Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting
rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously
the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are
calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation
such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years
when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years,
the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
波克夏在2017年淨資產增值653億美元，A類和B類股票的每股帳面價值均增長23%。在過去的53年裡（也就是從現在管理層接手以來），每股帳面價值從19美元增長到211750美元，年複合增長率為19.1%。*
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those
shown for the A shares.
在陳述上述財政事實後，我寧願立即轉向討論波克夏的業務。但是，還不得不說另外一件事，我必須先告訴你們一個新的會計規則：美國通用會計準則（GAAP）在未來的季度和年度報告中將嚴重扭曲波克夏的淨利潤數字，還會經常誤導評論員和投資者。
The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be
included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious
swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks (not including our shares of Kraft
Heinz), and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period.
Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our
operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless.
新規則規定，我們所持有股票的未實現投資收益和虧損的淨變化值必須包括在我們向您報告的所有淨利潤資料中。這一要求將導致我們的美國公認會計準則利潤產生非常劇烈和反復無常的波動。波克夏擁有1700億美元的可交易股（還不包括我們的卡夫亨氏股份），在每個季度報告期內，這些持股的價值可能輕易變動100億美元或甚至更多。在報告的淨利潤中包括如此大的波動，會淹沒能描述我們經營業績的真正重要數字。如果出於分析目的，波克夏的“盈利”將毫無用處。
The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains
(or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases,
we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they – just like our unrealized gains
– fluctuate randomly.
新規則加劇了我們在處理已實現收益（或虧損）方面已經長期存在的溝通問題，因為會計準則已迫使我們將這些損益納入我們的淨收益。在過去的季度和年度報告中，我們經常警告您不要關注這些已實現收益，因為它們 - 就像我們的未實現收益一樣 - 是隨機波動的。
That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying
to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when
our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).
這主要是因為我們會在看上去明智的時候出售證券，而不是因為我們努力以任何方式影響收益。因此，我們有時會在某一時段內，在我們的投資組合表現不佳時報告實質性收益（表現較好也會如此）。
由於有關未實現利得的新規則加重了現行已實現利得規則所造成的扭曲狀況，我們每個季度都需要費勁地解釋這些調整，以便使你們更好地理解我們的資料。但關於財報發佈的電視評論通常是一接收到就轉瞬即過，而報紙頭條幾乎總是關注按照公認會計準則（GAAP）計算的淨盈利年比變化。因此，媒體報導有時候強調的是一些讓讀者或觀眾不必要恐慌或激動的數字。
We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on
Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis
and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday.
Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.
我們試圖減輕這一問題，方法是延續我們的慣例，在股市收盤後的週五晚、或在週六早間發佈財報。那將使你有充足時間作分析，並使專業投資人士有機會在週一市場開盤前發表有見地的評論。不過，我預計那些不懂會計學的股東們還是會大感困惑。
At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on – and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.
在波克夏公司，最重要的是增強我們的常規化每股盈利能力。這一度量標準是我的長期合夥人查理-芒格（Charlie Munger）和我都很關注的，我們希望你們也重視它。我們2017年的成績單如下：
There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on
acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many
and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we
will review 2017 acquisition activity.
有四大板塊提高了波克夏公司的價值：（1）龐大的獨立收購；（2）適合我們已有業務的補強收購；（3）在我們許多不同業務部門的內部銷售增長以及利潤率提高；（4）我們的巨大股票與債券投資組合的投資收益。在這個部分，我們將回顧一下2017年的收購行動。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths;
able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business;
opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
在我們搜尋新的獨立企業時，我們尋找的關鍵品質是持久的競爭力、有能力且高品質的管理團隊、經營業務所需的有形資產淨值具有良好的回報率、內部增長帶來可觀的回報的機會，以及最後一點，合理的收購價格。
That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far
from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic
purchasers.
我們回顧2017年的並購交易時，最後一條幾乎構成了所有交易的障礙，因為一家還不錯、但遠夠不上令人矚目的企業的價格都達到了歷史最高水準。的確，面對一群樂觀的收購者，價格似乎無關緊要。
Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street
analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening
teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life.
為什麼會出現瘋狂收購？部分原因是因為CEO的職位自我選擇了“勇於嘗試者”這一類型。如果華爾街分析師或董事會成員敦促這類CEO考慮可能的收購交易，那就像告訴你家正在成長中的青年人一定要有正常性生活一樣。
Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates
will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate
size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a
haircut.) If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be
forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.
當一位CEO渴望進行交易，他/她絕對不會缺少進行收購的正當理由。屬下們會歡呼，憧憬著擴大業務領域，並期待通常隨著企業規模擴大而提高的薪酬水漲船高。嗅到巨大利潤氣味的投資銀行家也會鼓掌歡迎。（不要問理髮師你需不需要理髮！） 如果目標的歷史表現不足以證明收購是正確的，也會有人預測出很大的“協同效益”。試算表從來不會令人失望。
The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even
a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate
acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion
of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt
dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never
factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.
2017年有充足的、極其低廉的融資可用，這進一步促進了並購活動。畢竟，如果通過債務融資方式進行收購，即使是一筆高價收購交易通常也能推動每股收益數字增長。與之相比，在波克夏，我們是按照全股票交易方式來評價收購交易，因為要知道我們對整體負債的興趣很低，並且我們知道將我們的很大一筆債務分配給任何一家獨立企業，一般都是錯誤的（更不用說某些特定例外狀況，比如說專門用於Clayton‘s公司貸款投資組合的債務，或用於我們受嚴格監管的公用事業企業的固定資產投入的債務。） 而且我們也從不將“協同效益”考慮在內，並且通常也沒有發現有什麼“協同效益”。
Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us
believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years
ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold
it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.
我們對槓桿的厭惡，使過去多年來的收益受到了影響。但查理和我都睡得很香。我們都認為，拿你擁有的東西來冒險以獲得你不需要的東西，這是瘋狂的。我們50年前各自經營著一個由幾個朋友，以及相信我們的親戚投資的投資合夥公司時就是這麼想的。即使現在已有上百萬個“合夥人”加入了我們的波克夏，我們今天還是這麼想的。
Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe that from time to time Berkshire will have
opportunities to make very large purchases. In the meantime, we will stick with our simple guideline: The less the
prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.
儘管我們最近收購寥寥，但查理和我相信，波克夏仍會適時進行大規模採購。 與此同時，我們仍將堅持最簡單的指導原則：其他人處理事務的謹慎程度越低，我們越應該謹慎行事。
************
We were able to make one sensible stand-alone purchase last year, a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying
J (“PFJ”). With about $20 billion in annual volume, the company is far and away the nation’s leading travel-center
operator.
