資收入肯定會大幅成長，因為波克夏所持有的巨額美國國債部位終於開始支付遠高於預期的收益，而以往的收益回報往往十分微薄；
（4）保險業可能會有不錯的表現，這是因為保險業的承保收益與經濟中其他領域的收益並不相關，此外財產保險價格已經走強。
保險業務如期通過“考核”，然而我對BNSF和BHE預期有誤，讓我們分別來看看。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Rail is
essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way –
measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials
to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that
Americans need must travel to
customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country
can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge.
Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
鐵路對美國經濟的未來至關重要，從成本、燃料使用和碳排放強度等方面衡量，鐵路顯然是將重型材料運往遙遠目的地的最有效方式。卡車運輸在短途運輸中勝出，但美國人需要的是將許多貨物必須運往數百甚至數千英里之外的客戶手中。國家的發展離不開鐵路，而鐵路業的資金需求始終是龐大的。事實上，與大多數美國企業相比，鐵路業非常吃資本。
BNSF is the
largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad
carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521
locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance
sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate
those assets and decades to complete
the job.
BNSF是覆蓋北美的六大鐵路系統中最大的一家，我們的鐵路擁有23759英里長的主軌道、99條隧道、13495座橋樑、7521台機車和其他各種固定資產，資產負債表上的價值高達700億美元。但我猜測，複製這些資產至少需要花費5,000億美元，而完成這項工作則需要幾十年的時間。
BNSF must
annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for
owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is
particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.
BNSF每年的支出必須超過折舊費用，才能維持現有的業務水準。無論業主投資於哪個行業，這一現實都對他們不利，尤其是資本密集產業。
At BNSF, the
outlays in excess of GAAP
depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering
$22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid
to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall
considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase
the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
BNSF自14年前被收購以來，超出GAAP折舊費用的支出總額已達到驚人的220億美元，即每年超過15億美元。喔!這種差距意味著，除非我們定期增加鐵路公司的債務，否則支付給其所有者波克夏的BNSF股息將經常大大低於BNSF公佈的收益，但我們不打算這麼做。
Consequently,
Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less
than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the
property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It
explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement
value.
因此，波克夏的收購價格獲得了可接受的回報，儘管比表面上看起來的要少，而且資產重置價值也很低。我或波克夏董事會對此並不感到意外，這也解釋了為什麼我們能在2010年以其重置價值的一小部分買下BNSF。
North America’s
rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported
goods, etc. one-way for long
distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls.
Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the
utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None
of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading
is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes
dangerous conditions.
北美的長途鐵路系統單程運輸大量的煤炭、穀物、汽車、進出口貨物等，這些運輸回程車的收入往往出現問題。天氣條件極度惡劣，經常妨礙甚至阻礙軌道、橋樑和設備的使用。洪水更是一場惡夢，這些都不足為奇。雖然我坐在舒適的辦公室裡，但鐵路運輸是一項戶外工作，許多員工在艱苦、有時甚至危險的條件下工作。
An evolving
problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the
difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail
operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population
of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect
suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t
be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about
once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be
with us.
一個不斷演變的問題是，越來越多的美國人不願意在某些鐵路運營中從事艱苦且孤獨的工作。工程師必須面對這樣一個事實：在美國3.35億人口中，一些孤苦無依或精神失常的美國人將選擇躺在100節車廂的超重型列車前自殺，而這種列車在不到一英里或更長的距離內是停不下來的。你想成為那個無助的工程師嗎？在北美，這種創傷每天都會發生一次；在歐洲，這種情況要普遍得多，而且會一直伴隨著我們。
Wage
negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and
Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the
industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad
responsibilities.
鐵路業的工資談判最終可能掌握在總統和國會手中，此外，美國鐵路公司每天都需要運輸許多危險產品，而這該行業想極力避免的，“共同承運人”一詞界定了鐵路的責任。
Last year BNSF’s
earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs
also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the
country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
去年，由於收入下降，BNSF的獲利下降幅度超出了我的預期。雖然燃料成本也有所下降，但華盛頓頒布的工資漲幅遠遠超出了國家的通膨目標，這種差異可能會在未來的談判中再次出現。
Though BNSF
carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the
five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped
relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service
territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and
should improve.
雖然BNSF比北美其他五大鐵路公司運載更多的貨物，花費更多的資本支出，但自我們收購以來，其利潤率相對於所有五大鐵路公司均有所下滑。我相信，我們廣闊的服務區域是首屈一指的，因此利潤率可以而且應該會有所改善。
I am
particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people
who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep
America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when
they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed
immediately throughout America.
