BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
致波克夏公司股東：
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.
我和我的長期搭檔查理 · 孟格 (Charlie Munger)，我們的工作就是管理大量股東的儲蓄，能獲得大家長久以來的信任，且這種信任往往能貫穿一生中的大部分時間，我感到非常榮幸。當我在寫這封信的時候，腦海中浮現的是那些專注的股東們。
A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.
一般來說，人們的普遍觀念是，年輕時進行儲蓄，希望以此維持退休後的生活水平。去世後，遺留的所有資產通常會留給家人，也可能是朋友或慈善機構。
Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.
但我們的觀點有所不同，我們認為，波克夏的股東基本上是「儲蓄一次，儲蓄一輩子」的類型。儘管這些人生活優渥，但他們最終會將大部分資產捐獻給慈善機構。反過來，慈善機構又會用來改善許多與原始捐助者無關的人的生活，從而重新分配資金。有時，產生的結果是驚人的。
The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.
一個人如何對待金錢，暴露了他是個怎樣的人。查理和我很高興地看到，波克夏產生的大量資金流向公眾需求，以及我們的股東很少關注波克夏資產和帝國建設。
Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?
誰會不喜歡為我們這樣的股東工作呢？
What We Do
Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
查理和我將股東在波克夏的儲蓄分配成兩種相關的所有權形式。首先，投資於我們的全資控股企業，通常購買公司 100% 的股權。波克夏在這些子公司進行資本配置，並挑選負責日常營運決策的執行長。當管理大型企業時，信任和規則都是缺一不可的。
波克夏對前者的強調達到了不同尋常——以至於有人會說是極端的程度。失望是不可避免的，我們可以理解商業錯誤，但我們對個人不當行為的容忍度為零。
In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
在我們的第二類所有權中，我們購買公開交易的股票，透過購買這些股票，我們被動地擁有部分業務。持有這些投資時，我們在管理方面沒有發言權。
Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
我們在這兩種所有權形式中的目標都是，對具有長期良好經濟特徵和值得信賴的管理者的企業進行有意義的投資。請特別注意，我們持有股票是基於我們對企業長期經營業績的預期，而不是將其視為熟練買賣的工具。這一點很關鍵：查理和我不是選股高手，我們是選擇商業模式的人。
Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way,other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public.Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative
destruction.”
這些年來，我犯了很多錯誤。因此，我們廣泛的業務集合目前包括少數真正具有非凡經濟效益的企業，許多企業具有非常好的經濟特徵，以及一群龐大的邊緣企業。
在這一過程中，我投資的其他企業已經消亡，它們的產品被公眾拋棄。資本主義具有兩面性：一方面製度造就了越來越多的失敗者，但同時也帶來了大量改進的商品和服務。熊彼特稱這種現象為「創造性破壞」(creative destruction)。
One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.
我們的公開交易部門的一個優勢是，偶爾可以很容易地以極好的價格買到非常優秀的企業。重要的是要明白，股票會不時地以愚蠢的價格交易，可能是高也可能是低。「有效市場」只存在於教科書中。事實上，有市場的股票和債券令人困惑，它們的行為通常只有在回顧時才能理解。
Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.
被控股企業是另一種類型，有時它們的價格比合理價格高得離譜，但幾乎永遠不會以低價出售。除非受到脅迫，否則控股企業的所有者不會考慮以恐慌性估值出售。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management,most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)在這一點上，我的成績單是合適的：在波克夏 58 年的管理中，我的大部分資本配置決策都不過馬馬虎虎。此外，在某些情況下，我沒走好的棋也靠著很大的運氣得以挽救。（還記得我們在美國航空和所羅門公司險些發生的災難中逃生的故事嗎？我當然記得。）
Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.
我們令人滿意的結果是十幾個真正睿智決定的產物——大約每五年一個——以及一個有時被遺忘的優勢，它有利於像波克夏這樣的長期投資人。讓我們來窺探一下幕後的情況。
The Secret Sauce
In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.
In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400 million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.
1994 年 8 月——是的，1994 年——波克夏完成了為期 7 年的收購，購買了我們現在擁有的 4 億股可口可樂股票，總成本為 13 億美元——這對波克夏來說是一筆非常大的數目。
The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.