去年，我們做出的明智的獨立決策，就是收購Pilot Flying J（“PFJ”）38.6%的合夥人權益。該公司年銷售額約為200億美元，並且已成為美國國內領先的旅遊運營商。
PFJ has been run from the get-go by the remarkable Haslam family. “Big Jim” Haslam began with a dream
and a gas station 60 years ago. Now his son, Jimmy, manages 27,000 associates at about 750 locations throughout
North America. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest in PFJ to 80% in 2023;
Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%. Berkshire is delighted to be their partner.
PFJ由傑出的Haslam家族運營。Haslam家族在60年前就開始夢想並開設了一家加油站。現在他的兒子吉米管理著整個北美750個地區27000名員工。波克夏與PFJ有一份合同協議，約定在2023年將PFJ的合夥權益增加到80%；Haslam家族成員將擁有剩下的20%。波克夏很高興成為他們的合作夥伴。
When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it’s
been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.
Let’s move now to bolt-on acquisitions. Some of these were small transactions that I will not detail. Here is
an account, however, of a few larger purchases whose closings stretched between late 2016 and early 2018.
Clayton Homes在2017年收購了兩家傳統住宅建築商，這一舉措使我們三年前進入的這一領域的存在份額增加了一倍多。通過收購科羅拉多州的Oakwood Homes和伯明罕的Harris Doyle，我預計2018年住宅建成量將超過10億美元。Clayton的重點仍然是建造房屋，無論是建築還是融資方面。
Clayton’s emphasis, nonetheless, remains manufactured homes, both their construction and their financing.
In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled another 26,706 units to independent
retailers. All told, Clayton accounted for 49% of the manufactured-home market last year. That industry-leading share
– about three times what our nearest competitor did – is a far cry from the 13% Clayton achieved in 2003, the year it
joined Berkshire.
2017年，Clayton通過自己的零售業務銷售了19，168套房屋，並向獨立零售商批發了26，706套房屋。 總而言之，Clayton去年占房屋建造市場的49%。佔據這個行業領先份額 - 大約競爭對手的三倍 - Clayton所取得的成績已遠超2003年剛加入波克夏時的13%。
Both Clayton Homes and PFJ are based in Knoxville, where the Clayton and Haslam families have long been
friends. Kevin Clayton’s comments to the Haslams about the advantages of a Berkshire affiliation, and his admiring
comments about the Haslam family to me, helped cement the PFJ deal.
Clayton Homes和PFJ都位於諾克斯維爾，Clayton和Haslam家族也一直是世交。Kevin Clayton對Haslams關於波克夏附屬企業優勢的評價，以及他對Haslams家族的讚賞都促成了收購PFJ交易的達成。
Near the end of 2016, Shaw Industries, our floor coverings business, acquired U.S. Floors (“USF”), a rapidly
growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF’s managers, Piet Dossche and Philippe Erramuzpe, came out of the gate
fast, delivering a 40% increase in sales in 2017, during which their operation was integrated with Shaw’s. It’s clear
that we acquired both great human assets and business assets in making the USF purchase.
在2016年底前，我們的地板鋪裝業務Shaw Industries公司收購了美國地板公司（U.S． Floors “USF”），這是一家快速增長的豪華乙烯基磚分銷商。USF的經理人Piet Dossche和Philippe Erramuzpe使該公司2017年銷售額增長了40%，在此期間，他們的業務與Shaw‘s整合在一起。 很顯然，我們在購買USF時獲得了巨大的人力資產和商業資產。
Vance Bell, Shaw’s CEO, originated, negotiated and completed this acquisition, which increased Shaw’s
sales to $5.7 billion in 2017 and its employment to 22,000. With the purchase of USF, Shaw has substantially
strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire.
Shaw的首席執行官Vance Bell最初提議並談判完成了此次收購，該收購將Shaw的銷售額在2017年增加至57億美元，其就業人數增至22，000人。收購USF後，Shaw大大加強了其作為波克夏的重要和持久收入來源的地位。
I have told you several times about HomeServices, our growing real estate brokerage operation. Berkshire
backed into this business in 2000 when we acquired a majority interest in MidAmerican Energy (now named Berkshire
Hathaway Energy). MidAmerican’s activities were then largely in the electric utility field, and I originally paid little
attention to HomeServices.
我已多次向您介紹了Home Services，也就是我們不斷增長的房地產經紀業務。波克夏在2000年通過收購MidAmerican Energy（現稱為波克夏·海瑟威能源公司）的多數股權進入該領域。當時MidAmerican主要經營範圍是電力領域，而我最初也很少關注Home Services。
但是，該公司每年都增加經紀人，到2016年底HomeServices已擁有美國第二大的經紀業務部門，儘管如此它仍遠遠落後于領導者Realogy。然而，在2017年HomeServices出現爆炸式增長。我們收購了業內第三大運營商Long和Foster，以及第12大的Houlihan Lawrence以及Gloria Nilson。
With those purchases we added 12,300 agents, raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices is now close to
leading the country in home sales, having participated (including our three acquisitions pro-forma) in $127 billion of
“sides” during 2017. To explain that term, there are two “sides” to every transaction; if we represent both buyer and
seller, the dollar value of the transaction is counted twice.
通過這些採購，我們增加了12，300名代理，將總數提高到40，950。HomeServices現在已接近在全國房屋銷售額中領先，正參與1270億美元的“雙邊”銷售（其中包括我們上述三次收購的試算額）。需要解釋一下這個術語，每次交易都有兩方。如果我們既代表買方也代理賣方，那麼交易的美元價值將計算兩次。
Despite its recent acquisitions, HomeServices is on track to do only about 3% of the country’s homebrokerage
business in 2018. That leaves 97% to go. Given sensible prices, we will keep adding brokers in this most
fundamental of businesses.
儘管最近進行了多次收購，但HomeServices在2018年仍只可能完成全美約3%的房屋經紀業務。這就讓97%溜走了。鑒於合理的價格，我們將繼續增加經紀人，他們是業務的根本。
Finally, Precision Castparts, a company built through acquisitions, bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a
German maker of corrosion resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Please allow me to skip a further
explanation. I don’t understand manufacturing operations as well as I do the activities of real estate brokers, home
builders or truck stops.
最後，本身通過收購建立的公司Precision Castparts（精密鑄件），收購了德國耐腐蝕配件、管道系統和元件製造商Wilhelm Schulz GmbH，請允許我略過作出進一步的說明。我不瞭解製造業務，也不瞭解房地產經紀人的活動，也不知曉房屋建築或卡車休息站。
Fortunately, I don’t need in this instance to bring knowledge to the table: Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision,
is an extraordinary manufacturing executive, and any business in his domain is slated to do well. Betting on people
can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets.