我特別為BNSF對國家的貢獻感到自豪，也為那些在北達科他州和蒙大拿州冬天在零下的戶外工作以保持美國商業動脈暢通的人們感到自豪。鐵路在運行時不會受到太多關注，但如果鐵路無法運行，整個美國都會立即註意到這方面的問題。
A century from now, BNSF will continue to
be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
百年之後，BNSF仍將是美國和波克夏的重要資產，這一點您可以信賴。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our second and
even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility
businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as
expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of
zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest
utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult
to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among
the most stable industries in America.
去年，我們第二個甚至更嚴重錯誤是，對BHE收益感到失望。該公司的大部分大型電力業務以及廣泛的天然氣管道業務的表現與預期差不多，但是一些州的監管環境帶來了零利潤甚至破產的擔憂（這是加州最大的公用事業公司的實際結果，也是夏威夷目前面臨的威脅)。在這樣的司法管轄區，曾經被認為是美國最穩定的產業之一的收益和資產價值也很難預測。
For more than a
century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a
state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small
bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were
made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That
forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build
generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct.
BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in
2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10
states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一個多世紀以來，電力公司透過各州承諾的固定股本回報率（有時業績優異會有小額獎金）籌集巨額資金，為公司發展提供資金。透過這種方式，大量的投資被用於未來幾年可能需要的產能。這項前瞻性規定反映了一個現實，即公用事業公司建設發電和輸電資產往往需要多年時間。BHE在西部廣泛的多州輸電項目於2006年啟動，距離完成還有幾年時間。最終，它將服務於10個州，占美國大陸面積的30%。
With this model
employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even
if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of
safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now,
the fixed-but-satisfactoryreturn pact has been broken in a few states, and
investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate
change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who,
a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
私營和公共電力系統都採用這種模式，即使人口成長或工業需求超出預期，燈也會亮著。對於監管者、投資者和公眾看來，這種「安全邊際」方法是明智的。現在，這種「固定但令人滿意的回報」模式已經在幾個州被打破，投資者開始擔心這種破裂會蔓延開來。氣候變遷加劇了他們的擔憂。地下輸電可能是必要的，但幾十年前，有誰願意為這種建設支付高昂的費用？
At Berkshire, we
have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These
costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased –
and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more
frequent.
在波克夏，我們對已經發生的損失金額進行了最佳估算。這些損失是由森林火災造成的，如果對流風暴變得更加頻繁，森林火災的頻率和強度都會增加，而且很可能會繼續增加。
It will be many
years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can
intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in
vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory
environment will change elsewhere.
我們還需要很多年才能知道BHE森林火災損失的最終統計結果，並明智地做出未來在脆弱的西部各州投資決策。其他地方的監管環境是否會發生變化，還有待觀察。
Other electric
utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and
Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present
problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and
Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get
these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption,
and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we
will not knowingly throw good money
after bad.
其他電力公司可能會面臨與太平洋天然氣電力公司和夏威夷電力公司類似的生存問題。如果以沒收的方式解決目前的問題，顯然會對BHE造成不利影響，但該公司和波克夏本身的結構都能應對不利的意外情況。我們的基本產品是風險承擔，我們的保險業務經常會出現這種情況，其他業務也會發生這種情況。波克夏可以承受財務意外，但我們不會故意把好錢花在壞事上。
Whatever the
case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous:
Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and
will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in
the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country.
Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
無論波克夏的情況如何，公用事業行業的最終結果可能是不好的：某些公用事業公司可能無法吸引美國公民的儲蓄。內布拉斯加州在1930年代就做出了這樣的選擇，全國各地也有許多公共電力公司。最終，選民、納稅人和用戶將決定他們更喜歡哪種模式。
When the dust
settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be
staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in
regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a
costly mistake in not doing so.
當一切塵埃落定，美國的電力需求和隨之而來的資本支出將是驚人的，我和波克夏在BHE的兩位合夥人都沒有預料到甚至沒有考慮到監管回報的不利發展，我犯了一個代價高昂的錯誤。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Enough about
problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year,
setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty
insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We
have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17
million to $83 billion – we have much
room to grow.
問題說得夠多了：去年我們的保險業務表現優異，在銷售額、浮動虧損和承保利潤方面都創下了記錄。財產-責任保險（P/C）是波克夏公司福祉和成長的核心。我們從事這項業務已有57年，我們的業務量成長了近5,000倍，從1,700萬美元成長到830億美元，未來我們仍有很大的成長空間。
Beyond that, we
have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance
business and what sort of people to avoid.
The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male,
female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality
may generally be in life.