1994 年我們從可口可樂公司收到的現金股利為 7500 萬美元，到 2022 年，股利增加到 7.04 億美元。這樣的增長每年都在發生，就像生日一樣確定。我和查理所要做的就是兌現可口可樂的季度股利支票。我們預計這筆金額很可能會增加。
American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.
美國運通的情況大致相同。波克夏對美國運通的收購基本上在 1995 年完成，巧合的是，也花費了 13 億美元。從這項投資中獲得的年度股利已從 4100 萬美元增長到 3.02 億美元。這筆金額似乎也很有可能增加。
These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.
這些股利收益雖然令人高興，但遠非壯觀。但它們推動了股價的重要上漲。今年（2022 年）底，我們對可口可樂的投資價值為 250 億美元，而美國運通的投資價值為 220 億美元。現在這兩隻股票約占波克夏淨資產的 5%，與很久以前的權重相當。
Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.
假設我在上世紀 90 年代犯了一個類似規模的投資錯誤，這筆投資在 2022 年仍然價值 13 億美元 (比如 30 年期高等級債券)。這筆令人失望的投資現在只佔波克夏淨資產的微不足道的 0.3%，但仍將為我們帶來大約 8000 萬美元的年收入。
The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.
給投資人的教訓：野草會在鮮花盛開的時候枯萎 (The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom.)，這同樣意義重大。隨著時間推移，只需少數勝利就能創造奇蹟。而且，是的，早點開始也有幫助，還能幫助你活到 90 多歲。
The Past Year in Brief
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022,which is in no way unusual:
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022,which is in no way unusual:
波克夏在 2022 年表現不錯。公司調整後的營業利益——我們使用公認會計原則 (GAAP)，不包括持有股票的資本利得——創下了 308 億美元的歷史新高。查理和我專注於這個實際數字，並建議你也這樣做。不過，如果沒有我們的調整，GAAP 數據在每個報告日都會劇烈波動。請注意它在 2022 年的波動，這並不罕見：
Earnings in $ billions
2022 Quarter “Operating Earnings” GAAP Earnings We are Required to Report
1 7.0 5.5
2 9.3 (43.8)
3 7.8 (2.7)
4 6.7 18.2
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
按季甚至按年查看 GAAP 利益具有 100% 的誤導性。可以肯定的是，在過去幾十年裡，資本利得對波克夏來說非常重要，我們預估在未來幾十年裡，資本利得將顯著增加。但是，媒體經常無意識地報導它們每個季度的波動，這完全誤導投資人。
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
波克夏去年的第二個積極進展是我們收購了由喬 · 布蘭登 (Joe Brandon) 擔任董事長的財產意外保險公司 Alleghany Corporation。我過去曾與喬共事，他對波克夏和保險都很了解。Alleghany 為我們帶來特殊的價值，因為波克夏無與倫比的財務實力使其保險子公司能夠採用幾乎所有競爭對手都無法遵循的、有價值且持久的投資策略。
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
在 Alleghany 的幫助下，我們的保險浮存金在 2022 年從 1470 億美元增加到 1640 億美元。透過嚴格的承銷，隨著時間的推移，這些款項有相當大的機會實現零成本。自 1967 年收購第一家財產意外險公司以來，藉由收購、營運和創新，波克夏的浮存金增長 8000 倍。雖然在我們的財務報表中沒有得到證實，但這筆浮存金對波克夏來說是一筆非凡的資產。新股東可以透過閱讀 A-2 文件，看到我們每年更新的浮存金解釋，來了解其價值。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
2022 年，由於波克夏與我們重倉的蘋果、美國運通公司都回購股票，波克夏的每股內在價值略微增長。在波克夏，透過對公司已發行股份的 1.2% 進行回購，我們直接提高了您在我們獨特的持倉組合中的權益。蘋果和美國運通的回購也提高波克夏的持股比例，而我們沒有增加任何成本。
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
這裡的計算並不復雜：當股本數量減少時，您持有的眾多企業中的股權佔比就會增加。如果回購價格低於公司內在價值，那麼每一分錢回購對股東都有益處。當然，若公司以過高價格回購股票，繼續持有的股東會遭受損失。在這種時候，收益只會流向拋售股票的投資人，以及那些熱情推薦愚蠢購買行為但卻收費高昂的投資銀行家。
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
值得強調的是，如果回購價格低於公司內在價值，那麼公司所有股東將全面受益。如果您願意，可以思考下面的例子：一家當地汽車經銷商有三個完全知情的股東，其中一個負責企業管理。進一步想像一下，其中一位消極的股東，希望將他的權益賣回給公司，而且價格對另外兩位繼續持有的股東有吸引力。
交易完成後，是否對任何人的利益造成傷害？經理是否比持續消極的股東更受青睞？公眾是否受到傷害？
When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
當有人告訴你，所有的回購行為都對股東或國家有害，或者對執行長特別有利時，那麼你要不是在聽一個經濟文盲說話，就是在聽一個能言善辯的煽動家說話 (這兩個角色並不互斥)。
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.