幸運的是，在這種情況下，我不需要奉獻出自己的知識：Precision Castparts的首席執行官Mark Donegan是一位出色的製造業高管，他通曉領域的任何業務都運行良好。對人下注有時可能比投注實物資產帶來更大的確定。
Let’s now move on to operations, beginning with property-casualty (“p/c”) insurance, a business I do
understand and the engine that for 51 years has powered Berkshire’s growth.
保險
Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, let me remind you of how and why we entered the field. We
began by purchasing National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for $8.6 million in early 1967. With our
purchase we received $6.7 million of tangible net worth that, by the nature of the insurance business, we were able to
deploy in marketable securities. It was easy to rearrange the portfolio into securities we would otherwise have owned at
Berkshire itself. In effect, we were “trading dollars” for the net worth portion of the cost.
在我討論2017年的保險業績之前，讓我告訴你們我們如何以及為什麼要進入這一領域。我們最初是在1967年初以860萬美元收購了National Indemnity和一家較小的姐妹公司。通過收購我們獲得了670萬美元有形淨資產，由於保險業務的天然特點，我們能將這些投入有價證券中。將這一投資組合重新部署到證券，與波克夏自己擁有這些證券相比要容易得多。實際上，我們是將成本的淨值部分進行“美元交易”。
The $1.9 million premium over net worth that Berkshire paid brought us an insurance business that usually
delivered an underwriting profit. Even more important, the insurance operation carried with it $19.4 million of “float”
– money that belonged to others but was held by our two insurers.
波克夏所支付的淨資產之上的190萬美元溢價為我們帶來了一份通常將產生承保收益的保險業務。更重要的是，保險業務帶來了1940萬美元的“浮存金”，即屬於他人但由我們的兩家保險公司持有的錢。
Ever since, float has been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends,
interest and gains from their deployment belong to Berkshire. (If we experience investment losses, those, of course,
are on our tab as well.)
從那以後，浮存金對波克夏來說就非常重要。當我們投資這些資金時，我們投資的所有股息，利息和收益都屬於波克夏。 （當然，如果我們遭遇投資虧損，也會記在我們的帳簿上。）
Float materializes at p/c insurers in several ways: (1) Premiums are generally paid to the company upfront
whereas losses occur over the life of the policy, usually a six-month or one-year period; (2) Though some losses, such
as car repairs, are quickly paid, others – such as the harm caused by exposure to asbestos – may take many years to
surface and even longer to evaluate and settle; (3) Loss payments are sometimes spread over decades in cases, say, of
a person employed by one of our workers’ compensation policyholders being permanently injured and thereafter
requiring expensive lifetime care.
財產和傷亡保險的浮存特性體現在幾個方面：（1）保費通常是先付給公司，而損失發生在保單的有效期內，通常是六個月或一年的期限； （2）雖然有些理賠，例如汽車修理，很快就要付錢，但是其他的，比如石棉曝險造成的危害 - 可能需要很多年才能浮現，以及更長的時間來評估和解決； （3）保險賠付有時分佈在數十年的時間內，比如我們工人的保單持有人之一所雇傭的一名工人受到永久性傷害，此後需要昂貴的終身護理。
Float generally grows as premium volume increases. Additionally, certain p/c insurers specialize in lines of
business such as medical malpractice or product liability – business labeled “long-tail” in industry jargon – that
generate far more float than, say, auto collision and homeowner policies, which require insurers to almost immediately
make payments to claimants for needed repairs.
浮存金通常隨著保險金的增加而增長。此外，某些專注於醫療事故或產品責任等業務—行話叫做“長尾”的業務—的特定P/C保險商獲得的浮存金通常更多，比方說車禍保險與住宅綜合保險，這些險種要求保險商幾乎立即向索賠者支付維修款項。
Berkshire has been a leader in long-tail business for many years. In particular, we have specialized in jumbo
reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other p/c insurers. As a result of our
emphasizing that sort of business, Berkshire’s growth in float has been extraordinary. We are now the country’s second
largest p/c company measured by premium volume and its leader, by far, in float.
波克夏多年以來都是長尾業務領域的領導者。尤為特別的是，我們專業從事大型再保險業務，使我們承擔其他P/C保險商已產生了的長尾損失。作為我們著重此類業務的結果，波克夏的浮存金增長一直都很出色。按保險金額計算，我們現在是美國第二大P/C保險企業；而按照浮存金計算，我們是遠超第二名的榜首。
Here’s the record: (in $ millions)
以下是紀錄數位： （單位：百萬美元）
Yeart年份 Premium Volume保險金 Floa 浮存金
1970 $ 39 $ 39
1980 185 237
1990 582 1632
2000 19343 27871
2010 30749 65832
2017 60597 114500
Our 2017 volume was boosted by a huge deal in which we reinsured up to $20 billion of long-tail losses that
AIG had incurred. Our premium for this policy was $10.2 billion, a world’s record and one we won’t come close to
repeating. Premium volume will therefore fall somewhat in 2018.
2017年，一筆大額交易使上述數位大幅攀升。這筆交易使我們承擔了AIG公司產生的200億美元損失的再保險。我們這筆保險的保險金為102億美元，創世界最高紀錄，我們幾乎不可能複製這一交易。因此，2018年的保險金總額可能會有所下降。
Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will
be modest – at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender
options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of
widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment
decisions.
至少未來幾年內的浮存金增長可能會放緩。當我們最終經歷下降時，其降幅將是溫和的，任何一年最多為3%左右。與銀行存款保險或人壽保險中包含退保權不同，P/C浮存金不可撤銷。這就意味著P/C保險公司在金融緊張時期不會出現大規模“資金出逃”，這是波克夏最重要的特點，我們將其納入投資決定的考慮因素之中。
Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even
that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having
Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines
or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably
withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.
查理與我絕不會依賴陌生人的好心來運營波克夏，甚至朋友的善意也不行，因為他們也會面臨自己的流動性問題。在2008至2009年危機當中，我們喜歡持有短期國債，大量的短期國債，這樣使我們不必依賴銀行或商業票據等融資來源。我們特意將波克夏建設得能從容應對經濟不穩定局面，包括這種市場長期關閉的極端局面。
************
The downside of float is that it comes with risk, sometimes oceans of risk. What looks predictable in insurance
can be anything but. Take the famous Lloyds insurance market, which produced decent results for three centuries. In
the 1980’s, though, huge latent problems from a few long-tail lines of insurance surfaced at Lloyds and, for a time,
threatened to destroy its storied operation. (It has, I should add, fully recovered.)