除此之外，我們還學到了--往往是痛苦地學到了--應該避開哪些類型的保險業務和哪些人。保險業務最重要的教訓是，我們的承保人可以是瘦的、胖的、男的、女的、年輕的、年老的、外國的或國內的。但在辦公室裡，他們不能是樂觀主義者，無論這種特質在生活中通常多麼令人嚮往。
Surprises in the P/C
business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have
expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to
recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when
charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire
will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but
inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
意外險業務中的意外幾乎總是負面的，這種意外可能在六個月或一年期保單到期幾十年後才出現。該行業的會計是為了認識到這一現實而設計的，但估算錯誤可能非常嚴重。如果涉及到騙子，檢測往往既緩慢又昂貴。波克夏總是試圖準確估算未來的損失賠付，但通膨（包括貨幣和「法律」方面的通貨膨脹）是一個未知數。
I’ve told the
story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct
newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be
what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day
– aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began
early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness,
as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
關於我們的保險業務，我已經講過很多次了，所以我只想引導新讀者閱讀第18頁。在這裡，我只想重申，如果Ajit Jain沒有在1986年加入波克夏，我們的地位就不會是現在的樣子。在那個幸運的日子之前，除了1951年初與GEICO開始的一段幾乎令人難以置信的美好經歷之外，我一直在荒野中徘徊，努力建立我們的保險業務。
Ajit’s
achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of
hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names
and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup
of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to
baseball.
Ajit自加入波克夏以來所取得的成就，得到了我們各種財險業務中一大批才華橫溢的保險高管的支持。大多數媒體和公眾都不知道他們的名字和臉孔。不過，波克夏的基金經理陣容之於財險，就像庫柏斯敦的得獎者之於棒球一樣。
Bertie, you can
feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation
that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and
talent. It carried the day in 2023.
Bertie，你可以為自己擁有一家令人難以置信的保險公司的一部分而感到欣慰，這家公司目前在全球運營，擁有無與倫比的財務資源、聲譽和人才，它在2023年扛起了大旗。
What
is it with Omaha?
今年奧馬哈有什麼？
Come to
Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three
managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company.
What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look
alike. Let’s dig deeper.
來參加2024年5月4日的波克夏年度股東大會吧！在台上，你會看到三位經理人，他們現在承擔管理公司的主要責任。你可能會想，這三人有什麼共通點？他們肯定長得不像，讓我們深入了解。
Greg Abel, who
runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born
and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived
for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I
never met him.
格雷格·阿貝爾（Greg Abel）負責波克夏所有非保險業務，從各方面來看，他已經做好了明天成為波克夏執行長的準備。在1990年代，Greg在奧馬哈離我只有幾個街區遠的地方住了六年，但在那段時間裡，我從未見過他。
A decade or so earlier,
Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in
Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit
and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three
decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action
in reinsurance takes place).
大約十年前，在印度出生、長大、受教育的阿吉特·賈恩(Ajit Jain)和家人住在離我家只有一英里左右的地方，Ajit和他的妻子Tinku都在奧馬哈有很多的朋友，儘管他們搬到紐約已經30多年了(紐約是再保險行業的主要活動地）。
Missing from the
stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two
miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years,
Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its
office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and
were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until
much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of
America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that
numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were
not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
今年查理將缺席，他和我都出生在奧馬哈，大概距離五月股東會兩英里的地方。在他出生後的頭十年裡，查理住的地方離波克夏長期以來的辦公室只有半英里遠。查理和我的童年都在奧馬哈的公立學校度過，奧馬哈的童年給我們留下了不可磨滅的影響。然而，直到很久以後，我們才認識。(一個可能會讓你驚訝的註腳：在美國45位總統中，查理經歷了15位總統，人們把拜登總統稱為第46位，這一編號把格羅弗-克利夫蘭算作第22位和第24位總統，因為他的任期不是連續的。美國是一個非常年輕的國家。）
Moving to the
corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of
residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and
blossoming in its new home.
在公司層面上，波克夏於1970年從在新英格蘭待了81年的地方搬遷到奧馬哈，拋開煩惱，在新家園蓬勃發展。
As a final
punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class
neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s
great investors.
作為《奧馬哈效應》的最後點睛之筆，Bertie（伯蒂）--沒錯，就是伯蒂，早年在奧馬哈的一個中產階級社區度過了她的成長歲月，幾十年後，她成為了美國最偉大的投資者之一。
You may be
thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it.
But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active
financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with
some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你可能會認為，她把所有的錢都投到了波克夏，然後就坐吃山空了。但事實並非如此，1956年組建家庭後，伯蒂20年來一直活躍在金融領域：她持有債券，將1/3的資金投資於上市共同基金，並買賣股票。她的潛力一直未被發掘。
Then, in 1980,
when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to
make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years.