波克夏 2022 年的所有營運細節幾乎概述於 K-33 到 K-66 頁上。孟格和我，以及許多波克夏股東，都喜歡仔細研究這部分列出的諸多事實和數據。不過，這幾頁也不是必讀的。波克夏有很多百萬富翁，沒錯，還有一些億萬富豪，他們從來沒有研究過我們的財務數據。
他們只是知道，孟格和我——以及我們的家人和親密的朋友— —繼續在波克夏有大量投資，他們相信我們會像對待自己的錢一樣對待他們的錢。
And that is a promise we can make.
這也是我們可以做出的承諾。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
最後，一個重要的警告：財務報表中的「營運利益」是我們非常關注的，但這些數字很容易經理人操縱，只要他們想要這樣做。通常，執行長、董事和他們的顧問們也認為，這種篡改行為是久經世故的。記者和分析師也把這一行為當做家常便飯。畢竟，打破「預期」也是管理上的一次勝利。
That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
（不過，）這種行為真的很噁心。操縱數字不需要天賦，只需要強烈的欺騙慾望。一位執行官曾對我說，「大膽而富有想像力的會計（Bold imaginative accounting）」已經成為資本主義的恥辱之一。
58 Years – and a Few Figures
In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
1965 年，波克夏還只是一匹「只懂一種戲法的小馬」（即業務組成簡單），擁有一家歷史悠久、但注定要倒閉的新英格蘭紡織企業。隨著這項業務走向死亡，波克夏需要立即有一個新的開始。回過頭來看，我當時遲遲沒有意識到問題的嚴重性。
And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
但隨後，我們就迎來了一次好運：1967 年，國民保險 (National Indemity) 成立，我們將資源轉向保險和其他非紡織業務。
Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
就這樣，我們開啟了通往 2023 年的旅程，這是一條崎嶇坎坷的道路，包括我們所有者不斷的儲蓄（即透過他們的留存收益）、複利的力量、避免重大錯誤，以及最重要——搭上「美國順風」（American Tailwind）。沒有波克夏，美國也會過得不錯。反之則不然。
Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.
現在，波克夏擁有「無與倫比的龐大和多元化業務」的主要所有權。讓我們先看看每天在納斯達克、紐約證券交易所和相關交易場所交易的大約 5000 家上市公司。在這一群體中，有標準普爾 500 指數的成員。標準普爾 500 指數是一個由大型知名美國公司組成的精英集合。
In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022.Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
總體而言，這 500 家上市公司在 2021 年賺了 1.8 萬億美元。目前我還沒有 2022 年的最終數據。因此，使用 2021 年的數據，這 500 家公司中只有 128 家（包括波克夏）賺了 30 億美元或更多。事實上，還有 23 家公司虧損。
At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
截至 2022 年底，波克夏是其中八家巨頭的最大股東：美國運通、美國銀行、雪佛龍、可口可樂、惠普股份、穆迪、西方石油和派拉蒙全球。
In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S.company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
除去 8 家標的外，波克夏還持有伯靈頓北方鐵路運輸公司（簡稱 BNSF）100% 的股份和波克夏能源公司（BHE）92% 的股份，每個公司的獲利都超過上述 30 億美元的標準（BNSF 為 59 億美元，BHE 為 43 億美元）。
如果這兩家公司公開上市，它們將被收錄進那 500 強公司中。總體而言，我們的控股和非控股的 10 家巨頭，使波克夏公司比任何其他美國公司都更廣泛地與本國的經濟未來保持一致。（這一計算不考慮退休基金和投資公司等「信託」業務。）
此外，波克夏的保險業務雖然經由許多單獨管理的子公司進行，但其價值與 BNSF 或波克夏能源相當。
As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.