浮存金的消極面是有風險，有時候有巨大風險。保險中看起來可預測的東西都會出現萬一。舉著名的勞埃德(3.8, 0.00, 0.00%)保險市場為例，該公司在300年的時間裡都創造了輝煌業績。但在1980年代，勞埃德的幾個長尾保險業務出現了巨大的隱藏問題，一度使這個傳奇性的公司幾乎面臨滅頂之災。（我應該補充的是，它確實已全面恢復了元氣。）
Berkshire’s insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, who operate in a culture that has
long prioritized those qualities. That disciplined behavior has produced underwriting profits in most years, and in such
instances, our cost of float was less than zero. In effect, we got paid then for holding the huge sums tallied in the
earlier table.
波克夏的保險經理是保守與細緻的核保人，他們在長期注重品質的文化中進行運營。守紀律的行為在大多數年份裡創造了保險盈利，在這種情況下，我們的浮存金成本比零還要低。實際上，我們因為持有上述表格中的巨額資金而獲得收益。
I have warned you, however, that we have been fortunate in recent years and that the catastrophe-light period
the industry was experiencing was not a new norm. Last September drove home that point, as three significant
hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico.
不過，我向你們發出過警告，最近幾年以來我們很走運，但保險行業經歷的大災較少期並不是新常態。去年9月就被打回了原形，當時三場巨大的風暴襲擊了德克薩斯州、佛羅里達州與波多黎各。
My guess at this time is that the insured losses arising from the hurricanes are $100 billion or so. That figure,
however, could be far off the mark. The pattern with most mega-catastrophes has been that initial loss estimates ran
low. As well-known analyst V.J. Dowling has pointed out, the loss reserves of an insurer are similar to a self-graded
exam. Ignorance, wishful thinking or, occasionally, downright fraud can deliver inaccurate figures about an insurer’s
financial condition for a very long time.
我推測颶風造成的保險損失為1000億美元左右。然而，這個數字可能遠遠不夠。每個巨大災難最初的損失預估總是很低。正如著名分析師V． J． Dowling指出的，保險公司的虧損儲備類似於自考自評。忽視，一廂情願的想法或偶爾存在的徹頭徹尾欺詐都可能在很長一段時間內產出有關保險公司財務狀況的不準確資料。
We currently estimate Berkshire’s losses from the three hurricanes to be $3 billion (or about $2 billion after
tax). If both that estimate and my industry estimate of $100 billion are close to accurate, our share of the industry loss
was about 3%. I believe that percentage is also what we may reasonably expect to be our share of losses in future
American mega-cats.
我們目前估計，三次颶風對波克夏造成的損失約為30億美元（或稅後約20億美元）。如果這個預估和我對整個行業1000億美元的損失預估被證實接近準確的話，那麼我們在行業損失中所占的份額約為3%。我相信這個比例也是我們在未來美國重大災害中損失份額的合理預期。
It’s worth noting that the $2 billion net cost from the three hurricanes reduced Berkshire’s GAAP net worth
by less than 1%. Elsewhere in the reinsurance industry there were many companies that suffered losses in net worth
ranging from 7% to more than 15%. The damage to them could have been far worse: Had Hurricane Irma followed a
path through Florida only a bit to the east, insured losses might well have been an additional $100 billion.
值得注意的是，三場颶風造成的20億美元淨損失只導致波克夏的GAAP淨值降低了不到1%。在再保險行業的其他領域，許多公司的淨資產損失率從7%到15%以上不等。這些公司遭受的損失本來可能會更大：如果Irma颶風再往佛羅里達向東行進一點，那麼投保損失很可能會額外增加1000億美元。
We believe that the annual probability of a U.S. mega-catastrophe causing $400 billion or more of insured
losses is about 2%. No one, of course, knows the correct probability. We do know, however, that the risk increases
over time because of growth in both the number and value of structures located in catastrophe-vulnerable areas.
我們認為，每年發生能引發4000億美元或更多保險賠償的巨大災害的概率約為2%。當然，沒有人能準確知道正確的概率。但是，我們應該瞭解，隨著時間推移，風險會隨著災難脆弱地區的房屋數量和價值的增長而增加。
No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a $400 billion mega-cat. Our share
of such a loss might be $12 billion or so, an amount far below the annual earnings we expect from our non-insurance
activities. Concurrently, much – indeed, perhaps most – of the p/c world would be out of business. Our unparalleled
financial strength explains why other p/c insurers come to Berkshire – and only Berkshire – when they, themselves,
need to purchase huge reinsurance coverages for large payments they may have to make in the far future.
沒有哪家公司可以像波克夏一樣做好對4000億美元級損失大災害的財務準備。我們在這種損失中的份額可能達到120億美元左右，遠低於我們對非保險業務所期望的年收入。與此同時，許多的也許是大部分的財險和傷亡險公司將會因此破產。我們無與倫比的財務實力解釋了為什麼，其他保險公司選擇到波克夏 - 而且只能是波克夏 – 來購買大額再保險，以應對很遠的未來自己可能不得不支付的大額賠償。
Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits, which totaled $28.3
billion pre-tax. I have regularly told you that I expect Berkshire to attain an underwriting profit in a majority of years,
but also to experience losses from time to time. My warning became fact in 2017, as we lost $3.2 billion pre-tax from
underwriting.
在2017年之前，波克夏連續錄得14年的承保盈利，總計達稅前283億美元。我經常說，我希望波克夏能在大多數年份獲得承保盈利，但也會不時遭受損失。我的警告在2017年成為事實，2017年保險承保業務稅前虧損了32億美元。
A large amount of additional information about our various insurance operations is included in the 10-K at
the back of this report. The only point I will add here is that you have some extraordinary managers working for you
at our various p/c operations. This is a business in which there are no trade secrets, patents, or locational advantages.
What counts are brains and capital. The managers of our various insurance companies supply the brains and Berkshire
provides the capital.
本報告後的10-K部分包含了大量關於我們各種保險業務的額外資訊。我在這裡補充的唯一一點是，在我們的各種財險/傷亡險業務中有一些非凡的經理為您工作。這是一個沒有商業秘密、專利或地理位置優勢的行業。
************
For many years, this letter has described the activities of Berkshire’s many other businesses. That discussion
has become both repetitious and partially duplicative of information regularly included in the 10-K that follows the
letter. Consequently, this year I will give you a simple summary of our dozens of non-insurance businesses. Additional
details can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-50.
重要的還是人才和資本。我們各類保險公司的經理們提供了聰明才智，而波克夏提供了資金。多年來，這封信描述了波克夏許多其他企業的活動。有一些資訊會和10-K中包含的資訊重複或部分重複。因此，今年我只會給你簡單介紹一下我們的幾十家非保險公司。更多的詳細資訊請參見K-5至K-22頁和K-40至K-50頁。
Viewed as a group – and excluding investment income – our operations other than insurance delivered pretax
income of $20 billion in 2017, an increase of $950 million over 2016. About 44% of the 2017 profit came from two
subsidiaries. BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (of which we own 90.2%). You can read more
about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-44.