During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic
gifts (think nine figures).
1980年，46歲的伯蒂不顧哥哥的任何勸說，決定搬家。在接下來的43年裡，她只保留了共同基金和波克夏，沒有進行任何新的交易。在此期間，她變得非常富有，甚至在捐出大筆慈善捐款（9位數）之後也是如此。
Millions of
American investors could have
followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow
absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
數以百萬計的美國投資者本可以遵循她的推理，這些推理只涉及她小時候在奧馬哈不知怎麼吸收的常識。伯蒂不冒任何風險，每年五月都會回到奧馬哈重新充電。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
So what is going
on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary
phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s
marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday
yields the answer to this puzzle?
那麼到底是怎麼回事呢?是奧馬哈的水嗎?是因為奧馬哈的空氣嗎?是某種奇怪的行星現象，類似於牙買加盛產短跑運動員、肯尼亞盛產馬拉松運動員或俄羅斯盛產國際象棋專家的現象?我們必須等到人工智慧有一天給出謎題的答案嗎?
Keep an open
mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to
Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in
any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.
保持開放的心態。五月來奧馬哈吧，呼吸這裡的空氣，喝這裡的水，跟伯蒂和她漂亮的女兒們打個招呼。誰知道呢?沒有什麼壞處，而且，無論如何，您都會度過一段美好時光，並結識一大群友好的人。
最重要的是，我們將推出第四版《窮查理年鑑》。拿起一本，查理的智慧將改善你的生活，就像當初改變我的生活一樣。（華爾街見聞）
February 24, 2024 Warren
E. Buffett 華倫‧巴菲特
Chairman of the Board 董事會主席
Berkshire’s
Performance vs. the S&P 500
Annual
Percentage Change
in
Per-Share in
S&P 500
Market
Value of with
Dividends
Year
Berkshire
Included
|
1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
49.5 |
10.0 |
|
1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(3.4) |
(11.7) |
|
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
13.3 |
30.9 |
|
1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
77.8 |
11.0 |
|
1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
19.4 |
(8.4) |
|
1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(4.6) |
3.9 |
|
1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
80.5 |
14.6 |
|
1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
8.1 |
18.9 |
|
1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(2.5) |
(14.8) |
|
1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(48.7) |
(26.4) |
|
1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
2.5 |
37.2 |
|
1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
129.3 |
23.6 |
|
1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
46.8 |
(7.4) |
|
1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
14.5 |
6.4 |
|
1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
102.5 |
18.2 |
|
1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
32.8 |
32.3 |
|
1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
31.8 |
(5.0) |
|
1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
38.4 |
21.4 |
|
1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
69.0 |
22.4 |
|
1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(2.7) |
6.1 |
|
1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
93.7 |
31.6 |
|
1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
14.2 |
18.6 |
|
1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
4.6 |
5.1 |
|
1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
59.3 |
16.6 |
|
1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
84.6 |
31.7 |
|
1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(23.1) |
(3.1) |
|
1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
35.6 |
30.5 |
|
1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
29.8 |
7.6 |
|
1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
38.9 |
10.1 |
|
1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
25.0 |
1.3 |
|
1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
57.4 |
37.6 |
|
1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
6.2 |
23.0 |
|
1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
34.9 |
33.4 |
|
1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
52.2 |
28.6 |
|
1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(19.9) |
21.0 |
|
2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
26.6 |
(9.1) |
|
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
6.5 |
(11.9) |
|
2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(3.8) |
(22.1) |
|
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
15.8 |
28.7 |
|
2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
4.3 |
10.9 |
|
2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
0.8 |
4.9 |
|
2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
24.1 |
15.8 |
|
2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
28.7 |
5.5 |
|
2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(31.8) |
(37.0) |
|
2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
2.7 |
26.5 |
|
2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
21.4 |
15.1 |
|
2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(4.7) |
2.1 |
|
2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
16.8 |
16.0 |
|
2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
32.7 |
32.4 |
|
2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
27.0 |
13.7 |
|
2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
(12.5) |
1.4 |
|
2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
23.4 |
12.0 |
|
2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
21.9 |
21.8 |
|
2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
2.8 |
(4.4) |
|
2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
11.0 |
31.5 |
|
2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
2.4 |
18.4 |
|
2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
29.6 |
28.7 |
|
2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
4.0 |
(18.1) |
|
2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
15.8 |
26.3 |
|
Compounded Annual Gain –
1965-2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . |
19.8% |
10.2% |
|
Overall Gain – 1964-2023 . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . |
4,384,748% |
31,223% |
Note:
Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and
1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
17