至於未來，波克夏將始終持有大量現金和美國國債，以及其他各種更加廣泛業務。我們還將避免任何會在關鍵時刻導致現金流緊缺的魯莽行為，哪怕是在金融恐慌和前所未有的保險損失的時刻。
我們的執行長將永遠是風險長——儘管他（她）本不必承擔這項責任。此外，我們未來的執行長將有相當一部分的淨資產收益是用自己的錢購買波克夏股票而獲得的。是的，我們的股東將透過持續的獲得收益，確保儲蓄和繁榮。
At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.
波克夏，不會有終點線。
Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion
in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion
in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.
在截至 2021 年的十年間，美國財政部的稅收為 32.3 萬億美元，而支出卻達到 43.9 萬億美元，出現了嚴重的財政赤字。
Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.
眾多經濟學家、政治家及名人均對財政失衡的現狀發表了自己的看法，但查理和我卻自認對此知之甚少，但我們堅信如此龐大的財政赤字的糟糕的程度或許遠超市場所想。
我們負責管理波克夏的營運和財務，希望公司能長期維持比較高的收益，並在金融風險加劇及全球經濟出現衰退時依舊保持活力。
為了能避免持續高企的通脹問題，波克夏對沖了部分風險，來給投資人們提供一定保護，但這層保護遠非完美，美國財政如此龐大且根深蒂固的赤字會帶來嚴重後果。
The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (34 1⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (8 1⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
根據數據來看，美國財政部的稅收包括個人所得稅（48%）、社會保障和相關收入 (34.5%）、企業所得稅支付 (8.5%） 和各種較小的徵收項目獲得了 32 萬億美元的收人。波克夏公司在這十年間藉由貢獻 320 億美元的所得稅，幾乎為財政部所有收入的千分之一。
And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S.matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
這也意味著，美國僅需 1000 個波克夏實力相當的納稅企業，那麼其他企業和全國 1.31 億個家庭都不需要向聯邦政府支付任何稅收。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:
幾百萬、幾十化、幾萬億——我們都知道這些詞，但往往無法理解所涉及的龐大金額，讓我們給這些數字加上直觀的尺寸。
• If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
如果你把 100 萬美元兌換成新印製的 100 美元鈔票，你會有一疊達到你胸口高度的鈔票。
• Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky.
如果是 10 億美元——這時美元現金可以堆疊至 3/4 英里（約 1207 米）的天空。
• Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.
最後想像 320 億美元，這也是波克夏在 2012 至 2021 年所繳納的所有聯邦所得稅，現在，這堆錢達到了超 21 英里以上（約 3.3 萬米）的高度，大約是商業飛機通常巡航高度的三倍。
When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”
因此，每次涉及到聯邦稅時，波克夏可以毫不含糊地表示「我們給了」。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.
對於波克夏而言，我們希望且期待著在未來十年可以為美國繳納更多稅款，做出更大的貢獻。美國的經濟活力賦能了波克夏取得的所有成功。
I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
我已經做了 80 年的投資，超過美國建國時長的三分之一。儘管我們總是喜歡自我批評和懷疑，但我還沒在任何時候看到長期做空美國是有意義的。
Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner
Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
查理 · 孟格和我的想法很相似，但我往往需要一頁紙來解釋的內容，他卻可以用一句話總結，且邏輯清晰，直抒胸臆。
Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
以下是他的一些想法，很多都是從最近的 Podcast 中截取的：
• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
世界上有很多愚益的賭徒，他們遠不如有耐心的投資人。
• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
當你還未看清世界的本來面目，便只能透過扭曲的鏡頭來判斷。
• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought:Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
我想知道的是我將在哪裡死去，那我永遠不會去那裡。還有一個相關的想法：儘早寫下你想要的訃告——然後據此行事
• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay
irrational and get lousy results.