作為一個集團（不包括投資收入），2017年我們保險業務之外運營的稅前盈利為200億美元，比2016年增加了9.5億美元。2017年約44%的利潤來自兩家子公司。BNSF（伯靈頓北聖達菲公司）和波克夏·海瑟威能源公司（我們擁有後者90.2%的股份）。您可以在K-5至K-10頁和K-40至K-44頁上查閱有關這些業務的更多資訊。
Proceeding down Berkshire’s long list of subsidiaries, our next five non-insurance businesses, as ranked by
earnings (but presented here alphabetically) Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol,
Marmon and Precision Castparts had aggregate pre-tax income in 2017 of $5.5 billion, little changed from the $5.4
billion these companies earned in 2016.
在波克夏長長的依據利潤排列的子公司名單的最前面，是我們保險領域之外的最大五家公司（但它們是按照首字母順序排列的）：Clayton Homes（克萊頓房屋）、International Metalworking、Lubrizol（路博潤(1.43, 0.00, 0.00%)）、Marmon（瑪蒙）和Precision Castparts（精密鑄件），它們在2017年實現稅前總盈利55億美元，與這些公司在2016年獲得的54億美元稅前總利潤相比幾乎沒有變化。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.1
billion last year, up from $1.7 billion in 2016.
接下來的五家公司是Forest River， Johns Manville， MiTek， Shaw和TTI，它們的排列方式與前五類似，去年的總利潤為21億美元，高於2016年的17億美元。
The remaining businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – recorded little change in pre-tax
income, which was $3.7 billion in 2017 versus $3.5 billion in 2016.
剩下的波克夏所擁有的其他業務 - 還有很多 - 但是稅前利潤變化並不大，2017年為37億美元，而2016年為35億美元。
Depreciation charges for all of these non-insurance operations totaled $7.6 billion; capital expenditures were
$11.5 billion. Berkshire is always looking for ways to expand its businesses and regularly incurs capital expenditures
that far exceed its depreciation charge. Almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America’s
economic soil remains fertile.
所有這些非保險業務的折舊開支總計為76億美元，資本支出是115億美元。波克夏一直在尋找拓展業務的方式，並定期招致遠超折舊費用的資本支出。我們接近90%的投資都是在美國進行的。美國的經濟土壤仍然肥沃。
Amortization charges were an additional $1.3 billion. I believe that in large part this item is not a true
economic cost. Partially offsetting this good news is the fact that BNSF (like all other railroads) records depreciation
charges that fall well short of the sums regularly needed to keep the railroad in first-class shape.
攤銷費用為另外的13億美元。我相信這個專案在很大程度上並不是真的經濟成本。部分抵消這個好消息是BNSF（伯靈頓北聖達菲公司）所認列的折舊費用，就像所有其他的鐵路運營商一樣，明顯低於足以保持鐵路一流規格所需的水準。
Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we
will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held
$116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills (whose average maturity was 88 days), up from $86.4 billion at yearend
2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to
have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets.
波克夏的目標是顯著提高非保險業務的利潤。為實現這一點，我們將需要進行一次或多次大規模的收購。我們當然有資源這樣做。截至去年底波克夏持有1160億美元的現金和美國短期國債（其平均到期日為88天），高於截至2016年底的864億美元。這種非凡的流動性只有微薄收益，遠超出查理和我希望波克夏所擁有的水準。如果我們能將波克夏的過多資金部署到更具增長性的資產中，我們將笑得更開心。
Investments
投資
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude
our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must
account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at
a GAAP figure of $17.6 billion. The shares had a yearend market value of $25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.
下面我們列出了截至去年底市值最高的15大普通股投資。我們排除了卡夫亨氏的持股 - 325，442，152股 - 因為波克夏只是控股集團的一部分，因此必須以“權益法”考量這一投資。在卡夫亨氏的資產負債表上，波克夏所持卡夫亨氏股份的GAAP價值為176億美元。這些股票的年終市值為253億美元，成本基礎為98億美元。
|
|
|
|
|
12/31/16 |
| Shares* |
Company |
|
|
Percentage of Company
Owned |
Cost** |
Market |
|
|
|
|
(dollars in millions) |
| 151,610,700 |
American Express
Company |
17.6 |
$1,287 |
$15,056 |
| 166,713,209 |
Apple Inc. |
3.3 |
20,961 |
28,213 |
| 700,000,000 |
Bank of America
Corporation |
6.8 |
5,007 |
20,664 |
| 53,307,534 |
The Bank of New York
Mellon Corporation . |
5.3 |
2,230 |
2,871 |
| 225,000,000 |
BYD Company Ltd |
8.2 |
232 |
1,961 |
| 6,789,054 |
Charter
Communications, Inc. |
2.8 |
1,210 |
2,281 |
| 400,000,000 |
The Coca-Cola Company
. |
9.4 |
1,299 |
18,352 |
| 53,110,395 |
Delta Airlines Inc. |
7.4 |
2,219 |
2,974 |
| 44,527,147 |
General Motors Company |
3.2 |
1,343 |
1,825 |
| 11,390,582 |
The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc. |
3 |
654 |
2,902 |
| 24,669,778 |
Moody’s Corporation |
12.9 |
248 |
3,642 |
| 74,587,892 |
Phillips 66 |
14.9 |
5,841 |
7,545 |
| 47,659,456 |
Southwest Airlines Co |
8.1 |
1,997 |
3,119 |
| 103,855,045 |
U.S. Bancorp |
6.3 |
3,343 |
5,565 |
| 482,544,468 |
Wells Fargo &
Company |
9.9 |
11,837 |
29,276 |
|
Others |
|
14,968 |
24,294 |
|
Total Common Stocks
Carried at Market |
|
74,676 |
170,540 |
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
* 不包括波克夏子公司的養老基金所持有的股份。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of
write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** 這是我們的實際購買價格，也是我們的計稅基礎，GAAP“成本”在少數幾種情況下將有所差異，原因是GAAP規則下所要求的減記。
Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with
me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me, manages more than $12 billion; I usually learn
about decisions they have made by looking at monthly portfolio summaries. Included in the $25 billion that the two
manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments
are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.
表格中的某些股票，要麼由陶德-寇姆斯（Todd Combs）負責，要麼由泰德-韋施勒（Ted Weschler）負責，他們與我一同管理波克夏的投資。二人都獨立於我，每人管理的資金均超過120億美元。我通常是在查看每月投資組合總結時才知道他們作出的決定。在二人管理的250億美元資金當中，包括波克夏某些附屬公司超過80億美元的養老金信託資產。如前文所述，養老金投資並不包括在前面的波克夏控股公司的財務報表中。
************
Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker
symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media
pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be)
our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register
will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent
results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.
查理和我認為波克夏持有的可交易普通股是一種商業利益，而不是根據其“圖表”的形態、分析師的“目標”價或媒體專家的意見而進行買賣的股票代碼。相反，我們簡單地認為，如果投資物件的業務成功（我們相信大多數投資物件都會成功），我們的投資就也會成功。有時候我們的投資回報微薄，偶爾我們的投入會獲得巨大回報，有時候我會犯一些代價昂貴的錯誤。從整體而言，長期來看，我們會收穫體面的結果。在美國，股市投資者都是順心如意的。
From our stock portfolio – call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned
businesses – Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures,
as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports.
從我們的股票投資組合—我們持有的股票可謂是多元化上市企業集團中的“少數股權”—來看，波克夏2017年獲得了37億美元分紅。這一數位已計入我們的GAAP資料，並記錄在我們的季度與年度報告中的“運營盈利”專案中。
That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For
decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect
undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains.
不過分紅數字遠遠低估了源於我們所持有股票的“真正”盈利。數十年來，我們在自己的“股東相關的企業原則（Owner-Related Business Principles）”第六條（第19頁）中已闡明：我們希望我們投資物件的未分配盈利至少能通過隨後資本收益的方式向我們提供等價物。
Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP
rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the
earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into
commensurate capital gains for Berkshire.
我們對資本收益（或虧損）的確認將是粗略的，尤其是在我們遵守新的GAAP規則，要求我們不斷在盈利中計入未實現收益或者損失時。不過我確信，我們的投資物件—將所有投資物件視為一個集團的話，他們的留存盈利將隨著時間推移，轉化為波克夏的等量資本收益。
The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in
the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value.
Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine;
in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”
我剛剛描述的這種價值增長與留存盈利的關聯，在短期內是不可能察覺得到的。股票大漲令人興奮，似乎脫離了年復一年的潛在價值增長。但從長期來看，本-格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）膾炙人口的格言確是真話：“短期內市場是個投票機，但在長期內它就變成了一台稱重機。”
************
Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure longterm
growth in value. For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting
compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four
truly major dips. Here are the gory details:
波克夏公司本身就極好地說明了短期的價格隨機波動，可能掩蓋長期的價值增長。在過去的53年當中，波克夏通過將盈利進行再投資並讓其產生複利的方式創造了奇跡。年復一年，我們砥礪前行。但是，波克夏股票仍然經歷了4次重挫，以下就是慘案的細節：
Period時期 High最高股價 Low Percentage Decrease最低 Percentage Decrease跌幅
1973.1月至1975.1 93 38 (59.1%)
1987.10.2至10.27 4250 2675 (37.1%)
1998.6.19至2000.3.10 80900 41300 (48.9%)
2008.9.19至2009.3.5 147000 72400 (50.7%)
This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks.
There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your
positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines
and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.
這個表格為我反對借錢炒股提供了最有力的論據。因為完全無法預測短期內股票會跌到什麼程度。即使你借的錢很少，你的倉位也沒有受到市場下挫的直接威脅，但你的頭腦也許會受到恐怖的媒體頭條與令人窒息評論的影響，從而驚慌失措。一旦心無靜氣，你就很難作出好的決定。
In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one
can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow.
在接下來的53年裡，我們的股票（以及其他公司股票）還將經歷表格中出現的類似暴跌。不過沒有人能告訴你這會在什麼時候發生。就像紅綠燈有時會直接從綠燈變為紅燈而不會出現黃燈過渡。
When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped
by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If:
然而，如果出現大幅下滑，他們將為那些沒有債務負擔的人提供非凡的機會。現在是時候聽一下Kipling的If這首歌了：
“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . .
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting . . .
If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim . . .
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you...
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it.”
“如果所有人都失去理智，你仍能保持頭腦清醒；
如果你能等待，不要因此厭煩，
如果你是個愛思考的人—光想會達不到目標；
如果所有人都懷疑你，你仍能堅信自己，讓所有的懷疑動搖；
你就可以擁有一個世界，這個世界的一切都是你的。”
“打賭”已結束，並且給我們上了一堂很有價值的投資課程
“The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson
Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007.
(The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 – 26.) Now I have the final tally – and, in
several respects, it’s an eye-opener.
去年，十年賭注進行到90%。在去年年度報告的第24 - 26頁我已對2007年12月19日開始的賭博進行了詳細介紹。現在，賭博已結束。我有了最後的結論，某些方面，這讓我大開眼界。
I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum
that – if things turned out as I expected – would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to
publicize my conviction that my pick – a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund – would,
over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and
incentivized those “helpers” may be.
我之所以下注有兩個原因：（1）將我的318，250美元支出實現較大數額回報 - 如果事情按我的預期發展 - 將在2018年初分給奧馬哈的Girls公司； （2）宣傳我的信念，即我的選擇 – 近乎無手續費的標準普爾500指數基金進行投資 - 隨著時間的推移，將會取得比大多數投資專業人士更好的回報。
Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to
advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s
worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays?
這個問題是非常重要的。美國投資者每年向投資經理支付數目驚人的金錢，還往往會招致很多後續費用。總的來說，這些投資者是否能使他們的資金獲得價值？投資者是否真正能從支出獲得任何回報？
Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform
the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge
funds.
作為我的投資對賭對手，Protégé Partners選擇了五隻“基金中的基金”，並預計它將超過標準普爾500指數。這不是特例。這五檔基金中的基金涵蓋了超過200個對沖基金。
Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts
who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This
assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence.
從本質上講，Protégé作為一家對華爾街十分熟悉的諮詢公司，它選擇了五位投資專家，後者又聘請了數百名投資專家，每位投資專家管理著他或她自己的對沖基金。這個組合是一個精英團隊，充滿了才智，激情和自信。
The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could – and did – rearrange
their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge
funds whose managers had lost their touch.
五個基金中的基金的管理人員還擁有另一個優勢：他們可以 - 也確實可以 - 在十年內重組他們的對沖基金投資組合，投資新的“明星基金”，同時退出那些表現欠佳的對沖基金。
Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund
managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves
upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500
exceeded loss years.)
Protégé的每一位經理都獲得很多激勵：基金的基金經理和對沖基金經理，都可以獲得很大的收益，即使這些是因為市場總體向上而獲得的收益。（自從我們掌控波克夏以來的43年裡，標普500指數的上漲年份遠超下跌年份。）
Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the
funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because
fixed fees averaging a staggering 21⁄2% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part
of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the
underlying hedge funds.