如果你不關心自己是否理性，你就不會在這方面下功夫。那麼你就會一直不理性，得到最差的結果。
• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one
thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
耐心是可以學習的，擁有長時間的注意力且可以長時間集中於一件事的能力是巨大的優勢。
• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
你可以從死去的人身上學到很多東西，閱讀你所崇拜和厭惡的死者的文章。
• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
如果你能游到一艘適航的船，就不要在下沉的船上跳走。
• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
一個偉大的公司會在你不在之後繼續工作；一個平庸的公司則不會。
• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
華倫和我不關注市場的泡沫，我們一直尋找長期投資機會，並堅持長期持有。
• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
本 · 葛拉漢（Ben Graham）曾說：「從短期看，市場是一台投票機，但從長遠來看，它是一台秤重機。如果你不斷地製造更有價值的東西，那麼一些聰明的人就會注意到它並開始購買，仔細權衡長期價值會比試圖猜測短期熱點更能創造出卓越的業績。」
• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
投資是沒有 100% 的把握，因此，使用槓桿是危險的。一串美妙的數字乘以零，永遠等於零。不要指望一夜暴富。
• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
然而，你不需要擁有很多東西就能致富。
• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes,
you must change.
如果你想成為一個偉大的投資人，你必須不斷學習。當世界發生變化時，你必須改變。
• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
十年來，華倫和我一直痛恨鐵路股，但世界發生了變化，美國終於擁有了四條對美國經濟至關重要的大型鐵路。我們遲遲沒有意識到這一變化，但遲到總比不到好。
• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
最後，我要補充查理的兩句話，這句話是他幾十年來做決定的關鍵：「華倫，多考慮一下吧。你很聰明，但我是對的。」
And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And,
while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.
我和查理通話時，總能學到很多，而且他讓我思考時，也讓我發笑。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade
partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
我會在查理的名單上添加一條我自己的規則：找一個非常聰明的高級合作夥伴——最好比你年長一點，並認真地聽取他的意見。
A Family Gathering in Omaha
Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years,we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.
查理和我真是有點不知羞恥。去年，在我們三年來的第一次股東會上，我們一如既往地以繁忙的商業活動迎接大家。
From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
開市鈴一響，我們就直奔你們的錢包。很快，我們的 See’s Candy 賣掉 11 噸富含營養的花生糖和巧克力。在我們 PT 巴納姆（注：一位著名的大騙子）式的演講裡，我們保證過吃它會長壽。畢竟，除了 See’s Candy，還有什麼可以解釋查理和我能活到 99 歲和 92 歲呢?
I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.
我知道你們迫不及待地想聽去年聚會的細節。
On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 6 1⁄2 of the 9 1⁄2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.
我們從周五中午一直營業到下午 5 點，See’s Candy 店鋪紀錄 2690 筆交易。周六午 7 點到下午 4 點半，See’s Candy 店鋪又記錄了 3931 筆交易，這 9 個半小時裡有 6 個半小時是我們的電影放映和問答時間。
Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.
算一算：See’s Candy 店鋪在黃金時段每分鐘能賣掉 10 批糖果（兩天內累計銷售額達 40 萬美元），101 年以來，消費的模式沒有發生本質變化。在福特 T 型車時代賣 See’s Candy 的方法，今天一樣管用。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha onMay 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
查理、我和整個波克夏公司期待著在 5 月 5 日至 6 日在奧馬哈和你們見面。我們會玩得很開心，相信你也是。
February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2023 年 2 月 25 日 華倫 ·E· 巴菲特 董事長
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巴菲特和蒙格給年輕人的其他建議：
- 量入為出，除了房貸，不要有任何債務；
- 不要總是批評別人，不要用貶低別人的方式表達觀點；
- 不要做不善良的事，善良的人不會沒有朋友；
- 遠離有毒的環境和人，堅持終生學習、要有感恩心態。如果還是不成功，那就是運氣沒到。