應該強調的是，這些業績激勵是一個巨大而美味的蛋糕：即使這些基金在這十年中造成了投資者資金損失，他們的管理人員卻仍然會變得非常富有。因為這些基金每年要向投資者收取大約占2.5%的固定手續費，其中一部分費用給了基金中的基金的五個經理，剩下的給了對沖基金那200多位經理。
Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:
以下就是這場賭博的最終結果：
| Year |
|
Fund-of-Funds A |
|
Fund-of-Funds B |
|
Fund-of-Funds C |
|
Fund-of-Funds D |
|
Fund-of-Funds E |
|
S&P
Index Fund |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2008 |
|
-16.50% |
|
-22.30% |
|
-21.30% |
|
-29.30% |
|
30.10% |
|
-37.00% |
| 2009 |
|
11.30% |
|
14.50% |
|
21.40% |
|
16.50% |
|
16.80% |
|
26.60% |
| 2010 |
|
5.90% |
|
6.80% |
|
13.30% |
|
4.90% |
|
11.90% |
|
15.10% |
| 2011 |
|
-6.30% |
|
-1.30% |
|
5.90% |
|
-6.30% |
|
-2.80% |
|
2.10% |
| 2012 |
|
3.40% |
|
9.60% |
|
5.70% |
|
6.20% |
|
9.10% |
|
16.00% |
| 2013 |
|
10.50% |
|
15.20% |
|
8.80% |
|
14.20% |
|
14.40% |
|
32.30% |
| 2014 |
|
4.70% |
|
4.00% |
|
18.90% |
|
0.70% |
|
-2.10% |
|
13.60% |
| 2015 |
|
1.60% |
|
2.50% |
|
5.40% |
|
1.40% |
|
-5.00% |
|
1.40% |
| 2016 |
|
-3.20% |
|
1.90% |
|
-1.70% |
|
2.50% |
|
4.40% |
|
11.90% |
| 2017 |
|
12.20% |
|
10.60% |
|
15.60% |
|
N/A |
|
18.00% |
|
21.80% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Final Gain |
21.70% |
|
42.30% |
|
87.70% |
|
2.80% |
|
27.00% |
|
125.80% |
| Average Annual Gain |
2.00% |
|
3.60% |
|
6.50% |
|
0.30% |
|
2.40% |
|
8.50% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly
disclosed. I, however, have received their annual audits from Protégé. The 2016 figures for funds A, B
and C were revised slightly from those originally reported last year. Fund D was liquidated in 2017; its
average annual gain is calculated for the nine years of its operation.
注：根據我與Protégé Partners的協定，這些基金中的基金的名字是不能向公眾披露的。我從Protégé處獲得了這些基金的年度審計。基金A、B與C的2016年資料被小幅修正。而基金D在2017年被清算，它的年度增長率是根據九年運營時間計算得出。
The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In
every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund.
這五檔基金中的基金開端良好，在2008年都跑贏了指數基金，然後房子就塌了。在隨後的九年裡，這五檔基金做為一個整體，每年都落後於指數基金。
Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch.
If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their
guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that
environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group
prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade.
我要強調的是，在這十年期間，市場行為並沒有任何異常之處。如果在2007年底對投資“專家們”進行調查，問他們普通股的長期回報率是多少，他們的答案很可能接近8.5%，即標準普爾500指數的實際表現。在當時的環境下，賺錢應該是很容易的。事實上，華爾街的專家賺取了巨大的利潤。雖然這個群體賺錢了，但投資他們的人經歷了一個“失落的十年”。
Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.
業績有好有壞，但手續費永遠不變。
************
The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they
occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in
economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an
ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look
unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential.
這次打賭讓我們得到另一個重要的教訓。雖然市場通常是理性的，但偶爾也會變得瘋狂。抓住市場機會並不需要大智慧，不需要經濟學學位或熟悉華爾街的術語，比如alpha與beta。投資者真正需要的是不要理睬大眾的恐懼與貪婪，而要把注意力集中在幾個簡單的基本面上。願意被其它人在很長時間裡認為沒有想像力，甚至愚蠢也是必要的。
Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate $1 million prize by purchasing $500,000
face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us $318,250 –
a bit less than 64¢ on the dollar – with the $500,000 payable in ten years.
最初，Protégé和我均購買了面值50萬美元的零息國債，因為打了6.4拆，相當於我們每個人只花了318250美元，十年來這些國債便會按50萬美元兌現。
As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were
purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than
tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.
這些國債沒利息，但當時是打折賣的，如果持有到期，相當於年回報率為4.56%。Protégé和我當時沒有考慮太多，只是想在2017年底到期後，將這100萬美元交給獲勝的慈善機構。
After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012,
our bonds – now with about five years to go before they matured – were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that
price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%.
然而，在我們購買之後，債券市場發生了一些非常奇怪的事情。 到2012年11月，我們的債券 - 現在仍需要大約五年時間才能到期 – 按照票面價值的95.7%銷售。以這個價格，他們的年度到期收益率不到1%。或者，確切地說，是0.88%。
Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb – a really dumb – investment compared to
American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 – which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately
weighted by market value – has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth).
考慮到可憐的回報，尤其是與美國股票相比，我們的債券已變成了一種愚蠢 - 真正愚蠢的投資。隨著時間的推移，反映美國企業走向的標準普爾500指數，按照市場價值進行適當加權，每股收益（淨值）的年收益率遠超過10%。
In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 21⁄2%
annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow.
Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their
retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would,
over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And – as has been the case since 1776 – whatever its problems of
the minute, the American economy was going to move forward.
2012年11月，我們考慮到標準普爾500股息的現金回報率為每年2.5%，約為美國國債收益率的三倍。而且這些股息幾乎肯定會增長。除此之外，很多標普500公司都保留了巨額資金。這些企業可利用其留存的現金擴大業務範圍，或回購其股份。隨著時間推移，任何一種方式都會大幅提高每股收益。而且 - 從1776年以後的情況來看 - 不管現在的問題如何，美國經濟都會向前發展。
Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and
I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares.
The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving $2,222,279 last month rather than the $1 million it had originally
hoped for.
2012年晚些時候由於債券和股票之間的估值錯配，Protégé和我同意出售我們五年前購買的債券，並用所得款項購買11200股波克夏“B”股。結果就是奧馬哈的Girls公司上個月收到了222萬2279美元，而不是它最初希望獲得的100萬美元。
Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance
wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean
achievement.
值得強調的是，波克夏自2012年以來並沒有表現十分出色。但這並不需要十分出色：畢竟，波克夏的獲利只需要打敗收益僅為0.88%的債券，幾乎可以不算是一個巨大的成就。
The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally
weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this
conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur
at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the
charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017
didn’t produce at least $1 million.
賣掉國債買進波克夏股票的唯一的風險是股市在2017年底之前可能會出現大跌。不過Protégé和我覺得這種可能性（總是存在）非常低。有兩個因素決定了這一結論：波克夏在2012年末的價格比較合理及波克夏在5年內幾乎肯定會發生大規模資產積累，這些投資在下賭注前已經確定。即便如此，為了消除轉換帶來的所有風險，如果在2017年底銷售11200股波克夏股票沒有產生至少100萬美元，我同意彌補任何損失。
************
Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption
at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.
投資是一種放棄今天消費並試圖在未來可消費更多的活動。“風險”是這一目標可能無法實現。
By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a longterm
investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would
have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold.
按照這個標準，2012年的“無風險”長期債券是一項長期投資風險遠高於普通股的的投資。那時，即使2012年至2017年的年通貨膨脹率為1%，也會降低Protégé和我所賣出的政府債券的購買力。
I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far
riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio
of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible
multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.
我想我很快會承認，在未來一天、一周甚至一年中，股票的風險都會比短期美國債券風險更大。然而，隨著投資者的投資期限延長，假設股票以相對市場利率更合理的市盈率購買，美國股票的多元化投資組合的風險程度會逐漸低於債券。
It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college
endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds
to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.
對於長期投資者來說，包括養老基金，大學受捐贈基金和儲蓄基金等，比較投資組合中債券與股票的比率來衡量其投資“風險程度”是一個可怕的錯誤觀點。通常，投資組合中的高等級債券會增加風險。
***********
A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet,
the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell
decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would
prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals
and conferred with Wall Street analysts.
我們此次賭博的最後一個教訓是：堅持做出重大而“容易”的決定，並避免過度交易。在這十年裡，200多位對沖基金經理幾乎肯定做出了數以萬計的買賣決定。這些管理者中的大多數人無疑認真考慮了他們的決定，而且他們認為這些決定都是有利的。在投資過程中，他們學習了10-K表格，採訪了管理層，閱讀了貿易期刊，並與華爾街分析師進行交流。
Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment
decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings
(95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years.
與此同時，Protégé和我既不傾向於研究，也不依靠洞察力和才華，我們在這十年中只做了一種投資決定。我們只是簡單地決定以超過100倍收益的價格出售我們的債券投資（售價為95.7/收益為0.88%），即那些“收益”在隨後的五年內不可能增加的債券。
We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security – Berkshire – that, in turn, owned a
diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less
than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy.
我們出售債券是為了將我們的資金轉移到一種單一的證券 - 波克夏的股票中，這一證券擁有一個多元化的堅實業務組合。在留存收益的推動下，波克夏的價值年增長率不大可能低於8%，即使我們在表現平平的經濟環境下也是如此。
After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8%
was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.
在完成這一幼稚園式的分析之後，Protégé和我進行了上述轉換並放鬆下來，我們相信隨著時間的推移，8%肯定會擊敗0.88%，優勢極其明顯。
The Annual Meeting
股東大會
The annual meeting falls on May 5th and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, whose web address is
https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo! will
interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both the
interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.
Our partnership with Yahoo! began in 2016 and shareholders have responded enthusiastically. Last year,
real-time viewership increased 72% to about 3.1 million and replays of short segments totaled 17.1 million.
For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday
to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start
at 9:15 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder
meeting, which usually runs from 15 to 45 minutes. Shopping will end at 4:30.
On Friday, May 4th, our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink will be open from noon until 5 p.m. We added
that extra shopping time in 2015, and serious shoppers love it. Last year about 12,000 people came through the doors
in the five hours we were open on Friday.
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which
products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. (Your Chairman discourages freebies.) Say hello to the many
Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that
salutes all of our companies.
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.
After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our sixth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the
CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your
meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers,
directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; even with Brooks running shoes, our times would be
embarrassing.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from
around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 43% from 2016.
So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%).
This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount
is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your
existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire
products.
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry more than 40 books and DVDs, among
them a couple of new titles. Berkshire shareholders are a bookseller’s dream: When Poor Charlie’s Almanack (yes,
our Charlie) made its debut some years ago, we sold 3,500 copies at the meeting. The book weighed 4.85 pounds. Do
the math: Our shareholders left the building that day carrying about 81⁄2 tons of Charlie’s wisdom.
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the
credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that most airlines
substantially increase prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying
to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 21⁄2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can
save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will
again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make
your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and must also present your meeting
credential. Last year, the one-week volume for the store was a staggering $44.6 million. Bricks and mortar are alive
and well at NFM.
The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that
normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an
exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to
9 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is
hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
NFM will again extend its shareholder’s discount offerings to our Kansas City and Dallas stores. From May
1st through May 7th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such
as brokerage statements) to those NFM stores will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha
store.
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from
6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.
On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter
tells me when we visit the store).
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore,
shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please
identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you
own our stock.
On Sunday afternoon, on the upper level above Borsheims, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg,
two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders. If they suggest wagering on the game,
change the subject. Ajit, Charlie, Bill Gates and I will likely drop by as well.
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met
Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States
in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill
Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.) I
will participate on an advisory basis only.
Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, serving from 12 p.m. until
10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 2nd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated
diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.
We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking
Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail
addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at
loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the
New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting
and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you
keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two
questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned
if your question is asked.)
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the
insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance
operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since
what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions
that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough,
for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as
possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and
for you to have a good time while in Omaha.
All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for
18 from the audience. After the 54th, all questions come from the audience. Charlie and I have often tackled more than
60 by 3:30.
The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m.
on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will
host, so to speak, a drawing.
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe
all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should
also have adequate time to digest and analyze that information before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to
issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a
day that also eases traffic and parking problems).
We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts,
treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of
limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and
as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.
************
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars
who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our
managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of
our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their
paycheck.
If managers (or directors) own Berkshire shares – and many do – it’s from open-market purchases they
have made or because they received shares when they sold their businesses to us. None, however, gets the upside of
ownership without risking the downside. Our directors and managers stand in your shoes.
We continue to have a wonderful group at headquarters. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of
SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 32,700-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,935
state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the
country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and
on.
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy
and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with
the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also
handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered
in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help at the annual meeting in whatever
way they are needed. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.
************
I’ve saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire’s board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors
of Berkshire and also designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg
oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation.
You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and
Berkshire’s blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all.
Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look
forward to your visit.
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 24, 2018
華倫·巴菲特
董事會主席
